POLITICAL DOCTRINES IN SPAIN.
My explanation of this matter would be incomplete, were I to leave the
following difficulty unresolved: "In Spain, Catholicity has prevailed
exclusively, and under it an absolute monarchy was established, a
sufficient indication that Catholic doctrines are inimical to political
liberty." The great majority of men never look deeply into the real
nature of things, nor pay due attention to the true meaning of words.
Present them with something in strong relief that will make a vivid
impression on their imagination, and they take facts just as they
appear at the first glance, thoughtlessly confounding _causality_ with
_coincidence_. It cannot be denied that the empire of the Catholic
religion _coincided_ in Spain with the final _preponderance_ of
absolute monarchy; but the question is, _Was the Catholic religion
the true cause of this preponderance?_ Was it she that overturned the
ancient cortes, to establish the throne of absolute monarchs on the
ruins of popular institutions?
Before we commence our examination into the cause that destroyed the
influence of the nation on public affairs, it may be well to remind the
reader that in Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, absolutism was established
and upheld in juxtaposition with Protestantism. Hence the argument of
coincidence is very little worth, as, owing to the exact identity of
circumstances in the two cases, it could just as well be proved that
Protestantism leads to absolutism. I will just observe here, that
in my endeavors to demonstrate in the foregoing chapters that the
pseudo-Reformation tended to the overthrow of political liberty, I
have not rested my arguments upon coincidences only, however careful
I may have been to point them out to the reader. I have said that
Protestantism, by diffusing dissolvent doctrines, had occasioned a
necessity for an extension of temporal power; that by destroying the
political influence of the clergy and the Popes, it had destroyed the
equilibrium between the social classes, left no counterpoise to the
throne, and further augmented the power of the monarch, by granting him
ecclesiastical supremacy in Protestant countries, and exaggerating his
prerogatives in Catholic nations.
But we will dismiss these general considerations, and fix our attention
upon Spain. This nation has the misfortune to be one of those that
are least known; its history is not properly studied, nor are sound
views taken of its present condition. Its troubles, its rebellions,
its civil wars, proclaim that it has not yet received its true system
of government, which proves that the nation to be governed is but
imperfectly understood. Its history is, if possible, still less
perfectly understood. The present influence of events already very
remote, works secretly and almost imperceptibly; and hence the eye
of the observer is satisfied with a superficial view of affairs,
and he forms his opinions too hastily--opinions which too often, in
consequence, take the place of facts and reality. In treating of the
causes that have deprived Spain of her political liberty, almost all
authors fix their attention principally or exclusively upon Castile,
giving monarchs infinitely more credit for sagacity than the course
of events would seem to justify. They generally select the war of the
_Communeros_ as their point of view, and, according to certain writers,
but for the defeat at Villalar, the liberties of Spain would have been
forever secure. I admit that the war of the _Communeros_ affords an
excellent point of view for the study of this matter; in fact, the
field of Villalar was in some measure witness to the conclusion of
the drama. Castile should be regarded as the centre of events; and it
is here that the Spanish monarchs gave proof of great sagacity in the
manner in which they brought the enterprise to a close. Nevertheless,
I do not deem it just to give an exclusive preference to one of these
considerations, and it does appear to me that the real state of the
question is generally misconceived: effects are taken for causes,
accessories for principals.
In my opinion, the ruin of free institutions resulted from the
following causes:--1st, the premature and immoderately extensive
development of these institutions; 2dly, the formation of the Spanish
nation out of a successive reunion of very heterogeneous parts, all
possessing institutions extremely popular; 3dly, the establishment of
the centre of power in the middle of the provinces where these forms
were most restricted, and where the authority of the crown was the
greatest; 4thly, the extreme abundance of wealth, the power and the
splendor which the Spanish people saw everywhere around them, and which
lulled them to sleep in the arms of prosperity; 5thly, the exclusively
military position of the Spanish monarchs, whose armies were everywhere
victorious, their military power and prestige being at their height
precisely at the critical time when the quarrel had to be decided. I
will take a rapid view of these causes, although the nature of this
work does not permit me to devote to them the space which the gravity
and importance of the subject demand. The reader will pardon me this
political digression on account of the close connection existing
between this subject and the religious question.
As regards popular forms of government, Spain has been in advance
of all monarchical nations. This is an indubitable fact. In Spain,
these forms received a premature and extreme development; and this
contributed to their ruin, as a child sickens and dies, if, in its
tender years, its growth is too rapid, or its intellect too precocious.
