holding of an international conference. After considerable opposition
the conference met at Algeciras, in February, 1906. The Powers
represented there again solemnly recognized the independence and
integrity of Morocco. Meanwhile, various incidents were brought on
by the actions of French and Spanish commissaries in Morocco. The
French parliament repeatedly reiterated its intention to observe the
act of Algeciras, particularly in the declaration of February, 1909,
regarding Morocco, in which declaration Germany joined. In 1911, events
happened which induced a serious European crisis. The French Government
undertook military operations against Fez, the capital of Morocco, on
the ground that the foreign colony there was in danger. In reply to
questions in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey confirmed that such
measures were being undertaken by the French Government “for the succor
of Europeans in Fez.” He added: “The action taken by France is not
intended to alter the political status of Morocco, and His Majesty’s
Government cannot see why any objection should be taken to it.”
The facts of the Fez affair have been thus described by the French
publicist, Francis de Pressensé:
“At this point the Comité du Maroc and its organs surpassed
themselves. They organized a campaign of systematic untruth.
Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the public with
false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack.
A whole European French Colony was suddenly discovered there,
living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children
was described in the most moving terms.... At all costs the
Europeans--the Sultan, Fez itself must be saved.... As ever from
the beginning of this enterprise, the Government knew nothing,
willed nothing of itself.”
While these events were happening, the Foreign Offices both in Paris
and London failed to give any information concerning the aims which
underlay the action taken. On May 23d, Mr. Dillon in the House of
Commons asked to what extent England was committed to this “ill-omened
and cruel expedition.” The Foreign Secretary replied, “We are not
committed at all.” The French Foreign Minister declared at the same
time that he had never heard of any treaty with Spain concerning
Morocco.
When the international crisis came to a head suddenly in July, 1911,
through the disconcerting action of the German Government in sending a
war vessel to Agadir, the public was totally taken by surprise and was
absolutely in the dark as to the issues and interests involved as well
as to the commitments which had been made by the British and French
foreign offices. The text of the secret treaty between France and Spain
had, however, now been secured by the Paris papers _Le Temps_ and
_Le Matin_. This revelation led to party attacks on secret diplomacy
in the British House of Commons and in the French Parliament. Baron
d’Estournelles de Constant, in February, 1912, said:
... “Why was the French Parliament told only half the truth
when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with
England? Why was it allowed to suspect that this arrangement had
as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other
secret treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards
Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse
of trust.... Now the whole effort of the arrangement of 1904
appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a treaty of
friendship with England recognizing the freedom of our political
action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the
integrity of that country; that was what the public knew and
approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by
other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the
partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of
that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity.”
In the House of Commons, Mr. John Dillon charged that “the Foreign
Office policy has become during the last ten years progressively more
secret every year. For ten years the foreign policy of this country has
been conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy.”
VI
ENTENTE DIPLOMACY
As the commitments of the British Government gradually became more and
more known the question arose as to how deeply and extensively Great
Britain had been involved in continental affairs. Lord Rosebery, who
was uninformed, with the rest of Parliament and the public, as to the
actual details, said in a speech at Glasgow in January, 1912:
“This we do know about our foreign policy, that, for good or for
evil, we are now embraced in the midst of the Continental system.
That I regard as perhaps the gravest fact in the later portion of
my life. We are, for good or for evil, involved in a Continental
system, the merits of which I do not pretend to judge, because
I do not know enough about it, but which, at any rate, may at
any time bring us into conflict with armies numbering millions,
and our own forces would hardly be counted in such a war as they
stand at present.”
Lord Rosebery realized perhaps more fully than most of the leaders of
English public life the complications adherent to what had already
become public knowledge at the time.
Meanwhile the government, in Parliament, confined itself to plain
denials whenever the matter of international undertakings and
obligations of a general nature was brought up. The denials could be
justified from the point of view that the situation as stated by the
uninformed questioner in Parliament, in each case did not exactly
correspond to the facts. But the impression created by such denials
that no serious obligations had been incurred was, as the result
showed, entirely misleading.
On March 8, 1911, Mr. Jowett asked in the House of Commons whether any
undertaking, promise or understanding had been given to France that
in certain eventualities British troops would be sent to coöperate
with the French army. The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs
replied: “The answer is in the negative.” On December 6, 1911, the
Prime Minister said:
“As has been stated, there were no secret engagements with France
other than those that have now been published, and there are no
secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon
us any obligation to render military or naval assistance to any
other Power.”
