THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND
WOLFF’S MISSION
FOR the next four months I was busy carrying on the work of my
candidature in Camberwell, over the details of which I shall pass
lightly. The constituency was a new one, having only just been created
by the Redistribution Bill, and it was politically a chaos. My chief
supporters were men of no position, character, or intelligence, the most
active of my committee being a sweating tailor; and I had to create
everything in the way of organization, and educate the voters from the
first A B C of instruction on public matters. This was an advantage and
a disadvantage; on the one hand there was little prejudice to overcome,
and on the other extreme difficulty in getting the voters to take any
interest in the matters they were called upon to decide. I began with
very small meetings to very degraded audiences, sometimes in rooms
obtained for the purpose, but oftener mounted on a wagon in the streets,
where I found that nothing much short of pure socialism would be
listened to. The division was supposed to be strongly Radical, but as
time went on my Tory democracy became popular, at least in the streets;
and, as will be seen, I very nearly succeeded in winning the election.
Had I been properly supported from the Conservative head-quarters I have
no doubt I should have succeeded altogether. But the declarations I felt
bound to make in favour of Irish Home Rule, joined to the fact of my
Roman Catholic status, told against me, and in the end I was defeated,
but by only one hundred and sixty-two votes. I will give only such
extracts from my journal as take my candidature out of the ordinary rut
of commonplace experience. My journal was too hastily written at this
time of stress to have much interest apart from the election.
“_27th July._—There is something exceedingly absurd in this
electioneering business; one hundred frowsy fellows in a stuffy
schoolroom talking nonsense to each other about things they none of them
understand, or care about a straw. It is an experience, however, like
another, and we must go through it if we are to achieve anything of
large importance in the world. Yet it is a terrible come-down after the
politics of the golden East, or even of an Arab tribe.
“_28th July._—I have been in trepidation the last few days, for the
report of the Mahdi’s death seems confirmed. Went to see Lothian, who
has just been staying at Hatfield. He complains that Lord Salisbury is
less free spoken on affairs now than when he was out of office, but he
gathers from what he heard that there is no danger at all of a new
campaign. A reconciliation will be effected with Turkey, but no further
alliance will be entered into for the defence of Persia or Afghanistan.
‘Lord Salisbury,’ Lothian said, ‘still holds to his old illusion of
believing the Russian advance to be geographically impossible. He still
looks at the map and calls it a great way from the Caspian to the
Persian Gulf.’ Talking of past events, he told me that when the news
came of the fall of Khartoum Hartington actually resigned office, and
was out of office three days; he would not resume his position until the
absurd determination of advancing still on Khartoum was agreed to. This
is curious. [I believe it is also true that the pretence made by
Gladstone of fighting Russia over the Penjdeh incident was nothing more
than a manœuvre to persuade Hartington to agree to an evacuation of the
Soudan.]
“_29th July._—Wolff, whom I met at the Carlton Club, talked pretty
freely about his plans in Egypt. ‘I wish I knew,’ he said, ‘how to set
up an independent Government at Dongola.’ I said, ‘You had much better
leave it to the Mahdi.’ They will end by doing this.
“To Crabbet with Nebbi Ullah, who is going back shortly to India to
start a newspaper. He, like all the rest, has become spoilt by his
English life. Jemal-ed-Din and I have done our best to persuade him to
purge himself of it by making the pilgrimage and never to put on
European dress again. But he has not the backbone for this. Indians who
have lived in England are taken by our life and ways, and find it
difficult to return. They generally fall in love with some English woman
and abandon the ways of their people. I spoke strongly to him, but it
will be of no use. ‘If a man,’ said Jemal-ed-Din, ‘wishes to do good to
himself, nothing is easier. But if he wishes to do good to his country
he must deny himself.’ ‘I do not wish to be a martyr,’ said Nebbi Ullah,
‘I wish to keep my English clothes and be able to ride and play lawn-
tennis and get refreshment at refreshment rooms when I travel.’ I said,
‘You may put on your best English clothes and go to church if you like
on Sundays, the English in India will not receive you, and you will lose
all influence with your fellow countrymen.’
“_30th July._—Wolff came to James Street as agreed at half-past ten.
Before he saw Jemal-ed-Din I had a talk with him on the general question
of Egypt, the Soudan, and Turkey. With regard to Egypt he told me they
would have to keep on Tewfik for the present, and that Lord Salisbury
could not be got as yet to consent to Arabi’s recall. In the Soudan they
had no idea of any new expedition, Turkish or English. They had rather
make peace with the Soudanese, but had some idea of setting up an
independent government at Dongola. They were resolved to renew the
alliance with the Sultan. The points Wolff principally discussed with
Jemal-ed-Din were as to a possible acknowledgement by the Mahdi of the
Sultan’s Caliphate. This Jemal-ed-Din declared to be impossible, either
for the Mahdi or his successors, but they might be got to accept each
other, as the Ottoman Sultan and the Sultan of Morocco had done, if
Egypt were evacuated by the English and a legal Mohammedan Government
restored there. There would then be no danger from the Soudanese. The
Mahdist movement was religious and the Ulema of Cairo would not permit
him to invade Egypt. There ensued a long discussion about the
evacuation, Wolff declaring that Bismarck had announced in writing to
the Foreign Office that he should approve the French entering Egypt if
we abandoned it. The French would never allow Turkish troops, and it
must be occupied somehow. So it would be by the French. This the Seyyid
refused to believe, as he knew from Ferry and others in France that
nothing of the sort would happen. In the end, however, it was agreed
between Wolff and the Seyyid that, if England consented to fix a date
for evacuation, an arrangement with the Sultan might be come to. There
followed the Slave Trade question in the Soudan. Jemal-ed-Din said it
was impossible to stop the capture of idolatrous tribes in Central
Africa, but the seizure and sale of Abyssinians might be prevented by
the Mahdi. He could arrange that matter and commercial relations with
England and Egypt. It would not be difficult to get the Sultan to
consent to reasonable arrangements for Egypt, and Jemal-ed-Din would go
if necessary to Constantinople—this was my suggestion—nor would it be
difficult to get the Sultan to propose Arabi’s return. Wolff, however,
said distinctly that nothing definite could be settled till after the
elections. His present mission was to feel the ground and prepare for a
policy. The elections would decide whether it could be carried out.
Their talk lasted an hour and a half.
“Lunched with Meynell and Cox, editors of the ‘Weekly Register’ and
‘Tablet.’ They will go with me to-night to a meeting at Camberwell. Cox
is to see Cardinal Manning and get a message of approval from him.
Meynell told me among other things that Colonel Butler, his brother-in-
law, could give evidence that the bombardment of Alexandria was forced
on by Beauchamp Seymour, that they had tried to bribe the Egyptians to
fire the first shot, or something of the sort. Egmont Hake was there and
promised to give a lecture on Gordon at Camberwell in the interests of
my candidature. Meynell tells me that Lord Salisbury has engaged Hake to
lecture in all the large towns in England preparatory to the elections.
Lord Salisbury is to pay the expenses.
“_4th Aug._—Randolph, whom I met at the Carlton Club, has promised that
Lewisham and Folkestone shall support me at a meeting at Camberwell, as
the working men insist upon having a lord—‘no M.P.s for us’ they say.
Drummond Wolff talked to me again about Jemal-ed-Din going to
Constantinople. ‘He is too stiff in his ideas, however,’ he said, ‘about
the Mahdi not accepting the Sultan’s Caliphate.’ Wolff will send for
Jemal-ed-Din if he wants him, and will communicate with me through
Randolph, with whom, he tells me, he shall have a private cipher—a new
feature, this, in our diplomacy. Gregory, who called to-day, says that
Wolff told him he should explain to Tewfik that he had acted in the
matter of the massacres on wrong information, and that he considered him
a very honest man.
“_5th Aug._—I have read over my Electoral Address to McCarthy as far as
it relates to Ireland, and he highly approves it, suggesting only that I
should put in the words ‘Representatives of the Irish Nation,’ so as to
show that I accepted the Irish Parliamentary Party as being the real
national leaders. This I was quite willing to do. He assured me of the
Irish support at Camberwell; they all meant to vote with the Tories. He
warned me not to pay attention to anything they might say about being
indifferent to both parties. It was the _mot d’ordre_ just now to say
this, but the elections would prove which way their predilections
turned. Drummond Wolff has telegraphed from Portsmouth, asking once more
to see Jemal-ed-Din.
“_6th Aug._—Up to London early with Jemal-ed-Din, and had another long
talk with him and Drummond Wolff. Wolff is quite favourable to a Turco-
Perso-Afghan alliance, but says he shall not be able to talk of this
with the Sultan, except incidentally, as that would be the ambassador’s
business, but shall have to keep to Egypt. He was very anxious to know
how an accord could be made between the Sultan and the Mahdi. Would the
Mahdi acknowledge the Caliphate? Jemal-ed-Din said it would not be
necessary to decide or even raise that point just yet. The thing the
Sultan would really care for was a fixing of a limit of time for the
English occupation. Wolff said that that could be done; and that what
would be proposed would be that the Sultan should co-operate in the
establishment of a permanent order of things preparatory to English
evacuation. On this Jemal-ed-Din said that all could be satisfactorily
arranged, and that it mattered little whether it was Turkish or English
troops which would compose the _ad interim_ garrison. Next there was a
good deal of talk as to whether Jemal-ed-Din should go to Constantinople
while Wolff was there, the principal point being as to whether the
Sultan would understand it rightly. Jemal-ed-Din said that the Sultan
knew him only as an enemy of English policy, and, unless Wolff explained
the position, he would fancy Jemal-ed-Din had come to Constantinople to
counteract Wolff. Wolff, however, said that it would be difficult for
him to protect Jemal-ed-Din, or seem to have anything to do with him.
There was the question, too, of money, but I offered to advance the
Seyyid any money that might be wanted so that no inconvenient questions
should be raised. Wolff explained that he should not tell Lord Salisbury
anything about the Seyyid or his arrangements with me. ‘The reason I am
sent,’ he said, ‘is that I am ready to take responsibilities of this
sort on my shoulders which other men might refuse. I shall have a cipher
with Randolph, and if I want the Seyyid, or have anything else to tell
you, it will be through him.’ He told us, however, again very
distinctly, that he did not expect to be able to settle anything
definitely till after the elections. The French were very adverse to
Turkish troops going to Egypt, and Bismarck would give no firm support
till after the elections.
“We also talked about the recall of Arabi, and Jemal-ed-Din said it
would be quite easy to get the Sultan to propose it, two words from him
would effect that. I repeated this to Wolff, after he had left my house,
at the Carlton Club, but he said: ‘It would never do to raise the
question of Arabi yet; after the elections we may do it, but not now.’
Lord Salisbury requires educating to that as to other things.
“To a meeting at Camberwell with Napier, Meynell, and Lady Colin
Campbell. Randolph sent down Lord Folkestone and Sir Henry Fletcher, as
members of the Government, to support me with a message to the effect
that my presence in Parliament was necessary to the party and they must
get me elected.
“_7th Aug._—Mr. Cotton,[127] of the Indian Civil Service, came to
breakfast. He is a very enlightened man, and one with whom one can talk
openly. Speaking of the late Durbar, he said that the Amir Abd-el-
Rahman’s unwillingness to allow English troops into Afghanistan came
like a clap of thunder on Lord Dufferin, who, with the rest of the
officials, was under the idea that the Afghans loved us and sought our
help.
“Randolph made his statement on the Indian Budget last night in a very
masterly speech; but he attacked Lord Ripon in it, as I thought, most
foolishly. I met him at the Carlton Club, and told him I was sorry he
had done it. And he said it was quite necessary on party grounds in view
of the election. But he felt sure native opinion in India would be
satisfied with his promise of inquiry into the Indian Government.
Drummond Wolff was also at the Club, and we talked again about Jemal-ed-
Din’s visit to Constantinople. His last words were that he would write
or telegraph to Randolph, who would communicate his ideas to me.
“Lunched with Button and Sidney Herbert. Button’s candidature is going
badly at Clapham, and his brother’s at Southwark has, after all, broken
down completely. Now he says the people all say I shall get in for
Camberwell.
“_9th Aug._—To Windsor with the Wagrams, and called on the Ponsonbys,
who showed us over the Castle, including the Queen’s private rooms. The
long gallery in which she walks is full of interesting pictures. The
series of daubs by Winterhalter of royal marriages and christenings are
daubs certainly, but already interesting through time. I don’t think we
were intended to go into the Queen’s bedroom, but I looked in and was
very nearly locked in by the housekeeper for my curiosity. She had
already turned the key, and thoughts of the Tower and a trial for high
treason crossed my mind, but fortunately I was remembered and released.
“_13th Aug._—Crabbet. To Newbuildings to spend the day, which, like all
the rest of this summer, was heavenly. Coming home I found an important
communication from Churchill enclosing a deciphered telegram from Wolff,
saying that he wants the Seyyid to join him at Constantinople. The
Seyyid has been in great force here for the last ten days, and has given
us most valuable information about the past history of his own and other
countries. ‘Nadir Shah,’ he says, ‘was the son of a tradesman in Kelaat.
He rose against the Afghan rule, and, having driven the Afghans out of
Persia, conquered Afghanistan and Upper India. It was he who gave Arab
horses to the Turcomans, the breed they now possess.’ [We had staying
with us my cousin, Arthur Chandler, an Oxford divine, who has since
become a colonial bishop, and I arranged that they should have a dispute
together on the fundamental grounds of religion. This was carried on in
very indifferent French but with much spirit by the Seyyid, who
certainly got the best of the argument.]
