5 A.M. of the fifteenth. Orders were immediately given Breyman to march.
News of Baum's defeat reached Burgoyne during the night of the
sixteenth. The 20th regiment, British, was immediately marched to
Breyman's support. Burgoyne's anxiety was so great, that he followed it
until Breyman's corps was met on the road.
[35] ECHELON, the French word for step-ladder, by adoption a universal
military term, well describes the posting of troops, belonging to one
army, at stated intervals apart, so as to be moved forward or backward
step by step, always keeping the same relative distances between the
separate bodies. In marking out such positions on the map, the columns
would look like the rounds of a ladder, hence the term.
X.
ST. LEGER'S EXPEDITION.
Burgoyne's hopes now chiefly turned upon the promised cooeperation of St.
Leger from Oswego, and of Sir William Howe from New York.
[Sidenote: Refer to "Plan of Campaign."]
Convinced that the enemy would shortly invade the Mohawk Valley,
Schuyler had sent Colonel Gansevoort[36] to put Fort Stanwix,[37] the
key to this valley, in a state of defence, before it should be attacked.
[Illustration: ST. LEGER'S ROUTE TO FORT STANWIX.]
St. Leger's force was the counterpart of Burgoyne's, in that it
consisted of regular troops, loyalists, and Indians. Many of the
loyalists, and most of the Indians, had lived in this valley, so that
St. Leger had no want of guides, who knew every foot of ground, or of
spies acquainted with the sentiments of every settler.
[Sidenote: Aug. 3.]
A scanty supply of provisions had just been brought into the fort when
St. Leger's scouts opened fire upon it. The garrison shut the gates and
returned the fire. Instead of finding Fort Stanwix defenceless, St.
Leger was compelled to lay siege to it.
The news of St. Leger's appearance in the valley roused the settlers in
arms. Near a thousand men, all brave, but without discipline, promptly
marched, under General Herkimer,[38] to the relief of Fort Stanwix.
Gansevoort was notified, and was to aid the movement by making a sortie
from the fort, at the proper moment.
St. Leger's spies soon discovered Herkimer's men coming. All the
rangers, and most of the Indians, went out to waylay them in the thick
forests. Not far from Oriskany, Brant,[39] the Mohawk chief, and
Johnson,[40] the loyalist leader, hid their men in a ravine, through
which the Americans would have to pass, in a thin line, over a causeway
of logs.
[Sidenote: Aug. 6.]
Meantime, the Americans were heedlessly pressing on, without order, to
the rescue of their comrades. In their impatience, even ordinary
precautions were neglected. When the van entered the ravine, a terrible
fire mowed down the front ranks by scores; those in the rear fled in a
panic from the field. It was downright butchery.
After the firing had continued some time, those Americans whom panic had
not seized, threw themselves into a posture of defence, and resolved to
sell their lives dearly. Herkimer, their leader, had been struck down by
a bullet, among the first; but, notwithstanding his wound was a
disabling one, he continued to direct his men, and encourage them by his
firm demeanor to fight on. In the face of overwhelming odds they
gallantly stood their ground, until the enemy was alarmed by hearing
firing in its rear, and drew off, leaving Herkimer's little band of
heroes to retire unmolested from the field.
The firing had been heard at Fort Stanwix, and the cause easily guessed.
While the battle was raging at Oriskany, the garrison of the fort
sallied out upon the besiegers' camps. They met with little opposition,
as most of the defenders had gone out to fight Herkimer. The firing,
however, had called off the savages from Herkimer, to the defence of
their own camps. The sortie was gallantly made, and entirely successful;
but the attack on Herkimer rendered it of so little avail, that the
battle of Oriskany left Gansevoort hardly better off than before.
Two hundred of Herkimer's men were killed. He, too, soon died of his
wounds.
Though this attempt to relieve Fort Stanwix had so signally failed,
Schuyler was much too sensible of the importance of holding it, not to
make another effort to raise the siege. He could ill afford to spare the
troops necessary for the undertaking, since Burgoyne was now
manoeuvring in his front; but the gravity of the situation could not
be overlooked. He therefore sent Arnold, with Learned's brigade, to
retrieve Herkimer's disaster in the valley.
[Sidenote: Aug. 22.]
Gansevoort was still holding out against St. Leger as stubbornly as
ever. His situation was, however, growing desperate, when, one day,
without apparent cause, the besiegers suddenly decamped in headlong
haste, leaving their tents standing, their baggage in their tents, and
their artillery in the trenches.
This inglorious and unlooked-for flight was brought about by emissaries
from Arnold, who spread the report among St. Leger's Indians, that the
Americans were coming with forces as numerous as leaves on the trees.
Arnold, whom no one will accuse of want of courage, was really undecided
about advancing farther with his small force. His stratagem, however,
took effect. Grown weary of the siege, the Indians now made no scruple
of deserting their allies on the spot. In vain St. Leger stormed and
entreated by turns; stay they would not. He therefore had no choice but
to follow them, in mortification and disgust, back to Oswego. In the
belief that Arnold was close upon them, everything was left behind that
could impede the march. The siege was abandoned in disgrace, and Fort
Stanwix saved by a simple stratagem.
[Sidenote: Aug. 28.]
Six days later, Burgoyne was informed of St. Leger's retreat. He had now
no other resource than in the promised advance up the Hudson, and in the
strength of his artillery. By acting in detachments, his immediate force
had been so seriously weakened that a forward movement on his part,
without full assurance of active support from New York, savored far
more of recklessness than sound military judgment.
FOOTNOTES:
[36] COLONEL PETER GANSEVOORT, born at Albany, 1749, had fought with
Montgomery at Quebec.
[37] FORT STANWIX, also called Schuyler, built by General Stanwix of
Abercromby's army in 1758.
[38] GENERAL NICHOLAS HERKIMER, a leading settler of the Mohawk Valley.
[39] JOSEPH BRANT, or Thayandanega, sometime pupil of Dr. Wheelock's
school (since Dartmouth College), was by all odds the most active,
intelligent, and implacable enemy to the Americans that the war produced
among his people. With Johnson, he held most of the Six Nations at
enmity with us during the Revolution. (See Note 5.)
[40] SIR JOHN JOHNSON was the son of Sir William, who gained wealth and
a title by his victory over Dieskau at Lake George, 1755. He was also
the king's superintendent over the Six Nations, and had his residence at
Caughnawaga, since called Johnstown in his honor. Sir John succeeded to
his father's title and estates. He took sides with the Royalists, raised
a body of Tory followers, and with them fled to Canada. Out of these
refugees, he raised a corps of rangers called Royal Greens, with whom he
joined St. Leger, in the hope of crushing out his enemies in the valley.
XI.
OUR ARMY ADVANCES.
[Sidenote: Refer to Chapter V., "Facing Disaster."]
[Sidenote: Aug. 4.]
We remember that the united voice of the army and people had demanded
the recall of those generals whose want of foresight or energy, or both,
had caused the disasters with which the campaign had opened. Congress
chose General Gates[41] to command in room of Schuyler, who, with St.
Clair, was ordered to report at headquarters. With the methods of travel
then in use, Gates was nearly two weeks in getting from Philadelphia to
Albany. This fact will sufficiently illustrate the difficulties which
attended the movement of reenforcements from one army to another, before
the day of railways and steamboats.
All that lay in the power of man to do, Washington had done for the
Northern army. Though fronting an enemy greatly superior to himself, he
had still found time to so direct operations in the North, that his hand
may almost be said to have guided the course of events in that quarter.
He had soothed Schuyler's wounded self-love, commended his efforts,
strengthened his hands in the field, and nobly stood between him and his
detractors in Congress. When Congress had suspended all the generals of
the Northern army from command, it was Washington who interposed to
save them and the army from the consequences of such blindness and
folly. To Schuyler he had said, "Burgoyne is doing just what we could
wish; let him but continue to scatter his army about, and his ruin is
only a question of time." Schuyler urgently called for more troops.
Brigade after brigade had gone from Washington's own army to swell
Schuyler's ranks. "I care not where the victory is won, so we do but
gain it," Washington said. Schuyler again pleaded his want of general
officers. Washington sent him Arnold, the dare-devil of the army, and
Lincoln, a man of sound head, steady hand, and even temper, as a
counterpoise to Arnold's over-confident and impetuous nature. Thanks to
these efforts, we had created a new army on the ruins of the old.
