When the secret treaty of alliance of March, 1912, between Bulgaria and
Servia against Turkey was signed, a division of the territory that
might possibly fall to the allies was agreed upon. Neither Bulgaria nor
Servia has ever published the treaty in full, but from the
denunciations and recriminations indulged in by the parliaments of
both, we know in general what the division was to be. The river
Maritza, it was hoped, would become the western boundary of Turkey, and
a line running from a point just east of Kumanova to the head of Lake
Ochrida was to divide the conquered territory between Servia and
Bulgaria. This would give Monastir, Prilip, Ochrida, and Veles to the
Bulgarians--a great concession on the part of Servia. Certain other
disputed towns were to be left to the arbitrament of the Czar of
Russia. The chief aim to be attained by this division was that Servia
should obtain a seaboard upon the Adriatic Sea, and Bulgaria upon the
Aegean. Incidentally Bulgaria would obtain western Thrace and the
greater part of Macedonia, and Servia would secure the greater part of
Albania.
These calculations had been entirely upset by the course of events.
Bulgaria's share had been considerably increased by the unexpected
conquest of eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, whereas Servia's
portion had been greatly diminished by the creation of an independent
Albania out of her share. Moreover, M. Pashitch, the Servian prime
minister, maintained that whereas by the preliminary treaty Bulgaria
was to send detachments to assist the Servian armies operating in the
Vardar valley, the reverse had been found necessary and Adrianople had
only been taken with the help of 60,000 Servians and by means of the
Servian siege guns. Equity demanded that the new conditions which had
arisen and which had entirely altered the situation should be given
consideration and that Bulgaria should not expect the preliminary
agreement to be carried out. Now, from the outbreak of hostilities
Bulgaria's foreign affairs, in which King Ferdinand was supposed to be
supreme, were really controlled by the prime minister, Dr. Daneff. He
proved to be the evil genius of his country; for his arrogant,
unyielding attitude upon every disputed point, not only with the enemy,
but with the allies and with the Powers, destroyed all kindly feeling
for Bulgaria, and left her friendless in her hour of need. Dr. Daneff's
answer to the Servian contention was that Bulgaria bore the brunt of
the fight; that, had she not kept the main Turkish force occupied,
Servia and Greece would have been crushed; that a treaty is a treaty,
and that the additional gain of eastern Thrace in no way invalidated
the old agreement.
The recriminations between Greeks and Bulgarians were quite as bitter.
There had been no preliminary agreement as to the division of conquered
territory between them, and this permitted each to indulge in the most
extravagant claims. The great bone of contention was the possession of
the fine port of Salonika. As soon as the war against Turkey broke out,
both states pushed forward troops to occupy that city. The Greeks
arrived first and were still in possession. Moreover, they maintained
that, except for the Jews, the population is chiefly Greek. So are the
trade and the schools. M. Venezelos, the Greek prime minister, insisted
also that the erection of an independent Albania deprived Greece of a
large part of northern Epirus, as it had deprived Servia of a great
part of Old Servia, and Montenegro of Scutari. In fact, he asserted
that Bulgaria alone would retain everything she hoped for, securing
nearly three-fifths of the conquered territory, and leaving only
two-fifths to be divided among her three allies; and this, despite the
fact that but for the activity of the Greek navy in preventing the
convoy of Turkey's best troops from Asia, Bulgaria would never have had
her rapid success at the beginning of the war. Finally, he strenuously
objected to the whole seaboard of Macedonia going to Bulgaria, as the
population where it was not Moslem was chiefly Greek. All the parties
to the dispute made much of ethnical and historical claims--"A thousand
years are as a day" in their sight. The answer of Dr. Daneff to the
Greek demands was to the effect that Greece already had one good port
on the Mediterranean, while Bulgaria had none, and that Bulgaria would
have to spend immense sums on either Kavala or Dedeagatch to make them
of any great value. Moreover, as a result of the war, Greece would get
Crete, the Aegean islands, and a good slice of the mainland. She had
suffered least in the war and was really being overpaid for her
services.
Behind all these formal contentions were the conflicting ambitions and
the racial hatreds which no discussion could effectually resolve.
Bulgaria was determined to secure the hegemony of the Balkan peninsula.
