is found in the action of William J. Buchanan, American Minister
to Argentina, in adjusting the Chili-Argentinian boundary dispute.
Buchanan, one of the most original of American diplomats, had nothing
whatever of the suave manipulator of the old school of diplomacy. He
was direct to the verge of bruskness, yet his ability to go straight
to the essential point, and his mastery and bigness, made him highly
successful as a negotiator. In this particular case, Buchanan had been
designated, together with a Chilian and an Argentinian representative,
on a commission to settle boundary questions and requested to make a
preliminary report. He agreed to act only on the following conditions:
That because of the complexity and difficulty of the questions
involved, it would be necessary to report on the suggested boundary
by sections, that each section should be voted upon as reported by
him, and that a majority vote on each section should be decisive. This
proposal was accepted. After a careful investigation, Buchanan made his
report, and it was found that on each section the suggested boundary
was carried by two votes against one; the American always voted in the
affirmative; the Chilian and Argentinian, as in the particular section
the allotments seemed favorable or unfavorable to their respective
country. In accordance with the terms agreed upon, the entire report
had thus to be accepted, and all the thorny problems of long-standing
boundary controversies were settled. Had Buchanan not used this
stratagem it is very unlikely that the report as a whole would have
been accepted, as each of his associates would have felt that he could
not vote for a report containing arrangements for giving up specific
tracts of territory which his country had hitherto always insisted
upon retaining. By this clever arrangement Buchanan made it possible
for them to vote against such relinquishment in each case without
defeating the project as a whole; but if he had revealed to them his
plan at the beginning, the object could not have been achieved.
This incident illustrates that a complete solution will often be
accepted as satisfactory although it may contain details which, by
themselves, would have been resisted to the last. It may be said that
the disadvantage of public discussion lies in the emphasizing of such
points of opposition, and the obscuring of the general reasonableness
of a solution.
Mr. Balfour in his defense of the secrecy of diplomatic intercourse,
says that the work of diplomacy is exactly similar to the work which
is done every day between two great business firms. He then argues
that, in all such relationships, it is unwise to air difficulties in
public. Bismarck used the more homely illustration of a horse trade,
the participants in which should not be expected to tell each other
all they know about the prospective bargain. That view is putting
diplomacy on a rather lowly footing. One might expect a somewhat
different temper among men dealing with momentous public affairs than
the bluff-and-haggle of a petty private transaction. Yet such tactics
have actually been found useful in diplomacy. Mr. Balfour is on
sounder ground when he says, “In private, in conversations which need
not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, both parties may
put their case as strongly as they like and no soreness remains,” but
“directly a controversy becomes public, all that fair give-and-take
becomes difficult or impossible.” This, of course, implies a somewhat
low estimate of public intelligence and self-control, of which more
later.
The greatest vice of a secret diplomatic policy, working in the dark
and concealing international undertakings, lies in the inevitable
generating of mutual suspicion and the total destruction of public
confidence among the different countries which compose the family of
nations. No nation is so bad as imagination, confused and poisoned
by secrecy and by the suggestion of dire plottings, would paint it.
Agreements and understandings which do not exist at all are imagined,
the nature of those which actually have been made is misjudged, and
animosities are exaggerated; thus the public is quite naturally put in
that mood of suspicion and excitement which renders it incapable of
judging calmly when apparently startling facts suddenly emerge.
Secret diplomacy destroys public confidence, however, in a still more
insidious manner: by the practice of using a language of ideal aims
and humanitarian professions in order to conceal and veil the most
narrowly selfish, unjust and unconscionable actions. The conventional
language of diplomacy still carries in it many of the phrases and
concepts instilled by the false idealism of the eighteenth century, to
which at that time diplomacy gave lip worship. The most disconcerting
performances of this kind are the profuse and reiterated declarations
promising the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and
integrity of certain countries, when in fact the action really taken
was quite to the contrary effect.
The diplomacy of Japan has manifested peculiar expertship in the use
of phrases that are associated with some wise public dispensation
or arrangement and which have a calming effect--to cover action not
remotely in fact contributing to such beneficent providences. The
sovereignty, integrity and independence of a neighboring country are
guaranteed in solemn terms at the very moment when force, intrigue and
every tricky artifice are secretly employed to destroy them. “Strong
popular demand” is alleged as a reason for harsh action abroad, in a
country where the expressions of public opinions as well as policy
itself are controlled by a narrow group, with absolutist authority.
There is so much talk of “frank discussion” that every one is put on
his guard as soon as the word “frank” is uttered.
