EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON
MY Indian journey over I left Bombay for England on the 1st March 1884,
and arrived at Suez on the 12th, and going on by Naples to Paris reached
London on the 27th, altogether too late to be of any avail in the matter
of Gordon. He was already at Khartoum.
The only noticeable incident on this homeward journey was that passing
through the Suez Canal we found that vessels arriving from Bombay were
subject to quarantine, and so that any intention I might have had of
going ashore was necessarily abandoned. Nevertheless, while I was
standing with other passengers on deck, a Government boat drew alongside
our ship, remaining just outside the prescribed quarantine limit, and I
heard my name called with inquiry whether I was on board, and going to
the gangway was accosted from the boat by an Englishman in the Khedivial
uniform, who informed me that he was Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbons in the
Egyptian service, and that he had been instructed on behalf of the
Government to notify to me that if I attempted to land I should be
subjected to arrest. The announcement mattered little to me under the
circumstances, though it proved afterwards to be the first step in a
course of prohibition and exile which shut me out from Egypt for the
next three years, and which, as will be seen, was maintained against me
as long as Lord Granville continued at the Foreign Office.
At Paris we spent a few hours in the society of our refugee friends,
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din and James Sanua. The first I
had not seen since the war, for he had spent the first year of his exile
at Damascus, where the sons of Abd-el-Kader had befriended him, and
where he had lived poorly but in security with a number more of the
Egyptian Nationalist exiles. We found him somewhat Europeanized already
by a two months’ stay in Paris. He had left off shaving his head, and
wore a fez instead of a turban, which rather detracted from his dignity
as Sheykh, though he was still dressed in a respectable fur pelisse. “He
talks now openly against the Sultan and the Turks, complains of the
tyranny in Syria, and argues of the Sherif Own as the coming Caliph. The
Mahdi, he says, is the forerunner of the Arabian Caliph who will soon
be.” To him and to Jemal-ed-Din I related all that I had done in India,
and my thought of going to Constantinople, but they warned me this would
be of no use; I might try, but they expected no good to come of it. All
the power there was in the hands of Osman Pasha of Plevna, who cared
only to fill his own purse. Syria was becoming indoctrinated with ideas
of liberty in spite of the tyranny of spies and police. At
Constantinople nothing could be done. We talked of the Mahdi, who was
now the chief subject of interest with Moslems, and of Gordon, who was
at Khartoum. Jemal-ed-Din entirely approved of the letter I had written
to Gordon, and agreed that he would perish now that he had taken the
wrong side. The following occurs in my diary of
“_27th March._—We found Jemal-ed-Din in a little room eight feet square
at the top of a house in the Rue de Seize, where he and Abdu edit a
newspaper called the ‘Indissoluble Link.’ Almost at the same time came
in a very curious party of strangers who quite filled the room—a Russian
lady, an American philanthropist, and two young Bengalis who announced
themselves as Theosophists, come, they said, to consult the great
Sheykh. They talked an extraordinary jargon about humanity, but seemed
kind-hearted people, and so full of their cause as to take no notice
whatever of our presence. The main object of their visit was to inquire
about the Mahdi, whom they were all most anxious to believe in as a
humanitarian, but their minds were perplexed about the slave trade, and
they cross-questioned the Sheykh as to the Mahdi’s principles on that
head. The Sheykh had great difficulty in satisfying them, but explained
how much slaves gained among Mohammedans in exchange for their freedom.
This sent them away happy, but the poor Sheykh was put to his last
shifts to hide his amusement. When they were gone we had a good talk
about India, and all that we had done, which pleased him much.”
I called also at the Embassy, and had an hour with Sheffield, who told
me Gordon’s idea had been to go straight to the Mahdi and make peace
with him, but he had been prevented at Cairo. Now he considered his case
hopeless. Lord Lyons, whom I also saw, acknowledged that we had got into
an inextricable mess in Egypt. The same night we went on to England,
arriving in London. Here I found myself once more in the thick of a
political crisis, of which the main feature was the interminable
Egyptian imbroglio, made more than ever acute by Gordon’s peril at
Khartoum. My journal deals principally with this, and indeed it occupied
for ten months to come almost the whole public thought of Englishmen.
My first visits on arrival were to Button and Knowles, my threatened
arrest in Egypt being upper-most in my mind. “Button still maintains his
connection with the ‘Times,’ though poor Chenery is dead and his place
as Editor has been taken by a young man, Buckle. He gave me a pathetic
account of Chenery’s death. He had suffered great pain for years from a
cancer, of which he told no one of the ‘Times’ staff, though sometimes
it would make him groan aloud. He was very forlorn, being without
intimate friends while knowing every one. But he had an affection for
Button. Then he had suddenly gone away alone and died. Button’s
political report was that the life of Gladstone’s Cabinet was very
precarious—hardly likely to last through the Session. I stood well now,
he thought, with the public, as every one saw I had been right about
Egypt.
To Knowles I told what had happened to me in Egypt in consequence of the
encouragement given me. “Mr. Gladstone?” he said, “I should not be
surprised to see him any day order our troops back and clear bodily out
of Egypt; I have known him for years, and as long as he can twist his
conduct into an apparent consistency of words, he will change his
opinions without scruple. But he will not endure being brought face to
face with a flat contradiction. It has always been the same, about art
and literature and everything else. As yet, he has maintained a certain
verbal consistency, but he cannot do it much longer.”
A third visit was to my sister-in-law, Lady Wentworth, from whom I
learnt that my exclusion from Egypt had been ordered by the Foreign
Office. She knew of this from George Leveson Gower, Granville’s nephew
and Gladstone’s private secretary. Lastly, I saw Randolph Churchill.
“_30th March._—I found Randolph in bed in a little room at the top of
his house in Connaught Place. We had a long talk about Arabi and my
visit to India. He was curious to know what I had been doing with the
Mohammedans there, for Gorst had given him the idea that I had started
the university at Hyderabad for revolutionary purposes. I told him I
considered a revolution in India certain if changes in the system of
government were not introduced. He said, ‘It is hopeless to try and get
the Conservatives to take up the idea of any sort of change.’ He seemed
taken, however, with the notion I suggested to him of playing the part
of champion of the Mohammedans. I proposed that we should go together to
Constantinople in the recess, but he said he was canvassing Birmingham
and could not possibly find time. About my having been prevented from
landing in Egypt he was especially interested, and thinks it could be
made a capital point of attack on the Government. I told him the history
of Knowles’s message to me from Gladstone, without however mentioning
Knowles’s name. But he said at once: ‘Oh, I know, that’s Knowles,
because he has told lots of people the same thing.’ He advises the whole
of my correspondence about it being lumped at once into the ‘Times,’ and
that Drummond Wolff should be set at the Foreign Office to make the most
of it in Parliament.
