reserved to him; that it is _absolute_ and _unconditional_, so far as
the interests of the bank are concerned; that it is not restricted to
any particular contingencies; that the reservation of the power to the
secretary of the treasury exclusively, is a part of the compact; that
he may exercise it, if the public convenience or interest would _in any
degree_ be promoted; that this exclusive power, thus reserved, is so
absolute, that the secretary is not restrained by the considerations
that the public deposits in the bank are perfectly safe; that the bank
promptly meets _all_ demands upon it; and that it faithfully performs
all its duties; and that the power of congress, on the contrary, is so
totally excluded, that it could not, without a breach of the compact,
order the deposits to be changed, even if congress were satisfied that
they were not safe, or should be convinced that the interests of the
people of the United States imperiously demanded the removal.
Such is the statement which this unassuming secretary makes of his
own authority. He expands his own power to the most extravagant
dimensions; and he undertakes to circumscribe that of congress in
the narrowest and most restricted limits! Who would have expected
that, after having so confidently maintained for himself such absolute,
exclusive, unqualified, and uncontrollable power, he would have let
in any body else to share with him its exercise? Yet he says, ‘as
the secretary of the treasury presides over one of the _executive_
departments of the government, and _his_ power over this subject forms
a part of the executive duties of his office, the manner in which it is
exercised must be subject to the supervision of the officer,’ (meaning
the president, whose official name his modesty would not allow him to
pronounce,) ‘to whom the constitution has confided the whole executive
power, and has required to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.’ If the clause in the compact exclusively vests the power of
removal in the secretary of the treasury, what has the president to do
with it? What part of the charter conveys to him any power? If, as the
secretary contends, the clause of removal, being part of the compact,
restricts its exercise to the secretary, to the entire exclusion of
congress, how does it embrace the president? especially since both
the president and secretary conceive, that ‘the power over the place
of deposit for the public money would seem properly to belong to the
legislative department of the government?’ If the secretary be correct
in asserting that the power of removal is confined to the secretary of
the treasury, then Mr. Duane, while in office, possessed it; and his
dismission, because he would not exercise a power which belonged to him
exclusively, was itself a violation of the charter.
But by what authority does the secretary assert that the treasury
department is one of the executive departments of the government? He
has none in the act which creates the department; he has none in the
constitution. The treasury department is placed by law on a different
footing from all the other departments, which are, in the acts creating
them, denominated executive, and placed under the direction of the
president. The treasury department, on the contrary, is organized on
totally different principles. Except the appointment of the officers,
with the coöperation of the senate, and the power which is exercised
of removing them, the president has neither by the constitution nor the
law creating the department, any thing to do with it. The secretary’s
reports and responsibility are directly to congress. The whole scheme
of the department is one of checks, each officer acting as a control
upon his associates. The secretary is required by the law to report,
not to the president, but directly to congress. Either house may
require any report from him, or command his personal attendance
before it. It is not, therefore, true, that the treasury is one of the
executive departments, subject to the supervision of the president. And
the inference drawn from that erroneous assumption entirely fails. The
secretary appears to have no precise ideas either of the constitution
or duties of the department over which he presides. He says:
‘The treasury department being intrusted with the administration
of the finances of the country, it was always the duty of _the
secretary_, in the absence of any legislate provision on the
subject, to take care that the public money was deposited in
safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents,’ and so forth.
The premises of the secretary are only partially correct, and the
conclusion is directly repugnant to law. It never was the duty of
the _secretary_ to take care that the public money was deposited in
safe-keeping, in the hands of faithful agents, and so forth. That duty
is expressly, by the act organizing the department, assigned to the
treasurer of the United States, who is placed under oath, and under
bond, with a large penalty, not to issue a dollar out of the public
treasury, but in virtue of warrants granted in pursuance of acts of
appropriation, ‘and not otherwise.’ When the secretary treats of the
power of the president, he puts on corsets and prostrates himself
before the executive, in the most graceful, courteous, and lady-like
form; but when he treats of that of congress, and of the treasurer, he
swells and expands himself, and flirts about, with all the airs of high
authority.
But I cannot assent to the secretary’s interpretation of his power
of removal, contained in the charter. Congress has not given up its
control over the treasury, or the public deposits, to either the
secretary or the executive. Congress could not have done so without a
treacherous renunciation of its constitutional powers, and a faithless
abandonment of its duties. And now let us see what is the true state
of the matter. Congress has reserved to itself, exclusively, the right
to judge of the reasons for removal of the deposits, by requiring the
report of them to be made to it; and, consequently, the power to ratify
or invalidate the act. The secretary of the treasury is the fiscal
sentinel of congress, to whom the bank makes weekly reports, and who
is presumed constantly to be well acquainted with its actual condition.
He may, consequently, discover the urgent necessity of prompt action,
to save the public treasure, before it is known to congress, and when
it is not in session. But he is immediately to report――to whom? To
the executive? No, to congress. For what purpose? That congress may
sanction or disprove the act.
The power of removal is a reservation for the benefit of the people,
not of the bank. It may be waived. Congress, being a legislative party
to the compact, did not thereby deprive itself of ordinary powers of
legislation. It cannot, without a breach of the national faith, repeal
privileges or stipulations intended for the benefit of the bank. But it
may repeal, modify, or waive the exercise altogether, of those parts of
the charter which were intended exclusively for the public. Could not
congress repeal altogether the clause of removal? Such a repeal would
not injure, but add to, the security of the bank. Could not congress
modify the clause, by revoking the agency of the secretary of the
treasury, and substituting that of the treasurer, or any other officer
of government? Could not congress, at any time during the twenty years’
duration of the charter, abolish altogether the office of secretary
of the treasury, and assign all his present duties to some newly
constituted department? The right and the security of the bank do not
consist in the form of the agency, nor in the name of the agent, but in
this: that, whatever may be its form or his denomination, the removal
shall only be made upon urgent and satisfactory reasons. The power of
supplemental legislation was exercised by congress both under the new
and old bank. Three years after the establishment of the existing bank,
an act passed, better to regulate the election of directors, and to
punish any one who should attempt, by bribes, or presents in any form,
to influence the operation of the institution.
