become a motive, wrote, with obvious contempt and indignation: "I
observe among the members great embarrassment, alarm, anxiety, and
confusion of mind, but no preparation for any measure of vigor, and an
obvious strong disposition to yield all that Great Britain may (p. 049)
require, to preserve peace, under a thin external show of dignity and
bravery." This tame and vacillating spirit roused his ire, and as it
was chiefly manifested by his own party it alienated him from them
farther than ever. Yet his wrath was so far held in reasonable check
by his discretion that he would still have liked to avoid the perilous
conclusion of arms, and though his impulse was to fight, yet he could
not but recognize that the sensible course was to be content, for the
time at least, with a manifestation of resentment, and the most vigorous
acts short of war which the government could be induced to undertake.
On this sentiment were based his introduction of the aforementioned
resolutions, his willingness to support the administration, and his
vote for the Non-importation Act in spite of a dislike for it as a
very imperfectly satisfactory measure. But it was not alone his
naturally independent temper which led him thus to feel so differently
from other members of his party. In Europe he had had opportunities of
forming a judgment more accurate than was possible for most Americans
concerning the sentiments and policy of England towards this country.
Not only had he been present at the negotiations resulting in the
treaty of peace, but he had also afterwards been for several months
engaged in the personal discussion of commercial questions with (p. 050)
the British minister of foreign affairs. From all that he had thus
seen and heard he had reached the conviction, unquestionably correct,
that the British were not only resolved to adopt a selfish course
towards the United States, which might have been expected, but that
they were consistently pursuing the further distinct design of crippling
and destroying American commerce, to the utmost degree which their own
extensive trade and great naval authority and power rendered possible.
So long as he held this firm belief, it was inevitable that he should
be at issue with the Federalists in all matters concerning our policy
towards Great Britain. The ill-will naturally engendered in him by
this conviction was increased to profound indignation when illiberal
measures were succeeded by insults, by substantial wrongs in direct
contravention of law, and by acts properly to be described as of real
hostility. For Mr. Adams was by nature not only independent, but
resentful and combative. When, soon after the attack of the Leopard
upon the Chesapeake, he heard the transaction "openly justified at
noon-day," by a prominent Federalist,[1] "in a public insurance office
upon the exchange at Boston," his temper rose. "This," he afterward
wrote, "this was the cause ... which alienated me from that day (p. 051)
and forever from the councils of the Federal party." When the news
of that outrage reached Boston, Mr. Adams was there, and desired that
the leading Federalists in the city should at once "take the lead in
promoting a strong and clear expression of the sentiments of the
people, and in an open and free-hearted manner, setting aside all
party feelings, declare their determination at that crisis to support
the government of their country." But unfortunately these gentlemen
were by no means prepared for any such action, and foolishly left it
for the friends of the administration to give the first utterance to a
feeling which it is hard to excuse any American for not entertaining
beneath such provocation. It was the Jeffersonians, accordingly, who
convened "an informal meeting of the citizens of Boston and the
neighboring towns," at which Mr. Adams was present, and by which he
was put upon a committee to draw and report resolutions. These
resolutions pledged a cheerful coöperation "in any measures, however
serious," which the government might deem necessary and a support of
the same with "lives and fortunes." The Federalists, learning too late
that their backwardness at this crisis was a blunder, caused a town
meeting to be called at Faneuil Hall a few days later. This also (p. 052)
Mr. Adams attended, and again was put on the committee to draft
resolutions, which were only a little less strong than those of the
earlier assemblage. But though many of the Federalists thus tardily
and reluctantly fell in with the popular sentiment, they were for the
most part heartily incensed against Mr. Adams. They threatened him
that he should "have his head taken off for apostasy," and gave him to
understand that he "should no longer be considered as having any
communion with the party." If he had not already quite left them, they
now turned him out from their community. But such abusive treatment
was ill adapted to influence a man of his temper. Martyrdom, which in
time he came to relish, had not now any terrors for him; and he would
have lost as many heads as ever grew on Hydra, ere he would have
yielded on a point of principle.
[Footnote 1: Mr. John Lowell.]
His spirit was soon to be demonstrated. Congress was convened in extra
session on October 26, 1807. The administration brought forward the
bill establishing an embargo. The measure may now be pronounced a
blunder, and its proposal created a howl of rage and anguish from the
commercial states, who saw in it only their utter ruin. Already a
strong sectional feeling had been developed between the planters (p. 053)
of the South and the merchants of the North and East, and the latter
now united in the cry that their quarter was to be ruined by the
ignorant policy of this Virginian President. Terrible then was their
wrath, when they actually saw a Massachusetts Senator boldly give his
vote for what they deemed the most odious and wicked bill which had
ever been presented in the halls of Congress. Nay, more, they learned
with horror that Mr. Adams had even been a member of the committee
which reported the bill, and that he had joined in the report.
Henceforth the Federal party was to be like a hive of enraged hornets
about the devoted renegade. No abuse which they could heap upon him
seemed nearly adequate to the occasion. They despised him; they
loathed him; they said and believed that he was false, selfish,
designing, a traitor, an apostate, that he had run away from a failing
cause, that he had sold himself. The language of contumely was
exhausted in vain efforts to describe his baseness. Not even yet has
the echo of the hard names which he was called quite died away in the
land; and there are still families in New England with whom his
dishonest tergiversation remains a traditional belief.
Never was any man more unjustly aspersed. It is impossible to view all
the evidence dispassionately without not only acquitting Mr. (p. 054)
Adams but greatly admiring his courage, his constancy, his independence.
Whether the embargo was a wise and efficient or a futile and useless
measure has little to do with the question of his conduct. The emergency
called for strong action. The Federalists suggested only a temporizing
submission, or that we should avert the terrible wrath of England by
crawling beneath her lashes into political and commercial servitude.
Mr. Jefferson thought the embargo would do, that it would aid him in
his negotiations with England sufficiently to enable him to bring her
to terms; he had before thought the same of the Non-importation Act.
Mr. Adams felt, properly enough, concerning both these schemes, that
they were insufficient and in many respects objectionable; but that to
give the administration hearty support in the most vigorous measures
which it was willing to undertake, was better than to aid an opposition
utterly nerveless and servile and altogether devoid of so much as the
desire for efficient action. It was no time to stay with the party of
weakness; it was right to strengthen rather than to hamper a man so
pacific and spiritless as Mr. Jefferson; to show a readiness to
forward even his imperfect expedients; to display a united and
indignant, if not quite a hostile front to Great Britain, rather (p. 055)
than to exhibit a tame and friendly feeling towards her. It was for
these reasons, which had already controlled his action concerning the
non-importation bill, that Mr. Adams joined in reporting the embargo
bill and voted for it. He never pretended that he himself had any
especial fancy for either of these measures, or that he regarded them
as the best that could be devised under the circumstances. On the
contrary, he hoped that the passage of the embargo would allow of the
repeal of its predecessor. That he expected some good from it, and
that it did some little good, cannot be denied. It did save a great
deal of American property, both shipping and merchandise, from seizure
and condemnation; and if it cut off the income it at least saved much
of the principal of our merchants. If only the bill had been promptly
repealed so soon as this protective purpose had been achieved, without
awaiting further and altogether impossible benefits to accrue from it
as an offensive measure, it might perhaps have left a better memory
behind it. Unfortunately no one can deny that it was continued much
too long. Mr. Adams saw this error and dreaded the consequences. After
he had left Congress and had gone back to private life, he exerted all
the influence which he had with the Republican members of Congress to
secure its repeal and the substitution of the Non-intercourse (p. 056)
Act, an exchange which was in time accomplished, though much too tardily.