“_14th Aug._—To London with the Seyyid. I went at once to the India
Office, where I found Randolph very dull and tired with the end of the
Session, which is to-day. He will be off, however, to Scotland to-
morrow. I told him the Seyyid would start at once, but that he insisted
Wolff should give the Sultan a hint directly or indirectly that he had
ceased to be an enemy of England; also that he hoped Wolff would not
open negotiations till he arrived, or attempt to treat the Egyptian
question separately from that of the Mohammedan alliance. Randolph with
his usual quickness seized the points at once, and wrote a telegram to
Wolff something as follows: ‘Jemal-ed-Din starts for Constantinople on
Sunday. He says, however, he is known to the Sultan only as the enemy of
England, and it would be necessary to give the Sultan a hint that he is
now our friend. He hopes also that you will not enter on the Egyptian
question with the Sultan separately from the larger question of a
Mohammedan alliance. With regard to this last he believes he can be of
great service to you.’
“I also saw Ibrahim and wish I had seen him before, for he is a great
support to me with the Seyyid, and is bolder than he is. I am for their
starting together at once, and not waiting for an answer from Wolff. One
never knows what changes of mind may take place, and the ball is at our
foot now and we must play with courage. My fear is lest Wolff should be
scared by the telegram which the Seyyid insisted on. If I had had my
way, he should have started without conditions; Wolff could not refuse
him protection when he arrived. But we shall see.
“Down again to Crabbet for the night, and for a meeting of the Primrose
League at the Worth School. Young Montefiore was put in the chair, to
practise him for a Parliamentary candidature in London. He had learnt
his little opening speech by heart and recited it nicely. My own speech
dealt principally with the possibility of peasant proprietorship. It
gave satisfaction to the Radicals at the end of the room.
“_15th Aug._—There is a telegram from Pesth, saying that Wolff has
delayed his departure till Tuesday. This will give Jemal-ed-Din time to
join him there, and they will go on by the same train. Ibrahim is to go
as far as Varna and there wait further orders. To London for this
purpose. Parliament was adjourned yesterday and London is empty. To my
horror I found a letter in James Street from Moore, Randolph’s
secretary, enclosing a telegram from Wolff—just what I expected—to say
he had changed his mind about Jemal-ed-Din; he had better not start till
he telegraphed again from Constantinople. I went first to Moore at the
India Office and talked the matter over, and he agreed with me that it
seemed a pity the Seyyid should not start, and that we might telegraph
that it was too late to stop him. But he would not do anything without
Randolph’s order. So I went on to Connaught Place and saw Randolph. He
has been ill with a slight congestion of the lungs, but says that he is
better to-day, and we discussed the point fully. But I could not
persuade him to let me send the Seyyid, so the whole thing is off. The
tiresome part of it is that it is just at starting that Jemal-ed-Din
would have been of most use. But there is no help. The Seyyid’s ticket
and Ibrahim’s were already taken, and I had given them £100 for their
journey, all for nothing. [I have always been of opinion that Wolff’s
change of mind on this occasion cost him the success of his mission, and
that its ultimate failure was due to his having commenced it on the
common lines of English diplomacy without that moral support which
Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din could have given him both at Constantinople and
elsewhere with the secret societies.]
“_17th Aug._—My birthday of forty-five, which I spent pleasantly enough
with the children and Anne. Mrs. Sellwood[128] and Cowie had tea with
me. Mrs. Sellwood told me the history of my father’s death, how she had
disliked the hounds coming to Crabbet, and how they had howled, and how
he had caught cold cub hunting and died. Thus the day passed.
“When I look at my life, I see that it is still progressing, and while
there is progress there is happiness. I look forward to Parliament as
the beginning of a new phase. I shall be Cabinet Minister in five years’
time; head of my party, perhaps, in ten. But shall I get in? I think it
is in my fate. [I feel some shame in transcribing these vain-glorious
words, but they had more justification at the moment they were written
than they can possibly seem to have now. At that date Randolph Churchill
was certainly the coming man in English public life, and my position
with him was one which, if I had succeeded in obtaining a seat in the
House of Commons, would have made me one of his most trusted
lieutenants. I may say more: I exercised over him a very considerable
influence, precisely in the direction in which he needed most support. I
think I could have prevented him from making some of the larger mistakes
he made, and which eventually caused his ruin. I have sometimes thought
that I could even have maintained him faithful to Irish Home Rule, and
that together we might have persuaded Lord Salisbury to adopt it as the
Tory policy. It would have saved the Tories their present disaster at
the hands of the Irish party. My defeat left Churchill without any
adviser in the ways of political virtue.]
“_18th Aug._—The Prince of Wales has sent me a message through Lady C.
congratulating me on my standing for Parliament.
“_19th Aug._—Down to Brocket, where Auberon Herbert, his wife and
children are staying with Henry Cowper. Etty Fane is here, grown to be a
very pretty and clever girl after one London season. Of all people I
like Henry Cowper best as companion. He represents the Whig tradition in
its most attractive form, that of the cultured politician of a hundred
years ago, partly humane, partly sceptical, full of dignity and
profoundly immoral. He told me innumerable stories connected with
Brocket. It was outside the park at Brocket, on the high road, that Lady
Caroline Lamb and her husband were riding when they met Lord Byron’s
funeral, and she fell straightway off her horse. There is a portrait of
Lady Melbourne here, as a young woman, which is charming.
“_20th Aug._—After luncheon we went to Hatfield, Herbert and I on foot,
Henry and his niece, Miss Fane, in a pony chaise. On the way we
discussed social questions, on which Herbert has very distinct and
original ideas. He is against all State intervention, either against
drink or prostitution, believing in free trade in both as the best cure;
he is against State education, rates, or any kind of taxes, which should
all be voluntary. He trusts to a kind of natural selection to bring
about improvements with as little interference as may be by Government.
“Hatfield is quite the most perfect thing I have seen, there being none
of those great waste places common in most parks. We drove home all
together in the pony carriage. I am glad to have been here at Brocket,
as it has cleared my ideas on certain points very misty to me; not that
I altogether agree with Herbert, for anarchism is certainly outside the
range of practical politics, but his views are large and elevated and do
one good.
“_22nd Aug._—To London for Stead’s social demonstration. The procession
was entirely of the rag-tag and bobtail, with banners of the most
curious devices: one represented the Minotaur, a princely personage in a
blue uniform, and his victim; another a van full of middle-aged females,
labelled ‘Protection for Girls.’ Also there were political badges; one
banner stated that its bearer had refused taxes because he had no vote;
and there were socialistic and temperance vans, with ‘John Bright’ and
‘Sir Wilfrid Lawson Associations.’ In the Park I went the round of the
platforms, each with male and female speakers, and was fortunate enough
to hear Stead speak. This he did well, with a good deal of dramatic
action, but a certain self consciousness which occasionally marred the
effect. Besides the regular platform speakers, there were volunteer
orators, who held forth to groups on the ground. One I listened to
attacked Randolph fiercely through his brother Blandford, with whose
history the speaker professed to be well acquainted. The best speech I
heard, however, was from a democratic socialist; he hit the
demonstration hard when he expostulated against all parties in the
state, and especially against the Radical capitalists. Samuel Morley, he
said, had subscribed £2,000 for the protection of girls, but when had he
ever given £5 to a girl of the 5,000 in his own factories to save her
from perdition? It was the capitalists who were the cause of all crime
and misery, and who ground the faces of the poor. What we wanted was not
social reform, but social revolution. And he took his hat and showed on
its brim how a revolution should be made. When the poor, he said, have
got the rich under them they will know how to keep them there. I could
not help cheering.
“_27th Aug._—A note from Moore asking me to come and see him. Randolph
had told him to read me an extract from a letter of Wolff’s. It was to
the effect that he was in such a delicate position in regard to his
mission that he dared not appear to know Jemal-ed-Din. Jemal-ed-Din, he
said, was opposed to the Sultan’s Caliphate in the Soudan, and if he
acknowledged him as a friend, the Sultan might think that he had some
design on his spiritual pretensions. For this reason he dared not
mention his name. This is all nonsense. The question of the Sultan’s
Caliphate need never be raised, and Jemal-ed-Din is not known as its
opponent. On the contrary his newspaper was always loud on the Sultan’s
rights. The Seyyid, however, declined to go to Constantinople without
some acknowledgement from Wolff, because he says it would ruin his
influence everywhere if the Sultan were to shut the door in his face.
But I am to see Randolph to-morrow.
“_28th Aug._—At half-past one I called on Randolph at the India Office;
he is looking fagged and ill, and is still obliged to stay in town, but
talks of going to Scotland next week. I feel convinced he will not live
two years, or will be obliged to give up public life. We talked over the
Jemal-ed-Din affair, but as Jemal-ed-Din refuses to go to Constantinople
without Wolff’s support, and as Wolff refuses to commit himself with
Jemal-ed-Din, we agreed the matter must remain so. Then we talked about
Olivier Pain, and I told Randolph the whole story, and how Hartington
had denied the proclamation issued by Wolseley offering £50 for him,
dead or alive. This delighted him, and he offered to send my letter
about it to Lord Salisbury at Dieppe, and I gave it to him. Lastly, I
told him I had heard things were going badly at Hyderabad, and asked him
to write to the Nizam and warn him. But he said that to do so would be
against all rules, and that he could only communicate through the
Government of India. He told me, however, but as an absolute secret,
that he had already written to Lord Dufferin to suggest that Cordery
should be removed from Hyderabad. I then asked him to get Moore sent
there, Colonel Moore, who is now with the Duke of Connaught, and he
seemed to like the idea. Poor Randolph! I fear that the attainment of
his ambition, like the wasps with the honey-pot, will be his death.
“Lady Gregory sends me a sonnet on the Mahdi’s death, which is very
good.
“_3rd Sept._—Last night I made my declaration about Ireland. It is the
first public declaration made, since Parnell’s speech, in favour of Home
Rule.
“_4th Sept._—Ibrahim Bey has received a letter from Ismaïl Jowdat once
more pressing him to come and see the Sultan. It has been decided he
shall go. The Sultan has heard of Jemal-ed-Din having seen one of the
Ministers, and has sent for Ibrahim to find out what it is all about. He
wants Jemal-ed-Din too, but the Seyyid says he will wait till the Sultan
sends for him. For Ibrahim there will be no danger, and I will put him
in communication with Wolff and let Randolph know.
“_6th Sept._—Ibrahim left last night for Constantinople. Jemal-ed-Din
will stay on in London.
“_12th Sept._—Lord Salisbury has answered my letter as to my being
allowed to return to Egypt with great politeness. He says he thinks it
can be arranged. George Wyndham has come back from the wars, I am glad
to say, with a sound skin.
“_15th Sept._—Went to the ‘Pall Mall’ office and saw Milner,[129] the
acting editor in Stead’s place, about a letter I had written for them
but wished to withdraw, and explained to him how the case stood. He
agreed with me that it might be well to defer the publication, and
admitted that I was fully justified in withdrawing the letter under the
circumstances in which Stead was placed. He tells me that from the first
he did not approve of Stead’s “revelations.” He was very amiable about
it all. I like Milner.
“_16th Sept._—Mr. Tebbutt from St. Ives is here, at Crabbet, and I took
him to Newbuildings, to talk over the question of establishing small
holders there on small rents. But, though a strong Liberal, he does not
advise it; thinks it will not answer.
“_19th Sept._—Gladstone has published a manifesto, and I have been
writing to him protesting against his repetition of the plea of _honour_
in excuse of the bombardment of Alexandria. George Wyndham is just back
from Cyprus and the Soudan. He spoke with great admiration of the Arabs.
“_20th Sept._—There has been a revolution in Roumelia. This is Russian
doing in answer to Wolff’s mission, or rather in anticipation of the
elections here. Jemal-ed-Din always said they would make a move two
months before the elections, and here it is. My feeling is that it is
useless attempting to retain any part of Europe for the Turks except
just the city of Constantinople. I am certain Lord Salisbury will do
nothing to protect them anywhere out of Asia Minor.
“_21st Sept._—I have written to Mr. Gladstone proposing to meet him on a
platform and discuss the question of Egypt with him as a ‘question of
honour.’
“_22nd Sept._—William Morris was arrested two days ago at a socialist
trial for hissing the magistrate, and I have written to congratulate
him.
“_23rd Sept._—A letter has arrived from Ibrahim giving an account of
himself. He is staying with Jowdat, has been to the Palace, and is to
see the Sultan after Beiram. They are only angry with him for not coming
before. The Sultan is sending a man to Jemal-ed-Din for consultation.
“_24th Sept._—Talked the whole question of Roumelia over with Jemal-ed-
Din, and we are agreed that it is not Russia but Austria that has
encouraged the movement at this moment. I told the Seyyid it was useless
trying to save European Turkey for the Sultan; Lord Salisbury would not
dare guarantee it. He does not like this, but seems to think me right
all the same. There is a memorandum of Gordon’s of 1880 recommending the
partition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt to England, Syria to France,
Armenia to Russia, and European Turkey to independent Christian States.
Jemal-ed-Din thinks Wolff must have had a hand in the Roumelian
movement. I don’t.
“I have been asked to deliver the inaugural address at the Tyneside
lectures at Newcastle on 1st October. I have chosen for my subject
‘Egyptian Aggression, an answer to the Plea of Honour.’
“_25th Sept._—Chamberlain has been down in South London speaking. Of his
three proposals, taxing the rich, free schools, and dividing the land I
do not greatly quarrel with any.
