the 13th instant. It was owing to the confidence I placed in your
judgment and zeal for your country, that I intrusted to you the
propositions of the two Imperial Courts, and requested that you would
make such observations as you might think them susceptible of. Things
are not yet sufficiently advanced to admit of communicating them to
the two mediating Courts. As you have seen in the sketch of our
answer, there are preliminaries to be adjusted with respect to the
United States, and until they are adjusted you cannot appear, and
consequently you cannot transact anything officially with respect to
the two mediators. By so doing you would hazard and expose the dignity
of the character with which you are invested.
I have the honor to be, &c.
DE VERGENNES.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 18th, 1781.
Sir,
I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to
write me this day. I assure your Excellency, I never had a thought of
appearing upon the scene, or of taking ministerially or otherwise any
step towards the two mediators. I must confess to your Excellency that
I have too many jealousies of the motives, and too many apprehensions
of the consequences of this negotiation to be willing to take any part
in it, without an express vocation. The English are tottering on such
a precipice, and are in such a temper, that they will not hesitate at
any measure, which they think can move every latent passion, and
awaken every dormant interest in Europe, in order to embroil all the
world. Without looking much to consequences, or weighing whether the
quarrels they wish to excite will be serviceable to them or not, they
seem to think the more confusion they can make the better; for which
reason my fears from the proposed mediation are greater than my hopes.
Nevertheless, if properly called upon, it will be my duty to attend to
every step of it; but there are many questions arise in my mind, upon
which in due time I should wish to know your Excellency's opinion.
The two Imperial Courts have proposed, that there should be an
American Representative at the Congress. This is not merely by
implication, but expressly acknowledging, that there is a belligerent
power in America, of sufficient importance to be taken notice of by
them and the other powers of Europe. One would think after this, that
the two Imperial Courts would have communicated their propositions to
Congress. The propositions they have made and communicated to the
Courts of France, Spain and England, imply that America is a Power, a
free and Independent Power, as much as if they had communicated them
also to Congress at Philadelphia. Without such a formal communication
and an invitation to the United States in Congress, or to their
Representative here by the two Imperial Courts, I do not see how an
American Minister can with strict propriety appear at the proposed
Congress at Vienna at all. I have never heard it intimated, that they
have transmitted their propositions to Philadelphia; certainly I have
received no instructions from thence, nor have I received any
intimation of such propositions from any Minister of either of the
mediating Courts, although as my mission has been long public and much
talked of, I suppose it was well known to both that there was a person
in Europe vested by America with power to make peace.
It seems, therefore, that one step more might have been taken,
perfectly consistent with the first, and that it may yet be taken, and
that it is but reasonable to expect that it will be. How is the
American Minister to know that there is a Congress, and that it is
expected that he should repair to it? And that any Minister from Great
Britain will meet him there? Is the British Court, or their
Ambassador, to give him notice? This seems less probable, than that
the mediators should do it.
The dignity of North America does not consist in diplomatic
ceremonials, or any of the subtleties of etiquette; it consists solely
in reason, justice, truth, the rights of mankind, and the interests of
the nations of Europe; all of which well understood, are clearly in
her favor. I shall therefore never make unnecessary difficulties on
the score of etiquette, and shall never insist upon anything of this
sort, which your Excellency or some other Minister of our allies does
not advise me to as indispensable; and therefore I shall certainly go
to Vienna or elsewhere, if your Excellency should invite or advise me
to go. But as these reflections occurred to me upon the point of
propriety, I thought it my duty to mention them to your Excellency.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 19th, 1781.
Sir,
In my letter of the 18th, I had the honor to mention some things,
which lay upon my mind; but still I am apprehensive, that in a former
letter, I have not conveyed my full meaning to your Excellency.
In my letter of the 16th, I submitted to your Excellency's opinion and
advice, whether an American Minister could appear at the Congress at
Vienna, without having his character acknowledged by any power, more
expressly than it is now. This was said upon the supposition, and
taking it for granted, that it was the intention of the mediating
Courts to admit a representative of the United States to the Congress,
with such a commission and such a title as the United States should
think fit to give him, and that during his whole residence and
negotiations at Vienna, whether they should terminate in peace or not,
he should enjoy all the prerogatives, which the law of nations has
annexed to the character, person, habitation, and attendants of such a
Minister. It is impossible that there should be a treaty at Vienna
between Great Britain and the people of America, whether they are
called United States or American Colonies, unless both nations appear
there by representatives, who must be authorised by commissions or
full powers, which must be mutually exchanged, and consequently
admitted to be, what upon the face of them they purport to be. The
commission from the United States for making peace, which has been in
Europe almost two years, is that of a Minister Plenipotentiary, and it
authorises him to treat only with Ministers vested with equal powers.