Nay, much more than this, Mr. Adams stands forth almost alone as the
advocate of threatening if not of actually belligerent measures. He
expressed his belief that "our internal resources [were] competent to
the establishment and maintenance of a naval force, public and
private, if not fully adequate to the protection and defence of our
commerce, at least sufficient to induce a retreat from hostilities,
and to deter from a renewal of them by either of the warring parties;"
and he insisted that "a system to that effect might be formed,
ultimately far more economical, and certainly more energetic," than
the embargo. But his "resolution met no encouragement." He found that
it was the embargo or nothing, and he thought the embargo was a little
better than nothing, as probably it was.
All the arguments which Mr. Adams advanced were far from satisfying
his constituents in those days of wild political excitement, and they
quickly found the means of intimating their unappeasable displeasure
in a way certainly not open to misapprehension. Mr. Adams's term of
service in the Senate was to expire on March 3, 1809. On June 2 and 3,
1808, anticipating by many months the customary time for filling (p. 057)
the coming vacancy, the legislature of Massachusetts proceeded to
choose James Lloyd, junior, his successor. The votes were, in the
Senate 21 for Mr. Lloyd, 17 for Mr. Adams; in the House 248 for Mr.
Lloyd, and 213 for Mr. Adams. A more insulting method of administering
a rebuke could not have been devised. At the same time, in further
expression of disapprobation, resolutions strongly condemnatory of the
embargo were passed. Mr. Adams was not the man to stay where he was
not wanted, and on June 8 he sent in his letter of resignation. On the
next day Mr. Lloyd was chosen to serve for the balance of his term.
Thus John Quincy Adams changed sides. The son of John Adams lost the
senatorship for persistently supporting the administration of Thomas
Jefferson. It was indeed a singular spectacle! In 1803 he had been
sent to the Senate of the United States by Federalists as a Federalist;
in 1808 he had abjured them and they had repudiated him; in 1809, as
we are soon to see, he received a foreign appointment from the
Republican President Madison, and was confirmed by a Republican
Senate. Many of Mr. Adams's acts, many of his traits, have been
harshly criticised, but for no act that he ever did or ever was
charged with doing has he been so harshly assailed as for this (p. 058)
journey from one camp to the other. The gentlemen of wealth, position,
and influence in Eastern Massachusetts, almost to a man, turned
against him with virulence; many of their descendants still cherish
the ancestral prejudice; and it may yet be a long while before the
last mutterings of this deep-rooted antipathy die away. But that they
will die away in time cannot be doubted. Praise will succeed to blame.
Truth must prevail in a case where such abundant evidence is
accessible; and the truth is that Mr. Adams's conduct was not ignoble,
mean, and traitorous, but honorable, courageous, and disinterested.
Those who singled him out for assault, though deaf to his arguments,
might even then have reflected that within a few years a large
proportion of the whole nation had changed in their opinions as he had
now at last changed in his, so that the party which under Washington
hardly had an existence and under John Adams was not, until the last
moment, seriously feared, now showed an enormous majority throughout
the whole country. Even in Massachusetts, the intrenched camp of the
Federalists, one half of the population were now Republicans. But that
change of political sentiment which in the individual voter is often
admired as evidence of independent thought is stigmatized in (p. 059)
those more prominent in politics as tergiversation and apostasy.
It may be admitted that there are sound reasons for holding party
leaders to a more rigid allegiance to party policy than is expected of
the rank and file; yet certainly, at those periods when substantially
new measures and new doctrines come to the front, the old party names
lose whatever sacredness may at other times be in them, and the
political fellowships of the past may properly be reformed. Novel
problems cannot always find old comrades still united in opinions.
Precisely such was the case with John Quincy Adams and the Federalists.
The earlier Federalist creed related to one set of issues, the later
Federalist creed to quite another set; the earlier creed was sound and
deserving of support; the later creed was not so. It is easy to see,
as one looks backward upon history, that every great and successful
party has its mission, that it wins its success through the substantial
righteousness of that mission, and that it owes its downfall to
assuming an erroneous attitude towards some subsequent matter which
becomes in turn of predominating importance. Sometimes, though rarely,
a party remains on the right side through two or even more successive
issues of profound consequence to the nation. The Federalist mission
was to establish the Constitution of the United States as a (p. 060)
vigorous, efficient, and practical system of government, to prove its
soundness, safety, and efficacy, and to defend it from the undermining
assaults of those who distrusted it and would have reduced it to
imbecility. Supplementary and cognate to this was the further task of
giving the young nation and the new system a chance to get fairly
started in life before being subjected to the strain of war and
European entanglements. To this end it was necessary to hold in check
the Jeffersonian or French party, who sought to embroil us in a
foreign quarrel. These two functions of the Federalist party were
quite in accord; they involved the organizing and domestic instinct
against the disorganizing and meddlesome; the strengthening against
the enfeebling process; practical thinking against fanciful theories.
Fortunately the able men had been generally of the sound persuasion,
and by powerful exertions had carried the day and accomplished their
allotted tasks so thoroughly that all subsequent generations of
Americans have been reaping the benefit of their labors. But by the
time that John Adams had concluded his administration the great
Federalist work had been sufficiently done. Those who still believe
that there is an overruling Providence in the affairs of men and
nations may well point to the history of this period in support (p. 061)
of their theory. Republicanism was not able to triumph till Federalism
had fulfilled all its proper duty and was on the point of going wrong.
During this earlier period John Quincy Adams had been a Federalist by
conviction as well as by education. Nor was there any obvious reason
for him to change his political faith with the change of party
success, brought about as that was before its necessity was apparent
but by the sure and inscrutable wisdom so marvellously enclosed in the
great popular instinct. It was not patent, when Mr. Jefferson
succeeded Mr. Adams, that Federalism was soon to become an unsound
political creed--unsound, not because it had been defeated, but
because it had done its work, and in the new emergency was destined to
blunder. During Mr. Jefferson's first administration no questions of
novel import arose. But they were not far distant, and soon were
presented by the British aggressions. A grave crisis was created by
this system of organized destruction of property and wholesale
stealing of citizens, now suddenly practised with such terrible
energy. What was to be done? What had the two great parties to advise
concerning the policy of the country in this hour of peril?
