treaty has been signed between England, France, and Russia for the
pacification of Greece. A declaration of the decision of the Powers
has been presented to the Porte, and a similar declaration has been
presented to the Greeks. The armistice proposed to each, in these
declarations, has been acceded to by the Greeks, whilst it has been
refused by the Turks. It becomes, therefore, the duty of the allied
naval forces to enter, in the first place, on friendly relations with
the Greeks; and, next, to intercept every supply of men, arms, etc.,
destined against Greece, and coming either from Turkey or Africa in
general. The last measure is that which requires the greatest caution,
and, above all, a complete understanding as to the operations of the
allied naval forces. Most particular care is to be taken that the
measures adopted against the Ottoman navy do not degenerate into
hostilities. The formal intention of the Powers is to interfere as
conciliators, and to establish, in fact, at sea the armistice which the
Porte would not concede as a right. Every hostile proceeding would be
at variance with the pacific ground which they have chosen to take, and
the display of forces which they have assembled is destined to cause
that wish to be respected; but they must not be put into use, unless
the Turks persist in forcing the passages which they have intercepted.
All possible means should be tried, in the first instance, to prevent
the necessity of proceeding to extremities; but the prevention of
supplies, as before mentioned, is to be enforced, if necessary, and
when all other means are exhausted, by cannon shot. In giving you this
instruction as to the duty which I am directed to perform, my intention
is to make you acquainted thoroughly with the object of our Government,
that you may not be taken by surprise as to whatever measures I may
find it necessary to adopt. You will still look to me for further
instructions as to the carrying any such measures into effect.”
On September 11th Sir Edward Codrington, with the _Genoa_
and _Albion_, arrived off Navarino, and beheld the whole of
the expedition from Alexandria at anchor in the harbour, where it
had arrived two days previously. The English squadron hovered off
this place for above a week, awaiting the coming of the allies.
On the 19th September Sir Edward Codrington notified the admiral
commanding the Ottoman force in the port of Navarino that he would
be prevented--by extreme measures, if necessary--from attacking
the Greeks. Notwithstanding, on the 21st a division of the Turkish
expedition got under way, and came out of the harbour. Their intentions
were clear, and the British ships cleared for action. What the issue
of this incident might have been it is difficult to say, had not the
sails of a strange squadron appeared upon the horizon to windward
whilst the English and Turks were still manœuvring near the land. The
vessels turned out to be the French fleet, under Admiral de Rigny, and
whatever might have been the intentions of the commander of the Ottoman
expedition, it retired back into the harbour immediately the strangers
were near enough for the French colours to be visible.
By the arrival of Admiral de Rigny at Navarino, not only was Sir
Edward Codrington’s force largely augmented, but he was relieved of
his isolated and critical responsibility by the certainty of a joint
action in whatever steps might now be taken. The Russian squadron
had not yet appeared; but the British and French admirals at once
commenced proceedings by interviewing Ibrahim Pacha, the commander
of the Turkish forces at Navarino, and clearly impressing upon him
the determination of the allied Courts to carry out the spirit of the
treaty, and the necessity imposed on them (the admirals) to enforce
the armistice referred to in their instructions. The interview was
a long one. Ibrahim said that the admirals must be aware he was a
soldier like themselves, and that it was as imperative for him to obey
orders as for them; that his instructions were to attack Hydra, and
that he must put them into execution, it being for him merely to act
and not to negotiate. The admirals replied that they quite sympathised
with the feelings of a brave man under such circumstances, and that
they congratulated him upon having a force opposed to him which it
was impossible to resist. They reminded him that if he put to sea in
defiance of their amicable warning they must carry their instructions
into execution, and that if he resisted by force the total destruction
of his fleet must follow, which, they added archly and significantly,
was an act of madness the Grand Seignior could not applaud. Amidst
a profusion of Oriental compliments, French politeness, and British
bluntness was this interview between the warlike Turk and the allied
admirals carried on; and, although in conclusion Ibrahim pledged his
word of honour to observe the armistice, yet the actual result of the
long palavar was to leave things very much in the same situation in
which they had been before.
Admiral Codrington’s description of Ibrahim, contained in a letter
written by him to his sister Jane shortly after the interview referred
to, is particularly interesting. After a very graphic description of
the Turkish camp and of Ibrahim’s tent, he proceeds:--“They first began
with the ceremony of introduction, which, as there were a good many
of us on either side, was proportionally long.... At length, however,
I got settled, and began to look around me again.... This tent also
was open, and from his sofa he looked down over the whole harbour,
and really the sight was beautiful, covered as it was by the ships
and boats of all sorts continually passing to and fro. His tent was
_outside_ the walls of Navarin; and, indeed, what force he had
with him appeared to be outside of the town. Altogether, I thought he
had chosen the coolest and most convenient place to pitch his tent in
that could be found. But to return thither. He is a man of about forty
years old, not at all good-looking, but with heavy features, very much
marked with the smallpox, and as fat as a porpoise. Though I had no
opportunity of seeing his height--as he was on his sofa, lying down or
sitting the whole time--I should not think him more than five feet
seven inches. He was, _for a Pacha_, plainly dressed, I think,
particularly as his followers and officers were covered with gold and
embroidery; and, for _a Turk_, I think his manners were very
good indeed. The conversation first began about the weather, and such
common-place things; for I learnt (from the interpreter) he does not
talk of business till _after coffee_.”
