The rascally Russians have been intriguing with our Ionian subjects, and
Aberdeen has written a very strong letter to Lord Heytesbury on the
subject.
Polignac, desirous as he is of withdrawing the French troops altogether
from the Morea, is at present afraid of doing so.
Aberdeen told me things were not going on well here. The King has quite
lost the sight of one eye, and the sight of the other is indistinct. It
gives him pain, too, and the fear of blindness makes him nervous. The Duke
of Cumberland is always about him, as mischievous as ever, but pretending
not to be hostile.
The Duke of Wellington gives the King up as a bad job. He sees him very
seldom. At first he liked seeing him and setting things to rights; but he
says he found what he did one day was undone the next, and he is in
despair. The King has no constancy. There is no depending upon him from one
day to another.
Aberdeen says the accession of Rosslyn has not produced the effect we
anticipated--that Lord Grey is very hostile. What we shall do for a
majority next session I know not, but I think we shall stand, [Footnote:
This might have been but for the events on the Continent in the year
following, which formed a new starting-point in the politics of a large
part of Europe.] although we shall not, I fear, be a strong Government. The
Catholic Relief Bill has destroyed our unity and the spirit of party. It
has likewise destroyed that of the Opposition, who have no longer any
rallying point. Thus the formation of a strong Government is difficult. The
Brunswickers cannot form one, and the King cannot be persuaded to make one
out of the Opposition. Indeed, that the Duke of Cumberland would never
advise. The Brunswickers will endeavour to make terms with us as a body--to
make martyrs of some of the old Protestants, particularly of the Duke and
Peel, and placing themselves at the head to go on as well as they could
with the rest of us. This will not do.
_September 26._
The Chairs, or rather the Court, somewhat impertinently object to the
addition I made to a recent draft, recommending an enquiry by practical and
scientific men as to the powers India may possess of producing many
articles of stores now sent from England. They say this is liable to
misconstruction, and then misconstrue it themselves. They suppose these
practical men, not being servants of the Company, to sit in judgment upon
the proceedings of the military Board. I have corrected their intentional
misconstruction, and have acquiesced in the substitution of a draft they
propose to send instead, which will, I hope, practically effect my object,
and therefore I have said we are willing our object should be attained in
the manner most agreeable to the Court of Directors.
It is very lucky I had just sent them my letter about stores. It will
appear to be written subsequently to theirs. They think to humbug and to
bully me. They will find both difficult.
_September 30._
Read the collection respecting the health of the King's troops. It is
incredible to me that so many things should remain to be done--nothing
seems to have been done that ought to have been done. I fear our finances
make the building of new barracks impossible at present. We could not build
proper barracks for all the European troops in India much under a million.
Still much may be done for their health.
_October 5._
Arrived in London at 3. To the Cabinet room, where I found Lord Bathurst,
come up to town for Seymour Bathurst's [Footnote: Hon. Seymour Bathurst,
fourth son of third Earl Bathurst, married October 6, 1829, Julia, daughter
of John Peter Hankey, Esq.] marriage, and afterwards Fitzgerald came in.
Fitzgerald was a fortnight in Ireland, and gives a bad account of it.
A letter from Metternich says peace was actually signed. Sir E. Gordon's
despatches give every reason to expect it soon would be. The peace cannot
last. I am inclined to think it would have been better for the Russians to
have occupied Constantinople, and for the Ottoman Empire to have been
overthrown that we might have known at once where we were, than to have had
such a peace as this. It is practically present occupation (for a year) of
_more_ than they now hold, for they are to have the fortresses ceded to
them. They exact 750,000£ for the pretended losses of their merchants, and
five millions for themselves. The indemnity to the merchants to be paid by
three instalments. On the payment of the first, Adrianople and a few places
on the coast to be given up. On the payment of the second everything to the
Balkan, and on the third Bulgaria. These payments occupy a year.
The five millions are to be paid in ten years, or sooner if the Turks can
manage it. The Principalities to be occupied till the payment. The Turks to
confirm the Government established during the ten years, and not to impose
any taxes for two years more.
