McKINLEY’S OWN STORY OF THE SPANISH WAR.
In all that has been written of the Spanish war and the way in which it
was conducted by President McKinley’s administration, no history can
give such a clear and complete account of it as was written by the
President himself. President McKinley’s own history of the Spanish war
is contained in an official message to Congress sent by him after the
war had been brought to such a successful close. It is as follows:
For a righteous cause and under a common flag military service has
strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more closely than
ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the country.
In my annual message very full consideration was given to the question
of the duty of the Government of the United States toward Spain and the
Cuban insurrection as being by far the most important problem with which
we were then called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced, and
the exposition of the views then expressed, disclosed my sense of the
extreme gravity of the situation.
Setting aside, as logically unfounded or practically inadmissible, the
recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, the recognition of
the independence of Cuba, neutral intervention to end the war by
imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, intervention in
favor of one or the other party, and forcible annexation of the islands,
I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly relations with Spain
that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations
of reform, to which she had become irrevocably committed. Within a few
weeks previously she had announced comprehensive plans, which it was
confidently asserted would be efficacious to remedy the evils so deeply
affecting our own country, so injurious to the true interests of the
mother country as well as to these of Cuba, and so repugnant to the
universal sentiment of humanity.
The ensuing month brought little sign of real progress toward the
pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administration set up in the
capital and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor
of the inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large
extent of territory held by the insurgents, while the military arm,
obviously unable to cope with the still active rebellion, continued many
of the most objectionable and offensive policies of the government that
had preceded it.
No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy
reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard
and the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered
expedient of zones of cultivation proved illusory. Indeed, no less
practical nor more delusive promises of succor could well have been
tendered to the exhausted and destitute people, stripped of all that
made life and home dear and herded in a strange region among
unsympathetic strangers hardly less necessitous than themselves.
By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully
increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths
among these distressed people at over 40 per cent. from the time General
Weyler’s decree of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence
of the Spanish authorities a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable
contributions raised in this country and distributed, under the
direction of the Consul General and the several Consuls, by noble and
earnest individual effort through the organized agencies of the American
Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more
were inaccessible to such forms of aid.
The war continued on the old footing, without comprehensive plan,
developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic
result, that had marked the course of the earlier Ten Years’ rebellion
as well as the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save
physical exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical
ruin of the island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could
venture to conjecture.
DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.
At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction
of the battleship Maine, while rightfully lying in the Harbor of Havana
on a mission of international courtesy and good will—a catastrophe the
suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation’s heart
profoundly.
It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense
distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling
upon a generous people, already deeply touched by preceding events in
Cuba, did not move them to an instant, desperate resolve to tolerate no
longer the existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors
that made possible such a deed by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct
of justice prevailed and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the
searching investigation at once set on foot.
[Illustration:
POLICE STATION NO. 1, BUFFALO, WHERE THE ASSASSIN WAS TAKEN.]
[Illustration:
From a photograph taken for and used by courtesy of Chicago Inter
Ocean.
REMOVING THE CASKET FROM THE HEARSE AT THE CITY HALL, BUFFALO.]
The finding of the naval board of inquiry established that the origin of
the explosion was external by a submarine mine, and only halted through
lack of positive testimony to fix the responsibility of its authorship.
All these things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before
the finding of the naval court, that a crisis in our relations with
Spain and toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it
needed but a brief executive suggestion to the Congress to receive
immediate answer to the duty of making instant provision for the
possible and perhaps speedy probable emergency of war, and the
remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was presented of a unanimous vote
of both houses on the 9th of March, appropriating $50,000,000 for the
national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to
be expended at the direction of the President.
That this act of provision came none too soon was disclosed when the
application of the fund was undertaken. Our forts were practically
undefended. Our navy needed large provision for increased ammunition and
supplies and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack from the navy
of Spain, which comprised vessels of the highest type of continental
perfection. Our army also required enlargement of men and munitions.
The details of the hurried preparation for the dreaded contingency are
told in the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and need
not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that the outbreak of war,
when it did come, found our nation not unprepared to meet the conflict.