Unfortunately for the Federalists old predilections were allowed (p. 062)
now to govern their present action. Excusably Anglican in the bygone
days of Genet's mission, they now remained still Anglican, when to be
Anglican was to be emphatically un-American. As one reads the history
of 1807 and 1808 it is impossible not to feel almost a sense of
personal gratitude to John Quincy Adams that he dared to step out from
his meek-spirited party and do all that circumstances rendered
possible to promote resistance to insults and wrongs intolerable. In
truth, he was always a man of high temper, and eminently a patriotic
citizen of the United States. Unlike too many even of the best among
his countrymen in those early years of the Republic, he had no foreign
sympathies whatsoever; he was neither French nor English, but wholly,
exclusively, and warmly American. He had no second love; the United
States filled his public heart and monopolized his political
affections. When he was abroad he established neither affiliations nor
antipathies, and when he was at home he drifted with no party whose
course was governed by foreign magnets. It needs only that this
characteristic should be fully understood in order that his conduct in
1808 should be not alone vindicated but greatly admired.
At that time it was said, and it has been since repeated, that he (p. 063)
was allured by the loaves and fishes which the Republicans could
distribute, while the Federalists could cast to him only meagre and
uncertain crusts. Circumstances gave to the accusation such a
superficial plausibility that it was believed by many honest men under
the influence of political prejudice. But such a charge, alleged
concerning a single act in a long public career, is to be scanned with
suspicion. Disproof by demonstration is impossible; but it is fair to
seek for the character of the act in a study of the character of the
actor, as illustrated by the rest of his career. Thus seeking we shall
see that, if any traits can be surely predicated of any man,
independence, courage, and honesty may be predicated of Mr. Adams. His
long public life had many periods of trial, yet this is the sole
occasion when it is so much as possible seriously to question the
purity of his motives--for the story of his intrigue with Mr. Clay to
secure the Presidency was never really believed by any one except
General Jackson, and the beliefs of General Jackson are of little
consequence. From the earliest to the latest day of his public life,
he was never a party man. He is entitled to the justification to be
derived from this life-long habit, when, in 1807-8, he voted against
the wishes of those who had hoped to hold him in the bonds of (p. 064)
partisan alliance. In point of fact, so far from these acts being a
yielding to selfish and calculating temptation, they called for great
courage and strength of mind; instead of being tergiversation, they
were a triumph in a severe ordeal. Mr. Adams was not so dull as to
underrate, nor so void of good feeling as to be careless of, the storm
of obloquy which he had to encounter, not only in such shape as is
customary in like instances of a change of sides in politics, but, in
his present case, of a peculiarly painful kind. He was to seem
unfaithful, not only to a party, but to the bitter feud of a father
whom he dearly loved and greatly respected; he was to be reviled by
the neighbors and friends who constituted his natural social circle in
Boston; he was to alienate himself from the rich, the cultivated, the
influential gentlemen of his neighborhood, his comrades, who would
almost universally condemn his conduct. He was to lose his position as
Senator, and probably to destroy all hopes of further political
success so far as it depended upon the good will of the people of his
own State. In this he was at least giving up a certainty in exchange
for what even his enemies must admit to have been only an expectation.
But in fact it is now evident that there was not upon his part even an
expectation. At the first signs of the views which he was likely (p. 065)
to hold, that contemptible but influential Republican, Giles, of
Virginia, also one or two others of the same party, sought to approach
him with insinuating suggestions. But Mr. Adams met these advances in
a manner frigid and repellent even beyond his wont, and far from
seeking to conciliate these emissaries, and to make a bargain, or even
establish a tacit understanding for his own benefit, he held them far
aloof, and simply stated that he wished and expected nothing from the
administration. His mind was made up, his opinion was formed; no bribe
was needed to secure his vote. Not thus do men sell themselves in
politics. The Republicans were fairly notified that he was going to do
just as he chose; and Mr. Jefferson, the arch-enemy of all Adamses,
had no occasion to forego his feud to win this recruit from that
family.
Mr. Adams's Diary shows unmistakably that he was acting rigidly upon
principle, that he believed himself to be injuring or even destroying
his political prospects, and that in so doing he taxed his moral
courage severely. The whole tone of the Diary, apart from those few
distinct statements which hostile critics might view with distrust, is
despondent, often bitter, but defiant and stubborn. If in later life
he ever anticipated the possible publication of these private (p. 066)
pages, yet he could hardly have done so at this early day. Among
certain general reflections at the close of the year 1808, he writes:
"On most of the great national questions now under discussion, my
sense of duty leads me to support the Administration, and I find
myself, of course, in opposition to the Federalists in general. But I
have no communication with the President, other than that in the
regular order of business in the Senate. In this state of things my
situation calls in a peculiar manner for prudence; my political
prospects are declining, and, as my term of service draws near its
close, I am constantly approaching to the certainty of being restored
to the situation of a private citizen. For this event, however, I hope
to have my mind sufficiently prepared."
In July, 1808, the Republicans of the Congressional District wished to
send him to the House of Representatives, but to the gentleman who
waited upon him with this proposal he returned a decided negative.
Other considerations apart, he would not interfere with the reëlection
of his friend, Mr. Quincy.
Certain remarks, written when his senatorial term was far advanced,
when he had lost the confidence of the Federalists without obtaining
that of the Republicans, may be of interest at this point. He wrote,
October 30, 1807: "I employed the whole evening in looking over (p. 067)
the Journal of the Senate, since I have been one of its members. Of
the very little business which I have commenced during the four
sessions, at least three fourths has failed, with circumstances of
peculiar mortification. The very few instances in which I have
succeeded, have been always after an opposition of great obstinacy,
often ludicrously contrasting with the insignificance of the object in
pursuit. More than one instance has occurred where the same thing
which I have assiduously labored in vain to effect has been afterwards
accomplished by others, without the least resistance; more than once,
where the pleasure of disappointing me has seemed to be the prominent
principle of decision. Of the preparatory business, matured in
committees, I have had a share, gradually increasing through the four
sessions, but always as a subordinate member. The merely laborious
duties have been readily assigned to me, and as readily undertaken and
discharged. My success has been more frequent in opposition than in
carrying any proposition of my own, and I hope I have been
instrumental in arresting many unadvised purposes and projects. Though
as to the general policy of the country I have been uniformly in a
small, and constantly deceasing minority; my opinions and votes have
been much oftener in unison with the Administration than with (p. 068)
their opponents; I have met with at least as much opposition from
my party friends as from their adversaries,--I believe more. I know
not that I have made any personal enemies now in Senate, nor can I
flatter myself with having acquired any personal friends. There have
been hitherto two, Mr. Tracey and Mr. Plumer, upon whom I could rely,
but it has pleased Providence to remove one by death, and the changes
of political party have removed the other." This is a striking
paragraph, certainly not written by a man in a very cheerful or
sanguine frame of mind, not by one who congratulates himself on having
skilfully taken the initial steps in a brilliant political career;
but, it is fair to say, by one who has at least tried to do his duty,
and who has not knowingly permitted himself to be warped either by
passion, prejudice, party alliances, or selfish considerations.