All the fortresses on the left bank to be destroyed. None of the islands to
belong to Turkey. No Turk to enter the principalities. The princes to be
for life. All payments _in kind_ from the Principalities to cease, and
instead the Turks and the princes to _agree upon a compensation_! It is
unnecessary to go through the other articles relative to the
Principalities. The treaty contains a real cession of them to Russia.
The terms as to the navigation of merchantmen, their not being searched in
a Turkish port, the refusal of acquiescence in the demands of the Russian
Minister where any injury is pretended to have been done to a Russian, to
be _just ground for reprisal_, &c., are of a nature intolerable to an
independent Power, and not to be carried into execution.
On the side of Asia everything is ceded that can enable Russia to attack
either Turkey or Persia with advantage.
The terms imposed with regard to indemnities are extravagant and altogether
contrary to all the Emperor's promises. He has not deceived us; but he has
lied to us most foully. Sir R. Gordon seems to have done all that could be
done. Perhaps he has saved Constantinople from conflagration, and the
Empire from dissolution. He has managed to settle the Greek question,
Turkey consenting to everything the allies may determine under the protocol
of March 22. Sir R. Gordon has taken upon himself to order up the English
ships, and Guilleminot has ordered up the French ships, but they were still
at Smyrna when the dispatch came away. These ships, it is hoped, may be
some check on the Russians, and ostensibly they only go up to
Constantinople to save Christians. However, if the Russians advance they
will probably lead the Turks to fight. Gordon and Guilleminot have very
properly told the Sultan they will remain by him in any case.
The Turks declare the terms are, as regards payment, such as they have
really no means of complying with. The allies will make representations to
Petersburg to obtain a relaxation of these conditions.
In the meantime, while this was doing at Constantinople, Lord Heytesbury
was asking Nesselrode what the terms he intended to propose were, and
Nesselrode would not tell him. Lord Heytesbury's despatch and Gordon's are
both dated on September 10. The 12th was to be the day of signature. Lord
Stuart by Aberdeen's directions has been pressing Polignac very hard to
withdraw the French troops from the Morea, and Polignac has been obliged to
plead the weakness of his Government, and to put off Lord Stuart by
referring it to the Conference. I should say from what the papers show of
Polignac that he will not stand. I do not know what his antagonists may be,
but he is evidently not a powerful man.
A Liberal told Fitzgerald their object was now in France to make the King
of the Netherlands King of France, and give Holland to Prussia, taking
Belgium and everything to the Rhine to themselves.
I should say things looked ill everywhere, and unless we can make the
Emperor of Russia fear a convulsion in France, and determine to recede from
some of his stipulations with Turkey to satisfy the rest of Europe, we
shall have war, and war under the most unfavourable circumstances--that is,
if Austria be not as pusillanimous as she may be weak, for she ought never
to consent to the establishment of the Russians on the Danube.
The only line for the Turks to pursue is to promise everything; to
endeavour to perform everything, and to withdraw to Asia, leaving the rest
of Europe to settle who shall have Constantinople. _Now_ they could not do
that, as they are too weak; but six months hence they may.
We dine with the Duke on Wednesday--and shall then, I suppose, determine
what we are to do.
_October 7._
Cabinet at 3. All present except Lord Melville.
Aberdeen read a paper he had written before the peace was known, the object
of which was to show that the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, and that it
could not be reconstituted; that our views with regard to Greece should now
change with circumstances, and that we should endeavour to make it a
substantive state. To Turkey it could no longer signify whether Greece had
a more extended or more limited line of frontier, and our desire should be
to place a fit man upon the throne. France is willing to propose in the
Conference that to Turkey should be offered the alternative of a Greece
with extended limits under Suzeraineté, &c., according to the Protocol of
March 22, or a Greece with narrower limits, entirely independent.
The Duke said we must first have satisfaction for the insertion of the
Article in the treaty of peace which bound Turkey to the Protocol of March
22; Russia, as a party to the Treaty of London, having no right to settle
that treaty herself. Next, we should insist on an armistice between the
Greeks and Turks.
