land, because he was jealous of Eroles, and thought that a general
rising which ended in success would have meant the end of his own power
and tenure of office[749]. It is at least certain that the views which
he expressed caused Maitland much trouble, and made him to flinch from
his original idea of landing without delay and attacking Tarragona,
according to Wellington’s desire. The English general took refuge in a
council of war--the usual resource of commanders of a wavering purpose.
His lieutenants all advised him to refuse to land, on the ground that
his forces were too small and heterogeneous, that Lacy could give no
prompt assistance, and that there was no sign as yet of the general
rising which Eroles promised. Moreover, some of the naval officers told
him that anchorage off the Catalan coast was so dangerous, even in
summer, that they could not promise him that the army could be taken
safely on board in case of a defeat. To the intense disgust of Eroles
and the other Catalan leaders, but not at all to Lacy’s displeasure,
Maitland accepted the advice of his council of war, and resolved to
make off, and to land farther south. The original idea was to have
come ashore somewhere in the midst of the long coast-line south of
the Ebro, between Tortosa and Valencia, with the object of breaking
Suchet’s line in the middle. But the news of Joseph O’Donnell’s
gratuitous disaster at Castalla, which obviously enabled the Marshal
to use his whole army against a disembarking force, and the suggestion
that Alicante itself might be in danger, induced Maitland in the end
to order his whole armament to steer southward. He arrived at Alicante
on August 7th, and commenced to send his troops ashore--both his own
6,000 men and Whittingham’s 4,000 auxiliaries of the Balearic division.
Since Roche was already there, with his troops in good order, there
were 14,000 men collected in Alicante, over and above the wrecks of
O’Donnell’s force. If only the Murcians had been intact, the mass
assembled would have caused Suchet serious qualms, since it would have
outnumbered the French corps in Valencia very considerably, and there
was in it a nucleus of good troops in Maitland’s British and German
battalions. The news of Salamanca had also come to hand by this time,
and had transformed the general aspect of affairs in Suchet’s eyes:
King Joseph was again demanding instant help from him, in the hope of
retaining Madrid, and had called in (without his knowledge or consent)
the division of Palombini from Aragon, and the garrison of Cuenca[750].
If Wellington should advance--as he actually did--against the King,
and should drive him from his capital, it was possible that the main
theatre of the war might be transferred to the borders of Valencia.
[749] This seems to have been Codrington’s view, see his
_Memoirs_, i. p. 278, and he knew Lacy and the Catalans well.
[750] See above, pp. 487 and 488.
The Marshal therefore resolved to concentrate: he ordered Habert and
Harispe to fall back behind the Xucar with their 8,000 men, abandoning
their advanced positions in front of Alicante, and placed them at
Jativa; here he threw up some field-works and armed a _tête-de-pont_ on
the Xucar at Alberique. He ordered Paris’s brigade to come down from
northern Aragon to Teruel, and he warned the generals in Catalonia that
he might ask for reinforcements from them.
Maitland therefore, after his landing, found that the French had
disappeared from his immediate front. He was joined by Roche, and by
the 67th regiment from Cartagena, and proposed to drive Harispe from
Castalla and Ibi. But he marched against him on August 16th-18th, only
to find that he had already retired behind the Xucar. Farther than
Monforte he found himself unable to advance, for want of transport
and food. For the expedition from Sicily had not been fitted out for
an advance into the inland. It had been supposed by Bentinck that
the troops would be able to hire or requisition in Spain the mules
and carts that they would require for a forward movement. But the
country-side about Alicante was already exhausted by the long stay
of the Murcian army in that region; and O’Donnell--before Maitland
had come to know the difficulties of his position, got from him a
pledge that he would not take anything from it either by purchase or
by requisition. The British general had hired mules to draw his guns,
but found that he could not feed them on a forward march, because the
resources of the district were denied him. He himself had to stop at
Elda, Roche at Alcoy, because the problem of transport and food could
not be solved. All that he could do was to feel the French line of
outposts behind the Xucar with a flying column composed of his own
handful of cavalry--200 sabres--and a detachment of Spanish horse lent
him by Elio, the successor of O’Donnell [August 20th-21st].
But even the thought of farther advance had now to be given up, for the
news arrived that King Joseph had evacuated Madrid on the 14th, and
was marching on Valencia with the 15,000 men that he had collected. To
have tried any further attack on Suchet, when such an army was coming
in from the flank to join the Marshal, would have been insane. The
French force in this region would be doubled in strength by the King’s
arrival. Wherefore Maitland drew back his own division to Alicante,
and brought Roche back to Xixona, not far in front of that fortress,
expecting that he might ere long be pushed back, and perhaps besieged
there. Wellington in the end of the month, having the same idea, sent
him elaborate directions for the defence of the place, bidding him to
hold it as long as possible, but to keep his transports close at hand,
and to re-embark if things came to the worst[751].
[751] See Wellington to Maitland, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 386, dated
Aug. 30.
On the 25th King Joseph’s army and its vast convoy of French and
Spanish refugees, joined Suchet’s outposts at Almanza, and the
dangerous combination which Maitland and Wellington had foreseen came
to pass. But what was still more threatening for the army at Alicante
was the rumour that Soult was about to evacuate Andalusia, and to
bring the whole of the Army of the South to Valencia. This would mean
that nearly 80,000 French troops would ere long be collected within
striking distance of the motley force over which Maitland and Elio now
held command, and it seemed probable that Soult in his march might
sweep over the whole country-side, disperse the Spanish forces on the
Murcian border, and perhaps besiege and take Cartagena and Alicante
as a _parergon_ on the way. We have seen in chapter X that nothing
of this kind happened: Soult hung on to Andalusia for a month longer
than Wellington or any one else deemed probable: he only left Granada
on September 17th, and when he did move on Valencia he took the bad
inland roads by Huescar, Calasparra, and Hellin, leaving Murcia and
Cartagena and the whole sea-coast undisturbed. The reason, as has been
already pointed out, was the outbreak of yellow fever at Cartagena,
which caused the Duke of Dalmatia so much concern that he preferred to
keep away from the infection, even at the cost of taking inferior and
circuitous roads.
For the whole of September, therefore, Suchet on the one side and
Maitland and the Spaniards on the other, were waiting on Soult: in the
expectation of his early arrival both sides kept quiet. Thus tamely
ended the first campaign of the Anglo-Sicilian army, on whose efforts
Wellington had so much counted. And its later operations, as we shall
presently see, were to be wholly in keeping with its unlucky start.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XII
WELLINGTON RETURNS TO THE DOURO. FINIS
The garrison of the Retiro had surrendered on August 14th: Wellington
remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and did not leave it,
to take the field again, until August 31st. His stay in the Spanish
capital was not due, in the first instance, to the causes which might
seem most plausible--a desire to give his war-worn infantry a rest
during the hottest weeks of the year, or a determination to reorganize
the military resources of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of
the allied cause[752]. Both these ideas existed, and the latter in
especial absorbed much of his attention--he spent long hours in trying
to concert, with Carlos de España, measures for the utilization of
the captured munitions of the Retiro, and for the recruiting of the
regiments of the Spanish ‘Fifth Army.’ In this he accomplished less
than he had hoped, partly because of the dreadful exhaustion of the
central provinces of Spain after the famine of the preceding year,
partly because of the inefficiency of most of the Spanish officials
with whom he had to deal. He was much discontented with the list of
persons appointed by the new Regency to take up authority in the
reconquered provinces; and Castaños, whom he most trusted, and desired
to have with him, was lingering in Galicia[753].
[752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 364.
[753] Same to same, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 373. He was particularly
indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by
Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in
1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures,
and an impediment to all business.’
But the main reason for the halt at Madrid was the uncertainty as to
the movements of Soult. Was the Duke of Dalmatia about, as would seem
reasonable, to evacuate Andalusia? And if so, would he pick up King
Joseph and the Army of the Centre in La Mancha, and march on Madrid
with the 65,000 men whom they could collect? Or would he retire on
Valencia and join Suchet? Or again, would he persist in his intention,
expressed in dispatches to Joseph, which had fallen into Wellington’s
hands, of holding on to Andalusia and making it a separate base of
French power, despite of the fact that he had been cut off from
communication with the imperial armies of the East and North?