Nor was the apprehension of coming strife confined to our own country.
It was felt by the Continental powers, which, on April 6, through their
Ambassadors and Envoys, addressed to the Executive an expression of hope
that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this government
and people, and that further negotiations would lead to an agreement
which, while securing the maintenance of peace, would affirm all
necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.
In responding to that representation I also shared the hope that the
Envoys had expressed that peace might be preserved in a manner to
terminate the chronic condition of disturbance in Cuba so injurious and
menacing to our interests and tranquillity, as well as shocking to our
sentiments of humanity; and, while appreciating the humanitarian and
disinterested character of the communication they had made on behalf of
the powers, I stated the confidence of this government, for its part,
that equal appreciation would be shown for its own earnest and unselfish
endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the
indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable.
VAIN EFFORTS TO AVERT WAR.
Still animated by the hope of a peaceful solution and obeying the
dictates of duty, no effort was relaxed to bring about a speedy ending
of the Cuban struggle. Negotiations to this object continued actively
with the Government of Spain, looking to the immediate conclusion of a
six months’ armistice in Cuba with a view to effecting the recognition
of her people’s rights to independence. Besides this, the instant
revocation of the order of reconcentration was asked, so that the
sufferers, returning to their homes and aided by united American and
Spanish effort, might be put in a way to support themselves and, by
orderly resumption of the well-nigh destroyed productive energies of the
island, contribute to the restoration of its tranquillity and well
being.
Negotiations continued for some little time at Madrid, resulting in
offers by the Spanish Government which could not but be regarded as
inadequate. It was proposed to confide the preparation of peace to the
insular parliament, yet to be convened under the autonomous decrees of
November, 1897, but without impairment in any wise to the constitutional
powers of the Madrid government, which, to that end, would grant an
armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for such time as the
General-in-Chief might see fit to fix.
How and with what scope of discretionary powers the insular parliament
was expected to set about the “preparation” of peace did not appear. If
it were to be by negotiation with the insurgents, the issue seemed to
rest on the one side with a body chosen by a fraction of the electors in
the districts under Spanish control and on the other with the insurgent
population holding the interior country, unrepresented in the so-called
parliament, and defiant at the suggestion of suing for peace.
Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors
to reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole
question to the Congress. In the message of April 1, 1898, I announced
that with this last overture in the direction of immediate peace in
Cuba, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the effort of the
Executive was brought to an end.
I again reviewed the alternative course of action which I had proposed,
concluding that the only one consonant with international policy and
compatible with our firm-set historical traditions was intervention as a
neutral to stop the war and check the hopeless sacrifice of life, even
though that resort involved “hostile constraint upon both the parties to
the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.”
The grounds justifying that step were: The interests of humanity, the
duty to protect life and property of our citizens in Cuba, the right to
check injury to our commerce and people through the devastation of the
island, and, most important, the need of removing at once and forever
the constant menace and the burdens entailed upon our government by the
uncertainties and perils of the situation caused by the unendurable
disturbance in Cuba. I said:
“The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the
war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may
smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been, and it is plain that
it cannot be, extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief
and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the
enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of
civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us
the right and the duty to speak, the existing war in Cuba must stop.”
In view of all this the Congress was asked to authorize and empower the
President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of
hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and to secure in the
island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining
order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and
tranquillity, and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and
for the accomplishment of those ends to use the military and naval
forces of the United States as might be necessary, with added authority
to continue generous relief to the starving people of Cuba.
DECISIVE ACTION BY CONGRESS.
The response of the Congress, after nine days of earnest deliberation,
during which the almost unanimous sentiment of that body was developed
on every point save as to the expediency of coupling the proposed action
with a formal recognition of the republic of Cuba as the true and lawful
government of that island—a proposition which failed of adoption—the
Congress, after conference, on the 19th of April, by a vote of 42 to 35
in the Senate and 311 to 6 in the House of Representatives, passed the
memorable joint resolution, declaring:
“1. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent.
“2. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island
of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban
waters.