The denial of the secretary, to congress, of the power to remove the
deposits, under any circumstances, is most extraordinary. Why, sir,
suppose a corrupt collusion between the secretary and the bank, to
divide the spoils of the treasury? Suppose a total nonfulfilment of all
the stipulations on the part of the bank? Is congress to remain bound
and tied, whilst the bank should be free from all the obligations of
the charter? The obligation of one party, to observe faithfully his
stipulations, in a contract, rests upon the corresponding obligation of
the other party to observe his stipulations. If one party is released,
both are free. If one party fails to comply with his contract, _that_
releases the other. This is the fundamental principle of all contracts,
applicable to treaties, charters, and private agreements. If it were a
mere private agreement, and one party who had bound himself to deposit,
from time to time, his money with the other, to be redrawn at his
pleasure, saw that it was wasting and squandered away, he would have
a clear right to discontinue the deposits. It is true, that a party
has no right to excuse himself from the fulfilment of his contract,
by imputing a breach to the other which has never been made. And it
is fortunate for the peace and justice of society, that neither party
to any contract, whether public or private, can decide conclusively
the question of fulfilment by the other, but must always act under
subjection to the ultimate decision, in case of controversy, of an
impartial arbiter, provided in the judicial tribunals of civilized
communities.
As to the absolute, unconditional, and exclusive power which the
secretary claims to be vested in himself, it is in direct hostility
with the principles of our government, and adverse to the genius of
all free institutions. The secretary was made, by the charter, the mere
representative or agent of congress. Its temporary substitute, acting
in subordination to it, and bound, whenever he did act, to report to
his principal his reasons, that they might be judged of and sanctioned,
or overruled. Is it not absurd to say, that the agent can possess more
power than the principal? The power of revocation is incident to all
agency, unless, in express terms, by the instrument creating it, a
different provision is made. The powers, whether of the principal
or the agent, in relation to any contract, must be expounded by the
principles which govern all contracts. It is true, that the language
of the clause of removal, in the charter, is general, but it is not,
therefore, to be torn from the context. It is a part only of an entire
compact, and is so to be interpreted, in connection with every part
and with the whole. Upon surveying the entire compact, we perceive that
the bank has come under various duties to the public; has undertaken to
perform important financial operations of the government; and has paid
a bonus into the public treasury of a million and a half of dollars.
We perceive, that, in consideration of the assumption of these heavy
engagements, and the payment of that large sum of money on the part
of the bank, the public has stipulated that the public deposits shall
remain with the bank, during the continuation of the charter, and
that its notes shall be received by the government, in payment of
all debts, dues, and taxes. Except the corporate character conferred,
there is none but those two stipulations of any great importance to
the bank. Each of the two parties to the compact must stand bound
to the performance of his engagements, whilst the other is honestly
and faithfully fulfilling _his_. It is not to be conceived, in the
formation of the compact, that either party could have anticipated
that, whilst he was fairly and honestly executing every obligation
which he had contracted, the other party might arbitrarily or
capriciously exonerate himself from the discharge of his obligations.
Suppose, when citizens of the United States were invited by the
government to subscribe to the stock of this bank, that they had
been told, that, although the bank performs all its covenants with
perfect fidelity, the secretary of the treasury may, arbitrarily or
capriciously, upon his speculative notions of any degree of public
interest or convenience to be advanced, withdraw the public deposits;
would they have ever subscribed? Would they have been guilty of the
folly of binding themselves to the performance of burdensome duties,
whilst the government was left at liberty to violate at pleasure that
stipulation of the compact which by far was the most essential to them?
On this part of the subject, I conclude, that congress has not parted
from, but retains, its legitimate power over the deposits; that it
might modify or repeal altogether the clause of removal in the charter;
that a breach of material stipulations on the part of the bank would
authorize congress to change the place of the deposits; that a corrupt
collusion to defraud the public, between the bank and a secretary of
the treasury, would be a clear justification to congress to direct a
transfer of the public deposits; that the secretary of the treasury
is the mere agent of congress, in respect to the deposits, acting in
subordination to his principal; that it results from the nature of all
agency that it may be revoked, unless otherwise expressly provided;
and, finally, that the principal, and much less the agent, of one party
cannot justly or lawfully violate the compact, or any of its essential
provisions, whilst the other party is in the progressive and faithful
performance of all his engagements.
If I am right in this view of the subject, there is an end of the
argument. There was perfect equality and reciprocity between the
two parties to the compact. Neither could exonerate himself from the
performance of his obligations, while the other was honestly proceeding
fairly to fulfil all his engagements. But the secretary of the treasury
_concedes_ that the public deposits were perfectly safe in the hands
of the bank; that the bank promptly met every demand upon it; and
that it faithfully performed all its duties. By these concessions, he
surrenders the whole argument, admits the complete obligation of the
public to perform its part of the compact, and demonstrates that no
reasons, however plausible or strong, can justify an open breach of
a solemn national compact.
Secondly. But he has brought forward various reasons to palliate or
justify his violation of the national faith; and it is now my purpose
to proceed, in the second place, to examine and consider them. Before
I proceed to do this, I hope to be allowed again to call the attention
of the senate to the nature of the office of secretary of the treasury.
It is altogether financial and administrative. His duties relate to
the finances, their condition and improvement, and to them exclusively.
The act creating the treasury department, and defining the duties
of the secretary, demonstrates this. He has no legislative powers;
and congress has delegated and could delegate none to him. His
powers, wherever given, and in whatever language expressed, must be
interpreted by his defined duties. Neither is the treasury department
an _executive_ department. It was expressly created not to be an
executive department. It is administrative, but not _executive_.
His relations are positive and direct to congress, by the act of
his creation, and not to the president. Whenever he is put under
the direction of the president, (as he is by various subsequent acts,
especially those relating to the public loans,) it is done by express
provision of law, and for specified purposes.
With this key to the nature of the office, and the duties of the
officer, I will now briefly examine the various reasons which he
assigns for the removal of the public deposits. The first is, the near
approach of the expiration of the charter. But the charter had yet to
run about two and a half of the twenty years to which it was limited.
During the _whole_ term the public deposits were to continue to be made
with the bank. It was clearly foreseen, at the commencement of the term,
as now, that it would expire, and yet congress neither then nor since
has ever thought proper to provide for the withdrawal of the deposits
prior to the expiration of the charter. Whence does the secretary
derive an authority to do what congress had never done? Whence his
power to abridge in effect the period of the charter, and to limit it
to seventeen and a half years, instead of twenty? Was the urgency for
the removal of the deposits so great, that he could not wait sixty days,
until the assembling of congress? He admits that they were perfectly
safe in the bank; that it promptly met every demand upon it; and that
it faithfully performed all its duties. Why not, then, wait the arrival
of congress? The last time the house of representatives had spoken,
among the very last acts of the last session, that house had declared
its full confidence in the safety of the deposits. Why not wait until
it could review the subject, with all the new light which the secretary
could throw upon it, and it again proclaims its opinion? He comes into
office on the twenty-third of September, 1833, and in three days, with
intuitive celerity, he comprehends the whole of the operations of the
complex department of the treasury, perceives that the government,
from its origin, had been in uniform error, and denounces the opinions
of all his predecessors! And, hastening to rectify universal wrong,
in defiance and in contempt of the resolution of the house, he signs
an order for the removal of the deposits! It was of no consequence
to him, whether places of safety, in substitution of the bank of the
United States, could be obtained or not; without making the essential
precautionary arrangements, he commands the removal almost instantly
to be made.