We must recollect that Turkey had bound herself to acquiesce in the
decision of the Conference upon the Greek Treaty--that is, to defer to our
mediation. Could we, as mediators, propose to Turkey to cede Attica,
Negropont, and other possessions she now holds? and would we willingly
bring the frontiers of the Greek state into contact with our Ionian
Islands?
If Greece were to have a sovereign, Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg would be
the best man for us--Austria would prefer him. France admitted that the
wishes of Austria ought to be consulted.
France, however, rather wished for Prince Charles of Bavaria. Russia for a
Duke of Saxe-Weimar.
Aberdeen seemed to think there would be no great difficulty in carrying our
point, and having Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg.
Peel said he thought we could not allow a treaty such as that signed by
Turkey to pass without a remonstrance on our part. We referred to a letter
of Dudley's, and to Aberdeen's recent instruction to Lord Heytesbury, and
likewise to the various declarations of moderation put forth by the Emperor
Nicholas. Several ways were started of expressing our opinion--a sort of
circular to the Powers which signed the Treaty of the Congress--a
declaration to Parliament.
The Duke suggested a remonstrance to the Emperor Nicholas to be
communicated in the first instance only to Russia.
This seems likely to be adopted, but we are to have another Cabinet to-
morrow.
In whatever we do we must endeavour to keep Austria out of the scrape, for
there is nothing the Russians would like so much as the opportunity of
marching to Vienna.
Not only it would be romantic for us alone to go to war to maintain the
balance of power, but it would, in this case, be absurd indeed, for, if our
armies had driven the Russians out of Turkey, we could not reconstitute the
Turkish Empire. It is dissolved in its own weakness.
Great dissatisfaction was expressed, and justly, at the conduct of Lord
Heytesbury, who has been humbugged by the Russians all along.
The King has run up a bill of 4,000£ for clothes in six months. All the
offices of the Household, except the Chamberlain's, which has 1,900£ in
hand, are falling into arrear, and if there should be an arrear upon the
whole civil list, it must come before Parliament.
Fitzgerald gives a very bad account of trade generally.
The King does not like us better than he did, and the Duke of Cumberland
means to keep his son in England, and educate him here, taking the 6,000£ a
year. He wants to drive the Government to make him Viceroy of Hanover.
The Cabinet dined with the Duke.
_October 8._
Cabinet at 3. A great deal of conversation of which the result was that a
remonstrance should be made to Russia on the subject of the terms of the
peace. This remonstrance will temperately but strongly, more by statement
of facts than by observations, show that the peace is not such as the
Emperor had given us reason to expect he would require, and that it in
reality threatens the existence of the Turkish Empire; that the destruction
of that Empire would seriously affect the peace of Europe by changing the
relative position of the several States.
Aberdeen wants a guarantee of the territorial possessions of Turkey, not of
its Government. [Footnote: It is observable that this guarantee seems to
have said nothing of the internal system of government, and so far to have
been unconditional. It would therefore have gone considerably beyond the
Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1878. It would also have applied to Europe as
well as Asia. It is a commentary on the statement of Mr. Gladstone, in
later days a colleague of Lord Aberdeen, that no statesman whom he had
known in former times would ever have listened to the idea of such an
engagement.] I think no one seems much inclined to agree with him. Such a
guarantee would impose obligations without conferring rights upon us. It
would be a guarantee which would give rise to infinite complications, and
which would embarrass us very much.
Without a guarantee we may succeed in bringing the great States to an
understanding that the distribution of the Turkish territories, in the
event of the falling to pieces of that State, must be a subject for the
decision of a Congress.
Austria has expressed herself very frankly. She is ready to do anything.
She sees the danger and desires to know our view of it. The real view of
France does not seem to be very different; but there is no dependence to be
placed upon a Government trembling for its life. Prussia will be satisfied
with the peace. Her sovereign is very weak, and the Prussians think their
interest is served by the progress of Russia in a direction contrary to
them, and in which she menaces Austria.
