CHAPTER II (p. 101)

SECRETARY OF STATE AND PRESIDENT

From the capitals of Russia and Great Britain to the capital of the

United States was a striking change. Washington, in its early struggle

for existence, was so unattractive a spot, that foreigners must have

been at a loss to discover the principle which had governed the

selection. It combined all the ugliness with all the discomfort of an

unprosperous frontier settlement on an ill-chosen site. What must

European diplomats have thought of a capital city where snakes two

feet long invaded gentlemen's drawing-rooms, and a carriage, bringing

home the guests from a ball, could be upset by the impenetrable depth

of quagmire at the very door of a foreign minister's residence. A

description of the city given by Mr. Mills, a Representative from

Massachusetts, in 1815, is pathetic in its unutterable horror:--

"It is impossible [he writes] for me to describe to you my

feelings on entering this miserable desert, this scene of

desolation and horror.... My anticipations were almost (p. 102)

infinitely short of the reality, and I can truly say that the

first appearance of this seat of the national government has

produced in me nothing but absolute loathing and disgust."

If the place wore such a dreadful aspect to the simple denizen of a

New England country town, what must it have seemed to those who were

familiar with London and Paris? To them the social life must have been

scarcely less dreary than the rest of the surroundings. Accordingly,

with this change of scene, the Diary, so long a record of festivities

sometimes dull and formal, but generally collecting interesting and

distinguished persons, ceases almost wholly to refer to topics of

society. Yet, of course, even the foul streets could not prevent

people from occasionally meeting together. There were simple

tea-drinkings, stupid weekly dinners at the President's, infrequent

receptions by Mrs. Monroe, card-parties and conversation-parties,

which at the British minister's were very "elegant," and at the French

minister's were more gay. Mons. de Neuville, at his dinners, used to

puzzle and astound the plain-living Yankees by serving dishes of

"turkeys without bones, and puddings in the form of fowls, fresh cod

disguised like a salad, and celery like oysters;" further, he

scandalized some and demoralized others by having dancing on (p. 103)

Saturday evenings, which the New England ladies had been "educated to

consider as holy time." Mr. and Mrs. Adams used to give weekly parties

on Tuesday evenings, and apparently many persons stood not a little in

awe of these entertainments and of the givers of them, by reason of

their superior familiarity with the manners and customs of the best

society of Europe. Mrs. Adams was, "on the whole, a very pleasant and

agreeable woman; but the Secretary [had] no talent to entertain a

mixed company, either by conversation or manners;" thus writes this

same Mr. Mills, whose sentiments towards Mr. Adams were those of

respect rather than of personal liking. The favorite dissipation then

consisted in card-playing, and the stakes were too often out of all

just proportion to the assets of the gamesters. At one time Mr. Clay

was reputed to have lost $8,000, an amount so considerable for him as

to weigh upon his mind to the manifest detriment of his public

functions. But sometimes the gentlemen resident in the capital met for

purposes less innocent than Saturday evening cotillons, or even than

extravagant betting at the card-table, and stirred the dulness of

society by a duel. Mr. Adams tells of one affair of this sort, fought

between ex-Senator Mason, of Virginia, and his cousin, wherein the

weapons used were muskets, and the distance was only six paces. (p. 104)

Mason was killed; his cousin was wounded, and only by a lucky

accident escaped with his life. Mr. Adams had little time and less

taste for either the amusements or the dangers thus offered to him; he

preferred to go to bed in good season, to get up often long before

daybreak, and to labor assiduously the livelong day. His favorite

exercise was swimming in the Potomac, where he accomplished feats

which would have been extraordinary for a young and athletic man.

The most important, perplexing, and time-consuming duties then called

for by the condition of public affairs happened to fall within Mr.

Adams's department. Monroe's administration has been christened the

"era of good feeling;" and, so far as political divisions among the

people at large were concerned, this description is correct enough.

There were no great questions of public policy dividing the nation.

There could hardly be said to be two political parties. With the close

of the war the malcontent Federalists had lost the only substantial

principle upon which they had been able vigorously to oppose the

administration, and as a natural consequence the party rapidly shrank

to insignificant proportions, and became of hardly more importance

than were the Jacobites in England after their last hopes had (p. 105)

been quenched by the failure of the Rebellion of '45. The Federalist

faith, like Jacobitism, lingered in a few neighborhoods, and was

maintained by a few old families, who managed to associate it with a

sense of their own pride and dignity; but as an effective opposition

or influential party organization it was effete, and no successor was

rising out of its ruins. In a broad way, therefore, there was

political harmony to a very remarkable degree.

But among individuals there was by no means a prevailing good feeling.

Not held together by the pressure exerted by the antagonism of a

strong hostile force, the prominent men of the Cabinet and in Congress

were busily employed in promoting their own individual interests.

Having no great issues with which to identify themselves, and upon

which they could openly and honorably contend for the approval of the

nation, their only means for securing their respective private ends

lay in secretly overreaching and supplanting each other. Infinite

skill was exerted by each to inveigle his rival into an unpopular

position or a compromising light. By a series of precedents Mr. Adams,

as Secretary of State, appeared most prominent as a candidate for the

succession to the Presidency. But Mr. Crawford, in the Treasury

Department, had been very near obtaining the nomination instead (p. 106)

of Monroe, and he was firmly resolved to secure it so soon as Mr.

Monroe's eight years should have elapsed. He, therefore, finding much

leisure left upon his hands by the not very exacting business of his

office, devoted his ingenuity to devising schemes for injuring the

prestige of Mr. Adams. Mr. Clay also had been greatly disappointed

that he had not been summoned to be Secretary of State, and so made

heir apparent. His personal enmity was naturally towards Mr. Monroe;

his political enmity necessarily also included Mr. Adams, whose

appointment he had privately sought to prevent. He therefore at once

set himself assiduously to oppose and thwart the administration, and

to make it unsuccessful and unpopular. That Clay was in the main and

upon all weighty questions an honest statesman and a real patriot must

be admitted, but just at this period no national crisis called his

nobler qualities into action, and his course was largely influenced by

selfish considerations. It was not long before Mr. Calhoun also

entered the lists, though in a manner less discreditable to himself,

personally, than were the resources of Crawford and Clay. The daily

narrations and comments of Mr. Adams display and explain in a manner

highly instructive, if not altogether agreeable, the ambitions (p. 107)

and the manoeuvres, the hollow alliances and unworthy intrigues, not

only of these three, but also of many other estimable gentlemen then

in political life. The difference between those days and our own seems

not so great as the _laudatores temporis acti_ are wont to proclaim

it. The elaborate machinery which has since been constructed was then

unknown; rivals relied chiefly upon their own astuteness and the aid

of a few personal friends and adherents for carrying on contests and

attaining ends which are now sought by vastly more complex methods.

What the stage-coach of that period was to the railroads of to-day, or

what the hand-loom was to our great cotton mills, such also was the

political intriguing of cabinet ministers, senators, and

representatives to our present party machinery. But the temper was no

better, honor was no keener, the sense of public duty was little more

disinterested then than now. One finds no serious traces of vulgar

financial dishonesty recorded in these pages, in which Mr. Adams has

handed down the political life of the second and third decades of our

century with a photographic accuracy. But one does not see a much

higher level of faithfulness to ideal standards in political life than

now exists.

[Illustration: Wm. H. Crawford.]

As has been said, it so happened that in Mr. Monroe's (p. 108)

administration the heaviest burden of labor and responsibility rested

upon Mr. Adams; the most important and most perplexing questions fell

within his department. Domestic breaches had been healed, but foreign

breaches gaped with threatening jaws. War with Spain seemed imminent.

Her South American colonies were then waging their contest for

independence, and naturally looked to the late successful rebels of

the northern continent for acts of neighborly sympathy and good

fellowship. Their efforts to obtain official recognition and the

exchange of ministers with the United States were eager and persistent.

Privateers fitted out at Baltimore gave the State Department scarcely

less cause for anxiety than the shipbuilders of Liverpool gave to the

English Cabinet in 1863-64. These perplexities, as is well known,

caused the passage of the first "Neutrality Act," which first

formulated and has since served to establish the principle of

international obligation in such matters, and has been the basis of

all subsequent legislation upon the subject not only in this country

but also in Great Britain.