The “peace of Asia,” a “Monroe Doctrine for Asia,” the “Open Door,”
“greatest frankness,” “hearty coöperation with other powers,” are
heralded at times when the context of facts makes a strange commentary.
But while such a discrepancy is very strident in a country where
military absolutism wields control over diplomacy, with a grudging
obeisance to representative forms, yet other countries are by no
means free from this hypocrisy. What blasted promise of equity in
all that succession of declarations concerning Korea, China, Persia,
parts of Turkey, and Morocco. What confusion of political ideals in
supporting Denikin, Wrangel, and Horthy as defenders of “representative
government.”
When Russia and Japan, in response to Secretary Knox’ Manchurian
proposal had made their secret arrangements to defeat his policy,
Great Britain, though it had made many reassuring protestations at
Washington, nevertheless had secretly acquiesced (to cite a Russian
diplomatic paper) in the “recognition of our (Russian) sphere of
influence in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Western China, with
the exception of Kashgar, as well as the undertaking not to hinder us
in the execution of our plans in these territories, and herself to
pursue no aims which we should have to regard as incompatible with our
interest.” And it was also stated that Great Britain, in return, was
to receive “recognition of her freedom of action and her privileged
position in Tibet.” This was in 1912.
Thus were the solemn declarations relating to the Open Door and the
integrity of China applied in action.
Subsequent departure from the letter and spirit of such declarations
may indeed sometimes be excused on account of changed circumstances;
but frequently it is quite apparent to those who know what is going on,
that such well-sounding declarations are made for public consumption,
at the very time when the contrary action is taken secretly.
This is indeed nothing less than a crime against the public opinion and
conscience of the world, which cannot be condemned in terms too strong.
It shows a thorough contempt of the people, who are supposed to be
either of so little intelligence or of so short a memory that such vain
professions may succeed in veiling the true inwardness of political
intrigue. This practice tends to engender thorough confusion in the
public mind as to standards of right and justice in international
affairs; it shakes the basis on which alone sound international
relations can grow up; as, indeed, all social relations must rest upon
confidence in an underlying justice and equity.
Closely allied to the practice of making public declarations in
international affairs which do not correspond with the specific action
taken, is the control of the press and the censure of news. This is
indeed a matter which transcends the subject of diplomacy, because
a system of press control and censure is often applied by other
departments of the government than the diplomatic branch. As far as
foreign affairs are concerned, it is used in an effort to support
foreign policy, and it therefore shares the same defects which inhere
in the old diplomacy. Like secret diplomatic control, it is accounted
for on the assumption that the people cannot be trusted with the entire
truth, and that carefully selected portions of the truth have to be
put forth in order to make them ready to support the policy considered
necessary by the leaders. This involves the assumption of an enormous
responsibility by a few leaders in determining by themselves what
the public interest requires and instead of relying on the strength
naturally to be gained from a spontaneous public opinion, to attempt
to fashion that opinion for specific purposes. Press control and
censure, with the incomplete and warped information which it implies,
is one of the evil accompaniments considered necessary in the conduct
of a war, for the safety of the combatant nation. The principle that
strategic information must be kept secret is extended, at such times,
out of all reason. After hostilities have actually been concluded, this
practice tends to subsist and to continue the evils of misinformation
and confusion in the public judgment. The manner in which all news
emanating from the Balkan and Near Eastern countries has been censured
since the war, has made it impossible for the public of the world to
form a just conception as to what is there going on. Control of the
press and censorship likewise resulted in such confusion in the public
mind concerning the problems of Russia, that there remained no reliable
basis for a policy which would facilitate the restoration of more
normal conditions there, in a sympathetic spirit with the struggles and
difficulties of the Russian people.
On account of the natural fact that men are apt to be influenced in
their action unconsciously through persons with whom they have constant
associations, it is a matter of no mean importance that the armament
interests should have been so strongly represented in many capitals by
men of high professional and social standing, always on the ground,
eager to advance the business in military supplies. In many capitals,
very close relationships have grown up between the diplomatic officers
and the representatives of the great armament firms. As a mutual
apprehension of excessive preparation for war greatly stimulates these
industries, it is not surprising that their representatives do not
exert themselves to prevent occasional war scares. In fact, highly
misleading information on war plans has often been given out, as in the
case of a representative of the Coventry Ordnance Works, who in 1909
informed the British Government of excessive shipbuilding by Germany.
The news was later found to be erroneous; but new orders had been
given in Great Britain, and through action and reaction armaments were
stimulated elsewhere. The close connection of the Krupp Iron Works with
the German Government and with associations favoring aggressive foreign
action is well known.
