POLITICAL DECADENCE UNDER SPAIN
Though the seven Northern provinces could be considered as definitely
lost after the failure of Farnese's last attempt to reconquer them, the
Spanish Netherlands still included, at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, the three duchies of Brabant, Limburg (with its dependencies
beyond the Meuse, Daelhem, Fauquemont and Rolduc), Luxemburg and a
small part of Gelder with Ruremonde; four counties, Flanders, Artois,
Hainault and Namur, and the two seigneuries of Malines and Tournai.
When, in 1715, the Southern Netherlands passed under Austrian
sovereignty, they had lost Maestricht and part of Northern Limburg,
Northern Brabant, Zeeland Flanders, Walloon Flanders and Artois, and
various small enclaves, most of their fortified towns being further
obliged to receive foreign garrisons, maintained at the expense of the
State. Antwerp remained closed, and the efforts made during the first
years of the seventeenth century to restore the economic situation
through industrial and agricultural activity were practically
annihilated by incessant wars.
This situation was evidently caused by the weakness of Spain, which,
though clinging to its Northern possessions, did not possess the means
to defend them against the ambition of European Powers, more especially
France. It was due also to the policy of the United Provinces, who
considered Belgium as a mere buffer State which they could use for
their own protection and whose ruin, through the closing of Antwerp,
was one of the conditions of their own prosperity. Up to the War of the
Spanish Succession, England played a less prominent part in the various
conflicts affecting the Southern Netherlands, but she succeeded, on
several occasions, in checking the annexationist projects of France,
whose presence along the Belgian coast was a far greater danger than
that of a weak and impoverished Spain.
[_WEAKNESS OF BELGIUM_]
There is no better illustration of the paramount importance of a strong
and independent Belgium to the peace of Europe than the series of wars
which followed each other in such rapid succession during the
seventeenth century. It is true that, in nearly every instance, the new
situation created in the Netherlands cannot be given as the direct
cause of these various conflicts, resulting from territorial ambitions,
dynastic susceptibilities and even, as in the case of the Thirty Years'
War, from circumstances quite independent of those prevalent on the
Meuse and the Scheldt. But, whatever the nominal cause of these wars
may have been, they certainly acquired a more widespread character from
the fact that the Spanish Netherlands lay as an easy prey at the mercy
of the invader and constituted a kind of open arena where European
armies could meet and carry on their contests on enemy ground. It is
not a mere chance that the separation of the Southern and Northern
provinces coincided with a remarkable recrudescence of the warlike
spirit all over Europe. The contrast between the fifteenth century,
when the Seventeen Provinces constituted a powerful State under the
dukes of Burgundy, and the seventeenth, when the greater part of it was
ruined and undefended, at the mercy of foreign invasion, is
particularly enlightening. All through the Middle Ages first Flanders,
later the Burgundian Netherlands, had exerted their sobering and
regulating influence between France, on one side, and England or
Germany on the other. The Belgian princes were directly interested in
maintaining peace, and, in most cases, only went to war when their
independence, and incidentally the peace of Europe, was threatened by
the increasing ambition of one of their neighbours. The system of
alliances concluded with this object could not possibly prevent
conflicts, but it certainly limited their scope and preserved Europe
from general conflagration, the combination of the Netherlands with one
Power being usually enough to keep a third Power in order. The
weakening of the Southern provinces under Spanish rule thus caused an
irreparable gap in the most sensitive and dangerous spot on the
political map of Europe. Triple and Quadruple Alliances were entered
into and inaugurated the system of Grand Alliances which was henceforth
to characterize almost every European conflict and increase on such a
large scale the numbers of opposed forces and the devastations
accompanying their warlike operations.
