not merely from the military and naval power of the two states,
but from the force of the moral principle upon which that union
has been founded. Our union has for its foundation resistance to
unjust aggression, the defence of the weak against the strong,
and the maintenance of the existing balance of power. How, then,
could we combine to become unprovoked aggressors, to imitate
in Africa the partition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco
for France, of Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of
Egypt for England? And, more especially, how could England and
France, who have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire,
turn round and wrest Egypt from the Sultan? A coalition for such
a purpose would revolt the moral feelings of mankind, and would
certainly be fatal to any English Government that was a party to
it. Then, as to the balance of power to be maintained by giving
us Egypt, but we do not want the burden of governing Egypt, and
its possession would not, as a political, military, and naval
question, be considered, in this country, as a set-off against
the possession of Morocco by France. Let us try to improve all
these countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let
us all abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call upon
us the condemnation of all other civilized nations.”
This program of liberal principles applied to foreign affairs, of
high-toned and high-minded diplomacy, one reads with mixed feelings in
view of the things which have come thereafter.
In the period between the Crimean and the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon
pursued a policy, or a series of policies, which fitly illustrate the
worst features of secret diplomacy. In 1858 Napoleon III obtained
from Cavour a promise that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France.
These arrangements, made without the knowledge or the desire of the
French people, involved Napoleon in the war of 1859 and led to a
fatal weakening of his position. In 1864 Napoleon secretly suggested
to Prussia that she might take Schleswig-Holstein, thus greatly
encouraging her to undertake the war of 1864. France at this time was
under treaty obligations to Denmark which made such action doubly
dishonest. When the war between Austria and Prussia broke out in
1866, Napoleon concluded a secret treaty with Austria which contained
a bargain that he would assist Austria to recover Silesia in return
for a cession of Venetia to Italy, to compensate the latter for Savoy
and thus to eradicate the evil effects of the arrangement of 1858.
As this treaty became known, it absolutely alienated Prussia from
France. At the same time Napoleon had secretly demanded from Prussia
the cession of the Rhenish Palatinate which belonged to Bavaria; this
would mean of course that Prussia and France together would first have
to take it from Bavaria. Bismarck secretly informed Bavaria of this
demand and thus turned her decisively against Napoleon; so that he was
enabled to make secret treaties of alliance not only with Bavaria but
with Wurtemberg and Baden for their military support in case of war.
Napoleon had thus managed unwittingly to bring about the coalition of
German states which proved disastrous to him in 1870. Had the French
government known of these three German treaties, it would probably have
avoided war; as it was, France did not know that she would have all
Germany against her. In 1866 Napoleon, through Benedetti, submitted to
Bismarck a draft treaty according to which, in case the French Emperor
should decide to send his troops to enter Belgium, the King of Prussia
would grant armed aid to France and support her with all his forces,
military and naval, in the face of and against every other power which
might in this eventuality declare war. Though this draft treaty, which
became known in Great Britain and caused high excitement there, was
not adopted in this form, a secret compact was made between France and
Prussia in 1867, one article of which stated that Prussia would not
object to the annexation of Belgium by France. The fact that both of
these powers had signed the treaty of 1839, guaranteeing the neutrality
of Belgium, aggravates the noxiousness of this conspiracy. Early in
1870 Napoleon was secretly negotiating with Austria with a view to a
joint war against North Germany. The negotiations were in progress when
the war of 1870 broke out. Probably Bismarck was informed of what
was going on and was therefore the more anxious to face at once what
he considered an inevitable war. As already stated, Napoleon did not
communicate to his responsible minister his decision to require of the
King of Prussia the absolute assurance that no German prince should
ever again be nominated for the throne of Spain. In doing so he put
himself in a position where Bismarck could manœuver him into a dilemma
from which there seemed no exit except war.