She believed that her role was that of a Balkan Prussia, and her great
victories made her confident of her ability to play the role
successfully. To this Servia would never consent. The Servians far
outnumber the Bulgarians. Were they united under one scepter they would
be the strongest nation in the Balkans. Their policy is to maintain an
equilibrium in the peninsula until the hoped-for annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina will give them the preponderance. This alone would
incline Servia to make common cause with Greece. In addition, she had
the powerful motive of direct self-interest. Since she did not secure
the coveted territory on the Adriatic, Salonika would be more than ever
the natural outlet for her products. Should Bulgaria wedge in behind
Greece at Salonika, Servia would have two Powers to deal with, each of
which could pursue the policy of destroying her commerce by a
prohibitory tariff, a policy so often adopted toward her by
Austria-Hungary. M. Pashitch, therefore, was determined to have the new
southern boundary of Servia coterminous with the northern boundary of
Greece. Moreover, Greeks and Servians were aware of the relative
weakness of the Bulgarians due to their great losses and to the wide
territory occupied by their troops. The war party was in the ascendant
in each country. The Servians were anxious to avenge Slivnitza, and the
Greeks still further to redeem themselves from the reputation of 1897.
Had peace been signed in January, there is little doubt that a greater
spirit of conciliation would have prevailed. The Young Turks were
universally condemned at that time for refusing to yield; but had they
deliberately adopted Abdul Hamid's policy of playing off one people
against another, they could not have succeeded better than by their
determination to fight.
Even before the fall of Adrianople, on March 26th, military conflicts
had taken place between Bulgarians and Servians and between Bulgarians
and Greeks. On March 12th a pitched battle occurred between the latter
at Nigrita; and though a mixed commission at once drew up a code of
regulations for use in towns occupied by joint armies, not the
slightest attention was subsequently paid to it. The Servians shortly
afterward expelled the manager of the branch of the National Bulgarian
Bank at Monastir, a step which drew forth emphatic protests from Sofia
against the policy of Serbizing districts in anticipation of the final
settlement. On April 17th, M. Pashitch informed Bulgaria that the
Government would refuse to be bound by the terms of the preliminary
treaty of March, 1912. From that date until the signing of the treaty
of peace with Turkey on May 31st, the recent allies carried on an
unofficial war, which consisted of combats of extermination marked by
inhuman rage. After that event each of the combatants strained every
nerve to push forward its armies and to possess new territories, while
each continued to accuse the other of violating every principle of
international law.
The ambassadors of the great Powers at the capitals of the Balkan
States made urgent representations to the Balkan Governments to
restrain their armies, but without effect. On June 10th the Servian
Government dispatched a note to Sofia demanding a categorical answer to
the Servian demand for a revision of the preliminary treaty. On July
11th the Czar telegraphed to King Peter and King Ferdinand appealing to
them to avoid a fratricidal war, reminding them of his position as
arbitrator under the preliminary treaty and warning them that he would
hold responsible whichever state appealed to force. "The state which
begins war will be responsible before the Slav cause." This well-meant
action had an effect the opposite of that hoped for. In Vienna it was
looked upon as an indirect assertion of moral guardianship by Russia
over the Slav world. The Austrian press insisted that the Balkan states
were of age and could take care of themselves. If not, it was for
Europe, not for Russia, to control them. The political horizon grew
still darker when one week later Dr. Daneff answered the Servian note
in the negative. This resulted in the Servian Minister withdrawing from
Sofia on June 22d.
What was the plan of campaign and the degree of preparedness of the
principal belligerent in the second Balkan war which was about to
commence? The plan of the Bulgarians was the only one whereby they
could hope to secure victory. It depended for success upon surprizing
the Servians by sending masses of Bulgarian troops into the home
territory of Servia by way of the passes leading directly from Sofia
westward through the mountains. This would cut off the Servian armies
operating in Macedonia from their base of supplies and require their
immediate recall for the defense of the home territory. It was an
operation attended by almost insurmountable obstacles. The major part
of the Bulgarian army was in eastern Thrace and would have to be
brought across a country unprovided with either railroads or sufficient
highways. Moreover, the army would have to rely for the transport of
provisions and equipment upon slow-moving bullock wagons. Nevertheless,
given time, secrecy, and freedom from interference, the aim might be
attained. The necessary divisions of the army were set in motion in the
beginning of May. So successful were the Bulgarians in keeping secret
the route and the progress of the army, that by the middle of June they
confidently looked forward to success. Their high hopes were destroyed
by the evil diplomacy of Dr. Daneff in his relations with Roumania.
Russia rewarded Roumania for her splendid assistance in the
Russo-Turkish war of 1877 by depriving her of her fertile province of
Bessarabia and compelling her to take in exchange the Dobrudja, a low,
marshy district inhabited chiefly by Bulgarians and Moslems. And that
was not all. Through Russian influence the commission appointed to
delimit the boundary between Roumania and the new principality of
Bulgaria put the town of Silistria upon the Bulgarian side of the
boundary. Now the heights of Silistria command absolutely the Roumanian
territory opposite to it and the Dobrudja. The Danube directly in front
of Silistria spreads out in a marsh several miles wide, so that it is
impossible to approach Silistria from the Roumanian side by bridge. As
a result Roumania has always felt that her southern border was at the
mercy of Bulgaria and has always, as one of the chief aims of her
national existence, looked forward to the rectification of her southern
boundary. The unfriendly attitude of Russia threw Roumania into the
arms of Austria, so that from the days of the Berlin treaty to the
Balkan war, Roumania has been considered a true friend of the Triple
Alliance. She viewed with jealousy and fear the rapid growth of
Bulgaria in power and in strength. Crowded in between the two military
empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary, Roumania naturally looked upon
the development of another military state upon her southern border as a
menace to her national existence. Hence when the Macedonian question
became very acute in 1903, and it seemed that action would be
undertaken by Bulgaria and Servia against Turkey, Roumania had declared
that she would not tolerate an alteration of the _status quo_. She did
not move, however, when the allies undertook the war of liberation in
October, 1912. But when a month's campaign changed the war from one of
liberation to one of conquest, Roumania demanded from Bulgaria as the
price of neutrality Silistria and a small slice of the Black Sea coast
sufficient to satisfy strategic military demands.
It was in his relations with Roumania that Daneff's diplomacy was most
stupid. M. Take Jonescu, one of Roumanians ablest statesmen, was sent
by the Government to the first Peace Conference at London to secure
pledges from Dr. Daneff in regard to the Roumanian demand. He could get
no answer. Daneff used every device to gain time in the hope that a
settlement with Turkey would relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of
giving anything. When the peace negotiations failed and the war between
the allies and Turkey recommenced, the relations between Roumania and
Bulgaria became very critical. However, at the Czar's suggestion, both
countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the
ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg. Dr. Daneff, who
represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to
yield on any point. As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French
ambassador, M. Delcassé, in reconciling the divergent views of the
great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of
Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase
on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M.
Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian
Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after
the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies
were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that
she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the
interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.
Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th
was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more
inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no
intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to
the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay
was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians
were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions.
The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans
between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in
Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There
was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive
movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The
great _coup_ had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and
then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to
fight their combined forces.
Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part
of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians
demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent
Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded
he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the
military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman
would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon
the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It
was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign
which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be
remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place
between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while
insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to
enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on June 29th the
word went forth from Bulgarian headquarters for a general attack upon
the Servian line which, taken by surprise, yielded.
In the mean time public opinion at Bucharest became almost
uncontrollable in its demand for the mobilization of the troops, and
the government was outraged at the continued prohibition by Russia of a
forward movement. The Roumanian Government had already appealed to
Count Berchtold for Austro-Hungarian support against Russian
interference, but Austria-Hungary, like every other great power,
expected Bulgaria to win, and she intended that Bulgaria should take
the place vacated by Turkey as a counterpoise to Russia in the Balkans.
Hence Count Berchtold informed Roumania that she could not rely upon
Austro-Hungarian support, were she to ignore the Russian veto. But in
the mean time an exaggerated report of the Servian defeat had reached
St. Petersburg on July 1st, and to save Servia, Russia lifted the
embargo on Roumanian action.
Forty-eight hours later Europe knew that the Greeks had fought the
fearful battle of Kilchis, resulting in the utter rout of the
Bulgarians, who were in full retreat to defend the Balkan passes into
their home territory. Russia at once recalled her permission for
Roumanian mobilization, but it was too late. The army was on the march.
The situation of Bulgaria was now truly desperate. Not only had her
_coup_ against the Servians failed, but her troops were fleeing before
the victorious Greeks up the Struma valley. On July 5th war was
officially recognized by the withdrawal of the representatives of
Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, from Sofia. On the same day Turkey
requested the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops east of the Enos-Midia
line. In the bloody battles which continued to be fought against Greeks
and Servians, the Bulgarians were nearly everywhere defeated, and on
July 10th Bulgaria placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Russia
with a view to a cessation of hostilities.
This did not, however, prevent the forward movement of all her enemies.
On July 15th, Turkey, "moved by the unnatural war" existing in the
Balkan Peninsula, dispatched Enver Bey with an army to Adrianople,
which he reoccupied July 20th. By that time the Roumanians were within
twenty miles of Sofia, and the guns of the Servians and Greeks could be
heard in the Bulgarian capital. The next day King Ferdinand telegraphed
to King Charles of Roumania, asking him to intercede with the kings of
Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. He did so, and all the belligerents
agreed to send peace delegates to Bucharest. They assembled there on
July 29th and at once concluded an armistice.