The European powers, impelled by a natural distaste for rebellion by

colonists, and also believing that Spain would in time prevail over

the insurgents, turned a deaf ear to South American agents. But in the

United States it was different. Here it was anticipated that the (p. 109)

revolted communities were destined to win; Mr. Adams records this as

his own opinion; besides which there was also a natural sympathy felt

by our people in such a conflict in their own quarter of the globe.

Nevertheless, in many anxious cabinet discussions, the President and

the Secretary of State established the policy of reserve and caution.

Rebels against an established government are like plaintiffs in

litigation; the burden of proof is upon them, and the neutral nations

who are a sort of quasi-jurors must not commit themselves to a

decision prematurely. The grave and inevitable difficulties besetting

the administration in this matter were seriously enhanced by the

conduct of Mr. Clay. Seeking nothing so eagerly as an opportunity to

harass the government, he could have found none more to his taste than

this question of South American recognition. His enthusiastic and

rhetorical temperament rejoiced in such a topic for his luxuriant

oratory, and he lauded freedom and abused the administration with a

force of expression far from gratifying to the responsible heads of

government in their troublesome task.

Apart from these matters the United States had direct disputes of a

threatening character pending with Spain concerning the boundaries of

Louisiana. Naturally enough boundary lines in the half explored (p. 110)

wilderness of this vast continent were not then marked with that

indisputable accuracy which many generations and much bloodshed had

achieved in Europe; and of all uncertain boundaries that of Louisiana

was the most so. Area enough to make two or three States, more or

less, might or might not be included therein. Such doubts had proved a

ready source of quarrel, which could hardly be assuaged by General

Jackson marching about in unquestionable Spanish territory, seizing

towns and hanging people after his lawless, ignorant, energetic

fashion. Mr. Adams's chief labor, therefore, was by no means of a

promising character, being nothing less difficult than to conclude a

treaty between enraged Spain and the rapacious United States, where

there was so much wrong and so much right on both sides, and such a

wide obscure realm of doubt between the two that an amicable agreement

might well seem not only beyond expectation but beyond hope.

Many and various also were the incidental obstacles in Mr. Adams's

way. Not the least lay in the ability of Don Onis, the Spanish

Minister, an ambassador well selected for his important task and whom

the American thus described:--

"Cold, calculating, wily, always commanding his own temper, (p. 111)

proud because he is a Spaniard, but supple and cunning,

accommodating the tone of his pretensions precisely to the degree

of endurance of his opponent, bold and overbearing to the utmost

extent to which it is tolerated, careless of what he asserts or

how grossly it is proved to be unfounded, his morality appears to

be that of the Jesuits as exposed by Pascal. He is laborious,

vigilant, and ever attentive to his duties; a man of business and

of the world."

Fortunately this so dangerous negotiator was hardly less anxious than

Mr. Adams to conclude a treaty. Yet he, too, had his grave difficulties

to encounter. Spanish arrogance had not declined with the decline of

Spanish strength, and the concessions demanded from that ancient

monarchy by the upstart republic seemed at once exasperating and

humiliating. The career of Jackson in Florida, while it exposed the

weakness of Spain, also sorely wounded her pride. Nor could the

grandees, three thousand miles away, form so accurate an opinion of

the true condition and prospects of affairs as could Don Onis upon

this side of the water. One day, begging Mr. Adams to meet him upon a

question of boundary, "he insisted much upon the infinite pains he had

taken to prevail upon his government to come to terms of accommodation,"

and pathetically declared that "the King's Council was composed (p. 112)

of such ignorant and stupid _nigauds_, grandees of Spain, and priests,"

that Mr. Adams "could have no conception of their obstinacy and

imbecility."

Other difficulties in Mr. Adams's way were such as ought not to have

been encountered. The only substantial concession which he was willing

to make was in accepting the Sabine instead of the Rio del Norte as

the southwestern boundary of Louisiana. But no sooner did rumors of

this possible yielding get abroad than he was notified that Mr. Clay

"would take ground against" any treaty embodying it. From Mr. Crawford

a more dangerous and insidious policy was to be feared. Presumably he

would be well pleased either to see Mr. Adams fail altogether in the

negotiation, or to see him conclude a treaty which would be in some

essential feature odious to the people.

"That all his conduct [wrote Mr. Adams] is governed by his views

to the Presidency, as the ultimate successor to Mr. Monroe, and

that his hopes depend upon a result unfavorable to the success or

at least to the popularity of the Administration, is perfectly

clear.... His talent is intrigue. And as it is in the foreign

affairs that the success or failure of the Administration will be

most conspicuous, and as their success would promote the

reputation and influence, and their failure would lead to (p. 113)

the disgrace of the Secretary of State, Crawford's personal

views centre in the ill-success of the Administration in its

foreign relations; and, perhaps unconscious of his own motives,

he will always be impelled to throw obstacles in its way, and to

bring upon the Department of State especially any feeling of

public dissatisfaction that he can, ... and although himself a

member of the Administration, he perceives every day more clearly

that his only prospect of success hereafter depends upon the

failure of the Administration by measures of which he must take

care to make known his disapprobation."

President Monroe was profoundly anxious for the consummation of the

treaty, and though for a time he was in perfect accord with Mr. Adams,

yet as the Spanish minister gradually drew nearer and nearer to a full

compliance with the American demands, Monroe began to fear that the

Secretary would carry his unyielding habit too far, and by insistence

upon extreme points which might well enough be given up, would allow

the country to drift into war.

Fortunately, as it turned out, Mr. Adams was not afraid to take the

whole responsibility of success or failure upon his own shoulders,

showing indeed a high and admirable courage and constancy amid such

grave perplexities, in which it seemed that all his future political

fortunes were involved. He caused the proffered mediation of (p. 114)

Great Britain to be rejected. He availed himself of no aid save only

the services of Mons. de Neuville, the French minister, who took a

warm interest in the negotiation, expostulated and argued constantly

with Don Onis and sometimes with Mr. Adams, served as a channel of

communication and carried messages, propositions, and denials, which

could better come filtered through a neutral go-between than pass

direct from principal to principal. In fact, Mr. Adams needed no other

kind of aid except just this which was so readily furnished by the

civil and obliging Frenchman. As if he had been a mathematician

solving a problem in dynamics, he seemed to have measured the precise

line to which the severe pressure of Spanish difficulties would compel

Don Onis to advance. This line he drew sharply, and taking his stand

upon it in the beginning he made no important alterations in it to the

end. Day by day the Spaniard would reluctantly approach toward him at

one point or another, solemnly protesting that he could not make

another move, by argument and entreaty urging, almost imploring, Mr.

Adams in turn to advance and meet him. But Mr. Adams stood rigidly

still, sometimes not a little vexed by the other's lingering manoeuvres,

and actually once saying to the courtly Spaniard that he "was so (p. 115)

wearied out with the discussion that it had become nauseous;" and,

again, that he "really could discuss no longer, and had given it up in

despair." Yet all the while he was never wholly free from anxiety

concerning the accuracy of his calculations as to how soon the Don

might on his side also come to a final stand. Many a tedious and

alarming pause there was, but after each halt progress was in time

renewed. At last the consummation was reached, and except in the

aforementioned matter of the Sabine boundary no concession even in

details had been made by Mr. Adams. The United States was to receive

Florida, and in return only agreed to settle the disputed claims of

certain of her citizens against Spain to an amount not to exceed five

million dollars; while the claims of Spanish subjects against the

United States were wholly expunged. The western boundary was so

established as to secure for this country the much-coveted outlet to

the shores of the "South Sea," as the Pacific Ocean was called, south

of the Columbia River; the line also was run along the southern banks

of the Red and Arkansas rivers, leaving all the islands to the United

States and precluding Spain from the right of navigation. Mr. Adams

had achieved a great triumph.

On February 22, 1819, the two negotiators signed and sealed the (p. 116)

counterparts of the treaty. Mr. Adams notes that it is "perhaps

the most important day of my life," and justly called it "a great

epoch in our history." Yet on the next day the "Washington City

Gazette" came out with a strong condemnation of the Sabine concession,

and expressed the hope that the Senate would not agree to it. "This

paragraph," said Mr. Adams, "comes directly or indirectly from Mr.

Clay." But the paragraph did no harm, for on the following day the

treaty was confirmed by an unanimous vote of the Senate.