Upon another occasion Mr. Yerburgh, M.P., inquired:
“May I ask whether or not we are to understand that the
Government arrived at no decision upon this particular question?
Is the right honorable gentleman not aware that this new
definition of the two-Power standard is a question of supreme
importance, and that in arriving at our standard of naval
strength previous Governments had regard to the power of the
fleets of other countries?”
The Prime Minister replied only:
“I think this question shows the inconvenience of dealing with
these matters by way of question and answer.”
In December, 1912, Lord Hugh Cecil made the following inquiry:
“There is a very general belief that this country is under an
obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising
out of an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of
diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of
this country to operate in Europe. That is the general belief. It
would be very presumptuous of any one who has not access to all
the facts in possession of the Government--”
The Prime Minister interrupted him with: “I ought to say that it is
not true.” Lord Cecil thereupon expressed his satisfaction for having
elicited this explanation, “because,” he stated, “it was certainly
widely believed that the Government has engaged in a military
policy of an adventurous kind and that if such a policy had actually
been contemplated by the Government it would involve a very serious
consideration of the military resources of the country.” As a matter of
fact, the latter was a just conclusion from the actual situation as it
really existed, notwithstanding the denial by the Prime Minister.
In March, 1913, when during the discussion of the Navy estimates, the
Mediterranean situation came up, Lord Beresford suggested that Mr.
Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) must be trusting to France
the duty of guarding the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill had said in the
course of these discussions: “In conjunction with the Navy of France,
our Mediterranean Fleet would make a combined force superior to all
possible combinations.” Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke referred to this as a
remarkable statement, and one “somewhat difficult to reconcile with the
recent pronouncement of the Prime Minister as to our understanding with
France in the matter of armaments.” He added: “In one case we have the
Prime Minister repudiating an obligation on our side of any kind, and
in the other we have the First Lord of the Admiralty relying for the
safety of our Eastern Empire, our trade and our food supply, upon the
assistance which he presumes will be ready at any moment to be given to
us by France.”
On March 24, 1913, Mr. Asquith, Prime Minister, made a comprehensive
answer to a question of Sir W. Byles in the following terms:
“As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any
obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels
it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between
European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will
restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to
decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war.”
In August, 1913, Lord Haldane made a statement to the effect that the
very friendly relationships with France rendered the situation in the
Mediterranean most satisfactory. On June 11, 1914, this same general
matter was up again for discussion. Sir Edward Grey, in answering a
question, referred back to the statement made by Mr. Asquith on March
24, 1913, and added: “It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago.”
The nation was meanwhile left entirely in the dark with respect to the
actual matter of the relationships which had developed between Great
Britain and France, and it was only after the Great War had broken
out that Sir Edward Grey, in his speech of August 3, 1914, gave to
Parliament some account of what had actually happened.
The first important step in the new international policy of Great
Britain was taken immediately after the Liberal Government had been
formed on December 12, 1905. It appears that Sir Edward Grey consulted
in this matter particularly Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane, informing
the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but not his other
Cabinet colleagues. The above three men were the leaders of the Liberal
Imperialist faction, and it is not at all certain that in an aggressive
foreign policy they would have been at that moment readily followed by
their whole party.
When in consequence of the attempted division of Morocco, relations
between France and Germany became somewhat strained, Sir Edward Grey,
Foreign Minister, made communications to the French Ambassador to the
effect that, while no promises could be given to any Foreign Power,
yet in Sir Edward Grey’s opinion, if war was then forced upon France
on the question of Morocco, public opinion in England would rally to
the material support of France. Sir Edward Grey, as related in his own
words, said: “I made no promises and I used no threats, but I expressed
that opinion.” The accuracy of that opinion has been questioned, in
view of the temper of the House of Commons elected at a time when
resentment at the imperialist war in South Africa was powerful.
On the basis of the statement made by Sir Edward Grey, the French
Government said to the British Foreign Minister, as reported by him:
“If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great
Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in
giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in
advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you
wish it when the time comes, unless some conversations have
already taken place between naval and military experts.”