Each of the belligerent States sent its best man to the peace
conference. Greece was represented by M. Venezelos, Servia by M.
Pashitch, Roumania by M. Jonescu, Montenegro by M. Melanovitch, and
Bulgaria chiefly by General Fitcheff, who had opposed the surprise
attack upon the Servians. The policy of Bulgaria at the conference was
to satisfy the demands of Roumania at once, sign a separate treaty
which would rid her territory of Roumanian troops, and then treat with
Greece and Servia. But M. Jonescu, who controlled the situation,
insisted that peace must be restored by one treaty, not by several. At
the same time he let it be known that Roumania would not uphold
extravagant claims on the part of Greece and Servia which they could
never have advanced were her troops not at the gates of Sofia. The
moderate Roumanian demands were easily settled. Her southern boundary
was to run from Turtukai via Dobritch to Baltchik on the Black Sea. She
also secured cultural privileges for the Kutzovlachs in Bulgaria. The
Servians, who before the second Balkan war would have been satisfied
with the Vardar river as a boundary, now insisted upon the possession
of the important towns of Kotchana, Ishtib, Radovishta, and Strumnitza,
to the east of the Vardar. With the assistance of Roumania, Bulgaria
was permitted to retain Strumnitza. The Greeks were the most
unyielding. Before the war they would have been perfectly satisfied to
have secured the Struma river as their eastern boundary. Now they
demanded much more of the Aegean seacoast, including the important port
of Kavala. The Bulgarian representatives refused to sign without the
possession of Kavala, but under pressure from Roumania they had to
consent. But they would yield on nothing else. The money indemnity
demanded by Greece and Servia and the all-around grant of religious
privileges suggested by Roumania had to be dropped. The treaty was
signed August 6, 1913.
In the mean time the Powers had not been passive onlookers.
Austria-Hungary insisted that Balkan affairs are European affairs and
that the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as merely
provisional, to be made definitive by the great Powers. On this
proposition the members of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple
Entente divided. Austria and Italy in the one, and Russia in the other,
favored a revision. Austria fears a strong Servia, and Italy dislikes
the growth of Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean. These two
States and Russia favored a whittling-down of the gains of Greece and
Servia and insisted upon Kavala and a bigger slice of the Aegean
seaboard for Bulgaria. But France, England, and Germany insisted upon
letting well-enough alone. King Charles of Roumania, who demanded that
the peace should be considered definitive, sent a telegram to Emperor
William containing the following sentence: "Peace is assured, and
thanks to you, will remain definitive." This gave great umbrage at
Vienna; but in the divided condition of the European Concert, no State
wanted to act alone. So the treaty stands.
The condition of Bulgaria was indeed pitiable, but her cup was not yet
full. Immediately after occupying Adrianople on July 20th, the Turks
had made advances to the Bulgarian government looking to the settlement
of a new boundary. But Bulgaria, relying upon the intervention of the
Powers, had refused to treat at all. On August 7th the representatives
of the great Powers at Constantinople called collectively upon the
Porte to demand that it respect the Treaty of London. But the Porte had
seen Europe so frequently flouted by the little Balkan States during
the previous year, that it had slight respect for Europe as a
collective entity. In fact, Europe's prestige at Constantinople had
disappeared. _J'y suis, j'y reste_ was the answer of the Turks to the
demand to evacuate Adrianople. The recapture of that city had been a
godsend to the Young Turk party. The Treaty of London had destroyed
what little influence it had retained after the defeat of the armies,
and it grasped at the seizure of Adrianople as a means of awakening
enthusiasm and keeping office. As the days passed by, it became evident
that further delay would cost Bulgaria dear. On August 15th the Turkish
troops crossed the Maritza river and occupied western Thrace, though
the Porte had hitherto been willing to accept the Maritza as the
boundary. The Bulgarian hope of a European intervention began to fade.
The Turks were soon able to convince the Bulgarian Government that most
of the great Powers were willing to acquiesce in the retention of
Adrianople by the Turks in return for economic and political
concessions to themselves. There was nothing for Bulgaria to do but
yield, and on September 3d General Savoff and M. Tontcheff started for
Constantinople to treat with the Turkish government for a new boundary
line. They pleaded for the Maritza as the boundary between the two
States, the possession of the west bank being essential for railway
connection between Bulgaria and Dedeagatch, her only port on the
Aegean. But this plea came in conflict with the determination of the
Turks to keep a sufficient strategic area around Adrianople. Hence the
Turks demanded and secured a considerable district on the west bank,
including the important town of Dimotika. By the preliminary agreement
signed on September 18th the boundary starts at the mouth of the
Maritza river, goes up the river to Mandra, then west around Dimotika
almost to Mustafa Pasha. On the north the line starts at Sveti Stefan
and runs west so that Kirk Kilesseh is retained by Turkey.