As early as November, 1805, Mr. Adams, being still what may be
described as an independent Federalist, was approached by Dr. Rush
with tentative suggestions concerning a foreign mission. Mr. Madison,
then Secretary of State, and even President Jefferson were apparently
not disinclined to give him such employment, provided he would be
willing to accept it at their hands. Mr. Adams simply replied, (p. 069)
that he would not refuse a nomination merely because it came from Mr.
Jefferson, though there was no office in the President's gift for
which he had any wish. Perhaps because of the unconciliatory coolness
of this response, or perhaps for some better reason, the nomination
did not follow at that time. No sooner, however, had Mr. Madison
fairly taken the oath of office as President than he bethought him of
Mr. Adams, now no longer a Federalist, but, concerning the present
issues, of the Republican persuasion. On March 6, 1809, Mr. Adams was
notified by the President personally of the intention to nominate him
as Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia. It was a new mission, the first
minister ever nominated to Russia having been only a short time before
rejected by the Senate. But the Emperor had often expressed his wish
to exchange ministers, and Mr. Madison was anxious to comply with the
courteous request. Mr. Adams's name was accordingly at once sent to
the Senate. But on the following day, March 7, that body resolved that
"it is inexpedient at this time to appoint a minister from the United
States to the Court of Russia." The vote was seventeen to fifteen, and
among the seventeen was Mr. Adams's old colleague, Timothy Pickering,
who probably never in his life cast a vote which gave him so much (p. 070)
pleasure. Mr. Madison, however, did not readily desist from his
purpose, and a few months later, June 26, he sent a message to the
Senate, stating that the considerations previously leading him to
nominate a minister to Russia had since been strengthened, and again
naming Mr. Adams for the post. This time the nomination was confirmed
with readiness, by a vote of nineteen to seven, Mr. Pickering, of
course, being one of the still hostile minority.
At noon on August 5, 1809, records Mr. Adams, "I left my house at the
corner of Boylston and Nassau streets, in Boston," again to make the
tedious and uncomfortable voyage across the Atlantic. A miserable and
a dangerous time he had of it ere, on October 23, he reached St.
Petersburg. Concerning the four years and a half which he is now to
spend in Russia very little need be said. His active duties were of
the simplest character, amounting to little more than rendering
occasional assistance to American shipmasters suffering beneath the
severities so often illegally inflicted by the contesting powers of
Europe. But apart from the slender practical service to be done, the
period must have been interesting and agreeable for him personally,
for he was received and treated throughout his stay by the Emperor
and his courtiers with distinguished kindness. The Emperor, who (p. 071)
often met him walking, used to stop and chat with him, while Count
Romanzoff, the minister of foreign affairs, was cordial beyond the
ordinary civility of diplomacy. The Diary records a series of court
presentations, balls, fêtes, dinners, diplomatic and other, launches,
displays of fireworks, birthday festivities, parades, baptisms, plays,
state funerals, illuminations, and Te Deums for victories; in short,
every species of social gayety and public pageant. At all these Mr.
Adams was always a bidden and apparently a welcome guest. It must be
admitted, even by his detractors, that he was an admirable
representative of the United States abroad. Having already seen much
of the distinguished society of European courts, but retaining a
republican simplicity, which was wholly genuine and a natural part of
his character and therefore was never affected or offensive in its
manifestations, he really represented the best element in the politics
and society of the United States. Winning respect for himself he won
it also for the country which he represented. Thus he was able to
render an indirect but essential service in cementing the kindly
feeling which the Russian Empire entertained for the American Republic.
Russia could then do us little good and almost no harm, yet the (p. 072)
friendship of a great European power had a certain moral value in
those days of our national infancy. That friendship, so cordially
offered, Mr. Adams was fortunately well fitted to conciliate, showing
in his foreign callings a tact which did not mark him in other public
relations. He was perhaps less liked by his travelling fellow
countrymen than by the Russians. The paltry ambition of a certain
class of Americans for introduction to high society disgusted him
greatly, and he was not found an efficient ally by these would-be
comrades of the Russian aristocracy. "The ambition of young Americans
to crowd themselves upon European courts and into the company of
nobility is a very ridiculous and not a very proud feature of their
character," he wrote; "there is nothing, in my estimate of things,
meaner than courting society where, if admitted, it is only to be
despised." He himself happily combined extensive acquirements,
excellent ability, diplomatic and courtly experience, and natural
independence of character without ill-bred self-assertion, and never
failed to create a good impression in the many circles into which his
foreign career introduced him.
The ambassadors and ministers from European powers at St. Petersburg
were constantly wrangling about precedence and like petty matters of
court etiquette. "In all these controversies," writes Mr. Adams, (p. 073)
"I have endeavored to consider it as an affair in which I, as an
_American_ minister, had no concern; and that my only principle is to
dispute upon precedence with nobody." A good-natured contempt for
European follies may be read between the lines of this remark; wherein
it may be said that the Monroe Doctrine is applied to court etiquette.
He always made it a point to live within the meagre income which the
United States allowed him, but seems to have suffered no diminution of
consideration for this reason. One morning, walking on the Fontanka,
he met the Emperor, who said: "Mons. Adams, il y a cent ans que je ne
vous ai vu;" and then continuing the conversation, "asked me whether I
intended to take a house in the country this summer. I said, No....
'And why so?' said he. I was hesitating upon an answer when he
relieved me from embarrassment by saying, 'Peut-être sont-ce des
considerations de finance?' As he said it with perfect good humor and
with a smile, I replied in the same manner: 'Mais Sire, elles y sont
pour une bonne part.'"[2]
[Footnote 2: An interesting sketch of his household
and its expenses is to be found in ii. Diary, 193.]
The volume of the journal which records this residence in St. Petersburg
is very interesting as a picture of Russian life and manners in high
society. Few travellers write anything nearly so vivid, so (p. 074)
thorough, or so trustworthy as these entries. Moreover, during the
whole period of his stay the great wars of Napoleon were constantly
increasing the astonishment of mankind, and created intense excitement
at the Court of Russia. These feelings waxed stronger as it grew daily
more likely that the Emperor would have to take his turn also as a
party defendant in the great conflict. Then at last came the fact of
war, the invasion of Russia, the burning of Moscow, the disastrous
retreat of the invaders ending in ignominious flight, the advance of
the allies, finally the capture of Paris. All this while Mr. Adams at
St. Petersburg witnessed first the alarm and then the exultation of
the court and the people as the rumors now of defeat, anon of victory,
were brought by the couriers at tantalizing intervals; and he saw the
rejoicings and illuminations which rendered the Russian capital so
brilliant and glorious during the last portion of his residence. It
was an experience well worth having, and which is pleasantly depicted
in the Diary.