“He told me also that overtures had been made him from the Khedive for a
withdrawal of the charges he had brought forward implicating him in the
massacres of Alexandria, notably through the Prince of Wales, who had
had a quarrel with him, nine years before, and had not spoken to him
since. Now, however, the Prince had dined with him at a select dinner of
people interested in Egypt, and had talked highly of the Khedive to him.
‘The thing, however,’ he said, ‘has served its purpose, and we must go
on to something fresh. I look upon the charge as proved, and I know it
smashed up the Khedive and the Government policy at the time.’ Wentworth
has made a really good speech on the Soudan battles, and may, I think,
help us much in our new campaign.
“_31st March._—Gordon has been defeated outside Khartoum, his army of
2,500 flying from sixty of the Mahdi’s men. What a hideous comedy it all
is. He is now calling for English troops, he who went out to give
freedom to the Soudan, peace on earth and goodwill towards men. [This is
how I regarded his mission at the time.] Called on Sir Wilfrid Lawson,
the only honest man in Parliament. He urges that we should make some
move for the restoration of Arabi, but I doubt whether the time has
come. At the present time the Mahdi is the one popular man in Egypt. Saw
Lyulph Stanley.[28] He is now for a Protectorate in Egypt, and I can
find nobody in favour of a Nationalist restoration. They all say now
that I was right and Arabi was an honest man, but they treat it as a
matter of history, and rather old history too. Button advises my getting
a legal opinion on the case of my exclusion from Egypt before going any
further. Lawson sends me some doggerel verse about the war, not so good
as the last he wrote, but to the point.
“_3rd April._—Lunched with Button at the Carlton, who tells me the Jews
were never in such a fright about Egypt as they were two days ago. The
Rothschilds have still four millions invested there and are working the
press all they can. Lady Rosebery is nearly the only person who is
allowed to see Gladstone. But they are in a terrible fright of his doing
something violent, _e.g._, withdrawing the troops from Egypt. He,
Button, sees the Rothschilds nearly daily, for the ‘Times’ is in their
hands. To-day, however, they are more confident, and people are buying
Egyptian stock. While we were talking, Burnaby[29] came in with
Churchill and Gorst, and I had some talk with them. Burnaby looks weak
and wears his arm in a sling. [He was just back from Souakin, where he
had taken part in Graham’s expedition and the battle of Tamanieb as a
volunteer.] And I felt some disgust at shaking hands with a man who has
been murdering the Arabs with his shot gun as he seems to have done. I
have never liked him, for he has the most evil countenance one can
imagine. I like Churchill far the best of the three. He has a light
cheery manner like a boy at school.
“In the Park, where I sat for a few minutes and saw the two Lytton girls
looking like roses. Their father starts for Sorrento to-night.
“_4th April._—To Auberon Herbert at the Langham Hotel. He highly
approves of the idea of letting the Egyptians choose their own ruler,
and waiting for a spontaneous movement to bring back Arabi. If the
British Government recalled Arabi now and proposed him, he would be
looked upon with suspicion by the people. Thence to Lawson’s, whom I
found in high delight at having got a declaration out of the Government
that they do not intend to send troops to Khartoum.
“Lunched with Labouchere. He is more practical, and we have discussed
every detail of the policy to be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel
the ground through Herbert Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the
oracle. He told me the history of Gordon’s mission. Gordon’s idea had
been to go out and make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely
nothing to do with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He
was going to Souakin straight, where he counted upon one of the
neighbouring Sheykhs, whose sons’ lives he had saved or spared, and his
mission was to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and
Baring caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop
to see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the
Khedive’s Lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of
peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last
few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided
absolutely to recall all the troops from Egypt when Hicks’s defeat was
heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Souakin had been
forced on him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give
Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without orders.
This Graham of course had done, and Gladstone more angry still had gone
down to sulk at Coombe. [Bertram Currie’s villa in Coombe Wood.] Now he
would stand it no longer, and he had let Hartington in by coming up and
making the speech he did last night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere
thought the moment most favourable for a new move.
“_7th April._—Button tells me the Rothschilds are still in a great state
of anxiety about their money, and Button is for the Government
guaranteeing a loan of £8,000,000. It appears that the French are quite
ready to put in their oar and themselves guarantee if allowed to
protect. There is a split between Nubar and Clifford Lloyd. Nubar has
threatened to resign. This will bring things to a crisis.
“_8th April._—At Crabbet, dawdling about among the horses, and going to
see the Vardon property, which is for sale, and which I must buy if I
can. This property has for the best part of a century been a thorn in
our flesh, running like a wedge into Crabbet. There is an entry in the
shooting diary of 1824 in which complaint is made of ‘old Vardon’s
poaching.’ Now is the time to rectify our frontier. An estate is a
kingdom, with its wars and intrigues and ambitions and thirst for new
territory, and, though I have no personal wish to increase mine, I
consider this purchase a duty of my reign.
“I have written to Abdu a statement of my views about India, and to
Selim Faris asking him what chance I should have of being able to
influence people at Constantinople, if I went there, in favour of an
effort at Mohammedan regeneration.
“_9th April._—Called on Mrs. Howard. We had a tremendous argument, I
defending the Mahdi, she attacking him as a fanatic, and begging me not
to talk in that way in England. She said: ‘It is so stupid of you,
because you have so much sense, and if you would be moderate you might
have great influence.’ I said: ‘My influence will never be great in
England, because English people care nothing for principle and
everything for party, and I am not a party man. My influence lies in the
East, where all understand and accept me.’ We talked about Baring, and
their refusal to let me land in Egypt, and she declared the Foreign
Office had had nothing to do with it. But George said it was the only
sensible thing they had done yet. We went on to Gladstone, and she
described how he had become a political gambler. He had gambled with me
by sending me to Egypt, just as he had since gambled with Gordon. If we
succeeded he won; if we failed he did not intend to pay. This, I doubt
not, is the position exactly.
“Lunched at the Carlton with Button. He intends to stand for Dorchester
at the General Election, which may be anywhen now. But it will depend on
events in Egypt. Gordon’s death would precipitate matters, but anyhow
Egypt must go bankrupt in a month or two. He asked me why I did not look
out for a constituency, but I said there was none in England would elect
me. I could only conscientiously stand as a Home Ruler, and the Irish
would not have me because I am an Englishman. Besides, I could not
belong to a Party. He agreed that I was not meant for Parliament and had
a stronger position outside. I had some talk with Miltown, who believes
in the Sultan’s Caliphal prestige. I fancy the Tories, when they find
they cannot annex Egypt, will hand it over to the Sultan. Anything would
be better than the present state of things. I care little now who goes
to Egypt so long as the English leave and no other European Power takes
their place. But things are in the most extraordinary muddle; I find
people here more cordial and respectful of my opinion than they were
last year.