It was not long, however, before the pleasure justly derivable from

the completion of this great labor was cruelly dashed. It appeared

that certain enormous grants of land, made by the Spanish king to

three of his nobles, and which were supposed to be annulled by the

treaty, so that the territory covered by them would become the public

property of the United States, bore date earlier than had been

understood, and for this reason would, by the terms of the treaty, be

left in full force. This was a serious matter, and such steps as were

still possible to set it right were promptly taken. Mr. Adams appealed

to Don Onis to state in writing that he himself had understood that

these grants were to be annulled, and that such had been the intention

of the treaty. The Spaniard replied in a shape imperfectly (p. 117)

satisfactory. He shuffled, evaded, and laid himself open to suspicion

of unfair dealing, though the charge could not be regarded as fully

proved against him. Mr. Adams, while blaming himself for carelessness

in not having more closely examined original documents, yet felt

"scarce a doubt" that Onis "did intend by artifice to cover the grants

while we were under the undoubting impression they were annulled;" and

he said to M. de Neuville, concerning this dark transaction, that "it

was not the ingenious device of a public minister, but '_une fourberie

de Scapin_.'" Before long the rumor got abroad in the public prints in

the natural shape of a "malignant distortion," and Mr. Adams was

compelled to see with chagrin his supposed brilliant success

threatening to turn actually to his grave discredit by reason of this

unfortunate oversight.

What might have been the result had the treaty been ratified by Spain

can only be surmised. But it so befell--happily enough for the United

States and for Mr. Adams, as it afterwards turned out--that the

Spanish government refused to ratify. The news was, however, that they

would forthwith dispatch a new minister to explain this refusal and to

renew negotiations.

For his own private part Mr. Adams strove to endure this buffet (p. 118)

of unkindly fortune with that unflinching and stubborn temper,

slightly dashed with bitterness, which stood him in good stead in many

a political trial during his hard-fighting career. But in his official

capacity he had also to consider and advise what it behooved the

administration to do under the circumstances. The feeling was

widespread that the United States ought to possess Florida, and that

Spain had paltered with us long enough. More than once in cabinet

meetings during the negotiation the Secretary of State, who was always

prone to strong measures, had expressed a wish for an act of Congress

authorizing the Executive to take forcible possession of Florida and

of Galveston in the event of Spain refusing to satisfy the reasonable

demands made upon her. Now, stimulated by indignant feeling, his

prepossession in favor of vigorous action was greatly strengthened,

and his counsel was that the United States should prepare at once to

take and hold the disputed territory, and indeed some undisputed

Spanish territory also. But Mr. Monroe and the rest of the Cabinet

preferred a milder course; and France and Great Britain ventured to

express to this country a hope that no violent action would be

precipitately taken. So the matter lay by for a while, awaiting the

coming of the promised envoy from Spain.

At this time the great question of the admission of Missouri into (p. 119)

the Union of States began to agitate Congress and the nation. Mr.

Adams, deeply absorbed in the perplexing affairs of his department,

into which this domestic problem did not enter, was at first careless

of it. His ideas concerning the matter, he wrote, were a "chaos;" but

it was a "chaos" into which his interest in public questions soon

compelled him to bring order. In so doing he for the first time fairly

exposes his intense repulsion for slavery, his full appreciation of

the irrepressible character of the conflict between the slave and the

free populations, and the sure tendency of that conflict to a

dissolution of the Union. Few men at that day read the future so

clearly. While dissolution was generally regarded as a threat not

really intended to be carried out, and compromises were supposed to be

amply sufficient to control the successive emergencies, the underlying

moral force of the anti-slavery movement acting against the

encroaching necessities of the slave-holding communities constituted

an element and involved possibilities which Mr. Adams, from his

position of observation outside the immediate controversy, noted with

foreseeing accuracy. He discerned in passing events the "title-page to

a great tragic volume;" and he predicted that the more or less distant

but sure end must be an attempt to dissolve the Union. His own (p. 120)

position was distinctly defined from the outset, and his strong

feelings were vigorously expressed. He beheld with profound regret the

superiority of the slave-holding party in ability; he remarked sadly

how greatly they excelled in debating power their lukewarm opponents;

he was filled with indignation against the Northern men of Southern

principles. "Slavery," he wrote, "is the great and foul stain upon the

North American Union, and it is a contemplation worthy of the most

exalted soul whether its total abolition is or is not practicable." "A

life devoted to" the emancipation problem "would be nobly spent or

sacrificed." He talks with much acerbity of expression about the

"slave-drivers," and the "flagrant image of human inconsistency"

presented by men who had "the Declaration of Independence on their

lips and the merciless scourge of slavery in their hands." "Never," he

says, "since human sentiments and human conduct were influenced by

human speech was there a theme for eloquence like the free side of

this question.... Oh, if but one man could arise with a genius capable

of comprehending, and an utterance capable of communicating those

eternal truths that belong to this question, to lay bare in all its

nakedness that outrage upon the goodness of God, human slavery; (p. 121)

now is the time and this is the occasion, upon which such a man would

perform the duties of an angel upon earth." Before the Abolitionists

had begun to preach their great crusade this was strong and ardent

language for a statesman's pen. Nor were these exceptional passages;

there is much more of the same sort at least equally forcible. Mr.

Adams notes an interesting remark made to him by Calhoun at this time.

The great Southern chief, less prescient than Mr. Adams, declared that

he did not think that the slavery question "would produce a

dissolution of the Union; but if it should, the South would be from

necessity compelled to form an alliance offensive and defensive with

Great Britain."

Concerning a suggestion that civil war might be preferable to the

extension of slavery beyond the Mississippi, Adams said: "This is a

question between the rights of human nature and the Constitution of

the United States"--a form of stating the case which leaves no doubt

concerning his ideas of the intrinsic right and wrong in the matter.

His own notion was that slavery could not be got rid of within the

Union, but that the only method would be dissolution, after which he

trusted that the course of events would in time surely lead to

reorganization upon the basis of universal freedom for all. He (p. 122)

was not a disunionist in any sense, yet it is evident that his strong

tendency and inclination were to regard emancipation as a weight in

the scales heavier than union, if it should ever come to the point of

an option between the two.

Strangely enough the notion of a forcible retention of the slave

States within the Union does not seem to have been at this time a

substantial element of consideration. Mr. Adams acknowledged that

there was no way at once of preserving the Union and escaping from the

present emergency save through the door of compromise. He maintained

strenuously the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the

Territories, and denied that either Congress or a state government

could establish slavery as a new institution in any State in which it

was not already existing and recognized by law.

This agitation of the slavery question made itself felt in a way

personally interesting to Mr. Adams, by the influence it was exerting

upon men's feelings concerning the still pending and dubious treaty

with Spain. The South became anxious to lay hands upon the Floridas

and upon as far-reaching an area as possible in the direction of

Mexico, in order to carve it up into more slave States; the North, on

the other hand, no longer cared very eagerly for an extension of the

Union upon its southern side. Sectional interests were getting to (p. 123)

be more considered than national. Mr. Adams could not but recognize

that in the great race for the Presidency, in which he could hardly

help being a competitor, the chief advantage which he seemed to have

won when the Senate unanimously ratified the Spanish treaty, had

almost wholly vanished since that treaty had been repudiated by Spain

and was now no longer desired by a large proportion of his own

countrymen.

Matters stood thus when the new Spanish envoy, Vivês, arrived. Other

elements, which there is not space to enumerate here, besides those

referred to, now entering newly into the state of affairs, further

reduced the improbability of agreement almost to hopelessness. Mr.