The smuggling case is said to tell against Lord Stuart. He writes
unintelligibly, and the French will not trust him--so I shall not be sorry
if we can get rid of him.
With Lord Heytesbury we are all dissatisfied, and have been from the
beginning. There is a Council on Monday, and we have a Cabinet on Sunday at
3, when we are to hear Aberdeen's letter, and may probably have the Treaty.
There seems a determination to effect an armistice by force if the
Conference will not order it in Greece.
We have nine good ships there. The Russians seven bad ones, and the French
two.
Before the Conference can proceed the 10th Article of the Treaty of Peace
must be declared _non avenu_--that which obliges the Porte to accept the
Protocol of March 22--all negotiation upon that Protocol having been
committed by Russia to the French and English Ambassadors, and it having
been expressly reserved to the Porte by us, that her objections should be
fairly weighed.
The French have taken advantage of the peace to order their troops home
from the Morea.
_October 9._
Read many of the Protocols of the early Conferences after the Russian,
declaration of war. I shall to-morrow read these again carefully and sketch
_my_ State paper.
If I was in opposition I should describe the details relative to the
Principalities, as showing the moderation of the thief who would stipulate
that men should sleep with their doors open, till they have ransomed
themselves by paying their uttermost farthing.
_October 10._
Received a letter from Sir J. Malcolm. He seems pleased with the secret
dispatches relative to Persia and the Pacha of Bagdad. He seems upon the
whole very much gratified, and very grateful.
He strongly presses the appointment of an Indian as his successor, and
mentions Sir Ch. Metcalfe and Jenkins. He likewise mentions a Mr. Chaplin,
of whom I never heard. I take Jenkins to be a cleverer man than Sir Ch.
Metcalfe, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Metcalfe.] who rather disappoints me.
Had three letters by Petersburg from Colonel McDonald, the last dated in
August. The Persians, thoroughly alarmed, are doing all they can to satisfy
the Emperor Nicholas by punishing the persons engaged in the massacre of
the Russian mission; but they had an insurrection to quell on banishing the
High Priest, who was at the head of all. As they conclude all the bad
characters had a hand in it they mean to take the opportunity of punishing
them. Paskewitz is said to have from 20,000 to 22,000 men--to have
sustained no loss in the late engagements, but to suffer from the plague.
At Erzeroum the Mahometans are not only satisfied, but well pleased. The
Government of a Russian general is better than that of a Turkish Pasha.
The Prince Abbas Mirza is at last doing something towards making an army.
Major Hart, alone, however, keeps it together. The troops are as yet ill-
armed, but they have their pay. McDonald thinks the King not likely to live
long. He wants a cypher.
_October 11, Sunday._
Came up from Worthing to a Cabinet. Before we met read the last letters
from Lord Heytesbury, which show a degree of infatuation respecting the
Russians, which is quite wonderful.
Before we began to talk Rothschild called out the Duke of Wellington, and
offered at once all the money to pay the Russian Indemnity. He said he only
wanted the guarantee of England!
If the Russians remained in the Principalities there would be a general
war.
Irvine, an English loan jobber, saw the Duke yesterday with the same offer.
The joke is that Rothschild is to pay the money for the Turks, and to be
made King of Jerusalem.
Aberdeen began by begging we would first settle the Greek question. He
brought a paper the Russians were willing to deliver in containing a sort
of apology for the 10th Article, and declaring that it by no means
interfered with the powers of the Conference. We took a great deal of time
in considering whether we should not suggest some alteration in this
paper--some is to be proposed--not very essential.
We had a long discussion as to the name of the new State. At last it seemed
to be thought 'Sovereign Prince of Greece' was the best. Aberdeen thinks
he shall have little difficulty about the Prince. The Russians agree to the
description given; but I dare say they imagine we mean to describe a
different man. I suspect they think we want to give them Leopold.
Aberdeen read a letter he proposed sending to Lord Stuart, the purport of
which was that we wanted to know what he meant to do towards redeeming
France from the responsibility she had incurred and made us incur by giving
instructions to Count Guilleminot, stating the terms of peace and the
moderation of the Emperor--instructions which misled our Ambassador, and
induced the two Ambassadors to give assurances to the Porte which events
proved to be unfounded.