‘Any other but a modern French army would now leave the province [of
Andalusia],’ wrote Wellington to Lord Bathurst on July 18[754], ‘as
they have now absolutely no communication of any kind with France or
with any other French army; and they are pressed on all sides by troops
not to be despised, and can evidently do nothing. Yet I suspect that
Soult will not stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him:
and I think of making that movement as soon as I can take the troops
to the South without injuring their health.’ All military reasons were
against the probability of Soult’s holding on in Andalusia, yet he had
certainly expressed his intention of doing so as late as the middle of
July, and, what was more important still in judging of his plans, he
had not made a sudden movement of retreat when the news of Salamanca
reached him. Hill writing on August 4th, six days after the receipt of
the tidings of Marmont’s disaster, had to report[755] that ‘the recent
glorious event’ seemed to have had very little effect on the enemy, who
‘continued in a strong position in his front.’ And this was true, for
Soult, after hearing the news of Salamanca, had made his last frantic
appeal to King Joseph to fall back on Andalusia, and make his base at
Seville if Madrid were lost. Wellington was right in suspecting that,
if the Marshal had got his desire, the South would have been maintained
against him, and he would have had to march thither in person, to pick
up Hill, and to bring matters to an issue by another pitched battle.
It was only on August 12th that Soult reluctantly resolved to evacuate
Andalusia: his first precautionary movements for retreat were made
on August 15th, but it was not till the 24th that the Cadiz Lines
were destroyed, or till the 26th that all the French troops in front
of Hill suddenly vanished. Wellington was therefore kept for more
than a fortnight in a state of complete uncertainty as to whether he
might not have to march southward in the end, to evict Soult from his
viceroyalty. It was only on the 24th that he got information from
Hill (written on the 17th) which gave the first premonitory warning
that the French seemed to be on the move[756]. Next day confirming
evidence began to come to hand: ‘it is generally reported, and I have
reason to believe, that the Army of the South is about to make a
general movement ... it is supposed in the direction of Granada and
Valencia[757].’ On August 30, ‘though Sir Rowland Hill on the 17th
instant had no intelligence that the march was commenced, there was
every appearance of it.’ The fact that seemed to make it incredible
that Soult could be proposing to hold Andalusia any longer, was precise
information that King Joseph and the Army of the Centre had marched
upon Valencia to join Suchet, and had passed Chinchilla on August 24th,
going eastward[758]. If the King had gone by the passes of the Sierra
Morena southward, to join Soult, doubt might still have been possible:
but since he had made Valencia his goal, and was crawling slowly along
in that direction with his immense convoy of refugees and baggage,
Soult--left entirely to his own resources--could not retain his present
position. He must march on Valencia also, and it would be many weeks
before he could place himself in touch with Suchet, and produce a
threatening combination on the Mediterranean coast.
[754] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 370.
[755] See above, p. 537.
[756] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 377.
[757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1.
[758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of
Murcia. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 388.
On August 31st, therefore, with no absolutely certain news yet to hand
as to Soult’s retreat, but with every military probability in favour
of its having been begun, Wellington resolved to leave Madrid and to
return to the valley of the Douro, where the movements of Clausel and
the French Army of Portugal demanded his attention. He never thought
for a moment of endeavouring to march through La Mancha to intercept or
molest Soult’s retreat. The distance was too great, the roads unknown,
the problem of feeding the army in the desolate and thinly-peopled
country about the Murcian and Andalusian borders too difficult.
Wellington made up his mind that he had some time to spare: he would
march against Clausel and then ‘return to this part of the country
[Madrid] as soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction
on the right of the Douro. And I hope I shall be here [Madrid] and
shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, before Soult
can have made much progress to form his junction with the King[759].’
It is important, therefore, to realize that, in Wellington’s original
conception, the operations in Old Castile, which we may call the
Burgos campaign, were to be but a side-issue, an intermediate and
secondary matter. The real danger in Spain, as he considered, was the
approaching, but not immediate, junction of Soult, Suchet, and King
Joseph at Valencia. And the Commander-in-Chief evidently proposed to
be at Madrid, to face this combination, by October 1st. How and why he
failed to carry out this intention must be explained at length in the
next volume.
[759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid.
_Dispatches_, ix. p. 390.
Meanwhile, when he marched off to the Douro with part of his army,
he had to make provisions for the conduct of affairs in the South
during his absence. Hill, as has been shown in another chapter, had
been told to march on Madrid, as soon as Soult’s forces had made their
definitive departure for the East. As Drouet only disappeared from
Hill’s front on August 26th, the northward march of the army from
Estremadura began late: it had not commenced to cross the Guadiana
on September 1: its progress to and along the Tagus valley was slow,
owing to the difficulty of procuring food, and its main body had not
reached Almaraz and Talavera before the 20th September, and was only
concentrated about and behind Toledo at the end of the month. But
though Hill’s movement was not rapid, it was made in sufficiently good
time to face the danger that was brewing on the side of Valencia. And
there can be no doubt that if he had received orders to hurry, he
could have been in line some days before he actually appeared[760]. He
brought up all his force[761] except Buchan’s Portuguese brigade[762],
which was left at Truxillo and Merida, to keep up his communication
with Elvas. Estremadura, so long the contending ground of armies, had
now no solid body of troops left in it save the Spanish garrison of
Badajoz. For Penne Villemur and Morillo, with the division which had
so long operated in Hill’s vicinity, moved with him into New Castile.
They went by the rugged roads through the mountains of the province of
Toledo[763], and took post at Herencia, on the high-road from Madrid to
the Despeñaperros pass, in front of the British 2nd Division.
[760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo
on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the
21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the
Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the
17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the
30th (Swabey’s diary).
[761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division--British, 7,000;
Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and
Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of
all ranks.
[762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of
Elvas, and the 22nd.
[763] They marched from Cabeza del Buey, on the borders of
Andalusia and Estremadura, via Talarubia and Mazarambros to
Herencia. ‘Journal of Regiment of Leon,’ in Clonard, vol. iv.
In the rear of Hill’s column, and separated from it by many days’
march, was another small British force toiling up to Madrid from a very
distant point. This was the force under Colonel Skerrett, which had
taken part in the fighting round Seville. It consisted of the battalion
of the Guards from Cadiz, the 2/47th and 2/87th, two companies of the
2/95th, a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., the 20th Portuguese
Line, and a battery. By Wellington’s orders no British troops were now
left in Cadiz save the 2/59th, part of de Watteville’s regiment, the
‘battalion of foreign recruits,’ soon to become the 8/60th, and a few
artillery. Skerrett’s column, some 4,000 strong, marched by Merida
and Truxillo, and reached Toledo in time to join Hill for the autumn
campaign in front of Madrid. Hill’s corps, when joined by Skerrett,
provided a force of over 20,000 men, about equally divided between
British and Portuguese.
It would have been profitable to Wellington, as matters went in the
end, if he had handed over the entire task of observing Soult’s
operations to Hill. But being under the impression that he would return
ere long to Madrid, he left there and in the neighbourhood nearly
half the force that he had brought from Salamanca. He only took with
him to oppose Clausel the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack’s and
Bradford’s Portuguese, and Bock’s and Ponsonby’s (late Le Marchant’s)
brigades of heavy dragoons, a force of some 21,000 men[764]. He
left the 3rd and Light Divisions at Madrid, the 4th Division at the
Escurial, and Carlos de España’s Spaniards at Segovia. The cavalry of
Victor Alten and D’Urban were assigned to this force, and remained,
the former at Madrid, the latter at the Palacio de Rio Frio, near
Segovia. The British infantry divisions had all suffered heavily at
Badajoz, and the 4th at Salamanca also--they were weak in numbers, but
were expecting ere long to be joined by numerous convalescents. The
total force left behind amounted to about 17,000 men, including the
Spaniards[765]. Thus when Hill and Skerrett came up from the South,
there was a mass of nearly 40,000 men accumulated round Madrid, while
Wellington himself, after picking up Clinton and the 6th Division, and
the other troops left on the Douro, had a little under 30,000. This
proved in the autumn campaign an ideally bad partition of the army, for
on each wing the Anglo-Portuguese force was decidedly less numerous
than that which the French could bring against it. If Wellington had
taken his full strength to the North, he could have defied Clausel
and Caffarelli, and they could never have made head against him, or
pressed him away from Burgos. Hill, on the other hand, in front of
Madrid, would have been no more helpless with 22,000 men than he
actually was with 38,000 men, when Soult and King Joseph brought 60,000
against him in October. In either case he could only retreat without
offering battle. But Wellington, if the three additional divisions
left in New Castile had been brought to the North, would have had such
a superiority over the French in Old Castile that he could have dealt
with them as he pleased. The only explanation of the unfortunate
proportional division of his army, is that Wellington undervalued the
task he had to execute beyond the Douro, thought that he could finish
it more quickly than was to be the case, and calculated on being back
at Madrid in October before Soult could give trouble.
[764] There marched with Wellington--1st Division, 5,980 of
all ranks; 5th Division, 4,726; 7th Division, 4,841; Pack and
Bradford, 3,954; Bock and Ponsonby, 1,673; artillery, &c., about
500 = 21,674.
[765] There remained at Madrid, the Escurial, &c.--Arentschildt’s
cavalry, 515; D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, 552; 3rd Division,
4,234; 4th Division, 4,548; Light Division, 3,462; artillery,
about 350; Carlos de España’s Spaniards, about 3,000 = 16,661.