Why, sir, if the secretary were right in contending that he alone
could order the removal, even he admits that congress has power to
provide for the security of the public money, in the new places to
which it might be transferred. If he did not deign to consult the
representatives of the people as to the propriety of the first step,
did not a decent respect to their authority and judgment exact from
him a delay, for the brief term of sixty days, that they might consider
what was fitting to be done? The truth is, that the secretary, by law,
has nothing to do with the care and safe-keeping of the public money.
As has been already shown, that duty is specifically assigned by law
to the treasurer of the United States. And, in assuming upon himself
the authority to provide other depositories than the bank of the United
States, he alike trampled upon the duties of the treasurer, and what
was due to congress. Can any one doubt the motive of this precipitancy?
Does anybody doubt, that it was to preclude the action of congress,
or to bring it under the influence of the executive veto? Let the two
houses, or either of them, perform their duty to the country, and we
shall hereafter see whether, in that respect, at least, Mr. Secretary
will not fail to consummate his purpose.
Second. The next reason assigned for this offensive proceeding, is the
reëlection of the present chief magistrate. The secretary says:
‘I have always regarded the result of the last election of
president of the United States, as the declaration of a majority
of the people, that the charter ought not to be renewed.’ * * *
‘Its voluntary application to congress for the renewal of its
charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the
election of president, was _understood on all sides_ as bringing
forward that question for incidental decision at the then
approaching election. It was accordingly argued on both sides
before the tribunal of the people, and their verdict pronounced
against the bank,’ and so forth.
What has the secretary to do with elections? Do they belong to the
financial concerns of his department? Why this constant reference to
the result of the last presidential election? Ought not the president
to be content with the triumphant issue of it? Did he want still
more vetoes? The winners ought to forbear making any complaints,
and be satisfied, whatever the losers may be. After an election is
fairly terminated, I have always thought that the best way was to
forget all the incidents of the preceding canvass, and especially the
manner in which votes had been cast. If one has been successful, that
ought to be sufficient for him; if defeated, regrets are unavailing.
Our fellow-citizens have a right freely to exercise their elective
franchise as they please, and no one, certainly no candidate, has any
right to complain about it.
But the argument of the secretary is, that the question of the bank
was fully submitted to the people, by the consent of all parties,
fully discussed before them, and their verdict pronounced against the
institution, in the reëlection of the president. His statement of the
case requires that we should examine carefully the various messages of
the president, to ascertain whether the bank question was fairly and
frankly, (to use a favorite expression of the president,) submitted
by him to the people of the United States. In his message of 1829, the
president says:
‘The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836,
and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of
their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from
_precipitancy_ in a measure involving such important principles,
and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in
justice to _the parties_ interested, too soon present it to the
deliberate consideration of the legislature and the people.’
The charter had then upwards of six years to run. Upon this solemn
invitation of the chief magistrate, two years afterwards, the bank came
forward with an application for renewal. Then it was discovered that
the application was premature. And the bank was denounced for accepting
the very invitation which had been formally given. The president
proceeds:
‘Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the bank are
well questioned _by a large portion of our fellow-citizens_.’
This message was a noncommittal. The president does not announce
clearly his own opinion, but states that of _a large portion of our
fellow-citizens_. Now we all know that a large and highly respectable
number of the people of the United States have always entertained an
opinion adverse to the bank on both grounds. The president continues:
‘_If_ such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal
operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the
legislature whether _a national one_, founded upon the _credit_
of the government, and its resources, might not be devised.’
Here, again, the president, so far from expressing an explicit opinion
against all national banks, makes a hypothetical admission of the
utility of a bank, and distinctly intimates the practicability of
devising one on the basis of the credit and resources of the government.
In his message of 1830, speaking of the bank, the president says:
‘Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers
which _many of our citizens_ apprehend from that institution,
_as at present organized_. In the spirit of improvement and
compromise, which distinguishes our country and its institutions,
it becomes us to inquire whether it be not _possible_ to secure
the advantages afforded by the present bank through the agency
of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles
and structure, _as_ to obviate constitutional and other
objections.’
Here, again, the president recites the apprehensions of ‘many of
our citizens,’ rather than avows his own opinion. He admits, indeed,
‘the advantages afforded by the present bank,’ but suggests an inquiry
whether it be possible, (of course doubting,) to secure them by a bank
differently constructed. And towards the conclusion of that part of the
message, his language fully justifies the implication, that it was not
to the bank itself, but to ‘its present form,’ that he objected.
The message of 1831, when treating of the bank, was very brief. The
president says:
‘Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation
to the bank of the United States, _as at present organized_,’
(noncommittal once more: and what _that_ means, Mr. President,
nobody better knows than _you_ and I,) ‘I felt it my duty, in
my former messages, _frankly to disclose them_.’
_Frank_ disclosures! Now, sir, I recollect perfectly well the
impressions made on my mind, and on those of other senators with whom I
conversed, immediately after the message was read. We thought and said
to each other, the president has left a door open to pass out. It is
not the bank; it is not _any_ bank of the United States to which he is
opposed, but it is to the particular organization of the existing bank.
And we all concluded that, if amendments could be made to the charter
satisfactory to the president, he would approve a bill for its renewal.
We come now to the famous message of July, 1832, negativing the bill to
recharter the bank. Here, it may be expected, we shall certainly find
clear opinions, unequivocally expressed. The president cannot elude the
question. He must now be perfectly _frank_. We shall presently see. He
says:
‘A bank of the United States is, in _many_ respects, convenient
to the government, and useful to the people. Entertaining this
_opinion_, and deeply impressed with the belief that _some_ of
the powers and privileges possessed by the existing bank, are
unauthorized by the constitution.’ and so forth. * * * ‘I felt
it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the
attention of congress to the practicability of _organizing an
institution_, combining all its advantages, and obviating these
objections. I sincerely regret, that in the act before me I can
perceive none of _those modifications_,’ and so forth. * * *
‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties
which may be required by the government, might be so organized
as not to infringe on our own delegated powers, or the reserved
rights of the states, I do not entertain _a doubt_. Had the
executive been called on to furnish _the project of such an
institution_, the duty would have been cheerfully performed.’