“3. That the President of the United States be and he hereby is directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary, to
carry these resolutions into effect.
“4. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island,
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when
that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island
to its people.”
This resolution was approved by the Executive on the next day, April 20.
A copy was at once communicated to the Spanish Minister at this capital,
who forthwith announced that his continuance in Washington had thereby
become impossible, and asked for his passports, which were given him. He
thereupon withdrew from Washington, leaving the protection of Spanish
interests in the United States to the French Ambassador and the
Austro-Hungarian Minister.
Simultaneously with its communication to the Spanish Minister, General
Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, was telegraphed confirmation
of the text of the joint resolution, and directed to communicate it to
the Government of Spain, with the formal demand that it at once
relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and
withdraw its forces therefrom, coupling this demand with announcements
of the intentions of this government as to the future of the island, in
conformity with the fourth clause of the resolution, and giving Spain
until noon of April 23d to reply.
The demand, although, as above shown, officially made known to the
Spanish Envoy here, was not delivered at Madrid. After the instruction
reached General Woodford on the morning of April 21st, but before he
could present it, the Spanish Minister of State notified him that upon
the President’s approval of the joint resolution the Madrid Government,
regarding the act as “equivalent to an evident declaration of war,” had
ordered its Minister in Washington to withdraw, thereby breaking off
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and ceasing all official
communication between their respective representatives. General Woodford
thereupon demanded his passports and quitted Madrid the same day.
FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR.
Spain having thus denied the demand of the United States and initiated
that complete form of rupture of relations which attends a state of war,
the executive powers authorized by the resolution were at once used by
me to meet the enlarged contingency of actual war between Spain and the
United States.
On April 22d I proclaimed a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba,
including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the
port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, and on the 23d I called
for volunteers to execute the purpose of the resolution.
By my message of April 25th the Congress was informed of the situation,
and I recommended formal declaration of the existence of a state of war
between the United States and Spain. The Congress accordingly voted on
the same day the act approved April 25, 1898, declaring the existence of
such war, from and including the 21st day of April, and re-enacted the
provisions of the resolution of April 20th, directing the President to
use all the armed forces of the nation to carry that act into effect.
Due notification of the existence of war as aforesaid was given April
25th by telegraph to all the governments with which the United States
maintain relations, in order that their neutrality might be assured
during the war.
The various governments responded with proclamations of neutrality, each
after its own methods. It is not among the least gratifying incidents of
the struggle that the obligations of neutrality were impartially
discharged by all, often under delicate and difficult circumstances.
In further fulfillment of international duty, I issued, April 26th, a
proclamation announcing the treatment proposed to be accorded to vessels
and their cargoes as to blockades, contraband, the exercise of the right
of subjects and the immunity of neutral flags and neutral goods under
the enemy’s flag. A similar proclamation was made by the Spanish
government. In the conduct of hostilities the rules of the declaration
of Paris, including abstention from resort to privateering, have
accordingly been observed by both belligerents, although neither was a
party to that declaration.
RECRUITING OF ARMY AND NAVY.
Our country thus, after an interval of half a century of peace with all
nations, found itself engaged in deadly conflict with a foreign enemy.
Every nerve was strained to meet the emergency.
The response to the initial call for 125,000 volunteers was instant and
complete, as was also the result of the second call of May 25th for
75,000 additional volunteers. The ranks of the regular army were
increased to the limits provided by the act of April 26th.
The enlisted force of the navy on the 15th of August, when it reached
its maximum, numbered 24,123 men and apprentices. One hundred and three
vessels were added to the navy by purchase, one was presented to the
government, one leased and the four vessels of the International
Navigation Company—the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York and Paris—were
chartered. In addition to these the revenue cutters and lighthouse
tenders were turned over to the Navy Department and became temporarily a
part of the auxiliary navy.
The maximum effective fighting force of the navy during the war,
separated into classes, was as follows:
Regular—Four battleships of the first class, one battleship of the
second class, two armored cruisers, six coast defense monitors, one
armored ram, twelve protected cruisers, three unprotected cruisers,
eighteen gunboats, one dynamite cruiser, eleven torpedo boats, fourteen
old vessels of the old navy, including monitors.