This was done by the famous editing of the Ems dispatch through which,
taking advantage of King William’s permission to modify and eliminate,
Bismarck gave to the report sent by the king the appearance that
nothing further could be said between the king and the French envoy
and that therefore the only alternative to the French was retreat
or war. This act illustrates one of the most terrible dangers of
secret diplomacy in that just at the time when inflammable material
is at hand in abundance, one word or phrase may give a decisive turn
to developments and force an issue, in a certain direction, without
allowing a chance for calm consideration of all that is involved.
Bismarck considered that the unification of Germany required a war
because only thus could the feeling of unity among the German people,
until then divided into numerous small states, be molded into political
oneness. But in bringing on the Franco-Prussian war, no matter how
inevitable he might consider such a struggle, he was too confident of
his ability to play the part of a Providence and to cut short the slow
processes of historic development. Therefore, though he attempted to
work in the interest of outstanding national factors, his policy was
not of a nature to develop that public confidence in the aims of his
nation on which alone a statesman can permanently build. His was the
diplomacy of authority, often announcing its aims with great frankness,
indeed, but always retaining the old method so that the public mind
remained often in the dark. His politics directed German development
into a dangerous course. He abhorred German disunion, but tried to
cure it with means too forceful and artificial. The solutions brought
about further problems. The taking of Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of
future war. In 1871, Bismarck offered Mulhouse to Switzerland secretly,
but the gift was declined. In the years after 1871, Bismarck always
threatened Parliament with the danger of war whenever he wanted to put
anything through.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1878, being in its nature a conflict about the
merits of which only vague ideas could be current among the Western
nations, produced a whole nest of secret treaties. The treaty of San
Stefano itself was kept secret by Russia and Turkey. The British
Foreign Secretary in a diplomatic note which was much admired at the
time, demanded that the treaty must be submitted to the European powers.
Meanwhile a second secret treaty had been made between Russia and
Austria wherein, as is customary in such transactions, “compensations”
were distributed out of property belonging to neither of the
contracting parties, at the cost of somebody else; it was agreed that
Austria should have Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile the British
Foreign Office, though it had just declaimed in indignant tones against
the secret terms of San Stefano, made an agreement, equally secret,
with Russia (May 30, 1878), concerning the points on which Great
Britain would insist in the final adjustment. Through the wrongful
action of an employee of the Foreign Office this agreement leaked out
and a summary of it was published on May 31st. When questioned in
the House of Lords, the Marquis of Salisbury, who at all times had a
well-deserved reputation for sincerity, nevertheless qualified the
statement in the _Globe_ as “wholly unauthenticated and not deserving
of any confidence on the part of the House of Lords.” The full text
of the agreement was published by the _Globe_ on June 14th, and when
challenged by Lord Rosebery concerning his _dementi_, Lord Salisbury
calmly stated: “I described it as unauthentic simply because it was so,
and because no other adjective actually described it, and I shall be
able to state why I so described it.” The explanation which followed
was, however, quite lame, and consisted mainly in stating that the
document as published did not give a complete view of the situation.
The impression produced by these tactics was far from favorable. Lord
Granville, with a great deal of justice, wanted to know “where the
House of Lords would have been had it not been for the immoral action
of the man who gave the secret treaty to the newspaper. They would
have had blue books and copies of instructions, protocols and other
documents, but they would have been perfectly duped as to the way in
which the government had actually proceeded.”