“_28th Sept._—Munif Pasha is in London and has seen the Seyyid. He wants
to see Churchill. I have written about it.
“_30th Sept._—A great Tory demonstration at Crabbet held in a large tent
in the Park. Sir Walter Bartelot, Gregory, M.P., and Grantham spoke. I
was chairman. Bartelot is a really good speaker.
“Mr. Gladstone has answered my letter. He declines meeting me in
Midlothian and blames me for my action in Egypt.
“_3rd Oct._—The Hugh Wyndhams, the two Hardinges, and the Wentworths are
here (at Crabbet). I had a good deal of talk with Hardinge about
Egyptian diplomacy. He was with Dufferin in Egypt after the war.
“_6th Oct._—Ferid Bey has written to ask to see me, and he came to
luncheon to-day. Jemal-ed-Din was there, and, as long as he was present,
Ferid dealt only with generalities; but, luncheon over, we went upstairs
and, after much beating about the bush, he disclosed to me his real
object. The state of things, he told me, at Constantinople was hopeless,
and the discontent so general that important events might be looked for.
The empire was crumbling to pieces, and not only the empire but the
Turkish nation too would perish if nothing was done to save it. There
were therefore people who thought, and he himself was one, that the only
safety lay in an attempt to restore the constitutional scheme of Midhat,
and to take the absolute power out of the Sultan’s hands. The present
Sultan was incapable of action, and yet he had absorbed all power to
himself, and the government was carried on by a gigantic system of
espionage, which alone hindered a revolt. A revolt, however, might now
be expected, and the power might be put into the hands of some capable
general acting for the nation, while the Sultan might be deposed in
favour of some other person, a member of his family or another—he would
not commit himself to say exactly whom. What made men hesitate was only
this: that they feared a disturbance of any sort at Constantinople would
be taken as a pretext by Russia for military intervention. Bismarck, he
told me, would oppose all idea of constitutional government, but he
thought Lord Salisbury might not be opposed to it. He wanted me to find
out whether the English Government would allow Russian intervention, and
whether a change of Sultan would be acceptable to them. Abdul Hamid
might throw himself into Russian hands and ask protection against his
people. Would the English Government countenance a revolution? He asked
whether I thought it any good his consulting any one out of office, Sir
Henry Elliot for instance. I told him I thought Sir Henry Elliot would
be very little good with Lord Salisbury, but that if he liked I would
speak to Churchill about it. Wolff’s mission was at a standstill because
it was impossible to deal with the present Sultan, and perhaps they
might be willing to find a government with which they could deal. He
begged me to do this, only urging caution as the idea might be
frustrated if the English Government took it badly; also as regards
himself that I should not divulge his part in the affair. ‘The state of
espionage is such,’ he said, ‘at Constantinople that the son is spy on
the father, the brother on the brother, and though I know every man of
note there, there are not two I would trust as I do in talking with
you.’ I told him he need fear nothing on either head, that I would tell
Churchill the position only if I found they were at a standstill in
their negotiations, and that I would be silent as to himself. I asked
him whether Musurus, the ambassador, knew of this. ‘How should he?’ he
said. ‘Musurus is a traitor.’ He also forbade me to speak of it to
Jemal-ed-Din, who was imprudent and also a poor man, who might some day
be tempted by necessity. I have arranged with Moore to see Randolph to-
morrow.
“_7th Oct._—At twelve saw Randolph at the India Office, and finding
things as I supposed at a standstill with Wolff, told him what I had
heard. I, of course, did not say who had told me, only that it was a
person of high position, in no way connected with Jemal-ed-Din or any
other of my friends. He answered most decidedly that there was not the
remotest danger of Russia being allowed to intervene, and seemed quite
disposed to look favourably on the idea of a change of _régime_ at
Constantinople as favourable to the prospects of an arrangement. He
promised me absolute secrecy about it, and told me something of Wolff’s
progress. Wolff had come to the conclusion that it was very necessary to
take the Arab party at Constantinople into account, and was surprised
that Ibrahim had not been to see him yet. I said he had probably been
forbidden by the Sultan; and to-day a letter came from Ibrahim saying he
had sent in a full report of his doings in England to the Sultan, and
about myself among the rest. But the Sultan had forgotten all about
Wolff and England and everything but Roumelia. Randolph also promised to
send Gorst down to support me at Camberwell, and asked me to speak with
him at a meeting on Indian social reform at the Mansion House. Yesterday
a letter had come from Lord Salisbury telling me that the Egyptian
Government decidedly refused to allow my return to Cairo, and Randolph
encouraged me to insist. I had undertaken not to meddle with political
questions or projects during my stay. Randolph is looking better, and is
very hearty and pleasant. He is the most agreeable and least pedantic of
official men; office has not spoilt him, nor will it.
“Tea at Lady Gregory’s, where I met Kinglake.
“_8th Oct._—A long talk with Jemal-ed-Din about prospects at
Constantinople and about the Caliphate. He is for the Mahdi or the
Mahdi’s successor taking the Sultan’s place, or the Sherif Own, or the
Imam of Sanaa—any of these he thought might now take the lead. But
Constantinople must remain the seat of the Caliphate, as Arabia or
Africa would be mere places of exile. Amongst other things, he told me
that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn to
claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without
armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of
religion. Now, Jemal-ed-Din is very anxious to be away again to the
East. He will not go, he says, to Constantinople unless the Sultan sends
for him, and we have agreed that if I do not win my election at
Camberwell we will go together to the Imam of Sanaa in Yemen and raise
the standard of the Caliphate, as I intended to do four years ago. I
asked him whether he thought the Sultan had had El Huseyn assassinated;
and he said, ‘No, but perhaps some pasha had it done.’
“Ferid Bey came at twelve, and I told him of the answer I had received
from Churchill, and that I felt very sure our Government would not be
much displeased with a change of _régime_ at Constantinople. At the same
time I told him I thought it would be useless to kick against the union
of Roumelia and Bulgaria. This had been part of his plan. He was of a
different opinion, and said if they could only get free of the present
hindrance in the Sultan’s apathy they were quite ready to carry the war
to the Danube, Turkey’s true frontier. I asked him if they were ready to
fight Russia alone, and he said ‘Yes.’ I told him, ‘If so, go on, I have
nothing to say; but you must not count on assistance from Lord
Salisbury, or any other English Minister; public opinion in England
would not allow it.’ He told me that, without actually deposing Abdul
Hamid, they might put pressure on him to force him to constitutional
courses and a defence of the Empire. I think, nevertheless, he will
discourage his friends from their plan.[130]
“_9th Oct._—Lord Salisbury has pronounced himself in an admirable speech
in Wales. It will do the Party good, for it is straightforward and
strong.
“_11th Oct._—I came to Newcastle last night, and made my promised speech
at the theatre to about three thousand people, explaining to them the
intrigues which had brought on the Egyptian War. It is the most
important speech I have ever made, and it lasted two hours. Though most
of the audience were devoted admirers of Gladstone, I succeeded in
carrying them with me, and it was altogether a great success. What a
difference between these north country men and the miserable Camberwell
rabble! I am ashamed of my late electioneering; it is a degrading
business.
“_12th Oct._—Back to London. Drummond Wolff’s mission is announced as
having succeeded; the Sultan is to send a commissioner with Wolff to
Egypt. I expect Ibrahim Bey has been instrumental in bringing this
about. I hear no more of the threatened revolt at Constantinople. Lord
Salisbury writes to tell me he has forced the Egyptian Government to
receive me in Egypt.
“The old Cashmiri, Abd-el-Rasul, called and showed me a letter from
Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar and a correspondence he had had with Lord
Granville, and I promised to ask Churchill to intercede. Also two Indian
delegates with a letter from Ragunath Rao.
“Down to dine and sleep at Milford (my cousin Robert Webb’s house in
Surrey), and found them all in a barn hearing young Brodrick[131]
orating on Church and State. One cannot escape meetings anywhere now. It
was an absurd business: Bob in the chair, young Brodrick deadly dull;
the crowd cutting their country jokes, and from time to time outside the
bellow of a cow, which set all the meeting off in roars.
“_13th Oct._—Back to London. Saw Randolph at the India Office at three,
and told him of the success of the Newcastle meeting. He approves of my
going on to another at Edinburgh if it can be arranged. Also he agrees
to see Rama Swami and the other Indian delegates, who called on me a day
or two ago to ask my assistance at the India Office. He has asked me to
bring them to him on Thursday. Moore’s face was a picture when he told
him of this decision, but in his light-hearted way Randolph would hear
of no objection, and so it is settled. Then I laid before him a letter I
had received from Calcutta, about a native woman ravished on a
steamer—the Webb case—and he sent Moore to look it up. Lastly, I asked
him to intercede for the release of Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar. This,
too, he promised to see to, and said he thought it could easily be
managed. There had already been talk of releasing Zebehr, because the
Colonial Office and the War Office could not agree which was to pay the
expense of keeping him. But Egerton had objected at Cairo—this he told
me confidentially. Randolph is looking decidedly better than he did, and
nothing could be nicer than our relations at present. He volunteered the
information that the Austrian and Russian Governments were both backing
up the Sultan to claim his rights in Roumelia.
“A letter came to-day from Lord Salisbury, saying that I should go to
the Foreign Office and arrange with Pauncefote[132] the details of my
affairs in Egypt; and I did so. Pauncefote was exceedingly polite to me,
and I spoke pretty frankly to him about Baring and Granville in relation
to my exclusion from Egypt. It is a great triumph to have forced this
matter on the Foreign Office, and to be at last invited back to the
official sanctum after all our quarrels. I met Frank Villiers[133] later
at the club, and laughed about it with him. Rivers Wilson made a third
with us, and we had a grand discussion about the advantage of truth-
telling in politics. They would neither of them hear of it; but I said:
‘Look at me, if I had not made it a rule to speak the exact truth and
have no secrets where should I be to-day? I have been engaged for the
last four years in every kind of intrigue and yet my name stands clear.’
They laughed at this. Rivers is still bitter about Arabi, but we drove
home together, good friends as of old.
“_15th Oct._—After luncheon at the Morrises, I took the three delegates
to the India Office, giving them a good sermon first about the folly it
would be for them to hoist a Radical flag here in England. Anyhow, I
think Randolph has converted them, for he was quite charming to them,
putting them at their ease at once. There was nobody present but
ourselves, and the face of the office messenger when he showed us in was
even more comic than Moore’s had been two days ago. The expression on it
was exactly that of the old steward’s in the ‘Mariage à la Mode.’ Mon
Mohun Ghose did most of the talking; he asked Randolph about the
Parliamentary inquiry into the Government of India and what subjects it
would include. Randolph said it would depend on them to make it a useful
one; they must send over their very best men to give evidence, and take
care they were absolutely accurate about their facts, as there were
plenty of old-fashioned people who did not want existing things
disturbed, and who would pick holes where they could. He said Siva
Prasad had informed him that a royal order to come to England would
override caste difficulties, and that the Benares divines would decide
it in this sense. But Chandar Varkar objected to this, that Benares
could not lay down the law for the whole of India; still he hoped it
might have some effect. Mon Mohun Ghose wanted to know whether the
inquiry would include the judicial system, as that was what was giving
rise just now to most ill feeling. And Randolph said that if it depended
on him it should. His colleagues had been most amiable about this
inquiry, and if the Conservatives were in office the inquiry would be a
full and impartial one. He was against members of the Government sitting
on it, but those should be chosen who had most title to consider Indian
affairs, independent men of all parties. He should support the inquiry,
whether he was in office or not. The inquiry would also include the
revenue question, and Rama Swami explained to him the enhancement of the
land revenue grievance. He begged them to address him again on any
special points they required to make known connected with their
respective Presidencies, and at the end of three quarters of an hour
they went away highly delighted. He told me, at leaving, that I might
publish the result, and I have sent a few lines to the Press
Association, epitomizing the interview. The delegates will also
telegraph to India. This is a great move, and will do excellent work in
every way.
“_18th Oct._—An ultimatum has been sent by Lord Dufferin to King Thebaw
of Burmah. There is a long _communiqué_ in the ‘Observer’ showing how
rich Burmah is, and the wickedness of Thebaw; this has decided me to
write to Churchill and ask explanations. He is unfortunately out of
town. [This ultimatum led to the iniquitous annexation of Upper Burmah.]
“Delivered an address in the evening at Islington Hall, Frederic
Harrison in the chair, on ‘Reform in Foreign Policy.’ [This was an
appeal against secrecy and other evils in Foreign Affairs.]
“_20th Oct._—Randolph telegraphs he has been to my house, and is sorry
to miss me. He is just leaving for Lynn, but refers me to Moore. I
travelled up from Crabbet with Frederick Locker, who says it will be
unfair if I succeed in Parliament, seeing that I lived idly and amused
myself for forty years, and that I have succeeded too as a poet.
“A meeting at the Mansion House for Lady Dufferin’s Indian Female
Doctors’ Fund, for which Randolph had invited me to speak. I was put up
to second Sir Richard Temple; the Anglo-Indians will be very angry at
this. There has been a great row about the Indian delegates, who have
been sat upon by their Radical friends here for having promised to
support me at a meeting in Camberwell, and they are frightened out of
their wits. The Radicals say they won’t allow them to have anything to
do with a Conservative candidate.
“_21st Oct._—Saw Moore at the India Office, who spoke frankly enough
about Burmah. He said that the India Office had been opposed to
intervention for a long while, that Bernard, the Resident, especially
had opposed it, but now saw its necessity, that great commercial
pressure had been put on the Calcutta Government to take action, and
that perhaps Lord Dufferin was not sorry for so good an excuse at last
to settle the matter. ‘An important point,’ Moore said (and he thought
it would convince me), ‘was that _it would pay_.’ I told him this was
precisely the point which disturbed me. I asked him with whom the
responsibility rested. And he said, entirely with Lord Dufferin; he has
had _carte blanche_ given him in the matter. I said I hoped they would
not imitate the late Government by starting military operations without
declaration of war, and suggested they might wait till Parliament met.
He told me no papers had been published during the last two years. At
leaving he said: ‘I think you may make your mind comfortable as to there
being as much justice and reason in the case as there ever is in cases
of the kind.’ I shall attend the Peace and Arbitration Committee to-
morrow.
“In the evening we had a grand meeting of the Indian Delegates at Oakley
Hall. We got Jemal-ed-Din to deliver a discourse in Arabic, which no
soul in the room understood, but which was much applauded. Another
followed in Persian from Mirza Bakir; and Rama Swami and Chandar Varkar
spoke also. [It shows the absurdity of London audiences that this was by
far the most successful meeting we had during the canvass.]
“_24th Oct._—Dinner with Hancock and a nest of Radicals at the Reform
Club. I found them all less liberal than I am, especially about Ireland.
“_25th Oct._—To Hammersmith, where I found Morris laid up with the gout.
He thought things were going wonderfully well for his ideas, and only
hoped the Whigs would not get in with any large majority. He was
inclined to vote for the Tories, but all voting was against socialistic
principles.
“_28th Oct._—Wrote a letter to the ‘Times,’ in protest against the
Burmese War, but shall keep it a day or two to see how Lord Salisbury
answers my appeal to him for the recall of Arabi.
“_1st Nov._—Called on Lady C. yesterday, who said the Prince of Wales
had told her they were discussing the question of recalling Arabi at the
Foreign Office.
“Also saw Cardinal Manning. He was sitting very feeble in his arm-chair,
before the fire, with a book screen behind him. It would make a fine
picture. Truly, the only old age worth having is the old age of
religion. He talked to me about Urquhart, who, he said, had made great
efforts to enlist him among his disciples—‘a man of great personal charm
and genius, but mentally not quite sound’; also about Gladstone, ‘who
has gone altogether off the track.’ I told him I had hopes about Arabi’s
return under Lord Salisbury but none whatever under Gladstone, he was
too obstinate. ‘He was always like that,’ the Cardinal said, ‘the most
obstinate man in the world; he never would admit he had ever made a
mistake. To understand Gladstone you must remember he is a Scotchman on
his father’s and mother’s side, only by accident an Englishman, born at
Liverpool.’
“_2nd Nov._—Randolph writes that Lord Salisbury will certainly not give
me an encouraging reply about Arabi: ‘Even if he was disposed, as I
should be, to favour your views, he would not dare take such a step on
the eve of the election.’ This is bad.
“Jemal-ed-Din, who had been mysteriously absent for two or three days
from James Street, turned up again this morning. He had left the house
in consequence of a noisy disturbance that occurred in his room on
Thursday between two of his Oriental friends, Wahbi Bey and Abd-el-
Rasul; they seem to have quarrelled over politics or religion and ended
by beating each other over the heads with umbrellas. I had to beg them
both to leave the house, and the Seyyid followed them. One must draw the
line somewhere, and I have now suggested to the Seyyid that he should
take up his quarters elsewhere; he has been three months with me in the
house, the full term of Arab hospitality. [N.B.—This was the last I saw
of the good Seyyid that year; he took huff at my treatment of his
friends, and still more at the disappointment he had had in connection
with Drummond Wolff’s mission, and he left England a few days later in
anger against everything English and, shaking its dust from his feet,
went away to Moscow, where he joined himself with Katkoff, the well-
known Panslavist leader in a campaign against the British Empire. From
Russia he moved on to Persia and Afghanistan with the same object, and,
after much preaching and much persecution from the governments of all
these countries, drifted back at last to Constantinople, where I found
him many years later established in the precincts of the Yildiz Palace,
half pensioner, half prisoner of the Sultan. He died of cancer there,
some think of poison, in 1902, nursed, as I have heard, for sole
attendant, by a Christian servant. Jemal-ed-Din was a man of genius
whose teaching exercised an influence hardly to be overrated on the
Mohammedan reform movement of the last thirty years. I feel highly
honoured at his having lived three months under my roof in England; but
he was a wild man, wholly Asiatic and not easily tamed to European ways.
An account of my subsequent visit to him at Constantinople will be given
in its place.]
“_4th Nov._—There is a telegram from Cairo to-day which threatens a new
expedition against Dongola. I don’t like a speech Randolph has made on
the subject; he also talks nonsense about fighting for new markets in
connection with the Burmese quarrel. I don’t know what to do; one party
is as bad as the other. Lord Salisbury spoke last night at the Victoria
Hall (where I was present on the platform as one of his chief
supporters), and among other crudities he proposed this remedy of new
markets as a relief for the depression of trade. What nonsense it is
when men talk of ‘creating’ wealth by trade. English trade with Oriental
nations means only the transference of Oriental money into English
pockets; trade creates nothing, and one might parody the French axiom
and say, _Le commerce c’est le vol_. Lord Salisbury’s speech was a poor
affair; he does not come out well on occasions like these, having no
sympathy whatever with the people and being unable to pretend it. He was
evidently aware of his false position, and blundered on from one mistake
to another; even in form he was bad, and it was only towards the end of
his speech that he attained to anything approaching eloquence. Most of
it was a House of Lords reply to his fellow lords, Granville and
Hartington, about whom the South Londoners care less than for the man in
the moon. A few good hits he made, and his audience were quite prepared
to applaud anything, but it fell flat enough considering how great an
occasion it was. The rest of the proceedings were poor, but mercifully
curtailed, as his lordship was anxious to get home to Hatfield.
“_5th Nov._—Guy Fawkes’ Day, the guy this year being King Thebaw, a sad-
looking black monarch in a turban. This Burmese War is of a piece with
all these wars: hungry commercial speculators making contracts with a
dishonest prince, European intrigues, British remonstrances, official
interference, tales to the prince’s discredit, his subjects praying for
British intervention, threats from Calcutta, appeal of the prince to his
people, who strangely take his side in the quarrel, ultimatum issued,
arrival of fleet, massacre of Europeans, bombardment, slaughter of
natives, triumph of British arms, annexation of territory, pay, prize
money, pensions, peerages all round, and so _da capo_.
“_6th Nov._—Sent my letter about Burmah to the ‘Times,’ after calling at
the India Office to see if Randolph had any further explanation to make,
but he is out of town. He has stupidly, as I think, identified himself
with Lord Dufferin’s policy of war. But I cannot keep silent on an
occasion of this kind.
“_11th Nov._—We have decided to have a large meeting at Camberwell in
favour of Arabi’s recall to Egypt, and I went to see Randolph to ask him
about it and other things. He made a first-rate speech the other day at
Manchester, but looks fagged and several years older than when he took
office. I talked to him first about the Soudan, and asked him if
anything had been done in the way of negotiations. And he said that
Mukhtar, the Ottoman commissioner, and Wolff were going to do what they
could to pacificate; that already something had been begun; that Wolff
quite understood the necessity of dealing through Arab channels; that he
had discovered that if the Sultan was influenced by anybody it was by
the Arab Sheykhs, and, finally, that Mukhtar was the man Wolff himself
had wished for, and that all would be done that could be done. All the
same, there was imminent prospect of more fighting. I told him of the
papers I had sent in to Lord Salisbury, and of the meeting we are
getting up for the recall of Arabi. And he highly approved. He said: ‘I
am doing all I can with Lord Salisbury to get him to recall Arabi. But
his prejudices are strong and I shall be glad to have support from
outside.’ About the Burmese war I said that I hoped he did not
disapprove of my letter to the ‘Times,’ but I was obliged to write it,
as I could not afford not to be true to my principles, which were to me
what her virtue is to a woman. He said he thought it quite right, and
hoped I should pull my election through.”[134]
This proved to be my last talk with Churchill on our familiar and
intimate footing as political allies. In another fortnight the elections
had been fought and lost and won; then came Gladstone’s unexpected
pronouncement in favour of Home Rule, and we followed different paths,
and I saw Churchill no more that year, or at all as friends politically.
To end the story of the Camberwell election briefly: on the 12th
November I finally declared for Home Rule in its full sense, avowing my
intention in so many words of supporting Parnell in his demand for an
Irish Parliament. I felt bound to do this, but I believe it cost me my
election. All the last fortnight was occupied in heavy work, of which my
wife, with her maid Cowie and my private secretary Hope, an excellent
young man, took the lion’s share, and I was helped by many personal
friends from outside, notably by the Meynells and Pollens, and by an
excellent old-fashioned Radical banker from St. Ives, Mr. Tebbutt, who
came on principle to canvass for me because of my views on foreign
policy, and the Rev. Hugh Chapman of St. Luke’s, now chaplain to the
Savoy. But their devoted labours proved of no avail, and I lost the
election by 162 votes out of 6,112 votes polled.
THE END.
NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI’S DEATH
THE policy finally decided on by Lord Salisbury in July, 1885, of
completing the evacuation of the Soudan and leaving it to “stew in its
own juice” till such time as it could be reconquered in English
interests, was a Macchiavellian one, and resulted successfully from the
point of view of imperial ambition. The decision was come to
simultaneously with Mohammed Ahmed’s death, which I thought at the time,
and still think, was not wholly a natural one. His death was due,
according to the official account, to small-pox, but there were too many
interests engaged at Cairo and Constantinople just then not to make it
extremely probable that there was another agency at work to procure a
solution so simple and so timely. The Mahdi’s was a great personality,
commanding unbounded respect in the Soudan, and inspiring the religious
hopes of Mohammedan Egypt as that of a possible deliverer from Christian
domination, while beyond Egypt it had become a rival influence obnoxious
to the Ottoman Caliphate. There are too many examples of such deaths
procured for political ends in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid and of the
Khedivate to make the suspicion in the present instance unreasonable;
and it must be remembered that with the Drummond Wolff mission a new
opportunity was presenting itself at Constantinople, to which the life
of the Mahdi was a chief obstacle. Be this as it may, it is certain that
the blow dealt by Mohammed Ahmed’s death was fatal to the future of the
Soudan as that of a permanently powerful theocracy. The Khalifa Abdallah
el Taishi, who succeeded him in supreme rule, was a man wholly inferior
intellectually and politically to his master, and under him religious
enthusiasm waned and tribal rivalries took the place of a united front
against the enemy, while also the wisdom was lacking for the conclusion
of an effective peace on lines of commercial intercourse with Egypt.
There was always the excuse at Cairo that the Khalifa was impracticable
to treat with. The story, however, of the reconquest of Khartoum twelve
years later is beyond the scope of the present volume, as is any
appreciation of the actual condition of the Soudan under English rule,
and I leave both reluctantly for another occasion.
W. S. B.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS
COLONEL DONNELLY’S CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL C. G. GORDON, 30TH OCTOBER
1880 (FROM AMONG SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
THIS was the first time I had seen Colonel Gordon since he left England
as Lord Ripon’s private secretary. I asked him what was the real reason
of his giving up. He gave me to understand a number of things made him
feel that he was _de trop_. “For instance,” he said, “just after we
started, Lord Ripon gave me the minutes and evidence in the inquiry into
Yakub Khan’s connection with Cavagnari’s murder, and asked me to make a
_précis_ and give him my opinion. This was difficult. But after sitting
up the greater part of two nights I was able to give them back with my
remarks all over them in red and black ink. He asked me what I thought
of it. I said I did not see any evidence to prove Yakub guilty; he very
likely was glad Cavagnari was murdered, but I could see nothing to show
that he was implicated in the crime, and you know (to me, Donnelly)
three out of five of the Council (mentioning their names) were of that
opinion.
“Lord Ripon looked into it and told me to telegraph from Aden to his,
Yakub’s, keepers to meet him at Bombay. I said: ‘My Lord, I think that
will hardly do as you have not yet been sworn in and Lord Lytton is
still Governor General and may make a great fuss.’ Lord Ripon agreed,
thought I was right and said the telegram was not to be sent. When we
got to Bombay Lord Ripon again asked me to telegraph to Yakub’s keepers
to meet him at some station on the way to Simla. I had to ask White
(military secretary) as I did not know the route sufficiently to fix on
a station. He was awfully taken aback. Did I know what the consequences
would be? Every one in India would be staggered and so on. Begged me to
persuade Lord Ripon not to take such a step. I told him that it did not
seem to me it would make any difference one way or the other, but as he
was so very strong on the point, I said I would let Lord Ripon know
before I did anything. I wrote a note and sent it in early in the
morning to Lord Ripon, saying that I myself did not think it would
matter, but, as White was so very anxious on the subject, believing the
end of the world would come if such a step were taken, I thought it as
well to let him know before I carried out his, Lord Ripon’s,
instructions. This was just before breakfast, and he came out in a few
minutes very indignant that any one should have ventured to overrule his
orders; he had no intention of being controlled, and so on. All
breakfast time he looked quite hurt, and injured, and indignant. After
breakfast I left White talking with him in a beseeching way, and
presently he (Lord Ripon) came and asked me if I had sent the telegram.
I said No, I was waiting to see White to settle the place. ‘Well,’ he
said, ‘perhaps after all it was as well not to send it.’
“Now this is only one instance,” Gordon said. “There were lots of snubs
of this kind. You know I shouldn’t have minded getting snubbed, if there
was any use in it—but I saw it was only sure to get worse. Lord Ripon
was being surrounded and guided by the very people from whom Lord
Northcote had begged me to keep him clear. When he got to Simla I was
sure he would be completely in the hands of the Lytton party. I felt I
was _de trop_ and could do no good, and that it was as well to give up
as soon as possible. I told Lord Ripon so. He was very nice about it,
said that his regard for me had only been increased by what had
happened, but he saw it was advisable I should resign, was much obliged
to me for doing so, was only afraid of the awkwardness. I showed him the
letter I had written. He said I was giving him too great praise and
taking all the blame on myself—did not wish me to publish it. But I said
I had written it; it was too much trouble to write it again. And so I
sent it. We parted on the best of terms. He said he had a greater regard
for me than ever, and so on. In fact I have no doubt he was much
relieved by being rid of me.”
The opinion Gordon gave Lord Ripon on the Afghan question was this. He
said either Yakub Khan was guilty or not. If he was not, and there was
no reason for saying he was (_vide_ secret papers, Court of Enquiry on
Yakub Khan), he ought in justice to be restored. And moreover he was the
only man who was likely to be able to hold the country who had any
following. “‘Take him back yourself, my Lord. You can easily do it with
3,000 cavalry. If you succeed, you will be looked upon as the greatest
Governor-General India ever had, and if you fail and are killed you will
have a splendid marble monument put up to you.’ But Lord Ripon did not
seem to see the monument. I offered to do it myself with Yakub and some
lakhs of rupees. But they would not have it. What was the use of my
being there? There was no one who cared to look forward and have a
policy, only to let things drift.”
As to Candahar, Gordon’s opinion was that we ought to give in to the
Ruler of Afghanistan if we wished him to hold the country. The position
of Candahar with relation to Herat and Cabul was such [here a diagram is
given] that it was impossible for any man to really rule the country
unless he held Candahar. But he thought we had managed our withdrawal
from Cabul very badly. We had been in such a hurry as to look like
running away. Our prestige in India had been much shaken by the Maimand
disaster, and Roberts had only been able to get at Ayoub Khan’s
rearguard. As an illustration of our loss of prestige in India, he gave
an incident which occurred lately. When the Russian gunboats were in the
harbour of Bombay, the Parsees brought their children to see them and to
be introduced to the Russian officers.
Things were constantly happening which must have made his presence—to
say the least—irksome with a man of Lord Ripon’s calibre of mind. For
instance, the day before they started [from London], Lord Houghton was
lunching with Lord Ripon, Gordon kept away till after lunch was over.
But Lord Houghton was still there when he came in. On being introduced
by Lord Ripon, Lord Houghton said he was delighted to hear he was going
as private secretary; he could not congratulate Lord Ripon too highly on
his great good luck in having such a secretary; he was very glad Lord
Ripon was going as Governor-General, but almost more glad that Gordon
was going as his secretary.
EARL OF NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON
_Private._
_Jan._ 18, 1884.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I enclose a letter to Sir William Hewett. We have written officially to
him by this mail announcing your mission, and authorizing him to meet
your demands up to £1,000 upon your receipts. I am sure you will like
Hewett. As there is no telegraphic communication with Suakin we shall
arrange for the Helicon to be at Suez from Malta to take you to Suakin.
If she should not be available you will have to put up with the Cygnet,
but she is not nearly so comfortable as the Helicon.
I will telegraph to you to Port Said to say which arrangement has been
made, to the care of the senior officer.
I was very glad to see you in such good heart about affairs this
afternoon, and I trust that by God’s blessing you will succeed in
arranging them as satisfactorily as circumstances admit.
Yours very sincerely,
NORTHBROOK.
GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MISS GORDON
19. 1. 84.
MY DEAR AUGUSTA,
I arrived in town very tired at 6 a.m. yesterday, went with Brockenhurst
to Barracks, washed and went [to] Wolseley, he said Ministers would see
me at 3 p.m. I went back to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 p.m. Wolseley
came for me. I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke and
Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas. I
said yes, and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which
was “_they would evacuate Soudan_.” They were pleased and said, “that
was their idea. Would I go?” I said “yes.” They said “when?” I said “To-
night.” And it was over. I started at 8 p.m. H.R.H. [Cambridge] and Lord
W. [Wolseley] came to see me off. I saw Henry [Sir H. Gordon] and Bob
[R. F. Gordon], no one else except Stokes, all very kind. I have taken
Stewart with me, a nice fellow, we are now in train near Mont Cenis. I
am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Will you tell Sir J.
Cowell all this. Lord Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to
me. I said I was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King [of
Belgians] at once, and told him to wait a few months. Kindest love Mina,
Helen and yourself, A. Burton, and Hayter and Ellen [these two were
servants at Rockstone Place].
Believe me, my dear Augusta, yr. affect. brother
C. G. GORDON.
_Address_—Care H.M. Consul Suez.
MEMORANDUM AS TO GENERAL GORDON’S DOINGS IN CAIRO, JANUARY 1884, BY
COLONEL [SIR CHARLES] WATSON (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
On Saturday the 19th January when I went into Sir Evelyn Wood’s room at
the War Office he said, “Embrace me.” I said, “What has happened?” He
said, “The English Government is sending General Gordon out to settle
the affairs of the Soudan, and he started from London last night with
Colonel Stewart by the Brindisi Mail.” I said, “That is the best thing I
have heard for the last year. Is it to be made public, or is it still a
secret?” He said, “It is to be made as public as possible, tell
everybody.” Then we did some ordinary business, and I went to my own
office. Colonel Bruce Campbell was there, having come as usual for the
latest information. He said, “What news have you for me?” I replied,
“The newest and best is that General Gordon is coming out to settle the
Soudan, and is now on his way.” He said, “I don’t believe it. The
English Government will never let him come.” “Well,” I said, “I think
you’ll see it’s true.” Then he went away.
That evening I had to take some papers to Nubar’s house for him to sign.
Soon after I went in he said, “I am to be congratulated. The weight of
the Soudan is off my shoulders. If any one can manage it, Gordon can.”
He really did seem glad that Gordon was coming out, which was good of
him considering the abusive way in which Gordon had both written and
spoken of him.
The next day Nubar stopped me in the street to talk about Bashi Bazouks,
who had come to Cairo and were troubling him about their pay, and he
again repeated how glad he was that Gordon was coming out. The following
day every one was talking about it; several Egyptians said, “Finished
with the Mahdi.” But that was too hopeful a view. I had to see Major
Vincent about the War Office budget, in which he was very eager to make
more economies, and he asked how much money was Gordon likely to want
for taking all the people out of the Soudan and settling up the affairs
there. I said that Gordon couldn’t answer that question himself, that
there was no doubt that he would do the job better and cheaper than any
one else. Sir Evelyn Baring seemed hopeful and said, “That it was
specially understood that Gordon was under the English and not under the
Egyptian Government, and that therefore he would be under him [Baring]
and not under Nubar. But,” he added smiling, “not that it is very likely
that Gordon will take orders from me or any one else.”
The next day, the 22nd, Sir Evelyn Wood said to me, “Gordon is coming
out with the intention of going straight through the Canal and on to
Suakin, without coming to Cairo; I can quite understand his not liking
to come to Cairo, but it is very important he should see Baring before
going to the Soudan, and it would look badly if he did not call on the
Khedive. I shall therefore go down to Port Said to-morrow to meet and
try to bring him up to Cairo, and I want you to come with me. Nubar has
arranged for a boat and train to bring him up here.”
That day there was a telegram from Slatin Bey in Darfour, stating that
he was constantly being attacked by the Mahdi’s people, that his
ammunition was running out, his soldiers were getting demoralized, and
he had had to shoot several of them, and he could not hold out much
longer unless ammunition and reinforcements were sent him. It was
arranged to send a telegram to Dongola to be sent to him as soon as
possible, telling him that General Gordon was going to the Soudan to
withdraw all the Egyptian troops, and everybody else who wished to
leave. This message was to be sent to the Mudir of Dongola with orders
to send it on by several different messengers, so as to make sure of
Slatin Bey getting it.
In the afternoon Sir E. Wood asked me to see Nubar to make sure that the
necessary arrangements had been made for bringing Gordon quickly up from
Port Said. Nubar looked very tired and spoke French, said he was too
tired to talk in English. He sent for Tigrane who looked very sulky, but
it was not clear whether it was because Gordon was coming out, or
because he was not so important a man as in Cherif’s time. Nubar gave
him orders to see that everything was ready for Gordon’s journey, and
said that no expense would be spared to send him to Khartoum in the
shortest possible time, as the sooner he got there, the sooner things
would be settled. That night we dined at Sir E. Baring’s, a regular
Consular dinner—Austrian, Russian, Netherlands, etc. I was sitting next
Tigrane, who would hardly say a word; he does not seem quite to approve
of the advance of English ideas. Nubar on the contrary, who was also
there, seemed very cheerful. It will be curious to see whether Tigrane
will continue to work with Nubar or not. Other people came in after
dinner for dancing.
The next morning Sir E. Wood sent to me to say that he was unhappy about
Slatin Bey and the people in Darfour, and asked me to ask Nubar not to
send the message to Dongola until Gordon had arrived. Nubar was not in
his office, and I waited a good while in Tigrane’s room, who was much
more talkative than the night before. He said he was not let to do
anything now, and that Nubar and Sir E. Baring managed everything. He
seemed rather doubtful of the success of Gordon’s mission to the Soudan,
on account of the power that the Mahdi had up there.
At 11.30 Sir E. Wood and I started for Ismaïlia, and arrived there about
5 p.m. Sir Evelyn was rather uneasy in his mind about Gordon, as he
thought it might be difficult to persuade him to come to Cairo. At
Ismaïlia we were met by the Governor and other Notables, and went
straight over to the pier, where a steam launch was waiting to take us
to Port Said; among others who were there was Khalil Agha, an Albanian
policeman, who had been with me in the campaign, and who had now charge
of the roads and gardens at Ismaïlia. A little French red faced doctor
begged for a passage as he had been telegraphed for from Port Said. We
started at once and reached Port Said at 11.30 p.m. A lot of people met
us, and accompanied Sir Evelyn to the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where rooms
had been engaged for him by the Governor.
Next morning I went to the P. and O. Office and saw Mr. Roy, who said
that the “Tanjore” from Brindisi would not be in till the afternoon, but
he was proved to be wrong, for half an hour afterwards she was in sight,
and, by the time we had finished breakfast, and Sir Evelyn had inspected
the company of the 8th Battalion stationed at Port Said, the “Tanjore”
was in the harbour close to H.M.S. “Carysfort,” which had been sent from
Malta to take General Gordon to Suakin, and was now waiting for him with
steam up ready to start. Our steam launch was at the pier, and we went
out to the “Tanjore” at once. General Gordon was on the poop talking to
Col. Stewart. A minute served to make him and Sir E. Wood acquainted
with one another, and at the same moment the English Consul put into
General Gordon’s hands a bundle of cipher telegrams from Lord Granville
and Sir E. Baring, and Col. Stewart and I went down at once into the
saloon to decipher them. The Captain of the “Carysfort” came on board to
report his ship ready, and Sir E. Wood seemed at first a little doubtful
how to break the intelligence to General Gordon that he was expected to
come to Cairo instead of going to Suakin as he intended, but the latter
proved quite amenable, and as soon as he was told that the steam launch
was alongside to take him to Ismaïlia, said he was ready to start at
once; so their baggage was put in, and in five minutes we were steaming
to Ismaïlia somewhat to the astonishment of the Captain of the
“Carysfort,” who expected to have taken the General with him. Stewart
and I continued deciphering the telegrams, which were all to the same
effect, that General Gordon had better go to Cairo while he and Sir
Evelyn Wood were becoming acquainted with one another. It was curious to
think that Gordon had sent Sir Evelyn to Egypt, while Sir Evelyn had
really been the means of getting Gordon sent to the Soudan.
Although Gordon had started so readily for Cairo, he at first seemed of
opinion it would have been better if he had gone to Suakin to make
friends with the chief of the tribes who were fighting against Baker. He
seemed to have little doubt of the practicability of the scheme, but, as
he might not have been able to get by that road to Khartoum, and as the
main thing was to get him to that place as soon as possible, there is
little doubt it was better for him to go by the Nile valley. The five
hours to Ismaïlia were employed by Sir E. Wood making Gordon fully
acquainted with the state of affairs in Egypt and the Soudan. At five
o’clock we reached Ismaïlia and went at once to the station, where a
special train was ready to take Gordon to Cairo. In the carriage was
Mahommed Bey Tuhami, who had formerly been Gordon’s secretary in the
Soudan, and who had been sent down by Gordon’s request to meet him. He
is jet black and now quite blind, having lost his sight on the White
Nile, whither Gordon sent him for taking bakshish to the extent of
£3,000. This did not prevent his being very glad to see his old master
again, and his pleasure was increased when Gordon put £100 into his
hands. He is a wonderful old man, very clear-headed about the Soudan,
knowing nearly every chief by name. He said that Mousa, the chief of the
Hadendowa, whom Gordon had hoped to meet at Suakin [was away] and that
his son Mohammed was at Kassala with part of the tribe, while the rest
of it had left him, and with the Halega tribe under Osman Digna were
fighting against Baker at Suakin. It is possible, therefore, that Gordon
might not have found it as easy as he thought to get through that way.
Tuhami was of opinion that a great many people in the Soudan would be
very glad to hear of Gordon’s arrival, and that many of those who had
joined the Mahdi on account of their hatred of the Egyptian Government
would leave him. He repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was rather
against bad Government than a religious revolt.
The train reached Cairo at 9 o’clock, but there were not many waiting to
receive the General as we were not due till half an hour later. Gordon
went off with Sir E. Wood. After he had started Nubar Pasha and the
Khedive’s first aide-de-camp came up just too late to receive him.
The next morning Mohammed Tuhami came to our house with a clerk, Abo El
Melik Shai, and at once set to work to write telegrams to a number of
the Notable people in the Soudan, informing them that Gordon was going
up to bring peace to the country. During the morning one Arab after
another came in until there were seven or eight at work. Gordon looked
in for a few minutes, but spent most of the time with Sir E. Baring, Sir
E. Wood and Nubar. He also went to see the Khedive, and said he had been
very humble and made it up with him. He arranged with him that Abd el
Shakoor, the son of Abd el Kader, one of the late Sultans of Darfour,
was to be sent back to that country. This had been proposed by Gordon
years ago. The Khedive would never agree to it before. In the afternoon
Abd el Shakoor looked in, and the meeting between him and Tuhami was
very interesting. It should be remembered that Tuhami was secretary to
Ismael Pasha Ayoub when he as Governor-General of the Soudan conquered
Darfour, or to speak more correctly when Zebehr Rahama conquered it for
him and killed the Sultan. The young man, Abd el Shakoor, seems
intelligent, but at first sight does not show the strength of character
which he would require. Gordon came in and told him he was to start with
him the next night. The young man asked for a few days delay to collect
his family, but Gordon cut him short, saying, “Look, you want a throne,
throne first, family afterwards.” Tuhami and the other clerks did not
finish their work until late.
After dinner I went over to Sir E. Wood’s to see Gordon, who had just
gone; Sir E. was sitting with Slade, and was very low. Gordon, who
before he left London had protested in the strongest manner against
sending Zebehr to the Soudan, had that evening written a paper to show
why it would be a good thing to take Zebehr with him. Sir E. said he had
a great respect for Gordon, but he really could not change his opinion
entirely in twelve hours. I said it was not the least surprising, as it
was very usual for Gordon to change his opinion on the smallest
provocation; but in this case I was sure it would all come right, and
that Zebehr would not go. In the same paper he expressed a wish that
Zebehr and he might be confronted with one another in order that the
former might bring any accusation against him he thought fit.
Leaving Sir E. I went home and found Gordon, who seemed equally low. He
said he had been talking all day and was quite done. Speedy was also at
our house, and he and Gordon had been having an argument about King John
of Abyssinia. He rather took King John’s part, while Gordon said he was
a man on whom no reliance could be placed. Gordon said King John had
never stated what he wants, and that if he had a port he wouldn’t know
what to do with it. He said, however, he might have Senheit and
Gallabat, and free trade at Massowah.
The next morning Tuhami came again and wrote a proclamation for Gordon
to distribute in the Soudan. Gordon stopped at our house for a couple of
hours, during which time a great many people, principally Egyptians,
came to see him. The majority were persons whom he had known before, and
who wished to go up to the Soudan with him. He refused all the
applications, and the only two he agreed to take with him were Ibrahim
Bey Fawzi, who had formerly been with him in the Soudan, and Ibrahim
Effendi Ruchdi, whom he took as clerks. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi had been
promoted by Gordon to every grade from Lieutenant to Colonel, and
regarded Gordon as his Father. He had also at one time been in disgrace
with Gordon, and had been put in chains. During the Egyptian campaign
Ibrahim Fawzi had been with the rebels at Abou Kir, and had been without
employment since the disbandment of the old Egyptian army. Ibrahim
Ruchdi was a Khartoum clerk, who had been temporarily employed in the
Soudan office in Cairo. Gordon took him back to the Soudan at an
increased rate of pay, _i.e._, £20 a month. A little later in the
morning a deputation of merchants interested in the Soudan commerce came
to present Gordon with an address, and to beg that he would do what he
could to protect the interests of Soudan merchants. He replied to them
that he had been sent out from England by the English Government with a
definite object, viz., to withdraw the Egyptian Government from the
Soudan; that they all knew that the Egyptian Government in the Soudan
was bad, and had been used to oppress the people; that the present state
of affairs could not continue, but that he would do his best to set up
some system of self-government in the Soudan. After the deputation
retired, General Gordon went out, and I went to the War Office and
arranged for lithographing the proclamation alluded to above.
General Gordon and Colonel Stewart lunched with us. Giegler Pasha came
in afterwards and we all went to Sir E. Baring’s, with whom were Nubar
Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood. Sir Evelyn Baring said that General Gordon
had expressed a wish that certain matters between him and Zebehr Pasha
might be discussed, and Zebehr Pasha was called in. Gordon and Zebehr
sat near one another, with an interpreter between, and Zebehr Pasha was
asked what he had to say. He said that Gordon without cause had
confiscated his property, had put his people in chains, and had caused
his son to be killed, that when Gordon had gone to the Soudan he
(Zebehr) had put his hand on his (Gordon’s) hand and had asked him to
consider his son as his own son. Then General Gordon said that he had
confiscated the property of Zebehr because he had been convicted by a
court of enquiry at Khartoum of having instigated his son to revolt
against the Government, that the conviction was to a certain extent
based upon a letter written from Zebehr to his son and found among the
latter’s (Suliman’s) papers. _Zebehr_: “I never wrote such a letter. You
should produce it as proof of what you say.” _General Gordon_: “I cannot
produce the letter as it was attached to the proceedings of the court
and sent with the latter to his Highness the Khedive. If the proceedings
can be found the letter should be found with them.” _Zebehr_: “If the
letter can be found I deserve to lose my head,” and he drew his hand
across his throat. _Gordon_: “If the letter was not written, I was not
justified in what I did.” Then Sir Evelyn Baring said that he would see
that the “proceedings” were looked for, and he directed Sir E. Wood to
endeavour to find them. Then _Zebehr_ said to Gordon: “And you killed my
son, although I had specially entrusted him to your care.” _Gordon_: “I
did take care of your son and I had him promoted to the rank of Bey, and
then afterwards he treacherously killed 200 Egyptian soldiers in the
Bahr Gazal.” _Zebehr_ fenced with the question for some time and at last
said: “I was no longer responsible for my son, you had made him a Bey,
you were responsible.” Then _Sir E. Baring_ said that “apparently there
were two questions between Zebehr and Gordon, the first concerning
Zebehr himself which turned on the existence of a certain letter which
would be searched for, that if Zebehr was proved not to be guilty he
would see that compensation was made to him for his losses; the second
question concerned Zebehr’s son, for whose action it now appeared Zebehr
did not hold himself responsible.” Zebehr stood up and made a speech
mainly to the effect that the name of England and the justice of England
were known to all nations, and that he would leave all in the hands of
his Excellency. Zebehr then left the room. Sir E. Baring said that the
next point to discuss was whether Zebehr Pasha was to go to the Soudan
or not, as General Gordon had suggested the advisability of his going.
General Gordon said: “I had better not be here while you are discussing
that. Hear what Watson has to say.” And he went out. Sir E. Baring asked
me what I had to say, and I answered that I considered it would be the
greatest possible mistake to let Zebehr go to the Soudan with Gordon,
and that, if my own opinion was of no value, I had been requested by one
who knew the Soudan well to do all I could to prevent his going, as it
was almost certain that one or the other would not come back alive. Sir
E. Wood also said that he did not think it advisable for Zebehr to go,
and Nubar Pasha expressed the same opinion, but more mildly. Nubar gave
me the idea that for some reason or other he was annoyed at having
Zebehr’s affairs stirred up again and wanted it to relapse into oblivion
as soon as possible. Gordon and Zebehr were then called in again, and
Sir E. Baring informed the latter that it was considered desirable he
should not at present go to the Soudan, but that the question of his
return and of his position generally would be discussed as soon as
General Gordon had returned in safety. Soon after, every one went away.
That evening there was a large dinner at Sir E. Wood’s, Nubar Pasha, Abd
el Kader, etc., etc. At 9 o’clock we drove to Boulac Dakrour station to
see Gordon off, his train was to start at 9.30, but at the last minute
it appeared that Abd el Shakoor, the Sultan of Darfour, in place of
coming with two or three people as Gordon had arranged, had brought all
his family and followers, nearly fifty in number. Gordon did not like to
leave them behind, so fresh carriages were put on, and the people and
baggage were tumbled into the train, which started at 10.30. During the
following days Tuhami brought me several papers respecting affairs in
the Soudan, which he asked me to send to General Gordon for his
guidance.
Cairo, _10th Feb._, 1884.
GENERAL SIR GERALD GRAHAM TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Saxon, _Feb. 4th_, 1884.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
I have been accompanying your brother as far as Korusko and seen him
start off on his journey across the desert. He is much more cheery and
confident than he was when he left Cairo, and looks forward to
constructing a government and army out of native materials as if it were
the simplest thing in the world. He has certainly an extraordinary
influence over the natives, the secret of which seems to me to be that
he is really fond of them and enters into their feelings, while he at
the same time shows an energy that must appear to them superhuman. . . .
GERALD GRAHAM.
GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MONSIEUR DE MOUTARDIN, RUE ROGATE, NO. 7, PARIS
(FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS)
(_Apparently translated from the French._)
Khartoum, 5 _Novr._ 84.
MY DEAR SIR,
Thank you for your letter 25 August received yesterday by a spy, and
also for your good wishes for our security. The Arabs are tranquil
enough, they are at the South and S.W. and East, but otherwise they are
not. We are in much vicissitude. I regret sensibly that your Consul, Mr.
Harbin, who went down in a steamer with Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power,
English Consul, after an uproar were killed _en route_ with the other
M.M. I do not understand, for the steamer had been blinded, had a gun
and a good force. They left here the 10th of September. I had them
escorted below Berber, and they ought to have been at Dongola the 20th
September, but an officer has informed me that on the 14th October they
had not arrived there. It is very grievous. Excuse a longer letter, for
I have so many things to do.
Believe me my dear M. de Moutardin, Yours sincerely,
C. G. GORDON.
P.S. You say to me, “Expedition for my relief,” thank you,
no,—“Expedition for the relief of the garrisons of the Soudan,” _that is
the title_ you understand, is it not? I was sent to succour the
garrisons of the Soudan, I have failed, they sent the Troops to make up
for the failure on my part. Slatin Bey is with the Mahdi 8 miles distant
from here, he is well and has become Muslim, as they say is the case
with all the Europeans! The time of Martyrs for the faith is ended!
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
War Office, Cairo, 24. 2. 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Since posting my letter to you I have had forwarded to me from Korti a
letter from your brother dated 14. 12. 84. It is sad to get it, but I
thought you would like a copy, so send one. He evidently knew there was
treachery at work in Khartoum some time before it fell. The last
paragraph concerns some small commissions I did for him, it is of no
consequence. The letter was given to Sir Charles Wilson at Gubat by
Kashim el Moos, who commanded the steamers. So Wilson must have had an
anxious time going up. He would have done anything to save your brother,
and must have felt there was no hope before he left Khartoum behind him.
It is a sad story, but I cannot help envying your brother,
Ever yours sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
I have shown the letter to Sir F. Stephenson and Sir E. Baring. The
latter took a copy of it.
_Enclosure._
Khartoum, 14. 12. 84.
MY DEAR WATSON,
I think the game is up and send Mrs. Watson, you and Graham my adieux.
We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after 10 days time. This
would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken
better precautions as to informing us of their movements. But this is
“spilt milk,” good bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road,
Chelsea) know what I owe you.
Yours sincerely,
C. G. GORDON.
The above was received at Gubat by Sir C. Wilson on the 22 January 1885.
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
War Office, Cairo, 10. 3. 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Since last writing to you I have had a second letter from your brother,
but of earlier date than the one of which I sent you a copy. I am so
often asked for copies of it that I have had it lithographed in
facsimile, and enclose you a copy of it. You will see he speaks strongly
about the government, and he had reason. Why was not General Graham
allowed to go on last year? But it is not much use talking about it now.
I only hope that the government will at last realize that the Soudan
business is a large one that will take years to settle. I have seen
young Anderson of the artillery. He started for Souakim yesterday with
General Graham.
I hope you are all well,
Yours very sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
_Enclosure in Facsimile._
Kartum, 26. 11. 84.
MY DEAR WATSON,
Thanks for your letter which I received yesterday, the steamer which
brought it, had to run the gauntlet of no end of rifle fire and of 6
guns, she was struck 3 times by shells, but only 7 were wounded. I hope
you and Mrs. Watson are well. I am not ill-treated I consider, but the
Cairo people up here they are the ill used. I will accept _nothing
whatever_ from Gladstone’s Government. I will not even let them pay my
expenses. I will get the King to pay them. I will never put foot in
England again—but will (D.V. if I get out) go to Brussels and so on to
Congo. How is Miss Arnott, the lady who was with me? I greatly fear for
Stewart, Power and Herbin, French Consul. With kindest regards, believe
me yours sincerely, with kindest regards to Mrs. Watson,
C. G. GORDON.
LAST TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL GORDON (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS)
Junior United Service Club,
London, S.W.
8 _June_ 1886.
An Egyptian Clerk, who was taken prisoner by the rebels at the fall of
Khartoum, and at last succeeded in effecting his escape from Omdurman,
gave me a copy of an Arabic telegram of which he said the following was
the story.