Auxiliary Navy—Sixteen auxiliary cruisers, twenty-eight converted
yachts, twenty-seven converted tugs, nineteen converted colliers,
fifteen revenue cutters, four lighthouse tenders and nineteen
miscellaneous vessels.
Much alarm was felt along our entire Atlantic seaboard lest some attack
might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent
possible injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary
garrisons were provided, drawn from the State militia. Infantry and
light batteries were drawn from the volunteer force. About 12,000 troops
were thus employed. The coast signal service was established for
observing the approach of an enemy’s ships to the coast of the United
States, and the life-saving and lighthouse services co-operated, which
enabled the Navy Department to have all portions of the Atlantic coast,
from Maine to Texas, under observation.
The auxiliary navy was created under the authority of Congress and was
officered and manned by the naval militia of the several States. This
organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second arm
of defense.
Under the direction of the chief of engineers submarine mines were
placed at the most exposed points. Before the outbreak of the war
permanent mining casements and cable galleries had been constructed at
all important harbors. Most of the torpedo material was not to be found
in the market and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April
19th district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures,
short of the actual attaching of the loaded mines to the cables, and on
April 22d telegraphic orders were issued to place the loaded mines in
position.
The aggregate number of mines placed was 1,535 at the principal harbors
from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting
of mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of
the Spanish fleet these mines were not placed.
The signal corps was promptly organized and performed service of most
difficult and important character. Its operations during the war covered
the electrical connection of all coast fortifications and the
establishment of telephonic and telegraphic facilities for the camps at
Manila, Santiago and in Porto Rico.
There were constructed 300 miles of line at ten great camps, thus
facilitating military movements from those points in a manner heretofore
unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were
established and maintained under the enemy’s fire at Manila, and later
the Manila-Hongkong cable was reopened. In Porto Rico cable
communications were opened over a discontinued route, and on land the
headquarters of the commanding officer were kept in telegraphic or
telephonic communication with the division commanders of four different
lines of operation.
There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship, with
war cables and cable gear suitable both for the destruction of
communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own.
Two ocean cables were destroyed under the enemy’s batteries at Santiago.
The day previous to the landing of General Shafter’s corps at Caimanera,
within twenty miles of the landing place, cable communications were
established and cable stations opened, giving direct communication with
the Government at Washington. This service was invaluable to the
Executive in directing the operations of the army and navy.
With a total force of over 1,300 the loss was by disease and field,
officers and men included, only five.
PATRIOTISM IN BOND BIDS.
The national defense under the $50,000,000 fund was expended in large
part by the army and navy, and the objects for which it was used are
fully shown in the reports of the several Secretaries. It was a most
timely appropriation, enabling the government to strengthen its defense
and making preparations greatly needed in case of war.
This fund being inadequate to the requirements of equipment and for the
conduct of the war, the patriotism of the Congress provided the means in
the war revenue act of June 13th, by authorizing a 3 per cent popular
loan, not to exceed $400,000,000, and by levying additional imposts and
taxes. Of the authorized loan, $200,000,000 were offered and promptly
taken, the subscriptions so far exceeding the call as to cover it many
times over, while, preference being given to the smaller bids, no single
allotment exceeded $5,000.
This was a most encouraging and significant result, showing the vast
resources of the nation and the determination of the people to uphold
their country’s honor.
DEWEY’S HISTORIC VICTORY.
The first encounter of the war in point of date took place April 27th,
when a detachment of the blockading squadron made a reconnaissance in
force at Matanzas, shelled the harbor forts and demolished several new
works in construction.
The next engagement was destined to mark a memorable epoch in maritime
warfare. The Pacific fleet, under Commodore Dewey, had lain for some
weeks at Hongkong. Upon the colonial proclamation of neutrality being
issued and the customary twenty-four hours’ notice being given, it
repaired to Mirs Bay, near Hongkong, whence it proceeded to the
Philippine Islands under telegraphed orders to capture or destroy the
formidable Spanish fleet then assembled at Manila.