But there followed another, a fourth secret treaty, growing out of
the Turkish situation, an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey
concluded on June 4th, at Constantinople. As a result of erroneous
information having been telegraphed from Constantinople by Mr. Layard,
the British envoy, to the effect that in spite of the armistice
the Russians were moving on Constantinople, a large war credit was
voted in the British House, although against the opposition of the
Liberals under Gladstone and Bright. Orders were also given to the
Indian Government to send troops to Cyprus. A secret treaty was then
concluded in which Great Britain received a protectorate over Cyprus in
return for the engagement on her part to protect the Asiatic domains
of Turkey. Never was the blood of a nation without its own knowledge
and consent risked in a more doubtful adventure than in this famous
transaction of Lord Beaconsfield. Gladstone, on July 20th, analyzed the
treaty as providing for three things: the occupation and annexation of
Cyprus, the defense of Turkey in Asia against any attempt Russia may
make (“to go two thousand miles from your own country, alone and single
handed, in order to prevent Russia making war at any time upon Turkey
in Asia”), and responsibility for the government of Turkish territory
in Asia; and all that was undertaken without the consent and knowledge
of the British people, to be done at their expense by the blood of
their children. Mr. Gladstone concluded: “There is but one epithet
which I think fully describes a covenant of this kind. I think it is an
insane covenant.”
Disraeli had formerly said of Palmerston: “With no domestic policy, he
is obliged to divert the attention of the people from the consideration
of their own affairs to the distraction of foreign politics. His scheme
of conduct is so devoid of all political principle that when forced
to appeal to the people, his only claim to their confidence is his
name.” The same language could with equal justice have been applied to
Beaconsfield himself. His speeches in defense of his foreign policy are
usually a superficial appeal to imperialist passion, and deal in such
phrases as “What is our duty at this critical moment?” “To maintain
the empire of England.” (Loud cheers.) “Empire” is taken for granted
as covering everything desirable, but the actual relationship of these
adventurous foreign policies to the welfare and true development of the
English people is never reasoned out.
While Beaconsfield had opposed the first Afghan war, he readily changed
his views when he came into power and began the second war in 1878
on the avowed ground that the Ameer had refused to receive a British
mission. But with a sudden change of tactics, at a dinner at the
Mansion House on November 9, Lord Beaconsfield solemnly announced that
the war had been made because the frontier of India was “a haphazard
and not a scientific one.” Yet a little before, when condemning the
first Afghan war, he had described the frontiers of India as “a perfect
barrier.” He did not give to any organization of public opinion a
chance to influence him in this matter, or even to be heard. On
December 9, Lord Derby said in the House of Lords: “We are discussing,
and we know we are discussing, an issue upon which we have no real or
practical influence.”
V
TRIPLE ALLIANCE DIPLOMACY AND MOROCCO
Toward the end of the nineteenth century the dominating development
in the diplomacy of Europe was the actual formation of the two
great alliances--the Triple Alliance created by Bismarck, and
the Russo-French Alliance which had come into being in 1896 as a
counterpoise to the former. The treaties upon which these alliances
rested were made secretly; they were part of an authoritative policy
based on the theory of balance of power. The texts of the Triple
Alliance Treaty were not published until after the beginning of the
Great War. The so-called Counter-Insurance Treaty with Russia by which
Bismarck attempted to stabilize the situation and isolate France
through a mutual neutrality agreement between Russia, Austria and
Germany, was one of the most characteristic examples of complicated
methods followed by the old diplomacy; it was, of course, also kept
secret. When after Bismarck’s retirement the German Government did
not renew this secret treaty, it made possible a fundamental change in
the grouping of powers with the result that Russia, after a very short
interval, identified herself with France in the Dual Alliance.
While Bismarck had been in control of German diplomacy, the main lines
of German foreign policy were kept quite clear and their general
direction was definite, no matter how complicated and indirect were
the means frequently applied to carry it out. Emperor William II
sought to free himself from the tutelage of the powerful Chancellor,
but from then on the orientation of German diplomacy was far from
definite. No one could be clear where its main objective lay; it seemed
to seek expansion of influence in Asia Minor, the Far East, Morocco,
South Africa, and almost everywhere, even with the inclusion of South
America. Germany appeared to have many irons in the fire, although
meanwhile she did not make much progress in any specific direction.
This uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in an increasing manner aroused
the apprehension of her neighbors; none of them felt any assurance
about what Germany actually wanted. That her actual wants may not have
been unreasonable, that she herself apparently did not know exactly
which of her interests should predominate, did not help matters; all
those who had more possessions than she felt themselves endangered, and
a general suspicion and lack of confidence resulted.