If he were to appear at Vienna, he would certainly assume the title
and character of a Minister Plenipotentiary, and could enter into no
treaty or conference with any Minister from Great Britain, until they
had mutually exchanged authentic copies of their full powers. This it
is true, would be an implied acknowledgment of his character and
title, and of those of the United States too; but such an
acknowledgment is indispensable, because without it there can be no
treaty at all. In consequence he would expect to enjoy all the
prerogatives of that character, and the moment they should be denied
him, he must quit the Congress, let the consequences be what they
might.
And I rely upon it, this is the intention of the two Imperial Courts;
because otherwise, they would have proposed the Congress upon the
basis of the two British preliminaries, a rupture of the treaty with
France, and a return of the Americans to their submission to Great
Britain; and because I cannot suppose it possible, that the Imperial
Courts could believe the Americans capable of such infinite baseness,
as to appear upon the stage of the universe, acknowledge themselves
guilty of rebellion, and supplicate for grace; nor can I suppose they
meant to fix a brand of disgrace upon the Americans in the sight of
all nations, or to pronounce judgment against them; one or all of
which suppositions must be made, before it can be believed, that these
Courts did not mean to protect the American Representative in the
enjoyment of the privileges attached to the character he must assume;
and because, otherwise, all their propositions would be to no effect,
for no Congress at Vienna can make either the one or the other of the
two proposed peaces, without the United States. But upon looking over
again the words of the first article, there seems to be room for
dispute, of which a British Minister, in the present state of his
country, would be capable of taking advantage. The terms used seems to
be justly exceptionable. There are no "American Colonies" at war with
Great Britain. The power at war is the United States of America. No
American Colonies have any Representative in Europe, unless Nova
Scotia or Quebec, or some of the West India Islands, may have an agent
in London. The word Colony, in its usual acceptation, implies a
metropolis, a mother country, a superior political Governor, ideas
which the United States have long since renounced forever.
I am therefore clear in my opinion, that a more explicit declaration
ought to be insisted on, and that no American Representative ought to
appear, without an express assurance, that while the Congress lasts,
and in going to it, and returning from it, he shall be considered as a
Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, and
entitled to all the prerogatives of such a Minister from a sovereign
power. The Congress might be to him and to his country but a snare,
unless the substance of this is _bona fide_ intended, and if it is
intended, there can be no sufficient reason for declining to express
it in words.
If there is a Power upon earth, that imagines that America will ever
appear at a Congress, before a Minister of Great Britain, or any other
power in the character of repenting subjects, soliciting an amnesty,
or a warranty of an amnesty, that Power is infinitely deceived. There
are few Americans who would hold their lives upon such terms. I know
of none who would not rather choose to appear upon a scaffold in their
own country, or in Great Britain. All such odious ideas ought to be
laid aside by the British Ministry, before they propose mediations.
The bare mention of such a thing to the United States by Great Britain
would be considered only as another repetition of injury and insult.
The proposal of a rupture of the treaty is little less to France. But
it is possible, that in the future course of this negotiation, there
may be a proposal of a Congress of Ministers of the several mediating
and belligerent powers, exclusive of the United States, to deliberate
on the question, in what character the United States are to be
considered, whether a Representative of the people of North America
can be admitted, and what shall be his title and privileges.
All that I can say to this case at present is this. The United States
have assumed their equal station among the nations. They have assumed
a sovereignty, which they acknowledge to hold only from God and their
own swords. They can be represented only as a sovereign; and,
therefore, although they might not be able to prevent it, they can
never consent that any of these things shall be made questions. To
give their consent, would be to make the surrender of their
sovereignty their own act.
France has acknowledged all these things, and bound her honor and
faith to the support of them, and, therefore, although she might not
be able to prevent it, she can never consent that they should be
disputed. Her consent would make the surrender of the American
sovereignty her act. And what end can it answer to dispute them,
unless it be to extend the flames of war? If Great Britain had a color
of reason for pretending, that France's acknowledgment of American
independence was a hostility against her, the United States would have
a stronger reason to say, that a denial of their sovereignty was a
declaration of war against them. And as France is bound to support
their sovereignty, she would have reason to say, that a denial of it
is a hostility against her. If any power of Europe has an inclination
to join England, and declare war against France and the United States,
there is no need of a previous Congress to enable her to do it with
more solemnity, or to furnish her with plausible pretexts. But on the
other hand, if the powers of Europe are persuaded of the justice of
the American pretensions, and think it their duty to humanity to
endeavor to bring about peace, they may easily propose, that the
character of the United States shall be acknowledged, and their
Minister admitted.
I cannot but persuade myself, that the two Imperial Courts are
convinced of the justice of the American cause, of the stability of
the American sovereignty, and of the propriety and necessity of an
acknowledgment of it by all the powers of Europe. This, I think, may
be fairly and conclusively inferred from the propositions themselves.
Was there ever an example of a Congress of the powers of Europe to
exhort, to influence, to overawe the rebellious subjects of any one of
them into obedience? Is not every sovereign adequate to the
government, punishment, or pardon of its own criminal subjects? Would
it not be a precedent mischievous to mankind, and tending to universal
despotism, if a sovereign, which has been proved to be unequal to the
reformation or chastisement of the pretended crimes of its own
subjects, should be countenanced in calling in the aid of all or any
of the other powers of Europe to assist them? It is quite sufficient,
that England has already been permitted to hire twenty thousand German
troops, and to have the number annually recruited for seven years, in
addition to her own whole force; it is quite sufficient, that she has
been permitted to seduce innumerable tribes of savages, in addition to
both, to assist her in propagating her system of tyranny, and
committing her butcheries in America, without being able to succeed.
After all this, which is notorious to all Europe, it is impossible to
believe, that the Imperial Courts mean to give their influence in any
degree towards bringing America to submission to Great Britain. It
seems to me, therefore, most certain, that the Imperial Courts
perceive, that American independence must be acknowledged; and if this
is so, I think there can be no objection against ascertaining the
character of the American Minister before any Congress meets, so that
he may take his place in it as soon as it opens.
But if any sentiments of delicacy should induce those Courts to think
it necessary to wait for Great Britain to set the example of such
acknowledgment, one would think it necessary to wait until that power
shall discover some symptoms of an inclination that way. A Congress
would have no tendency, that I know of, to give her such a
disposition; on the contrary, a Congress in which Great Britain should
be represented, and France and the United States not, would only give
her an opportunity of forming parties, propagating prejudices and
partial notions, and blowing up the coals of war.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 21st, 1781.
Sir,
Since my letter of the 19th, another point has occurred to me, upon
which it seems necessary, that I should say something to your
Excellency, before my departure for Holland, which will be on Monday
morning.
An idea has, I perceive, been suggested of the several States of
America choosing agents separately to attend the Congress at Vienna,
in order to make peace with Great Britain; so that there would be
thirteen instead of one. The constitution of the United States, or
their confederation, which has been solemnly adopted and ratified by
each of them, has been officially and authentically notified to their
Majesties, the Kings of France and Spain, and to their High
Mightinesses, the States-General of the United Provinces of the Low
Countries, and communicated to all the Courts and nations of the
world, as far as all the gazettes of Europe are able to spread it; so
that it is now as well and universally known as any constitution of
government in Europe. By this constitution, all power and authority of
negotiating with foreign powers is expressly delegated to the United
States in Congress assembled. It would, therefore, be a public
disrespect and contempt offered to the constitution of the nation, if
any power should make any application whatever to the Governors, or
Legislature of the separate States. In this respect, the American
Constitution is very different from the Batavian. If the two Imperial
Courts should address their articles to the States separately, no
Governor or President of any one of those Commonwealths could even
communicate it to the Legislature. No President of a Senate could lay
it before the body over which he presides. No Speaker of a House of
Representatives could read it to the House. It would be an error, and
a misdemeanor in any one of these officers to receive and communicate
any such letter. All that he could do would be, after breaking the
seal and reading it, to send it back. He could not even legally
transmit it to Congress. If such an application, therefore, should be
made and sent back, it would consume much time to no purpose, and
perhaps have other worse effects.
There is no method for the Courts of Europe to convey anything to the
people of America but through the Congress of the United States, nor
any way of negotiating with them but by means of that body. I must,
therefore, entreat your Excellency, that the idea of summoning
Ministers from the thirteen States may not be countenanced at all.
I know very well, that if each State had in the confederation reserved
to itself a right of negotiating with foreign powers, and such an
application should have been made to them separately upon this
occasion, they would all of them separately refer it to Congress,
because the people universally know and are well agreed, that all
connexions with foreign countries must, in their circumstances, be
made under one direction.