The letter, I think, likewise desired him to enquire in what form our joint
representations as to the amount of the indemnity were to be made. To these
the Ambassadors have pledged the two Cabinets.
There was a great deal more in the letter which is to be left out. It went
into the details of the treaty, or rather of its effects.
The offer is to be made to the Turks of an independent Greece, from the
Gulf of Volo to Missolonghi, or of a Greece under Suzeraineté, with
Negropont, and the line from Volo to the Gulf of Arta.
I think we are all agreed that at the commencement of the war it was our
interest to take as little as possible from Turkey--that now it is our
interest to make Greece a substantive State, which may hereafter receive
the _débris_ of the Ottoman Empire. [Footnote: This may explain the
apparently illiberal views of many of the Cabinet as to the Greek
boundaries. They saw the difficulty of any halting place outside the
Isthmus of Corinth, short of a wider boundary even than that ultimately
adopted.]
As to the really important matter, the remonstrance to Russia, nothing was
done. Nothing is, I conclude, written, and Aberdeen does not like Cabinet
criticism, nor do I think the Cabinet at all agreed as to what should be
said. Dudley's letters used to occupy us for days, and certainly they were
the better for it--although we lost a good deal of time occasionally.
Aberdeen said he would send it to me. I think I shall write an _esquisse_
myself. We are to have no more Cabinets for some time. The Chancellor
wishes to have the remaining fortnight of his holidays uninterrupted.
_October 12._
Went to town at quarter-past one. To the Foreign Office. The treaty arrived
last night. Lord Aberdeen took it with him to Windsor. It differs
materially from the _projet_. The Articles respecting indemnity are
_relégués_ to a separate transaction. The payment of 100,000 ducats is to
lead to the evacuation of Adrianople; 400,000 form the next payment, then
500,000, and 500,000, making the sum originally demanded for individual
losses; but, as I understand Mr. Backhouse, eighteen months must elapse
before Turkey can be evacuated to the Danube. I had much conversation with
him as to other points. On looking into the Act of the Congress I find the
Powers adhering to it may be considered as binding themselves not to
_disturb_ the territorial arrangements that Act establishes; but they are
not bound to _maintain_ them. Thus if France appropriated to herself Spain,
she would violate the treaty, but no Power signing the treaty would be
obliged, by virtue of that Act, to make war upon France for doing so.
That the general treaty contains no guarantee is evident from the specific
guarantee of the cessions made by Saxony to Prussia, which would have been
unnecessary if the spirit of the treaty had been that of existent
guarantee.
_October 13._
Cabinet room. Found Lord Rosslyn there. Read the treaty.
The King was very well yesterday. The Recorder's Report was so long that
half was deferred.
The last dispatches from Persia, which arrived on Friday, were opened at
the Foreign Office, and read by everybody. Aberdeen sent them to the Duke,
who has probably taken them to Walmer in his carriage. The Chairs sent for
them, and could not get them. I must put a stop to this. I have written to
Lord Heytesbury to beg he will in future forward letters to their address.
Wrote a 'proposed draft' to Lord Heytesbury, directing him, if he should
have reason to think the Russians intend to exact further concession from
Persia, to intimate that such an attempt will be considered by his Majesty
as unfriendly to himself as an Asiatic Power. I doubt my getting the Duke
to agree to the sending of this despatch; but I shall try.
_October 14._
Carried my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury to Aberdeen, who agrees to
send it with a trifling alteration, at least one not very important. Read
to him my proposed letter to Lord Heytesbury on the Peace of Adrianople. He
seemed to approve of great part of it. He has done nothing at his yet, and
seems to think there is no hurry!
We shall stand very ill in Parliament if we have nothing to show. I think
mine is a good _cadre_ of a letter, but that specific instructions should
be given to Lord Heytesbury as to what he shall endeavour to obtain in a
separate despatch.