Yet when he started he was not comfortable in his mind about the
general situation. If the French drew together, their total strength
in Spain was far too great for him. In a moody moment he wrote to
his brother Henry: ‘though I still hope to be able to maintain our
position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when
I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with
inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any
kind from the Spaniards.... I am apprehensive that all this may turn
out ill for the Spanish cause. If by any cause I should be overwhelmed,
or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the
people of England say? What will those in Spain say?[766]’
[766] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 375.
Wellington’s forebodings were, only too soon, to be justified. But the
tale of the campaign against Clausel and Caffarelli, of the advance to
and retreat from Burgos, must be told in another volume.
APPENDICES
I
SUCHET’S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF OCT. 1, 1811
1st Division (Musnier): _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Robert’s { 114th Line (3 batts.) 58 1,579 1,637
Brigade { 1st of the Vistula (2 batts.) 27 836 863
Ficatier’s { 121st Line (3 batts.) 44 1,156 1,200
Brigade { 2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 1,103 1,129 = 4,829
2nd Division (Harispe):
Paris’s { 7th Line (4 batts.) 55 1,584 1,639
Brigade { 116th Line (3 batts.) 42 1,105 1,147
Chlopiski’s { 44th Line (2 batts.) 35 1,191 1,226
Brigade { 3rd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 26 724 750 = 4,762
3rd Division (Habert):
Montmarie’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 31 771 802
Brigade { 16th Line (3 batts.) 56 1,261 1,317
Bronikowski’s Brigade, 117th Line (3 batts.) 49 1,291 1,340 = 3,459
Palombini’s Italian Division:
Saint Paul’s{ 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 59 2,141 2,200
Brigade { 4th Line (3 batts.) 57 1,603 1,660
Balathier’s { 5th Line (2 batts.) 37 893 930
Brigade { 6th Line (3 batts.) 51 1,378 1,429 = 6,219
Compère’s Neapolitan Division:
1st Léger (1 batt.) 27 419 446
1st Line (1 batt.) 24 536 560
2nd Line (1 batt.) 27 358 385 = 1,391
Cavalry (General Boussard):
4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 30 720 750
24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 17 419 436
13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 584
Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 24 442 466
Neapolitan Chasseurs 13 156 169 = 2,405
Artillery (General Vallée) 48 1,757 1,805
Engineers (General Rogniat) 16 584 600
Équipages Militaires and Gendarmerie 10 653 663 = 3,068
--- ------ ------ ------
916 25,217 26,133 26,133
N.B.--Ficatier’s Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini’s division, and two
squadrons of 4th Hussars were not present at the battle of Saguntum,
being on the line of communications, and blockading Peniscola and
Oropesa.
This return, lent me by Mr. Fortescue who found it in the Paris
Archives, differs by over 2,000 men from Suchet’s figures given in
his _Mémoires_, p. 436 of vol. ii. The Marshal has left out the 3
battalions and 2 squadrons on the line of communications, mentioned
above.
II
STRENGTH OF BLAKE’S ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM
I. ‘THE EXPEDITIONARY CORPS.’
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Lardizabal’s Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia
(2 batts.), 2nd of Badajoz (2 batts.), Campo
Mayor (1 batt.), Tiradores de Cuenca (1 batt.) 149 2,823 2,972
Zayas’s Division: 2nd Spanish Guards, 4th ditto,
1st Walloon Guards, Voluntarios de la Patria,
Toledo, Ciudad Rodrigo, Legion Estrangera (1
batt. each), Companies of Cazadores 177 2,373 2,550
Loy’s Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Rey
(1 ditto), Husares de Castilla (1 ditto) 50 244 294
Horse Artillery: two batteries 11 214 225
--- ----- -----
Total of the ‘Expeditionary Corps’ 387 5,654 6,041
II. VALENCIAN TROOPS (‘SECOND ARMY’).
Miranda’s Division: Valencia (3 batts.), Voluntarios
de Castilla (2 batts.), 1st of Avila (1 batt.),
2nd Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.) 120 3,844 3,964
Obispo’s Division: Cariñena (2 batts.) 2nd of Avila
(1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.),
Daroca (1 batt.), Tiradores de Doyle (1 batt.) 110 3,290 3,400
Villacampa’s Division: Princesa (2 batts.), Soria
(2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.),
1st Cazadores de Valencia (1 batt.), Molina
(1 batt.) 162 3,190 3,352
Reserve (General Velasco): 3rd Battalions of
Voluntarios de Castilla, Don Carlos, Avila, Cazadores
de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75 3,595 3,670
San Juan’s Cavalry: Cuenca, Dragones del Rey,
Reina, Numancia, Husares de Aragon, Cazadores
de Valencia, Alcantara, Husares Españoles,
Husares de Granada (none over two squadrons
strong) 111 1,610 1,721
Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21 340 361
--- ------ ------
Total ‘2nd Army’ 599 15,869 16,468
III. MURCIAN TROOPS (‘3RD ARMY’).
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Creagh’s Brigade: Corona, Alcazar,
Tiradores de Cadiz (1 batt. each) 97 2,121 2,218
Montijo’s Brigade: 1st of Badajoz, 1st of
Cuenca, Voluntarios de Burgos, Sappers
(1 batt. each) 108 2,302 2,410
Cavalry: Reina (2 squadrons), Pavia (2
squadrons), Granada (2 squadrons),
Madrid (1 squadron), Husares de Fernando
7me (1 squadron) 83 743 826
Horse Artillery: 1 battery 3 78 81
--- ----- -----
Total ‘3rd Army’ 291 5,244 5,535
General Total of the Army: 1,277 officers, 26,767 men = Total, 28,044.
III
SUCHET’S ARMY AT THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 31
N.B.--The regiments of the Army of Aragon are the same as in Appendix I.
I. ARMY OF ARAGON (officers and men).
Musnier’s Division (10 battalions) 3,727
Harispe’s Division (10 battalions) 4,828
Habert’s Division (8 battalions) 3,150
Palombini’s Division (10 battalions) 3,591
Compère’s Division (3 battalions) 1,092
Boussard’s Cavalry (13 squadrons) 1,839
Artillery 1,511
Engineers, &c. 857
------
Total Army of Aragon 20,595
II. REILLE’S CORPS (officers and men).
Pannetier’s { 10th and 81st Line (7 battalions) 2,834
Brigade {
Bourke’s { 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions) 3,961
Brigade {
Severoli’s Italian { 1st Line (3 batts.) }
{ 7th Line (2 batts.) } 4,370
Division { 1st Léger (3 batts.) }
Cavalry { 9th Hussars 543
{ 1st Italian Chasseurs 262
Artillery 1,153
------
Total Reille’s Corps 13,123
General Total of combined forces, 33,718.
IV
SURRENDER-ROLL OF BLAKE’S ARMY OF VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812
_Officers._ _Rank
and file._
Zayas’s Division 96 1,319
Lardizabal’s Division 165 3,385
Miranda’s Division 237 5,513
Division of Reserve, &c. 130 3,171
Cavalry 77 818
Artillery 73 1,581
Engineers and Sappers 38 383
--- ------
Total 816 16,170
General total, 16,986 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff
or administrative employments, 23 chaplains, and 19 surgeons.
Of the remainder of Blake’s army there had rallied at Alicante by
January 14 of infantry 361 officers and 5,125 men, of cavalry 164
officers and 671 men, of artillery 30 officers and 720 men--total of
all arms, 7,071.
V
FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF TARIFA (DEC. 1811-JAN. 1812)
[From the table in Belmas, iv. pp. 40-2.] _Of all
ranks._
From Leval’s Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts.
each) 3,000
From Barrois’s Division, 16th Léger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2
batts.), 54th Ligne (2 batts.) 4,200
From Villatte’s Division, 27th Léger (1 batt.), 94th and 95th
Ligne (1 batt. each) 1,800
Cavalry, 16th Dragoons, and one squadron 21st Dragoons 585
Artillery 469
Engineers, Sappers, Marines, &c. 385
------
Total 10,439
In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons
of the 2nd Dragoons were occupied on the lines of communications,
between Vejer and Fascinas.
ANGLO-SPANISH GARRISON OF TARIFA
_Of all
British (Colonel Skerrett): ranks._
2/47th 570
2/87th 560
Battalion of Flank Companies 400
1 company 95th regiment 75
1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L. 70
Artillery (Hughes’s Company R.A.) 83
-----
Total 1,758
Spanish (General Copons):
Cantabria (1 batt.) 450
Irlanda (1 batt.) 357
Cazadores 333
Artillery 106
Sappers 83
Cavalry 17
-----
Total 1,346
N.B.--Another return makes the total of the British part of the
garrison 67 officers and 1,707 men, a total of 1,774.