On or about the 29th December 1884, General Gordon dictated this
telegram to him. It was written on a small piece of paper. General
Gordon then took a cartridge, took out the bullet and shook the
gunpowder out of it. He then folded up the telegram, put it in the
cartridge in place of the powder, and replaced the bullet, so that the
cartridge looked as if it had not been touched. General Gordon then gave
it to a messenger who put it with his other cartridges and started for
Dongola.
I have never heard that he arrived, neither have I any means of
confirming the truth of the clerk’s story. It seems, however, very
unlikely that he should have invented such a tale, or have written the
telegram himself.
The translation of the telegram is as follows:
“To the Sovereign of the Kingdom.
“After salutations. I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone
through, inform their Majesties the Sovereigns of the actions of Great
Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor-General of
the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country.
“During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the
one remarkable for her wealth and the other for her military force, have
remained unaffected by my situation, perhaps relying too much on the
news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa who surrendered of his own accord.
Although I personally am too insignificant to be taken into account, the
Powers were bound nevertheless to fulfil the engagement upon which my
appointment was based, so as to shield the honor of the Governments.
“What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help
me.”
I would observe that the fact of General Gordon speaking of having been
“twelve months” in the Soudan would lead to the supposition that the
telegram was written later than the clerk stated. This is quite possible
as Egyptians are not good at remembering dates.
C. M. WATSON.
SIR CHARLES WILSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Mountjoy Barracks, Phœnix Park, Dublin,
_Sep._ 9 1885.
MY DEAR GORDON,
There has never been any doubt in my mind as to the manner of your
brother’s death. He was killed before sunrise, apparently before it was
quite daylight, a short distance outside the Palace gates, where he met
a party of Arabs. He fell at the first discharge, but whether killed, or
severely wounded, we do not know; his body when seen afterwards had
several lance wounds, and his head was cut off by a Dugaini Arab and
exposed on a pole in the open space between the Mahdi’s two camps at
Omdurman. I tried to keep these details from the correspondents in the
Sudan, knowing how painful they would be to you and his family, but as
you have asked for them I give them now. The body was left on the ground
some time, and then appears to have been buried with others in the ditch
south of Khartum. One account was that the body was buried under a large
cairn of stones, where it fell, by people throwing stones at it as they
passed, a common Arab custom. The decapitation is also Arab and what one
might naturally expect; on the other hand the Arabs never mutilate the
dead as the Ethiopic tribes do. Our dead were untouched except by lance
thrusts, whilst those on the Sawakin side were horribly mutilated. You
may therefore be certain that no insult was offered to your brother’s
body.
My view is that your brother was roused up, just before daylight, by the
news that the Arabs had entered the town, that he hastily collected his
cavasses (armed servants) and left the Palace with the intention of
reaching the stone church, where the ammunition was stored, and then of
blowing up the magazine or trying to hold out till we arrived. He
probably intended picking up the Austrian Consul on his way, but
unfortunately was met by a party of Arabs just after he left the Palace
gates. The Arabs apparently did not know it was your brother when they
fired; they only saw the cavasses in their Egyptian uniform. Your
brother, if he had chosen, might have made an attempt to save his own
life by going on board the steamers which always had steam up; but you
know as well as I do he would never have done that. The steamers tried
to get down the river, but turned back when fire was opened upon them
from Omdurman; had a European been on board they might have run the
gauntlet. My account of your brother’s death is based on two independent
reports made not very long after the fall of Khartum and before the wild
stories which so rapidly grow out of such an event, in semi-civilised
countries, had time to obscure the truth. In all essential particulars
these reports have been confirmed by later ones. The two reports I
allude to were one by a cavass of Ibrahim Bey Rushdi’s, whose master was
killed with your brother and who was present when they were killed. This
man was of Turkish origin, and bribed some Arabs to bring him across the
desert; from Khartum he went down to Cairo with the Mudir of Dongola.
The other was by a leading Sheikh of the Shagiyeh, whom we had sent to
Khartum with letters for your brother; this man was in Khartum when it
fell, and saw your brother’s body not long after he had been killed; he
came down to us by the Wady Bishara road. The two men were unknown to
each other, of different race, and came by different roads, at an
interval of a few days; there could not therefore have been any
collusion.
Watson is collecting all he can about the last days at Khartum; have you
written to him?
Yours sincerely,
C. W. WILSON.
NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A REFUGEE WHO CAME FROM KHARTOUM ON OR
ABOUT THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1887 TO SUAKIN (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS)
Rank, _Sergt. Major_.
Nationality, _Turk_.
Was formerly in the Garrison at Berber, but escaped at its fall to
Kartoum, where he was one of four Sergeants Orderlies to Gordon. He was
“on duty” on the 26th, and was with Gordon in the “look out” on the top
of the Palace. Gordon the evening before warned the people that he had
seen a great deal of extra excitement going on in the rebel camp, and
that unless a “good resistance was made that night the town would fall.”
The soldiers were in a starving state and many left the lines in search
of food, the civilians armed themselves and went on to the lines. As the
morning star rose the rebels made a feint at the portion of the defence
under Ferag Pasha (with the black troops), but at the same time they
directed their full attack at the defence commanded by Hassan Bey
Benassawie (with the 5th Regt., fellaheen) and succeeded in getting into
the town. Gordon, when he heard the rebels in the town, said: “It is all
finished; to-day Gordon will be killed (“enhardeh Gordon cassoora”), and
went downstairs, followed by the four sergeants, who took their rifles
with them. He took a chair and sat down on the right of the Palace door,
the four sergeants standing on his left; all at once a sheikh galloped
up with some Baggara Arabs; the sergeants were on the point of firing
when Gordon, seizing one of their rifles, said: “No need of rifles; to-
day Gordon is to be killed” (as before). The Sheikh told Gordon that he
had been ordered by the Mahdi to bring him alive. Gordon refused to go,
saying that he would die where he was, and adding that no harm was to be
done to the four sergeants who had not fired on the rebels. The Sheikh
repeated the order three times, and each time Gordon gave the same
answer. After a few words the Sheikh drew his sword and rushing up to
Gordon cut him in a slanting direction over the left shoulder, Gordon
looking him straight in the face and offering no resistance of any kind.
His head was cut off and taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and his body
was buried close to the door of the Palace and a tomb built over it. The
four sergeants were not hurt, but taken prisoners, and two have already
managed to escape. The sergeant, on being questioned about the report
made by Colonel Kitchener, states that food was so scarce that Gordon
himself lived on a handful of doura, which was made into a thick soup,
the people living chiefly on the fibre of the palm-tree made into cakes.
All the animals were killed, with the exception of a donkey, over which
there was a guard. Finally an officer stole it and sold its flesh at any
price he asked. A fish was caught and sold in a similar manner.
Ibrahim Bey Fowsi is now at Omdurman, Farag Ullah Bey is at Galabat.
SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
Cairo, 2 _July_ 1885.
MY DEAR SIR HENRY,
Very many thanks for sending me the “Journals,” which have reached me
this afternoon. I have only just had time to glance at them, but write
at once to catch the Italian mail. They seem most interesting. What a
pity it is that he did not keep them all from the beginning of the siege
instead of sending them down by Stewart, but of course he thought it
safer to do the latter.
I was very glad to read your paper in the introduction about Sir Charles
Wilson, who seems to be unjustly blamed. Have you seen him since he came
to England? I was a little sorry to see the footnote on page 121 about
Abd-el-Kader Pasha, as it does not quite convey the truth about his
refusal to go to the Soudan. He agreed to go on certain conditions, the
most important of which was that the abandonment of the Soudan was not
to be announced, but in the instructions which were drawn up for him the
abandonment was a leading feature. I made this note upon them at the
time.
“N.B. Abd-el-Kader did not agree to these instructions on the ground
that an immediate abandonment of Khartoum was inexpedient, and that to
go to the Soudan with such an intention would lead to certain failure.
The proposal to send him therefore fell through (16 Jan. 1884).”
Abd-el-Kader always remained of the same opinion that to proclaim the
abandonment of the Soudan was to make the removal of the garrisons
impossible. He is one of the best Pashas I have met with, _one who has
not got rich_.
I shall write again when I have read the Journals.
Yours very sincerely,
C. M. WATSON.
SIR CHARLES WILSON’S ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPEDITION TO OMDURMAN SENT TO SIR
H. GORDON
Mountjoy Barracks, Dublin, 27 _July_ 1885.
1. The force under Sir H. Stewart was sent across the desert to occupy
Matammeh, open up communication with General Gordon’s steamers, and
through them with Khartum. It was hoped that the presence of this force,
which was not much larger than a battalion at war strength, on the Nile
at Matammeh would withdraw some of the pressure on Khartum, but it was
not sent to relieve that place.
2. My mission was to communicate with General Gordon; to deliver Lord
Wolseley’s letters to him; to ascertain from him the exact position of
affairs at Khartum; to inform him that the forces advancing for the
relief of Khartum would be concentrated at Matammeh and Shendy by the
first week in March, and to have three officers in Khartum to assist
General Gordon in the defence until relief came. I was then to return to
Korti, bringing the English soldiers down the river with me. There was
never any question of my attempting the relief of Khartum.
3. No one at Gubat, no one on the steamers of General Gordon’s flotilla
had the slightest suspicion that a crisis would occur at Khartum within
a few days of our arrival at Matammeh. The first time that the officers
and men on the steamers expressed a doubt as to the safety of Khartum
was when we came under fire of the guns at Halfiyeh. There was therefore
no urgent necessity for an immediate start without consideration for the
position of the little force which had been more than decimated on its
march to the Nile.
4. The steamers left Gubat at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and arrived off
Omdurman at 2 p.m. on the 28th; they were heavily laden with grain, yet
they made better time up the river as far as times can be compared, than
Lord C. Beresford in the “Safieh,” manned by officers and men of the
Second Division of the Naval Brigade who had come across after the
steamers left; this shows when once started there was no delay. Had the
steamers started at 3 p.m. On the 21st, the day of their arrival, they
would on the evening of the 25th have been some distance below Halfiyeh,
out of sight of Khartum and unable to exert any influence over the
events which occurred at Khartum at dawn on the 26th. It is absurd to
suppose the Mahdi’s plans would have been altered by his knowing the two
steamers were coming up; he probably believed, as General Gordon did,
they could not pass the batteries.
5. The steamers were under fire from both banks, in action with the
Mahdi’s army, for four hours; it was impossible to land in the face of
such a strong force; they came out of action a little after 4, and about
5 or soon after hauled into the bank to obtain information. We
ascertained then, _i.e._ on the evening of the 28th, that Khartum had
fallen through the treachery of Faraj Pasha at dawn on the 26th, and
that General Gordon had been killed. These were the two capital facts
which it was necessary the Government and Lord Wolseley should know; all
we have learned since is matter of detail. There was frequent
communication with natives on the way down; they all told essentially
the same story, and there was never any doubt in my mind as to the truth
of the main points.
6. It may be interesting to know that General Gordon’s last great sortie
was on the 17th January, the day of Abu Klea; and that it is almost
certain he and his garrison had heard of the fight at Abu Klea, and
possibly Gubat before the end came.
C. W. W.
MR. EDWARD HAMILTON TO SIR HENRY GORDON
10, Downing Street, _20th July_ 1884.
DEAR SIR,
I beg to return to you Lord Wolseley’s letter, of which I have retained
a copy.
Mr. Gladstone is much obliged for your further note of to-day on the
subject of the position of affairs at Khartoum. He admits the force of
what you say; but he was under the impression that there was a known
route to the South and to the sea from Khartoum, and that there must be
persons, perhaps many persons, who are acquainted with it from the
course of trade or otherwise. He would be glad to know whether he is
right or wrong in this impression. Faithfully yours,
E. W. HAMILTON.
MEMORANDUM BY SIR HENRY GORDON, DATED _22nd July_ 1884. FORWARDED TO MR.
GLADSTONE, _23rd July_ 1884. GENERAL GORDON’S PRESENT POSITION
There is no proof that Khartoum is invested upon the South—on the
contrary there is presumptive evidence that it is not, since the Rebels,
if in position there, would find it difficult to keep up their
communications for supplies of Food, while their flanks would be exposed
on either side to constant attacks—by means of steamers from Khartoum.
All communications that have come to hand, whether true or not, point to
the country to the South as being open, and as of supplies coming in.
There is no question but what if General Gordon wished to leave with
Colonel Stewart he could do so at any time, he could go to the Bahr-el-
Gazelle—or he could move to the Equator (see General Gordon’s own
statement that he could get away to the Congo, also Sir Samuel Baker’s
letter to the “Times” of 30th April, and to the fact, according to Dr.
Hill’s book, “Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,” that he was travelling
to and fro on a “low Nile,” in March and April 1874).
But it is equally certain that General Gordon would not desert the
people who have been faithful to him.
It is not a question of the safety of the garrison, but it is one of the
protection of the traders at Khartoum.
The former might be moved to Sennaar and thence transported further to
the South, the latter would not leave—to do so would be worse than death
(see enclosure in No. 3, Egypt, dated Khartoum, 8th April 1884, showing
that General Gordon had traded with the people whom he would not
desert).
The question would be the same if a force were at Khartoum.
No doubt General Gordon at this time is doing all he can to secure the
safety of the inhabitants, and would not care how he accomplished it.
It is believed that he is conferring with the Mahdi, having this object
in view, although he has no faith in his (the Mahdi’s) power. If General
Gordon could secure the safety of the people of Sennaar and Khartoum he
would retire, since it may be assumed that Kassala is safe.
It seems probable that the Rebels to the North of Khartoum are
instigated by Zebehr, and that the money at Berber has been too great a
temptation to the Governor of that Station. It is doubtful whether
Berber was not quietly given over to the rebels, and that it did not
fall by assault.