Sir Edward Grey saw merit in this proposal and agreed to it. He
authorized that conversations should take place, but with the distinct
understanding that nothing which would bind either Government should
occur. However, the holding of conversations between two Powers
concerning military coöperation is in itself a sufficiently serious
matter out of which expectations and relationships are apt to arise
that cannot be overlooked in future action. The Cabinet was not
informed of the authorization given by Sir Edward Grey until later. He
did not state how much later.
We know from official sources that Colonel Barnardiston proceeded to
Belgium and had interviews with the Chief of the Belgian General Staff
concerning combined operations in the event of a German attack directed
against Antwerp. Colonel Barnardiston confided to the Belgian Chief
of Staff that his Government intended to move the British base of
supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had
been cleared of all German warships. When the Belgian documents were
published in Germany, it was attempted by the press to represent these
conversations as an actual convention. These consultations occurred
during the first quarter of 1906.
From an official source comes the statement that in July, 1911, the
British Government informed the German, that on certain contingencies,
Great Britain would support France (if Germany should demand the whole
of French-Congo and Agadir as a naval base). What actually happened at
this time has never been fully revealed.
In April, 1912, the British military attaché at Brussels informed the
Belgian General Jungbluth that Great Britain had 160,000 men available
for despatch to the continent, and added that the British Government
in certain contingencies during recent events would have immediately
landed troops on Belgian territory.
About this time the Cabinet had a discussion of the whole situation
and of the special relationship with France; and it was decided that
there should be some definite expression in writing, of the latter.
Accordingly, in November, 1912, an exchange of notes took place between
Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador. The British Foreign Minister
wrote the following letter:
Nov. 22nd (1912).
“MY DEAR AMBASSADOR:
“From time to time in recent years the French and British Naval
and Military experts have consulted together. It has always
been understood that such consultation does not restrict the
freedom of either Government to decide at any future time
whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have
agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to
be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to
action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never
arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British
fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon
an engagement to coöperate in war. You have, however, pointed
out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential
to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed
assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power,
or something that threatened the general peace, it should
immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments
should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace,
and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in
common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the
General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the
Governments would then decide what effect should be given to
them.”
A reply from the French Ambassador accepted this understanding.
Side by side with the Anglo-French military and naval collaboration,
there went the making of joint plans by France and Russia which
culminated in the Franco-Russian military convention of August, 1912.
At the same time Russia had pressed upon France the need of increasing
her army by raising the term of service to three years. Concerning the
new disposal of the French fleet, according to the desires of Russia,
President Poincaré stated to Ambassador Isvolsky in November, 1912:
“This decision has been made in agreement with England, and forms
the further development and completion of arrangements already
made previously between the French and English staffs.”
Thus the chain of coöperation was completed, and England was
effectively tied up with the situation in the Balkans, in which only
Russia had a primary interest.
Meanwhile, the repeated denials previously set forth kept the British
Parliament and public from all knowledge of the exceedingly important
relationships which were growing up between the Naval and Military
establishments of Great Britain and France.
How these relationships, though only partially known and suspected,
were looked upon by outsiders is shown from expressions in the reports
of Belgian diplomats. Count de Lalaing wrote from London in 1907:
“England is quietly pursuing a policy opposed to Germany and aimed
at her isolation.” Baron Greindl wrote from Berlin in 1908: “Call it
alliance or what you will, the grouping constitutes, none the less, a
diminution of Germany’s security.” Baron Guillaume wrote, in 1911, from
Paris: “I have less faith in the desire of Great Britain for peace.
She would not be sorry to see the others eat one another up.” These
expressions are not, of course, evidences of British policy, but simply
of the impression which whatever leaked out concerning that policy,
made upon outside diplomats.
In his clear and convincing analysis of the situation created by the
gradual formation in secret, of these relationships, Lord Loreburn
brings out the following points: Through the communications with the
French Ambassador and military and naval conversations concerning
plans for joint action, France was encouraged more and more to expect
that Great Britain would stand by her in arms if she were attacked by
Germany. Such a policy of a defensive understanding with France, no
matter how right in itself, was obviously a new departure of tremendous
importance. Its execution and effectiveness could be assured only if
understood by Parliament as a national policy, with all the risks
involved, so that proper preparations could be made. Parliament was,
however, never warned of the danger England stood of being thrown
suddenly into a European war. Had Germany been told in July, 1914,
that Great Britain would support France and Russia, the war would
undoubtedly have been prevented; but while the ministers had in fact
incurred moral obligations over against France, they had not assured
themselves of the necessary Parliamentary support and could therefore
not make a statement involving such risk as the above declaration to
Germany would have created.