VI
CIUDAD RODRIGO
A. THE FRENCH GARRISON
The garrison, according to Belmas, iv. pp. 282-3, stood on the day of
the investment as follows:
34th Léger, one battalion 975 officers and men effective.
113th Ligne, one battalion 577 ” ”
Artillery, 2 companies 168 ” ”
Engineers 15 ” ”
Non-combatants (Civil officers, &c.) 36 ” ”
Sick in Hospital 163
Staff 3
-----
Total 1,937
B. BRITISH LOSSES DURING THE SIEGE
The British losses between the investment and the storm were, according
to the official returns at the Record Office, 1 officer and 69 men
killed, 19 officers and 462 men wounded, 2 men (both Portuguese)
missing, or a total of 553. These figures added to the 568 lost in the
storm (for details see below), make altogether 1,121, which does not
agree with the statement in Wellington _Dispatches_, viii. p. 557;
this gives as the total for the siege 9 officers and 169 men killed,
70 officers and 748 men wounded, 7 men missing, or only 1,003, over a
hundred less than the total from the return quoted above. Napier gives
1,290 as the casualties for the whole siege, which much exceeds the
return in the Record Office; he also makes the total for the storm 60
officers and 650 killed and wounded, while the official return here
printed makes it only 59 officers and 509 men. Lord Londonderry and Sir
John Jones also give figures agreeing with no others. I prefer to take
the total of the official report, which is here appended.
C. BRITISH LOSSES AT THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. JANUARY 19, 1812
_Killed._ _Wounded._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Staff 1[767] -- 2[768] -- 3
Engineers -- -- 2 2 4
3rd Division:
{1/45th 3 14 4 27 48
Mackinnon’s {5/60th -- 1 1 3 5
Brigade {74th -- 4 4 13 21
{1/88th -- 7 4 23 34
{2/5th 1 33 8 52 94
Campbell’s {77th -- 14 5 31 50
Brigade {2/83rd -- 1 -- 4 5
{94th 2 13 6 48 69
---
Divisional Total 326
Light Division:
Vandeleur’s {1/52nd 1 2 2 23 28
Brigade {2/52nd -- 1 1 7 9
{3/95th -- -- -- 9 9
Barnard’s {1/43rd -- 7 3 31 41
Brigade {1/95th -- 1 3 16 20
{2/95th -- -- 2 4 6
---
Divisional Total 113
Portuguese -- 19 4 91 114
-- --- -- --- ---
Grand Total 8 117 51 384 560
Adding 5 British and 3 Portuguese missing, the total loss is 568 in the
storm.
[767] General Mackinnon.
[768] Generals Craufurd and Vandeleur.
VII
NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE STORM OF CIUDAD RODRIGO
Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about the exact amount
of co-operation by the Light Division in helping the 3rd to clear
the French from behind the Greater Breach, there are several other
vexed points concerning the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. The one on which
most dispute arose was that concerning the capture of General Barrié.
Gurwood of the 52nd claimed to have been the first officer to enter
the Castle, and to receive the surrender of the governor and his
staff. He is mentioned as doing so in Wellington’s Rodrigo dispatch,
and generally had the credit at the time. But Lieutenant Mackie of
the 88th, who had led the forlorn hope of the 3rd Division, also put
in a claim, and had many supporters. Many years after the war was
over, Maxwell (the author of one of the several _Lives of the Duke
of Wellington_, which came out in early Victorian times) championed
Mackie’s claim with such vehemence that Gurwood issued a pamphlet
defending his own credit. Considerable controversy arose in the _United
Service Journal_ for 1843, and elsewhere. Mackie’s story was that
he, with some of the 88th, arrived first at the Castle, summoned the
governor to surrender, and was received by several French officers,
who handed him over a sword and announced that the general yielded.
Some moments after, according to Mackie, Gurwood came up, spoke to the
governor himself, and obtained his sword, which, when the prisoners
were brought before Wellington, he presented to his commander, who
gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered
Gurwood’s name in his dispatch as the officer who had received the
surrender. Gurwood’s story, told with as much detail and circumstance
as Mackie’s, is that he, with two soldiers of the 52nd, arrived at the
citadel, got the gate opened by threatening the officer in charge that
no quarter would be given if resistance were made, and was received by
Barrié, who in a great state of nervousness, threw his arms round his
neck, kissed him, and said, ‘_je suis le Gouverneur de la place--je
suis votre prisonnier_,’ handing over his sword at the same time.
He accompanied the captive staff-officers to Wellington’s presence,
and presented them to him. It is difficult to come to any certain
conclusion in face of two such contradictory tales, but there is a
bare possibility of reconciling them, by supposing that Mackie entered
first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that
Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while
Mackie had been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had
received. But if so, it is odd that Gurwood never saw Mackie: Mackie is
quite positive that he saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes
later than himself. The dispute tended to become a controversy between
Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, each backing their own man. A
synopsis of the papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i
of Grattan’s second series of _Adventures with the Connaught Rangers_
(London, 1853). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion,
put in his final definitive edition the non-committal statement that
‘the garrison fled to the Castle, where Lieutenant Gurwood, who
though severely wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser
Breach, received the governor’s sword’ (iv. p. 90). Harry Smith says
(i. p. 58): ‘Gurwood got great credit here unfairly. Johnstone and poor
Uniacke were the first on the ramparts, Gurwood having been knocked
down in the breach, and momentarily stunned. However, Gurwood’s a sharp
fellow, and he cut off in search of the governor and brought his sword
to the Duke. He made the _most_ of it.’
Another controversy is as to which troops of the 3rd Division got first
into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the
94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his
kinsman, William Lang of the 94th, very clearly stating that a solid
body of 200 men of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated
in force to the Plaza Mayor, and received the surrender of the garrison
there.
Still another controversy, about which there is much in the Rice Jones
papers, in the possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is as to
what engineer officers conducted the storming-columns. Apparently some
credit has been misplaced among individuals here, but to decide upon
the point would take more space than a book like this can afford.
VIII
ARMY OF THE SOUTH
REORGANIZED AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE POLES AND OTHER REGIMENTS
RETURN OF MARCH 1, 1812
[From the returns in the _Archives Nationales_. Lent me by Mr.
Fortescue.]
_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Conroux. Head-quarters: Villamartin
(near Bornos).
1st Brigade, Meunier; 9th Léger (2 batts.)*, 24th
Ligne (3 batts.).
2nd Brigade, Mocquery; 96th Ligne (3 batts.).
Total, including artillery 182 5,263
2nd Division: Barrois. Head-quarters: Puerto Real
(near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Cassagne: 16th Léger, 8th Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Avril: 51st Ligne, 54th Ligne (3
batts. each).
Total, including artillery 225 7,551
3rd Division: Villatte. Head-quarters: Santa Maria
(near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, Pécheux: 27th Léger, 63rd Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Lefol: 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3
batts. each).
Total, including artillery 244 7,115
4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Rey: 32nd Ligne, 43rd Ligne (4 batts.
each).
2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batts.), 58th
Ligne* (3 batts.).
Total, including artillery 273 9,131
5th Division: Drouet D’Erlon. Head-quarters: Zafra
(Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Léger, 45th Ligne
(3 batts. each).
2nd Brigade, Reymond: 64th Ligne* (2-2/3 batts.),
88th Ligne* (2 batts.)
Total, including artillery 192 5,927
6th Division: Daricau. Head-quarters: Zalamea
(Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st Léger, 100th Ligne (3
batts. each).
2nd Brigade, St. Pol: 28th Léger*, 103rd Ligne*
(2 batts. each).
Total, including artillery 174 4,854
----- ------
Total of six divisions 1,290 39,841
The regiments marked * had each one battalion in garrison at Badajoz,
except the 64th, which had two companies there only [9th Léger, 28th
Léger, 58th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. The total of these 5-1/3 battalions
was 2,951 officers and men. Adding these to the six divisions the total
was 44,082 French infantry present under arms.
CAVALRY.
1st Division. Head-quarters: Ribera (Estremadura).
1st Brigade, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 21st
Chasseurs, 26th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Bonnemain: 5th Chasseurs, 27th
Chasseurs.
Total 116 1,840
2nd Division. Head-quarters: Cordova.
1st Brigade, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17th, 27th Dragoons.
Total 170 3,307
3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Boille: 10th Chasseurs, 12th
Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Ormancey: 16th Dragoons, 21st
Dragoons.
Total 135 2,203
--- -----
Total Cavalry 421 7,350
N.B.--7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually
stayed with the Army of the South till the end of 1812.
Spanish Troops [by return of April 1]: _Officers._ _Men._
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
--- -----
Total _Juramentados_ 381 5,090
Artillery (deducting divisional batteries) 100 2,800
Engineers and Sappers 20 900
Three naval battalions (43rd and 44th _équipages de
flotte_, and a battalion of _ouvriers de
marine_) 60 1800
Gendarmerie, &c. 10 600
----- ------
General Total of army 2,282 58,381
Or adding the garrison of Badajoz (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265
sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of the South, _not_ including 910
Hessians of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick,
&c.