This active spirit of liberty, this multitude of _fueros_ and of
privileges, these impediments everywhere placed in the way of power,
checking the rapidity and energy of its action--this great development
of the popular element, in its very nature restless and turbulent,
existing simultaneously with the wealth, the power, and the pride
of the aristocracy, very naturally gave rise to many commotions.
Elements so numerous, so various, and so opposite to each other, which,
moreover, had not time to be combined so as to form a peaceable and
harmonious whole, were not likely to work tranquilly together. Order is
the prime necessity of society; it is essential to the growth of the
ideas, the manners, and the laws of a nation. Wherever there exists
a germ of continual disorder, how deep soever it may have struck its
roots, it is sure to be extirpated, or at least crushed, so as no
longer to keep public tranquillity in perpetual danger. The municipal
and political organization of Spain had this inconvenience, and hence
an imperative necessity for its modification. But the ideas and the
manners of the time were such, that matters could not be expected to
stop at a simple modification. The system of constituencies, which so
easily creates numerous assemblies, either to enact new fundamental
codes or to reform the old ones, was not then understood as it is in
our days; neither were men's ideas at that time so generalized as to
place them above all that exclusively and particularly relates to a
people, at a point of elevation whence they could no longer observe
every petty local object, but had their attention wholly engrossed
by mankind, society, the nation, or the government. It was not so at
that time: a charter of liberty granted by a king to a city or a town;
an immunity wrested from a feudal lord by his armed vassals; some
privilege obtained in reward of warlike achievements, or sometimes
granted as a recompense for the bravery of a man's ancestors; a
concession to the cortes, made by the monarch in exchange for the grant
of a contribution, or, as it was then termed, of a _service_,--a law or
custom, the antiquity of which lay hidden in the depths of the past, or
confounded with the infancy of monarchy: such, to give a few instances,
were the titles of which they were proud, and which they maintained
with jealous ardor.
Liberty now-a-days is more vague, and sometimes less positive, owing
to the generalization and elevation which men's ideas have assumed;
but then it is far less liable to destruction. Speaking a language
well understood by the people, and appearing as the common cause of
all nations, it awakens universal sympathies, and is in a position to
found more extensive associations as a guarantee against the attacks
of power. The words liberty, equality, rights of man, intervention
of the people in public affairs, ministerial responsibility, public
opinion, liberty of the press, toleration, and other similar ones, do
undoubtedly contain a great diversity of meanings, which it would be
difficult to determine and to classify when we come to make a specific
application of them; and yet these words present to the mind certain
ideas which, although complicated and confused, have a false appearance
of clearness and simplicity. On the other hand, these words represent
certain striking objects that dazzle the mind by their vivid and
flattering colors, and hence they cannot be uttered without exciting
a lively interest; they are understood by the masses, and hence every
self-constituted champion of the ideas they convey is at once regarded
as a defender of the rights of all mankind. But imagine yourself
living among the people of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and
your position will be found very different. Take for your subject the
franchises of Catalonia or of Castile, and address yourself to the
Aragonese, who were so intractable on the subject of their _fueros_,
and you will produce no effect--will not succeed in awakening either
their zeal or their interest; a charter that does not contain the
name of one of their towns or cities is, in their eyes, a thing of
no importance, and foreign to their wishes. This inconvenience,
originating in the ideas of the times, which were naturally confined
to local circumstances, became very great in Spain, where, under the
same sceptre, there was formed an amalgamation of people differing most
widely in their manners, in their municipal and political organization,
and divided, moreover, by rivalries and animosities. In such a state
of things it was comparatively easy to curtail the liberties of one
province without giving umbrage to the others, or exciting their
apprehensions for their own liberties. If, at the period of the
insurrections of the _Communeros_ in Castile against Charles V., there
had existed that communication of ideas and sentiments, and those
lively sympathies, which at the present time unite people together,
the defeat of Villalar would have been a simple defeat and nothing
more; the cry of alarm, resounding throughout Aragon and Castile, would
certainly have given more trouble to the young and ill-advised monarch.
But such was not the case; all the efforts of the people were isolated,
and consequently barren of results. The royal power, proceeding upon a
fixed and steady plan, was able to beat down piecemeal these scattered
forces, and the result was not doubtful. In 1521, Padilla, Bravo, and
Maldonado perished on the scaffold; in 1591, D. Diego de Heredia, D.
