CHAPTER IV

ROBBERY UNDER ARMS

Between Montreux Vieux and Pfetterhausen there is a little French

village called Suarce, which, on the very eve of the war, was the scene

of an incident almost as dramatic from a historical point of view as the

violation of Belgium two days later. At the end of July, for some days

before the war began, the French had withdrawn their troops to a

distance of six miles from the frontier all along the line from

Luxembourg to the point, a mile from Pfetterhausen, which is the

meeting-place of the boundaries of France, Switzerland, and Alsace. They

were acting, I believe, partly at the suggestion of the English

Government, and certainly with their warm approval. A few frontier

posts, consisting chiefly of douaniers and gendarmes, had to be left,

but, short of their recall, everything possible was done to remove

temptation from the path of swashbuckling Uhlan patrols, and so to

diminish the risk of incidents likely to precipitate the declaration of

war.

Unfortunately, these precautions were thrown away, and were even turned

to France’s disadvantage. Before war had begun, Germany had sent a

number of small patrols across the frontier with roving commissions, to

promote the very incidents which France had tried to avoid. After it was

declared, in part of the border district between Metz and Luxembourg,

she gained valuable time by the ease with which her troops advanced in

the neutral zone which France had created. France, hoping against hope

for peace, had played the game: Germany, bent on war, had broken the

rules before it began.

There were nineteen of these deliberate acts of trespass by armed men on

the soil of a friendly power between Longwy and Belfort, twelve of them,

on Sunday, August 2nd, in the Belfort district, the rest, either on the

Sunday or the Monday, at Cirey and other places further north. The

number of them and the wide extent of ground which they covered, were in

themselves enough to prove that they were part of a premeditated scheme,

and not merely the casual acts of a few irresponsible and excitable

individuals. But there were facts about the affair at Suarce which made

it different from the others and established beyond question that the

German soldiers concerned in it (and therefore in the other eighteen

cases) were acting under the orders of their superior officers.

The affray in which the first lives were lost on each side took place at

Joncherey, close to Delle on the Swiss frontier, five miles nearer to

Belfort than Suarce. A glowing account of it was given in the _Elsasser

Kurier_, a paper published at Colmar, which not only acknowledged the

raid and the date (August 2, 1914), but deliberately gloried in the

achievement of its leader, Lieutenant Mayer, of the 5th Chasseurs. He

was, it says, when he received his orders from the general officer

commanding the brigade to reconnoitre in the direction of Belfort, “full

of joy and the lust of fighting, and proud to be the first to teach the

enemy the might of the German trooper.” When he and his patrol of six or

seven crossed the frontier into France they found, according to the same

authority, that the numerous French cavalry and infantry detachments

which had patrolled the district for some days before had disappeared—in

obedience, of course, to the orders of their Government. On the way to

Delle they saw, however, two sentinels posted on the road. “Like a flash

of lightning,” wrote the Colmar enthusiast, “Lieutenant Mayer overtook

them, and with the first stroke of his German sabre cleft to the breast

the head of a French _pioupiou_, who was almost paralyzed by terror. At

the same time, just as quickly, first-class trooper Heize thrust his

lance with such fury into the breast of the other private that he could

not withdraw his weapon from the body which he had pierced (“overtaken”

is the word used), and was obliged to continue his ride with his sabre

(and not his lance) in his hand.” The German story then goes on to tell

how the little troop proceeded to gallop through a company of fifty

French infantry without losing a man, how Lieutenant Mayer was shot down

after they had passed them, and how first-class trooper Heize then took

command and finally reached the German lines with a further loss of

three men. As a matter of fact, the feats of arms of the gallant

lieutenant and first-class trooper Heize were not quite so charmingly

mediæval as the story makes out. What really happened was that when they

came upon the French post, consisting of a corporal and four men,

Lieutenant Mayer, by way of answer to Corporal Peugeot’s challenge,

fired three shots at him with his revolver, one of which wounded him

mortally, and was himself hit and killed by three bullets fired by the

guard. (He was afterwards buried at Joncherey with full military

honours, and a wreath was placed on his grave by the French.) The rest

of the German account, except the appearance on the scene of the fifty

worst shots in the French army, is fairly correct. In any case it is

near enough to the truth to prove without need of further witness that

the raid was not a mere youthful indiscretion on the part of the

unfortunate Lieutenant Mayer.

[Illustration:

FRENCH ADVANCE IN VILLAGE STREET OF MAGNIÈRES, MEURTHE ET MOSELLE.

_From “En Plein Feu.” By kind permission of M. Vermot, Rue

Duguay-Trouin, Paris._

]

But the affair at Suarce is the most really damning piece of evidence

supplied by any of these pre-war violations of French territory. It is

not necessary to depend on the testimony of a Colmar newspaper, which

might possibly be still further mistaken in its statements, to make the

complicity of the German _haut commandement_ historically certain. Early

in the morning of the same fateful date (August 2, 1914), two cyclists

and seven troopers of the German 22nd regiment of Dragoons rode into the

village and informed the inhabitants that it was conquered territory.

Later in the day an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and twelve

troopers of the same regiment appeared, and after breaking up the

telephone apparatus, forced a provision convoy, consisting of nine men,

two waggons, and twenty-two horses, on its way to Belfort, to turn round

and accompany them to Germany. The waggons and horses were taken as

loot; the men were presumably the first specimens of the new kind of

civil prisoner which, during the war, the Germans have been pleased to

label as “hostages.” But in time of peace it is not the custom of

civilized nations to take either loot or hostages from their neighbours,

and, since there were no soldiers engaged in the affair on the French

side, and therefore no fighting, the act could not be defended as an act

of retaliation. Nor is there any question of the officer having done

what he did merely on his own responsibility. You cannot take a troop of

French horses and waggons and men into Germany and hide them under a

bushel. The officer would not, in fact, have dared to commit the crime

of international robbery and kidnapping, and then carried off his spoil

with him to barracks, unless he had known that it would be condoned by

his superior officers. In other words, like the Roman centurion, he was

a man set under authority, and only did what he was told to do. The

facts of the incident, as I have given them, are indisputable. If, at

the time when the British cabinet was weighing the reasons for and

against joining in the war, there were any of its members who doubted

the extent of Germany’s guilt, the story of Suarce may well have played

(as I have heard it did) an important part in helping them to make up

their minds. For it was possibly the earliest positive evidence which

proved beyond a shadow of doubt Germany’s deliberate intention of going

to war. As far as I know, the story has not previously been published,

at all events in any detail, and therefore it may be of a certain amount

of historical interest to give the names of the nine Frenchmen who were

made prisoners of war before war was declared. They were: Edouard Voelin

(58 years of age), Eugène Mattin (52), François Verthe (66), Isidore

Skup (57), Céléstin Fleury (55), Henri Féga (53), J. Pierre Marchal

(51), Charles Martin (29), and Emile Mouhay (29). The last two had been

passed as “bons pour l’armée” in the class of 1914. The rest were

obviously far beyond the military age. Two of the nine have died during

their indefensible imprisonment in Germany.

Verdun to the Vosges: Impressions of the War on the Fortress Frontier of France · 第 4 / 20 章