When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz,
he drew up the following statistics as to the strength of his army,
_omitting the naval troops, and the gunners of the Cadiz Lines_:
(1) Marched for Badajoz: _Officers._ _Men._
Infantry 600 17,964
Cavalry 237 3,944
Artillery 26 613
Engineers 2 116
--- ------
Total 865 22,637 = 23,502
(2) Left before Cadiz and in Granada, &c.:
Infantry 611 18,312
Cavalry 152 2,555
--- ------
Total 763 20,867 = 21,630
(3) Garrisons of the Provinces of Cordova,
Jaen, Granada, and Seville:
Infantry 90 2,547
Cavalry 57 1,654
--- -----
Total 147 4,201 = 4,348
(4) Spanish troops:
Infantry 218 2,732
Cavalry 163 2,358
--- -----
Total 381 5,090 = 5,471
Adding up these four totals we get officers 2,156, rank and file 52,795
= 54,951. This total omits the artillery in the Cadiz Lines and other
fortified places, and the three marine regiments, and such sappers,
gendarmes, military train, &c., as did not form part of the expedition
that marched with Soult to relieve Badajoz. Adding these, at their
strength of March 1, we get a total of about 59,000 of all ranks, not
including the garrison of Badajoz. This agrees well enough with the
March total of 60,663, allowing for a month’s wear and tear.
IX
THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH 15-APRIL 6, 1812
(A) STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH GARRISON ON MARCH 15
[See the Tables in Belmas, iv. pp. 364-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.]
Staff 25
Infantry:
3/9th Léger officers and men 580
1/28th Léger ” ” 597
1/58th Ligne ” ” 450
3/88th Ligne ” ” 600
3/103rd Ligne ” ” 540
64th Ligne (2 companies) ” ” 130
Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.) ” ” 910
_Juramentados_ 54 = 3,861 infantry.
Cavalry 42
Artillery 261
Engineers and Sappers 260
Sick in Hospital 300
Civil Departments, non-combatants, &c. 254
-----
5,003
A report of the governor at noon on April 5, found among his papers
after the storm, gave the following as surviving under arms (sick
excluded)--infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 217, cavalry
50, _Juramentados_ 86. This report, printed in Jones, i. p. 230,
implies a higher original total than Belmas allows--the artillery and
_Juramentados_ are actually more numerous on April 5 than on March 15!
And the infantry are only 458 less, despite of losses of a considerably
higher figure, for another paper of the commandant shows (Jones, i. p.
230)--Sortie of March 19: killed 30, wounded 287=317[769]. Storm of
Picurina Fort: killed or prisoners, 8 officers, 278 men = 286. We have
thus 603 casualties in these two affairs only, beside the ordinary wear
and tear of the siege.
[769] Phillipon’s report to Clarke, drawn up on June 12, gives
273 instead of 317 for the loss in this sally (see Belmas, iv. p.
414).
Noting the considerable number of ‘round figures’ in Belmas’s table, I
am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a
few hundreds over what he allows.
(B) LOSSES AT STORM OF BADAJOZ, APRIL 6, 1811
[From the Returns at the Record Office.]
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
General Staff 1 -- 16 -- -- -- 17
Royal Artillery 1 6 1 9 -- -- 17
Royal Engineers 2 -- 3 5 -- -- 10
Assistant Engineers -- -- 3 -- -- -- 3
THIRD DIVISION.
Kempt’s Brigade:
1/45th Foot 6 19 8 64 -- -- 97
3/60th Foot 1 4 4 26 -- -- 35
74th Foot -- 12 7 33 -- 2 54
1/88th Foot 3 28 7 106 -- -- 144
J. Campbell’s Brigade:
2/5th Foot 1 11 3 28 -- -- 43
77th Foot -- -- 3 11 -- -- 14
2/83rd Foot 1 22 7 39 -- -- 69
94th Foot 1 12 1 51 -- -- 65
-- --- -- --- -- -- ---
Total 3rd Division 13 108 40 358 -- 2 521
FOURTH DIVISION.
Kemmis’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 4 37 12 132 -- -- 185
1/40th Foot 2 51 13 170 -- -- 236
Bowes’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot 5 44 12 119 -- -- 180
1/23rd Foot 3 22 14 92 -- 20 151
1/48th Foot 3 32 16 122 -- -- 173
-- --- -- --- -- -- --
Total 4th Division 17 186 67 635 -- 20 925
FIFTH DIVISION.
Hay’s Brigade:
3/1st Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1/9th Foot -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2/38th Foot 1 12 3 26 -- -- 42
Walker’s Brigade:
1/4th Foot 2 40 15 173 -- -- 230
2/30th Foot -- 38 6 86 -- -- 130
2/44th Foot 2 37 7 88 -- -- 134
-- --- -- --- -- -- --
Total 5th Division 5 127 31 373 -- -- 536
LIGHT DIVISION:
1/43rd Foot 3 74 15 249 -- -- 341
1/52nd Foot 5 53 14 248 -- -- 320
1/95th Foot 3 27 10 154 -- -- 194
3/95th Foot 4 9 4 47 -- -- 64
-- --- -- --- -- -- ---
Total Light Division 15 163 43 698 -- -- 919
Brunswick Oels, dispersed
in companies in 4th and
5th Divisions -- 7 2 26 -- -- 35
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
Total British loss 54 597 206 2,104 -- 22 2,983
PORTUGUESE 8 147 45 500 -- 30 730
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
General Total 62 744 251 2,604 -- 52 3,713
-- --- --- ----- -- -- -----
Losses during previous
operations 10 219 54 661 -- 13 957
The total loss during the siege and storm would therefore appear to
have been 4,670.
X
WELLINGTON’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA. STRENGTH AND LOSSES
N.B.--Strength by the morning state of July 15, 1812. Losses of the
British by the return annexed to Wellington’s dispatch: those of the
Portuguese from the official returns at Lisbon. The fighting strength
on July 22, owing to losses at Castrejon and Castrillo, and to weary
men falling out during the retreat, may have been perhaps 1,000 less.
I. BRITISH TROOPS
_Losses._
_Strength._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._ _Men._ _Total Loss._
CAVALRY
(Stapleton Cotton):
Le Marchant’s Brigade
3rd Dragoons 17 322 339 1 6 -- 11 2 20
4th Dragoons 22 336 358 -- 7 1 21 -- 29
5th Dragoon Guards 22 313 325 -- 9 2 42 3 56
G. Anson’s Brigade
11th Light Dragoons 30 361 391 -- -- -- -- -- --
12th Light Dragoons 19 321 340 1 2 -- 2 -- 5
16th Light Dragoons 14 259 273 -- -- -- -- -- --
V. Alten’s Brigade
14th Light Dragoons 23 324 347 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3
1st Hussars K.G.L. 23 376 399 -- 2 5 16 -- 23
Bock’s Brigade
1st Dragoons K.G.L. 25 339 364 -- -- -- -- -- --
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 23 384 407 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Total British Cavalry 218 3,335 3,543 2 27 8 94 5 136
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
INFANTRY.