Adams, despairing of any other solution than a forcible seizure of

Florida, to which he had long been far from averse, now visibly

relaxed his efforts to meet the Spanish negotiator. Perhaps no other

course could have been more effectual in securing success than this

obvious indifference to it. In the prevalent condition of public

feeling and of his own sentiments Mr. Adams easily assumed towards

General Vivês a decisive bluntness, not altogether consonant to the

habits of diplomacy, and manifested an unchangeable stubbornness which

left no room for discussion. His position was simply that Spain might

make such a treaty as the United States demanded, or might take (p. 124)

the consequences of her refusal. His dogged will wore out the

Spaniard's pride, and after a fruitless delay the King and Cortes

ratified the treaty in its original shape, with the important addition

of an explicit annulment of the land grants. It was again sent in to

the Senate, and in spite of the "continued, systematic, and laborious

effort" of "Mr. Clay and his partisans to make it unpopular," it was

ratified by a handsome majority, there being against it "only four

votes--Brown, of Louisiana, who married a sister of Clay's wife;

Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky, against his own better judgment, from

mere political subserviency to Clay; Williams, of Tennessee, from

party impulses connected with hatred of General Jackson; and Trimble,

of Ohio, from some maggot of the brain." Two years had elapsed since

the former ratification, and no little patience had been required to

await so long the final achievement of a success so ardently longed

for, once apparently gained, and anon so cruelly thwarted. But the

triumph was rather enhanced than diminished by all this difficulty and

delay. A long and checkered history, wherein appeared infinite labor,

many a severe trial of temper and hard test of moral courage, bitter

disappointment, ignoble artifices of opponents, ungenerous (p. 125)

opposition growing out of unworthy personal motives at home, was now

at last closed by a chapter which appeared only the more gratifying by

contrast with what had gone before. Mr. Adams recorded, with less of

exultation than might have been pardonable, the utter discomfiture of

"all the calculators of my downfall by the Spanish negotiation," and

reflected cheerfully that he had been left with "credit rather augmented

than impaired by the result,"--credit not in excess of his deserts.

Many years afterwards, in changed circumstances, an outcry was raised

against the agreement which was arrived at concerning the southwestern

boundary of Louisiana. Most unjustly it was declared that Mr. Adams

had sacrificed a portion of the territory of the United States. But

political motives were too plainly to be discerned in these tardy

criticisms; and though General Jackson saw fit, for personal reasons,

to animadvert severely upon the clause establishing this boundary

line, yet there was abundant evidence to show not only that he, like

almost everybody else, had been greatly pleased with it at the time,

but even that he had then upon consultation expressed a deliberate and

special approval.

The same day, February 22, 1821, closed, says Mr. Adams, "two of the

most memorable transactions of my life." That he should speak thus (p. 126)

of the exchange of ratifications of the Spanish treaty is natural; but

the other so "memorable transaction" may not appear of equal magnitude.

It was the sending in to Congress of his report upon weights and

measures. This was one of those vast labors, involving tenfold more

toil than all the negotiations with Onis and Vivês, but bringing no

proportionate fame, however well it might be performed. The subject

was one which had "occupied for the last sixty years many of the

ablest men in Europe, and to which all the power and all the

philosophical and mathematical learning and ingenuity of France and of

Great Britain" had during that period been incessantly directed. It

was fairly enough described as a "fearful and oppressive task." Upon

its dry and uncongenial difficulties Mr. Adams had been employed with

his wonted industry for upwards of four years; he now spoke of the

result modestly as "a hurried and imperfect work." But others, who

have had to deal with the subject, have found this report a solid and

magnificent monument of research and reflection, which has not even

yet been superseded by later treatises. Mr. Adams was honest in labor

as in everything, and was never careless at points where inaccuracy or

lack of thoroughness might be expected to escape detection. (p. 127)

Hence his success in a task upon which it is difficult to imagine other

statesmen of that day--Clay, Webster, or Calhoun, for example--so much

as making an effort. The topic is not one concerning which readers

would tolerate much lingering. Suffice it then to say that the

document illustrated the ability and the character of the man, and so

with this brief mention to dismiss in a paragraph an achievement

which, had it been accomplished in any more showy department, would

alone have rendered Mr. Adams famous.

It is highly gratifying now to look back upon the high spirit and

independent temper uniformly displayed by Mr. Adams abroad and at home

in all dealings with foreign powers. Never in any instance did he

display the least tinge of that rodomontade and boastful extravagance

which have given an underbred air to so many of our diplomats, and

which inevitably cause the basis for such self-laudation to appear of

dubious sufficiency. But he had the happy gift of a native pride which

enabled him to support in the most effective manner the dignity of the

people for whom he spoke. For example, in treaties between the United

States and European powers the latter were for a time wont to name

themselves first throughout the instruments, contrary to the custom of

alternation practised in treaties between themselves. With some (p. 128)

difficulty, partly interposed, it must be confessed, by his own

American coadjutors, Mr. Adams succeeded in putting a stop to this

usage. It was a matter of insignificant detail, in one point of view;

but in diplomacy insignificant details often symbolize important

facts, and there is no question that this habit had been construed as

a tacit but intentional arrogance of superiority on the part of the

Europeans.

For a long period after the birth of the country there was a strong

tendency, not yet so eradicated as to be altogether undiscoverable, on

the part of American statesmen to keep one eye turned covertly askance

upon the trans-Atlantic courts, and to consider, not without a certain

anxious deference, what appearance the new United States might be

presenting to the critical eyes of foreign countries and diplomats.

Mr. Adams was never guilty of such indirect admissions of an inferiority

which apparently he never felt. In the matter of the acquisition of

Florida, Crawford suggested that England and France regarded the

people of the United States as ambitious and encroaching; wherefore he

advised a moderate policy in order to remove this impression. Mr.

Adams on the other side declared that he was not in favor of our

giving ourselves any concern whatever about the opinions of any (p. 129)

foreign power. "If the world do not hold us for Romans," he said,

"they will take us for Jews, and of the two vices I would rather be

charged with that which has greatness mingled in its composition." His

views were broad and grand. He was quite ready to have the world

become "familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion

to be the continent of North America." This extension he declared to

be a "law of nature." To suppose that Spain and England could, through

the long lapse of time, retain their possessions on this side of the

Atlantic seemed to him a "physical, moral, and political absurdity."

The doctrine which has been christened with the name of President

Monroe seems likely to win for him the permanent glory of having

originated the wise policy which that familiar phrase now signifies.

It might, however, be shown that by right of true paternity the

bantling should have borne a different patronymic. Not only is the

"Monroe Doctrine," as that phrase is customarily construed in our day,

much more comprehensive than the simple theory first expressed by

Monroe and now included in the modern doctrine as a part in the whole,

but a principle more fully identical with the imperial one of to-day

had been conceived and shaped by Mr. Adams before the delivery of (p. 130)

Monroe's famous message. As has just been remarked, he looked forward

to the possession of the whole North American continent by the United

States as a sure destiny, and for his own part, whenever opportunity

offered, he was never backward to promote this glorious ultimate

consummation. He was in favor of the acquisition of Louisiana, whatever

fault he might find with the scheme of Mr. Jefferson for making it a

state; he was ready in 1815 to ask the British plenipotentiaries to

cede Canada simply as a matter of common sense and mutual convenience,

and as the comfortable result of a war in which the United States had

been worsted; he never labored harder than in negotiating for the

Floridas, and in pushing our western boundaries to the Pacific; in

April, 1823, he wrote to the American minister at Madrid the significant

remark: "It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the

annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to

the continuance and integrity of the Union." Encroachments never

seemed distasteful to him, and he was always forward to stretch a

point in order to advocate or defend a seizure of disputed North

American territory, as in the cases of Amelia Island, Pensacola, and

Galveston. When discussion arose with Russia concerning her (p. 131)

possessions on the northwest coast of this continent, Mr. Adams

audaciously told the Russian minister, Baron Tuyl, July 17, 1823,

"that we should contest the rights of Russia to _any_ territorial

establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly

the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for

any new European colonial establishments." "This," says Mr. Charles

Francis Adams in a footnote to the passage in the Diary, "is the first

hint of the policy so well known afterwards as the Monroe Doctrine."

Nearly five months later, referring to the same matter in his message

to Congress, December 2, 1823, President Monroe said: "The occasion

has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the

rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the

American continents, by the free and independent condition which they

have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as

subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

It will be observed that both Mr. Adams and President Monroe used the

phrase "continents," including thereby South as well as North America.