Read my drafts to Lord Rosslyn after dinner. He seemed to think the view I
took was the right, and that much of what I had written was very good, but
that it might be shortened. So I think.
_October 15._
Henry copied the draft to Lord Heytesbury, for the Duke, to whom I sent it
with a letter.
Showed the Chairs the draft to Lord Heytesbury on Persia. They were much
pleased with it. So was old Jones. Sent it to the Duke. In little doubt his
approving it.
Received from the Duke the Persian despatches which I gave to the Chairs.
The Duke had not read them.
Received from him a letter on the subject of half-Batta. He says as an
officer he should have thought there was a compromise in 1801. That it
should be looked into as a question of economy. That above all things in
dealing with an army you must _be just_.
The Duke thinks the publication of the letter of Lord Combermere's
secretary indiscreet and _wicked_, and is very angry with Lord Combermere.
A letter will be written to the Government on the subject, directing
enquiry.
_October 19, Sunday._
Read McDonald's despatches from Persia, and sent them to the Duke, with a
letter suggesting the heads of a letter to the Envoy.
The Russians have given up one of the two crores due, and allow five years
for paying the other. They mean, therefore, to rule Persia _by influence_.
However, there is a good Mahometan and Anti-Russian feeling beyond the
Euphrates, and if mischief happens, it is our fault.
Received a letter from Hardinge respecting half-Batta. He is for standing
firm and giving some general boon, as an addition to marching money, to the
whole army. That is my idea. I am sure it is the safest course.
Wrote to Loch, suggesting it, and at the same time advised him to answer
the paragraphs respecting half-Batta, and not give misrepresentations too
much head.
_October 20._
Two letters from the Duke, written very hastily. It is evident he did not
like my making a sketch of a letter to Lord Heytesbury, and that he does
not like any difference of opinion as to the Batta question.
On the first point I still think I was right. He mentions some ideas of
Russia ordering Diebitch across the Balkan, and even the Danube, of her
giving up the Principalities, &c. In short he says all we know is that
there is a peace--we do not know what it is--and it would be ridiculous to
remonstrate against we know not what.
My draft was written before these reports were spread; and I only, from
anxiety to have the despatch well written and soon, sketched what I thought
would do.
As to the reports, I have told Aberdeen I cannot believe Russia has on a
sudden ceased to be ambitious, or to use perfidy as a mode of accomplishing
ambitious ends. She may give out she will make these changes--she may make
some--but her object is to prevent all combination on the part of Austria,
France, and England. If we do not remonstrate against what is signed, we
shall lose all credit, if that which is executed should be comparatively
favourable, and we shall incur great blame if no relaxation takes place. A
remonstrance might be so worded as to do no harm to Turkey or to Europe,
and to do good to us.
The Duke's other letter was on the Batta question, upon which he does not
like contradiction, yet I think his course would lead to continued demands
on the part of all the armies. I have told him I shall be in town to see
the Chairs on Saturday, and will try to see him on Friday, and, if he
wishes, bring the Chairs to him on Saturday.
_October 21._
Received a long confused letter from Fitzgerald upon my project of a draft
to Lord Heytesbury. He was at Sudborn, [Footnote: Seat of Lord Hertford, in
Suffolk] where the Duke was. The Duke was not so much inclined to think the
Russians would make any considerable concessions as Aberdeen, but he
thought, and had made Fitzgerald think, it would be premature to
remonstrate. I have written to Fitzgerald and told him my opinion more at
length than I told Aberdeen yesterday.
_October 23._
Cabinet room. Read the despatches from Petersburg and Paris. All the hints
of the Emperor of Russia's intention of not retaining his army in Turkey
come through Paris, Nesselrode having on September 29 spoken thus
specifically to the Duke de Mortemart, and merely talked about taking less
money and making some change in the guarantees to Lord Heytesbury. I did
not see Aberdeen, who was engaged with the Spanish Minister.
I do not depart from my original idea that Russia does all this to gain
time, and with as much perfidy as she has shown throughout.
Polignac would take a loyal view if he durst.
I cannot see the Duke till Monday, as he does not return to London till
Sunday evening.