1st Division (H. Campbell):
Fermor’s Brigade
1st Coldstream Guards 26 928 954 -- 7 1 22 8 38
1st Third Guards 23 938 961 -- 1 1 20 2 24
1 comp. 5/60th Foot 1 56 57 -- -- -- -- -- --
Wheatley’s Brigade
2/24th Foot 23 398 421 -- -- -- 5 -- 5
1/42nd Foot 40 1,039 1,079 -- -- -- 3 -- 3
2/58th Foot[770] 31 369 400 -- -- -- 3 1 4
1/79th Foot 40 634 674 -- -- -- 1 3 4
1 comp. 5/60th 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- --
Löwe’s Brigade
1st Line Battalion
K.G.L. 26 615 641 -- 1 -- 8 -- 9
2nd Line Battalion
K.G.L. 26 601 627 -- 1 2 40 4 47
5th Line Battalion
K.G.L. 30 525 555 -- 1 1 17 -- 19
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 1st Division 267 6,156 6,423 -- 11 5 119 18 153
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
3rd Division (Pakenham):
Wallace’s Brigade
1/45th Foot 26 416 442 -- 5 5 45 -- 55
74th Foot 23 420 443 -- 3 2 40 4 49
1/88th Foot 21 642 663 2 11 4 110 8 135
3 comps. 5/60th Foot 11 243 254 -- 6 3 24 3 36
J. Campbell’s Brigade
1/5th Foot 32 870 902 -- 10 6 110 -- 126
2/5th Foot 19 289 308 -- 1 2 21 -- 24
2/83rd Foot 24 295 319 -- 2 2 30 -- 34
94th Foot 24 323 347 1 3 3 21 -- 28
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 3rd Division 180 3,498 3,678 3 41 27 401 15 487
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
4th Division (Lowry Cole):
W. Anson’s Brigade
3/27th Foot 19 614 633 -- -- 1 7 -- 8
1/40th Foot 24 558 582 -- 12 5 115 -- 132
1 comp. 5/60th 2 44 46 -- -- -- -- -- --
Ellis’s Brigade
1/7th Foot 24 471 495 1 19 10 165 -- 195
1/23rd Foot 19 427 446 1 9 6 90 -- 106
1/48th Foot 22 404 426 -- 9 10 60 -- 79
1 comp. Brunswick
Oels[771] 1 53 54 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 4th Division 111 2,571 2,682 2 49 32 437 -- 520
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
5th Division (Leith):
Greville’s Brigade
{ 3/1st Foot 32 729 761 -- 23 8 129 -- 160
{ 1/9th Foot 31 635 666 -- 3 1 42 -- 46
{ 1/38th Foot[772] 36 764 800 2 14 12 115 -- 143
{ 2/38th Foot 20 281 301 -- 9 2 40 1 52
{ 1 comp. Brunswick
{ Oels[2] 2 76 78 -- -- -- -- -- --
Pringle’s Brigade
{ 1/4th Foot 36 421 457 -- -- 1 17 -- 18
{ 2/4th Foot 27 627 654 -- 2 -- 23 6 31
{ 2/30th Foot 20 329 349 -- 3 1 22 1 27
{ 2/44th Foot 20 231 251 2 4 -- 23 -- 29
{ 1 comp. Brunswick
{ Oels[2] 3 66 69 -- -- -- -- -- --
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 25 411 8 506
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- --- -- ---
6th Division (Clinton):
Hulse’s Brigade
{ 1/11th Foot 31 485 516 1 44 14 281 -- 340
{ 2/53rd Foot 25 316 341 -- 26 11 105 -- 142
{ 1/61st Foot 29 517 546 5 39 19 303 -- 366
{ 1 comp. 5/60th 2 59 61 -- -- -- -- -- --
Hinde’s Brigade
{ 2nd Foot 27 381 408 1 13 6 77 12 109
{ 1/32nd Foot 33 576 609 2 15 9 111 -- 137
{ 1/36 Foot 29 400 429 4 16 5 74 -- 99
--- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -----
Total 6th Division 176 2,734 2,910 13 153 64 951 12 1,193
--- ----- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -----
7th Division (Hope):
Halkett’s Brigade
{ 1st Light Batt. K.G.L. 25 544 569 -- -- 2 7 -- 9
{ 2nd Light Batt. K.G.L. 21 473 494 1 5 1 9 -- 16
{ Brunswick Oels[773] (9
{ companies) 23 573 596 -- 4 2 42 1 49
De Bernewitz’s Brigade
{ 51st Foot 27 280 307 -- -- -- 2 -- 2
{ 68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14 -- 20
{ _Chasseurs_
{ _Britanniques_ 27 686 713 -- 5 -- 10 14 29
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Total 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- ---
Light Division (Chas. Alten):
Barnard’s Brigade
{ 1/43rd Foot 30 718 748 -- -- 1 15 -- 16
{ Detachments 2/95th and
{ 3/95th Rifles 19 373 392 -- -- -- 5 -- 5
Vandeleur’s Brigade
{ 1/52nd Foot. 28 771 799 -- -- -- 2 -- 2
{ 8 comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 -- -- -- 2 2 4
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
Total Light Division 104 2,377 2,481 -- -- 1 24 2 27
--- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
Royal Horse Artillery
(troops of Ross,
Macdonald, and Bull,
and drivers) 18 403 421 -- 1 -- 2 -- 3
Field Artillery
(companies of Lawson,
Gardiner, Greene,
Douglas, May, and
drivers) 35 650 685 -- 1 -- 4 -- 5
King’s German Legion
Artillery (battery of
Sympher) 5 75 80 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
-- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
Artillery Total 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14
-- ----- ----- -- -- -- -- -- --
ENGINEERS 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- --
STAFF CORPS 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- --
WAGON TRAIN 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- --
[770] The 2/58th though properly belonging to the 5th Division,
appears to have acted on this day with the 1st Division.
[771] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are
only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.
[772] This battalion only joined the division on the
battle-morning.
[773] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are
only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.
BRITISH TOTAL
Infantry 1,209 24,368 25,577 24 329 159 2,387 69 2,968
Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 94 5 136
Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 -- 4 -- 10 -- 14
Engineers 12 9 21 -- -- -- -- -- --
Staff Corps 5 81 86 -- -- -- -- -- --
Train 24 115 139 -- -- -- -- -- --
General Staff ? ? ? 2 -- 9 -- -- 11
----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- -- -----
Total 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129
II. PORTUGUESE TROOPS
CAVALRY:
D’Urban’s Brigade: 1st
and 11th Dragoons (12th
Dragoons absent)[774] 32 450 482 2 5 2 18 10 37
INFANTRY:
Power’s Brigade, 3rd
Division: 9th and 21st
Line, 12th Caçadores 90 2,107 2,197 1 29 9 23 14 76
Stubbs’s Brigade, 4th
Division: 11th and 23rd
Line, 7th Caçadores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 18 267 11 476
Spry’s Brigade, 5th
Division: 3rd and 15th
Line, 8th Caçadores 156 2,149 2,305 3 45 4 64 7 123
Rezende’s Brigade, 6th
Division: 8th and 12th
Line, 9th Caçadores 134 2,497 2,631 8 113 10 336 20 487
Collins’s Brigade, 7th
Division: 7th and 19th
Line, 2nd Caçadores 132 2,036 2,168 -- 5 1 10 1 17
Pack’s Independent
Brigade: 1st and 16th
Line, 4th Caçadores 85 2,520 2,605 5 97 15 242 17 376
Bradford’s Independent
Brigade: 13th and 14th
Line, 5th Caçadores 112 1,782 1,894 -- 8 -- 3 6 17
Attached to Light
Division: 1st and 3rd
Caçadores 30 1,037 1,067 -- 5 -- 12 -- 17
ARTILLERY:
Arriaga’s battery 4 110 114 -- -- -- 1 -- 1
--- ------ ------ -- --- -- --- -- -----
Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627
[774] The 12th Dragoons were marching to the rear in charge of
the baggage-train.
III. SPANISH TROOPS
Carlos de España’s
Division: 2nd of
Princesa, Tiradores de
Castilla, 2nd of Jaen,
3rd of 1st Seville,
Caçadores de Castilla,
Lanceros de Castilla 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
GENERAL TOTAL
BRITISH 1,526 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,491 74 3,129
PORTUGUESE 912 17,105 18,017 22 484 59 976 86 1,627
SPANISH 160 3,200 3,360 -- 2 -- 4 -- 6
----- ------ ------ -- --- --- ----- --- -----
Total 2,598 49,341 51,939 50 846 235 3,471 160 4,762
XI
STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF MARMONT’S ARMY AT SALAMANCA
To fix the fighting strength of Marmont’s army at Salamanca is
comparatively easy. It consisted of the 49,636 officers and men
accounted for by the return of July 15th printed on the next page,
minus some 700 men lost at the combats of Castrillo and Castrejon [also
called ‘combat of the Guarena’] on July 18, and such few hundreds
more as may have fallen behind from fatigue during the long marches
of July 20-1. Roughly speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men,
as opposed to Wellington’s 50,000. The French translators of Napier’s
_Peninsular War_ (Mathieu Dumas and Foltz) only give a table of June
15, which is of course a month out of date for Salamanca, and append
a note that ‘deducting artillery, engineers, _équipages militaires_,
officers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also losses between June 15 and
July 15 they find the result of about 42,000 sabres and bayonets for
the battle.’ Why any sane person _should_ deduct officers, sergeants,
and artillerymen from a fighting total I am unable to conceive, though
contemporary British writers, including Wellington himself, often did
so. But the results of adding to their ‘42,000 sabres and bayonets’
the list of 1,925 officers, 3,244 artillerymen and artillery train
(both in the divisions and in the reserve), 332 engineers, and 742
_équipages militaires_, is to give the figure 48,343, which practically
agrees with the total that I state above; if sergeants are added it
would much exceed that total. We may take this, therefore, as fairly
correct--bearing in mind that the 26 officers and 742 men of the
_équipages militaires_ cannot be counted as combatants.
These totals do not include the 23rd Léger (2 batts.) and the 2/1st
Line, both from Thomières’s division, which were garrisoning Astorga,
about 1,500 strong. Nor do they include the minor garrisons left at
Toro, Zamora, Olmedo, Valdestillas, Tordesillas, Simancas, Cabezon,
Medina del Campo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which
appear to have been altogether about 4,184 strong, nor the dépôts at
Valladolid, 3,307 strong on June 15, but probably much less on July
15, when Marmont had remounted nearly 1,000 dismounted dragoons and
picked up all detachments and convalescents that he could gather. Nor
do they include the sick, who had been 8,633 on June 15th, and 8,332
on May 15th--probably the total in hospital was a trifle more on July
15, owing to the fatigues of the campaigns round San Cristobal in the
latter days of June.