Juan de Luna, and the Justiciary himself, D. Antonio de Lanuza, met the
same fate; when, in 1640, the Catalonians rose in insurrection for the
defence of their rights, notwithstanding the manifestos they issued to
attract supporters, they found no one to assist them. There were then
no flying sheets, coming every morning to fix the attention of the
people upon all sorts of questions, and to stir up alarm at the least
appearance of danger to their liberties. The people, warmly attached
to their customs and usages, satisfied with the nominal confirmations
which their monarchs were daily giving to their _fueros_, proud also of
the respect shown to their ancient liberties, were little aware that
they were confronted by a sagacious adversary, who never resorted to
force but to effect a decisive blow, yet constantly held his powerful
arm ready to crush them. An attentive study of the history of Spain
will show that the concentration of the whole governing power in the
hands of the monarch, to the exclusion, as far as was possible, of
popular influence, dates from the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. Nor
is this surprising; for there was then a greater necessity for such
a course, and it could be more easily adopted. There was a greater
necessity; for, from that time, the action of government began to
extend from one common center over the whole of Spain, the various
portions of which differed so widely in their laws, their manners, and
their customs; hence the central action naturally felt more sensibly
the embarrassment occasioned by so great a diversity of cortes, of
municipalities, of codes, and of privileges; and, as every government
wishes its action to be rapid and efficacious, the idea of simplifying,
uniting, and centralizing their power naturally took possession of the
kings of Spain. It is, in fact, easy to understand that a monarch at
the head of numerous armies, with magnificent fleets at his disposal,
who had, on a hundred occasions, humbled his most powerful foes, and
won the respect of foreign nations, would not like to be continually
going to preside over the cortes in Castile, in Aragon, in Valencia,
and in Catalonia. It would undoubtedly cost him dear to be constantly
repeating the oath binding him to protect the rights and liberties of
his subjects, and listening to the perpetual strain re-echoed in his
ears by the _procuradores_ of Castile, and the _brazos_ of Aragon,
Valencia, and Catalonia. It was hard for him to be obliged humbly to
solicit from the cortes assistance for the expenses of the state,
and particularly for almost continual wars. If he submitted to this,
it was only from the dread of those resolute men, real lions in the
battle-field when fighting in defence of their religion, their country,
and their king, and who would have fought with no less intrepidity in
their streets and houses, had an attempt been made to despoil them of
those rights and franchises which they inherited from their forefathers.
The union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile alone so far prepared
the way for the ruin of popular institutions, that it followed almost
necessarily. From that time, in fact, the throne had obtained too great
a preponderance for the _fueros_ of the kingdoms recently united to
oppose it with success. To imagine the existence at that period of a
political power capable of resisting the crown, we must suppose all the
assemblies held from time to time in the different kingdoms under the
name of cortes united into one grand national representative body, with
a power analogous to that of the king; we must suppose this central
assembly actuated by a zeal equal to that of the ancient assemblies for
the preservation of their _fueros_ and privileges, ready to sacrifice
all their rivalries to the public good, and advancing towards their
object with a firm step, in one compact mass, and never giving an
advantage to their adversary. In other words, we must suppose what was
utterly impossible at that period; impossible, on account of the ideas,
the habits, and the rivalries of the people; impossible, at a time when
the people were incapable of comprehending the question in so lofty a
sense; impossible, owing to the resistance which it would have met with
from the monarchs; to the embarrassment and complication, arising from
the municipal, social, and political organization. In a word, it was
something impossible to effect or even to conceive.
Every circumstance was in favor of the aggrandizement of the royal
power. The monarch being no longer merely king of Aragon or of Castile,
but of Spain, the ancient kingdoms dwindled into insignificance before
the majesty and the splendor of the throne, and sank by degrees to
the rank which alone suited them, that of provinces. From that moment
the action of the monarch became more extensive and complicated,
and consequently he could not come so frequently into contact with
his vassals. The celebration of the cortes in each of the recently
united kingdoms, would have occasioned long delays; for the king was
oftentimes engaged at another part of the empire. When sedition was to
be chastised, abuses to be checked, or excesses to be repressed, he
was no longer obliged to have recourse to the forces of the particular
kingdom in which these things occurred, as he could employ the arms
of Castile to subdue insurrection in the kingdom of Aragon, and
those of Aragon to put down the rebels of Castile. Grenada lay at
his feet; Italy yielded to one of his victorious captains; in his
fleet was Columbus, who had just discovered a new world; under these
circumstances, it was in vain to listen for the murmurs of the cortes
and of _ayuntamientos_,--these were no longer heard, they had totally
disappeared.
Had the national manners had a peaceable tendency, had not Spain been
habituated to war, democratic institutions would probably have been
preserved with less difficulty. Had the attention of the people been
fixed exclusively upon their municipal and political affairs, they
would have better understood their real interests; kings themselves
would not have been so ready to rush into war, and the throne would
in some degree have lost the prestige it obtained from the splendor
and success of its armies; the administration would not have been
imbued with that blunt harshness for which military habits are always
more or less remarkable; and the ancient _fueros_ would thus have
more easily retained some consideration. But precisely at that period
Spain was the most warlike nation in the world; it was in its element
on the battle-field; seven centuries of combats had made it a nation
of soldiers. Its recent victories over the Moors; the exploits of its
armies in Italy; the discoveries of Columbus; every thing, in fine,
contributed to its exaltation, and to inspire it with that spirit of
chivalry which, for so long a time, was one of its distinguishing
characteristics. It was necessary for the king to be a captain; and
he was certain to captivate the minds of Spaniards, so long as he won
renown by brilliant feats of arms. Now, arms are the bane of popular
institutions. After a victory on the field of battle, the order and
discipline of the camp are usually transferred to the city.
From the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, the throne rose to such a
height of power that liberal institutions were almost lost sight of.
The people and the grandees, it is true, reappeared upon the scene
after the death of Isabella; but this was entirely owing to the
misunderstanding between Ferdinand the Catholic and Philip le Bel,
which impaired the unity, and consequently the strength of the throne;
and hence, as soon as these circumstances disappeared, the throne again
resumed its full preponderance, and that not only during the last
days of Ferdinand, but even under the regency of Ximenes. The men of
Castile, exasperated by the excesses of the Flemish, and encouraged
perhaps by the hope, that the rule of a young monarch would be, as it
usually is, only feeble, again raised their voices; their remonstrances
and complaints speedily ended in commotions and in open insurrection.
Notwithstanding many circumstances highly favorable to the
_Communeros_, and the probability that their conduct would be followed
by all the provinces of the monarchy, we find that the insurrection,
although considerable, did not assume either the importance or extent
of a national movement; a great portion of the Peninsula preserved a
strict neutrality, and the rest inclined to the cause of monarchy. If
I am not mistaken, this fact indicates that the throne had already
obtained an immense prestige, and was regarded as the highest and most
powerful institution. The entire reign of Charles V. was extremely well
calculated to perfect this beginning. Commenced under the auspices of
the battle of Villalar, this reign continued through an uninterrupted
series of wars, in which the treasures and the blood of Spain were
spent with incredible profusion in all the countries of Europe,
Africa, and America. The nation was not allowed time even to think of
its affairs: almost always deprived of the presence of its king, it
had become a province at the disposal of the Emperor of Germany, the
ruler of Europe. True, the cortes of 1538 boldly gave Charles a severe
lecture instead of the succor he demanded. But it was already too
late; the clergy and the nobility were expelled from the cortes, and
the representation of Castile was restricted for the future to the
_procuradores_ alone; that is, it was doomed to be no more than the
shadow of what it had been--a mere instrument of the royal will.
Much has been said against Philip II.; but, in my opinion, this monarch
merely kept his place, and allowed things to take their natural course.
The crisis was already past; the question already decided; the Spanish
nation could not regain its lost influence, save by the regenerating
action of centuries. Still, we must not imagine that absolute power
was so fully and completely established as to leave not a vestige of
ancient liberty; but this liberty could do nothing from its asylum in
Aragon and Catalonia against the giant that held it in check from the
midst of a country entirely subject to his sway, from the capital of
Castile. The monarchs might probably, by one bold and heavy blow, have
struck down every thing that opposed them; but whatever probabilities
of success they had in the vast means at their disposal, they were very
careful not to make the attempt, but left the inhabitants of Navarre,
the subjects of the crown of Aragon, in the tranquil enjoyment of
their franchises, rights, and privileges. At the same time, they were
careful to prevent the contagion spreading to the other provinces. By
means of partial attacks, and more especially by leading the people to
allow their ancient liberties to fall into desuetude, they gradually
diminished their zeal for them, and insensibly brought them to a habit
of tamely bending under the action of a central power.[39]