In September, 1812, Count Romanzoff suggested to Mr. Adams the
readiness of the Emperor to act as mediator in bringing about peace
between the United States and England. The suggestion was promptly
acted upon, but with no directly fortunate results. The American (p. 075)
government acceded at once to the proposition, and at the risk of an
impolitic display of readiness dispatched Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard
to act as Commissioners jointly with Mr. Adams in the negotiations.
These gentlemen, however, arrived in St. Petersburg only to find
themselves in a very awkward position. Their official character might
not properly be considered as attaching unless England should accept
the offer of mediation. But England had refused, in the first
instance, to do this, and she now again reiterated her refusal without
regard for the manifestation of willingness on the part of the United
States. Further, Mr. Gallatin's nomination was rejected by the Senate
after his departure, on the ground that his retention of the post of
Secretary of the Treasury was incompatible, under the Constitution,
with this diplomatic function. So the United States appeared in a very
annoying attitude, her Commissioners were uncomfortable and somewhat
humiliated; Russia felt a certain measure of vexation at the brusque
and positive rejection of her friendly proposition on the part of
Great Britain; and that country alone came out of the affair with any
self-satisfaction.
But by the time when all hopes of peace through the friendly offices
of Russia were at an end, that stage of the conflict had been (p. 076)
reached at which both parties were quite ready to desist. The United
States, though triumphing in some brilliant naval victories, had been
having a sorry experience on land, where, as the Russian minister
remarked, "England did as she pleased." A large portion of the people
were extremely dissatisfied, and it was impossible to ignore that the
outlook did not promise better fortunes in the future than had been
encountered in the past. On the other hand, England had nothing
substantial to expect from a continuance of the struggle, except heavy
additional expenditure which it was not then the fashion to compel the
worsted party to recoup. She accordingly intimated her readiness to
send Commissioners to Göttingen, for which place Ghent was afterwards
substituted, to meet American Commissioners and settle terms of
pacification. The United States renewed the powers of Messrs. Adams,
Bayard, and Gallatin, a new Secretary of the Treasury having in the
meantime been appointed, and added Jonathan Russell, then Minister to
Sweden, and Henry Clay. England deputed Lord Gambier, an admiral, Dr.
Adams, a publicist, and Mr. Goulburn, a member of Parliament and Under
Secretary of State. These eight gentlemen accordingly met in Ghent on
August 7, 1814.
It was upwards of four months before an agreement was reached. (p. 077)
During this period Mr. Adams kept his Diary with much more even than
his wonted faithfulness, and it undoubtedly presents the most vivid
picture in existence of the labors of treaty-making diplomatists. The
eight were certainly an odd assemblage of peacemakers. The ill-blood
and wranglings between the opposing Commissions were bad enough, yet
hardly equalled the intestine dissensions between the American
Commissioners themselves. That the spirit of peace should ever have
emanated from such an universal embroilment is almost sufficiently
surprising to be regarded as a miracle. At the very beginning, or even
before fairly beginning, the British party roused the jealous ire of
the Americans by proposing that they all should meet, for exchanging
their full powers, at the lodgings of the Englishmen. The Americans
took fire at this "offensive pretension to superiority" which was "the
usage from Ambassadors to Ministers of an inferior order." Mr. Adams
cited Martens, and Mr. Bayard read a case from Ward's "Law of Nations."
Mr. Adams suggested sending a pointed reply, agreeing to meet the
British Commissioners "at any place other than their own lodgings;"
but Mr. Gallatin, whose valuable function was destined to be the
keeping of the peace among his fractious colleagues, as well as (p. 078)
betwixt them and the Englishmen, substituted the milder phrase, "at
any place which may be mutually agreed upon." The first meeting
accordingly took place at the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where it was
arranged that the subsequent conferences should be held alternately at
the quarters of the two Commissions. Then followed expressions,
conventional and proper but wholly untrue, of mutual sentiments of
esteem and good will.
No sooner did the gentlemen begin to get seriously at the work before
them than the most discouraging prospects were developed. The British
first presented their demands, as follows: 1. That the United States
should conclude a peace with the Indian allies of Great Britain, and
that a species of neutral belt of Indian territory should be
established between the dominions of the United States and Great
Britain, so that these dominions should be nowhere conterminous, upon
which belt or barrier neither power should be permitted to encroach
even by purchase, and the boundaries of which should be settled in
this treaty. 2. That the United States should keep no naval force upon
the Great Lakes, and should neither maintain their existing forts nor
build new ones upon their northern frontier; it was even required that
the boundary line should run along the southern shore of the (p. 079)
lakes; while no corresponding restriction was imposed upon Great
Britain, because she was stated to have no projects of conquest as
against her neighbor. 3. That a piece of the province of Maine should
be ceded, in order to give the English a road from Halifax to Quebec.
4. That the stipulation of the treaty of 1783, conferring on English
subjects the right of navigating the Mississippi, should be now
formally renewed.
The Americans were astounded; it seemed to them hardly worth while to
have come so far to listen to such propositions. Concerning the
proposed Indian pacification they had not even any powers, the United
States being already busied in negotiating a treaty with the tribes as
independent powers. The establishment of the neutral Indian belt was
manifestly contrary to the established policy and obvious destiny of
the nation. Neither was the answer agreeable, which was returned by
Dr. Adams to the inquiry as to what was to be done with those citizens
of the United States who had already settled in those parts of
Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio, included within the territory which it
was now proposed to make inalienably Indian. He said that these
people, amounting perhaps to one hundred thousand, "must shift for
themselves." The one-sided disarmament upon the lakes and along the
frontier was, by the understanding of all nations, such an (p. 080)
humiliation as is inflicted only on a crushed adversary. No return was
offered for the road between Halifax and Quebec; nor for the right of
navigating the Mississippi. The treaty of peace of 1783, made in
ignorance of the topography of the unexplored northern country, had
established an impossible boundary line running from the Lake of the
Woods westward along the forty-ninth parallel to the Mississippi; and
as appurtenant to the British territory, thus supposed to touch the
river, a right of navigation upon it was given. It had since been
discovered that a line on that parallel would never touch the
Mississippi. The same treaty had also secured for the United States
certain rights concerning the Northeastern fisheries. The English now
insisted upon a re-affirmance of the privilege given to them, without
a re-affirmance of the privilege given to the United States; ignoring
the fact that the recent acquisition of Louisiana, making the
Mississippi wholly American, materially altered the propriety of a
British right of navigation upon it.