Parallel with the return of July 15th, I have printed that of August
1. The difference between the two--211 officers and 10,124 men--might
be supposed to represent the losses in the campaign between those
dates. It does not, however, because the total of August 1 represents
not only the survivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all the men
from garrisons evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid dépôt, who
joined the colours after the disaster of July 22, in consequence of the
district in which they were lying having been evacuated by the army.
The garrisons of Toro and Zamora held out till they were relieved, that
of Tordesillas surrendered to the Galicians: but the men from the other
smaller garrisons and from the dépôts fell in to their respective corps
before August 1. I imagine that we may take these additions to be some
5,000 men at least, but cannot give the exact figures, through being
unable to say what the Valladolid dépôts (3,307 strong on June 15)
amounted to on July 15.
After comparing the totals of the brigades and regiments shown under
July 15 and August 1, we must proceed to show the reasons why, in
individual cases, the regimental differences between the two sets of
figures cannot be taken to represent the sum of the losses in the
Salamanca campaign. The proof is clear.
THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA
From two returns of effectives in the Archives of the Ministry of War,
Paris, dated July 15 and August 1, respectively.
_July 15._ _August 1._
_Officers._ _Men._ _Officers._ _Men._
1st DIVISION (Foy):
Brigade { 6th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,055 41 684
Chemineau { 69th Ligne (2 batts.) 50 1,408 47 1,322
Brigade {
Desgraviers- { 39th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 918 49 872
Berthelot { 76th Ligne (2 batts.) 56 1,351 45 887
Artillery Train, &c. 7 207 7 207
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 208 4,939 189 3,972
--- ----- --- -----
2nd DIVISION (Clausel):
Brigade { 25th Léger (3 batts.) 54 1,485 43 1,222
Berlier { 27th Ligne (2 batts.) 40 1,637 31 1,248
Brigade { 50th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,490 46 1,177
Barbot { 59th Ligne (2 batts.) 47 1,531 38 1,278
Artillery Train, &c. 7 219 7 216
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 200 6,362 165 5,141
--- ----- --- -----
Brigade { 31st Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,359 45 1,325
Menne { 26th Ligne (2 batts.) 44 1,145 43 1,116
{ 47th Ligne (3 batts.) 67 1,558 62 1,650
? { 70th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061
Artillery Train, &c. 5 302 3 193
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345
--- ----- --- -----
4th DIVISION (Sarrut):
Brigade { 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 66 1,772 68 1,702
Fririon { 36th Ligne (3 batts.) 69 1,570 71 1,514
Brigade { 4th Léger (3 batts.) 63 1,219 63 989
? { 130th Ligne (absent) -- -- -- --
Artillery Train, &c. 5 238 5 214
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 203 4,799 207 4,419
--- ----- --- -----
5th DIVISION (Maucune):
Brigade { 15th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,615 46 1,229
Arnaud { 66th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 661
Brigade { 82nd Ligne (2 batts.) 41 966 39 729
Montfort { 86th Ligne (2 batts.) 30 1,155 28 961
Artillery Train, &c. 4 212 4 212
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 165 5,079 151 3,792
--- ----- --- -----
6th DIVISION (Brennier):
Brigade { 17th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,074 42 855
Taupin { 65th Ligne (3 batts.) 59 1,527 52 1,302
{ 22nd Ligne (3 batts.) 61 1,486 40 716
? { Régiment de Prusse (remnant
{ of) 9 79 9 79
Artillery Train, &c. 4 213 4 213
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 179 4,379 147 3,165
--- ----- --- -----
7th DIVISION (Thomières):
Brigade { 1st Line (3 batts.)[775] 80 1,683 79 1,454
Bonté { 62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 45 1,048
{ 23rd Léger (absent)[776] -- -- -- --
? { 101st Line (3 batts.) 61 1,388 29 412
Artillery Train, &c. 5 203 nil nil
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 193 4,350 153 2,914
--- ----- --- -----
8th DIVISION (Bonnet):
Brigade { 118th Line (3 batts.) 53 1,584 37 1,024
Gautier { 119th Line (3 batts.) 64 1,265 48 831
{ 120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152
? { 122nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000
Artillery train, &c. 3 107 nil nil
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007
--- ----- --- -----
LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (Curto):
{ 3rd Hussars (3 squadrons) 17 231 14 165
{ 22nd Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 18 233
? { 26th Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225
{ 28th Chasseurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 39
{ 13th Chasseurs (5 squadrons) 20 496 28 426
? { 14th Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332
{ Escadron de marche 11 141 9 52
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 102 1,777 108 1,472
--- ----- --- -----
HEAVY CAVALRY DIVISION (Boyer):
{ 6th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 376 19 332
? { 11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 411 18 359
Brigade { 15th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 15 328 16 294
Carrié { 25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 314 18 282
Artillery attached to cavalry 3 193 3 148
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415
--- ----- --- -----
Total Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
--- ----- --- -----
Artillery Reserve, Park, &c. 50 1,450 22 707
Engineers and Sappers 17 332 16 345
Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186
_Équipages militaires_ 26 742 22 707
État-Major Général 54 -- 54 --
----- ------ ----- ------
{ Infantry Divisions 1,597 41,669 1,392 32,755
General Total { Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
{ Auxiliary Arms 153 2,653 120 1,945
----- ------ ----- ------
1,925 47,721 1,694 37,587
[775] Not including 2nd battalion, about 450 strong, at Astorga
in garrison.
[776] In garrison at Astorga.
N.B.--Guns, July 15, 78; August 1, 58; lost 7 12-pounders, 3
8-pounders, 9 4-pounders, 1 3-pounder. Horses, July 15, 4,278; August
1, 3,231. Draught horses, July 15, 2,037; August 1, 1,847. _Équipages
militaires_, horses, July 15, 800; August 1, 331.
To these two tables we must append, as a side-light, the results of a
compilation of the totals of officers killed and wounded at Salamanca,
from Martinien’s admirable _Liste des officiers tués et blessés pendant
les guerres de l’Empire_. This of course does not include unwounded
prisoners.
_Killed._ _Wounded._
Foy’s Division (including
losses at Garcia Hernandez
on July 23rd):
6th Léger 1 10 = 11
69th Line 2 8 = 10
39th Line -- 2 = 2
76th Line 1 7 = 8
--
Total 31
Clausel’s Division:
25th Léger 4 10 = 14[777]
27th Line 2 5 = 7
50th Line 9 17 = 26
59th Line 4 15 = 19
--
Total 66
Ferey’s Division:
31st Léger 1 6 = 7
26th Line -- 6 = 6
47th Line 5 13 = 18
70th Line 2 3 = 5
--
Total 36
Sarrut’s Division:
2nd Léger -- 3 = 3
36th Line -- 3 = 3
4th Léger -- 2 = 2
--
Total 8
Maucune’s Division:
15th Line 4 12 = 16
66th Line 2 15 = 17
82nd Line 1 7 = 8
86th Line -- 3 = 3
--
Total 44
Brennier’s Division:
17th Léger 1 3 = 4[778]
65th Line 1 8 = 9[779]
22nd Line 2 19 = 21[780]
--
Total 34
Thomières’s Division:
1st Line -- 4 = 4
62nd Line 1 14 = 15
101st Line 6 19 = 25
--
Total 44
Bonnet’s Division:
118th Line 2 18 = 20
119th Line 3 23 = 26
120th Line -- 8 = 8
122nd Line 3 13 = 16
--
Total 70
Curto’s Light Cavalry:
3rd Hussars -- 2[781]
13th Chasseurs -- 7
14th Chasseurs -- 5[782]
22nd Chasseurs -- 5
26th Chasseurs -- 4
28th Chasseurs -- 2
--
Total 25
Boyer’s Division of Dragoons:
6th Dragoons -- 9
11th Dragoons -- 2[783]
15th Dragoons -- 1[784]
25th Dragoons -- 6[785]
--
Total 18
Artillery, Horse -- 1
” Field -- 5
” Train -- 1
--
Total 7
Engineers -- 3 = 3
Staff 3 17[786] = 20
Miscellaneous
officers, whose
regiments were
not present at
Salamanca -- 2 = 2
[777] Plus 1 killed and 5 wounded at the combat of the Guarena,
July 18.
[778] Plus 2 killed 6 wounded at the Guarena.
[779] Plus 2 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena.
[780] Plus 5 wounded at the Guarena.
[781] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at Castrejon.
[782] Plus 3 wounded at Castrejon.