Schuyler's deportment toward the Massachusetts authorities at this time
was neither conciliatory nor conducive to the interests of the service.
He knew their feelings of distrust toward him, and in making application
to them for reenforcements showed his resentment in a way that called
forth an acrimonious response. He upbraided them for their shortcomings;
they entreated him to look nearer home. Thus we find General Schuyler
and the Massachusetts Council engaged in an exchange of sarcasms at a
time when the exigency called for something besides a war of words
between the commander of an army and the executive head of a powerful
State.
[Sidenote: Aug. 19.]
Gates took command just after the Battle of Bennington was won. He
found the army in much disorder, but pleased with the change of
commanders. Gates was a thorough disciplinarian and organizer. In his
hands, the efficiency of the army daily increased. Old jealousies were
silenced, and confidence restored. Letters from the soldiers show the
change in temper and spirit to have been instant and marked. One of them
says, "When we came to Albany, things looked very dark for our side, for
there were officers in town who had left camp, and would not go back as
long as Schuyler had the command. Both officers and soldiers were
determined not to fight under him, and would tell him so to his head.
But General Gates came to town, and then the tune was turned, and every
face showed a merry heart."
The hostile armies now lay, quietly gathering up their strength for the
decisive struggle, within sound of each other's evening guns.
[Sidenote: Sept. 9.]
Gates was the first to act. Having been joined by Morgan's rifle
corps,[42] and by large numbers of militia, the whole army now moved up
to Stillwater, within a dozen miles of the enemy, who still remained
intrenched behind the Batten-Kill. This movement put new life into our
soldiers, and was not without its effect upon the enemy, whose spirit
was aroused at finding the antagonist it had been pursuing suddenly
become the aggressor. The Americans had a well-served though not
numerous artillery, but the presence of Morgan's corps more than made
good any deficiency in this respect. The great drawback to the
efficiency of the army was the want of cordiality between Gates and
Arnold. The breach between them was daily widening that was presently to
become an impassable gulf.
Gates purposed taking up a strong position, and awaiting Burgoyne's
attack behind his intrenchments. Either Burgoyne must risk an assault,
under conditions most favorable to the Americans, or retire discomfited
under conditions highly unfavorable to a successful retreat.
The country between Saratoga and Stillwater, covered with woods and
intersected by ravines, was wholly unsuited to the free movement of
troops. All the shore of the Hudson is high ground, rising to a nearly
uniform level next the river, but gradually ascending, as the river is
left, to the summit of the streams falling into it. Long slopes or
terraces are thus formed, furrowed here and there by the ravines, which
serve to drain off the water from above into the river below. Puny
rivulets where they begin, these watercourses cut deeper as they run on,
until, at the river, they become impassable gulches. The old military
road skirts the foot of the heights, which sometimes abut closely upon
the river, and sometimes draw back far enough to leave a strip of meadow
between it and them.
[Sidenote: Sept. 12.]
[Sidenote: Bemis' Heights.]
Kosciusko,[43] Gates's engineer, chose the ground on which to receive
Burgoyne's attack, at one of these places where the heights crowd upon
the river, thus forming a narrow defile, which a handful of men could
easily defend against an army. At this place the house of a settler
named Bemis stood by the roadside. Our army filed off the road here, to
the left, scaled the heights, and encamped along a ridge of land,
running west as far as some high, rough, and woody ground, which formed
the summit.
[Sidenote: Freeman's Farm.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 13.]
Except two or three clearings, all the ground in Gates's front was
thickly wooded. One settler, called Freeman, had cleared and planted
quite a large field in front of the American centre and left, though at
some distance beyond, and hid from view by intervening woods. This field
of Freeman's was one of the few spots of ground lying between the two
armies, on which troops could be manoeuvred or artillery used with
advantage. The farm-house stood at the upper edge of it, at a distance
of a mile back from the river. Our pickets immediately took post there,
as no one could enter the clearing without being seen from the house.
Accident has thus made this spot of ground, Freeman's Farm,[44] famous.
The Americans were at work like beavers, strengthening their line with
redoubts, felled trees, and batteries, when the enemy was discovered
marching against them.
FOOTNOTES:
[41] GENERAL GATES had resigned his command at Ticonderoga, rather than
serve under Schuyler. There was no good feeling between them.