“_10th April._—My letter proposing a new settlement for Egypt is in the
‘Times,’ with a leading article in disparagement. It is all very well to
bluster, but I cannot see how they are to carry on their game of brag
with no soldiers to send to Egypt and the French getting angry, and
bankruptcy staring them in the face.
“_11th April._—Dined with Eddy Hamilton at the St. James’s Club. He has
been wanting to see me, and has written four times since I came home. In
spite of his declaration that we were not to talk politics, nothing else
was talked of. He began by saying that he had read my letter to the
‘Times,’ and agreed with most of it, but he thought it a pity that I had
mentioned the Khedive’s abdication as a possible thing. I must know that
the English Government was committed to his support. It was committed
before Mr. Gladstone came into office, and such pledges could not be
withdrawn from. He himself had always regretted this, and had considered
the Joint Note of January, 1882, a great mistake. But the thing was done
now and there was no help for it. He was sick of the whole thing and
wished Egypt at the bottom of the sea. But they could not get out of it
till there was a prospect of peace. I said: ‘You will never have peace
as long as you insist on keeping Tewfik, and you are only at the
beginning of your troubles. We will plague you in turn with all the
plagues of Egypt until you let the people go. This year you will have
the Mahdi, next year you will have a flood, and the next a famine.’ He
said: ‘It is impossible to do anything for the Egyptians. They will not
help themselves, they are such miserable cowards, and there is not an
honest man among them.’ I said: ‘As for their cowardice, you have taken
peasants from the fields and have sent them to fight for a man they hate
against a man they love. As for their dishonesty, you have driven the
honest men out of Egypt or frightened them into holes and corners. There
are plenty of honest Egyptians, and I could guarantee an honest
government if you would let me, only not with Tewfik, and not with the
class of men you now employ.’ He said: ‘The rest are too stupid.’ I
said: ‘Egypt is the easiest of all lands to govern, and it does not
require cleverness to do it. It requires honesty and the consent of the
people. In all Arab societies the character of the Ruler is reflected in
the Ministers, and, with a ruler whom they respected, and who had the
qualities they respected, you could reform the whole mass. But Tewfik
they never can respect, and the Circassians are opposed to all reform.’
We talked about Gordon and the Mahdi. Gordon it appears has written to
say that the Mahdi has no power in the Soudan, and Eddy thinks the whole
thing a myth. He does not want to send an army to Khartoum, but trusts
to the desert frontier as Egypt’s best defence. In this he is right, but
I told him he must expect raids such as the Wahhabis used to make in the
last century on Bagdad and Syria; they used to make desert marches of a
thousand miles. I warned him against employing Indian troops, and told
him my view of the danger of mixing India up with the troubles of Egypt.
He said: ‘I hope there may be no occasion.’ But from his tone I should
judge they have the possibility of employing Indian troops in their eye,
in spite of their public declarations. He said they had no reason to
believe these otherwise than loyal.
“We then talked about my exclusion from Egypt, and he was glad I had not
attempted to force a landing on my way home, which he had feared. He
assured me the Foreign Office had nothing whatever to do with the matter
(which is not true), and trusted I would let the matter rest. I told him
that was out of the question, and as a public duty, if for no other
reason, I must bring it before the Foreign Office. He seemed much taken
aback by this, and I am sure it was to find out my intentions, amongst
other things, that he proposed this dinner. We then talked about India.
. . . While we were talking the Duke of Marlborough came up and talked
also about India, and my success there with the Mohammedans. He knows
India well, and is a cleverer man than people give him credit for,
cleverer than his brother Randolph. [I ought rather to have said more
intellectual, for he could not compare with Randolph in readiness of wit
or those qualities which made his brother a leader of men. But his mind
was a broad one, and if he had lived for anything else but pleasure he
might have gained a high public position in the world.]
“I am satisfied with the conversation with Eddy. It is clear they are at
their wits’ end for a policy. They are waiting at present upon
Providence, but Providence will not help them.
“_12th April._—An important move is noticed in to-day’s telegrams.
Germany and Austria have presented identical notes pressing the claims
of their subjects on the Egyptian Government. This will force a
financial crisis and bring all Europe into the matter.
“_13th April, Easter Sunday._—An anxious letter from Sir Wilfrid Lawson.
He is as angry as I am about Egypt. He would clear out of it bag and
baggage. I would stay long enough to do justice and make reparation, no
matter at what cost to England.
“_15th April._—Abdu and Sanua have both written, delighted with my
letter in the ‘Times.’ The French papers have taken it up and reprinted
it, and I expect it will cause some trouble to Baring.
“_16th April._—Met Button at the Carlton and talked over plans. Drummond
Wolff, whom I met the other day, asked me whether it was true that
Button meant to break with the Fourth Party, and I mentioned this to
Button, and he said that it was so; Randolph was becoming more
unscrupulous than ever, and Gorst was still worse. Not long ago they had
tried to play a trick upon the ‘Times,’ and had all but succeeded. Gorst
had written to Buckle, who is young and new to his work, to say that Sir
Stafford Northcote had decided to retire after the Easter recess from
the leadership of the Opposition, and Buckle had actually got the
article in print, when at twelve o’clock at night the article writer had
suggested that he (Button) should be consulted. Button was in bed, but
he got up and succeeded in finding his uncle, Robert Bourke, who told
him the whole thing was a plant, he having been with Northcote that very
afternoon devising plans for the coming Session. So the article was
stopped just in time. Wolff, Button thinks, is the only honest one of
the lot. I expect Robert Bourke has advised him to have nothing more to
do with them. Young Hamid Ullah is here.
“_18th April._—Lunched with Colonel Osborn[30] to talk over plans
connected with India. He thinks I have done a great work there, and
agrees with nearly every point of my programme. But he says it is
useless bringing it forward this year, as Parliament is entirely
occupied with the prospect of a dissolution, and it would be impossible
to get members to commit themselves to vigorous action. He is probably
right.
“At three Mr. Stead, the new ‘Pall Mall’ Editor, called, and I had a
long conversation with him about the prospects in Egypt. He tried to
make me commit myself to some approval of annexation as better than the
present state of things, but I would not do this, and I think he went
away with the impression that I was impracticable. He is by way of
knowing a great deal of the opinions of the various European Cabinets,
and assured me that Germany would not interfere with anything that might
be done or proposed to be done in Egypt, that Bismarck did not care what
happened to the Suez Canal, and that the question would have to be
settled between France and England. He did not believe in the Mahdi
having any real power in the Soudan, and Gordon ought to be reinforced.
Mr. Stead is a smart intelligent pressman, very different indeed from
his predecessor Morley. I do not think we are likely to agree or that he
will make any use of my opinions. We are too wide apart. At any rate he
promised to publish nothing as mine without letting me see what he had
written.
“As he was going, Jack and Mark Napier rushed in to ask if I would help
them to save Gordon.[31] They had an idea, which was to get together a
thousand sportsmen, men they explained who would be ready ‘to go a
thousand miles to shoot a lion,’ and try to force a passage from Suakin
to Berber and carry off Gordon on the true principles of a rescue. They
thought I might like to join them and show them the way. But I told them
the scheme was nonsense, and even if it wasn’t I would have nothing to
do with armed operations against the Arabs. Much as I liked Gordon
personally, I considered him to be in the wrong and the others in the
right, and I would rather see him perish than cause the death of one of
his opponents. If it came to sending an Embassy to the Mahdi, I might be
able to help them, and I advised them to put this idea forward, rather
than the other. I have written to Jemal-ed-Din to ask him what he thinks
of it.
“_19th April._—At Crabbet. Count Alfred Potocki came down with his son
Roman, and Mr. Marcowski, manager of Count Branicki’s stud, all Poles
and breeders of Arab horses, to see our horses. They have come over to
England on purpose to see them, and are in raptures. Count Potocki is a
very distinguished man. Forty years ago he was attaché to the Austrian
Embassy in London and knew everybody worth knowing, and he still keeps
up a marvellous acquaintance with English politics. We talked over the
whole situation with regard to Egypt. He ridicules the idea of the
French being able to fight over the matter, and he considers Gladstone
the most dangerous man England has ever had as minister. He tells me the
new Russian Ambassador in London who has just been appointed is the same
Staal[32] who was my friend twenty-five years ago at Athens. It is
singular how many men whom I was with there, and knew intimately as
colleagues, have since distinguished themselves. Haymerlé, whom I
remember lamenting that he never on account of his birth could rise
higher than the rank of Secretary, died Prime Minister of Austria;
Nelidoff is Ambassador to the Porte; Staal is Ambassador in London;
Malzen Grand Chamberlain at Munich, and Dufferin, who however was only a
visitor at Athens in 1859, holds first European rank as a Diplomatist
after Bismarck. We talked about Lytton, who Potocki declares will be the
next Tory Foreign Secretary, and we talked about India.
“Button telegraphs that a Conference has been called!
“_20th April._—The ‘Observer’ announces that the Conference will be held
in London, but will confine itself to financial matters. Baring has been
summoned to England. My only fear now is the re-establishment of the
Dual Control, which is evidently on the cards.
“_21st April._—Twiss has given his opinion on the case of my being
prevented landing in Egypt. It is wholly adverse to my legal position as
having a right to land. I must now treat the case diplomatically.
“_22nd April._—Parliament met yesterday, and Gladstone has at last
admitted that Gordon is ‘hemmed in,’ though he denies that he is
‘surrounded.’ The Governor of Berber[33] telegraphs that he must make
friends with the Mahdi, and the French are writing violent articles. The
‘Pall Mall’ this evening predicts a war with France.
“_23rd April._—To London. Things worse than ever in Egypt. Baring is on
his way home to be hauled over the coals, and about time; Nubar talking
again of resigning if Berber is not relieved; and Topsy Egerton,[34] who
is in charge at Cairo, recommending a mixed English and Egyptian
expedition of relief.
“Jack and Mark Napier came again, and I read them the draft of a letter
I have written to Gladstone, proposing to act as mediator for the relief
of Gordon.[35] This was suggested by one I received this morning from
Jemal-ed-Din to the effect that for my sake he would do what he could
with the Mahdi to save Gordon’s life. Button advised me to take it
myself to Downing Street and ask to see Gladstone. But the Prime
Minister was busy with a Cabinet Council, and I was obliged to entrust
it to Eddy Hamilton in the hope of getting an answer. Button says it is
too late, and that they decided yesterday to send a relief expedition to
Berber. But as yet they have announced no such intention. Lord De la
Warr,[36] too, approves of the letter, and I think at least it will be
an advantage to put it on record that the offer was made. I told Eddy
briefly the nature of my proposal, and he said he was entirely for
peace, but he could not promise me Mr. Gladstone would see me, because I
was looked upon as an opponent of their Egyptian policy.[37]
“My idea of a solution would be either to go myself or get some one else
to go, Jemal-ed-Din or Abdu or young Abd-el-Aal, first to Dongola, and
thence to Obeyd. There ought not to be much difficulty about this. The
condition, I fancy, which might be accepted would be the evacuation of
the fortified places by Gordon and such Europeans, Turks, Copts, and
others as might wish to go back to Egypt; a treaty of peace, or rather
an engagement on the part of the Mahdi that he would fix his frontier at
Berber and Dongola, and the Egyptian Government theirs at Assouan; a
guarantee of the Red Sea from Foreign European attack; an indemnity to
the Hadendowas as blood money for those slain at Teb, Tamasi, and
elsewhere. For myself I should stipulate that no military operation was
to be begun during my mission, that no revenge should be taken for my
death, or expedition be sent for my release in case of capture, and that
it should be recorded in writing that the terms of the agreement should
be kept. I should also mention that I should expect Arabi to be restored
in Lower Egypt should my mission prove successful. But it is extremely
unlikely they will let me go.
“At the Carlton Club I met Seymour FitzGerald,[38] with whom I talked
about India. He wonders I do not stand at Horsham for the next
elections, or as a Tory Home Ruler in Ireland. Major Napier,[39] too,
was there, and old Ranalagh with whom I have always had a sympathy as
having been once a rebel. He fought with the Carlists in Spain. De la
Warr is expecting the ex-Khedive at Buckhurst.
“Later to Button’s, where I met Brocklehurst, Gordon’s chief friend and
correspondent, and had a long talk with him about Gordon. It appears
that Gordon asked repeatedly for me when he was starting for Egypt, and
it is a thousand pities I did not see him (being away in India), as I
could have prevented his making the mistake of going to Tewfik and
neglecting to go to the Mahdi. Brocklehurst declares that Gordon, from
first to last, has refused to believe in the Mahdi’s influence, and does
not believe in it now. He says that if he had done so he would certainly
have made friends with him. But he is very angry with Baring. He does
not trust much to the relief expedition, though he is in favour of
trying it, and I think he is inclined to support my plan of negotiation
instead. The only thing is, is it not too late?
“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Arthur Godley, who has always been
sympathetic with my ideas. He is now at the India Office, and can afford
to talk more openly than formerly when he was Gladstone’s Private
Secretary. He is all for peace in Egypt, and thinks Gordon mad, which I,
too, begin to think may be the real explanation of it. About India he
was very ready apparently to take my views. But he considered the ill-
feeling between Englishmen and natives was confined to Bengal. I am to
go to him again in a day or two at the India Office to talk over Indian
affairs. He agreed with me when I said that the end of it all would be
that we should leave Egypt and only keep possession of her debt.