[_DUTCH POLICY_]
It may be said that the United Provinces might have played the part
formerly filled by the Burgundian Netherlands and the county of
Flanders, but, in spite of their amazing maritime expansion and of the
prosperity of their trade, they did not enjoy the same military
prestige on land. Besides, they did not care to undertake such a heavy
responsibility, and pursued most of the time a narrowly self-centred
policy. Though they had some excellent opportunities of reconstituting
the unity of the Low Countries, and though some of their statesmen
contemplated such a step, the United Provinces never embarked upon a
definite policy of reconstitution. They played for safety first and
were far too wary to sacrifice solid material advantages for a
problematic European prestige. Unification would have meant the
reopening of the Scheldt and the resurrection of Antwerp, whose rivalry
was always dreaded by the Northern ports. It would have meant the
admission of a far more numerous population on an equal footing, with
religious freedom, to the privileges of the Republic. It would have
implied the sacrifice of an extraordinarily strong strategic situation
and the risks involved by the defence of weak and extended frontiers.
The maintenance of a weak buffer State, as a glacis against any attacks
from the South, seemed far more advantageous, especially if its
fortified positions were garrisoned with Dutch forces. It gave all the
same strategic advantages which unification might have given, without
any of its risks and inconveniences. "It is far better," wrote a Dutch
Grand Pensioner, at the time, "to defend oneself in Brussels or Antwerp
than in Breda or Dordrecht." Such an attitude was perfectly justified
as long as Holland did not claim the advantages attached to the
position of a moderating central Power and ask for the reward without
having taken the risks.
We have seen how, in 1632, the delegates of the States General were met
at The Hague with the proposal of the creation of a Federative Catholic
Republic under the tutelage of France and Holland. This project,
already entertained in 1602 by the Grand Pensioner Oldenbarneveldt, was
very much favoured by Cardinal Richelieu, who, in 1634, signed a secret
convention with the United Provinces, according to which such a
proposal would be made to the people of the Southern Netherlands. In
the event of their refusing this arrangement, the country would be
divided among the two allies, following a line running from
Blankenberghe to Luxemburg. If we remember the attitude of the Belgians
at the time of the Conspiracy of the Nobles, led by the Count of Bergh
(1632), such a refusal must have been anticipated, so that the proposal
amounted really to a project of partition. This project would anyhow
have been opposed by England, since, according to the Dutch diplomat
Grotius, Charles I "would not admit" the presence of France on the
Flemish coast.
In 1635 a formal and public alliance was declared between the United
Provinces and France, and war broke out once more between Spain and the
confederates. The operations which followed form part of the fourth
phase of the Thirty Years' War, but we are only concerned here with
their result with regard to the Netherlands. While the Dutch took Breda
and concentrated near Maestricht, the French advanced through the
Southern provinces towards Limburg, where they made their junction
with their allies to proceed against Brussels. The Belgians had not
answered the Franco-Batavian manifesto, inviting them to rebel, and
gave whatever help they could to their Spanish governor, the Cardinal
Infant Ferdinand. Students co-operated in the defence of Louvain, and
the people showed the greatest loyalty during the campaign. They knew
by now that they had very little good to expect from a Franco-Dutch
protectorate and that even the shadow of independence they were allowed
to preserve under the Spanish regime would be taken from them.
Powerless to reconquer full independence, they preferred a weak rule
which secured for them at least religious liberty to the strong rule of
those whom they considered as foreigners and as enemies to their
country.
[_RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN_]
Operations were pursued with alternating success until 1642, when
Mazarin succeeded Richelieu as French Prime Minister. Mazarin favoured
a more radical solution of the Netherlands difficulty. He persuaded
Louis XIV that the possession of the left bank of the Rhine was
essential to the safety of the kingdom, and aimed at the total
annexation of the Belgian Provinces. The negotiations begun in that
direction met with Dutch and English opposition and the curt refusal of
Spain to renounce her rights on her Northern possessions. This new
attitude of France brought about a rapprochement between Spain and the
United Provinces, who began to fear Louis XIV's ambitious schemes. The
two countries settled their difficulties by the treaty of Muenster
(1648), while, after a new series of defeats, culminating, in 1658, in
the Battle of the Dunes, won by Turenne against Don Juan, Philip IV
was finally obliged to submit to the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659).
The Dutch plenipotentiaries had practically a free hand in the settling
of the Muenster treaty. They acquired all the territories they claimed,
and they only claimed the territories they wanted and which they
already held. Their choice was dictated neither by territorial ambition
nor by the desire to realize the unity of the Netherlands. They
obtained, of course, the official recognition of their full
independence and the maintenance of the closing of the Scheldt and of
its dependencies. The annexation of Zeeland Flanders, henceforth known
as Flanders of the States, ensured their position on the left bank of
the stream, that of North Brabant with Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda and
Bois-le-Duc, ensured the protection of their central provinces, while
Maestricht, together with Fauquemont, Daelhem and Rolduc, secured their
position on the Meuse. These were purely strategic annexations,
prompted by strategic motives and by the desire to keep a firm hold on
some key positions from which the United Provinces could check any
attack, either from Spain or from France, with the least effort.
By the treaty of the Pyrenees Philip IV abandoned to France the whole
of Artois and a series of fortified positions in Southern Flanders,
Hainault, Namur and Luxemburg. These latter demands were prompted by an
evident desire to extend French territory towards the Netherlands and
to obtain a position which should afford a good starting-point for such
extension.
The treaties of Muenster and of the Pyrenees had, broadly speaking,
determined the new status of the Southern provinces, considerably
diminished to comply with the wishes and the interests of the United
Provinces and of France. This status was not considerably altered by
the succession of wars which took place during the second half of the
seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth, and which
ended by the substitution of Austrian for Spanish rule. It was,
however, considered as provisional by Louis XIV, whose territorial
ambitions extended far beyond Walloon Flanders, and, before obtaining
the right to live within her new frontiers, Belgium had still to
undergo the ordeal of five devastating wars.
Illustration: PROCLAMATION OF THE PEACE OF MUENSTER IN FRONT OF
THE ANTWERP TOWN HALL.
From an old print (1648).
[_PROJECTS OF PARTITION_]
At the time of the death of Philip IV (1665), the Southern provinces,
impoverished and inadequately defended, were an easy prey to foreign
territorial greed. The Dutch Grand Pensioner De Witt returned to the
old plan of 1634, whereby Holland and France should agree to the
constitution of a protected buffer State, and, in case this proposal
should not meet with the support of the States, to a partition along a
line extending from Ostend to Maestricht. Holland and England, however,
were soon to realize that no compromise was possible with France and
that their safety required prompt joint action.
The Roi-Soleil would not agree to recognize the right of the new King
of Spain, Charles II, to the Southern Netherlands. A few years before,
King Louis had married Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV,
and his legal advisers made a pretext of the non-payment of her dowry
and of a custom prevalent in some parts of Brabant, according to which
the children of a first marriage were favoured ("devolution"), to
claim this part of the Spanish succession. The King's troops entered
the Netherlands in 1667, without meeting with any serious opposition,
and hostilities only came to an end when, after concluding a hasty
peace and enlisting the support of Sweden, the United Provinces and
England concluded the Triple Alliance (1668). By the treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle, France nevertheless obtained the fortified towns of
Bergues, Furnes, Armentieres, Courtrai, Lille, Oudenarde, Tournai, Ath,
Douai, Binche and Charleroi, strengthening her position still further
on the borders of Walloon Flanders and in Hainault. The allies
understood by then that Louis's ambitions threatened their very
existence. When the French resumed hostilities, four years later, a
revolution took place in Holland which overthrew De Witt in favour of
William III of Orange, who was hereafter the strongest opponent of
French policy. Charles II of England took an equally strong attitude,
following the traditional English policy of not allowing the French to
obtain a hold on the Flemish coast. Addressing Parliament, a few years
later, he declared that England could not admit "that even one town
like Ostend should fall into French hands, and could not tolerate that
even only forty French soldiers should occupy such a position, just
opposite the mouth of the Thames." William had therefore no difficulty
in constituting a powerful alliance, including, besides the United
Provinces and England, Spain, Germany and Denmark. In face of such
opposition, Louis was finally compelled to sign the treaty of Nymegen,
which restored to Spain some of the advanced positions obtained by the
treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, but confirmed the loss of Walloon Flanders
and Southern Hainault.
After a few years, however, seeing the alliance broken off and his
enemies otherwise engaged, the King of France assumed a more and more
aggressive attitude and encroached so much on the rights of Spain that
Charles II was finally compelled to resist his pretensions. Luxemburg
was the only town which offered any serious resistance; everywhere else
French armies pursued their methods of terrorism, bombarded the towns
and ravaged the country. The Truce of Ratisbon, concluded in 1684 for
twenty years, added Chimay, Beaumont and Luxemburg to the French
spoils.
[_THE AUGSBURG LEAGUE_]
William III, alarmed by this progress, succeeded in enlisting the
support of the Emperor Leopold I, the King of Spain, the King of Sweden
and the Duke of Savoy. A new League against France was founded in
Augsburg (1686). When, two years later, William succeeded in
supplanting James II on the throne of England, this country entered the
League and a new conflict became inevitable. Belgium was not directly
interested in it, and, as on former occasions, served as the
battleground of foreign armies. In spite of the series of victories won
by the French general, the Marshal of Luxemburg, at Fleurus (1690),
Steenkerque (1692) and Neerwinden (1693), William III always succeeded
in reconstituting his army. Two years later, he retook Namur, in spite
of Marshal de Villeroi's attack on Brussels, during which the capital
was bombarded for two days (August 13th to 15th) with red-hot bullets,
over four thousand houses, including those of the Grand' Place, being
destroyed by fire. The peace of Ryswyck, September 20, 1697, gave back
to Spain the advanced fortresses annexed by the two previous treaties,
William being definitely recognized as King of England.
The personal union between the two countries reacted somewhat on
British policy in the Netherlands, this country taking a far more
important share in the last period of the struggle against Louis XIV.
Up till then, England had been content with checking France's
encroachments in Flanders and maintaining the balance of power in
Europe. The closer relationships with the United Provinces, during the
reigns of William and Mary and of Queen Anne, involved England in
further responsibilities and even induced her to impose, for a short
time, an Anglo-Dutch protectorate on the Belgian provinces. This
attitude was made more apparent by Marlborough's personal ambitions
concerning the governorship of the Southern provinces, but the failure
of these projects and the prompt return to traditional policy, after
the treaty of Utrecht, only makes more apparent the general territorial
disinterestedness of this country concerning the Netherlands.
[_MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS_]
Charles II of Spain had died in 1700, leaving all his possessions and
the crown of Spain to Philip, Duke of Anjou, the second grandson of
Louis XIV, thus depriving of his hopes of the succession Archduke
Charles, son of the Emperor Leopold I, who stood in exactly the same
relation to the deceased monarch. The emperor at once sought the
support of the United Provinces, which, however, hesitated to reopen
hostilities. The Spanish governor in Belgium was then Maximilian
Emmanuel of Bavaria, who harboured the project of restoring the
Southern provinces to their former prosperity and of becoming the
sovereign of the new State, with or without a Spanish protectorate.
French agents at his court encouraged his plan and so lured him by
false promises that, in 1701, he allowed French troops to enter Belgium
unopposed and to establish themselves in the principal towns. The Grand
Alliance, including the same partners as the Augsburg League, was at
once re-formed, in spite of the death, in 1702, of William, and the
Duke of Marlborough was placed at the head of the allied troops. During
the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, operations were
purely defensive in the Netherlands, owing specially to the anxiety of
the Dutch not to risk any offensive which might have left a gap for the
enemy's attacks. It was not until 1706 that Marlborough was able to
break through the enemy's defences at Ramillies, near Tirlemont. This
victory was followed by a French retreat, and the Belgians expected to
be placed at once under the rule of Charles III, the other claimant of
the Spanish crown, instead of which the Council of State, summoned in
Brussels, was subjected to the orders of an Anglo-Batavian Conference,
which had no legitimate right to rule the country. The Council
protested, upon several occasions, and the exactions of the allies, who
had been first hailed as deliverers, caused such indignation in the
provinces that some towns, such as Ghent, opened their gates to the
French. The defeat of Louis XIV was, however, consummated at Oudenarde
(1708) and Malplaquet (1709). The French forces had been so
considerably reduced that, had Louis's openings for peace been met at
the time, the integrity of the Southern provinces might have been
restored. The Allies were, however, rather indifferent to such
advantages, since it became more and more evident that, owing to
Anglo-Dutch rivalries, they could not reap any direct benefit from
them, and the Netherlands would finally have to be restored to Charles
III, who, at the death of the emperor, in 1710, succeeded his brother
under the name of Charles VI. The Whig Party had fallen from power in
England in the previous year, and Marlborough, no longer supported at
home, could not undertake any further operations. Under these
conditions negotiations became possible, and the result was not so
damaging to the prestige of France as might have been expected. By the
treaty of Utrecht (1713) the Southern Netherlands were transferred to
the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs as a compensation for its loss of
the Spanish crown. Louis restored Tournai, and a portion of West
Flanders beyond the Yser including Furnes and Ypres, but Artois,
Walloon Flanders, the south of Hainault and of Luxemburg remained
French.
[_TREATY OF UTRECHT_]
From the point of view of the Netherlands, the treaties of Rastadt and
of Baden (1714) were merely the ratification, by the emperor and by the
Holy Roman Empire, of the clauses of the treaty of Utrecht. But the
treaty of Antwerp, or of the Barriers, concluded the next year, between
Austria and the United Provinces, included new stipulations practically
placing the new Austrian Netherlands under the tutelage of Holland and
still increasing her territorial encroachments. This was the outcome of
previous conventions concluded between England and the United Provinces
and according to which the latter were promised, beside some
territorial advantages, the possession of a certain number of fortified
towns "in order that they should serve as a barrier of safety to the
States General" (1705). If, at Utrecht, the British had obtained new
possessions in Canada, at Antwerp the Dutch claimed their share of
advantages and exacted from Charles VI the price of their services.
Namur, Tournai, Menin, Ypres, Warneton, Furnes, Knocke and Termonde
were to be the fixed points of the Barrier where the United Provinces
might keep their troops at the expense of the Belgian provinces.
Further advantages were obtained in Zeeland Flanders and on the Meuse
by the annexation of Venloo, Stevensweert and Montfort. The
fortifications of Liege, Huy and Ghent were to be razed and the Dutch
had further the right to flood certain parts of the country if they
considered it necessary for defence. The Scheldt, of course, remained
closed, since, according to Article XXVI, "the trade of the Austrian
Netherlands and everything depending on it would be on the same footing
as that established by the treaty of Muenster, which was confirmed."
The treaty of the Barriers marked the lowest ebb of Belgian
nationality. During the protracted war which preceded it, complete
anarchy reigned, imperialists, the allied conference, Maximilian
Emmanuel and the French administering various parts of the country. The
great nation raised in the heart of Europe by the dukes of Burgundy
seemed practically annihilated, but the people had retained, in spite
of all reverses and tribulations, the memory of their past, and, from
the very depth of their misery, evolved a new strength and reasserted
their right to live, in spite of the attitude of all European Powers,
which seemed, at the time, to consider their nationality as
non-existent.
"We are reduced to the last extremity," wrote the States of Brabant to
Charles II in 1691, "we are exhausted to the last substance by long and
costly wars, and we can only present your Majesty with our infirmities,
our wounds and our cries of sorrow."
Illustration: BELGIUM UNDER THE RULE OF THE EMPERORS OF AUSTRIA.