But we are not always sure that we understand Mr. Finlay, even in the

particular use which he makes of the words 'Greece' and 'Grecian.'

Sometimes he means beyond a doubt the people of Hellas and the Ægean

islands, as _opposed_ to the mixed population of Constantinople.

Sometimes he means the Grecian element as opposed to the Roman element

_in_ the composition of this mixed Byzantine population. In this case

the Greek does not mean (as in the former case) the non-Byzantine, but

the Byzantine. Sometimes he means by preference that vast and most

diffusive race which throughout Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, the Euxine and

the Euphrates, represented the Græco-Macedonian blood from the time of

Alexander downwards. But why should we limit the case to an origin from

this great Alexandrian æra? Then doubtless (330 B.C.) it received a

prodigious expansion. But already, in the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.),

this Grecian race had begun to sow itself broadcast over Asia and

Africa. The region called _Cyrenaica_ (viz., the first region which you

would traverse in passing from the banks of the Nile and the Pyramids to

Carthage and to Mount Atlas, _i.e._, Tunis, Algiers, Fez and Morocco, or

what we now call the Barbary States) had been occupied by Grecians

nearly seven hundred years before Christ. In the time of Croesus (say

560 B.C.) it is clear that Grecians were swarming over Lydia and the

whole accessible part of Asia Minor. In the time of Cyrus the younger

(say 404 B.C.) his Grecian allies found their fiercest opponents in

Grecian soldiers of Artaxerxes. In the time of Alexander, just a

septuagint of years from the epoch of this unfortunate Cyrus, the most

considerable troops of Darius were Greeks. The truth is, that, though

Greece was at no time very populous, the prosperity of so many little

republics led to as ample a redundancy of Grecian population as was

compatible with Grecian habits of life; for, deceive not yourself, the

_harem_, what we are accustomed to think of as a Mahometan institution,

existed more or less perfectly in Greece by seventeen centuries at least

antecedently to Mahometanism. Already before Homer, before Troy, before

the Argonauts, woman was an abject, dependent chattel in Greece, and

living in nun-like seclusion. There is so much of _intellectual_

resemblance between Greece and Rome, shown in the two literatures, the

two religions, and the structure of the two languages, that we are apt

to overlook radical repulsion between their _moral_ systems. But such a

repulsion did exist, and the results of its existence are 'writ large'

in the records, if they are studied with philosophic closeness and

insight, and could be illustrated in many ways had we only time and

space for such an exercise. But we must hurry on to remark that Mr.

Finlay's indefiniteness in the use of the terms 'Greece' and 'Grecian'