[42] MORGAN'S RIFLEMEN was the most celebrated corps of the Continental
Army. The men were unerring marksmen, and on that account greatly feared
by the British. All were expert woodsmen, devoted to their leader, who
held them under strict discipline.
[43] THADDEUS KOSCIUSKO came to this country to offer his services to
Congress. "What can you do?" asked Washington. "Try me," was the laconic
reply. In course of time, he was sent to Schuyler as engineer of his
army.
[44] FREEMAN'S HOUSE was made use of by Burgoyne, during the battle of
September 9, as his headquarters. After this battle it was included
within the British lines.
XII.
BATTLE OF BEMIS' HEIGHTS.[45]
(_September 19, 1777._)
Burgoyne, at Batten-Kill, had only a choice of evils to make. Either he
could save his army by retreating to Fort Edward, and thus give up all
hope of seeing the ends of the campaign fulfilled, or he might still
make a bold push for Albany, and so put everything at the hazard of
battle.
But to fall back when he had promised to go forward, when the doing so
meant ruin to his reputation, and possibly to the cause of his king, was
not only a bitter alternative, but a responsibility heavier than he was
prepared to take.
On the other hand, should he now cross the Hudson, with intent to bring
on a decisive battle,--and his crossing meant just this,--Burgoyne knew
that he must drop his communications with Canada, because he could not
afford the guards necessary to keep them open. Already he had been
weakened by the loss of more than fifteen hundred men, without counting
the Indians who had so basely deserted him; St. Leger had failed him in
his utmost need. On his left, the Americans were watching their chance
to strike a blow in his rear. Burgoyne therefore felt that, from the
moment he should put the Hudson between his army and its only way of
retreat, all must be staked on the doubtful issue of battle. He decided
to make the gambler's last throw.
Burgoyne himself has said that his orders left him no choice but to go
on. It is evident he construed them to his own wishes. He still believed
his six thousand excellent soldiers, with their superb artillery, would
prove themselves more than a match for twice their own number of
undisciplined yeomanry. He would not admit even the possibility of
defeat. He felt confident of beating Gates with ease.
In choosing to fight, rather than retreat, Burgoyne, perhaps, acted from
the impulse of a brave nature, rather than the promptings of his sober
judgment, as he was bound to do; since he had known for some time that
Sir William Howe had gone to Pennsylvania, without making any definite
preparations to come to his assistance. Notwithstanding this assurance,
that a most important part of the plan of campaign had failed, through
no fault of his, Burgoyne seems to have put his trust in the chapter of
accidents, rather than remain inactive until it was certain he would be
supported from New York. Not one solitary circumstance, except faith in
the valor of his troops, favored a further advance at this time. But his
gallant little army was ready to follow him, the enemy was within
striking distance, and so Burgoyne marched on, bemoaning his ill luck,
but with the pluck characteristic of the man.
On the thirteenth the British army crossed the Hudson, by a bridge of
boats, to Saratoga. Burgoyne took with him provisions for five weeks,
which were loaded in bateaux and floated down the river as he advanced.
As yet he knew comparatively nothing of what preparations the Americans
were making to receive him, and but little about the country he was in.
But he did know that the patriot army had at last faced about, and that
was enough to rouse the spirit of his soldiers to the highest pitch.
[Illustration: BURGOYNE'S ORDER OF BATTLE.
19th September.
[_Pen and ink sketch by a British officer._]
A, The Line Formed. B, The Columns in March.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]
On the fifteenth the British Army began its march southward in three
divisions. The only road had to be given up to the baggage and
artillery. To protect it, the left, or German division, marched along
the meadows, next the river. The centre, or British division, kept the
heights above; while Frazer's corps moved at some distance, on the right
of it, with Breyman's following just behind in support. Two divisions
were therefore marching on the heights, and one underneath them.
[Sidenote: Sept. 17.]
What with the delays caused by broken bridges on the road, bridging the
ravines on the heights, or forcing a way through thick woods, which it
was necessary always to reconnoitre with care,--the royal army could get
over but six miles in two days. Being then near the enemy, a halt was
made to prepare for battle.
[Sidenote: Sept. 19.]
On this day, Burgoyne continued his march in the same order as before,
with skirmishers thrown out well in advance of each column. The centre,
which he directed in person, would, in following the direction it was
taking, very shortly find itself at Freeman's Farm.