The Tribes to the North of Khartoum rose in rebellion for the reasons
stated in the “Times” of the 10th March, under date of Khartoum 7th
March; “this is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the
pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan, which policy has
been published by sending down the widows and orphans and Cairo
employees from Khartoum. We cannot blame them for rising when no
definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here. The
Mahdi is a nonentity as to any advance on Khartoum, but all-powerful
through his emissaries when backed with pronounced policy of abandonment
without establishing a permanent Government.”
On the other hand while General Gordon may not, at this time, be in
actual personal danger more than that incidental to disaffection at
Khartoum, or from the daily contingencies which present themselves in
time of war, yet the time is approaching when some steps must be taken
to prove that he, as the agent of the British Government, is not to be
abandoned, and to this must be coupled the fact that his ammunition is
running short, and that he has not been heard of for so long a period.
It was hoped that the outbreaks among the tribes to the North of
Khartoum would long ago have been put down, and that the country would
have been quiet: such an expectation, however, has not been realized,
and when General Gordon’s ammunition fails he will be at the mercy of
the Rebels.
In the absence of a Government that could secure the safety of the
inhabitants, matters could not improve, it is therefore necessary,
imperatively so, to reconsider General Gordon’s application to have
Zebehr sent up (see “Times,” 5th March, dated Khartoum, 3rd March).
“It is now admitted that Zebehr Pasha is the only man connected with the
Soudan, who is endowed with the ability and firmness necessary to head
any Government here.
“It is out of the question that General Gordon should leave Khartoum
without first having formed a Government which would in some measure
stem the wave of fearful anarchy that must eventually sweep over the
Soudan. The arrival of Zebehr Pasha would draw off to his side the bands
of rebels which are now scattered over the Soudan, and his great
knowledge of the tribes fits him more than any other man to take the
place of the Egyptian Government. He would, of course, come here under
certain stringent conditions. General Gordon had foreseen this ever
since he left Cairo.” I mentioned to Lord Granville in consequence of
confidential information from Cairo, to the effect “that if Zebehr went
up to Khartoum his first act would be to hang General Gordon,” that it
would be dangerous to send Zebehr up, and to this opinion I have adhered
up to the present time.
As, however, the rebels remain in force to the North of Khartoum, and as
matters have not improved, and cannot improve unless some future in the
way of Government is made clear (bearing also in mind that General
Gordon will not desert the people at Khartoum, unless he can leave them
in safety), the time has now arrived that Zebehr should be sent up. It
would be in compliance with General Gordon’s own request, and Zebehr
might be offered a sum of money provided he established an independent
Government and so enabled General Gordon to leave Khartoum. The payment
might be withheld until the object in view, viz., General Gordon’s
absence from Khartoum, had been secured.
It is believed that if Zebehr was sent up all danger to the peoples at
Khartoum, Sennaar and Kassala would cease, and the country would be
quieted.
At the same time it is necessary that other precautions should be taken
the more especially as General Gordon’s ammunition is daily decreased by
expenditure. It would therefore seem desirable that a force should be
sent to Suakim in order to open the road from that place to Berber (one
of General Gordon’s suggestions), but of course if Zebehr agrees to go,
and is successful, then this force would not be called into action,
although no delay should take place in its preparation.
It would be out of place my making any remarks upon any expedition
advancing by the Nile, nevertheless I do not believe it to be
practicable.
Any movement of Abyssinia upon Kassala and Sennaar would raise the whole
of the Soudan, and would do an amount of harm that cannot be
contemplated.
H. W. GORDON.
THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., TO SIR HENRY GORDON
10, Downing Street, 22 _Feb._ 1885.
DEAR SIR HENRY GORDON,
As long as a hope could in any way be entertained that your
distinguished and excellent brother had survived the betrayal of
Khartoum, I was unwilling to forgo the slender consolation it might
afford; and I have also been delayed in writing this note for two or
three days by an inquiry on a kindred subject. But I cannot longer
forbear from addressing to you my humble tribute to his memory,
insignificant as that tribute must be when rendered to one, whose fame
has not only become a national possession, but gone forth throughout the
world.
Though I had not the privilege of his personal acquaintance, yet his was
a character of which I think many features could be plainly read even
from a distance. The judgement of mankind has pronounced him a hero; and
the application of that lofty name is specially marked in his case by
the fact that it applies not only to his public acts, but to the man; to
the spirit of self-sacrifice, such as distinguished martyrs and
apostles, to a simplicity of character not less remarkable than his
profound enthusiasm and his boundless courage. I cannot but add, though
it is perhaps presumptuous, my admiration of his astonishing command,
under circumstances so difficult of military resource, and of that
inexhaustible strength of will which formed the crown of his powers, it
is difficult to wish any of his virtues had been in any respect
restrained; yet I reflect with pain, now that catastrophe has come, how
ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose
welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live
or die. I congratulate you on your close and intimate association with
General Gordon, and I trust that among us there are and will be many who
will strive to learn lessons in their several places from this noble
example of Christian heroism. Believe me with much respect, faithfully
yours,
W. E. GLADSTONE.
SIR HENRY GORDON TO MR. GLADSTONE
_23rd February_ (1885).
DEAR MR. GLADSTONE,
I am very much obliged for your very kind note of sympathy, and for the
very handsome manner in which you speak of General Gordon’s character
and services. It is not for me to dwell upon them, and the subject is a
very painful one, and therefore I hope you will forgive the brevity of
my reply.
Yours faithfully,
H. W. GORDON.
H.M. QUEEN VICTORIA TO MISS GORDON
Osborne, _17th Feb._ 1885.
DEAR MISS GORDON,
_How_ shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express _what I
feel_! To _think_ of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his
Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so
edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of
support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed
on those who asked him to go—is to me _grief inexpressible_! indeed it
has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you his Sister, who have gone
through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother
as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such
strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when _real_ absolute
evidence of your dear Brother’s death does not exist—but I fear there
cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell
you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I
do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy with you. I hear so many
expressions of sorrow and sympathy from _abroad_: from my eldest
daughter the Crown Princess, and from my cousin the King of the
Belgians—the very warmest. Would you express to your other Sisters and
your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the
_stain_ left upon England, for your dear Brother’s cruel, though heroic,
fate.
Ever
Dear Miss Gordon,
Yours sincerely and sympathizingly,
V. R. I.
MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO QUEEN VICTORIA
Rockstone Place, Southampton.
MADAM,
The letter which your Majesty has so graciously honoured me with has
deeply touched and gratified me. I am so thankful to know of your
sympathy for, and the endeavours you so very kindly made to save my dear
Brother, though _others dared_ to prevent your supporting him in his
just demands. Never can I cease to be deeply grateful to your Majesty
for the great kindness you have shown towards him. I think he received
the gracious message you sent him through me as in one of the Volumes of
his Diaries he returns a little letter in which I told him of your
Majesty’s message. If permitted I should like to bring over the Original
Diaries when I have the great honour to wait on your Majesty next month.
I am your Majesty’s devoted subject and servant,
M. AUGUSTA GORDON.
MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO MR. BLUNT
Rockstone Place, Southampton, _11th September_ 1882.
Will you kindly give me a copy (two if you can spare them) of your
letter on Egypt written to Mr. Gladstone and others. I am sending on by
the first mail your letters and the 19th Century to my Brother at the
Cape. Strange you were not listened to by those in authority. I fancy
there are many of your way of thinking and there would be many more if
they knew the rights and wrongs done to Egypt.
A. GORDON.
MR. BLUNT TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON
Delhi, _24th January_, 1884.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I feel obliged to write to you about your mission to the Soudan. I see
it announced to-day by telegraph without explanation of its object, but
I cannot wait till more definite news arrives, and I desire to warn you.
It may be you are going there to make peace between the Mahdi and our
troops in Egypt, to acknowledge his sovereignty in the Soudan, and
arrange terms for the evacuation of Khartoum. If so, I can only wish you
God speed. It is a good work, and you will accomplish it. But if, as I
fear it may be, from the tradition of some of those in power, the object
of your mission is to divide the tribes with a view to retaining any
part of the country for the Khedive, to raise men for him and scatter
money, it is bad work, and you will fail. It must be so. Neither your
courage, nor your honest purpose, nor the inspiration which has hitherto
guided you, will bring you success. I know enough to be able to assure
you that every honest Mohammedan in Egypt and North Africa and Arabia
sympathizes with the Mahdi’s cause, not necessarily believing him to
have a Divine mission, but as representing ideas of liberty and justice
and religious government which they acknowledge to be divine. For this
reason you will only have the men of Belial on your side, and these will
betray you. I beg you be cautious. Do not trust to the old sympathy
which united Englishmen with the Arabs. I fear it is a thing of the
past, and that even your great name will not protect you with them. Also
consider what your death will mean: the certainty of a cry for vengeance
in England, and an excuse with those who ask no better than a war of
conquest. I wish I could be sure that all those who are sending you on
your mission do not foresee this end. Forgive me if I am wrong in my
fears; and believe me yours, very gratefully, in memory of last year,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Dec._ 27, 1884.
DEAR SIR,
Will you allow me, personally a stranger, to tell you how interested I
am in the result of your application to Mr. Gladstone respecting your
mediation with the Mahdi.
You will the more readily understand my great interest, when I mention
that I was in London for some weeks last spring for the purpose of
devising some means for the rescue of General Gordon, and that I was
about the first (I believe) to suggest the Volunteer Expedition of which
I see by the “Pall Mall Gazette” you had heard.
I saw Captain Brocklehurst, having called upon him though a stranger,
but knowing his friendship for General Gordon. My own scheme was in the
first place to have raised a “Khartoum Fund,” for which I had many
promises, and would have had no difficulty in raising from £80,000 and
upwards. My idea was to pay the safe conduct for General Gordon and his
garrison (in fact for all his people at Khartoum) from Khartoum to
Cairo, a certain sum to be paid to the chief of each tribe, the amount
to be in proportion to the extent of territory over which the safe pass
would be given. I saw many members of the House of Commons and other
influential persons, but after discussion, though my plan was approved
by many, it was waived in favour of the Volunteer Expedition, to which I
promised to transfer the £100 I should have subscribed to the “safe
conduct” scheme.
But the Government negatived decidedly the Volunteer movement, and my
plan had fallen through. It was with much regret that I returned here,
having after much anxiety and trouble effected nothing of that on which
my heart was set.
If I had known you were in London I would have ventured to have called
on you. I have a strong personal regard for General Gordon, and with
many members of his family I am on terms of friendship. Now, I am
perplexed whether to wish you success in your application to the
Premier—if it would save General Gordon I would pray for it—but if you
should be frustrating plans for his safety I could not. I write to you
freely though a stranger, and I hope you will forgive me, but the one
great interest which I think we both have in common, General Gordon,
will plead my excuse.
Believe me, dear Sir, yours faithfully,
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.
MR. BLUNT TO MRS. ALLNATT
Crabbet Park, _Dec._ 29, 1884.
MY DEAR MADAM,
I am sorry that I did not know of your plans for rescuing General Gordon
by peaceful means last year, as your support and that of friends so
liberal and sincere in their efforts would have given great weight to my
plea with Mr. Gladstone, and might perhaps have turned the scale with
him in favour of negociation. This course would, I am convinced, have
been an infinitely surer and better one than that of war which our
Government have chosen.
My point of view in the matter is of course rather a different one from
yours, for you look only to General Gordon’s safety, whereas I look
also, and indeed primarily, to the well-being of the Nile populations;
but I see no reason that our efforts should not even now be made in
common.
From all the accounts I receive, Lord Wolseley’s expedition will meet
with determined opposition, and it is quite possible that it may be
several months yet on the road—in which case the time will shortly come
when necessity will compel the Government, if they would not fail
altogether in their object of saving Gordon’s life, to have recourse to
our ideas if not to our help. My principal fear indeed is that, going to
work through ignorance of the conditions before them in a blundering
way, their attempts to treat will be so protracted that Khartoum will in
the interval have fallen. I will not, however, be a prophet of evil,
only I would urge you not to relax your efforts. Any independent appeal
made just now to Mr. Gladstone would, I believe, have at least this good
effect, that it would force on his attention the daily increasing
gravity of Gordon’s situation.
Very faithfully yours,
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Febry._ 17, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
I thank you for your letter just received. I have given up (as you see)
all hope of the precious life having been saved. But how cruel has been
the martyrdom of his, during weeks and months, owing to the Government,
of which one cannot speak with aught but the greatest contempt and
indignation. Knowing the faith of the devoted Christian soldier, I have
the hope or rather the consolation of thinking that as he was deserted
by man so his God was nearer to him day by day.
I go tomorrow (Wednesday) till Saturday to Mr. Egmont Hake, the
Biographer of “Chinese Gordon.” I should like very much to talk over one
or two matters with you now, respecting the recovery of his bible and
journal, etc., and also of the proposed additional expedition. Is it not
madness to send one of the Khedive’s sons as Governor General of the
Soudan? I thought the Egyptians were hated by the poor Soudanese.
Unhappy land! What will be the outcome of all this? God, who created the
world out of chaos, can bring order out of the Egyptian confusion.
Believe me, My dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely,
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.
MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT
38, Montpellier Terrace, Cheltenham, _Feb._ 21, 1885.
MY DEAR SIR,
I am staying here till Wednesday, when I shall D.V. return to Hereford,
where I shall anxiously await the result of your kind effort to procure
for me the bible of dear General Gordon.