Apart from the intolerable character of these demands, the personal
bearing of the English Commissioners did not tend to mitigate the
chagrin of the Americans. The formal civilities had counted with the
American Commissioners for more than they were worth, and had (p. 081)
induced them, in preparing a long dispatch to the home government,
to insert "a paragraph complimentary to the personal deportment" of
the British. But before they sent off the document they revised it and
struck out these pleasant phrases. Not many days after the first
conference Mr. Adams notes that the tone of the English Commissioners
was even "more peremptory, and their language more overbearing, than
at the former conferences." A little farther on he remarks that "the
British note is overbearing and insulting in its tone, like the two
former ones." Again he says:--
"The tone of all the British notes is arrogant, overbearing, and
offensive. The tone of ours is neither so bold nor so spirited as
I think it should be. It is too much on the defensive, and too
excessive in the caution to say nothing irritating. I have seldom
been able to prevail upon my colleagues to insert anything in the
style of retort upon the harsh and reproachful matter which we
receive."
Many little passages-at-arms in the conferences are recited which
amply bear out these remarks as regards both parties. Perhaps,
however, it should be admitted that the Americans made up for the
self-restraint which they practised in conference by the disagreements
and bickerings in which they indulged when consulting among (p. 082)
themselves. Mr. Gallatin's serene temper and cool head were hardly
taxed to keep the peace among his excited colleagues. Mr. Adams and
Mr. Clay were especially prone to suspicions and to outbursts of
anger. Mr. Adams often and candidly admits as much of himself,
apparently not without good reason. At first the onerous task of
drafting the numerous documents which the Commission had to present
devolved upon him, a labor for which he was well fitted in all
respects save, perhaps, a tendency to prolixity. He did not, however,
succeed in satisfying his comrades, and the criticisms to which they
subjected his composition galled his self-esteem severely, so much so
that erelong he altogether relinquished this function, which was
thereafter performed chiefly by Mr. Gallatin. As early as August 21,
Mr. Adams says, not without evident bitterness, that though they all
were agreed on the general view of the subject, yet in his "exposition
of it, one objects to the form, another to the substance, of almost
every paragraph." Mr. Gallatin would strike out everything possibly
offensive to the Englishmen; Mr. Clay would draw his pen through every
figurative expression; Mr. Russell, not content with agreeing to all
the objections of both the others, would further amend the construction
of every sentence; and finally Mr. Bayard would insist upon (p. 083)
writing all over again in his own language. All this nettled Mr. Adams
exceedingly. On September 24 he again writes that it was agreed to
adopt an article which he had drawn, "though with objections to almost
every word" which he had used. "This," he says, "is a severity with
which I alone am treated in our discussions by all my colleagues.
Almost everything written by any of the rest is rejected, or agreed to
with very little criticism, verbal or substantial. But every line that
I write passes a gauntlet of objections by every one of my colleagues,
which finally issues, for the most part, in the rejection of it all."
He reflects, with a somewhat forced air of self-discipline, that this
must indicate some faultiness in his composition which he must try to
correct; but in fact it is sufficiently evident that he was seldom
persuaded that his papers were improved. Amid all this we see in the
Diary many exhibitions of vexation. One day he acknowledges, "I cannot
always restrain the irritability of my temper;" another day he
informed his colleagues, "with too much warmth, that they might be
assured I was as determined as they were;" again he reflects, "I, too,
must not forget to keep a constant guard upon my temper, for the time
is evidently approaching when it will be wanted." Mr. Gallatin alone
seems not to have exasperated him; Mr. Clay and he were constantly (p. 084)
in discussion, and often pretty hotly. Instead of coming nearer
together, as time went on, these two fell farther apart. What Mr. Clay
thought of Mr. Adams may probably be inferred from what we know that
Mr. Adams thought of Mr. Clay. "Mr. Clay is losing his temper, and
growing peevish and fractious," he writes on October 31; and constantly
he repeats the like complaint. The truth is, that the precise New
Englander and the impetuous Westerner were kept asunder not only by
local interests but by habits and modes of thought utterly dissimilar.
Some amusing glimpses of their private life illustrate this
difference. Mr. Adams worked hard and diligently, allowing himself
little leisure for pleasure; but Mr. Clay, without actually neglecting
his duties, yet managed to find ample time for enjoyment. More than
once Mr. Adams notes that, as he rose about five o'clock in the
morning to light his own fire and begin the labors of the day by
candle-light, he heard the parties breaking up and leaving Mr. Clay's
rooms across the entry, where they had been playing cards all night
long. In these little touches one sees the distinctive characters of
the men well portrayed.
The very extravagance of the British demands at least saved the (p. 085)
Americans from perplexity. Mr. Clay, indeed, cherished an "inconceivable
idea" that the Englishmen would "finish by receding from the ground
they had taken;" but meantime there could be no difference of opinion
concerning the impossibility of meeting them upon that ground. Mr.
Adams, never lacking in courage, actually wished to argue with them
that it would be for the interests of Great Britain not less than of
the United States if Canada should be ceded to the latter power.
Unfortunately his colleagues would not support him in this audacious
policy, the humor of which is delicious. It would have been infinitely
droll to see how the British Commissioners would have hailed such a
proposition, by way of appropriate termination of a conflict in which
the forces of their nation had captured and ransacked the capital city
of the Americans!
On August 21 the Englishmen invited the Americans to dinner on the
following Saturday. "The chance is," wrote Mr. Adams, "that before
that time the whole negotiation will be at an end." The banquet,
however, did come off, and a few more succeeded it; feasts not marked
by any great geniality or warmth, except perhaps occasionally warmth
of discussion. So sure were the Americans that they were about to
break off the negotiations that Mr. Adams began to consider by (p. 086)
what route he should return to St. Petersburg; and they declined to
renew the tenure of their quarters for more than a few days longer.
Like alarms were of frequent occurrence, even almost to the very day
of agreement. On September 15, at a dinner given by the American
Commissioners, Lord Gambier asked Mr. Adams whether he would return
immediately to St. Petersburg. "Yes," replied Mr. Adams, "that is, if
you send us away." His lordship "replied with assurances how deeply he
lamented it, and with a hope that we should one day be friends again."
On the same occasion Mr. Goulburn said that probably the last note of
the Americans would "terminate the business," and that they "must
fight it out." Fighting it out was a much less painful prospect for
Great Britain just at that juncture than for the United States, as the
Americans realized with profound anxiety. "We so fondly cling to the
vain hope of peace, that every new proof of its impossibility operates
upon us as a disappointment," wrote Mr. Adams. No amount of pride
could altogether conceal the fact that the American Commissioners
represented the worsted party, and though they never openly said so
even among themselves, yet indirectly they were obliged to recognize
the truth. On November 10 we find Mr. Adams proposing to make (p. 087)
concessions not permitted by their instructions, because, as he said:--
"I felt so sure that [the home government] would now gladly take
the state before the war as the general basis of the peace, that
I was prepared to take on me the responsibility of trespassing
upon their instructions thus far. Not only so, but I would at
this moment cheerfully give my life for a peace on this basis. If
peace was possible, it would be on no other. I had indeed no hope
that the proposal would be accepted."