At daybreak on the 1st of May the American force entered Manila Bay, and
after a few hours’ engagement effected the total destruction of the
Spanish fleet, consisting of ten warships and a transport, besides
capturing the naval station and forts at Cavite, thus annihilating the
Spanish naval power in the Pacific Ocean and completely controlling the
Bay of Manila, with the ability to take the city at will. Not a life was
lost on our ships, the wounded only numbering seven, while not a vessel
was materially injured.
For this gallant achievement the Congress, upon my recommendation, fitly
bestowed upon the actors preferment and substantial reward.
The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and
upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility
thereby attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle.
Re-enforcements were hurried to Manila under the command of
Major-General Merritt and firmly established within sight of the
capital, which lay helpless before our guns.
On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the
victory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet
what troops would be required. The information was received on the 15th
day of May, and the first army expedition sailed May 25th and arrived
off Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon followed, the total force
consisting of 641 officers and 15,058 men.
Only reluctance to cause needless loss of life and property prevented
the early storming and capture of the city, and therewith the absolute
military occupancy of the whole group. The insurgents meanwhile had
resumed the active hostilities suspended by the uncompleted truce of
December, 1897. Their forces invested Manila from the northern and
eastern side, but were constrained by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt
from attempting an assault.
It was fitting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive
operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of
the United States alone. Obeying the stern precept of war, which enjoins
the overcoming of the adversary and the extinction of his power wherever
assailable as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory
was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities
attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be
thought of.
CAMPAIGN IN CUBA REVIEWED.
Following the comprehensive scheme of general attack, powerful forces
were assembled at various points on our coast to invade Cuba and Porto
Rico. Meanwhile naval demonstrations were made at several exposed
points. On May 11th the cruiser Wilmington and torpedo boat Winslow were
unsuccessful in an attempt to silence the batteries at Cardenas, against
Matanzas, Worth Bagley and four seamen falling.
These grievous fatalities were, strangely enough, among the very few
which occurred during our naval operations in this extraordinary
conflict.
Meanwhile the Spanish naval preparations had been pushed with great
vigor. A powerful squadron under Admiral Cervera, which had assembled at
the Cape Verde Islands before the outbreak of hostilities, had crossed
the ocean, and by its erratic movements in the Caribbean Sea delayed our
military operations while baffling the pursuit of our fleets. For a time
fears were felt lest the Oregon and Marietta, then nearing home after
their long voyage from San Francisco of over 15,000 miles, might be
surprised by Admiral Cervera’s fleet, but their fortunate arrival
dispelled these apprehensions and lent much needed re-enforcement.
Not until Admiral Cervera took refuge in the Harbor of Santiago de Cuba
about May 9th was it practicable to plan a systematic military attack
upon the Antillean possessions of Spain. Several demonstrations occurred
on the coasts of Cuba and Porto Rico in preparation for the larger
event. On May 13th the North Atlantic squadron shelled San Juan de Porto
Rico. On May 30th Commodore Schley’s squadron bombarded the forts
guarding the mouth of Santiago Harbor. Neither attack had any material
result. It was evident that well-ordered land operations were
indispensable to achieve a decisive advantage.
The next act in the war thrilled not alone the hearts of our countrymen
but the world by its exceptional heroism.
On the night of June 3d Lieutenant Hobson, aided by seven devoted
volunteers, blocked the narrow outlet from Santiago Harbor by sinking
the collier Merrimac in the channel, under a fierce fire from the shore
batteries, escaping with their lives as by a miracle, but falling into
the hands of the Spaniards.
It is a most gratifying incident of the war that the bravery of this
little band of heroes was cordially appreciated by the Spaniards, who
sent a flag of truce to notify Admiral Sampson of their safety and to
compliment them upon their daring act. They were subsequently exchanged
July 7th.
By June 7th the cutting of the last Cuban cable isolated the island.
