[THE house of representatives, on the second of March, 1833,
adopted, by a vote of one hundred and ten to forty-six, the
following resolution: ‘that the government deposits may, in the
opinion of the house, be safely continued in the bank of the
United States.’ Notwithstanding this resolution, the president
of the United States, (general Jackson,) in September following,
read a paper to his cabinet, declaring his intention to cause
the deposits to be removed from the bank. He then removed
the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Duane, from office, in
consequence of his refusal to comply with the president’s
orders in this respect, and appointed Mr. Taney secretary in
his place; who removed the deposits from the United States bank,
on the first of October, 1833, and placed them in sundry state
banks. At the ensuing session of congress, the secretary of the
treasury, Mr. Taney, having made his report on that transaction,
the subject came up for consideration in the senate, when Mr.
Clay submitted the following resolutions, which he accompanied
with the subjoined speech.]
RESOLVED, that by dismissing the late secretary of the treasury,
because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty,
remove the money of the United States in deposit with the bank
of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the
president’s opinion; and by appointing his successor to effect
such removal, which has been done, the president has assumed the
exercise of a power over the treasury of the United States not
granted to him by the constitution and laws, and dangerous to
the liberties of the people.
Resolved, that the reasons assigned by the secretary of the
treasury for the removal of the money of the United States,
deposited in the bank of the United States and its branches,
communicated to congress on the third of December, 1833, are
unsatisfactory and insufficient.
WE are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly
tending towards a total change of the pure republican character of
the government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of
one man. The powers of congress are paralysed, except when exerted in
conformity with his will, by frequent and an extraordinary exercise of
the executive veto, not anticipated by the founders of our constitution,
and not practiced by any of the predecessors of the present chief
magistrate. And, to cramp them still more, a new expedient is
springing into use, of withholding altogether bills which have received
the sanction of both houses of congress, thereby cutting off all
opportunity of passing them, even if, after their return, the members
should be unanimous in their favor. The constitutional participation
of the senate in the appointing power is virtually abolished by the
constant use of the power of removal from office, without any known
cause, and by the appointment of the same individual to the same office,
after his rejection by the senate. How often have we, senators, felt
that the check of the senate, instead of being, as the constitution
intended, a salutary control, was an idle ceremony? How often, when
acting on the case of the nominated successor, have we felt the
injustice of the removal? How often have we said to each other, well,
what can we do? the office cannot remain vacant, without prejudice
to the public interest, and, if we reject the proposed substitute, we
cannot restore the displaced; and, perhaps, some more unworthy man may
be nominated.
The judiciary has not been exempt from the prevailing rage for
innovation. Decisions of the tribunals, deliberately pronounced, have
been contemptuously disregarded. And the sanctity of numerous treaties
openly violated. Our Indian relations, coeval with the existence
of the government, and recognised and established by numerous laws
and treaties, have been subverted, the rights of the helpless and
unfortunate aborigines trampled in the dust, and they brought under
subjection to unknown laws, in which they have no voice, promulgated in
an unknown language. The most extensive and most valuable public domain
that ever fell to the lot of one nation, is threatened with a total
sacrifice. The general currency of the country――the life-blood of all
its business――is in the most imminent danger of universal disorder
and confusion. The power of internal improvement lies crushed beneath
the veto. The system of protection of American industry was snatched
from impending destruction, at the last session; but we are now coolly
told by the secretary of the treasury, without a blush, ‘that it
is understood to be _conceded on all hands_, that the tariff for
protection merely is to be finally abandoned.’ By the third of March,
1837, if the progress of innovation continues, there will be scarcely
a vestige remaining of the government and its policy, as they existed
prior to the third of March, 1829. In a term of eight years, a
little more than equal to that which was required to establish our
liberties, the government will have been transformed into an elective
monarchy――the worst of all forms of government.
Such is a melancholy but faithful picture of the present condition of
our public affairs. It is not sketched or exhibited to excite, here or
elsewhere, irritated feeling. I have no such purpose. I would, on the
contrary, implore the senate and the people to discard all passion and
prejudice, and to look calmly, but resolutely, upon the actual state
of the constitution and the country. Although I bring into the senate
the same unabated spirit, and the same firm determination which have
ever guided me in the support of civil liberty, and the defence of our
constitution, I contemplate the prospect before us with feelings of
deep humiliation and profound mortification.
It is not among the least unfortunate symptoms of the times, that a
large portion of the good and enlightened men of the union, of all
parties, are yielding to sentiments of despondency. There is, unhappily,
a feeling of distrust and insecurity pervading the community. Many
of our best citizens entertain serious apprehensions, that our union
and our institutions are destined to a speedy overthrow. Sir, I trust
that the hopes and confidence of the country will revive. There is
much occasion for manly independence and patriotic vigor, but none for
despair. Thank God, we are yet free; and, if we put on the chains which
are forging for us, it will be because we deserve to wear them. We
should never despair of the republic. If our ancestors had been capable
of surrendering themselves to such ignoble sentiments, our independence
and our liberties would never have been achieved. The winter of 1776–7
was one of the gloomiest periods of the revolution; but on _this day_,
fifty-seven years ago, the father of his country achieved a glorious
victory, which diffused joy and gladness and animation throughout
the states. Let us cherish the hope that, since he has gone from
among us, Providence, in the dispensation of his mercies, has near at
hand in reserve for us, though yet unseen by us, some sure and happy
deliverance from all impending dangers.
When we assembled here last year, we were full of dreadful forebodings.
On the one hand we were menaced with a civil war, which, lighting
up in a single state, might spread its flames throughout one of the
largest sections of the union. On the other, a cherished system of
policy, essential to the successful prosecution of the industry of our
countrymen, was exposed to imminent danger of immediate destruction.
Means were happily applied by congress to avert both calamities;
the country was reconciled, and our union once more became a band of
friends and brothers. And I shall be greatly disappointed, if we do not
find those who were denounced as being unfriendly to the continuance of
our confederacy, among the foremost to fly to its preservation, and to
resist all executive encroachment.