While the Balkan belligerents were settling upon terms of peace among
themselves, the conference of ambassadors at London was trying to bring
the settlement of the Albanian problem to a conclusion. On August 11th
the conference agreed that an international commission of control,
consisting of a representative of each of the great Powers, should
administer the affairs of Albania until the Powers should select a
prince as ruler of the autonomous State. The conference also decided to
establish a _gendarmerie_ under the command of military officers
selected from one of the small neutral States of Europe. At the same
time the conference agreed upon the southern boundary of Albania. This
line was a compromise between that demanded by Greece and that demanded
by Austria-Hungary and Italy. Unfortunately it was agreed that the
international boundary commission which was to be appointed should in
drawing the line be guided mainly by the nationality of the inhabitants
of the districts through which it would pass. At once Greeks and
Albanians began a campaign of nationalization in the disputed
territory, which resulted in sanguinary conflicts. Unrest soon spread
throughout the whole of Albania. On August 17th a committee of
Malissori chiefs visited Admiral Burney, who was in command, at
Scutari, of the marines from the international fleet, to notify him
that the Malissori would never agree to incorporation in Montenegro.
They proceeded to make good their threat by capturing the important
town of Dibra and driving the Servians from the neighborhood of Djakova
and Prizrend. Since then the greater part of northern and southern
Albania has been practically in a state of anarchy.
The settlement of the Balkans described in this article will probably
last for at least a generation, not because all the parties to the
settlement are content, but because it will take at least a generation
for the dissatisfied States to recuperate. Bulgaria is in far worse
condition than she was before the war with Turkey. The second Balkan
war, caused by her policy of greed and arrogance, destroyed 100,000 of
the flower of her manhood, lost her all of Macedonia and eastern
Thrace, and increased her expenses enormously. Her total gains, whether
from Turkey or from her former allies, were but eighty miles of
seaboard on the Aegean, with a Thracian hinterland wofully depopulated.
Even railway communication with her one new port of Dedeagatch has been
denied her. Bulgaria is in despair, but full of hate. However, with a
reduced population and a bankrupt treasury, she will need many years to
recuperate before she can hope to upset the new arrangement. And it
will be hard even to attempt that; for the _status quo_ is founded upon
the principle of a balance of power in the Balkan peninsula; and
Roumania has definitely announced herself as a Balkan power. Servia,
and more particularly Greece, have made acquisitions beyond their
wildest dreams at the beginning of the war and have now become strong
adherents of the policy of equilibrium.
The future of the Turks is in Asia, and Turkey in Asia just now is in a
most unhappy condition. Syria, Armenia, and Arabia are demanding
autonomy; and the former respect of the other Moslems for the governing
race, _i.e._, the Turks, has received a severe blow. Whether Turkey can
pull itself together, consolidate its resources, and develop the
immense possibilities of its Asiatic possessions remains, of course, to
be seen. But it will have no power, and probably no desire, to upset
the new arrangement in the Balkans.
The settlement is probably a landmark in Balkan history in that it
brings to a close the period of tutelage exercised by the great Powers
over the Christian States of the Balkans. Neither Austria-Hungary nor
Russia emerges from the ordeal with prestige. The pan-Slavic idea has
received a distinct rebuff. To Roumania and Greece, another non-Slavic
State, _i.e._, Albania, has been added; and in no part of the peninsula
is Russia so detested as in Bulgaria which unreasonably protests that
Russia betrayed her. "Call us Huns, Turks, or Tatars, but not Slavs."
Twice the Austro-Hungarians, in their anxiety to maintain the balance
of power in the Balkans, made the mistake of backing the wrong
combatant. In the first war, they upheld Turkey; and in the second,
they favored Bulgaria. In encouraging Bulgarian aggression they
estranged Roumania, the faithful friend of a generation, and Bulgaria
won only debt and disgrace. Yet Austria-Hungary must now continue to
support Bulgaria as a counterpoise to a stronger Servia which they
consider a menace to their security because of Servian influence on
their southern Slavs. The Balkan states will manage their own affairs
in the future, but they will still offer abundant opportunity for the
play of Russian and Austro-Hungarian rivalry. It had been hoped that
the Balkan peninsula, when freed from the incubus of Turkish misrule,
would settle down to a period of general tranquillity. Instead of this,
the ejectment of the Turk has resulted in increased bitterness and more
dangerous hate.