The message is principally employed in discussing the objections which
the president entertained to the particular provisions of the charter,
and not to the bank itself; such as the right of foreigners to hold
stock in it; its exemption from state taxation; its capacity to hold
real estate, and so forth, and so forth. Does the president, even in
this message, array himself in opposition to any bank of the United
States? Does he even oppose himself to the existing bank under every
organization of which it is susceptible? On the contrary, does he
not declare that he does not entertain _a doubt_ that a bank may be
constitutionally organized? Does he not even rebuke congress for not
calling on him to furnish a project of a bank, which he would have
cheerfully supplied? Is it not fairly deducible, from the message, that
the charter of the present bank might have been so amended as to have
secured the president’s approbation to the institution? So far was the
message from being decisive against all banks of the United States, or
against the existing bank, under any modification, that the president
expressly declares that the question was adjourned. He says:
‘A general discussion will now take place, eliciting new
light, and settling important principles; and a _new_ congress,
elected in the midst of such discussion, and furnishing an equal
representation of the people, according to the last census, will
bear to the _capitol_ the verdict of public opinion, and I doubt
not bring this important question to a satisfactory result.’
This review of the various messages of the president, conclusively
evinces that they were far from expressing, frankly and decisively,
any opinions of the chief magistrate, except that he was opposed to the
amendments of the charter contained in the bill submitted to him for
its renewal, and that he required further amendments. It demonstrates
that he entertained no doubt that it was practicable and desirable to
establish a bank of the United States; it justified the hope that he
might be ultimately reconciled to the continuation of the present bank,
with _suitable_ modifications; and it expressly proclaimed that the
whole subject was adjourned to the new congress, to be assembled under
the last census. If the parts of the messages which I have cited, or
other expressions, in the same document, be doubtful, or susceptible
of a different interpretation, the review is sufficient for my purpose;
which is, to refute the argument, so confidently advanced, that the
president’s opinion, in opposition to the present or any other bank of
the United States, was frankly and fairly stated to the people, prior
to the late election, was fully understood, and finally decided by them.
Accordingly, in the canvass which ensued, it was boldly asserted by
the partisans of the president, that he was not opposed to a bank of
the United States, nor to the existing bank with proper amendments.
They maintained, at least, wherever those friendly to a national
bank were in the majority, that the reëlection would be followed by a
recharter of the bank, with proper amendments. They dwelt, it is true,
with great earnestness, upon his objections to the pernicious influence
of foreigners in holding stock in it; but they nevertheless contended
that these objections would be cured, if he was reëlected, and the
bank sustained. I appeal to the whole senate, to my colleagues, to
the people of Kentucky, and especially to the citizens of the city
of Louisville, for the correctness of this statement.
After all this, was it anticipated by the people of the United States,
that, in the reëlection of the president, they were deciding against an
institution of such vital importance? Could they have imagined, that,
after an express adjournment of the whole matter to a new congress, by
the president himself, he would have prejudged the action of this new
congress, and pronounced that a question, expressly by himself referred
to its authority, was previously settled by the people? He claimed no
such result in his message, immediately after the reëlection; although
in it he denounced the bank as an unsafe depository of the public
money, and invited congress to investigate its condition. The president,
then, and the secretary of the treasury, are without all color of
justification for their assertions, that the question of bank or no
bank was fully and fairly submitted to the people, and a decision
pronounced against it by them.
Sir, I am surprised and alarmed at the new source of executive power,
which is found in the result of a presidential election. I had supposed
that the constitution and the laws were the sole source of executive
authority; that the constitution could only be amended in the mode
which it has itself prescribed; that the issue of a presidential
election, was merely to place the chief magistrate in the post assigned
to him; and that he had neither more nor less power, in consequence
of the election, than the constitution defines and delegates. But it
seems that if, prior to an election, certain opinions, no matter how
ambiguously put forth by a candidate, are known to the people, these
loose opinions, in virtue of the election, incorporate themselves with
the constitution, and afterwards are to be regarded and expounded as
parts of the instrument.
Third. The public money ought not, the secretary thinks, to remain in
the bank until the last moment of the existence of the charter. But
that was not the question which he had to decide on the twenty-sixth
of September last. The real question then was, could he not wait sixty
days for the meeting of congress? There were many _last_ moments,
nearly two years and a half, between the twenty-sixth of September and
the day of the expiration of the charter. But why not let the public
money remain in the bank until the last day of the charter? It is
a part of the charter, that it shall so remain; and congress having
so ordered it, the secretary ought to have acquiesced in the will of
congress, unless the exigency had arisen on which alone it was supposed
his power over the deposits would be exercised. The secretary is
greatly mistaken, in believing that the bank will be less secure in the
last hours of its existence than previously. It will then be collecting
its resources, with a view to the immediate payment of its notes, and
the ultimate division among the stockholders of their capital; and at
no period of its existence will it be so strong and able to pay all
demands upon it. As to the depreciation in the value of its notes in
the interior, at that time, why, sir, is the secretary possessed of
the least knowledge of the course of the trade of the interior, and
especially of the western states? If he had any, he could not have
made such a suggestion. When the bank itself is not drawing, its notes
form the best medium of remittance from the interior to the Atlantic
capitals. They are sought after by merchants and traders with avidity,
are never below par, and in the absence of bank drafts may command
a premium. This will continue to be the case as long as the charter
endures, and especially during the last moments of its existence, when
its ability will be unquestionable, Philadelphia being the place of
the redemption; whilst the notes themselves will be received in all
the large cities in payment of duties.
Fourth. The secretary asserts, that ‘it is _well understood_ that
the superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the notes of the bank of
the United States, was not founded on any particular confidence in its
management or solidity. It was occasioned _altogether_ by the agreement
on behalf of the public, in the act of incorporation, to receive them
in all payments to the United States.’ I have rarely seen any state
paper characterized by so little gravity, dignity, and circumspection,
as the report displays. The secretary is perfectly reckless in his
assertions of matters of fact, and culpably loose in his reasoning. Can
he believe the assertion which he has made? Can he believe, for example,
that if the notes of the bank of the Metropolis were made receivable
in all payments to the government, they would ever acquire, at home
and abroad, the credit and confidence which are attached to those
of the bank of the United States? If he had stated that the faculty
mentioned, was one of the elements of the great credit of those
notes, the statement would have been true; but who can agree with
him, that it is the _sole_ cause? The credit of the bank of the United
States results from the large amount of its capital; from the great
ability and integrity with which it has been administered; from the
participation of the government in its affairs; from its advantageous
location; from its being the place of deposit of the public moneys, and
its notes being receivable in all payments to the government; and from
its being emphatically _the bank of the United States_. This latter
circumstance arranges it with the bank of England, France, Amsterdam,
Genoa, and so forth.