Thereafter the invasion was vigorously prosecuted. On June 10th, under a
heavy protecting fire, a landing of 600 marines from the Oregon,
Marblehead and Yankee was effected in Guantanamo Bay, where it had been
determined to establish a naval station. This important and essential
port was taken from the enemy after severe fighting by the marines, who
were the first organized force of the United States to land in Cuba. The
position so won was held despite desperate attempts to dislodge our
forces.
By June 16th additional forces were landed and strongly intrenched. On
June 22d the advance of the invading army under Major-General Shafter
landed at Baiquiri, about fifteen miles east of Santiago. This was
accomplished under great difficulties, but with marvelous dispatch. On
June 23d the movement against Santiago was begun.
On the 24th the first serious engagement took place, in which the First
and Tenth Cavalry and the First United States Volunteer Cavalry, General
Young’s brigade of General Wheeler’s division, participated, losing
heavily. By nightfall, however, ground within five miles of Santiago was
won.
The advantage was steadily increased. On July 1st a severe battle took
place, our forces gaining the outworks of Santiago. On the 2d El Caney
and San Juan were taken after a desperate charge, and the investment of
the city was completed. The navy co-operated by shelling the town and
the coast forts.
DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMADA.
On the day following this brilliant achievement of our land forces, July
3d, occurred the decisive naval combat of the war. The Spanish fleet,
attempting to leave the harbor, was met by the American squadron under
command of Commodore Sampson. In less than three hours all the Spanish
ships were destroyed, the two torpedo boats being sunk, and the Maria
Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya and Cristobal Colon driven ashore.
The Spanish Admiral and over 1,300 men were taken prisoners, while the
enemy’s loss of life was deplorably large, some 600 perishing.
On our side but one man was killed, on the Brooklyn, and one man
seriously wounded. Although our ships were repeatedly struck, not one
was seriously injured.
Where all so conspicuously distinguished themselves, from the commanders
to the gunners and the unnamed heroes in the boiler-rooms, each and all
contributing toward the achievement of this astounding victory, for
which neither ancient nor modern history affords a parallel in the
completeness of the event and the marvelous disproportion of casualties
it would be invidious to single out any for especial honor.
Deserved promotion has rewarded the more conspicuous actors—the nation’s
profoundest gratitude is due to all of those brave men who by their
skill and devotion in a few short hours crushed the sea power of Spain
and wrought a triumph whose decisiveness and far-reaching consequences
can scarcely be measured. Nor can we be unmindful of the achievements of
our builders, mechanics and artisans for their skill in the construction
of our warships.
With the catastrophe of Santiago Spain’s effort upon the ocean virtually
ceased. A spasmodic effort toward the end of June to send her
Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Camara to relieve Manila was
abandoned, the expedition being recalled after it had passed through the
Suez Canal.
The capitulation of Santiago followed. The city was closely besieged by
land, while the entrance of our ships into the harbor cut off all relief
on that side. After a truce to allow of the removal of non-combatants
protracted negotiations continued from July 3d to July 15th, when, under
menace of immediate assault, the preliminaries of surrender were agreed
upon. On the 17th General Shafter occupied the city.
The capitulation embraced the entire eastern end of Cuba. The number of
Spanish soldiers surrendered was 22,000, all of whom were subsequently
conveyed to Spain at the charge of the United States.
The story of this successful campaign is told in the report of the
Secretary of War, which will be laid before you. The individual valor of
officers and soldiers was never more strikingly shown than in the
several engagements leading to the surrender of Santiago, while the
prompt movements and successive victories won instant and universal
applause.
To those who gained this complete triumph, which established the
ascendancy of the United States upon land as the fight off Santiago had
fixed our supremacy on the seas, the earnest and lasting gratitude of
the nation is unsparingly due.
Nor should we alone remember the gallantry of the living; the dead claim
our tears, and our losses by battle and disease must cloud any
exultation at the result and teach us to weigh the awful cost of war,
however rightful the cause or signal the victory.
OCCUPATION OF PORTO RICO.
With the fall of Santiago, the occupation of Porto Rico became the next
strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been assigned to
organize an expedition for that purpose. Fortunately he was already at
Santiago, where he had arrived on the 11th of July, with re-enforcements
for General Shafter’s army.