Mr. President, when congress adjourned, at the termination of the
last session, there was one remnant of its powers, that over the purse,
left untouched. The two most important powers of civil government are,
those of the sword and the purse. The first, with some restriction,
is confided by the constitution to the executive, and the last to
the legislative department. If they are separate, and exercised by
different responsible departments, civil liberty is safe; but if
they are united in the hands of the same individual, it is gone. That
clear-sighted and sagacious revolutionary orator and patriot, Patrick
Henry, justly said, in the Virginia convention, in reply to one of his
opponents:
‘Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist,
when the sword and purse were given up from the people? Unless a
miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its
liberty after the loss of the sword and the purse? Can you prove
by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe
without one of them? If you give them up you are gone.’
Up to the period of the termination of the last session of congress,
the exclusive constitutional power of congress over the treasury of
the United States had never been contested. Among its earliest acts
was one to establish the treasury department, which provided for
the appointment of a treasurer, who was required to give bond and
security in a very large amount, ‘to receive and keep the moneys of
the United States and to disburse the same, upon warrants drawn by the
secretary of the treasury, countersigned by the comptroller, recorded
by the register, _and not otherwise_.’ Prior to the establishment
of the present bank of the United States, no treasury or place had
been provided and designated by law for the safe-keeping of the
public moneys, but the treasurer was left to his own discretion and
responsibility. When the existing bank was established, it was provided
that the public moneys should be deposited with it, and consequently
that bank became the treasury of the United States. For whatever place
is designated by law for the keeping of the public money of the United
States, under the care of the treasurer of the United States, is for
the time being the _treasury_. Its safety was drawn in question by
the chief magistrates, and an agent was appointed, a little more than
a year ago, to investigate its ability. He reported to the executive,
that it was perfectly safe. His apprehensions of its solidity were
communicated by the president to congress, and a committee was
appointed to examine the subject. They, also, reported in favor
of its security. And, finally, among the last acts of the house of
representatives, prior to the close of the last session, was the
adoption of a resolution, manifesting its entire confidence in the
ability and solidity of the bank.
After all these testimonies to the perfect safety of the public moneys,
in the place appointed by congress, who could have supposed that the
place would have been changed? Who could have imagined, that within
sixty days of the meeting of congress, and, as it were, in utter
contempt of its authority, the change should have been ordered? Who
would have dreamed, that the treasurer should have thrown away the
single key to the treasury, over which congress held ample control, and
accepted in lieu of it some dozens of keys, over which neither congress
nor he has any adequate control? Yet, sir, all this has been done;
and it is now our solemn duty to inquire, first, by whose authority
it has been ordered? and, secondly, whether the order has been given
in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States?
I agree, sir, and I am happy whenever I can agree with the president,
as to the immense importance of these questions. He says, in a paper
which I hold in my hand, that he looks upon the pending question as
involving higher considerations than the ‘mere transfer of a sum of
money from one bank to another. Its decision may affect the character
of our government for ages to come.’ And, with him, I view it as
of transcendent importance, both in its consequences and the great
principles which the question involves. In the view which I have taken
of this subject, I hold the bank as nothing, as perfectly insignificant,
faithful as it has been in the performance of all its duties, efficient
as it has proved in regulating the currency, than which there is
none in all christendom so sound, and deep as is the interest of the
country in the establishment and continuance of a sound currency,
and the avoidance of all those evils which result from a defective or
unsettled currency. All these I regard as questions of no importance,
in comparison with the principles involved in this executive innovation.
It involves the distribution of power by the executive, and the
taking away a power from congress which it was never before doubted
to possess――the power over the public purse. Entertaining these views,
I shall not, to-day, at least, examine the reasons assigned by the
president, or by the secretary of the treasury; for if the president
had no power to perform the act, no reasons, however cogent or strong,
which he can assign as urging him to the accomplishment of his purpose,
no reasons, can sanctify an unconstitutional and illegal act.
The first question, sir, which I intimated it to be my purpose to
examine, was, by whose direction was this change of the deposits made?
Now, sir, is there any man who hears me, who requires proof on this
point? Is there an intelligent man in the whole country who does not
know who it was that decided on the removal of the deposits? Is it not
of universal notoriety? Does any man doubt that it was the act of the
president? That it was done by his authority and at his command? The
president, on this subject, has himself furnished evidence which is
perfectly conclusive, in the paper which he has read to his cabinet;
for, although he has denied to the senate an official copy of that
paper, it is universally admitted that he has given it to the world,
as containing the reasons which influenced him to this act. As a part
of the people, if not in our senatorial character, we have a right
to avail ourselves of that paper, and of all which it contains. Is
it not perfectly conclusive as to the authority by which the deposits
have been removed? I admit that it is an unprecedented and most
extraordinary power. The constitution of the United States admits of a
call, from the chief magistrate, on the heads of departments, for their
opinions in writing.
It appears, indeed, that this power which the constitution confers on
the president, had been exercised, and that the cabinet were divided,
two and two; and one, who was ready to go on either side, being a
little indifferent how this great constitutional power was settled
by the president. The president was not satisfied with calling on his
cabinet for their opinions, in the customary and constitutional form;
but he prepares a paper of his own, and instead of receiving reasons
from them, reads to them, and thus indoctrinates them according to his
own views. This, sir, is the first time in the history of our country,
when a paper has been thus read, and thus published. The proceeding is
entirely without precedent. Those who now exercise power, consider all
precedents wrong. They hold precedents in contempt; and, casting them
aside, have commenced a new era in administration. But while they thus
hold all precedents in contempt, disregarding all, no matter how long
established, no matter to what departments of the government they may
have given sanction, they are always disposed to shield themselves
behind a precedent, whenever they can find one to subserve their
purpose.
But the question is, who gave the order for the removal of the
deposits? By whose act were they removed from the bank of the United
States, where they were required by the law to be placed, and placed
in banks which the law never designated? I tell the gentlemen who are
opposed to me, that I am not to be answered by the exhibition of an
order signed by R. Taney, or any one else. I want to know, not the
clerk who makes the writing, but the individual who dictates――not the
hangman who executes the culprit, but the tribunal which orders the
execution. I want the original authority, that I may know by whose
order, on whose authority, the public deposits were removed, and I
again ask, is there a member of this senate, is there an intelligent
man in the whole country, who doubts on this point? Hear what the
president himself says, in his manifesto, read to his cabinet:
‘The president deems it HIS duty, to communicate in this manner
to his cabinet _the final conclusions_ OF HIS OWN MIND, and the
reasons on which they are founded,’ and so forth.