[783] Plus 1 wounded on July 21, and 2 wounded at Garcia
Hernandez, July 23.
[784] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena, July 18.
[785] Plus 4 wounded at the Guarena.
[786] Plus 1 general wounded July 16, died next day (Dembouski),
and 1 general wounded and taken July 18 (at the Guarena), Carrié,
and 1 officer wounded at Garcia Hernandez.
General total 60 officers killed, 347 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia
Hernandez; plus 7 officers killed and 27 wounded at the Guarena on July
18, and 2 wounded in minor engagements.
Loss in killed and wounded, not including unwounded prisoners, during
the campaign, 67 killed, 376 wounded = 443 officers in all.
After arriving at this general loss in killed and wounded officers,
so far as is possible from Martinien’s tables, which are not quite
complete for all corps, it only remains to estimate the unwounded
prisoners. I searched the immense volumes of rolls of French officers
in captivity at the Record Office, and found 63 names of prisoners
taken at Salamanca, the Guarena, and Garcia Hernandez. A few of these
duplicate the names of wounded officers to be found in Martinien’s
tables, the remainder must represent the unwounded prisoners.
Wellington in his Salamanca dispatch wrote that he had 137 French
officers prisoners--evidently the larger number of them must have been
wounded, as only 63 were sent off to England that autumn. Probably many
died in hospital. Prisoners are most numerous from the 101st, 22nd, and
from Foy’s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandez, the 76th and 6th
Léger.
In the Library of the _Archives de la Guerre_ at the Paris Ministry of
War I went through the regimental histories of all the French infantry
regiments present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they
differ much in value--some are very full and with statistics carefully
worked out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin
and factless. Fourteen units give their losses, which I herewith annex:
Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, 350.
Ferey’s Division: 70th Line, 111; 31st Léger, 340.
Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger, 202.
Maucune’s Division: 15th Line, 359.
Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger, 264; 65th Line, 359.
Thomières’s Division: 1st Line, 227; 62nd Line, 868; 101st Line, 1,000.
Bonnet’s Division: 120th, 458; 122nd, 527.
The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave
fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that
we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s
lists [which are not _quite_ complete], at least 152 officers out of
5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers
killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries
of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in
individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large
total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560
would be something very like the total loss _killed and wounded_ in the
French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers
taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men.
The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and
artillery, &c., 53 officers hit--as by Martinien’s tables--must imply
something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of
14,000 for the casualties--the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469).
To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses
by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and
August 1, the following instances may suffice.
The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52
officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and
225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed,
5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39
missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious,
one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at
Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125
greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown.
A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It
shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45
officers and 1,048 men--the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28
men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least
15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20
officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868
not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a
strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This
corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787]
at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as
having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly
the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle--having
presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated
after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the
other two battalions.
[787] And one odd company of its 3rd battalion, 61 of all ranks,
while in the return of August 1, the 3rd battalion has 13
officers and 480 men.
But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total
figures actually _go up_ from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between
July 15th and August 1st--in despite of the fact that it lost (as
Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360
rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It
must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers
and 452 men at least[788].
[788] The 2/47th shows on July 15, 310 of all ranks, on August 1,
513.
Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole
Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000
men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already
drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about
48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners,
and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying.
XII
BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18,
1812
[789] The fight at Castrillo is often called the ‘Combat of the
Guarena’.
_Officers._ _Men._ _Missing_ _Total._
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Men._
G. Anson’s Brigade:
11th Lt. Dragoons -- 2 3 10 -- 15
12th Lt. Dragoons -- 1 5 11 1 18
16th Lt. Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- --
V. Alten’s Brigade:
1st Hussars K.G.L. -- 4 7 45 4 60
14th Lt. Dragoons -- 3 14 49 9 75
Bock’s Brigade:
1st Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- -- 1 -- 1
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- 5 1 1 7
Le Marchant’s Brigade:
3rd Dragoons -- 1 -- 9 -- 10
4th DIVISION.
W. Anson’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 2 1 11 58 -- 72
1/40th Foot -- 1 8 59 1 69
Ellis’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot -- 1 1 14 3 19
1/23rd Foot -- -- -- 2 2 4
1/48th Foot -- -- -- 5 1 6
5th DIVISION.
Greville’s Brigade:
3/1st -- -- -- 2 -- 2
Detached Companies
of 5/60th -- -- -- 1 2 3
Horse Artillery -- 1 2 2 -- 5
German Artillery -- -- -- 2 -- 2
Portuguese 1 6 33 90 27 157
-- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 3 21 89 361 51 525
XIII
SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN THE SPRING OF 1812
(A) REMAINS OF THE 2ND (VALENCIAN) AND 3RD (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1
_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Conde de Montijo, 1st of Badajoz (2
batts.), Cuenca (2 batts.), 2 squadrons cavalry 110 2,049
2nd Division: General Luis Riquelme, 2nd Walloon
Guards, Guadalajara (3 batts.), 1st of Burgos (3
batts.), Guadix (2 batts.), Baden (1 batt.),
Alpujarras (1 batt.), dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) 335 5,214
Reserve Division: General Philip Roche. Voluntarios
de Aragon, Canarias, Alicante, 2nd of Murcia,
Alcazar de San Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2
squadrons of Husares de Fernando 7º 300 5,576
Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons),
España (2 squadrons), Reina (2 squadrons),
Carabineros Reales, Farnesio, Montesa, Dragones del
Rey, Cazadores de Valencia, Pavia, Rey, Granaderos
a caballo, Husares de Castilla (one squadron
each), three provisional squadrons 321 1,565
Cadres of dispersed battalions, now reorganizing:
Lorca, Velez Malaga, Almanza, America 98 1,079
Artillery (Field) 38 651
Artillery (Garrison) in Alicante and Cartagena 17 582
Engineers 8 202
----- ------
Total 1,227 16,918
(B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA
[The figures of the former from _Los Ejércitos españoles_. The list of
prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris _Archives de la Guerre_.]
_Unwounded
_Strength._ prisoners
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ reported
by Suchet._
Michelena’s {Corona (1 Batt.) 24 630} 255
Brigade {Velez Malaga (1 batt.) 36 834} 2,035 --
{Guadix 24 487} 337
Montijo’s {2nd Walloon Guards (1 batt.) 20 569} 350
Brigade {Cuenca (2 batts.) 33 890} 2,152 112
{1st of Badajoz (1 batt.) 27 613} --
{Bailen (1 batt.) 32 708} 405
Mijares’s {Alcazar de San Juan (1 batt.) 31 855} 2,187 434
Brigade {Lorca (1 batt.) 25 536} 242
Cavalry (Provisional Regiment, 2 squadrons) 29 207 --
Engineers 26 325 --
Roche’s Division:
1st of Burgos (2 batts.) 27 786 --
Canarias (1 batt.) 34 818 --
Alicante (2 batts.) 35 1,110 --
Chinchilla (2 batts.) 26 918 --
--- ------ -----
Total 429 10,286 2,135
Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their
wounds.
No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban,
which was not in action at Castalla.
XIV
THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812
[A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON]
I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812
(War Office: _Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence_, Series I,
vol. 311.)
_Officers._ _N.C.O.’s
and Men._
20th Light Dragoons 9 158
Foreign Troop of Hussars 3 68
R.A. (including drivers) 8 73
Marine Artillery 1 29
R.E. 5 42
Staff Corps 1 13
1/10th Foot 33 902
1/58th Foot 31 840
1/81st Foot 44 1,230
4th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 36 953
6th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 33 1,041
De Roll’s Regiment (3 companies) 11 320
Dillon’s Regiment (5 companies) 18 536
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)[790] 14 338
--- -----
Total 247 6,543
[790] This corps was organized in five ‘divisions,’ each of three
companies.
II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812
(Ibid., vol. 312.)
_Officers._ _N.C.O.’s
and Men._
20th Light Dragoons -- 13
Guides -- 14
R.A. (including drivers) 4 131
Grenadier Battalion[791] 35 924
Light Infantry Battalion[792] 21 582
1/27th Foot 25 828
2nd Battalion, Anglo-Italian Levy[793] 33 1,184
Sicilian Artillery -- 155
Sicilian Grenadiers[794] -- 605
--- -----
Total 118 4,436[795]
[791] From 2/10th, 1/21st, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1/75th, 3rd, 7th, and
8th K.G.L.
[792] Schwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, says it was composed of the
light companies of De Roll’s, Dillon’s, De Watteville’s (this is
inaccurate, as De Watteville’s regiment had moved to Cadiz before
the end of 1811), and the 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.
[793] 150 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.
[794] 140 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.
[795] A ‘division’ of the Calabrian Free Corps, 300 strong, was
left behind for want of room, as well as the Sicilian Regiment de
Presidi, 1,200 strong.
III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25[796]