Fifth. The expansion and contraction of the accommodations of the bank
to its individual customers, are held up by the secretary, in bold
relief, as evidences of misconduct, which justified his withdrawal of
the deposits. He represents the bank as endeavoring to operate on the
public, by alternate bribery and oppression, with the same object in
both cases, of influencing the election, or the administration of the
president. Why this perpetual reference of all the operations of the
institution to the executive? Why does the executive think of nothing
but itself? It is I! It is I! It is I, that is meant! appears to be
the constant exclamation. Christianity and charity enjoin us never
to ascribe a bad motive if we can suppose a good one. The bank is a
moneyed corporation, whose profits result from its business; if that
be extensive, it makes better; if limited, less profit. Its interest
is to make the greatest amount of dividends which it can safely. And
all its actions may be more certainly ascribed to that than any other
principle. The administration must have a poor opinion of the virtue
and intelligence of the people of the United States, if it supposes
that their judgments are to be warped, and their opinions controlled
by any scale of graduated bank accommodations. The bank must have a
still poorer conception of its duty to the stockholder, if it were
to regulate its issues by the uncertain and speculative standard of
political effect, rather than a positive arithmetical rule for the
computation of interest.
As to the alleged extension of the business of the bank, it has
been again and again satisfactorily accounted for by the payment of
the public debt, and the withdrawal from Europe of considerable sums,
which threw into its vaults a large amount of funds, which, to be
productive, must be employed; and, as the commercial wants proceeding
from extraordinary activity of business, created great demands about
the same period for bank accommodations, the institution naturally
enlarged its transactions. It would have been treacherous to the
best interests of its constituents if it had not done so. The recent
contraction of its business is the result of an obvious cause.
Notwithstanding the confidence in it, manifested by one of the last
acts of the last house of representatives, congress had scarcely
left the district before measures were put in operation to circumvent
its authority. Denunciations and threats were put forth against it.
Rumors, stamped with but too much authority, were circulated, of the
intention of the executive to disregard the admonition of the house of
representatives. An agent was sent out――_and then such an agent_――to
sound the local institutions as to the terms on which they would
receive the deposits. Was the bank, who could not be ignorant of all
this, to sit carelessly by, without taking any precautionary measures?
The prudent mariner, when he sees the coming storm, furls his sails,
and prepares for all its rage. The bank knew that the executive was
in open hostility to it, and that it had nothing to expect from its
forbearance. It had numerous points to defend, the strength or weakness
of all of which was well known from its weekly returns to the secretary,
and it could not possibly know at which the first mortal stroke
would be aimed. If, on the twentieth of September last, instead of
the manifesto of the president against the bank, he had officially
announced, that he did not mean to make war upon the bank, and intended
to allow the public deposits to remain until the pleasure of congress
was expressed, public confidence would have been assured and unshaken,
the business of the country continued in quiet and prosperity, and the
numerous bankruptcies in our commercial cities averted. The wisdom of
human actions is better known in their results than at their inception.
That of the bank is manifest from all that has happened, and especially
from its actual condition of perfect security.
Sixth. The secretary complains of misconduct of the bank in delegating
to the committee of exchange the transaction of important business, and
in that committee’s being appointed by the president and not the board,
by which the government directors have been excluded. The directors who
compose the board meet only periodically. Deriving no compensation from
their places, which the charter, indeed, prohibits them from receiving,
it cannot be expected that they should be constantly in session. They
must, necessarily, therefore, devolve a great part of the business
of the bank in its details, upon the officers and servants of the
corporation. It is sufficient, if the board controls, governs, and
directs the whole machine. The most important operation of a bank, is
that of paying out its cash, and that the cashier or teller and not
the board performs. As to committees of exchange, the board not being
always in session, it is evident that the convenience of the public
requires that there should be some authority at the bank daily, to pass
daily upon bills, either in the sale or purchase, as the wants of the
community require. Every bank, I believe, that does business to any
extent, has a committee of exchange, similar to that of the bank of the
United States. In regard to the mode of appointment by the president of
the board, it is in conformity with the invariable usage of the house
of representatives, with the practice of the senate for several years,
and, until altered at the commencement of this session, with the usage,
in a great variety, if not all of the state legislatures, and with
that which prevails in our popular assemblies. The president, speaker,
chairman, moderator, almost uniformly appoints committees. That none
of the government directors have been on the committee of exchange, has
proceeded, it is to be presumed, from their not being entitled, from
their skill and experience, and standing in society, to be put there.
The government directors stand upon the same equal footing with those
appointed by the stockholders. When appointed, they are thrown into the
mass, and must take their fair chances with their colleagues. If the
president of the United States will nominate men of high character and
credit, of known experience and knowledge in business, they will, no
doubt, be placed in corresponding stations. If he appoints different
men, he cannot expect it. Banks are exactly the places where currency
and value are well understood, and duly estimated. A piece of coin,
having even the stamp of the government, will not pass, unless the
metal is pure.
Seventh. The French bill forms another topic of great complaint with
the secretary. The state of the case is, that the government sold to
the bank a bill on that of France for nine hundred thousand dollars,
which the bank sold in London, whence it was sent by the purchaser
to Paris to receive the amount. When the bank purchased the bill, it
paid the amount to the government, or, which is the same thing, passed
it to the credit of the treasury, to be used on demand. The bill was
protested in Paris, and the agents of the bank, to avoid its being
liable to damages, took up the bill on account of the bank. The bill
being dishonored, the bank comes back on the drawer, and demands the
customary damages due according to the course of all such transactions.
The complaint of the secretary is, that the bank took up the bill
to save its own credit, and that it did not do it on account of the
government; in other words, that the bank did not advance at Paris nine
hundred thousand dollars to the government on account of a bill which
it had already paid, every dollar, at Philadelphia. Why, sir, has the
secretary read the charter? If he has, he must have known that the bank
could not have _advanced_ the nine hundred thousand dollars for the
government at Paris, without subjecting itself to a penalty of three
times the amount, (two million and seven hundred thousand dollars.) The
thirteenth section of the charter is express and positive:
‘That if the said corporation shall _advance_ or lend any sum
of money for _the use or on account_ of the government of the
United States, to an amount exceeding five hundred thousand
dollars, all persons concerned in making such unlawful advances
or loan, shall forfeit treble the amount, one fifth to the
informer,’ and so forth.