At the conclusion of this paper what does he say?
‘The president again repeats, that he begs his cabinet to
consider the proposed measure as HIS OWN, in the support of
which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of
opinion or principle. ITS RESPONSIBILITY HAS BEEN ASSUMED, after
the most mature reflection, as necessary to preserve the morals
of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity of the
elective franchise, without which all will unite in saying,
that the blood and treasure expended by our forefathers in the
establishment of our happy system of government will have been
vain and fruitless. Under these convictions, he feels that a
measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced
too soon; _and_ HE _therefore names the first day of October
next_ as a period proper for the change of the deposits, or
sooner, provided the necessary arrangements with the state banks
can be made.’
Sir, is there a senator here who will tell me that this removal was
not made by the president? I know, indeed, that there are in this
document many of those most mild, most gracious, most condescending
expressions, with which power too well knows how to clothe its mandates.
The president coaxes, he soothes the secretary, in the most bland and
conciliating language:
‘In the remarks he has made on this all-important question,
he _trusts_ the secretary of the treasury will see only the
frank and _respectful_ declarations of the opinions which
the president has formed on a measure of great national
interest, deeply affecting the character and usefulness of
his administration; and _not a spirit of dictation_, which the
president would be as _careful to avoid_, as ready to resist.
Happy will he be, if the facts now disclosed produce uniformity
of opinion and unity of action among the members of the
administration.’
Sir, how kind! how gentle! How very gracious must this have sounded
in the gratified ear of the secretary of the treasury! Sir, it reminds
me of an historical anecdote, related of one of the most remarkable
characters which our species has ever produced. While Oliver Cromwell
was contending for the mastery of Great Britain, or Ireland, (I do not
now remember which,) he besieged a certain catholic town. The place
made a stout resistance; but at length the town being likely to be
taken, the poor catholics proposed terms of capitulation, stipulating
therein for the toleration of their religion. The paper containing the
terms was brought to Oliver, who, putting on his spectacles to read
it, cried out, ‘oh, granted, granted, certainly;’ he added, however,
‘but if one of them shall dare to be found attending mass, he shall be
hanged;’ (under what section is not mentioned; whether under a second,
or any other section, of any particular law, we are not told.)
Thus, sir, the secretary was told by the president, that he had not
the slightest wish to dictate――oh, no; nothing is further from the
president’s intention; but, sir, what was he told in the sequel? ‘If
you do not comply with my wishes――if you do not effect the removal
of these deposits within the period I assign you――you must quit your
office.’ And what, sir, was the effect? This document bears date on the
eighteenth of September. In the official paper, published at the seat
of government, and through which it is understood that the government
makes known its wishes and purposes to the people of the United States,
we were told, under date of the twentieth of September, 1833, two days
only after this cabinet paper was read, as follows:
‘We are authorized to state’――[_authorized_; this is the word
which gave credit to this annunciation――] ‘We are authorized to
state, that the deposits of the public money will be changed
from the bank of the United States to the state banks, as soon
as necessary arrangements can be made for that purpose; and that
it is believed they can be completed in Baltimore, Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston, in time to make the change _by the first
of October, and perhaps sooner_, if circumstances should render
an earlier action necessary on the part of the government.’
Yes, sir, on the eighteenth of September this measure was decided on;
and on the twentieth, it is announced to the people, that the deposits
would be removed by the first of October, or sooner, if practicable!
Mr. Duane was continued in office till the twenty-third, on which day
he was dismissed; and between the twenty-third and the twenty-sixth, on
which latter day the mere clerical act of signing the order for removal
was performed, Mr. Taney, by whom it was done, was appointed secretary
of the treasury, having conformed to the will of the president, against
his own duty, which Mr. Duane would not do. Yes, sir, on the twentieth
went forth this proclamation, by authority, of the removal of the
deposits, although Mr. Duane remained in office till the twenty-third.
On this point we have conclusive proof in a letter of the president to
that gentleman, dated on the twenty-third, which letter, after all the
gracious, friendly, and conciliating language of the cabinet paper,
concludes in these terms:
‘I feel constrained to notify you, that your further services as
secretary of the treasury are no longer required.’
Such, Mr. President, is the testimony on the one side to prove the
truth of the proposition, that the removal of the deposits from the
bank of the United States, was a measure determined on by the president
himself――determined on while the latter secretary of the treasury was
still in office, and against the will of the secretary; although Mr.
Taney may have put his signature to the order on the twenty-sixth――a
mere ministerial act, done in conformity with the previous decision
of the president, that the removal should take place on or before the
first of October.
I now call the attention of the senate to testimony of the other party;
I mean Mr. Duane. After giving a history of the circumstances which
accompanied his appointment to office, and what passed antecedently to
his removal, he proceeds to say:
‘Thus was I thrust into office: thus was I thrust from office;
not because I had neglected any duty; not because I had differed
with him about the bank of the United States; but because I
refused, without further inquiry by congress, to remove the
deposits.’
Can testimony be more complete to establish the proposition I have
advanced? And is it possible, after the testimony of the president
on one side, and of his secretary on the other, that the former had
decided that the deposits should be removed, and had removed the
secretary because he would not do it, that any man can doubt that the
removal was the president’s own act?――that it was done in accordance
with his command?
And now, sir, having seen that the removal was made by the command and
authority of the president, I shall proceed to inquire whether it was
done in conformity with the constitution and laws of the United States.
I do not purpose at this time to go into the reasons alleged by the
president or his secretary, except so far as those reasons contain an
attempt to show that he possessed the requisite authority. Because if
the president of the United States had no power to do this thing――if
the constitution and laws, instead of authorizing it, required him
to keep his hands off the treasury――it is useless to inquire into any
reasons he may give for exercising a power which he did not possess.
Sir, what power has the president of the United States over the
treasury? Is it in the charter establishing the bank? The clause of
the charter relating to the public deposits declares,
‘That the deposits of the money of the United States, in places
in which the said bank and branches thereof may be established,
shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, unless the
secretary of the treasury shall at any time otherwise order
and direct; in which case the secretary of the treasury shall
immediately lay before congress, if in session, and if not,
immediately after the commencement of the next session, the
reasons of such order or direction.’
This is in strict consonance with the act creating the treasury
department in 1789. The secretary of the treasury is by that act
constituted the agent of congress; he is required to report to congress
annually the state of the finances, and his plans respecting them; and
if congress in either of its branches shall require it, he is to report
at any time on any particular branch of the fiscal concerns of the
country. He is the agent of congress to watch over the safety of the
national deposits; and if, from any peculiar circumstances, the removal
of them shall be required, he is to report the fact――to whom? to the
president? No, sir; he must report to congress, together with his
reasons therefor. By the charter of the bank, the president of the
United States is clothed with two powers respecting it, and two only.
By one of its clauses he is authorized to nominate, and by and with
the consent of the senate, to appoint the government directors, and
to remove them, by the other clause he is empowered to issue a _scire
facias_ when he shall apprehend that the charter of the institution
has been violated. These, I say, are the only powers given him by the
charter; all others are denied to him, and are given to others. The
bank is not bound to report the state of its affairs to him, but to
the secretary of the treasury; and it is thus to report whenever he
shall call upon it for information; but when it becomes necessary to
go further, a committee of congress is authorized to examine the books
of the bank, and to look into the whole state of its affairs, and to
report, not to the president, but to congress, who appointed them.
The president, as I have said, is restricted to the two powers of
appointing directors, and issuing a _scire facias_.
And has the president any power over the treasury by the constitution?
None, sir――none. The constitution requires that no money shall be drawn
from the treasury except by appropriation, thus placing it entirely
under the control of congress. But the president himself says; ‘upon
him has been devolved, by the constitution and the suffrages of the
American people, the duty of superintending the operation of the
executive departments of the government, and seeing that the laws
are faithfully executed.’ Sir, the president, in another part of this
same paper, refers to the same suffrages of the American people, as
the source of some other and new powers over and above those in the
constitution, or at least as expressive of their approbation of the
exercise of them. Sir, I differ from the president on this point; and
though it does not belong exactly in this place in the argument, I
will add a remark or two on this idea. His reëlection resulted from
his presumed merits generally, and the confidence and attachment of
the people; and from the unworthiness of his competitor; nor was it
intended thereby to express their approbation of all the opinions he
was known to hold. Sir, it cannot be believed that the great state
of Pennsylvania, for instance, which has so justly been denominated
the key-stone of our federal arch, in voting again and again for
the present chief magistrate, meant by that act to reverse her own
opinions on the subject of domestic industry. Sir, the truth is,
that the reëlection of the president proves as little an approbation
by the people of all the opinions he may hold, even if he had ever
unequivocally expressed what those opinions were, (a thing which he
never, so far as my knowledge extends, has yet done,) as it would prove
that if the president had a carbuncle or the king’s evil, they meant,
by reëlecting him, to approve of his carbuncle.
But the president says, that the duty ‘has been devolved upon him,’
to remove the deposits, ‘by the constitution and the suffrages of the
American people.’ Sir, does he mean to say that these suffrages created
of themselves a new source of power? That he derived an authority from
them which he did not hold as from any other source? If he means that
their suffrages made him the president of the United States, and that,
as president, he may exercise every power pertaining to that office
under the constitution and the laws, there are none who controvert
it; but then there could be no need to add the suffrages to the
constitution. But his language is, ‘the suffrages of the American
people and the constitution.’ Sir, I deny it. There is not a syllable
in the constitution which imposes any such duty upon him. There is
nothing of any such thing; no color to the idea. It is true, that
by law, all the departments, with the exception of the treasury, are
placed under the general care of the president. He says this is done by
the constitution. The laws, however, have appointed but three executive
departments; and it is true, that the secretaries are often required
by law to act in certain cases according to the directions of the
president. _So far_ it is admitted that they have been, by the law,
(not by the constitution,) placed under the direction of the president.
Yet, even as to the state department, there are duties devolving
upon the secretary over which the president has no control; and for
the non-performance of which that officer is responsible, not to the
president, but to the legislative tribunals or to the courts of justice.
This is no new opinion. The supreme court, in the case of Marbury and
Madison, expressed it in the following terms:
‘By the constitution of the United States, the president
is invested with certain important political powers, in the
exercise of which, he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and
to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these
duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by
his authority, and in conformity to his orders.
* * * * *
‘In such cases, their acts are his acts: and whatever opinion
may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion
may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion. The subjects are political. They
respect the nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted
to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.
The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to
the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign
affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act,
is to conform precisely to the will of the president. He is the
mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such
an officer, as an officer, can never be examined by the courts.
‘But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer
other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform
certain acts, (that is, when he is not placed under the
direction of the president,) when the rights of individuals are
dependent on the performance of those acts, he is so far _the
officer of the law_; is amenable _to the laws_ for his conduct;
and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of
others.
‘The conclusion from this reasoning is that where the heads
of departments are the political or confidential agents of
the executive, merely to execute the will of the president,
or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses
a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more
perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically
examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for
a remedy.’
Though the president is mistaken in his assertion, that the
constitution devolves upon the president the superintendence of the
departments, there is one clause of that instrument which he has very
correctly quoted, and which makes it his duty to ‘see that the laws
are faithfully executed,’ as it is mine now to examine what authority
he obtains by this clause in the case before us. Under it, the most
enormous pretensions have been set up for the president.
It has been contended, that if a law shall pass which the president
does not conceive to be in conformity with the constitution, he is not
bound to execute it; and if a treaty shall have been made, which, in
his opinion, has been unconstitutional in its stipulations, he is not
bound to enforce them. And it necessarily follows, that, if the courts
of justice shall give a decision, which he shall in like manner deem
repugnant to the constitution, he is not expected or bound to execute
that law. Sir, let us look a little into this principle, and trace it
out into some of its consequences.
One of the most important acts performed at the departments is,
to settle those very large accounts which individuals have with the
government; accounts amounting to millions of dollars; to settle them,
an auditor and a comptroller have been appointed by law, whose official
acts may affect, to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars, the
property of individual contractors. If the pretensions of the president
are well founded, his power goes further than he has exerted it. He may
go into the office of the auditor, or the office of the comptroller,
and may say to him, sir, Mr. A. B. has an account under settlement
in this office, one item of which, objected to by you, I consider to
be in accordance with the constitution; pass that account and send
it to the auditor; and he may then go to the auditor and hold similar
language. If the clause of the constitution is to be expounded, as is
contended for, it amounts to a complete absorption of all the powers
of government in the person of the executive. Sir, when a doctrine like
this shall be admitted as orthodox, when it shall be acquiesced in by
the people of this country, our government will have become a _simple_
machine enough. The will of the president will be the whole of it.
There will be but one bed, and that will be the bed of Procrustes;
but one will, the will of the president. All the departments, and all
subordinate functionaries of government, great or small, must submit to
that will; and if they do not, then the president will have failed to
‘see that the laws are faithfully executed.’
Sir, such an extravagant and enormous pretension as this must be set
alongside of its exploded compeer, the pretension that congress has
the power of passing any and all laws which it may suppose conducive
to ‘the general welfare.’
Let me, in a few words, present to the senate what are my own views
as to the structure of this government. I hold that no powers can
legitimately be exercised under it but such as are expressly delegated,
and those which are necessary to carry these into effect. Sir, the
executive power, as existing in this government, is not to be traced
to the notions of Montesquieu, or of any other writer of that class, in
the abstract nature of the executive power. Neither is the legislative
nor the judicial power to be decided by any such reformer. These
several powers with us, whatever they may be elsewhere, are just what
the constitution has made them, and nothing more. And as to the general
clauses in which reference is made to either, they are to be controlled
and interpreted by those where these several powers are specially
delegated, otherwise the executive will become a great vortex that
must end in swallowing up all the rest. Nor will the judicial power be
any longer restrained by the restraining clauses in the constitution,
which relate to its exercise. What then, it will be asked, does this
clause, that the president shall see that the laws are faithfully
executed, mean? Sir, it means nothing more nor less than this, that
if resistance is made to the laws, he shall take care that resistance
shall cease. Congress, by the first article of the eighth section of
the constitution, is required to provide for calling out the militia
to execute the laws, in case of resistance. Sir, it might as well
be contended under that clause, that congress have the power of
determining what are, and what are not, the laws of the land. Congress
has the power of calling out the military; well, sir, what is the
president, by the constitution? He is commander of the army and navy
of the United States, and of the militia when called out into actual
service. When, then, we are here told that he is clothed with the whole
physical power of the nation, and when we are afterwards told, that he
must take care that the laws are faithfully executed, is it possible
that any man can be so lost to the love of liberty, as not to admit
that this goes no further than to remove any resistance which may be
made to the execution of the laws? We have established a system in
which power has been carefully divided among different departments
of the government. And we have been told a thousand times, that this
division is indispensable as a safeguard to civil liberty. We have
designated the departments, and have established in each, officers
to examine the power belonging to each. The president, it is true,
presides over the whole; his eye surveys the whole extent of the system
in all its movements. But has he power to enter into the courts, for
example, and tell them what is to be done? Or may he come here, and
tell us the same? Or when we have made a law, can he withhold the power
necessary to its practical effect? He moves, it is true, in a high, a
glorious sphere. It is his to watch over the whole with a paternal eye;
and, when any one wheel of the vast machine is for a time interrupted
by the occurrence of invasion or rebellion, it is his care to propel
its movements, and to furnish it with the requisite means of performing
its appropriate duty in its own place.
That this is the true interpretation of the constitutional clause
to which I have alluded, is inferred from the total silence of all
contemporaneous expositions of that instrument on the subject. I have
myself, (and when it was not in my power personally, have caused others
to aid me,) made researches into the numbers of the Federalist, the
debates in the Virginia convention, and in the conventions of other
states, as well as all other sources of information to which I could
obtain access, and I have not, in a solitary instance, found the
slightest color for the claims set up in these most extraordinary
times for the president, that he has authority to afford or withhold
at pleasure the means of enforcing the laws, and to superintend and
control an officer charged with a specific duty, made by the law
exclusively his. But, sir, I have found some authorities which strongly
militate against any such claim. If the doctrine be indeed true, then
it is most evident that there is no longer any other control over
our affairs, than that exerted by the president. If it be true, that
when a duty is by law specifically assigned to a particular officer,
the president may go into his office and control him in the manner
of performing it, then is it most manifest that all barriers for the
safety of the treasury are gone. Sir, it is that union of the purse
and the sword, in the hand of one man, which constitutes the best
definition of tyranny which our language can give.
The charter of the bank of the United States requires that the public
deposits be made in its vaults. It also gives the secretary of the
treasury power to remove them――and why? The secretary is at the head of
the finances of the government. Weekly reports are made by the bank to
him. He is to report to congress annually; and to either house whenever
he should be called upon. He is the sentinel of congress――the agent of
congress――the representative of congress. Congress has prescribed and
has defined his duties. He is required to report to them, not to the
president. He is put there by us, as our representative; he is required
to remove the deposits when they shall be in danger, and we not in
session; but when he does this, he is required to report to congress
the fact, with his reasons for it. Now, sir, if, when an officer of
government is thus specifically assigned his duty, if he is to report
his official acts on his responsibility to congress; if, in a case
where no power whatever is given to the president, the president may
go and say to that officer, ‘go and do as I bid you, or you shall be
removed from office;’ let me ask, whether the danger apprehended by
that eloquent man has not already been realized?
But, sir, let me suppose that I am mistaken in my construction of
the constitution; and let me suppose that the president has, as is
contended, power to see every particular law carried into effect; what,
then, was it his duty to do in the present case under the clause thus
interpreted? The law authorized the secretary of the treasury to remove
the deposits on his responsibility to congress. Now, if the president
has power to see this, like other laws, faithfully executed, then,
surely, the law exacted of him that he should see that the secretary
was allowed to exercise his free, unbiased, uncontrolled judgment
in removing or not removing them. That was the execution of the law.
Congress had not said that the secretary of war, or the secretary of
state, might remove the public deposits from the treasury.
The president has no right to go to the secretary of war and ask him
what the secretary of the treasury ought to do. He might as well have
consulted the secretary of the treasury about a contemplated movement
of the army, as to ask the secretary of war about the disposition of
the public moneys. It was not to the president, and all his secretaries
combined, that the power was given to alter the disposition of the
deposits in the bank. It was to the secretary alone, exclusive of the
president, and all the other officers of government. And according
to gentlemen’s own showing, by their construction of the clause, the
secretary ought to have been left to his own unbiased determination,
uncontrolled by the president or any body else.
I would thank the secretary of the senate to get me the sedition law.
It is not very certain how soon we may be called to act upon it.
Now, sir, let us trace some of the other sources of the exercise of
this power, or motives for it, or by whatever other name they are to be
called. He says to Mr. Duane:
‘The president repeats, that he begs the cabinet to consider
the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he
shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or
principle. Its responsibility has been assumed, after the most
mature deliberation and reflection, as necessary to preserve the
morals of the people, the freedom of the press, and the purity
of the elective franchise.’
The morals of the people! What part of the constitution has given
to the president any power over ‘the morals of the people?’ None. It
does not give such power even over religion, the presiding and genial
influence over every true system of morals. No, sir, it gives him no
such power.
And what is the next step? To-day he claims a power as necessary to
the morals of the people; to-morrow he will claim another, as still
more indispensable to our religion. And the president might in this
case as well have said that he went into the office of the secretary
of the treasury, and controlled his free exercise of his authority as
secretary, because it was necessary to preserve ‘the religion of the
people!’ I ask for the authority. Will any one of those gentlemen
here, who consider themselves as the vindicators of the executive,
point me to any clause of the constitution which gives to the _present_
president of the United States any power to preserve ‘the morals of the
people?’
But ‘the freedom of the press,’ it seems, was another motive. Sir,
I am not surprised that the present secretary of the treasury should
feel a desire to revive this power over the press. He, I think, was
a member of that party which passed the sedition law, under precisely
the same pretext. I recollect it was said, that this bank, this monster
of tyranny, was taking into its pay a countless number of papers, and
by this means was destroying the fair fame of the president and his
secretary, and all that sort of thing. Sir, it is sometimes useful to
refer back to those old things――to the notions and the motives which
induced men in former times to do certain acts which may not be
altogether unlike some others in our own time.
The famous sedition act was passed, sir, in 1789; and it contained,
among others, the following provision:
‘Section 2. That if any person shall write, print, utter, or
publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed,
uttered, or published, or shall, knowingly and willingly, assist
or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing, any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings, against the
government of the United States, or either house of the congress
of the United States, or the president of the United States,
with intent to defame the said government, or either house of
the said congress, or the said president, or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against
them, or either of them, the hatred of the good people of the
United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States:
or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing
or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the
president of the United States, done in pursuance of any such
law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the
United States; or to resist, oppose, or defeat, any such law
or act; or to aid, encourage, or abet, any hostile designs of
any foreign nation, against the United States, their people, or
government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by
imprisonment not exceeding two years.’
We have now, sir, in the reasons for the removal of the government
deposits, the same motives avowed and acted upon. The abuse of the
government, bringing it into disrepute, using contemptuous language
to persons high in authority, constituted the motives for passing
the sedition law; and what have we now but a repetition of the same
complaints of abuses, disrespect, and so forth. As it is now, so it
was then; for, says the next section of the same sedition act:
‘That if any person shall be prosecuted under this act for
the writing or publishing of any libel aforesaid, it shall be
lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give
in evidence in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in
the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try
the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases.’
It is only for the sake of _the truth_, said they who favored the
passage of that law――for the sake of justice; as it is now said that it
was necessary to remove the deposits, in order to preserve the purity
of the press. That’s all, sir. But there is one part of this assumption
of power by the president much more tyrannical than that act. Under
that law, the offending party was to have a trial by jury; the benefit
of witnesses and of counsel; and the right to have the truth of his
alleged libels examined. But what is the case now under consideration?
Why, sir, the president takes the whole matter in his own hands; he is
at once the judge, the jury, and the executioner of the sentence, and
utterly deprives the accused party of the opportunity of showing that
the imputed libel is no libel at all, but founded in the clearest truth.
But ‘the purity of the elective franchise,’ also, the president
has very much at heart. And here, again, I ask what part of the
constitution gives him any power over that ‘franchise?’ Look, sir, at
the nature of the exercise of this power! If it was really necessary
that steps should be taken to preserve the purity of the press or the
freedom of elections, what ought the president to have done? Taken the
matter into his own hands? No, sir; it was his duty to recommend to
congress the passage of laws for the purpose, under suitable sanctions;
laws which the courts of the United States could execute. We could not
have been worse off under such laws, (however exceptionable they might
be,) than we are now. We could then, sir, have reviewed the laws, and
seen whether congress or the president had properly any power over this
matter; or whether the article of the constitution which forbids that
the press shall be touched, and declares that religion shall be sacred
from all the powers of legislation, applied in the case or not. This
the president has undertaken to do of himself, without the shadow of
authority, either in the constitution or the laws.
Suppose, sir, that this contumacious institution, which committed
the great sin, in 1829, of not appointing a new president to a certain
one of its branches――suppose that the bank should go on and vindicate
itself against the calumnies poured out upon it――that it should
continue to stand upon its defence; how inefficient will have been the
exercise of power by the president! How inadequate to the end he had
in view, of preserving the press from being made use of to defend the
bank! Why, sir, if we had had the power, and the president had come
to us, we could have laid Mr. Nicholas Biddle by the heels, if he
should have undertaken to publish another report of general Smith or
Mr. Duffie, or another speech of the eloquent gentleman near me, (Mr.
Webster,) or any other such _libels_, tending to bring the president
or his administration into disrepute. But the president of the United
States, who thought he had the bank in his power, who thought he could
stop it, who was induced to believe, by that ‘influence behind the
throne, greater than itself,’ that he could break down the bank at a
word, has only shown his want of power over the press, by his attempt
to exercise it in the manner he has done. The bank has avowed and
openly declared its purpose to defend itself on all suitable occasions.
And, what is still more provoking, instead of being a bankrupt, as was
expected, with its doors closed, and its vaults inaccessible, it has
now, it seems, got more money than it knows what to do with; and this
greatest of misers and hoarders, cruelly refuses to let out a dollar of
its ten millions of specie, to relieve the sufferings of the banks to
which the government deposits have been transferred.
Sir, the president of the United States had nothing to do with the
morals of the community. No, sir; for the preservation of our morals we
are responsible to God, and I trust that that responsibility will ever
remain to Him and His mercy alone. Neither had the president any thing
to do with the freedom of the press. The power over it is denied, even
to congress, by the people. It was said, by one of those few able men
and bright luminaries, whom Providence has yet spared to us, in answer
to complaints by a foreign minister, against the freedom with which
the American press treated certain French functionaries, that the
press was one of those concerns which admitted of no regulation by the
government; that its abuses must be tolerated, lest its freedom should
be abridged. Such, sir, is the freedom of the press, as recognised by
our constitution, and so it has been respected ever since the repeal
of the obnoxious act which I have already quoted, until the detestable
principles of that law have been reasserted by the president, in his
assumption of a power, in nowise belonging to his office, of preserving
the purity of the press.
Such, sir, are the powers on which the president relies to justify his
seizure of the treasury of the United States. I have examined them one
by one; and they all fail, utterly fail, to bear out the act. We are
irresistibly brought to the conclusion, that the removal of the public
money from the bank of the United States has been effected by the
displacement from the head of the treasury department of one who would
not remove them, and putting in his stead another person, who would;
and, secondly, that the president has no color of authority in the
constitution or the laws for the act which he has undertaken to perform.
Let us now, for a few moments, examine the consequences which may
ensue from the exercise of this enormous power. If the president has
authority, in a case in which the law has assigned a specific duty
exclusively to a designated officer, to control the exercise of his
discretion by that officer, he has a right to interfere in every other
case, and remove every one from office who hesitates to do his bidding,
against his judgment of his own duty. This, surely, is a logical
deduction not to be resisted. Well, then, how stands the matter?
Recapitulating the provisions of the law prescribing how money should
be drawn from the treasury and the deduction above stated, what is to
prevent the president from going to the comptroller, and, if he will
not countersign a warrant which he has found an accommodating secretary
to sign, turning him out for another; then going to the register,
and doing the same; and then to the treasurer, and commanding him to
pay over the money expressed in the warrant, or subject himself to
expulsion.
Where is the security against such conduct on the part of the
president? Where the boundary to this tremendous authority, which he
has undertaken to exercise? Sir, every barrier around the treasury
is broken down. From the moment that the president said, ‘I make this
measure my own, I take upon myself the responsibility,’ from that
moment the public treasury might as well have been at the hermitage
as at this place. Sir, the measure adopted by the president is without
precedent――in our day at best. There is, indeed, a precedent on
record, but you must go down to the christian era for it. It will be
recollected, by those who are conversant with ancient history, that
after Pompey was compelled to retire to Brundusium, Cæsar, who had been
anxious to give him battle, returned to Rome, ‘having reduced Italy,
(says the historian,) in sixty days, (the exact period, sir, between
the removal of the deposits, and the meeting of congress, without
the usual allowance of three days’ grace,) without bloodshed.’ The
historian goes on; ‘finding the city in a more settled condition than
he expected, and many senators there, he addressed them in a mild and
gracious manner, (as the president addressed his late secretary of the
treasury,) and desired them to send deputies to Pompey with an offer
of honorable terms of peace. As Metellus, the tribune, _opposed his_
taking money out of the public treasury, and cited some laws against it,
(such, sir, I suppose, as I have endeavored to cite on this occasion,)
Cæsar said, ‘arms and laws do not flourish together. If you are not
pleased with what I am about, you have only to withdraw. (Leave the
office, Mr. Duane!) War, indeed, will not tolerate much liberty of
speech. When I say this, I am renouncing my own right; for you, and all
those whom I have found exciting a spirit of faction against me, are at
my disposal.’ Having said this, he approached the doors of the treasury,
and as the keys were not produced, he sent for workmen to break them
open. Metellus again opposed him, and gained credit with some for his
firmness; but Cæsar, with an elevated voice, threatened to put him to
death, if he gave any further trouble. ‘And you know very well, young
man,’ said he, ‘that this is harder for me to say than to do.’ Metellus,
terrified by the measure, retired, and Cæsar was afterward easily and
readily supplied with every thing necessary for the war.
And where now, sir, is the public treasury? Who can tell? It is
certainly without a local habitation, if it be not without a name.
And where is the money of the people of the United States? Floating
about in treasury drafts or checks to the amount of millions, placed
in the hands of tottering banks, to enable them to pay their own debts,
instead of being appropriated to the service of the people. These
checks are scattered to the winds by the treasurer of the United States,
who is required by law to let out money from the treasury, on warrants
signed by the secretary of the treasury, countersigned, registered, and
so forth, and not otherwise.
[Mr. Clay here referred to a correspondence, which he quoted,
between the treasurer and the officers of the bank, complaining
of these checks drawn without proper notice, and so forth, in
which the treasurer says they were only issued to be used in
certain contingencies, and so forth.]
Thus, sir, the people’s money is put into a bank here, and
the bank there, in regard to the solvency of which we know
nothing, and it is placed there to be used in the event of certain
contingencies――contingencies of which neither the treasurer nor the
secretary have yet deigned to furnish us any account.
Where was the oath of office of the treasurer, when he ventured thus
to sport with the people’s money? Where was the constitution, which
forbids money to be drawn from the treasury without appropriation
by law? Where was the treasurer’s bond, when he thus cast about the
people’s money? Sir, his bond is forfeited. I do not pretend to any
great knowledge of the law, but give me an intelligent and unpacked
jury, and I undertake to prove to him that he has forfeited the penalty
of his bond.
Mr. President, the people of the United States are indebted to the
president for the boldness of this movement; and as one among the
humblest of them, I profess my obligations to him. He has told the
senate, in his message refusing an official copy of his cabinet paper,
that it has been published for the information of the people. As a part
of the people, the senate, if not in their official character, have
a right to its use. In that extraordinary paper, he has proclaimed,
that the measure is _his_ own; and that _he has taken_ upon himself
the responsibility of it. In plain English, he has proclaimed an open,
palpable, and daring usurpation!
For more than fifteen years, Mr. President, I have been struggling
to avoid the present state of things. I thought I perceived in some
proceedings, during the conduct of the Seminole war, a spirit of
defiance to the constitution and to all law. With what sincerity and
truth, with what earnestness and devotion to civil liberty, I have
struggled, the searcher of all human hearts best knows. With what
fortune, the bleeding constitution of my country now fatally attests.
I have, nevertheless, persevered; and under every discouragement,
during the short time that I expect to remain in the public councils,
I will persevere. And if a bountiful Providence would allow an unworthy
sinner to approach the throne of grace, I would beseech Him, as the
greatest favor He could grant to me here below, to spare me until I
live to behold the people rising in their majesty, with a peaceful
and constitutional exercise of their power, to expel the Goths from
Rome; to rescue the public treasury from pillage, to preserve the
constitution of the United States; to uphold the union against the
danger of the concentration and consolidation of _all_ power in the
hands of the executive; and to sustain the liberties of the people
of this country against the imminent perils to which they now stand
exposed.
[Here Mr. Clay, who was understood to have gone through the
first part of his speech only, gave way, and Mr. Ewing of Ohio
moved that the further consideration of the subject be postponed
until Monday next; which was ordered accordingly. And then the
senate adjourned to that day. December 30, Mr. Clay resumed his
speech.]
Before I proceed to a consideration of the report of the secretary
of the treasury, and the second resolution, I wish to anticipate and
answer an objection, which may be made to the adoption of the first. It
may be urged, that the senate, being, in a certain contingency, a court
of impeachment, ought not to prejudge a question which it may be called
upon to decide judicially. But by the constitution the senate has three
characters, legislative, executive, and judicial. Its ordinary, and
by far its most important character, is that of its being a component
part of the legislative department. Only three or four cases, since
the establishment of the government, (that is, during a period of
nearly half a century,) have occurred, in which it was necessary that
the senate should act as a judicial tribunal, the least important
of all its characters. Now it would be most strange if, when its
constitutional powers were assailed, it could not assert and vindicate
them, because, by possibility, it might be required to act as a court
of justice. The first resolution asserts only, that the president has
assumed the exercise of a power over the public treasury not granted
by the constitution and laws. It is silent as to motive; and without
the _quo animo_――the deliberate purpose of usurpation――the president
would not be liable to impeachment. But if a concurrence of all the
elements be necessary to make out a charge of wilful violation of
the constitution, does any one believe that the president will now be
impeached? And shall we silently sit by and see ourselves stripped of
one of the most essential of our legislative powers, and the exercise
of it assumed by the president, to which it is not delegated, without
effort to maintain it, because, against all human probability, he may
be hereafter impeached?
The report of the secretary of the treasury, in the first paragraph,
commences with a misstatement of the fact. He says, ‘_I have directed_’
that the deposits of the money of the United States shall not be made
in the bank of the United States. If this assertion is regarded in
any other than a mere formal sense, it is not true. The secretary
may have been the instrument, the clerk, the automaton, in whose
name the order was issued; but the measure was that of the president,
by whose authority or command the order was given; and of this we
have the highest and most authentic evidence. The president has told
the world that the measure was his own, and that he took it upon
his own responsibility. And he has exonerated his cabinet from all
responsibility about it. The secretary ought to have frankly disclosed
all the circumstances of the case, and told the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth. If he had done so, he would have informed
congress, that the removal had been decided by the president on the
eighteenth of September last; that it had been announced to the public
on the twentieth; and that Mr. Duane remained in office until the
twenty-third. He would have informed congress, that this important
measure was decided before he entered into his new office, and was
the cause of his appointment. Yes, sir, the present secretary stood
by, a witness to the struggle in the mind of his predecessor, between
his attachment to the president and his duty to the country; saw him
dismissed from office, because he would not violate his conscientious
obligations, and came into his place, to do what he could not,
honorably, and would not perform. A son of one of the fathers
of democracy, by an administration professing to be democratic,
was expelled from office, and his place supplied by a gentleman,
who, throughout his whole career, has been uniformly opposed to
democracy!――a gentleman who, at another epoch of the republic, when it
was threatened with civil war, and a dissolution of the union, voted,
(although a resident of a slave state,) in the legislature of Maryland,
against the admission of Missouri into the union without a restriction
incompatible with her rights as a member of the confederacy![21] Mr.
Duane was dismissed because the solemn convictions of his duty would
not allow him to conform to the president’s will; because his logic
did not bring his mind to the same conclusions with those of the logic
of a venerable old gentleman, inhabiting a white house not distant from
the capitol; because his watch, (here Mr. Clay held up his own,) did
not keep time with that of the president. He was dismissed under that
detestable system of proscription for opinion’s sake, which has finally
dared to intrude itself into the halls of congress――a system under
which three unoffending clerks, the husbands of wives, the fathers
of families, dependent on them for support, without the slightest
imputation of delinquency, have been recently unceremoniously
discharged, and driven out to beggary, by a man, himself the substitute
of a meritorious officer, who has not been in this city a period equal
to one monthly revolution of the moon! I tell our secretary, (said
Mr. Clay, raising his voice,) that, if he touch a single hair of the
head of any one of the clerks of the senate, (I am sure he is not
disposed to do it,) on account of his opinions, political or religious,
if no other member of the senate does it, I will instantly submit a
resolution for his own dismission.
The secretary ought to have communicated all these things; he ought
to have stated that the cabinet was divided two and two, and one of
the members equally divided with himself on the question, willing
to be put into either scale. He ought to have given a full account
of this, the most important act of executive authority since the
origin of the government; he should have stated with what unsullied
honor his predecessor retired from office, and on what degrading
conditions he accepted his vacant place. When a momentous proceeding
like this, varying the constitutional distribution of the powers
of the legislative and executive departments, was resolved on,
the ministers against whose advice it was determined, should have
resigned their stations. No ministers of any monarch in Europe, under
similar circumstances, would have retained the seals of office. And
if, as nobody doubts, there is a cabal behind the curtain, without
character and without responsibility, feeding the passions, stimulating
the prejudices, and moulding the actions of the incumbent of the
presidential office, it was an additional reason for their resignations.
There is not a _maitre d’hotel_ in christendom, who, if the scullions
were put into command in the parlor and dining-room, would not scorn to
hold his place, and fling it up in disgust with indignant pride!
I shall examine the report before us, first, as to the power of the
secretary over the deposits; secondly, his reasons for the exercise of
it; and, thirdly, the manner of its exercise.