With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and artillery, two
companies of engineers, and one company of the signal corps, General
Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st, having nine transports convoyed by
the fleet under Captain Higginson, with the Massachusetts (flagship),
Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia and Yale, the two latter carrying troops.
The expedition landed at Guanica July 25th, which port was entered with
little opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the Annapolis and the
Wasp, while the Puritan and Amphitrite went to San Juan and joined the
New Orleans, which was engaged in blockading that port.
The major-general commanding was subsequently re-enforced by General
Schwann’s brigade of the Third Army Corps, by General Wilson, with a
part of his division, and also by General Brooke, with a part of his
corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27 he entered
Ponce, one of the most important ports in the island, from which he
thereafter directed operations for the capture of the island.
With the exception of encounters with the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueres,
Coamo and Yauco, and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there
was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor,
and by the 12th of August much of the island was in our possession, and
the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time.
At most of the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically
welcomed. Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for
delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage.
As a potent influence toward peace, the outcome of the Porto Rican
expedition was of great consequence, and generous commendation is due to
those who participated in it.
WAR’S LAST SCENE AT MANILA.
The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its starting place. On
August 15th, after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in
which the squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally.
The casualties were comparatively few.
By this the conquest of the Philippine Islands, virtually accomplished
when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by Admiral
Dewey’s victory of the 1st of May, was formally sealed.
To General Merritt, his officers and men, for their uncomplaining and
devoted services, for their gallantry in action, the nation is sincerely
grateful. Their long voyage was made with singular success, and the
soldierly conduct of the men, most of whom were without previous
experience in the military service, deserves unmeasured praise.
LOSSES OF ARMY AND NAVY.
The total casualties in killed and wounded during the war were as
follows:
ARMY.
Officers killed 23
Enlisted men killed 257
—————
Total 280
Officers wounded 113
Enlisted men wounded 1,464
—————
Total 1,577
NAVY.
Killed 17
Wounded 67
Died as result of wounds 1
Invalided from service 6
——
Total 91
It will be observed that while our navy was engaged in two great battles
and in numerous perilous undertakings in the blockades and bombardment,
and more than fifty thousand of our troops were transported to distant
lands and engaged in assault and siege and battle and many skirmishes in
unfamiliar territory, we lost in both arms of the service a total of
1,948 killed and wounded; and in the entire campaign by land and sea we
did not lose a gun or a flag or a transport or a ship, and with the
exception of the crew of the Merrimac not a soldier or sailor was taken
prisoner.
On August 7th, forty-six days from the date of the landing of General
Shafter’s army in Cuba and twenty-one days from the surrender of
Santiago, the United States troops commenced embarkation for home, and
our entire force was returned to the United States as early as August
24th. They were absent from the United States only two months.
It is fitting that I should bear testimony to the patriotism and
devotion of that large portion of our army which, although eager to be
ordered to the post of greatest exposure, fortunately was not required
outside of the United States. They did their whole duty, and, like their
comrades at the front, have earned the gratitude of the nation.
In like manner, the officers and men of the army and of the navy who
remained in their departments and stations of the navy, performing most
important duties connected with the war, and whose requests for
assignments in the field and at sea I was compelled to refuse because
their services were indispensable here, are entitled to the highest
commendation. It is my regret that there seems to be no provision for
their suitable recognition.
In this connection it is a pleasure for me to mention in terms of
cordial appreciation the timely and useful work of the American National
Red Cross, both in relief measures preparatory to the campaign, in
sanitary assistance at several of the camps and assemblage, and later,
under the able and experienced leadership of the president of the
society, Miss Clara Barton, on the fields of battle and in the hospitals
at the front in Cuba. Working in conjunction with the governmental
authorities and under their sanction and approval and with the
enthusiastic co-operation of many patriotic women and societies in the
various States, the Red Cross has fully maintained its already high
reputation for intense earnestness and ability to exercise the noble
purposes of its international organization, thus justifying the
confidence and support which it has received at the hands of the
American people.