On his part, Gates had sent out Morgan's rifle corps to feel the enemy,
in order to learn what they were doing or intending to do. Morgan had
advanced as far as our outpost at Freeman's house, when the British
skirmishers came out of the woods into the clearing. They were instantly
fired upon and returned the fire. It was therefore here that the action
of September 19 began.
Morgan's hot fire soon drove the enemy back to cover again, with loss.
Our riflemen dashed into the woods after them, got into disorder, and,
before they were aware, fell upon the supporting battalions, by whom
they were defeated and scattered, in their turn. This division then
advanced into the clearing, from which by this time the Americans had
decamped. Burgoyne thus gained the ground about Freeman's house, whence
his pickets were first attacked and driven in.
At this place, Burgoyne formed his line, facing towards the woods into
which Morgan's men had retreated. He rightly judged the enemy to be
there, though threats failed to extort any information from the
prisoners he had taken. When Frazer told one of Morgan's captains he
would hang him up to the nearest tree, unless he would point out the
place where his comrades were posted, the man undauntedly replied, "You
may, if you please."
Knowing that Gates could not be attacked on his right, Burgoyne meant to
make the trial on the left. If that wing could be turned, Gates would
have to retreat from his works, or be driven into the river. This was
all the simple plan of attack, but as yet, Burgoyne did not know where
the American left was posted. The woods effectually masked the American
position, and all was now quiet.
Burgoyne now prepared to go forward again. From what had just taken
place, he supposed the troops now with him would strike the American
line first. It was therefore arranged that when he became fully engaged,
Frazer was to charge the American flank, and crush it, making the centre
division his pivot. With his right, Burgoyne meant to turn the American
left.
Burgoyne had with him four battalions of the line, and four guns. He
would have brought more guns if more could have been used with effect in
the woods, as he greatly relied upon this arm. Frazer had twenty
companies of grenadiers and light infantry, the 24th British regiment,
Breyman's Germans, and all the Canadians, loyalists, and Indians now
left with the army; he also had four pieces of artillery. About four
thousand men were thus in readiness to engage. The left wing was now in
motion along the river road, under the heights, but was too far off to
be of much use in reenforcing the right. It was, however, of service in
preventing Gates from sending troops away from his right, to fight
Burgoyne on the left.
Though Burgoyne did not know the American position, which thick woods
everywhere masked from his view, he had disclosed his own very clearly
to Morgan, who sent an urgent request for reenforcements.
Gates wished to receive the attack in his works, not make one himself.
He therefore ordered only one or two battalions from his left to go to
Morgan's assistance, and withstood the entreaties of his officers to be
allowed to meet the enemy in the open field.
At between two and three o'clock, as Burgoyne had just finished his
dispositions for attacking, a heavy fire broke from the woods in
Frazer's front. This came from Morgan and the troops sent to his
support. Making no impression on Frazer, whose cannon held them in
check, the assailants suddenly shifted their attack over to the left,
where Burgoyne commanded in person. And thus it was that, instead of
attacking, Burgoyne found himself assaulted; instead of turning Gates's
left, his own was being assailed, with the purpose of separating the two
wings of his army.
On finding a battle actually in progress, Gates reenforced the troops
who were fighting against odds, with driblets of a regiment at a time.
Instead of going on the field himself, or letting Arnold go,[46] he
pretended to believe that his own right was the real object of attack,
and kept in his quarters. This day's battle was therefore fought wholly
by his subordinates, against the British general-in-chief, seconded by
his ablest lieutenants.
Having found the enemy's left, the Americans chiefly turned their
attention to that flank, as has just been said. The 62d British regiment
was posted here with two guns. This flank was crushed, and its artillery
silenced by a superior fire. Its defeat caused the whole British line
to give way, leaving part of their artillery in our hands.
[Illustration: FIRST BATTLE OF BEMIS' HEIGHTS.
[_Pen and ink sketch by a British officer._]
A, Americans Attacking. B, British Positions.]
So far the battle had gone in our favor. Any demonstration from our
right, upon the enemy's left, would, unquestionably, have rendered the
victory complete. As nothing of the kind was attempted, the British were
able to bring up reenforcements from that wing, without opposition, and
the golden opportunity was lost.