[Illustration: ZANTE.]
Ibrahim proved treacherous. He disregarded his own word of honour to
accept the armistice, and there followed a long series of negotiations,
in which the attitude of the allied admirals gradually grew more
threatening and that of the Ottoman leader proportionately defiant.
On the 2nd of October, in the midst of a heavy thunderstorm, the
Turkish fleet boldly put to sea. This was a direct breach of the
parole which had been passed, and the Honourable Captain Spencer, in
the _Talbot_, was instructed to inform the Turkish admiral that
he would not be permitted to proceed, and that if he allowed a single
gun to be fired at the English flag the whole of his fleet would be
destroyed. This message speedily caused the Turks to bring their ships
to the wind, and the second in command, Halhil Bey, came on board
the _Asia_. He admitted that he had been present at Sir Edward
Codrington’s interview with Ibrahim Pacha, when the latter bound
himself in honour not to send any of his fleet out of the port, but
pretended to believe that it had been sanctioned for a Turkish squadron
to go to Patras. The British admiral bluntly informed Halhil that,
having broken their faith with him, he would not trust them henceforth,
and that if they did not put about and return to Navarino he would make
them. This message was accompanied by the _Asia_ firing a gun and
filling her main-topsail; on which the Turkish fleet, by a signal from
their admiral, swung their yards afresh and stood back towards the
harbour.
This little incident confirmed Sir Edward Codrington in his intention
of summarily enforcing the treaty he had been despatched to uphold.
Admiral de Rigny, on his part, showed no less a degree of determination
to maintain the pledge which his nation had conjointly given to the
Greeks. Down to this period, however, the Russians had not appeared
upon the scene; but on the 15th of October their squadron, under
Count Heiden, joined the French and British fleets off Zante. Sir
Edward Codrington, from seniority of rank, was commander-in-chief of
the combined fleet. On the 18th of October the three admirals held a
conference for the purpose of concerting the measures of effecting the
object specified in the Treaty of London--namely, an armistice _de
facto_ between the Turks and Greeks. They considered: “That Ibrahim
Pacha having violated the engagement he entered into with the admirals
on September 25th for a provisional suspension of arms, by causing his
fleet to come out and proceed towards another point in the Morea; that
since the return of the fleet, owing to meeting Admiral Codrington near
Patras, the Pacha’s troops had carried on a warfare more destructive
and exterminating than before, killing women and children, burning
habitations, etc., for completing the devastation of the country; and
that all endeavours to put a stop to these atrocities by persuasion
and conciliation, by representations to the Turkish chiefs, and advice
given to Mehemet Ali have been treated as mockeries, though they could
have been stopped by a word: Therefore the admirals found that there
remained to them only three modes of action:--
“1st. The continuing throughout the whole of the winter a
blockade--difficult, expensive, and perhaps useless, since a storm
might disperse the squadrons, and afford to Ibrahim the facility of
conveying his destroying army to different parts of the Morea and the
islands;
“2nd. The uniting the allied squadrons in Navarin itself, and securing
by this permanent presence the inaction of the Ottoman fleets, but
which mode alone leads to no termination, since the Porte persists in
not changing its system;
“3rd. The proceeding to take a position with the squadrons in Navarin,
in order to renew to Ibrahim propositions which, entering into the
spirit of the Treaty, were evidently to the advantage of the Porte
itself.”
Having taken these three modes into consideration, the admirals
unanimously agreed that the last method was best calculated, without
bloodshed, but simply by the imposing presence of the squadrons, to
produce the desired end. Sir Edward Codrington had a considerable
difficulty to contend with in the jealousy which existed between the
Russian and French admirals, and it called for no small exercise of
tact on his part to maintain harmony in the combined fleet. The allied
force was as follows:--
English: Three line-of-battle ships, four frigates, four brigs, one
cutter.
French: Three line-of-battle ships, one double-banked frigate, one
frigate, two cutters.
Russian: Four line-of-battle ships, four frigates.
In all twenty-four ships of war.
The Ottoman force was as follows:--Three line-of-battle ships,
four double-banked frigates, thirteen frigates, thirty corvettes,
twenty-eight brigs, six fire brigs, five schooners, forty-one
transports.