Eighth. The last reason which I shall notice of the secretary is, that
this ambitious corporation aspires to possess political power. Those
in the actual possession of power, especially when they have grossly
abused it, are perpetually dreading its loss. The miser does not cling
to his treasure with a more death-like grasp. Their suspicions are
always active and on the alert. In every form they behold a rival, and
every breeze comes charged with alarm and dread. A thousand spectres
glide before their affrighted imaginations, and they see, in every
attempt to enlighten those who have placed them in office, a sinister
design to snatch from them their authority. On what other principles
can we account for the extravagant charges brought forward by the
secretary against the bank? More groundless and reckless assertions
than those which he has allowed himself to embody in his report, never
were presented to a deceived, insulted, and outraged people. Suffer
me, sir, to group some of them. He asserts, ‘that there is _sufficient
evidence to prove_ that the bank has used its means to obtain political
power;’ that, in the presidential election, ‘the bank took an open
and direct interest, demonstrating that it was using its money for
the purpose of obtaining a hold upon the people of this country;’
that it ‘entered the political arena;’ that it circulated publications
containing ‘attacks on the officers of government;’ that ‘it is now
openly in the field as a political partisan;’ that there are ‘_positive
proofs_’ of the efforts of the bank to obtain power. And, finally, he
concludes, as a demonstrated proposition:
‘Fourthly, that there is sufficient evidence to show that the
bank has been and still is seeking to obtain political power,
and has used its money for the purpose of influencing the
election of the public servants.’
After all this, who can doubt that this ambitious corporation is a
candidate for the next presidency? Or, if it can moderate its lofty
pretensions, that it means at least to go for the office of secretary
of the treasury, upon the next removal? But, sir, where are the proofs
of these political designs? Can any thing be more reckless than these
confident assertions of the secretary? Let us have the proofs; I
call for the proofs. The bank has been the constant object for years
of vituperation and calumny. It has been assailed in every form of
bitterness and malignity. Its operations have been misrepresented;
attempts have been made to destroy its credit, and the public
confidence in its integrity and solidity; and the character of its
officers has been assailed. Under these circumstances, it has dared to
defend itself. It has circulated public documents, speeches of members
of congress, reports made by chairmen of committees, friends of the
administration, and other papers. And, as it was necessary to make the
defence commensurate with the duration and the extensive theatre of the
attack, it has been compelled to incur a heavy expense to save itself
from threatened destruction. It has openly avowed, and yet avows,
its right and purpose to defend itself. All this was known to the
last congress. Not a solitary material fact has been since disclosed.
And when before, in a country where the press is free, was it deemed
criminal for any body to defend itself? Who invested the secretary
of the treasury with power to interpose himself between the people,
and light and intelligence? Who gave him the right to dictate what
information should be communicated to the people and by whom? Whence
does he derive his jurisdiction? Who made him censor of the public
press? From what new sedition law does he deduce his authority? Is
the superintendence of the American press a part of the financial
duty of a secretary of the treasury? Why did he not lay the whole case
before congress, and invite the revival of the old sedition law? Why
anticipate the arrival of their session? Why usurp the authority of the
only department of government competent to apply a remedy, if there be
any power to abridge the freedom of the press? If the secretary wishes
to purify the press, he has a most Herculean duty before him. And when
he sallies out on his quixotic expedition, he had better begin with
the Augean stable, the press nearest to him, his organ, as most needing
purification.
I have done with the secretary’s reasons. They have been weighed
and found wanting. There was not only no financial motive for his
acting――the sole motive which he could officially entertain――but every
financial consideration forbade him to act. I proceed now, in the third
and last place, to examine the manner in which he has exercised his
power over the deposits.
Thirdly. The whole people of the United States derive an interest from
the public deposits in the bank of the United States, as a stockholder,
in that institution. The bank is enabled, through its branches, to
throw capital into those parts of the union where it is most needed.
Thus it distributes and equalizes the advantages accruing from the
collection of a large public revenue, and the consequent public
deposits. Thus it neutralizes the injustice which would otherwise
flow from the people of the west and the interior’s paying their full
proportion of the public burdens, without deriving any corresponding
benefit from the circulation and deposits of the public revenue. The
use of the capital of the bank has been signally beneficial to the
west. We there want capital, domestic, foreign――any capital that we can
honestly get. We want it to stimulate enterprise, to give activity to
business, and to develope the vast resources which the bounty of Nature
has concentrated in that region. But, by the secretary’s financial
arrangements, the twenty-five or thirty millions of the public revenue
collected from all the people of the United States, (including those
of the west,) will be retained in a few Atlantic ports. Each port will
engross the public moneys there collected. And, as that of New York
collects about one half of the public revenue, all the people of the
United States will be laid under contribution, not for the sake of the
people of the city of New York, but of two or three banks in that city,
in which the people of the United States, collectively, have not a
particle of interest; banks, the stock in which is or may be held by
foreigners.
Three months have elapsed, and the secretary has not yet found places
of deposit for the public moneys, as substitutes for the bank of the
United States. He tells us, in his report of yesterday, that the bank
at Charleston, to which he applied for their reception, declined the
custody, and that he has yet found no other bank willing to assume it.
But he states that the public interest does not in consequence suffer.
No! What is done with the public moneys constantly receiving in the
important port of Charleston, the largest port, (New Orleans excepted,)
from the Potomac to the Gulf of Mexico? What with the revenue bonds?
It appears that he has not yet received the charters from all the banks
selected as places of deposit. Can any thing be more improvident than
that the secretary should undertake to contract with banks, without
knowing their power and capacity to contract by their charters? That he
should venture to deposit the people’s money in banks, without a full
knowledge of every thing respecting their actual condition? But he has
found some banks willing to receive the public deposits, and he has
entered into contracts with them. And the very first step he has taken
has been in direct violation of an express and positive statute of the
United States. By the act of the first of May, 1820, section sixth, it
is enacted:
‘That no contract shall hereafter be made by the secretary of
state, or of _the treasury_, or of the department of war, or of
the navy, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an
appropriation adequate to its fulfilment; and excepting, also,
contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy,
and contracts by the quarter-master’s department, which may be
made by the secretaries of those departments.’
Now, sir, what law authorized these contracts with the local banks,
made by the secretary _of the treasury_? The argument, if I understand
the argument intended to be employed on the other side, is this;
that, by the bank charter, the secretary, is authorized to remove
the public deposits, and that includes the power in question? But
the act establishing the treasury department confides, expressly, the
safe-keeping of the public moneys of the United States to the treasurer
of the United States, and not to the secretary; and the treasurer, not
the secretary, gives a bond for the fidelity with which he shall keep
them. The moment, therefore, that they are withdrawn from the bank
of the United States, they are placed, by law, under the charge and
responsibility of the treasurer and his bond, and not of the secretary,
who has given no bond. But let us trace this argument a little further.
The power to remove the deposits, says the secretary, _from_ a given
place, implies the power to designate the place _to_ which they shall
be removed. And this _implied_ power to designate the place to which
they shall be removed, _implies_ the power to the secretary of the
treasury to contract with the new banks of deposit. And, on this
third link, in the chain of implications, a fourth is constructed,
to dispense with the express duties of the treasurer of the United
States, defined in a positive statute; and _yet a fifth_, to repeal
a positive statute of congress, passed four years after the passage
of the law containing the present source of this most extraordinary
chain of implications. The exceptions in the act of 1820, prove the
inflexibility of the rule which it prescribes. Annual appropriations
are made for the clothing and subsistence of the army and navy. These
appropriations might have been supposed to be included in a power to
contract for those articles, notwithstanding the prohibitory clause
in that act. But congress thought otherwise, and therefore expressly
provided for the exceptions. It must be admitted that our clerk, (as
the late governor Robinson, of Louisiana, one of the purest republicans
I have ever known, used to call a secretary of the treasury,) tramples
with very little ceremony upon the duties of the treasurer, and the
acts of the congress of the United States, when they come in his way.
These contracts, therefore, between the secretary of the treasury and
the local banks are mere nullities, and absolutely void, enforceable
in no court of justice whatever, for two causes; first, because they
are made in violation of the act of the first of May, 1820; and,
secondly, because the treasurer, and not the secretary of the treasury,
alone had, if any federal officer possessed the power to contract with
the local banks. And here, again, we perceive the necessity there was
for avoiding the precipitancy with which the executive acted, and for
awaiting the meeting of congress. Congress could have deliberately
reviewed the previous legislation, decided upon the expediency of a
transfer of the public deposits, and, if deemed proper, could have
passed the new laws adapted to the new condition of the treasury. It
could have decided whether the local banks should pay any bonus, or
pay any interest, or diffuse the public deposits throughout the United
States, so as to secure among all their parts, equality of benefits as
well as of burdens, and provided for ample guarantees for the safety of
the public moneys in their new depositories.
But let us now inquire, whether the secretary of the treasury has
exercised his usurped authority, in the formation of these contracts,
with prudence and discretion. Having substituted himself to congress
and to the treasurer of the United States, he ought at least to show
that, in the stipulations of the contracts themselves, he has guarded
the public moneys and provided for the public interests. I will examine
the contract with the Girard bank of Philadelphia, which is presented
as a specimen of the contracts with the Atlantic banks. The first
stipulation limits the duty of the local banks to receive in deposit,
on account of the United States, only the notes of banks convertible
into coin, ‘in its _immediate_ vicinity,’ or which it is, ‘for the
time being, in the habit of receiving.’ Under this stipulation, the
Girard bank, for example, will not be bound to receive the notes of
the Louisville bank, although that also be one of the deposit banks,
nor the notes of any other bank, not in its immediate vicinity. As to
the provision that it will receive the notes of banks which, for the
time being, it is in the habit of receiving, it is absurd to put such
a stipulation in a contract, because by the power retained to change
the habit, for the time being, it is an absolute nullity. Now, sir, how
does this compare with the charter and bank of the United States? The
bank receives every where, and credits the government with the notes,
whether issued by the branches or the principal bank. The amount of
all these notes is every where available to the government. But the
government may be overflowing in distant bank notes when they are
not wanted, and a bankrupt, at the places of expenditure, under this
singular arrangement.
With respect to the transfer of moneys from place to place, the local
banks require in this contract, that it shall not take place but upon
_reasonable_ notice. And what reasonable is, has been left totally
undefined, and of course open to future contest. When hereafter a
transfer is ordered, and the bank is unable to make it, there is
nothing to do but to allege the unreasonableness of the notice. The
local bank agrees to render to the government all the services now
performed by the bank of the United States, subject, however, to the
restriction that they are required ‘in the vicinity’ of the local bank.
But the bank of the United States is under no such restrictions; its
services are coextensive with the United States and their territories.
The local banks agree to submit their books and accounts to the
secretary of the treasury, or to any agent to be appointed by him, but
to be paid by the local banks pro rata, as far as such examination _is
admissible without a violation of their respective charters_; and how
far that may be, the secretary cannot tell, because he has not yet seen
all the charters. He is, however, to appoint the agents of examination,
and to fix the salaries which the local banks are to pay. And where
does the secretary find the authority to create officers and fix their
salaries, without the authority of congress?
But the most improvident, unprecedented, and extraordinary provision
in the contract, is that which relates to the security. When, and
not until the deposits in the local bank shall exceed one half of the
capital stock annually paid in, collateral security, satisfactory to
the secretary of the treasury, is to be given for the safety of the
deposits. Why, sir, a freshman, a schoolboy, would not have thus dealt
with his father’s guardian’s money. Instead of the security _preceding_,
it is to _follow_ the deposit of the people’s money! That is, the local
bank gets an amount of their money, equal to one half its capital, and
then it condescends to give security! Does not the secretary know, that
when he goes for the security, the money may be gone, and that he may
be entirely unable to get the one or the other! We have a law, if I
mistake not, which forbids the advance of any public money, even to a
disbursing agent of the government, without previous security. Yet, in
violation of the spirit of that law, or, at least, of all common sense
and common prudence, the secretary disperses upwards of twenty-five
millions of public revenue among a countless number of unknown banks,
and stipulates that, when the amount of the deposit exceeds one half of
their respective capitals, security is to be given!
The best stipulation in the whole contract, is the last, which reserves
to the secretary of the treasury the power of discharging these local
banks from the service of the United States whenever he pleases; and
the sooner he exercises it, and restores the public deposits to the
place of acknowledged safety, from which they have been rashly taken,
the better for all parties concerned.
Let us look into the condition of one of these local banks, the nearest
to us, and that with respect to which we have the best information.
The banks of this district (and among them that of the Metropolis) are
required to make annual reports of their condition on the first day of
January. The latest official return from the Metropolis bank is of the
first of January, 1832. Why it did not make one on the first of last
January, along with the other banks, I know not. In point of fact,
I am informed, it made none. Here is its account of January, 1832,
and I think you will agree that it is a Flemish one. On the debit
side stand capital paid in, five hundred thousand dollars. Due
to the banks, twenty thousand nine hundred and eleven dollars
and ten cents; individuals on deposit, seventy-four thousand nine
hundred and seventy-seven dollars and forty-two cents; dividend and
expenses, seventeen thousand five hundred and ninety-one dollars
and seventy-seven cents; and surplus, eight thousand one hundred and
thirty-one dollars and two cents; making an aggregate of six hundred
and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars and
thirty-one cents. On the credit side, there are bills and notes
discounted, and stock (what sort?) bearing interest, six hundred and
twenty-six thousand and eleven dollars and ninety cents; real estate,
eighteen thousand four hundred and four dollars and eighty-six cents;
notes of other banks on hand, and checks on the same, twenty-three
thousand two hundred and thirteen dollars and eighty cents; specie――now,
Mr. President, how much do you imagine? Recollect, that this is the
bank selected at the seat of government, where there is necessarily
concentrated a vast amount of public money, employed in the expenditure
of government. Recollect that, by another executive edict, all public
officers, charged with the disbursement of the public money here, are
required to make their deposits with this Metropolis; and how much
specie do you suppose it had at the date of its last official return?