A momentous question was imminent, which fortunately never called for

a determination by action, but which in this latter part of 1823

threatened to do so at any moment. Cautious and moderate as the (p. 132)

United States had been, under Mr. Adams's guidance, in recognizing

the freedom and autonomy of the South American states, yet in time the

recognition was made of one after another, and the emancipation of

South America had come, while Mr. Adams was yet Secretary, to be

regarded as an established fact. But now, in 1823-24, came mutterings

from across the Atlantic indicating a strong probability that the

members of the Holy Alliance would interfere in behalf of monarchical

and anti-revolutionary principles, and would assist in the resubjugation

of the successful insurgents. That each one of the powers who should

contribute to this huge crusade would expect and receive territorial

reward could not be doubted. Mr. Adams, in unison with most of his

countrymen, contemplated with profound distrust and repulsion the

possibility of such an European inroad. Stimulated by the prospect of

so unwelcome neighbors, he prepared some dispatches, "drawn to

correspond exactly" with the sentiments of Mr. Monroe's message, in

which he appears to have taken a very high and defiant position. These

documents, coming before the Cabinet for consideration, caused some

flutter among his associates. In the possible event of the Holy

Alliance actually intermeddling in South American affairs, it was (p. 133)

said, the principles enunciated by the Secretary of State would

involve this country in war with a very formidable confederation. Mr.

Adams acknowledged this, but courageously declared that in such a

crisis he felt quite ready to take even this spirited stand. His

audacious spirit went far in advance of the cautious temper of the

Monroe administration; possibly it went too far in advance of the

dictates of a wise prudence, though fortunately the course of events

never brought this question to trial; and it is at least gratifying to

contemplate such a manifestation of daring temper.

But though so bold and independent, Mr. Adams was not habitually

reckless nor prone to excite animosity by needless arrogance in action

or extravagance in principle. In any less perilous extremity than was

presented by this menaced intrusion of combined Europe he followed

rigidly the wise rule of non-interference. For many years before this

stage was reached he had been holding in difficult check the

enthusiasts who, under the lead of Mr. Clay, would have embroiled us

with Spain and Portugal. Once he was made the recipient of a very

amusing proposition from the Portuguese minister, that the United

States and Portugal, as "the two great powers of the western hemisphere,"

should concert together a grand American system. The drollery pf (p. 134)

this notion was of a kind that Mr. Adams could appreciate, though

to most manifestations of humor he was utterly impervious. But after

giving vent to some contemptuous merriment he adds, with a just and

serious pride: "As to an American system, we have it; we constitute

the whole of it; there is no community of interests or of principles

between North and South America." This sound doctrine was put forth in

1820; and it was only modified in the manner that we have seen during

a brief period in 1823, in face of the alarming vision not only of

Spain and Portugal restored to authority, but of Russia in possession

of California and more, France in possession of Mexico, and perhaps

Great Britain becoming mistress of Cuba.

So far as European affairs were concerned, Mr. Adams always and

consistently refused to become entangled in them, even in the slightest

and most indirect manner. When the cause of Greek liberty aroused the

usual throng of noisy advocates for active interference, he contented

himself with expressions of cordial sympathy, accompanied by perfectly

distinct and explicit statements that under no circumstances could any

aid in the way of money or auxiliary forces be expected from this

country. Neutrals we were and would remain in any and all (p. 135)

European quarrels. When Stratford Canning urged, with the uttermost

measure of persistence of which even he was capable, that for the

suppression of the slave trade some such arrangement might be made as

that of mixed tribunals for the trial of slave-trading vessels, and

alleged that divers European powers were uniting for this purpose, Mr.

Adams suggested, as an insuperable obstacle, "the general extra-European

policy of the United States--a policy which they had always pursued as

best suited to their own interests, and best adapted to harmonize with

those of Europe. This policy had also been that of Europe, which had

never considered the United States as belonging to her system.... It

was best for both parties that they should continue to do so." In any

European combinations, said Mr. Adams, in which the United States

should become a member, she must soon become an important power, and

must always be, in many respects, an uncongenial one. It was best that

she should keep wholly out of European politics, even of such leagues

as one for the suppression of the slave trade. He added, that he did

not wish his language to be construed as importing "an unsocial and

sulky spirit on the part of the United States;" for no such temper

existed; it had simply been the policy of Europe to consider (p. 136)

this country as standing aloof from all European federations, and in

this treatment "we had acquiesced, because it fell in with our own

policy."

In a word, Mr. Adams, by his language and actions, established and

developed precisely that doctrine which has since been adopted by this

country under the doubly incorrect name of the "Monroe Doctrine,"--a

name doubly incorrect, because even the real "Monroe Doctrine" was not

an original idea of Mr. Monroe, and because the doctrine which now

goes by that name is not identical with the doctrine which Monroe did

once declare. Mr. Adams's principle was simply that the United States

would take no part whatsoever in foreign politics, not even in those

of South America, save in the extreme event, eliminated from among

things possible in this generation, of such an interference as was

contemplated by the Holy Alliance; and that, on the other hand, she

would permit no European power to gain any new foothold upon this

continent. Time and experience have not enabled us to improve upon the

principles which Mr. Adams worked out for us.

Mr. Adams had some pretty stormy times with Mr. Stratford Canning--the

same gentleman who in his later life is familiar to the readers of (p. 137)

Kinglake's "History of the Crimean War" as Lord Stratford de

Redclyffe, or Eltchi. That minister's overbearing and dictatorial

deportment was afterwards not out of place when he was representing

the protecting power of Great Britain in the court of the "sick man."

But when he began to display his arrogance in the face of Mr. Adams he

found that he was bearding one who was at least his equal in pride and

temper. The naïve surprise which he manifested on making this

discovery is very amusing, and the accounts of the interviews between

the two are among the most pleasing episodes in the history of our

foreign relations. Nor are they less interesting as a sort of

confidential peep at the asperities of diplomacy. It appears that

besides the composed and formal dignity of phrase which alone the

public knows in published state papers and official correspondence,

there is also an official language of wrath and retort not at all

artificial or stilted, but quite homelike and human in its sound.

One subject much discussed between Mr. Adams and Mr. Canning related

to the English propositions for joint efforts to suppress the slave

trade. Great Britain had engaged with much vigor and certainly with an

admirable humanity in this cause. Her scheme was that each power

should keep armed cruisers on the coast of Africa, that the (p. 138)

war-ships of either nation might search the merchant vessels of the

other, and that mixed courts of joint commissioners should try all

cases of capture. This plan had been urged upon the several European

nations, but with imperfect success. Portugal, Spain, and the

Netherlands had assented to it; Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia

had rejected it. Mr. Adams's notion was that the ministry were, in

their secret hearts, rather lukewarm in the business, but that they

were so pressed by "the party of the saints in Parliament" that they

were obliged to make a parade of zeal. Whether this suspicion was

correct or not, it is certain that Mr. Stratford Canning was very

persistent in the presentation of his demands, and could not be

persuaded to take No for an answer. Had it been possible to give any

more favorable reply no one in the United States in that day would

have been better pleased than Mr. Adams to do so. But the obstacles

were insuperable. Besides the undesirability of departing from the

"extra-European policy," the mixed courts would have been

unconstitutional, and could not have been established even by act of

Congress, while the claims advanced by Great Britain to search our

ships for English-born seamen in time of war utterly precluded the

possibility of admitting any rights of search whatsoever upon her (p. 139)

part, even in time of peace, for any purpose or in any shape. In vain

did the Englishman reiterate his appeal. Mr. Adams as often explained

that the insistence of England upon her outrageous claim had rendered

the United States so sensitive upon the entire subject of search that

no description of right of that kind could ever be tolerated. "All

concession of principle," he said, "tended to encourage encroachment,

and if naval officers were once habituated to search the vessels of

other nations in time of peace for one thing, they would be still more

encouraged to practise it for another thing in time of war." The only

way for Great Britain to achieve her purpose would be "to bind herself

by an article, as strong and explicit as language can make it, never

again in time of war to take a man from an American vessel." This of

course was an inadmissible proposition, and so Mr. Stratford Canning's

incessant urgency produced no substantial results. This discussion,

however, was generally harmonious. Once only, in its earlier stages,

Mr. Adams notes a remark of Mr. Canning, repeated for the second time,

and not altogether gratifying. He said, writes Mr. Adams, "that he

should always receive any observations that I may make to him with a

just deference to my advance of years--over him. This is one of (p. 140)

those equivocal compliments which, according to Sterne, a Frenchman

always returns with a bow."