In all, one hundred and thirty sail of vessels. The Turks had in
addition to this imposing force an army of 35,000 Egyptian troops in
the Morea, of whom 4,000 were on board the transports.
On the 19th of October Admiral Codrington issued his instructions to
his colleagues as to the manner in which the combined fleet was to be
disposed on entering the port of Navarino.
“It appears,” runs the order, “that the Egyptian ships in which the
French officers are embarked are those most to the south-east.[8] It
is, therefore, my wish that his excellency Rear-Admiral Chevalier
de Rigny should place his squadron abreast of them. As the next
in succession appears to be a ship of the line with a flag at the
main, I propose placing the _Asia_ abreast of her, with the _Genoa_
and _Albion_ next to the _Asia_; and I wish that his excellency
Rear-Admiral Count Heiden will have the goodness to place his squadron
next in succession to the British ships of the line. The Russian
frigates in this case can occupy the Turkish ship next in succession to
the Russian ships of the line; the English frigates forming alongside
such Turkish vessels as may be on the western side of the harbour
abreast of the British ships of the line; and the French frigates
forming in the same manner, so as to occupy the Turkish frigates,
etc., abreast of the French ships of the line. If time permits, before
any hostility is committed by the Turkish fleet, the ships are to moor
with springs on the ring of each anchor. No gun is to be fired from the
combined fleet without a signal being made for that purpose, unless
shot be fired from any of the Turkish ships, in which case the ships so
firing are to be destroyed immediately. The corvettes and brigs are,
under the direction of Captain Fellows, of the _Dartmouth_, to remove
the fire vessels into such a position as will prevent their being
able to injure any of the combined fleet. In case of a regular battle
ensuing, and creating any of that confusion which must necessarily
arise out of it, it is to be observed that, in the words of Lord
Nelson, ‘no captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside
that of an enemy.’--Edward Codrington, Vice-Admiral.”
The combined fleet made an attempt to stand into Navarino on the 19th
of October, but the wind was too light and the current too strong to
enable them to effect their purpose. On the following day, however, at
about two o’clock in the afternoon, the allied squadrons passed the
batteries at the entrance to the harbour to take up their anchorage.
The Turkish ships lay moored in the form of a great crescent, with
springs upon their cables, the large ones presenting their broadsides
towards the centre, and the smaller craft filling up the intervals
between them. The allied fleet was formed in the order of sailing in
two columns, the British and French forming the starboard or weather
line, and the Russian the lee column. Sir Edward Codrington, in the
_Asia_, led in, closely followed by the _Genoa_ and _Albion_, and
anchored in succession close alongside a line-of-battle ship flying
the flag of the Capitana Bey, another ship of the line, and one of the
large double-banked frigates, each thus having her proper opponent in
the front line of the enemy’s fleet. The four ships to windward, which
formed a portion of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to Admiral
de Rigny’s vessels; and those to leeward, in the bight or hollow of
the crescent, were to mark the stations of the whole Russian squadron,
the ships of their line covering those of the English line, and being
followed by the frigates of their division.
Admiral Codrington had been very express in his instructions that no
gun should be fired until some act of open hostility was committed
by the Turks, and this order was strictly carried out. The three
English ships were permitted to pass the batteries, and proceeded to
moor in their respective stations with great celerity. But upon the
_Dartmouth_ sending a boat to one of the six fire vessels lying
near the entrance to the harbour, Lieutenant Fitzroy and several seamen
in her were killed by a volley of musketry. This immediately produced a
responsive fire of musketry from the _Dartmouth_ and likewise from
_La Syrène_, the flagship of the French admiral, followed almost
at once by the discharge of a broadside gun from one of the Egyptian
ships, and in a breath almost the action became general.
The _Asia_ was ranged alongside the ship of the Capitana Bey, and
equally close to that of Moharem Bey, the commander of the Egyptian
squadron. As neither of these ships opened upon the British flagship,
notwithstanding the action was raging briskly to windward, Sir Edward
Codrington withheld his fire. No interchange of hostilities between
the vessels took place, therefore, for a considerable while after the
_Asia_ had returned the first volley of the Capitana; and, indeed,
it was evidently the intention of the enemy to try and avoid a regular
battle, for Moharem sent a message that he would not fire at all. Sir
Edward Codrington, equally willing to avert bloodshed, sent the British
pilot, Peter Mitchell, who also acted as interpreter, to Moharem with
a message to the effect that it was no desire of his to proceed to
extreme measures. As the boat went alongside, a discharge of musketry
from the Egyptian ship killed Mitchell, and at the same time she opened
fire upon the _Asia_. Upon this Admiral Codrington opened his
broadside in real earnest, and so furious was the fire from his ship
that in a very little while the ship of the Capitana Bey and that of
Moharem were reduced to total wrecks, and went drifting away to leeward.
The French and Russian squadrons played their part gallantly and well.
“The conduct of my brother admirals, Count Heiden and the Chevalier
de Rigny, throughout,” wrote Sir Edward to the Duke of Clarence,
“was admirable and highly exemplary.” In the British division the
_Genoa_ and _Albion_ took their stations with magnificent precision,
and maintained a most destructive fire throughout the contest. The
_Glasgow_, _Cambrian_, and _Talbot_ followed the example set by the
intrepid Frenchman who commanded the _Armide_, which effectually
destroyed the leading frigate of the enemy’s line and silenced the
batteries ashore. Captain Fellows, in the _Dartmouth_, succeeded in
frustrating the designs of the fireships stationed near the mouth of
the harbour, and preserved the _Syrène_ from being burnt. The battle
was maintained with unabated fury for above four hours, and owing to
the crowded formation of the Ottoman fleet, and the close quarters
at which the allied ships engaged them, the havoc and bloodshed were
prodigious. As the Turkish vessels were one after another disabled,
their crews set them on fire and deserted them, and the lurid scene
was rendered infinitely more terrible and weird by the flaming ships
and incessant explosions among the huddled and shattered craft. The
resistance of the enemy then began to sensibly slacken. By the time
that night had closed down upon the scene, the Turkish fleet was so
crippled as to cease any longer to be a menace to the violation of
the Treaty. “When I found,” wrote Sir Edward Codrington, “that the
boasted Ottoman’s word of honour was made a sacrifice to wanton, savage
destruction, and that a base advantage was taken of our reliance upon
Ibrahim’s good faith, I own I felt a desire to punish the offenders.”
And most terribly punished they were. Never did British arms bear part
in a more complete and decisive victory. When the dusk of the Oriental
evening, obscured into a pall-like gloom by the dense banks of smoke,
descended over the terrific spectacle, the enemy’s cannonade had grown
feeble and scattered, and presently ceased altogether. Their vessels
continued to blaze and to explode. Out of the proud fleet which in
the noontide of that day had floated serenely upon the blue waters of
Navarin harbour sixty ships were totally destroyed, and the remainder
driven ashore in a shattered condition, with the exception of the
_Leone_, four corvettes, six brigs, and four schooners, which remained
afloat after the battle. The carnage was frightful. According to the
statistics furnished by Monsieur Letellier, the French instructor
to the Egyptian navy, to Commander Richards, of the _Pelorus_, the
enemy’s losses amounted to 3,000 killed and 1,109 wounded. The defeat,
indeed, practically amounted to annihilation. At ten o’clock on the
night of the battle, Sir Edward Codrington was writing an account of
the victory to his wife: “Well, my dear, the Turks have fought, and
fought well too, and we have annihilated their fleet. We have lost poor
Smith, Captain Bell, R.M., and many good men.... I am entirely unhurt,
but the _Asia_ is quite a wreck, having had her full allowance of the
work.” The admiral, however, had a succession of marvellous escapes,
and, indeed, almost seems to have borne a charmed life throughout the
battle. Mr. Lewis, the boatswain of the _Asia_, while speaking to him
early in the action, was struck dead. Mr. Smith, the master, was also
shot down whilst talking with him. Sir Edward was a tall man, and in
his uniform must have made a conspicuous figure upon the _Asia’s_ deck.
Instead of his cocked hat he wore a round hat, which afforded better
shade to his eyes; this was pierced in two places by bullet-holes. His
coat-sleeve, which chanced to be rather loose, had two bullet-holes
in it just above the wrist. A ball struck the watch in his fob and
shivered it, but left him uninjured. Tahir Pacha afterwards admitted to
Mr. Kerigan, on board the _Blonde_, that he himself posted a company of
riflemen to aim at the British admiral and shoot him if they could.
[Illustration: Battle of NAVARINO.]
The combined fleets quitted the harbour of Navarino on the 25th of
October, having tarried awhile, unmolested, to repair damages. They
were suffered to depart by the Turks without the firing of a single
shot, although it had been quite expected that the batteries would open
upon them as they passed the harbour mouth. On the 3rd of November they
arrived at Malta. Here they spent some considerable time in refitting.
For his services Sir Edward Codrington received the Grand Cross of the
Bath; the King of France conferred upon him the Grand Cross of the
Military Order of St. Louis; and the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, in
an autograph letter, bestowed upon him the rare honour of wearing the
second class of the Military Order of St. George.
[Illustration: “THE BATTLE WAS MAINTAINED WITH UNABATED
FURY FOR ABOVE FOUR HOURS” (_p._ 368).]