Mr. Clay thought that the British would laugh at this: "They would say,
Ay, ay! pretty fellows you, to think of getting out of the war as well
as you got into it." This was not consoling for the representatives of
that side which had declared war for the purpose of curing grievances
and vindicating alleged rights. But that Mr. Adams correctly read the
wishes of the government was proved within a very few days by the
receipt of express authority from home "to conclude the peace on the
basis of the _status ante bellum_." Three days afterwards, on November
27, three and a half months after the vexatious haggling had been
begun, we encounter in the Diary the first real gleam of hope of a
successful termination: "All the difficulties to the conclusion of a
peace appear to be now so nearly removed, that my colleagues all (p. 088)
consider it as certain. I myself think it probable."
There were, however, some three weeks more of negotiation to be gone
through before the consummation was actually achieved, and the ill
blood seemed to increase as the end was approached. The differences
between the American Commissioners waxed especially serious concerning
the fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi. Mr. Adams
insisted that if the treaty of peace had been so far abrogated by the
war as to render necessary a re-affirmance of the British right of
navigating the Mississippi, then a re-affirmance of the American
rights in the Northeastern fisheries was equally necessary. This the
English Commissioners denied. Mr. Adams said it was only an exchange
of privileges presumably equivalent. Mr. Clay, however, was firmly
resolved to prevent all stipulations admitting such a right of
navigation, and the better to do so he was quite willing to let the
fisheries go. The navigation privilege he considered "much too
important to be conceded for the mere liberty of drying fish upon a
desert," as he was pleased to describe a right for which the United
States has often been ready to go to war and may yet some time do so.
"Mr. Clay lost his temper," writes Mr. Adams a day or two later, (p. 089)
"as he generally does whenever this right of the British to navigate
the Mississippi is discussed. He was utterly averse to admitting it as
an equivalent for a stipulation securing the contested part of the
fisheries. He said the more he heard of this [the right of fishing],
the more convinced he was that it was of little or no value. He should
be glad to get it if he could, but he was sure the British would not
ultimately grant it. That the navigation of the Mississippi, on the
other hand, was an object of immense importance, and he could see no
sort of reason for granting it as an equivalent for the fisheries."
Thus spoke the representative of the West. The New Englander--the son
of the man whose exertions had been chiefly instrumental in originally
obtaining the grant of the Northeastern fishery privileges--naturally
went to the other extreme. He thought "the British right of navigating
the Mississippi to be as nothing, considered as a grant from us. It
was secured to them by the peace of 1783, they had enjoyed it at the
commencement of the war, it had never been injurious in the slightest
degree to our own people, and it appeared to [him] that the British
claim to it was just and equitable." Further he "believed the right to
this navigation to be a very useless thing to the British.... But
their national pride and honor were interested in it; the (p. 090)
government could not make a peace which would abandon it." The
fisheries, however, Mr. Adams regarded as one of the most inestimable
and inalienable of American rights. It is evident that the United
States could ill have spared either Mr. Adams or Mr. Clay from the
negotiation, and the joinder of the two, however fraught with
discomfort to themselves, well served substantial American interests.
Mr. Adams thought the British perfidious, and suspected them of not
entertaining any honest intention of concluding a peace. On December
12, after an exceedingly quarrelsome conference, he records his belief
that the British have "insidiously kept open" two points, "for the
sake of finally breaking off the negotiations and making all their
other concessions proofs of their extreme moderation, to put upon us
the blame of the rupture."
On December 11 we find Mr. Clay ready "for a war three years longer,"
and anxious "to begin to play at _brag_" with the Englishmen. His
colleagues, more complaisant or having less confidence in their own
skill in that game, found it difficult to placate him; he "stalked to
and fro across the chamber, repeating five or six times, 'I will never
sign a treaty upon the _status ante bellum_ with the Indian article.
So help me God!'" The next day there was an angry controversy (p. 091)
with the Englishmen. The British troops had taken and held Moose
Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, the rightful ownership of which was in
dispute. The title was to be settled by arbitrators. But the question,
whether the British should restore possession of the island pending
the arbitration, aroused bitter discussion. "Mr. Goulburn and Dr.
Adams (the Englishman) immediately took fire, and Goulburn lost all
control of his temper. He has always in such cases," says the Diary,
"a sort of convulsive agitation about him, and the tone in which he
speaks is more insulting than the language which he uses." Mr. Bayard
referred to the case of the Falkland Islands. "'Why' (in a transport
of rage), said Goulburn, 'in that case we sent a fleet and troops and
drove the fellows off; and that is what we ought to have done in this
case.'" Mr. J. Q. Adams, whose extensive and accurate information more
than once annoyed his adversaries, stated that, as he remembered it,
"the Spaniards in that case had driven the British off,"--and Lord
Gambier helped his blundering colleague out of the difficulty by
suggesting a new subject, much as the defeated heroes of the Iliad
used to find happy refuge from death in a god-sent cloud of dust. It
is amusing to read that in the midst of such scenes as these the (p. 092)
show of courtesy was still maintained; and on December 13 the
Americans "all dined with the British Plenipotentiaries," though "the
party was more than usually dull, stiff, and reserved." It was
certainly forcing the spirit of good fellowship. The next day Mr. Clay
notified his colleagues that they were going "to make a damned bad
treaty, and he did not know whether he would sign it or not;" and Mr.
Adams also said that he saw that the rest had made up their minds "at
last to yield the fishery point," in which case he also could not sign
the treaty. On the following day, however, the Americans were
surprised by receiving a note from the British Commissioners, wherein
they made the substantial concession of omitting from the treaty all
reference to the fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi. But
Mr. Clay, on reading the note, "manifested some chagrin," and "still
talked of breaking off the negotiation," even asking Mr. Adams to join
him in so doing, which request, however, Mr. Adams very reasonably
refused. Mr. Clay had also been anxious to stand out for a distinct
abandonment of the alleged right of impressment; but upon this point
he found none of his colleagues ready to back him, and he was compelled
perforce to yield. Agreement was therefore now substantially (p. 093)
reached; a few minor matters were settled, and on December 24, 1814,
the treaty was signed by all the eight negotiators.
It was an astonishing as well as a happy result. Never, probably, in
the history of diplomacy has concord been produced from such discordant
elements as had been brought together in Ghent. Dissension seemed to
have become the mother of amity; and antipathies were mere
preliminaries to a good understanding; in diplomacy as in marriage it
had worked well to begin with a little aversion. But, in truth, this
consummation was largely due to what had been going on in the English
Cabinet. At the outset Lord Castlereagh had been very unwilling to
conclude peace, and his disposition had found expression in the
original intolerable terms prepared by the British Commissioners. But
Lord Liverpool had been equally solicitous on the other side, and was
said even to have tendered his resignation to the Prince Regent, if an
accommodation should not be effected. His endeavors were fortunately
aided by events in Europe. Pending the negotiations Lord Castlereagh
went on a diplomatic errand to Vienna, and there fell into such
threatening discussions with the Emperor of Russia and the King of
Prussia, that he thought it prudent to have done with the American (p. 094)
war, and wrote home pacific advices. Hence, at last, came such
concessions as satisfied the Americans.