Of Sir Edward Grey’s speech of the 3rd of August, 1914, Lord Loreburn
says:
“This remarkable speech began with an elaborate effort to prove
that the House of Commons was perfectly free to determine either
for peace or war. It ended with a passionate declaration that
this country would be disgraced if we did not declare war, and
the reasoning of the speech proved that Sir Edward Grey had
committed himself irretrievably. It left the House of Commons
convinced that it had in honor no choice but to join France in
arms. It is an epitome of the reasoning by which Sir Edward Grey
had been brought to believe that he could say and do what he said
and did without limiting his freedom of action. But if this is
legitimate we ought not to keep up the pretense that we are a
self-governing nation in foreign affairs.”
Thus a minister, to whom national intrigue and duplicity were
essentially foreign, who was trusted by his country and who wanted
peace, was brought by the methods of secret diplomacy into a position
where he had actually incurred the moral obligation to assist another
country without having the power for peace which the ability to avow
that relationship openly, to take the responsibility, and to confront
Germany therewith, would have given him.
As early as November, 1911, Lord Lansdowne, one of the founders of
the Entente, in speaking of the secret agreement of 1904 concerning
Morocco, which had then just become known to the public, had admitted
that in such a case the promise of purely diplomatic support might
easily bring on the obligation to assist in other ways; that an entente
cordiale creates close relationships between two countries; and that,
should one of them get into difficulties without its guilt, it would
expect to receive support.
The moral responsibilities in which the Foreign Minister had involved
the British Government were not simple, nor did they exist against
France alone. Because of the Franco-Russian alliance the relationship
established between Great Britain and France virtually involved sharing
in the defense of France against the consequences of her alliance with
Russia, as the subsequent events showed; any serious situation arising
in the Balkans and affecting Russian interests would thereafter involve
France, and through her, Great Britain. Accordingly, the effect of
this policy was to make the peace of Great Britain depend upon, and to
involve it with, the complex struggle for influence in the Balkans.
After Sir Edward Grey’s speech of August 3rd, Mr. T. Edmund Harvey,
M.P., said: “I am convinced that this war for the great masses of the
countries of Europe is no peoples’ war. It is a war that has been
made by men in high places, by diplomatists working in secret, by
bureaucrats out of touch with the people, by men who are a remnant of
an older evil civilization.”
Lord Loreburn sums up his indictment of secret diplomacy in the
following language: “Secret diplomacy has undergone its ‘acid test’ in
this country. It had every chance. The voice of party was silent. The
Foreign Minister was an English gentleman whom the country trusted and
admired, who was wholly free from personal enmities of every kind, and
who wanted peace. And secret diplomacy utterly failed. It prevented us
from finding some alternative for war, and it prevented us from being
prepared for war, because secret diplomacy means diplomacy aloof from
Parliament.” The issue is here quite clearly stated. Those who see in
the methods and spirit of the old diplomacy the chief cause of war,
do not hold, on the one hand, that secret diplomacy involves at all
times and in all cases unscrupulous plotting. But they believe that the
method of dealing with foreign affairs as a mysterious matter, fit to
be handled only by the select, and the reliance on a policy of bargains
and compensations, with the aim thus artificially to maintain a balance
of power, may be blamed for this great catastrophe; for they stood
in the way of dealing with great public affairs in a sounder manner,
that is, with more regard of the actual public interest and of the
underlying racial and popular factors.
Those British critics who have attacked this method as practised in
their own country before and during the war, do not thereby mean to
impute to British statesmen a major share in the responsibility for
the war. The high-mindedness and public spirit of the responsible
statesmen is recognized by all fair critics, and most of them imply
that Great Britain has far less to fear from this system than have
nations with less responsible governments and a less sound tradition
of statesmanship. They attack the system as a whole as it exists
throughout European diplomacy, and as it has been used by the British
Government.