is almost equalled by his looseness in dealing with institutions and the

principles which determined their character. He dwells meditatively upon

that tenacity of life which he finds to characterize them--a tenacity

very much dependent upon physical[13] circumstances, and in that respect

so memorably inferior to the social economy of Jewish existence, that

we have been led to dwell with some interest upon the following

distinctions as applicable to the political existence of all nations who

are in any degree civilized. It seems to us that three forces, amongst

those which influence the movement of nations, are practically

paramount; viz., first, the _legislation_ of a people; secondly, the

_government_ of a people; thirdly, the _administration_ of a people. By

the quality of its legislation a people is moulded to this or that

character; by the quality of its government a people is applied to this

or that great purpose; by the quality of its administration a people is

made disposable readily and instantly and completely for every purpose

lying within the field of public objects. _Legislation_ it is which

shapes or qualifies a people, endowing them with such qualities as are

more or less fitted for the ends likely to be pursued by a national

policy, and for the ends suggested by local relations when combined with

the new aspects of the times. _Government_ it is which turns these

qualifications to account, guiding them upon the new line of tendencies

opening spontaneously ahead, or (as sometimes we see) upon new

tendencies created deliberately and by forethought. But _administration_

it is which organizes between the capacities of the people on the one

hand, and the enlightened wishes of the government on the other--that

intermediate _nexus_ of social machinery without which both the amplest

powers in a nation and the noblest policy in a government must equally

and continually fall to the ground. A general system of instruments, or

if we may use the word, system of instrumentation and concerted

arrangements--behold the one sole _conditio sine qua non_ for giving a

voice to the national interests, for giving a ratification to the

national will, for giving mobility to the national resources. Amongst

these three categories which we have here assigned as summing up the

relations of the public will in great nations to the total system of

national results, this last category of _administration_ is that which

(beyond the rest) postulates and presupposes vast developments of

civilization. Instincts of nature, under favourable circumstances, as

where the national mind is bold, the temper noble, veracity adorning the

speech, and simplicity the manners, may create and _have_ created good

elementary laws; whilst it is certain that, where any popular freedom

exists, the government must resemble and reflect the people. Hence it

cannot be denied that, even in semi-barbarous times, good legislation

and good government may arise. But good administration is not

conceivable without the aids of high civilization. How often have piracy

by sea, systematic robbery by land, tainted as with a curse the

blessings of life and property in great nations! Witness the state of

the Mediterranean under the Cilicians during the very sunset of Marius;

or, again, of the Caribbean seas, in spite of a vast Spanish empire, of

Buccaneers and Filibusters. Witness Bagandæ in Roman Spain, or the cloud

of robbers gathering in France through twelve centuries after _every_

period of war; witness the scourges of public peace in Italy, were it in

papal Rome or amongst the Fra Diavolos of Naples.

We believe that, so far from possessing any stronger principle of

vitality than the Roman institutions, those of Greece Proper (meaning

those originally and authentically Greek) had any separate advantage

only when applied locally. They were essentially _enchorial_

institutions, and even _physically_ local (_i.e._, requiring the same

place as well as the same people); just as the ordinances of Mahomet

betray his unconscious frailty and ignorance by presuming and

postulating a Southern climate as well as an Oriental temperament. The

Greek usages and traditionary monuments of civilization had adapted

themselves from the first to the singular physical conformation of

Hellas--as a 'nook-shotten'[14] land, nautically accessible and laid

down in seas that were studded with islands systematically adjusted to

the continental circumstances, whilst internally her mountainous

structure had split up almost the whole of her territory into separate

chambers or wards, predetermining from the first that galaxy of little

republics into which her splintered community threw itself by means of

the strong mutual repulsion derived originally from battlements of

hills, and, secondarily, from the existing state of the military art.

Having these advantages to begin with, reposing upon these foundations,

the Greek civil organization sustained itself undoubtedly through an

astonishing tract of time; before the ship _Argo_ it had commenced;

under the Ottoman Turks it still survived: for even in the Trojan æra,

and in the pre-Trojan or Argonautic æra, already (and perhaps for many

centuries before) the nominal kingdoms were virtually republics, the

princes being evidently limited in their authority by the 'sensus

communis' of the body politic almost as much as the Kings of Sparta were

from the time of Lycurgus to the extinction of the Peloponnesian

independence.

Accidents, therefore, although accidents of a permanent order (being

founded in external nature), gave to Greece a very peculiar advantage.

On her own dunghill her own usages had a tenacity of life such as is

seen in certain weeds (couch-grass, for instance). This natural

advantage, by means of intense local adaptation, did certainly prove

available for Greece, under the circumstances of a hostile invasion.

Even had the Persian invasion succeeded, it is possible that Grecian

civilization would still have survived the conquest, and would have

predominated, as actually it did in Ionia, etc.

So far our views seem to flow in the channel of Mr. Finlay's. But these

three considerations occur:

1st. That oftentimes Greece escaped the ravages of barbarians, not so

much by any quality of her civil institutions, whether better or worse,

as by her geographical position. It is 'a far cry to Loch Awe'; and had

Timon of Athens together with Apemantus clubbed their misanthropies,

joint and several, there would hardly have arisen an impetus strong

enough to carry an enemy all the way from the Danube to the Ilyssus; yet

so far, at least, every European enemy of Thebes and Athens had to

march. Nay, unless Monsieur le Sauvage happened to possess the mouths of

the Danube, so as to float down 'by the turn of tide' through the

Euxine, Bosphorus, Propontis, Hellespont, etc., he would think twice

before he would set off a-gallivanting to the regions of the South,

where certainly much sunshine was to be had of undeniable quality, but

not much of anything else. The Greeks were never absolute paupers,

because, however slender their means, their social usages never led to

any Irish expansion of population; but under no circumstances of

government were they or could they have been rich. Plunder therefore,

that could be worth packing and cording, there was little or none in

Greece. People do not march seven hundred miles to steal old curious

bedsteads, swarming, besides, with fleas. Sculptured plate was the

thing. And, from the times of Sylla, _that_ had a strange gravitation

towards Rome. It is, besides, worth noticing--as a general rule in the

science of robbery--that it makes all the difference in the world which

end of a cone is presented to the robber. Beginning at the apex of a

sugar-loaf, and required to move rapidly onwards to the broad basis

where first he is to halt and seek his booty, the robber locust advances

with hope and cheerfulness. Invert this order, and from the vast base of

the Danube send him on to the promontory of Sunium--a tract perpetually

dwindling in its breadth through 500 miles--and his reversion of booty

grows less valuable at every step. Yet even this feature was not the

most comfortless in the case. That the zone of pillage should narrow

with every step taken towards its proper ground, this surely was a bad

look-out. But it was a worse, that even this poor vintage lay hid and

sheltered under the Ægis of the empire. The whole breadth of the empire

on that side of the Mediterranean was to be traversed before one cluster

of grapes could be plucked from Greece; whereas, upon all the horns of

the Western Empire, plunder commenced from the moment of crossing the

frontier. Here, therefore, lies one objection to the supposed excellence

of Grecian institutions: they are valued, upon Mr. Finlay's scale, by

their quality of elastic rebound from violence and wrong; but, in order

that this quality might be truly tested, they ought to have been equally

and fairly tried: now, by comparison with the Western provinces, that

was a condition not capable of being realized for Greece, having the

position which she had.

2ndly. The reader will remark that the argument just used is but

negative: it does not positively combat the superiority claimed for the

Greek organization; that superiority may be all that it is described to

be; but it is submitted that perhaps the manifestation of this advantage

was not made on a sufficient breadth of experiment.

Now let us consider this. Upon the analogy of any possible precedent,

under which Rome could be said to have taken seven centuries in

unfolding her power, our Britain has taken almost fourteen. So long is

the space between the first germination of Anglo-Saxon institutions and

the present expansion of British power over the vast regions of

Hindostan. Most true it is that a very small section of this time and a

very small section of British energies has been applied separately to

the Indian Empire. But precisely the same distinction holds good in the

Roman case. The total expansion of Rome travelled, perhaps, through

eight centuries; but five of these spent themselves upon the mere

_domestic_ growth of Rome; during five she did not so much as attempt

any foreign appropriation. And in the latter three, during which she

did, we must figure to ourselves the separate ramifications of her

influence as each involving a very short cycle indeed of effort or

attention, though collectively involving a long space, separately as

involving a very brief one. If the eye is applied to each conquest

itself, nothing can exhibit less of a slow or gradual expansion than the

Roman system of conquest. It was a shadow which moved so rapidly on the

dial as to be visible and alarming. Had newspapers existed in those

days, or had such a sympathy bound nations together[15] as could have

supported newspapers, a vast league would have been roused by the

advance of Rome. Such a league _was_ formed where something of this

sympathy existed. The kingdoms formed out of the inheritance of

Alexander being in a sense Grecian kingdoms--Grecian in their language,

Grecian by their princes, Grecian by their armies (in their privileged

sections)--_did_ become alarming to the Greeks. And what followed? The

Achæan league, which, in fact, produced the last heroes of

Greece--Aratus, Philopoemen, Cleomenes. But as to Rome, she was too

obscure, too little advertised as a danger, to be separately observed.

But, partly, this arose from her rapidity. Macedonia was taken

separately from Greece. Sicily, which was the advanced port of Greece to

the West, had early fallen as a sort of appanage to the Punic struggle.

And all the rest followed by insensible degrees. In Syria, and again in

Pontus, and in Macedonia, three great kingdoms which to Greece seemed

related rather as enemies than as friends, and which therefore roused no

spirit of resistance in Greece, through Rome had already withdrawn all

the contingent proper from Greece. Had these powers concerted with Egypt

and with Greece a powerful league, Rome would have been thrown back

upon her Western chambers.

The reason why the Piratic power arose, we suppose to have been this,

and also the reason why such a power was not viewed as extra-national.

The nautical profession as such flowed in a channel altogether distinct

from the martial profession. It was altogether and exclusively

commercial in its general process. Only, upon peculiar occasions arose a

necessity for a nautical power as amongst the resources of empire.

Carthage reared upon the basis of her navy, as had done Athens, Rhodes,

Tyre, some part of her power: and Rome put forth so much of this power

as sufficed to meet Carthage. But that done, we find no separate

ambition growing up in Rome and directing itself to naval war.

Accidentally, when the war arose between Cæsar and Pompey, it became

evident that for rapidly transferring armies and for feeding these

armies, a navy would be necessary. And Cicero, but for _this crisis_,

and not as a _general_ remark, said--that 'necesse est qui mare tenuit

rerum potiri.'

Hence it happened--that as no permanent establishment could arise where

no permanent antagonist could be supposed to exist--oftentimes, and

indeed always, unless when some new crisis arose, the Roman navy went

down. In one of these intervals arose the Cilician piracy. Mr. Finlay

suggests that in part it arose out of the fragments from Alexander's

kingdoms, recombining: partly out of the Isaurian land pirates already

established, and furnished with such astonishing natural fortresses as

existed nowhere else if we except those aërial caves--a sort of mountain

nests on the side of declivities, which Josephus describes as harbouring

Idumean enemies of Herod the Great, against whom he was obliged to

fight by taking down warriors in complete panoply ensconced in baskets

suspended by chains; and partly arising on the temptation of rich

booties in the commerce of the Levant, or of rich temples on shore

amidst unwarlike populations. These elements of a warlike form were

required as the means of piracy, these fortresses and Isaurian caves as

the resources of piracy, these notorious cargoes or temples stored with

wealth as temptations to piracy, before a public nuisance could arise

demanding a public chastisement. And yet, because this piracy had a

local settlement and nursery, it seemed hardly consonant to the spirit

of public (or international) law, that all civil rights should be denied

them.

Not without reason, not without a profound purpose, did Providence

ordain that our two great precedents upon earth should be Greece and

Rome. In all planets, if you could look into them, doubt not (oh, reader

of ours!) that something exists answering to Greece and Rome. Odd it

would be--_curioes_! as the Germans say--if in Jupiter--or Venus--those

precedents should exist under the same _names_ of Greece and Rome. Yet,

why not? Jovial--and Venereal--people may be better in some things than

our people (which, however, we doubt), but certainly a better language

than the Greek man cannot have invented in either planet. Falling back

from cases so low and so lofty (Venus an inferior, Jupiter a far

superior planet) to our own case, the case of poor mediocre Tellurians,

perhaps the reader thinks that other nations might have served the

purpose of Providentia. Other nations might have furnished those

Providential models which the great drama of earth required. No.

Haughtily and despotically we say it--No. Take France. _There_ is a

noble nation. We honour it exceedingly for that heroic courage which on

a morning of battle does not measure the strength of the opposition;

which, when an enemy issues from the darkness of a wood, does not stop

to count noses, but like that noblest of animals, the British bull-dog,

flies at his throat, careless whether a leopard, a buffalo, or a tiger

of Bengal. This we vehemently admire. This we feel to be an echo, an

iteration, of our own leonine courage, concerning which--take you note

of this, oh, chicken-hearted man! (if any such is amongst _our_

readers)--that God sees it with pleasure, blesses it, and calls it 'very

good!' Next, when we come to think at odd times of that other courage,

the courage of fidelity, which stands for hours under the storm of a

cannonade--British courage, Russian courage--in mere sincerity we cannot

ascribe this to the Gaul. All this is true: we feel that the French is

an imperfect nation. But suppose it _not_ imperfect, would the French

therefore have fulfilled for us the mission of the Greek and the Roman?

Undoubtedly they would not. Far enough are we from admiring either Greek

or Roman in that degree to which the ignorance, but oftener the

hypocrisy, of man has ascended.

We, reader, are misanthropical--intensely so. No luxury known amongst

men--neither the paws of bears nor the tails of sheep--to us is so sweet

and dear as that of hating (yet much oftener of despising) our excellent

fellow-creatures. Oftentimes we exclaim in our dreams, where excuse us

for expressing our multitude by unity, 'Homo sum; humani nihil mihi

tolerandum puto.' We kick backwards at the human race, we spit upon

them; we void our rheum upon their ugly gaberdines. Consequently we do

not love either Greek or Roman; we regard them in some measure as

humbugs. But although it is no cue of ours to admire them (viz., in any

English sense of that word known to Entick's Dictionary), yet in a

Grecian or Roman sense we may say that [Greek: thaumazomen],

_admiramur_, both of these nations: we marvel, we wonder at them

exceedingly. Greece we shall omit, because to talk of the arts, and

Phidias, and Pericles, and '_all that_,' is the surest way yet

discovered by man for tempting a vindictive succession of kicks. Exposed

to the world, no author of such twaddle could long evade assassination.

But Rome is entitled to some separate notice, even after all that has

been written about her. And the more so in this case, because Mr. Finlay

has scarcely done her justice. He says: 'The Romans were a tribe of

warriors. All their institutions, even those relating to property, were

formed with reference to war.' And he then goes on to this invidious

theory of their history--that, as warriors, they overthrew the local

institutions of all Western nations, these nations being found by the

Romans in a state of civilization much inferior to their own. But

eastwards, when conquering Greece, her institutions they did _not_

overthrow. And what follows from that memorable difference? Why, that in

after days, when hives of barbarians issued from central Europe, all the

Western provinces (as not cemented by any native and home-bred

institutions, but fighting under the harness of an exotic organization)

sank before them; whereas Greece, falling back on the natural resources

of a system self-evolved and _local_, or epichorial in its origin, not

only defied these German barbarians for the moment, but actually after

having her throat cut in a manner rose up magnificently (as did the

Lancashire woman after being murdered by the M'Keans of Dumfries)[16],

staggered along for a considerable distance, and then (as the

Lancashire woman did not) mounted upon skates, and skated away into an

azure infinite of distance (quite forgetting her throat), so as to--do

what? It is really frightful to mention: so as to come safe and sound

into the nineteenth century, leaping into the centre of us all like the

ghost of a patriarch, setting her arms a-kimbo, and crying out: 'Here I

come from a thousand years before Homer.' All this is really true and

undeniable. It is past contradiction, what Mr. Finlay says, that Greece,

having weathered the following peoples, to wit, the Romans; secondly,

the vagabonds who persecuted the Romans for five centuries; thirdly, the

Saracens; fourthly and fifthly, the Ottoman Turks and Venetians;

sixthly, the Latin princes of Constantinople--not to speak seventhly and

eighthly of Albanian or Egyptian Ali Pashas, or ninthly, of Joseph Humes

and Greek loans, is now, viz., in March, 1844, alive and kicking. Think

of a man, reader, at a _soirée_ in the heavenly spring of '44 (for

heavenly it _will_ be), wearing white kid gloves, and descended from

Deucalion or Ogyges!

Amongst the great changes wrought in every direction by Constantine, it

is not to be supposed that Mr. Finlay could overlook those which applied

a new organization to the army. Rome would not be Rome; even a product

of Rome would not be legitimate; even an offshoot from Rome would be of

suspicious derivation, which _could_ find that great master-wheel of the

state machinery a secondary force in its system. It is wonderful to mark

the martial destiny of all which inherited, or upon any line descended

from Rome in every age of that mighty evolution. War not barbaric, war

exquisitely systematic, war according to the vigour of all science as

yet published to man, was the talisman by which Rome and the children

of Rome prospered: the S.P.Q.R. on the legionary banners was the sign

set in the rubric of the heavens by which the almighty nation, looking

upwards, read her commission from above: and if ever that sign shall

grow pale, then look for the coming of the end, whispered the prophetic

heart of Rome to herself even from the beginning. But are not all great

kingdoms dependent on their armies? No. Some have always been protected

by their remoteness, many by their adjacencies. Germany, in the first

century from Augustus, retreated into her mighty forests when closely

pressed, and in military phrase 'refused herself' to the pursuer. Persia

sheltered herself under the same tactics for ages;[17] scarcely needed

to fight, unless she pleased, and, when she did so, fought in alliance

with famine--with thirst--and with the confusion of pathless deserts.

Other empires, again, are protected by their infinity; America was found

to have no local existence by ourselves: she was nowhere because she was

everywhere. Russia had the same illimitable ubiquity for Napoleon. And

Spain again is so singularly placed with regard to France, a chamber

within a chamber, that she cannot be approached by any power not

maritime except on French permission. Manifold are the defensive

resources of nations beyond those of military systems. But for the Roman

empire, a ring fence around the Mediterranean lake, and hemmed in upon

every quarter of that vast circuit by an _indago_ of martial hunters,

nature and providence had made it the one sole available policy to stand

for ever under arms, eternally 'in procinctu,' and watching from the

specular altitude of her centre upon which radius she should slip her

wolves to the endless circumference.

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