To the members and officers of this society and all who aided them in
their philanthropic work, the sincere and lasting gratitude of the
soldiers and the public is due and is freely accorded.
In tracing these events we are constantly reminded of our obligations to
the Divine Master for His watchful care over us and His safe guidance,
for which the nation makes reverent acknowledgment and offers humble
prayer for the continuance of His favor.
SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL.
The annihilation of Admiral Cervera’s fleet, followed by the
capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish Government a
realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing a struggle now
becoming wholly unequal, it made overtures of peace through the French
Ambassador, who, with the assent of his government, had acted as the
friendly representative of Spanish interests during the war.
On the 26th of July M. Cambon presented a communication signed by the
Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United
States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to make peace.
On July 30th, by a communication addressed to the Duke of Almodovar and
handed to M. Cambon, the terms of this government were announced,
substantially as in the protocol afterward signed.
On August 10th the Spanish reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M.
Cambon to the Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms
imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrones group, but
appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our
demand as to the Philippines.
Conceiving that discussion on this point could neither be practicable or
profitable, I directed that in order to avoid misunderstanding the
matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a
formal protocol of the terms on which the negotiations for peace were to
be undertaken.
The vague and inexplicit suggestions of the Spanish note could not be
accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual ultimatum a draft
of a protocol embodying the precise terms tendered to Spain in our note
of July 30th, with added stipulations of detail as to the appointment of
commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles.
On August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full power to sign the
protocol so submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of August 12th, M.
Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and the Secretary of State, as
the plenipotentiary of the United States, signed the protocol,
providing:
“Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba.
“Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto
Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies,
and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.
“Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and
harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall
determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.”
The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint commissions on
the part of the United States and Spain, to meet in Havana and San Juan,
respectively, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details
of the stipulated evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish
islands in the West Indies.
[Illustration:
From a photograph taken for and used by courtesy of Chicago Inter
Ocean.
CARRYING PRESIDENT McKINLEY’S CASKET INTO THE CITY HALL, BUFFALO.]
[Illustration:
From a photograph taken for and used by courtesy of the Chicago Inter
Ocean.
HEARSE PASSING ST. PAUL’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH EN ROUTE TO THE FUNERAL
TRAIN.]
The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more than five
commissioners on each side to meet at Paris not later than October 1st
and to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace,
subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms
of the two countries.
The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of the
protocol, hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and
that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each
government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.
CESSATION OF STRIFE.
Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol I issued a proclamation
on August 12th, suspending hostilities on the part of the United States.
The necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The
blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico were in like
manner raised.
On August 18th the muster out of 100,000 volunteers, or as near that
number as was found to be practicable, was ordered. On December 1st,
101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and discharged from the
service; 9,002 more will be mustered out by the 10th of the month. Also
a corresponding number of Generals and general staff officers have been
honorably discharged from the service.
The military committees to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Porto
Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed—for Cuba,
Major-General James F. Wade, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson and
Major-General Matthew C. Butler; for Porto Rico, Major-General John C.
Brooke, Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley and Brigadier-General W. W.
Gordon, who soon afterward met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and
San Juan respectively.
WORK OF EVACUATION.
The Porto Rican joint commissions speedily accomplished its task, and by
October 18th the evacuation of the island was completed. The United
States flag was raised over the island at noon on that day.
As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the island it
will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a
government for themselves. This should be undertaken at the earliest
moment consistent with safety and assured success.
It is important that our relations with these people shall be of the
most friendly character and our commercial relations close and
reciprocal. It should be our duty to assist in every proper way to build
up the waste places of the island, encourage the industry of the people
and assist them to form a government which shall be free and
independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the Cuban people.
Spanish rule must be replaced by a just, benevolent and humane
government, created by the people of Cuba, capable of performing all
international obligations, and which shall encourage thrift, industry
and prosperity, and promote peace and good will among all of the
inhabitants, whatever may have been their relations in the past. Neither
revenge nor passion should have a place in the new government.
WM. McKINLEY,
President of the United States.