ten thousand nine hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-six
cents; due from other banks, five thousand eight hundred and ninety
dollars and ninety-nine cents; making in the aggregate on the credit
side, six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six
dollars and thirty-one cents. Upon looking into the items, and casting
them up, you will find that this Metropolis bank, on the first day
of January, 1832, was liable to an immediate call for one hundred
and seventy-six thousand three hundred and thirty-five dollars and
twenty-nine cents, and that the amount which it had on hand, ready
to meet that call, was forty thousand and seventy-nine dollars and
fifty-five cents. And _this_ is one of the banks selected at the seat
of the general government, for the deposit of the public moneys of the
United States. A bank with a capital of thirty millions of dollars,
and upwards of ten millions of specie on hand has been put aside, and
a bank with a capital of half a million, and a little more than ten
thousand dollars in specie on hand, has been substituted in its place!
How that half million has been raised, whether in part or in the whole,
by the neutralizing operation of giving stock notes in exchange for
certificates of stock, does not appear.
The design of the whole scheme of this treasury arrangement seems to
have been, to have united in one common league a number of local banks,
dispersed throughout the union, and subject to one central will, with
a right of scrutiny instituted by the agents of that will. It is a bad
imitation of the New York project of a safety-fund. This confederation
of banks will probably be combined in sympathy as well as interest,
and will be always ready to fly to the succor of the source of their
nourishment. As to their supplying a common currency, in place of that
of the bank of the United States, the plan is totally destitute of the
essential requisite. They are not required to credit each other’s paper,
unless it be issued in the ‘_immediate vicinity_.’
We have seen what _is_ in this contract. Now let us see what is _not_
there. It contains no stipulation for the preservation of the public
morals; none for the freedom of elections; none for the purity of the
press. All these great interests, after all that has been said against
the bank of the United States, are left to shift and take care of
themselves as they can. We have already seen the president of a bank in
a neighboring city, rushing impetuously to the defence of the secretary
of the treasury against an editorial article in a newspaper, although
the ‘venom of the shaft was quite equal to the vigor of the bow.’ Was
he rebuked by the secretary of the treasury? Was the bank _discharged_
from the public service? Or, are morals, the press, and elections,
in no danger of contamination, when a host of banks become literary
champions on the side of power and the officers of government? Is the
patriotism of the secretary only alarmed when the infallibility of high
authority is questioned? Will the states silently acquiesce, and see
the federal authority insinuating itself into banks of their creation,
and subject to their exclusive control?
We have, Mr. President, a most wonderful financier at the head of our
treasury department. He sits quietly by in the cabinet, and witnesses
the contest between his colleague and the president; sees the conflict
in the mind of that colleague between his personal attachment to the
president on the one hand, and his solemn duty to the public on the
other; beholds the triumph of conscientious obligation; contemplates
the noble spectacle of an honest man, preferring to surrender an
exalted office with all its honors and emoluments, rather than betray
the interests of the people; witnesses the contemptuous and insulting
expulsion of that colleague from office; and then coolly enters
the vacated place, without the slightest sympathy or the smallest
emotion. He was installed on the twenty-third of September, and by the
twenty-sixth, the brief period of three days, he discovers that the
government of the United States had been wrong from its origin; that
every one of his predecessors from Hamilton down, including Gallatin,
(who, whatever I said of him on a former occasion, and that I do not
mean to retract, possessed more practical knowledge of currency, banks,
and finance, than any man I have ever met in the public councils,)
Dallas, and Crawford, had been mistaken about both the expediency and
constitutionality of the bank; that every chief magistrate, prior to
him whose patronage he enjoyed, had been wrong; that the supreme court
of the United States, and the people of the United States, during the
thirty-seven years that they had acquiesced in or recognised the utter
utility of a bank, were all wrong. And, opposing his single opinion
to their united judgments, he dismisses the bank, scatters the public
money, and undertakes to regulate and purify the public morals, the
public press, and popular elections!
If we examine the operations of this modern Turgot, in their financial
bearing, merely, we shall find still less for approbation.
First. He withdraws the public moneys, where, by his own deliberate
admission, they were perfectly safe, with a bank of thirty-five
millions of capital, and ten millions of specie, and places them at
great hazard with banks of comparatively small capital, and but little
specie, of which the Metropolis bank is an example.
Second. He withdraws them from a bank created by, and over which the
federal government had ample control, and puts them in other banks,
created by different governments, and over which it has no control.
Third. He withdraws them from a bank in which the American people, as
a stockholder, were drawing their fair proportion of interest accruing
on loans, of which those deposits formed the basis, and puts them where
the people of the United States draw no interest.
Fourth. From a bank which has paid a bonus of a million and a half,
which the people of the United States may be now liable to refund, and
puts them in banks which have paid to the American people no bonus.
Fifth. Depreciates the value of stock in a bank, where the general
government holds seven millions, and advances that of banks in whose
stock it does not hold a dollar; and whose aggregate capital does not
probably much exceed that very seven millions. And, finally,
Sixth. He dismisses a bank whose paper circulates in the greatest
credit throughout the union and in foreign countries, and engages
in the public service banks whose paper has but a limited and local
circulation in their ‘immediate vicinities.’
These are immediate and inevitable results. How much that large and
long-standing item of unavailable funds, annually reported to congress,
will be swelled and extended, remains to be developed by time.
And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it
our duty to do? Is there a senator, who can hesitate to affirm, in the
language of the resolution, that the president has assumed a dangerous
power over the treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the
constitution and the laws; and that the reasons assigned for the act,
by the secretary of the treasury, are insufficient and unsatisfactory?
The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to
congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their
confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in
danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one
man’s hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority
of the executive, and his negative power exerted over congress, the
will of one man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question
is no longer what laws will congress pass, but what will the executive
not veto? The president, and not congress, is addressed for legislative
action. We have seen a corporation, charged with the execution of a
great national work, dismiss an experienced, faithful, and zealous
president, afterwards testify to his ability by a voluntary resolution,
and reward his extraordinary services by a large gratuity, and
appoint in his place an executive favorite, totally inexperienced and
incompetent, to propitiate the president. We behold the usual incidents
of approaching tyranny. The land is filled with spies and informers;
and detraction and denunciation are the orders of the day. People,
especially official incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in
the fearless tones of manly freedom, but in the cautious whispers of
trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us;
and if congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the
fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die――ignobly die! base,
mean, and abject slaves――the scorn and contempt of mankind――unpitied,
unwept, unmourned!