The treaty established "a firm and universal peace between his
Britannic Majesty and the United States." Each party was to restore
all captured territory, except that the islands of which the title was
in dispute were to remain in the occupation of the party holding them
at the time of ratification until that title should be settled by
commissioners; provision was made also for the determination of all
the open questions of boundary by sundry boards of commissioners; each
party was to make peace with the Indian allies of the other. Such
were, in substance, the only points touched upon by this document. Of
the many subjects mooted between the negotiators scarcely any had
survived the fierce contests which had been waged concerning them. The
whole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi, access to that
river, and a road through American territory, had been dropped by the
British; while the Americans had been well content to say nothing of
the Northeastern fisheries, which they regarded as still their own.
The disarmament on the lakes and along the Canadian border, and the
neutralization of a strip of Indian territory, were yielded by the (p. 095)
English. The Americans were content to have nothing said about
impressment; nor was any one of the many illegal rights exercised by
England formally abandoned. The Americans satisfied themselves with
the reflection that circumstances had rendered these points now only
matters of abstract principle, since the pacification of Europe had
removed all opportunities and temptations for England to persist in
her previous objectionable courses. For the future it was hardly to be
feared that she would again undertake to pursue a policy against which
it was evident that the United States were willing to conduct a
serious war. There was, however, no provision for indemnification.
Upon a fair consideration, it must be admitted that though the treaty
was silent upon all the points which the United States had made war
for the purpose of enforcing, yet the country had every reason to be
gratified with the result of the negotiation. The five Commissioners
had done themselves ample credit. They had succeeded in agreeing with
each other; they had avoided any fracture of a negotiation which, up
to the very end, seemed almost daily on the verge of being broken off
in anger; they had managed really to lose nothing, in spite of the
fact that their side had had decidedly the worst of the struggle. (p. 096)
They had negotiated much more successfully than the armies of their
countrymen had fought. The Marquis of Wellesley said, in the House of
Lords, that "in his opinion the American Commissioners had shown a
most astonishing superiority over the British during the whole of the
correspondence." One cannot help wishing that the battle of New Orleans
had taken place a little earlier, or that the negotiation had fallen a
little later, so that news of that brilliant event could have reached
the ears of the insolent Englishmen at Ghent, who had for three months
been enjoying the malicious pleasure of lending to the Americans
English newspapers containing accounts of American misfortunes. But
that fortunate battle was not fought until a few days after the eight
Commissioners had signed their compact. It is an interesting
illustration of the slowness of communication which our forefathers
had to endure, that the treaty crossed the Atlantic in a sailing ship
in time to travel through much of the country simultaneously with the
report of this farewell victory. Two such good pieces of news coming
together set the people wild with delight. Even on the dry pages of
Niles's "Weekly Register" occurs the triumphant paragraph: "Who would
not be an American? Long live the Republic! All hail! last asylum (p. 097)
of oppressed humanity! Peace is signed in the arms of victory!" It was
natural that most of the ecstasy should be manifested concerning the
military triumph, and that the mass of the people should find more
pleasure in glorifying General Jackson than in exalting the Commissioners.
The value of their work, however, was well proved by the voice of
Great Britain. In the London "Times" of December 30 appeared a most
angry tirade against the treaty, with bitter sneers at those who
called the peace an "honorable" one. England, it was said, "had
attempted to force her principles on America, and had failed." Foreign
powers would say that the English "had retired from the combat with
the stripes yet bleeding on their backs,--with the recent defeats at
Plattsburgh and on Lake Champlain unavenged." The most gloomy
prognostications of further wars with America when her naval power
should have waxed much greater were indulged. The loss of prestige in
Europe, "the probable loss of our trans-Atlantic provinces," were
among the results to be anticipated from this treaty into which the
English Commissioners had been beguiled by the Americans. These latter
were reviled with an abuse which was really the highest compliment. The
family name of Mr. Adams gained no small access of distinction in (p. 098)
England from this business.
After the conclusion of the treaty Mr. Adams went to Paris, and
remained there until the middle of May, 1815, thus having the good
fortune to witness the return of Napoleon and a great part of the
events of the famous "hundred days." On May 26 he arrived in London,
where there awaited him, in the hands of the Barings, his commission
as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain.
His first duty was, in connection with Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin, to
negotiate a treaty of commerce, in which business he again met the
same three British Commissioners by whom the negotiations at Ghent had
been conducted, of whose abilities the government appeared to
entertain a better opinion than the Marquis of Wellesley had
expressed. This negotiation had been brought so far towards conclusion
by his colleagues before his own arrival that Mr. Adams had little to
do in assisting them to complete it. This little having been done,
they departed and left him as Minister at the Court of St. James. Thus
he fulfilled Washington's prophecy, by reaching the highest rank in
the American diplomatic service.
Of his stay in Great Britain little need be said. He had few duties of
importance to perform. The fisheries, the right of impressment, (p. 099)
and the taking away and selling of slaves by British naval officers
during the late war, formed the subjects of many interviews between
him and Lord Castlereagh, without, however, any definite results being
reached. But he succeeded in obtaining, towards the close of his stay,
some slight remission of the severe restrictions placed by England
upon our trade with her West Indian colonies. His relations with a
cabinet in which the principles of Castlereagh and Canning
predominated could hardly be cordial, yet he seems to have been
treated with perfect civility. Indeed, he was not a man whom it was
easy even for an Englishman to insult. He remarks of Castlereagh,
after one of his first interviews with that nobleman: "His deportment
is sufficiently graceful, and his person is handsome. His manner was
cold, but not absolutely repulsive." Before he left he had the
pleasure of having Mr. Canning specially seek acquaintance with him.
He met, of course, many distinguished and many agreeable persons
during his residence, and partook of many festivities, especially of
numerous civic banquets at which toasts were formally given in the
dullest English fashion and he was obliged to display his capacity for
"table-cloth oratory," as he called it, more than was agreeable to
him. He was greatly bored by these solemn and pompous feedings. (p. 100)
Partly in order to escape them he took a house at Ealing, and lived
there during the greater part of his stay in England. "One of the
strongest reasons for my remaining out of town," he writes, "is to
escape the frequency of invitations at late hours, which consume so
much precious time, and with the perpetually mortifying consciousness
of inability to return the civility in the same manner." The
republican simplicity, not to say poverty, forced upon American
representatives abroad, was a very different matter in the censorious
and unfriendly society of London from what it had been at the kindly
disposed Court of St. Petersburg. The relationship between the mother
country and the quondam colonies, especially at that juncture, was
such as to render social life intolerably trying to an under-paid
American minister.
Mr. Adams remained in England until June 15, 1817, when he sailed from
Cowes, closing forever his long and honorable diplomatic career, and
bidding his last farewell to Europe. He returned home to take the post
of Secretary of State in the cabinet of James Monroe, then lately
inaugurated as President of the United States.