“_24th April._—No answer from Downing Street, but Button says that at
the Cabinet Council yesterday afternoon they changed their minds in
favour of peace. Wolseley was there, and there was to be no expedition
after all. He thinks perhaps my letter may have had something to do with
it. Lunched at the Carlton and met Jem Lowther,[40] who talked about
Egypt, and Robert Bourke, who is asking the question about the dispatch
of troops to Berber and Khartoum. It is the opinion of both these Right
Honourable Gentlemen that the Government would give its ears to learn
that Gordon was dead.
“To the House of Commons and heard Gladstone make his explanation about
Gordon. It is certainly most audacious. But I am convinced it means no
troops, though nearly everybody seemed to understand the contrary. What
he said was that ‘All human means would be taken.’ Button, who was in
the gallery with me, whispered ‘Human means means you.’ Rivers
Wilson[41] was also in the gallery, and proposes to come and see me to-
morrow, a thing he has not done for the last two years. Gladstone is
looking thin and old. To my mind he does not show to advantage in the
House of Commons. He is argumentative, short tempered, and insincere;
the reverse in fact of what he is at home. And to-day he looked like a
fraudulent bankrupt trying to make his creditors believe he was paying
them twenty shillings in the pound. One wonders how he can inspire
confidence in his supporters, but I have never heard him on a really
great occasion.
“I have written to Jemal-ed-Din, sending extracts from the ‘Pall Mall,’
which has my letter to Gordon, the one written from India, in it, and a
leading article recommending that I should be sent to Obeyd to treat
with the Mahdi.” [It says: “If everything—Khartoum, arsenals, steamers,
and munitions of war—if all these are to be handed over to the Mahdi and
the garrisons are to trust their lives to his tender mercies, our proper
agent in the Soudan is not General Gordon, but Mr. Wilfrid Blunt.
General Gordon was prepared to go a great length in order to conciliate
the Mahdi. Mr. Blunt is prepared to go all lengths. General Gordon, as a
last resort, and being a man of war from his youth up, has always avowed
his readiness to fight rather than see his men cut to pieces. Mr.
Wilfrid Blunt would not injure the hair of an Arab to save the lives of
General Gordon and all his men. Mr. Blunt, then, is obviously the man to
whom the Government should turn in this the hour of their need. He
represents their policy to a nicety. If they will not relieve Berber,
and if they can do nothing to assist Gordon to hold Khartoum, let them
at least send Mr. Blunt in hot haste to El Obeid to arrange with the
Mahdi for the escape of the abandoned garrisons. Mr. Blunt is not less
brave than General Gordon, and he could be sacrificed at least as
safely.”]
“At Button’s, where I looked in again to ask his advice about an answer
which has come from Downing Street. Reginald Brett, Hartington’s
Secretary, called, and Button saw him in the other room. He states
positively that the Government has decided not only not to send troops
to Berber, but to forbid the Egyptian Government sending any. They mean
to do nothing at all, and have telegraphed to Egypt to say so. He thinks
they will certainly come to me. Eddy Hamilton’s note is to the effect
that Mr. Gladstone will answer later, but is now laying my proposal
before the Cabinet. He writes, however, another private note suggesting
that I should talk it over with Brand.[42] This, however, Button
recommends me not to do, so I have written to say I can only talk to Mr.
Gladstone, and will wait his convenience. What they want is, evidently,
that I should take all the responsibility of the negotiation on myself,
and offer terms which they might afterwards repudiate. But they won’t
catch me again doing this, and, if I go to Obeyd, I go as British envoy.
Otherwise I should only be waylaid by the Khedive on my road. Button is
in high delight at the upshot of it all. He tells me it was Wolseley
himself who told him what had been decided in the Cabinet.
“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Captain Abney, a friend of
Gordon’s.
“_25th April._—To Button’s early, to talk matters over again. But there
is nothing new, except that the Bisharin Arabs have joined the Mahdi,
and the desert of Korusko is blocked. The telegrams in the papers don’t
say this. But Button had it from Wolseley, and I have written again to
Jemal-ed-Din, asking him about the terms which we might ask. The
Government won’t say anything to me till Baring arrives; that is to say
on Monday.
“Wrote a number of letters, to Jemal-ed-Din especially, and to Arabi,
asking the latter whether it would be possible for him to work with
Ismaïl in case such a solution should be proposed. He is to answer by
telegram, the words ‘Content,’ or ‘Refuse.’ This because I think the
time is come when a new settlement _must_ be made; and this is not the
most unlikely of the many proposals that will be brought forward.
“_26th April._—Called on Button. He tells me the Cabinet are again
wavering about sending troops to Berber, or rather Khartoum, for they
would probably start from Massowa if at all. The reason of this is that
the Liberal M.P.s understood Mr. Gladstone’s declaration yesterday in a
sense exactly opposite to his real meaning, that is to say as a promise
of sending troops, and half a dozen of their leaders went to him and
explained how much they approved of it, and Mr. Gladstone had been
unable to satisfy them by saying that all he had meant was that Gordon
should be ordered home. So, to please these people, there is to be more
slaughter. But we shall know when I get the answer to my letter. Button
tells me that several members of the Cabinet would be glad to go out of
office, notably Harcourt,[43] who is afraid of dynamite and is tired of
being watched by the police. Three or four days ago, talking of the
Conference with Natty Rothschild, Harcourt said: ‘Our hope is that the
Powers will refuse our proposals, which will give us an excuse for
coming straight out of Egypt.’ Button advises me not to send in my
papers about my being refused entrance to Egypt until I get my answer
about the Soudan. My own idea was to do so at once, as it is a rule of
strategy to fight stronger than ever when you are negotiating for peace.
“Then to Rivers Wilson whom I found in bed with a cold and a fox
terrier. He is of opinion that the Conference will meet and that it will
be impossible to exclude politics. ‘Ferry,’[44] he said, ‘is beginning
to feel his legs, and he means to restore the Dual Control, and will
insist on dragging in everything if he is asked to make a concession of
French financial rights. You talk about altering the Law of Liquidation,
but that is out of the question, and whatever happens, Egypt must pay
the interest on the debt. If this was not so I should be very happy to
see you set up Arabi or anybody you liked at Cairo. But what there must
be is a strong Government, which can collect the taxes and pay the
interest.’ He believes Egypt still able to raise £9,000,000 of revenue
and pay away half of it. But he spoke less positively than in former
days. We talked about Ismaïl. He would never have anything to do with
his coming back. Ismaïl was no longer any good, as he had lost all his
prestige, and though clever could not maintain himself. Tewfik was good
as an instrument. He himself had chosen him in preference to Halim as
being the more absolutely servile of the two—but of course he could not
rule. Arabi had lost all sympathy in England by his personal cowardice.