In the years after the Chino-Japanese war the German Government showed
a great desire to play a prominent part in Far Eastern affairs. Thus,
it took the lead in bringing about the joint intervention of Russia,
France and Germany, which obliged Japan to surrender Port Arthur, a
part of the spoils of war just taken from China. The three powers who
had thus come to the rescue, however, forthwith proceeded to exact
from China an enormous commission for their good offices, and forced
her to make to them grants of lease-holds and other concessions, in
which was included the very territory that they had rescued from Japan.
In this keen onset, which amounted to an attempt to divide up the
Chinese Empire, Great Britain in her turn also participated. The Far
Eastern situation was rendered decidedly unstable, and the frantic and
unorganized resistance of the Boxer levies was the result.
After the settlement of these troubles, in 1901, the German Government,
as we now know, tentatively suggested the formation of an alliance
including Great Britain and Japan. This proposal shows how far
German diplomacy at the time had departed from the fundamentals of
policy under Bismarck. Japan proceeded most assiduously to work on
this suggestion, but Germany was left out when the highly important
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was secured by the Japanese Minister in London.
Negotiations between Great Britain and Japan were carried on with the
greatest secrecy. Lord Lansdowne himself seems at one time to have been
very anxious for prompt action; he said to Count Hayashi, as reported
by the latter, that “there was great danger in delay, as the news of
the proposed treaty might leak out and objections might then be raised.”
It is significant that while Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi were in
the depth of their negotiations, Marquis Ito, on his return journey
from the United States, proceeded to Russia and, entirely in opposition
to the express judgment of Count Hayashi, “plunged into conversations
on the most delicate of matters” at St. Petersburg. In fact, the
Japanese Government allowed almost identical secret negotiations to
be carried on in London and St. Petersburg at the same time. Count
Hayashi considered this procedure as implying “a lack of faith and a
breach of honor.” When the Anglo-Japanese treaty had been actually
signed it was, through the indiscretion of some official, published in
Japan three days too soon. The Japanese Foreign Office promptly denied
its existence, and Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister at Tokyo, who no
doubt knew of the Ito negotiations at St. Petersburg, very emphatically
denied the very possibility of such a treaty. The effect on Russia of
the truth when it became known there, can be readily imagined. In the
Anglo-Japanese treaty, England, which had recently joined in the solemn
guarantee of the integrity of China and of the independence of Korea,
made engagements scarcely consistent with either.
Lord Rosebery, in a public address, October, 1905, expressed his
sense of the great importance of this treaty. “The treaty,” he
said, “is an engine of tremendous power and tremendous liability.
Whatever else is certain, this at least is sure, that it will lead to
countless animosities, many counter intrigues, and possibly hostile
combinations. But I want to point out to you the enormous importance of
the engagements in which this treaty involves you, the reactions which
it will cause elsewhere, and to bid you to be vigilant and prepared,
and not negligent, as sometimes you are, of the vast bearings of your
foreign policy.”
The German Emperor, having failed to obtain a treaty with England, now
turned to his Russian cousin with the design of inducing him to make
an alliance. The Willy-Nicky correspondence which was published by the
Russian Revolutionary Government in 1917, as well as the memoirs of
Isvolsky, give us a complete insight into the action of William II in
this matter. The correspondence shows that Emperor William neglected no
means of arousing resentment and suspicion of England in the mind of
Nicholas, particularly in attempting to show a complicity of England
with Japan in the war against Russia. In November, 1904, William
proposed the immediate signature by Russia, without the knowledge of
France, of a defensive treaty of alliance, evidently directed against
Great Britain. France was to be invited to join _after_ the signature
by Germany and Russia. The Czar, however, insisted that he could not
entertain this proposal without first submitting it to his ally.
