not fall far short of 40,000 men; and General Roberts, reluctantly
compelled to abandon for the time any further offensive efforts,
determined to withdraw the troops from all isolated positions and
to concentrate his whole force within the protection of the Sherpur
cantonment. The orders issued to Baker and Macpherson, gradually to
retire into the cantonment, were executed with skill and steadiness.
Macpherson coolly marched through Deh Afghan, his baggage sent on
in front under a guard. Jenkins’ evacuation of the Asmai position
was conspicuously adroit. Baker held a covering position until all
the other details had steadily made good their retirement, and he
was the last to withdraw. By dusk the whole British force was safely
concentrated within the cantonment, and the period of the defensive
had begun. The casualties of the day were serious--35 killed and
107 wounded. During the week of fighting the little force had lost
altogether, in officers and men, 83 killed and 192 wounded.
Although overlarge for its garrison, the Sherpur cantonment possessed
many of the features of a strong defensive position. On the southern
and western faces the massive and continuous enceinte made it
impregnable against any force unprovided with siege artillery; but on
the eastern face the incomplete wall was low, and the northern line of
defence on the Behmaroo heights was defective until strengthened by
a series of blockhouses supporting a continuous entrenchment studded
with batteries. The space between the north-western bastion and the
heights was closed by an entrenchment supported by a laager of Afghan
gun-carriages and limbers; the open space on the north-eastern angle
was similarly fortified; the unfinished eastern wall was heightened by
built-up tiers of logs, and its front, as elsewhere, was covered with
_abattis_ wire entanglements, and other obstacles. The enceinte
was divided into sections, to each of which was assigned a commanding
officer with a specified detail of troops; and a strong brigade of
European infantry was under the command of Brigadier-General Baker,
ready at short notice to reinforce any threatened point. Before the
enemy cut the telegraph wire, in the early morning of the 15th,
Sir Frederick Roberts had informed the authorities in India of his
situation and need for reinforcement.
During the 15th and 16th the Afghan troops were busily engaged in
sacking the Hindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters of Cabul, in looting and
wrecking the houses of chiefs and townsfolk who had shown friendliness
to the British, and in fiercely quarrelling among themselves over
the spoil. On the 17th and 18th they made sundry ostentatious
demonstrations against Sherpur, but these were never formidable.
Although they made themselves troublesome with some perseverance during
the daytime, they consistently refrained from night-attacks, to which
ordinarily the Afghan hillmen are much addicted. There never was any
investment of Sherpur, nor indeed any approximation to an investment.
The Afghan offensive was not dangerous, but annoying and wearisome. It
was pushed, it was true, with some resolution on the 18th, when several
thousand men poured out of the city, and skirmished forward under a
cover of the gardens and enclosures on the plain between Cabul and the
cantonment. Some of the more adventurous were able to get within four
hundred paces from the enceinte, but could make no further headway,
although they long maintained a brisk fire. The return fire was chiefly
restricted to volleys directed on those few of the enemy who offered
a sure mark by exposing themselves; and shell-fire was chiefly used
to drive the Afghan skirmishers from their cover in the gardens and
enclosures. On the morning of the 19th it was found that in the night
they had occupied the Meer Akhor fort, a few hundred yards in front
of the eastern face of the enceinte. Baker went out on the errand of
destroying it, with 880 bayonets, two guns, and a party of sappers. In
the approach through the mist, a sudden volley struck down several men,
and Lieutenant Montenaro, of the mounted battery, was mortally wounded.
The fort was heavily shelled, its garrison was driven out, and it was
blown up.
For the moment circumstances had enforced on Roberts the wisdom of
accepting the defensive attitude, but he nevertheless knew himself
the virtual master of the situation. He had but one anxiety--the
apprehension lest the Afghans should not harden their hearts to deliver
a real assault on his position. That apprehension was not long to
give him concern. On the 20th the enemy took strong possession of
the Mahomed Shereeff fort on the southern face of Sherpur; and they
maintained themselves there during the two following days against the
fire of siege guns mounted on the bastions of the enceinte. On the
21st and 22nd large numbers of Afghans quitted the city, and passing
eastward behind the Siah Sung heights, took possession in great force
of the forts and villages outside the eastern face of Sherpur, which
should have been destroyed previously. On the afternoon of the 22nd a
spy brought in the intelligence that Mahomed Jan and his brother chief
had resolved to assault the cantonment early on the following morning.
His tidings were true; and the spy was even able to communicate the
details of the plan of attack. The 2,000 men who were holding the
King’s Garden and the Mahomed Shereeff post had been equipped with
scaling-ladders, and were to make a false attack, which might become
a real one, against the western section of the front. The principal
assault, however, was to be made against the eastern face of the
Behmaroo village, unquestionably the weakest part of the defensive
position. The 23rd was the last day of the Mohurrum--the great
Mahomedan religious festival--when fanaticism would be at its height;
and further to stimulate that incentive to valour, the Mushk-i-Alum was
his holy self to kindle the beacon fire on the Asmai height which would
be the signal to the faithful to rush to the attack.
The information proved perfectly accurate. All night long the shouts
and chants of the Afghans filled the air. Purposeful silence reigned
throughout the cantonment. In the darkness the soldiers mustered and
quietly fell into their places. The officers commanding sections of the
defence made their dispositions. The reserves were silently standing to
their arms. Every eye was toward the Asmai height, shrouded still in
the gloom of the night. A long tongue of flame shot up into the air,
blazed brilliantly for a few moments, and then waned. At the signal
a fierce fire opened from before one of the gateways of the southern
face, the flashes indicating that the marksmen were plying their rifles
within two hundred yards of the enceinte. The bullets sped harmlessly
over the defenders sheltered behind the parapet, and in the dusk of the
dawn reprisals were not attempted. But this outburst of powder-burning
against the southern face was a mere incident. What men listened
for and watched for was the development of the true assault on the
eastern end of the great parallelogram. The section-commanders there
were General Hugh Gough, in charge of the eastern end of the Behmaroo
heights, and Colonel Jenkins from the village down past the native
hospitals to the bastion at the south-eastern corner. The defending
troops were the Guides from Behmaroo to the hospital, in which were
100 Punjaubees; and beyond to the bastion the 67th reinforced by two
companies of the 92nd. From beyond Behmaroo and the eastern trenches
and walls as day broke, there came a roar of voices so loud and
menacing that it seemed as if an army 50,000 strong was charging down
on our thin line of men. Led by Ghazees, the main body of Afghans,
who had been hidden in the villages and orchards on the east side of
Sherpur, rushed out in one dense horde, and every throat was filling
the air with shouts of “Allah-il-Allah!” The roar surged forward as the
line advanced, but it was answered by such a roll of musketry that it
was drowned for the moment, and then merged into the general turmoil of
sound that told our men with Martinis and Sniders were holding their
own against the assailants.
[Illustration: NORTH END OF SHERPUR ENTRENCHMENTS, CABUL.]
[Illustration: “THE ROAR SURGED FORWARD” (_p._
243).]
When the first attack was made the morning was so dark and misty
that the outlook from the trenches was restricted, and the order
to the troops was to hold their fire until the enemy should be
distinctly visible. The Punjaubee detachment in the hospital opened
fire prematurely, and presently the Guides, holding Behmaroo and
the trenches on the slopes, followed the example, and sweeping with
their fire the terrain in front of them broke the force of the attack
when its leaders were still several hundred yards away. Between the
hospital and the corner bastion, the men of the 67th and 92nd awaited
with impassive discipline the word of permission to begin firing. From
out the mist at length emerged dense masses of men, some of whom were
brandishing swords and knives, while others loaded and fired when
hurrying forward. The order to fire was not given until the leading
Ghazees were within eighty yards, and the mass of assailants not more
than two hundred. Heavily struck by volley on volley, they recoiled,
but soon gathered courage to come on again; and for several hours
there was sharp fighting, repeated efforts being made to carry the low
eastern wall. So resolute were the Afghans that more than once they
reached the _abattis_, but each time they were driven back with
heavy loss. About ten o’clock there was a lull, and it seemed that the
attacking force was owning the frustration of its attempts; but an
hour later there was a partial recrudescence of the fighting, and the
assailants once more came on. The attack, however, was not pushed with
much vigour, and was soon beaten down, but the Afghans still maintained
a threatening attitude, and the fire from the defences was ineffectual
to dislodge them. The General then determined to take them in flank,
and with this intention sent out into the open through the Behmaroo
gorge four field-guns escorted by a cavalry regiment. Bending to the
right, the guns came into action on the Afghan right flank, and the
counterstroke had an immediate effect. The enemy wavered, and soon
were in full retreat. The Kohistanee contingent, some 5,000 strong,
cut loose and marched away northward with obvious recognition that
the game was up. The fugitives were scourged with artillery and rifle
fire; and Massy led out the cavalry, swept the plain, and drove the
lingering Afghans from the slopes of Siah Sung. The false attacks on
the southern face from the King’s Garden and the Mahomed Shereef fort
never made any head. Those positions were steadily shelled until late
in the afternoon, when they were finally evacuated, and by nightfall
all the villages and enclosures between Sherpur and Cabul were entirely
deserted. Some of these had been destroyed by sappers from the
garrison during the afternoon, in the course of which operation two
gallant Engineer officers, Captain Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, were
unfortunately killed by the premature explosion of a mine.
Mahomed Jan had been as good as his word: he had delivered his stroke
against Sherpur; and that stroke had utterly failed. With its failure
came promptly the collapse of the national rising. Before daybreak
of the 24th the formidable combination, which had included all the
fighting elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan, and under whose banners
it was believed that more than 100,000 armed men had mustered, was
no more. Not only had it broken up--it had disappeared. Neither in
the city itself nor in the adjacent villages, nor on the surrounding
heights, was a tribesman to be seen. So hurried had been the Afghan
dispersal that the dead were left to lie unburied where they had
fallen. His nine days on the defensive had cost Sir Frederick Roberts
singularly little in casualties: his losses were eighteen killed and
sixty-eight wounded. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded, from first
to last of the rising, was reckoned to be not under 3,000.
On the 24th the cavalry rode far and fast in pursuit of the fugitives,
but they overtook none, such haste had the fleeing Afghans made.
On the same day Cabul and the Balla Hissar were reoccupied, and
General Hills resumed his functions as military governor of the city,
_vice_ the old moulla Mushk-i-Alum, departed precipitately to
regions unknown. Cabul had the aspect of having undergone a siege at
the hands of an enemy; the bazaars were broken up and deserted. After
making a few examples, the General issued a proclamation of amnesty,
excluding therefrom only five of the principal leaders and fomenters
of the recent rising. This policy of conciliation bore good fruit; and
a durbar was held on January 9th, 1880, at which were present about
300 sirdars, chiefs, and headmen from the various provinces. Although
the country remained disturbed, there were no more outbreaks. Cabul
and Sherpur were strongly fortified, military roads were made, and
all cover and obstructions for the space of 1,000 yards outside the
enceinte of Sherpur were swept away. In March the Cabul force had
increased to a strength of about 11,500 men and twenty-six guns; and
General Roberts formed it into two divisions, one of which he himself
commanded, the other being commanded by Major-General John Ross.
On 2nd May, Sir Donald Stewart arrived at Cabul from Candahar, and
took over from Sir Frederick Roberts the command in North-Eastern
Afghanistan.
[Illustration:
[_Photo., Lock & Whitfield. Regent St., W._
SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS IN 1880.]
[Illustration:
CUSTOZZA.
_By A. Hilliard Atteridge._]
When Nicholas Nickleby suggested to Mr. Vincent Crummles that the
“terrific broadsword combat” on his stage would look better if the two
adversaries were more of a size, the veteran manager replied that the
remark showed how little he knew about the business. What the public
really liked to see was the little fellow getting the better of the
big one. And Mr. Crummles was right. Most men have a “weakness for the
weaker side,” and if there is one thing they like better to see than a
fair and even fight, it is the spectacle of a victory won by skill and
pluck against superior strength. Such was the victory that splendid old
soldier the Archduke Albert of Austria won at Custozza during the brief
campaign of Northern Italy in 1866.
As it happened, it was--so far as tangible results were concerned--a
barren success. The prize that was fought for was the possession of
Venice and its territory; and by the course of events this went to
Italy at the close of the war, notwithstanding her defeats by land and
sea. But for all that, Custozza and Lissa were a solid gain to Austria,
for they enabled her to yield to fate without losing heart and hope for
the future. Broken as her power was on the wider field of the struggle
with Prussia, she could yet trust to sailors of the stamp of Tegethoff,
soldiers like the Archduke Albert, to secure for her the respect even
of the victors, and to ensure that before long she would again be a
factor to be reckoned with in the councils of Europe.
The Archduke Albert was the son of a famous soldier, the Archduke
Charles, who was one of the most formidable opponents of the Great
Napoleon, and who by the victory of Aspern brought him within sight of
ruin many years before Waterloo was fought and won. The Archduke Albert
had distinguished himself in the campaigns of Italy in 1848 and 1849,
taking part in more than one hard-fought action on the very ground
which he held in 1866. When, in that year, Italy began to prepare to
take the field against Austria as the ally of Prussia, the Government
at Vienna concentrated the bulk of its forces on the northern frontiers
of the empire to meet the more formidable attack that was threatened
from Berlin, and the Archduke was left to hold Venetia against the
Italians with very inferior forces. It was this marked inferiority that
gave special interest to his successful campaign against the great
armies that were marshalled against him.
At the end of the month of May the Italians had concentrated a main
army of 140,000 men in Lombardy, and a second force of about 60,000
between Ferrara and Bologna in the Romagna. The army in Lombardy
was commanded nominally by the King, Victor Emmanuel; really by his
chief of the staff, the veteran General La Marmora, the same who had
commanded the Sardinian contingent in the Crimea. The army was divided
into three corps under Durando, Cucchiari, and Della Rocca. The King’s
eldest son, Prince Humbert, then Crown Prince and now King of Italy,
commanded a division in Della Rocca’s corps. His brother, Prince
Amadeo, afterwards King of Spain, commanded a brigade of Grenadiers
in the first corps. This army was destined to cross the little river
Mincio, which formed the boundary between Lombardy and Venetia, thus
attacking the Austrians in front; while the second army of 60,000 men
under Cialdini would be in a position to cross the lower course of the
Po, and fall upon their flank. On the left of the royal army Garibaldi
was assembling a third force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men, with
which he was to invade the Tyrol.
To meet these three armies--amounting in all to at least 235,000
men--the Archduke Albert had nominally at his disposal a force of
135,000. Thus he had a majority of 100,000 against him at the very
outset, but even this does not represent the whole deficiency. First
he had to detach 12,000 men for the defence of the Tyrol. These
were expected to be able to deal with Garibaldi’s 30,000 or 40,000
volunteers; 12,000 more were assigned to the defence of Istria and the
neighbourhood of Trieste and Pola, where, considering the strength
of Italy on the sea, there was supposed to be some danger of a naval
descent; 40,000 were employed in the garrisons of the Quadrilateral
(Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Legnago) and in the fortresses of Rovigo
and Venice; finally 6,000 had to be left to guard his communications
with Austria. This reduced the field army to a little over 60,000 men,
and with these he had to meet the 200,000 of Italy.
The Italians had divided their forces, and the Archduke saw that his
best chance of success would lie in an attempt to deal with one of
their armies before the other could come to its assistance. In order
to do this it would be necessary from the very outset to conceal his
own position and movements, and be fully informed of those of his
opponents. Therefore, concentrating his army in a central position
behind the Adige, a little to the east of Verona, a point from which
he could move either against the King or against Cialdini, he left
only a screen of cavalry outposts along the Mincio, between Peschiera
and Mantua, and along the north bank of the Po, opposite Ferrara. Once
war was declared they allowed no one to pass the frontier in either
direction, and even before that only those few privileged persons who
had obtained a special passport from the Austrian military authorities
were allowed to cross.
[Illustration:
SKETCH MAP
OF THE
SEAT OF WAR IN ITALY
1866.]
The cavalry scouts and vedettes did their work to perfection. They
prevented the Italians from obtaining any information as to the plans
or movements of the Archduke, and they kept him well informed as to all
that was going on upon the Lombard shore of the Mincio. The Archduke
had in the last few days before the declaration of war made up his mind
to attack the King’s army. If Victor Emmanuel crossed the Mincio he
would fall upon him on the ground between that river and the Adige; or
if the Italians remained in Lombardy he intended himself to cross the
Mincio, trusting to be able to defeat them, and then return in time to
deal with Cialdini. In both cases he would have the advantage of being
able to make one or other of the four fortresses of the Quadrilateral
the base of his attack. On June 20th he received notice that war had
been declared. On the same day he had reports from his cavalry outposts
to the effect that both the Italian armies were preparing to advance.
From the westward the King’s army was closing in upon various points
on the Mincio, and to the southward Cialdini was collecting material
to construct bridges across the Po at Francolinetto, and had actually
occupied an island in the middle of the wide stream at that point. The
Archduke remained quiet near Verona for nearly two days longer. His
plan was to lull his enemy into a false sense of security, and then
strike swiftly and sharply. All the bridges on the Mincio were left
standing, and the screen of cavalry posts received orders not to oppose
the Italians seriously at any point when they tried to cross. When
the invaders entered Venetia the Austrian horsemen were to fall back
before them, to do as little fighting as possible, but never to lose
sight of them.
On Thursday, June 22nd, the royal army of Italy was concentrated on
the right or Lombard bank of the Mincio. At Monzambano the engineers
were at work constructing bridges. At Valeggio and Goito the cavalry
of De Sonnaz was ready to seize the existing bridges as soon as the
word was given to advance. In the grey of the early morning of Friday
they crossed the river at both points. The Austrian cavalry, under
Colonel Pulz, fell back without firing a shot. Avoiding the hills that
lie northward towards the Garda lake, Pulz retired across the level
ground of the plain of Villafranca. The plain is thickly populated.
There are numerous villages and hamlets, and plenty of roads,
footpaths, and tracks; but it is difficult country to manœuvre in, for
everywhere the ground is cut up with small watercourses and irrigation
channels--hedgerows, orchards, and plantations restrict the view.
Along the course of the streams are swampy rice-fields, and on every
stretch of sloping ground there are thickly-planted vineyards. Pulz was
able to make the Italians very slow and cautious in their advance. It
was the afternoon before he retired from Villafranca, and behind the
little country town he made a stand with his horsemen and a battery
of artillery; and though he again retreated after a short skirmish,
the result was that the Italian cavalry of De Sonnaz did not push
their explorations any further that day. They reported to the royal
headquarters that the Austrians had no force between the Adige and the
Mincio beyond a couple of regiments of cavalry and a battery of horse
artillery; and this confirmed La Marmora in his idea that the Archduke
would be compelled by his inferior numbers to remain on the defensive
near Verona.
[Illustration: VERONA.]
All day the Italian army had been pouring across the bridges of the
Mincio, and advancing by the hot, sandy roads--the right into the plain
of Villafranca, the left towards the low hills that border it on the
northward, stretching from the lake of Garda to Custozza and Somma
Campagna. General La Marmora was confident of victory. He was occupying
the very ground where the allied armies of France and Italy had stayed
their onward march in 1859. He was going to take up the work of
conquest where Napoleon III. had left off, and he hoped to complete it
by entering Venice as a victor. North and south and away to his front
lay the famed fortresses of the Quadrilateral, the keys of Northern
Italy; but their garrisons were cowering behind the ramparts, and doing
nothing to disturb his movements.
On the Saturday night about half the Italian army was across the
river, and the rest was close up to the bridges, ready to follow in
the morning. The troops were to be moving by 3.30 a.m., and La Marmora
had issued orders for an advance upon Verona. The right was to move by
the plain of Villafranca to the hills round Somma Campagna; the left
was to enter the hill country, more directly marching from Monzambano
and Valeggio on Castelnuovo and Sona. The object of the movement was
to occupy the mass of hills to the south-east of the lake of Garda,
cut off Peschiera from Verona, and threaten the positions held by the
Archduke near that fortress.