Rivers in fact is all for annexation if annexation is allowed by the
other Powers, which he doubts. I then told him my views for Egypt. He
has a good deal of influence with the Rothschilds, and if we could get
them at all on our side we should win the game.
“Then on to Labouchere, who has just written a capital letter about
Egypt in the ‘Times.’ He wants me to get Arabi to write him a letter
from Ceylon, giving his view about a possible restoration of the
National Party. He considers Gordon to be a stark lunatic, and is for
leaving him to his own devices.
“_28th April._—Berber is being abandoned, the garrison having gone over
to the Mahdi. Khartoum will follow.
“_29th April._—The ‘Standard’ has a telegram, saying that certain troops
and tribes from Khartoum have joined the Mahdi. If so, Gordon’s end has
come. The ‘Daily News’ has a letter from O’Kelly[45] at Dongola,
describing the Mahdi and his system in almost the same language that
these were described to me at Cairo seven months ago. I wonder whether
Eddy Hamilton would still maintain that the Mahdi was nobody.
“To London and found a letter from Jemal-ed-Din, giving me in detail his
idea of the Mission of Peace that might be sent to the Mahdi.[46] Button
tells me that the Government have decided _pour tout potage_ to send
Curly Knox to Khartoum! The idea is that he, knowing the country as a
sportsman, and something of the language, could smuggle himself into the
town, where he could deliver to Gordon the Government’s order that he
should return. The Government think that this will absolve them from all
further responsibility, and that, if Gordon—as he probably would—should
refuse to come back, his blood would be on his own head. I remember
Curly Knox ever since the days of the Crimean war. Now he is a somewhat
decayed blood, a rabid damned-nigger guardsman. And I would not be in
his shoes when the Mahdi has got hold of him—only he will never go.
Baring has been to the ‘Times’ people, which is always a sign with
officials that they feel their position shaky; and Button is sure he
won’t go back to Egypt. He has made too absurd a hash of it there.
Colvin, he said, was a clever fellow to get out of it when he did.
“Called on Hill, the Editor of the ‘Daily News,’ who has been asking me
to write for him. He agreed as to re-establishing a National Government
in Egypt, but it was necessary to find some formula for Mr. Gladstone
which could reconcile him to it; Mr. Gladstone changed his principles
constantly—but every time he needed a fresh formula, by which he could
satisfy his mind that he was consistent; he had nailed his colours to
Tewfik, and it would require management to get him to abandon him. As
for Gordon, they were going to do nothing now except perhaps get ready
for moving a small column of relief in July.
“Luncheon at the Carlton with Burnaby, whom I especially dislike. He
said he did not care a rap what happened to Gordon or Khartoum, and why
should he? So long as he has something to tell his electors, it will be
enough. He is a dull heavy fellow in my opinion, with a dash of cunning
and more than a dash of brutality. Afterwards to the House of Commons,
where I had a long talk with Lawson and John Morley,[47] whom Mrs.
Howard has written advising me to take into my councils. We three
discussed the whole thing. First, about Gordon, who we agreed was past
praying for. Morley said the Government were willing to bite their
tongues out now for having sent him; they were very angry with him, for
he had done everything he said he wouldn’t do, and done nothing that
they told him to do. He thought if his death had happened two months
ago, it would have turned out the Ministry. Now people were tired of
Gordon, and, though there would be a row, it would blow over. He thought
the Government would rather do anything than accept my help, it would be
very unpopular, and, with the failure of Gordon before their eyes, they
would be doubly disinclined. Still the necessity might be so great as to
force them.
“About Egypt I explained my views at length, Morley insisting that I
should put aside all moral arguments, and treat the case only as it
might appear to regard English interests. I said, therefore, that I
recognized two undoubted interests—(1) the Suez Canal, and (2) the
friendship of the Mohammedan world. Both these he admitted, and said you
may add a third. If things go on as they are now, we shall be at war
with France in less than five years. I then explained that as regards
the Suez Canal, we must either make an arrangement with Europe or with
France, and secure our interest in it by sharing it with them. The
friendship of the Mohammedan world could be best secured by establishing
a Mohammedan Government in Egypt and withdrawing our troops. But France
would only be satisfied with the establishment of a strong Government,
which could keep order. This could be done by allowing the people to
choose their own ruler—a ruler who would be supported by the troops.
Egypt was the easiest country in the world to govern, but you must have
the troops on your side. This seemed to please Morley as practical and
businesslike. He asked me, however, to explain how it was that last
August Sherif Pasha had declared to the Government that he was satisfied
with the loyalty of the troops and begged them to withdraw; it was then
decided that all the English troops should leave Egypt in the spring,
except a Corporal’s guard to be stationed at Alexandria, not to protect
the Khedive, but to prevent interference from the French. I told him the
reason was this, that the Egyptians then had no leader, and were
hopeless in the hands of the Circassians. But now the Mahdi had appeared
as a champion, and the army would serve him rather than Tewfik. It was
necessary therefore now to consider the Mahdi, and find a ruler who
could act on friendly terms with him. He asked about Arabi, saying he
was out of the question now. But I told him I still considered Arabi a
valuable man, as a good Mohammedan and one who would take advice. But he
must not be recalled as our nominee, which would spoil his influence.
‘Yes,’ Morley said, ‘the Egyptians must choose, and we must leave the
country—but we must not make it over to France.’
“_1st May._—Mr. Gladstone’s answer has come. Her Majesty’s Government
cannot make use of my offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, ‘in as
much as it must already be known throughout that region that they in
common with the Government of Egypt have no other desire than to promote
the evacuation of the country—and the restoration of its liberties.’
This is as pure a specimen of Gladstonese as can be found in Hansard.
And the ‘promotion of an evacuation’ is as funny as anything since the
French were reported to have ‘evacuated Spiders and Worms’ [an old
Napoleonic joke].
“To a Peace Conference, where I arrived just in time to prevent two
annexationists, Villiers Stuart and McCoan from carrying a resolution
calling on England to ‘take a determined course with regard to reform in
Egypt,’ specifying the reforms suggested by Arabi. I exposed this
manœuvre as meaning the dispatch to Egypt of fifty more Clifford Lloyds
and twenty more Evelyn Barings, and got an amendment passed that ‘reform
in Egypt should be entrusted to the only hands capable of effecting it,
those of the Egyptians themselves.’ McCoan went away in a huff, and
Stuart talked of resigning the chair.
“To the House of Commons, where I had a talk in the tea room with old
Donald Currie.[48] He told me that Gladstone had it all his own way
still in the Cabinet, and was at last anxious about Gordon. ‘His one
idea now,’ he said, ‘is to avoid more bloodshed.’ Both he and Sir George
Campbell,[49] who joined our conversation, talked of Gordon as having
gone off his head. I showed him that terms must be come to at once with
the Mahdi if we were not to have another bloody war. He promised to
speak to Gladstone in this sense.
“Spent the evening with Button looking through the Gordon Blue Book. It
is most damaging for the Government. Donald Currie and Campbell talked
of Gordon as having gone off his head. But this Blue Book shows the
Government went off theirs too.
“_2nd May._—Went to see Lady C. who talked about the Prince of Wales and
his political ideas. She says he is coming round a bit to Arabi.
“_3rd May._—There has been a great split between Randolph Churchill and
Lord Salisbury; and Churchill has resigned the Chairmanship of the
Conservative Union. This will probably save the Government, who were
threatened with a dissolution, nominally on the Reform Bill, but really
on their Egyptian policy.
“_5th May._—Sent in my case of exclusion from Egypt to Lord Granville.
It is certainly a strong one, and I think it must harass them if it does
no other good.
“_6th May._—An extraordinary set of Parliamentary Papers published
relating to Gordon. Reading these and the others carefully through, I
have come to the conclusion that Gordon is a very self-willed man,
without fixed rule of action. In any case he has clearly lost his head,
and, having failed to exercise the influence he expected over the
Soudanese, has turned against them, and is now the bitterest enemy of
everything he supported as good last year. He is fighting for his own
hand as simply and solely as any adventurer of them all. It will lead to
a new war, if he has not his head cut off and sent to Obeyd before the
summer is over.
“_7th May._—Called on Percy Wyndham,[50] who is much exercised against
the Government, as is natural, but at the same time is reasonable about
Gordon. I find most people inclined in private to think him out of his
mind. Percy has acted very straight in all this Egyptian business. He
was one of the minority of nine, and the only Tory who voted against the
war in 1882, and he has never made a mistake on any essential point. I
told him about my being refused a landing in Egypt, and he has promised,
when the time comes, to take the matter up in Parliament. As my nearest
relation, he is the right man to do it.
“Lunched with Dr. Leitner.[51] He shows great sympathy with the
Mohammedans, but is one of the Conservative school, loving the Turks,
and desiring no change. He wants me to make it up with the Sultan, and
urges me to go to Constantinople, and thinks I might gain influence
there.
“_8th May._—Button also thinks I had better go to Constantinople and
that Dufferin would be glad to see me. He, Button, has seen Wolseley,
who assures him no preparations are yet made for a Soudan expedition.
But he thinks, all the same, they will send a small force when the Nile
rises and will have a large force in Egypt. He wants me to call on him,
but I don’t think I will do this, as anything I could tell him would
only make him more anxious to send troops. I wrote yesterday to Jemal-
ed-Din, telling him I washed my hands of Gordon, that he had proved
himself a friend neither to liberty, nor to the Arabs, nor yet to Islam.
“A long talk with Mrs. Howard. She says people will never forgive me for
having given Arabi information before the war, especially about his
being attacked from the Suez Canal. Lord Granville is very angry still
and F. Leveson,[52] but she thinks not Mr. Gladstone. She says the
Government could never recognize the Mahdi as a religious personage.
“_9th May._—Mrs. Howard, talking yesterday of my article in the
‘Nineteenth Century’ on the proposed Arab race at Newmarket, said that
Freddy Leveson had asked Rosebery the other day why he continued on the
turf, and he had answered because it was the easiest way in England to
be accepted as a statesman, and he had appealed to Gladstone, who quite
agreed with him. She tells me that her husband, who represents the ideas
of the rank and file of the Liberal Party, is infinitely disgusted with
the Egyptian Policy, and says that half the party would vote against the
Government but for Home Questions.
“Called on Hugh Wyndham[53] in Dover Street, he having asked to see me.
He is Secretary of the Constantinople Embassy. We talked the Eastern
Question thoroughly through, and he seemed disposed to think my policy
might be adopted eventually as far as allowing the Arabs to set up a
Caliphate was concerned. Constantinople, he says, is crumbling to
pieces, the Turks of Europe emigrating in a continuous stream to Asia
Minor. The Germans are still supporting the Sultan. The Government of
the Porte is defunct, and the Sultan rules everything through a changing
set of Ministers who are all opposed to each other. The Sultan himself
is a mono-maniac, fancying himself in constant danger of assassination.
Hugh had seen him when Dufferin was on leave, and the Sultan had talked
to him for three-quarters of an hour about a certain Armenian doctor who
had been found dead in the Bosphorus, and he could be got to think of
nothing else. He thought Dufferin would wish to see me if I went to
Constantinople.
“_10th May._—To Button’s. He tells me the Government scheme was to offer
a remission of the English interest on the Suez Canal shares, for a
reduction of interest on the bonds. This had been proposed to France,
and at first was well received, but later Alphonse Rothschild had put
pressure on the French Government, and now they would do nothing unless
there was an international control.
“_11th May._—The ‘Observer’ announces that a relief expedition under
Wolseley will be dispatched to Khartoum in October. Jemal-ed-Din writes
expressing his great confidence in me, which is satisfactory,[54] for it
is of course difficult they should understand how I can remain on
confidential terms with our officials here and yet be true to Islam. It
is a strange position, but its strangeness is its strength.
“_12th May._—Met Churchill at the Carlton. He said: ‘Well, we shall have
Arabi back very soon now.’ I said: ‘I am afraid they will hand over
Egypt to the Conference—and the Conference will hand it over to Italy,
and Italy will hand it over to Ismaïl.’ He said they would like to do it
perhaps, but they would be prevented. I asked him about his own affairs,
saying: ‘You have been in the wars since I saw you.’ ‘Yes, as usual,’ he
said, ‘and I am not out of it yet.’ Thence to the India Office, where I
had it out with Godley about the Patna case.[55] I told him there had
been a compact that if I did not publish the case it would be inquired
into and redressed; and nothing had been done. I did not wish to annoy
Lord Ripon, but I should have to bring it before Parliament before the
end of the Session. He promised to write to Primrose and represent this
to him, which he admitted was fair. We talked about Hyderabad affairs.
Cordery, he told me, was in London, and I explained, for his private
information, the whole history of the intrigue against Salar Jung and
the Nizam.[56] He did not seem at all surprised and said everything was
going on right now. And I presume Cordery is not to return there. He
approved very heartily of the University scheme. Godley is a good
fellow, and I hear he always speaks of me in high terms. I have always
believed he left Gladstone partly because of the Egyptian war.
“After this to the House of Commons, where there was a tremendous crush
to hear the debate on the Vote of Censure, the Duke of Cambridge and
many another bigwig being left out in the cold. I got in through Harry
Brand, who entrusted me to Ponsonby, who squeezed me into the
Ambassadors’ Gallery, where I had a capital place. Hicks Beach’s[57]
speech was an excellent one, very well prepared and arranged, and rising
at certain points to eloquence. His best hits were when he asked if ever
a British Government received such a telegram as one of General
Gordon’s, and when he pointed to Mr. Gladstone and repeated, ‘You will
incur indelible disgrace.’ It was a dignified speech, almost in the old-
fashioned style, with a Latin quotation, and without the modern
Parliamentary violence, and will increase Beach’s reputation. Mr.