It has often happened that what represents itself to be a national
interest and enlists diplomatic and political support in that way, is
really only the enterprise of individuals to make profits. The men
who support it with their best energies and talents are not villains,
but their method of assuming a great national interest where only
a tradition, a prejudice or a private plan of profit are involved,
renders their doings far from beneficial to the commonweal. Similarly,
those who operate on the principle that the public mind must be
nourished with certain carefully selected facts and kept from the
knowledge of others, may have honest motives, but their ideas of public
action are obsolete or deserve to be so, as they are left over from the
absolutist régime in politics.
XI
PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In considering the relation of legislative bodies, and of the public
opinion therein represented, to the conduct of foreign affairs, it will
be useful to glance briefly at the relevant historical facts. When the
United Colonies of America formed a separate political organization
from the mother country, the conduct of foreign affairs was entrusted
to a committee of Congress, a successor to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence. In 1781 a Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, with a
permanent department, was created and in 1782 the conduct of foreign
affairs was regulated in the following terms:
“All letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence, plans of
treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions, passports, safe
conducts, and other acts of Congress relative to the department
of foreign affairs, when the substance thereof shall have been
previously agreed to in Congress, shall be reduced to form in
the office of foreign affairs, and submitted to the opinion of
Congress, and when passed, signed and attested, sent to the
office of foreign affairs to be countersigned and forwarded.”
Congress therefore retained a very close control over this matter; a
control which under the Constitution passed to the Senate, though in
a restricted form. In no other country did a legislative committee
participate in the conduct of foreign affairs with similar power and
influence. The policy of the arrangements under the Constitution is
explained by John Jay in the _Federalist_ as follows:
“It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever
nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate despatch are
sometime requisite. There are cases where the most useful
intelligency may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can
be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions
will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by
mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many
of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and
still less in that of a large popular assembly.”
Jay’s explanation is dominated by the conception which the eighteenth
century had of the functions of diplomacy and the conditions of its
work. The constitutional system as conceived at that time implied
(1) Full power of negotiation in the President, (2) Taking counsel
with the Senate, (3) Formal ratification of treaties by the Senate,
and publication thereof as parts of the law of the land. The system
has been highly praised by European publicists as reconciling the
maintenance of confidential relations with publicity of the results, in
that treaties are given the character of laws.
In the course of the nineteenth century there occurred many instances
resulting in a growing practice of making special agreements by the
Secretary of State alone, without the advice and consent of the Senate.
When President Roosevelt in 1905 attempted to deal with the Dominican
situation in this manner, the Senate objected and insisted that all
international agreements of any kind must be submitted to its action.
The system of the United States, however, actually permits of the
current conduct of foreign affairs without information to the people or
even without constant and complete information to the Senate which is,
moreover, usually preoccupied with matters of internal legislation.
In England, the mother of Parliaments, we might expect that there
should have been a constant effort at parliamentary control of
foreign affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective control was
denied; yet on account of the specific nature of the system of Cabinet
government, such has not been the case. Under the two-party system as
it exists in England the conduct of foreign affairs is always in the
hands of a minister trusted and supported by the majority in the Lower
House. Even if the minority should attempt to censor the conduct of
foreign affairs as being carried on apart from the knowledge and active
consent of the House, the majority whose leaders form the Cabinet which
is managing things, will always prevent such a vote from succeeding.
Only in case of a cabinet going absolutely and openly counter to the
policy of its own party in Parliament could a real conflict of this
nature arise; and such a contingency is itself impossible, because of
the party control exercised by the cabinet.
According to the theory of the Stuarts, the management of foreign
affairs belonged entirely to the Crown which had not at that time been
put in commission. In 1677 the House of Commons objected to granting
money for alliances and for wars, unless the matter in question had
been previously communicated to it. Charles II, however, declared the
conduct of foreign affairs to be the Crown’s fundamental prerogative
in which it must remain free from direct control of Parliament.
William III was in fact to a very large extent his own Minister for
Foreign Affairs. With the introduction of responsible Government
under the Hanoverians, however, the situation changed. The dominant
party being represented by the ministers was quite ready to submit to
their guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was the opposition
who occasionally attacked the government on its foreign policy, and
particularly the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords’ protest
of March 26, 1734, it was urged that “the interposition of the British
Parliament would be more effectual than the occasional expedients of
fluctuating and variable negotiations.” In 1740 it was moved that a
select committee consisting of peers should be appointed to inquire
into the conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was rejected. Another
Lords’ protest in the same year opposes the argument that absolute
secrecy is essential because this claim is often used in bar of all
inquiries. Such secrecy is “much oftener the refuge of guilt than the
resort of innocence.”
Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for certain letters of
instructions, argued for the necessity of giving such information to
Parliament. He asked how could members of the House of Commons judge
of the estimates to be laid before them as a provision for national
safety if they did not know by what danger the nation was confronted.
The motion, however, was rejected.
When Pelham was criticized in the House for not having informed
Parliament of the preliminaries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he
argued: “If Parliament should encroach upon the prerogative of the
Crown, by assuming a right to make peace or war, and to inquire into
foreign transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be reduced
to a dangerous predicament; for no foreign State will negotiate with
our ministers, or conclude any treaty with them, either political or
commercial.” This is an argument often made in the eighteenth century
to show the unwisdom of Parliamentary control. The change of ministers
following party changes in the House, and the fact that the Foreign
Minister would not by his own word be able to give complete assurances
to foreign governments, were considered to put the British Government
under a disadvantage in negotiations. It was therefore considered
undesirable that negotiations should be submitted to the control and
sanction of Parliament. Walpole had stated the matter in the following
words:
“Therefore while our happy constitution remains entire, while the
Parliament meets but once a year, and does not continue assembled
above three or four months in the twelve, it is impossible for
either House of Parliament to intermeddle, much less to prescribe
to the Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without
exposing the nation to imminent danger.”
Throughout the nineteenth century Parliament interfered very little
with the conduct of foreign affairs. The minister for foreign affairs
or the premier would from time to time give information or make a
systematic discourse on foreign affairs and it was understood that
the House would be kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies
of the Government’s foreign policy. Specific questions were asked by
members but not frequently. The nature of the British system would have
rendered unmeaning any struggle for control between the House and the
Cabinet.
The manner of keeping Parliament and the public informed on foreign
affairs was discussed. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of
laying before Parliament official information in the _Blue Books_. He
stated:
“I am perfectly certain there is always laid before Parliament
a very fair and complete view of the transactions between this
country and any other to which those papers may relate. I know
that foreign Governments rather complain of our Blue Books, and
to a certain extent they may curtail some of the communications
that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be extremely
sorry to see our system of publication of diplomatic papers in
any way curtailed, or different from what it is; of course,
there must always be care taken not to compromise individuals
for the information they have given, but I believe it is an
immense advantage to this country that our despatches and
diplomatic transactions should be known, because if they have the
approbation of Parliament and of the country, the Government then
has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor, and it is
that which gives such strength to our policy and to our opinions
in foreign countries.”
That is a very statesmanlike presentation of the advantages of constant
public knowledge of foreign policy in giving the government a secure
base of intelligent support.
When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large numbers concerning the
foreign policy of the government, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after
the concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, complaint was frequently
made in Parliament and in the press to the effect that Parliament on
the one hand was not given a chance to acquire a complete knowledge
of foreign policy, and on the other it was not sufficiently alert and
active in using its opportunities for control. In 1886 the following
resolution was moved:
“That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient
to embark in war, contract engagements involving grave
responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the
Empire, without the knowledge and consent of Parliament.”
Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass. Mr. Gladstone opposed
it on the ground that the House of Commons under existing arrangements
actually possessed all necessary power of control and that the passage
of this resolution would mean simply that the House of Lords would
share this power with it.
In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to public criticism of
negotiations which were still in progress between Russia and Great
Britain regarding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the following
interesting and important statement with respect to the relations of
foreign policies to public opinion, which in temper resembles that of
Lord Clarendon cited above:
“The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which
we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of
an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the conduct of the
Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of
discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world.
That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it
is impossible to assent to.... If we are of opinion that the
course of public affairs is going ill, and that our Government
has mismanaged, that faults are being committed and dangers are
being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can
appeal in order to correct the evil; our absolute Sovereign is
the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who
can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have
a form of Government which in many points is purely democratic,
and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to
it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The
Cabinet is the people, and their deliberations are conducted in
the open field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal
fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their
determination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but
it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign
Powers overhear, so to speak, the privileged communications
between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot
suppress the argument because somebody else outside hears it and
you may be adversely affected by it....”
The concealment of important obligations and the growing secrecy of
diplomatic affairs during the first decade of the Twentieth Century
brought on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the House of Commons.
After the secret agreement concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John
Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech in the House of
Commons in September, 1911: