main aim in the furnace heat of the war, questions which might divide
them when peace had come in sight, could be understood; and that such
agreements should be kept secret during the war, might have been
considered a necessity. However, the necessity of war in this case was
stretched to cover arrangements which in themselves went diametrically
contrary to the publicly professed principles for which the war was
being fought, and gave rise to the just suspicion that in several cases
at least, very specific advantages had been the controlling incentive
for entering the war. But these agreements have aroused the greatest
resentment because they were in several cases directed against the
interests of third parties, and particularly because when the United
States was making its enormous and unselfish sacrifices, these treaties
were kept from its knowledge. That the American Government should not
have been informed of the secret treaties made at the instance of Japan
in which American interests were most seriously affected, and that just
after these agreements had been concluded the statesmen who had been
closely connected with acceding to these arrangements on the part of
Great Britain, at the price of the British control of the islands of
the South Pacific, came to the United States to stimulate the practical
devotion there to the cause of the Allies, is a fact that will
unfortunately help to give munition to those who are unfavorable to
any real friendly understanding between the two great English-speaking
powers. The secret commercial policy pursued by Great Britain during
the war is also justly subject to severe criticism as giving food and
subsistence to the growth of deep suspicion on the part of even the
most faithful of friends.
The secret treaties relating to the division of territories in Europe
did not come to the knowledge of the public until 1918. At that
time they were republished by one or two British papers, but were
suppressed by the remainder. The treaties were, however, distributed
in innumerable copies by their own governments among the troops of
the Central Powers in order to stimulate them to fight in a spirit of
self-defense. It is reported from various reliable sources that the
Slovenes were the most eager to fight, of any part of the Austrian
army, after the Pact of London had become known to them, with its
various promises to Italy.
The secret assurances which had been given to Italy in the Compact
of London were probably the cause of prolonging the war, with its
enormous slaughter, for more than a year. In the Spring of 1917,
secret negotiations were pursued between the Emperor of Austria, the
President and Premier of France, and the British Prime Minister. The
intermediaries in these negotiations were the Bourbon Princes Sixtus
and Xavier, brothers of the Empress of Austria. The negotiations were
carried on from Switzerland with a confidential envoy of the Emperor
of Austria. Only the Emperor, the Empress and the Duchess of Parma
were in the secret. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of
Foreign Affairs at this time, at first knew only of the general fact,
not of the details. A note of Count Czernin, with a secret personal
note written by the Emperor, were brought to Prince Xavier and taken
by him to Paris. The proposals in Count Czernin’s note related to the
restoration and indemnification of Belgium, and the German renunciation
of Alsace-Lorraine, which “Austria-Hungary naturally would not
oppose.” Count Czernin stated that Austria-Hungary could not make a
separate peace; that it had no idea of crushing Servia, but needed
guarantees against such affairs as led to the murder at Sarajevo; that
Austria-Hungary had no desire of crushing Roumania, etc. The secret
addenda made by the Emperor, without the knowledge of Count Czernin,
stated: “We will support France and exercise pressure on Germany with
all means [in connection with Alsace-Lorraine]. We are absolutely not
in Germany’s hands; it was against Germany’s will that we did not break
with America.”
When President Poincaré received the Prince’s report he stated
that the secret note afforded a basis for discussion, that he would
communicate the two notes, with arrangements of absolute secrecy, to
the Premier, and inform the Czar by personal letter, as well as the
King of England, and Mr. Lloyd George, “who is a discrete man.” But
the President thought that Italy would be the stumbling block. After
this interview the Princes proceeded to Vienna for a personal interview
with the Emperor, which took place on the night of March 23rd. The
Emperor discussed the whole situation, saying that Servia was naturally
the friend of Austria, and that all that Austria needed was the
suppression of revolutionary propaganda there. He stated that one of
the Entente Powers was secretly conversing with Bulgaria; Bulgaria does
not know that the secret has leaked out. “It has not much importance,
because all these dreams of empire of the East will have to end in the
status quo, or very nearly that.” Count Czernin later joined in the
conversation, which is described as “rather glacial.” He expressed
his belief that peace must be made at any price, and that it might be
necessary for Austria to secure a divorce from Germany because the
latter would never abandon Alsace-Lorraine. After a second visit, the
Emperor gave Prince Xavier an autographed letter, enjoining absolute
secrecy because “an indiscretion would force him to send troops to the
French front.” The autographed letter of Emperor Charles, dated March
24th, contains the following proposals: That he will support the just
French claims to Alsace-Lorraine by all means, using all his personal
influence with his allies; Belgium and Servia are to be restored to
full sovereignty; Belgium is to secure indemnities for her losses; and
Servia is to have access to the Adriatic Sea. On the basis of this
letter, discussions took place among the men concerned in France and in
England. But Italy remained the obstacle.
Another trip was taken by Prince Xavier to Vienna, where he met the
Emperor on May 8th. The question now was, What compensations should
Austria receive for ceding its territory to Italy in accordance
with the Pact of London? Count Czernin joined the meeting and on
the following day prepared a memorandum, which was based upon the
principle, “Austria-Hungary can cede no territory without compensation;
but if the territorial question is arranged, then a separate peace with
the Entente might be concluded.” When the matter was taken up again at
Paris, the Italian difficulty remained. M. Ribot strongly adhered to
the idea that without Italy, no result could be had. Meanwhile, the
unsuccessful Italian offensive of July, 1917, had supervened, and the
war had to go on for another sixteen months, although the acceptance of
the proposals of the Emperor would undoubtedly have brought it to an
early end.
Count Czernin has given in his book, _In the World War_, an
unimpassioned and coldly-balanced view of the diplomacy of the time.
He does not relate the details of the secret negotiations of 1917, but
he evidently did not approve of the manner in which they were carried
out because their effect was to suggest to the Entente a willingness of
Austria-Hungary to separate from her allies, without strengthening her
position in any way. In a letter written to Count Tisza in the summer
of 1917, Czernin said: “It is possible to turn and steer the Entente
course if thought feasible; but then courage would be needed to make
the turn fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery
and not carrying it out; we should lose all ground in Berlin and gain
nothing either in London or Paris.”
The policy pursued by Japan throughout the war made use of all the
devices of secret diplomacy for the attainment of ends narrowly
national. After having possessed herself of Tsing-tau, with a marked
cold-shouldering of her British allies, Japan set about an attempt
to arrange things in China so that no effective resistance might be
offered there to Japan’s expansionist desires. In January, 1915, the
Japanese minister in an interview with the President of China, after
enjoining the strictest secrecy on the pain of most disagreeable
consequences, proposed the famous twenty-one demands. That it should
have been attempted to dispose of matters so fundamentally important,
involving the national rights of a population of 350,000,000 people,
through demands secretly forced upon a President, at a time when the
national representative body did not function,--that is one of the
startling facts of modern history. Strange as it may seem, the Japanese
Foreign Office had apparently persuaded itself that secrecy could
be maintained in a matter of such transcendent importance. For when
contrary to that expectation and in accordance with nature and with
the salutary fact that, after all, such tremendous issues can not be
thus secretly disposed of, the facts of the case began to leak out,
categorical denials were made by the Japanese Foreign Office and by
various embassies. In this case, those who had the right to object
to the disposal of important interests in which they themselves had a
share, were not mere neutrals or outsiders but the allies of Japan,
engaged in a life and death struggle at the time. As the twenty-one
demands aimed at the establishment of a predominant position in
China through control of finance and armament, every other nation
there interested would have been adversely affected by the proposed
arrangement. The Chinese, though isolated, would not immediately yield
to the threatening attitude of their neighbor and the negotiations
were strung out over months. Though they were assiduously kept secret,
the nature of the transaction in general and in detail became quite
well known outside, so that the results could not be kept hidden; yet
the whole procedure constituted an affirmation that it was proper to
deal with the destinies of a people in a secret council chamber, where
the demandant backed by strong military forces, confronted the first
official of a vast, peaceful but unmilitant nation, which would never
in the world agree to such procedure and the resultant undertakings.
Japan did indeed get certain concessions, but at the cost of making her
diplomacy and policy universally suspected on account of the methods
which had been used.
The policy of Japan at the time did not look with favor upon China
associating herself with the Allies. Démarches which were made to
bring about the entry of China into the alliance were negatived by
Japan. This in itself might have been based on sound reasons, yet
the real inwardness of this policy was revealed at the time when the
United States had broken off relations with Germany and when the
Chinese Government in the days immediately thereafter was considering
whether to follow the example of the United States. From a report
of the Russian Ambassador at Tokio concerning an interview with the
Foreign Minister of Japan, which took place on February 10, 1917, we
learn that the Minister for Foreign Affairs alluded to a rumor that an
attempt might be made to induce China to join the Allies to the extent
of breaking off relations with Germany. The Foreign Minister said in
effect: “It would be unwise and dangerous to attempt to bring China to
the side of the Allies unless we can be sure that it can be carried
through. This is, however, doubtful. Yet the Japanese Government is
willing to undertake the task of inducing China to take the step. But
before making any such proposal, the Japanese Government desires to be
informed as to the attitude of the Russian Government in the matter of
Shantung and the Pacific Islands. Will the Russian Government support
Japan at the Peace Conference in these matters?” The Russian ambassador
was requested to get the opinion of his government on this point. In
other words, in return for a commission paid largely by China herself,
the Japanese Government was ready to permit that China should join the
Allies in the Great War. It was assumed by the Foreign Minister that
Japan’s persuasion should be necessary to induce China to take this
step; but in fact, at the very time when this conversation between
the minister and ambassador was going on, the Cabinet of China was in
the all-day session from which resulted the decision to follow the
United States in breaking off relations with Germany. This step was
taken without compulsion, urgency or the promise of advantages, upon
a careful consideration of the underlying conditions and equities,
without assurances of gain, merely in the expectation of fair treatment
as an ally and associate.
IX
HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED
The world has not yet recovered from the surprise and disillusionment
which overcame it when the secret treaties of the war became known and
when it became evident that they would be made the basis of the Treaty
of Peace. The secrecy of the procedure of the Peace Conference--which
had been heralded as an assembly of the peoples for carrying out and
making permanent those great principles for which men had grimly and
silently suffered and died and which had been eloquently voiced by
the American President--seemed to be so complete a return to the old
methods of diplomacy that from the day when the muzzle was clamped on,
public faith in the conference and its results was shaken. The motives
of the men who made this decision were probably good. It was their
desire that the work should be rapidly accomplished and should not
be confused by divided counsels. But again the results of the secret
method are hardly apt to increase confidence in its usefulness as a
procedure for dealing with the affairs of the peoples of the world in
such a manner as to place them upon a sound and lasting foundation.
The solemn document which was prepared for the information of the
newspaper men on the decision of the peace conference to enforce
secrecy, did not satisfy any one. To the public there seemed to be
no larger principle at issue than that, on this occasion if ever,
open covenants should be openly arrived at, and it was feared that
if the peace conference did not base its action upon an appeal to
public opinion, no adequate solution could be found at all. When the
treaty itself had been framed, it was sedulously kept secret until
distributed by the French paper _Bonsoir_. The deliberations of the
Council of Five were secret beyond all precedents in public action.
No secretaries were admitted and no official minutes were kept, nor
were there communications to the public through the press. Doctor
Dillon’s description of the Five as “a gang of benevolent conspirators,
ignoring history and expertship, shutting themselves up in a room and
talking disconnectedly,” unfortunately appears not entirely untrue;
particularly as to the ignoring of history and expertship, which was
quite patent, although from the nature of things we cannot exactly
know how disconnectedly the Five talked.
Unfortunately, after the war the use of secret diplomatic policy
has continued without noticeable diminution. The details of certain
situations make one feel as if we are after all only a generation
removed from the eighteenth century. These matters are so recent and
still so controversial that I do not desire to enter upon them in any
detail.
It is, however, surely to be regretted, that it should have been
found necessary to surround the mandates with peculiar secrecy. This
institution was conceived in a desire to create a trusteeship in
behalf of the world in general and for the particular benefit of the
populations comprised in the mandates. Not only has the assignment of
certain mandates given rise to great popular resistance indicating that
the local populations were far from ready to trust their interests
to a foreign mandatory, but the fact that these arrangements are so
carefully guarded with secrecy comes near to destroying all hope
that there is any intention to handle them otherwise than from the
imperialist point of view and for the benefit of the mandatory.
Among the many things that have happened since the armistice, the
Franco-Hungarian intrigues are specially to be noted as emphasizing the
great danger of secret methods, in which a government runs the risk of
being committed by persons, irresponsible or not properly controlled,
into embarrassing and harmful situations. We know of these particular
facts through confidential reports discovered and published, officially
recognized by certain governments, though formally denied by the
Magyar Cabinet. These papers give working details of what was already
known in general terms concerning reactionary Hungarian intrigues
in Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, including preparations for an armed
uprising, and other assistance to monarchists. French interests were at
the same time active in Hungary. They made an agreement for a leasing
of the Hungarian state railways for fifty years. According to this
contract, the Hungarian Government is bound to consult the diplomatic
representative of the French Government concerning every measure
which may have a bearing on any clause of the agreement. A political
compact was simultaneously initialed in which the French Government
withdrew its opposition to universal military service in Hungary, and
that country was to be assisted in boundary rectifications at the
expense of Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania. A third agreement provided
for the sending of a Hungarian army against Soviet Russia under French
command. These agreements were undoubtedly accepted by many people as
fully concluded. The Magyar Premier in open session of the national
assembly boasted of having achieved an alliance with France; the same
understanding was also accepted by certain Paris newspapers. The French
Government, however, did not sanction what secret negotiators had
prepared in Hungary and disavowed the agreements, with the exception
of the lease of the Hungarian railways. This illustrates how in times
of unsettlement and sharp national rivalry, representatives on the
spot or agents of powerful interests in close touch with the home
government may by secret means try to bring about arrangements which
the conscience of their nation does not approve and which serve merely
to generate suspicion and distrust.
There is reason to believe that the draft of a secret treaty between
France and Yugo-Slavia which was published in 1920 by the _Idea
Nazionale_ was at the time actually being considered by the two
governments concerned. One of the points of the proposed treaty was
that upon the declaration of war between France and any Mediterranean
power, Yugo-Slavic troops would be massed along the hostile boundary
according to previously determined plans. In connection with this
provision the representatives of France made the following suggestion:
“In case of a conflict it would be better that the Yugo-Slavic
troops, instead of massing on the hostile frontier, should rather
provoke a ‘Casus Belli’ on the part of the nation at war with France.
Otherwise their intervention might bring on the interference of other
powers.” The proposed arrangements, even though not adopted by the two
governments, nevertheless illustrate the methods acceptable to secret
diplomacy, but which open public opinion would never sanction.
Whatever we may think about the exact share of the blame for having
brought on the great catastrophe which should be attributed to
secret methods and policies, we cannot have any doubts about their
influence since the armistice. Whether or not secret diplomacy brought
on the war, it certainly has not ended it. War still exists, not
only when actual hostilities are going on, but in the whole temper
of international affairs--continuing enmity, continuing armaments,
unending waste of human effort. Thus, for one thing, the entire Near
Eastern situation remains unsettled. As an expert on this troubled
region has said: “The principle of settlement as revealed by these
treaties is fundamentally wrong. The East must be resuscitated, not
exploited.” But be it East or West, there is the same return to the
old game of balancing off gains and changing boundaries, without
consideration of the rights of the respective peoples. The costly
mistakes of the Congresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin are being
repeated.
X
THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
Our historical survey of diplomatic policy and practice does not hold
much assurance that the evils of secret diplomacy have very appreciably
waned since the eighteenth century. The cruder methods of deception
and corruption which were at that time employed would indeed now be
considered beneath the dignity of diplomats; although it is unhappily
true that some of the most despicable tricks, such as stealing
correspondence and placing informers in houses to be watched, are still
practised occasionally. However, it may be said that while in general
the trade-secrets of diplomacy have lost greatly in prestige, the
spirit of diplomatic action itself has not yet been brought into accord
with democratic ideals.
A secret service attached to the diplomatic establishment is still
considered useful by some governments. It is, however, certainly very
doubtful whether the results thus obtained in the nature of accurate
information, are at all commensurate to the expense and to the constant
danger of being misinformed through secret agents who think that they
must earn their pay. My own observation leads me to believe that people
who use secret service information are frequently confused and worried
by an abundance of unauthenticated reports brought to them; they would
have been far better off without backstairs information, relying on
the fundamental facts and on knowledge which can be obtained only by
seeking the confidence of the men who control public action. Secret
service gossip may often give the key to the aims and desires of an
individual person, and if one is willing to appeal to motives through
corrupt and deceitful means, the information may be actually useful.
However, he whose policy rests upon an essential reasonableness and
mutual benefit, can afford to disregard such gossip.
We might distinguish between a secrecy which is vicious in itself,
and one that pursues beneficent objects. The former seeks to conceal
the presence of harmful motives and projects, to confuse and mislead
people to their disadvantage, and in general, to play on weakness and
ignorance. The other keeps secret its plans and negotiations which in
themselves have honest motives, from a desire to prevent interference
with their prompt and complete realization. Opinions as to the
character of a policy may differ widely and those who secretly advance
a policy generally condemned by many, may perhaps claim credit for
honest purposes. This type of secrecy is common. Unfortunately, though
it may advance a good object, it incidentally has an evil influence
upon public confidence. It must be confessed that the distinction here
pointed out is difficult to apply in practice in a thoroughly objective
manner, because there are probably among diplomats very few indeed who
do not persuade themselves at least that the means applied by them are
designed to achieve useful purposes.