Gladstone was to my mind not so happy. While Beach was speaking he had
been taking notes in pen and ink, and rose to answer him more as a man
might in a debating club, than as a statesman arraigned on a
dishonourable charge. He was argumentative, sarcastic, petulant, but in
the course of speaking he became angry, and then he spoke with effect. I
was immensely pleased of course at the line he took of declining to make
war on the Mahdi’s followers who were ‘men fighting for their country’s
freedom’ [‘rightly struggling to be free’], and Scott Holland,[58] who
was near me in the Gallery, was equally excited. But he did not state
his case quite frankly, and constantly spoilt it by drawing fine
distinctions and quibbling as is his wont with words. In a speech of
this sort, it was surely a mistake of oratory ever to suggest a laugh.
His argument, however, was a strong one, that the Opposition had never
during all the Egyptian troubles formulated an alternative policy, and
he was powerful when he challenged Hicks Beach to say that he would send
an army to Khartoum. Having said this he waited a moment, and then
pointing to Beach, turned to the House and screamed ‘Look! Dumb!’ This
was a great oratorical success. But as I have said before, oratory under
the circumstances was rather out of place. I have been unfortunate in
never hearing Gladstone quite at his best, though Lawson called this one
of his best.
“_13th May._—Talked things over with Button. He advises me certainly to
go to Constantinople, but to tell nobody about it. It seems there is
some chance of the Vote of Censure being carried, and all now depends on
the Irish members. If they can turn the Government out, they will do so,
for the sake of a dissolution. But if they doubt their power they will
vote for Government. They will only make up their minds at the last
moment. If the Government is not beaten on the division, the
Conservatives will bring forward an address to the Crown to restrain the
Ministers from sacrificing British interests in Egypt. Button says this
is a quite Constitutional course.
“Called on Harry Brand, who thinks the Government will be beaten on the
division. He would vote against them himself if he was not in the
Government. ‘There is one man.’ he said, ‘who will be happy if it goes
against us, and that is Hartington. He is sick of office, and wants to
be away amusing himself. As things go worse for the Government, his
spirits rise.’ We walked together in the Park. I then went on to Stanley
of Alderley.[59]
“Stanley is quite reconciled to me now, and talks to me as Mohammedan to
Mohammedan, though he warns me still not to speak evil of the Turks.
‘There is a maxim,’ he says, ‘among Catholics, that whoever speaks ill
of the Jesuits, speaks ill of the Church, and so it is with the Turks.
They are the race which has carried out the teaching of the prophet in
its purity more than any other.’ I told him I had no quarrel with the
Turks except in their relations with the Arabs, whom they always managed
to corrupt, and I was come to ask his advice about going to
Constantinople. I had been through India, and was charged by the Indian
Mohammedans to see the Sultan and lay before him the need of a social
and moral reform for Islam, and to urge him to take the matter up, as
Emir el Mumenin, and to warn him that, if he neglected this duty, the
Indian Mohammedans would fall off from him. He thought the idea a good
one, and that I would be listened to, and he has promised to come to
James Street on Monday at noon, with letters he will write to Vefyk and
Khair-ed-Din Pashas on the subject. I intend, if the Government is not
turned out on the Vote of Censure, to leave for Paris and Constantinople
on Monday evening. Stanley is a good fellow, and I have known him now
for twenty-five years. He knows a great deal about Islam, but his ideas
are all confused, and he has no knowledge of the Arabs. He tells me he
was never in India—only in Ceylon and Siam, and knows so little of
modern ideas in India, that he had not heard of Seyd Ahmed being charged
with rationalism nor of the rivalry between Abd-el-Latif and Amir Ali at
Calcutta.
“Lunched at the Gregorys. Later to the House of Commons. Lymington, whom
I met there, said: ‘I am coming to think after all we should have done
better to stick to Arabi.’ Lymington was one of Gladstone’s strongest
supporters at the time of the war.[60]
“_14th May._—The Government are not turned out. The Irish waited, as
Button said they would, till the last minute, and then voted against the
Government, but nevertheless there remained a majority of twenty-eight.
I don’t know whether to be glad or sorry, but I think on the whole I am
glad. The measure of their iniquity is not yet full. Called on Button.
Natty Rothschild is selling Egyptian stock. He sold £150,000 Preference
Stock yesterday. Button thinks it will end by a partial repudiation when
the Conference meets.
“Met Lascelles[61] in the evening at St. James’s Club. Talking about
Gordon, he said he had always been a man of violent temper, and what he
had done lately at Khartoum was nothing more than what he had always
done. Nubar said of him long ago: ‘He reads the Bible all the
morning—and then gets up and orders a man to be hanged.’ Gordon’s idea
on leaving England had been to convert the Soudanese to Christianity.
His (Lascelles’) brother-in-law, the Bishop of Exeter (Dr. Temple), had
told him that Gordon had called on him to ask whether he considered that
the Soudanese converts might be allowed to keep three wives. The Bishop
had thought this would be uncanonical.[62] Lascelles has been in
Bulgaria several years superintending the growth of liberty there, and
we might do worse than have him Consul General at Cairo. He says he has
been much disappointed in Nubar. Sherif, he says, is a good companion,
but without ideas. Riaz, when he first came into office, was under the
influence of Gabriel Charmes, who when he wanted him to do anything used
to tell him M. Thiers would have done it in his place. But they
quarrelled at last, Charmes wanting something which Riaz would not give,
and Riaz answering that M. Thiers would have said no.
“_17th May._—Went down to Crabbet with Tommy Bowles, the Editor of
‘Vanity Fair.’[63] He is thinking of starting a new political newspaper
to be called ‘The Statesman,’ or, ‘The Précis Writer,’ and wants me to
assist him, but I would not promise. He told a good story about
Disraeli, who, having ventured some more than usually daring lie in
Parliament, was walking home afterwards with Monty Corry.[64] Monty
congratulated him on nobody having found him out, and called it a
special interposition of Providence. ‘Yes,’ said Dizzy, ‘God is great,
and He seems to me to get greater and greater every day.’
[N.B.—With regard to my offer of mediation, through Jemal-ed-Din, with
the Mahdi—an offer which I still believe might at that date, May, have
saved the disaster of Gordon’s death—it is worth noting that the
decision of the Government refusing it was delayed until after Lord
Cromer’s arrival from Egypt in London, which seems to fix on Lord Cromer
the departmental responsibility of the refusal, and with it of the loss
of whatever chance there was of a peaceful solution. It was then already
too late in the season to send an English army up the Nile before the
rising of the river.]