It was when they got upon the matter of the American settlement at the

mouth of the Columbia River, that the two struck fire. Possession of

this disputed spot had been taken by the Americans, but was broken up

by the British during the war of 1812. After the declaration of peace

upon the _status ante bellum_, a British government vessel had been

dispatched upon the special errand of making formal return of the port

to the Americans. In January, 1821, certain remarks made in debate in

the House of Representatives, followed soon afterward by publication

in the "National Intelligencer" of a paper signed by Senator Eaton,

led Mr. Canning to think that the Government entertained the design of

establishing a substantial settlement at the mouth of the river. On

January 26 he called upon Mr. Adams and inquired the intentions of the

Administration in regard to this. Mr. Adams replied that an increase

of the present settlement was not improbable. Thereupon Mr. Canning

dropping the air of "easy familiarity" which had previously marked the

intercourse between the two, and "assuming a tone more peremptory"

than Mr. Adams "was disposed to endure," expressed his great (p. 141)

surprise. Mr. Adams "with a corresponding change of tone" expressed

equal surprise, "both at the form and substance of his address." Mr.

Canning said that "he conceived such a settlement would be a direct

violation of the article of the Convention of 20th October, 1818." Mr.

Adams took down a volume, read the article, and said, "Now, sir, if

you have any charge to make against the American Government for a

violation of this article, you will please to make the communication

in writing." Mr. Canning retorted, with great vehemence:--

"'And do you suppose, sir, that I am to be dictated to as to the

manner in which I may think proper to communicate with the

American Government?' I answered, 'No, sir. We know very well

what are the privileges of foreign ministers, and mean to respect

them. But you will give us leave to determine what communications

we will receive, and how we will receive them; and you may be

assured we are as little disposed to submit to dictation as to

exercise it.' He then, in a louder and more passionate tone of

voice, said: 'And am I to understand that I am to be refused

henceforth any conference with you upon the subject of my

mission?' 'Not at all, sir,' said I, 'my request is, that if you

have anything further to say to me _upon this subject_, you would

say it in writing. And my motive is to avoid what, both from the

nature of the subject and from the manner in which you (p. 142)

have thought proper to open it, I foresee will tend only to

mutual irritation, and not to an amicable arrangement.' With some

abatement of tone, but in the same peremptory manner, he said,

'Am I to understand that you refuse any further conference with

me on this subject?' I said, 'No. But you will understand that I

am not pleased either with the grounds upon which you have sought

this conference, nor with the questions which you have seen fit

to put to me.'"

Mr. Adams then proceeded to expose the impropriety of a foreign

minister demanding from the Administration an explanation of words

uttered in debate in Congress, and also said that he supposed that the

British had no claim to the territory in question. Mr. Canning

rejoined, and referred to the sending out of the American ship of war

Ontario, in 1817, without any notice to the British minister[3] at

Washington,--

"speaking in a very emphatic manner and as if there had been an

intended secret expedition ... which had been detected only by

the vigilance and penetration of the British minister. I

answered, 'Why, Mr. Bagot did say something to me about it; but I

certainly did not think him serious, and we had a good-humored

laughing conversation on the occasion.' Canning, with great

vehemence: 'You may rely upon it, sir, that it was no laughing

matter to him; for I have seen his report to his government and

know what his feelings concerning it were.' I replied, (p. 143)

'This is the first intimation I have ever received that Mr. Bagot

took the slightest offence at what then passed between us, ...

and you will give me leave to say that when he left this

country'--Here I was going to add that the last words he said to

me were words of thanks for the invariable urbanity and

liberality of my conduct and the personal kindness which he had

uniformly received from me. But I could not finish the sentence.

Mr. Canning, in a paroxysm of extreme irritation, broke out: 'I

stop you there. I will not endure a misrepresentation of what I

say. I never said that Mr. Bagot took offence at anything that

had passed between him and you; and nothing that I said imported

any such thing.' Then ... added in the same passionate manner: 'I

am treated like a school-boy.' I then resumed: 'Mr. Canning, I

have a distinct recollection of the substance of the short

conversation between Mr. Bagot and me at that time; and it was

this'--'No doubt, sir,' said Canning, interrupting me again, 'no

doubt, sir, Mr. Bagot answered you like a man of good breeding

and good humor.'"

[Footnote 3: Then Mr. Bagot.]

Mr. Adams began again and succeeded in making, without further

interruption, a careful recital of his talk with Mr. Bagot. While he

was speaking Mr. Canning grew cooler, and expressed some surprise at

what he heard. But in a few moments the conversation again became warm

and personal. Mr. Adams remarked that heretofore he had thrown off (p. 144)

some of the "cautious reserve" which might have been "strictly

regular" between them, and that

"'so long as his (Canning's) professions had been supported by

his conduct'--Here Mr. Canning again stopped me by repeating with

great vehemence, 'My conduct! I am responsible for my conduct

only to my government!'"

Mr. Adams replied, substantially, that he could respect the rights of

Mr. Canning and maintain his own, and that he thought the best mode of

treating this topic in future would be by writing. Mr. Canning then

expressed himself as

"'willing to forget all that had now passed.' I told him that I

neither asked nor promised him to forget.... He asked again if he

was to understand me as refusing to confer with him further on

the subject. I said, 'No.' 'Would I appoint a time for that

purpose?' I said, 'Now, if he pleased.... But as he appeared to

be under some excitement, perhaps he might prefer some other

time, in which case I would readily receive him to-morrow at one

o'clock;' upon which he rose and took leave, saying he would come

at that time."

The next day, accordingly, this genial pair again encountered. Mr.

Adams noted at first in Mr. Canning's manner "an effort at coolness,

but no appearance of cheerfulness or good humor. I saw there was (p. 145)

no relaxation of the tone he had yesterday assumed, and felt that

none would on my part be suitable." They went over quietly enough some

of the ground traversed the day before, Mr. Adams again explaining the

impropriety of Mr. Canning questioning him concerning remarks made in

debate in Congress. It was, he said, as if Mr. Rush, hearing in the

House of Commons something said about sending troops to the Shetland

Islands, should proceed to question Lord Castlereagh about it.

"'Have you,' said Mr. Canning, 'any claim to the Shetland

Islands?' 'Have you any _claim_,' said I, 'to the mouth of

Columbia River?' 'Why, do you not _know_,' replied he, 'that we

have a claim?' 'I do not _know_,' said I, 'what you claim nor

what you do not claim. You claim India; you claim Africa; you

claim'--'Perhaps,' said he, 'a piece of the moon.' 'No,' said I,

'I have not heard that you claim exclusively any part of the

moon; but there is not a spot on _this_ habitable globe that I

could affirm you do not claim!'"

The conversation continued with alternations of lull and storm, Mr.

Canning at times becoming warm and incensed and interrupting Mr.

Adams, who retorted with a dogged asperity which must have been

extremely irritating. Mr. Adams said that he did "not expect to be (p. 146)

plied with captious questions" to obtain indirectly that which

had been directly denied. Mr. Canning, "exceedingly irritated,"

complained of the word "captious." Mr. Adams retaliated by reciting

offensive language used by Mr. Canning, who in turn replied that he

had been speaking only in self-defence. Mr. Canning found occasion to

make again his peculiarly rasping remark that he should always strive

to show towards Mr. Adams the deference due to his "more advanced

years." After another very uncomfortable passage, Mr. Adams said that

the behavior of Mr. Canning in making the observations of members of

Congress a basis of official interrogations was a pretension the more

necessary to be resisted because this

"'was not the first time it had been raised by a British minister

here.' He asked, with great emotion, who that minister was. I

answered, 'Mr. Jackson.' 'And you got rid of him!' said Mr.

Canning, in a tone of violent passion--'and you got rid of

him!--and you got rid of him!' This repetition of the same words,

always in the same tone, was with pauses of a few seconds between

each of them, as if for a reply. I said: 'Sir, my reference to

the pretension of Mr. Jackson was not'--Here Mr. Canning

interrupted me by saying: 'If you think that by reference to Mr.

Jackson I am to be intimidated from the performance of my (p. 147)

duty you will find yourself greatly mistaken.' 'I had not,

sir,' said I, 'the most distant intention of intimidating you

from the performance of your duty; nor was it with the intention

of alluding to any subsequent occurrences of his mission;

but'--Mr. Canning interrupted me again by saying, still in a tone

of high exasperation,--'Let me tell you, sir, that your reference

to the case of Mr. Jackson is _exceedingly offensive_.' 'I do not

know,' said I, 'whether I shall be able to finish what I intended

to say, under such continual interruptions.'"

Mr. Canning thereupon intimated by a bow his willingness to listen,

and Mr. Adams reiterated what in a more fragmentary way he had already

said. Mr. Canning then made a formal speech, mentioning his desire "to

cultivate harmony and smooth down all remnants of asperity between the

two countries," again gracefully referred to the deference which he

should at all times pay to Mr. Adams's age, and closed by declaring,

with a significant emphasis, that he would "never forget the respect

due from him _to the American Government_." Mr. Adams bowed in silence

and the stormy interview ended. A day or two afterward the disputants

met by accident, and Mr. Canning showed such signs of resentment that

there passed between them a "bare salutation."

In the condition of our relations with Great Britain at the time (p. 148)

of these interviews any needless ill-feeling was strongly to be

deprecated. But Mr. Adams's temperament was such that he always saw

the greater chance of success in strong and spirited conduct; nor

could he endure that the dignity of the Republic, any more than its

safety, should take detriment in his hands. Moreover he understood

Englishmen better perhaps than they have ever been understood by any

other of the public men of the United States, and he handled and

subdued them with a temper and skill highly agreeable to contemplate.

The President supported him fully throughout the matter, and the

discomfiture and wrath of Mr. Canning never became even indirectly a

cause of regret to the country.

As the years allotted to Monroe passed on, the manoeuvring among the

candidates for the succession to the Presidency grew in activity.

There were several possible presidents in the field, and during the

"era of good feeling" many an aspiring politician had his brief period

of mild expectancy followed in most cases only too surely by a hopeless

relegation to obscurity. There were, however, four whose anticipations

rested upon a substantial basis. William H. Crawford, Secretary of the

Treasury, had been the rival of Monroe for nomination by the

Congressional caucus, and had then developed sufficient strength (p. 149)

to make him justly sanguine that he might stand next to Monroe in the

succession as he apparently did in the esteem of their common party.

Mr. Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, had such

expectations as might fairly grow out of his brilliant reputation,

powerful influence in Congress, and great personal popularity. Mr.

Adams was pointed out not only by his deserts but also by his position

in the Cabinet, it having been the custom heretofore to promote the

Secretary of State to the Presidency. It was not until the time of

election was near at hand that the strength of General Jackson,

founded of course upon the effect of his military prestige upon the

masses of the people, began to appear to the other competitors a

formidable element in the great rivalry. For a while Mr. Calhoun might

have been regarded as a fifth, since he had already become the great

chief of the South; but this cause of his strength was likewise his

weakness, since it was felt that the North was fairly entitled to

present the next candidate. The others, who at one time and another

had aspirations, like De Witt Clinton and Tompkins, were never really

formidable, and may be disregarded as insignificant threads in the

complex political snarl which must be unravelled.

[Illustration: Stratford Canning]

As a study of the dark side of political society during this (p. 150)

period Mr. Adams's Diary is profoundly interesting. He writes with a

charming absence of reserve. If he thinks there is rascality at work,

he sets down the names of the knaves and expounds their various

villainies of act and motive with delightfully outspoken frankness.

All his life he was somewhat prone, it must be confessed, to

depreciate the moral characters of others, and to suspect unworthy

designs in the methods or ends of those who crossed his path. It was

the not unnatural result of his own rigid resolve to be honest.

Refraining with the stern conscientiousness, which was in the

composition of his Puritan blood, from every act, whether in public or

in private life, which seemed to him in the least degree tinged with

immorality, he found a sort of compensation for the restraints and

discomforts of his own austerity in judging severely the less

punctilious world around him. Whatever other faults he had, it is

unquestionable that his uprightness was as consistent and unvarying as

can be reached by human nature. Yet his temptations were made the

greater and the more cruel by the beliefs constantly borne in upon him

that his rivals did not accept for their own governance in the contest

the same rules by which he was pledged to himself to abide. Jealousy

enhanced suspicion, and suspicion in turn pricked jealousy. It is (p. 151)

necessary, therefore, to be somewhat upon our guard in accepting

his estimates of men and acts at this period; though the broad general

impression to be gathered from his treatment of his rivals, even in

these confidential pages, is favorable at least to his justice of

disposition and honesty of intention.

At the outset Mr. Clay excited Mr. Adams's most lively resentment. The

policy which seemed most promising to that gentleman lay in antagonism

to the Administration, whereas, in the absence of substantial party

issues, there seemed, at least to members of that Administration, to

be no proper grounds for such antagonism. When, therefore, Mr. Clay

found or devised such grounds, the President and his Cabinet, vexed

and harassed by the opposition of so influential a man, not

unnaturally attributed his tactics to selfish and, in a political

sense, corrupt motives. Thus Mr. Adams stigmatized his opposition to

the Florida treaty as prompted by no just objection to its

stipulations, but by a malicious wish to bring discredit upon the

negotiator. Probably the charge was true, and Mr. Clay's honesty in

opposing an admirable treaty can only be vindicated at the expense of

his understanding,--an explanation certainly not to be accepted. But

when Mr. Adams attributed to the same motive of embarrassing the (p. 152)

Administration Mr. Clay's energetic endeavors to force a recognition

of the insurgent states of South America, he exaggerated the inimical

element in his rival's motives. It was the business of the President

and Cabinet, and preëminently of the Secretary of State, to see to it

that the country should not move too fast in this very nice and

perilous matter of recognizing the independence of rebels. Mr. Adams

was the responsible minister, and had to hold the reins; Mr. Clay,

outside the official vehicle, cracked the lash probably a little more

loudly than he would have done had he been on the coach-box. It may be

assumed that in advocating his various motions looking to the

appointment of ministers to the new states and to other acts of

recognition, he felt his eloquence rather fired than dampened by the

thought of how much trouble he was making for Mr. Adams; but that he

was at the same time espousing the cause to which he sincerely wished

well is probably true. His ardent temper was stirred by this struggle

for independence, and his rhetorical nature could not resist the

opportunities for fervid and brilliant oratory presented by this

struggle for freedom against mediæval despotism. Real convictions were

sometimes diluted with rodomontade, and a true feeling was to some

extent stimulated by the desire to embarrass a rival.

Entire freedom from prejudice would have been too much to expect (p. 153)

from Mr. Adams; but his criticisms of Clay are seldom marked by

any serious accusations or really bitter explosions of ill-temper.

Early in his term of office he writes that Mr. Clay has "already

mounted his South American great horse," and that his "project is that

in which John Randolph failed, to control or overthrow the Executive

by swaying the House of Representatives." Again he says that "Clay is

as rancorously benevolent as John Randolph." The sting of these

remarks lay rather in the comparison with Randolph than in their

direct allegations. In January, 1819, Adams notes that Clay has

"redoubled his rancor against me," and gives himself "free swing to

assault me ... both in his public speeches and by secret machinations,

without scruple or delicacy." The diarist gloomily adds, that "all

public business in Congress now connects itself with intrigues, and

there is great danger that the whole Government will degenerate into a

struggle of cabals." He was rather inclined to such pessimistic

vaticinations; but it must be confessed that he spoke with too much

reason on this occasion. In the absence of a sufficient supply of

important public questions to absorb the energies of the men in public

life, the petty game of personal politics was playing with unusual

zeal. As time went on, however, and the South American questions (p. 154)

were removed from the arena, Adams's ill-feeling towards Clay became

greatly mitigated. Clay's assaults and opposition also gradually

dwindled away; go-betweens carried to and fro disclaimers, made by the

principals, of personal ill-will towards each other; and before the

time of election was actually imminent something as near the _entente

cordiale_ was established as could be reasonably expected to exist

between competitors very unlike both in moral and mental

constitution.[4]

[Footnote 4: For a deliberate estimate of Clay's

character see Mr. Adams's Diary, v. 325.]

Mr. Adams's unbounded indignation and profound contempt were reserved

for Mr. Crawford, partly, it may be suspected by the cynically minded,

because Crawford for a long time seemed to be by far the most

formidable rival, but partly also because Crawford was in fact unable

to resist the temptation to use ignoble means for attaining an end

which he coveted too keenly for his own honor. It was only by degrees

that Adams began to suspect the underhand methods and malicious

practices of Crawford; but as conviction was gradually brought home to

him his native tendency towards suspicion was enhanced to an extreme

degree. He then came to recognize in Crawford a wholly selfish (p. 155)

and scheming politician, who had the baseness to retain his seat in

Mr. Monroe's Cabinet with the secret persistent object of giving the

most fatal advice in his power. From that time forth he saw in every

suggestion made by the Secretary of the Treasury only an insidious

intent to lead the Administration, and especially the Department of

State, into difficulty, failure, and disrepute. He notes, evidently

with perfect belief, that for this purpose Crawford was even covertly

busy with the Spanish ambassador to prevent an accommodation of our

differences with Spain. "Oh, the windings of the human heart!" he

exclaims; "possibly Crawford is not himself conscious of his real

motives for this conduct." Even the slender measure of charity

involved in this last sentence rapidly evaporated from the poisoned

atmosphere of his mind. He mentions that Crawford has killed a man in

a duel; that he leaves unanswered a pamphlet "supported by documents"

exhibiting him "in the most odious light, as sacrificing every

principle to his ambition." Because Calhoun would not support him for

the Presidency, Crawford stimulated a series of attacks upon the War

Department. He was the "instigator and animating spirit of the whole

movement both in Congress and at Richmond against Jackson and the

Administration." He was "a worm preying upon the vitals of the (p. 156)

Administration in its own body." He "solemnly deposed in a court

of justice that which is not true," for the purpose of bringing

discredit upon the testimony given by Mr. Adams in the same cause. But

Mr. Adams says of this that he cannot bring himself to believe that

Crawford has been guilty of wilful falsehood, though convicted of

inaccuracy by his own words; for "ambition debauches memory itself." A

little later he would have been less merciful. In some vexatious and

difficult commercial negotiations which Mr. Adams was conducting with

France, Crawford is "afraid of [the result] being too favorable."

To form a just opinion of the man thus unpleasantly sketched is

difficult. For nearly eight years Mr. Adams was brought into close and

constant relations with him, and as a result formed a very low opinion

of his character and by no means a high estimate of his abilities.

Even after making a liberal allowance for the prejudice naturally

supervening from their rivalry there is left a residuum of condemnation

abundantly sufficient to ruin a more vigorous reputation than Crawford

has left behind him. Apparently Mr. Calhoun, though a fellow

Southerner, thought no better of the ambitious Georgian than did Mr.

Adams, to whom one day he remarked that Crawford was "a very (p. 157)

singular instance of a man of such character rising to the eminence he

now occupies; that there has not been in the history of the Union

another man with abilities so ordinary, with services so slender, and

so thoroughly corrupt, who had contrived to make himself a candidate

for the Presidency." Nor was this a solitary expression of the

feelings of the distinguished South Carolinian.

Mr. E. H. Mills, Senator from Massachusetts, and a dispassionate

observer, speaks of Crawford with scant favor as "coarse, rough,

uneducated, of a pretty strong mind, a great intriguer, and determined

to make himself President." He adds: "Adams, Jackson, and Calhoun all

think well of each other, and are united at least in one thing,--to

wit, a most thorough dread and abhorrence of Crawford."

Yet Crawford was for many years not only never without eager

expectations of his own, which narrowly missed realization and might

not have missed it had not his health broken down a few months too

soon, but he had a large following, strong friends, and an extensive

influence. But if he really had great ability he had not the good

fortune of an opportunity to show it; and he lives in history rather

as a man from whom much was expected than as a man who achieved (p. 158)

much. One faculty, however, not of the best, but serviceable, he had

in a rare degree: he thoroughly understood all the artifices of

politics; he knew how to interest and organize partisans, to obtain

newspaper support, and generally to extend and direct his following

after that fashion which soon afterward began to be fully developed by

the younger school of our public men. He was the _avant courier_ of a

bad system, of which the first crude manifestations were received with

well-merited disrelish by the worthier among his contemporaries.

It is the more easy to believe that Adams's distrust of Crawford was a

sincere conviction, when we consider his behavior towards another

dangerous rival, General Jackson. In view of the new phase which the

relationship between these two men was soon to take on, Adams's hearty

championship of Jackson for several years prior to 1825 deserves

mention. The Secretary stood gallantly by the General at a crisis in

Jackson's life when he greatly needed such strong official backing,

and in an hour of extreme need Adams alone in the Cabinet of Monroe

lent an assistance which Jackson afterwards too readily forgot. Seldom

has a government been brought by the undue zeal of its servants into a

quandary more perplexing than that into which the reckless military

hero brought the Administration of President Monroe. Turned loose (p. 159)

in the regions of Florida, checked only by an uncertain and disputed

boundary line running through half-explored forests, confronted by a

hated foe whose strength he could well afford to despise, General

Jackson, in a war properly waged only against Indians, ran a wild and

lawless, but very vigorous and effective, career in Spanish

possessions. He hung a couple of British subjects with as scant trial

and meagre shrift as if he had been a mediæval free-lance; he marched

upon Spanish towns and peremptorily forced the blue-blooded commanders

to capitulate in the most humiliating manner; afterwards, when the

Spanish territory had become American, in his civil capacity as

Governor, he flung the Spanish Commissioner into jail. He treated

instructions, laws, and established usages as teasing cobwebs which

any spirited public servant was in duty bound to break; then he

quietly stated his willingness to let the country take the benefit of

his irregular proceedings and make him the scapegoat or martyr if such

should be needed. How to treat this too successful chieftain was no

simple problem. He had done what he ought not to have done, yet

everybody in the country was heartily glad that he had done it. He

ought not to have hung Arbuthnot and Ambrister, nor to have seized (p. 160)

Pensacola, nor later on to have imprisoned Callava; yet the general

efficiency of his procedure fully accorded with the secret disposition

of the country. It was, however, not easy to establish the propriety

of his trenchant doings upon any acknowledged principles of law, and

during the long period through which these disturbing feats extended,

Jackson was left in painful solitude by those who felt obliged to

judge his actions by rule rather than by sympathy. The President was

concerned lest his Administration should be brought into indefensible

embarrassment; Calhoun was personally displeased because the

instructions issued from his department had been exceeded; Crawford

eagerly sought to make the most of such admirable opportunities for

destroying the prestige of one who might grow into a dangerous rival;

Clay, who hated a military hero, indulged in a series of fierce

denunciations in the House of Representatives; Mr. Adams alone stood

gallantly by the man who had dared to take vigorous measures upon his

own sole responsibility. His career touched a kindred chord in Adams's

own independent and courageous character, and perhaps for the only

time in his life the Secretary of State became almost sophistical in

the arguments by which he endeavored to sustain the impetuous warrior

against an adverse Cabinet. The authority given to Jackson to (p. 161)

cross the Spanish frontier in pursuit of the Indian enemy was

justified as being only defensive warfare; then "all the rest," argued

Adams, "even to the order for taking the Fort of Barrancas by storm,

was incidental, deriving its character from the object, which was not

hostility to Spain, but the termination of the Indian war." Through

long and anxious sessions Adams stood fast in opposing "the unanimous

opinions" of the President, Crawford, Calhoun, and Wirt. Their policy

seemed to him a little ignoble and wholly blundering, because, he

said, "it is weakness and a confession of weakness. The disclaimer of

power in the Executive is of dangerous example and of evil

consequences. There is injustice to the officer in disavowing him,

when in principle he is strictly justifiable." This behavior upon Mr.

Adams's part was the more generous and disinterested because the

earlier among these doings of Jackson incensed Don Onis extremely and

were near bringing about the entire disruption of that important

negotiation with Spain upon which Mr. Adams had so much at stake. But

few civilians have had a stronger dash of the fighting element than

had Mr. Adams, and this impelled him irresistibly to stand shoulder to

shoulder with Jackson in such an emergency, regardless of possible

consequences to himself. He preferred to insist that the hanging (p. 162)

of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was according to the laws of war and to

maintain that position in the teeth of Stratford Canning rather than

to disavow it and render apology and reparation. So three years later

when Jackson was again in trouble by reason of his arrest of Callava,

he still found a stanch advocate in Adams, who, having made an argument

for the defence which would have done credit to a subtle-minded

barrister, concluded by adopting the sentiment of Hume concerning the

execution of Don Pantaleon de Sa by Oliver Cromwell,--if the laws of

nations had been violated, "it was by a signal act of justice

deserving universal approbation." Later still, on January 8, 1824,

being the anniversary of the victory of New Orleans, as if to make a

conspicuous declaration of his opinions in favor of Jackson, Mr. Adams

gave a great ball in his honor, "at which about one thousand persons

attended."[5]