William, in a long telegram, argued insistently upon the danger of
informing France before the signature. He said: “Only the absolute,
undeniable knowledge that we are both bound by the treaty to give
mutual aid to each other, can induce France to exercise pressure upon
England to remain tranquil and in peace, for fear of placing France
in a dangerous situation. Should France know that a German-Russian
agreement is simply in preparation and not yet signed, she would
immediately inform England. England and Japan would then forthwith
attack Germany.” Therefore, William concluded that if the Czar should
persist in refusing to sign the treaty without the previous consent
of France, it would be better not to attempt making an agreement at
all. He stated that he had spoken only to Prince Buelow about it, and
that as undoubtedly the Czar had spoken only to Count Lamsdorff, the
foreign minister, it would be easy to keep it an absolute secret. He
then congratulated the Czar on having concluded a secret agreement of
neutrality with Austria. As a matter of fact, Count Lamsdorff had not
been informed by the Czar of the Emperor’s proposal.
In the summer of 1905, Emperor William returned to the charge, taking
advantage of the discouragement of the Czar due to many external and
internal troubles resulting from the Japanese war. He visited the Czar
at the Island Bjorkoe in July, and used every resource of his personal
influence to prevail on Nicholas. This time he succeeded, and the two
sovereigns signed a secret treaty of alliance, which contained four
articles to the following effect:
(1) If any European state shall attack either of the empires the allied
party engages itself to aid with all its forces on land and sea.
(2) The contracting parties will not conclude a separate peace.
(3) The present agreement comes in force at the moment of conclusion of
peace between Russia and Japan, and may be denounced with one year’s
notice.
(4) When the treaty has come into force Russia will take the necessary
steps to inform France and to propose to her to adhere to it as an ally.
On this occasion the Emperor was accompanied by Von Tschirsky, who
soon after became German Foreign Minister and who countersigned the
agreement. The Russian Foreign Minister was not present but Admiral
Birileff, the Minister of the Navy, was called in to countersign the
Czar’s signature. After his return to St. Petersburg, the Czar allowed
fifteen days to pass before informing Count Lamsdorff. When informed,
the Czar’s advisers took a very strong position against the agreement,
with the result that notwithstanding the insistent arguments of
Emperor William, who in his telegram signed himself “Your friend and
ally,” the treaty was never given full force. William strongly appealed
to the gratefulness of the Czar for having stood by him during the
Japanese war, at a time when, “as afterwards the indiscretions of
Delcassé have shown, although allied to Russia, France had nevertheless
made an agreement with England to attack Germany without warning, in
time of peace.” The latter phrase gives the effect upon William’s mind
of all he knew or believed to know about the arrangements concluded
between France and Great Britain concerning Morocco.
The Moroccan intrigues and secret negotiations, during the first decade
of the twentieth century, contributed in no small measure to rendering
international relations strained and generating a general sense of
insecurity and suspicion. In July, 1901, a protocol was signed between
the Sultan of Morocco and the French Government in which the latter
declared its respect for the integrity of Morocco. At the same time M.
Delcassé began secret negotiations with Spain for a delimitation of
spheres of influence in that country. In September, 1902, the first
Franco-Spanish secret treaty concerning Morocco was given its final
form. It was, however, not ratified because of British opposition at
the time. In 1904, the formation of the Anglo-French Entente agreement,
in which the French Government declared that it had no intention “of
altering the political status of Morocco,” was accompanied by the
conclusion of a secret understanding concerning Morocco which was not
revealed until 1911. According to the terms of that agreement the
British Government was to be informed of any understanding on Morocco
which might be concluded between France and Spain. These two countries,
in fact, on October 3, 1904, consummated a convention for the partition
of Morocco into spheres of influence. A copy of this secret agreement
was given to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Minister, who wrote,
in acknowledging it: “I need not say that the confidential character of
the Convention entered into by the President of the French Republic and
the King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Morocco
is fully recognized by us, and will be duly respected.”