But all these things were very minutely considered in framing the
confederation, by which the people of each State have taken away from
themselves even the right of deliberating and debating upon these
affairs, unless they should be referred to them by Congress for their
advice, or unless they should think proper to instruct their delegates
in Congress of their own accord.
This matter may not appear to your Excellency in so important a light
as it does to me, and the thought of such an application to the United
States may not have been seriously entertained; but as it has been
mentioned, although only in a way of transient speculation, I thought
I could not excuse myself from saying something upon it, because I
know it would be considered in so unfavorable a light in America; that
I am persuaded Congress would think themselves bound to remonstrate
against it in the most solemn manner.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Amsterdam, July 21st, 1781.
Sir,
From the Hague, there is an article of the following tenor.
"As to the affair of the Field Marechal, the Duke of Brunswick, which
makes an object of deliberation in the Assemblies of the Provinces,
one sees in public a copy of the opinion of the Quarter of Westergo,
(one of the four Chambers which form the States of Friesland,) in
which it is joined by four Manors or Intendancies of the Quarter of
Sevenwonde, which have protested against the opinion of the plurality
of their Chamber; this opinion is of the following tenor."
"The Quarter having examined with all due attention the memorial,
presented by the Duke to their High Mightinesses, is of opinion, that
the paragraphs of the memorial, remitted to his Highness in the name
of the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, of which the said Lord the Duke
complains, contain not the least thing by which the Lord the Duke may
be considered to have been any way hurt in his character; but rather,
that the paragraphs or complaints contained in the said Memorial,
exhibit an accusation against the Duke in his quality of Counsellor of
his Highness, and that they express the sentiments of the people,
which the gentlemen, the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, have infused into
the breast of our well beloved hereditary Stadtholder; by means of
which, they have manifested an evident proof of their sincere
attachment to his Highness and to his illustrious House. The Quarter
is therefore of opinion, that in case the Lord Duke thinks himself
aggrieved by the Burgomasters of Amsterdam, he ought to address
himself to their ordinary and competent judge, seeing that this
Assembly of their High Mightinesses is not a competent judge in this
matter; and that, therefore, it is proper to charge the gentlemen, the
Deputies in the Assembly of the States-General, not to enter into any
deliberations upon this matter."
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Amsterdam, August 3d, 1781.
Sir,
I have the honor to enclose copies of some papers, which passed
between the Count de Vergennes and me, lately at Paris. The
conjecture, that the British Court would insist upon their two
preliminaries, is become more probable by the publication of the
King's speech at the prorogation of Parliament.
"The zeal and ardor, which you have shown for the honor of my Crown,"
says the King, "your firm and steady support of a just cause, and the
great efforts you have made to enable me to surmount all the
difficulties of this extensive and complicated war, must convince the
world, that the ancient spirit of the British nation is not abated or
diminished.
"While I lament the continuance of the present troubles, and the
extension of the war, I have the conscious satisfaction to reflect,
that the constant aim of all my counsels has been to bring back my
deluded subjects in America to the happiness and liberty they formerly
enjoyed, and to see the tranquillity of Europe restored.
"To defend the dominions, and to maintain the rights of this country,
was on my part the sole cause, and is the object of the war. Peace is
the earnest wish of my heart, but I have too firm a reliance on the
spirit and resources of the nation, the powerful assistance of my
Parliament, and _the protection of a just and all ruling Providence_,
to accept it upon any other terms or conditions than such as may
consist with the honor and dignity of my Crown, and the permanent
interest and security of my people."
We all know very well what his meaning is when he mentions "the honor
and dignity of his Crown, and the permanent interest and security of
his people." Could the Minister who composed this speech expect that
anybody would believe him when he said, that the constant aim of all
his counsels had been to bring back the Americans to the happiness and
liberty they formerly enjoyed?
The whole of this speech is in a strain, which leaves no room to doubt
that the cabinet of St James is yet resolved to persevere in the war
to the last extremity, and to insist still upon the return of America
to British obedience, and upon the rupture of the treaty with France,
as preliminaries to the Congress at Vienna. Thus the two Imperial
Courts will find themselves trifled with by the British. It is not to
be supposed that either will be the voluntary bubble of such trickish
policy. The Empress of Russia is supposed to be as sagacious as she is
spirited; yet she seems to have given some attention to the pacific
professions of the English. If she could see herself intentionally
deceived, she will not probably be very patient.