[Sidenote: [133-60 B.C.]]
At this point the Roman historian Florus casts a backward look over the
history of his people. Giving the point of view of the first century of
the empire, it shows no little acumen and is well worth quoting.
“This,” he says, “is the third age of the Roman people, with reference
to its transactions beyond the sea; an age in which, when they had once
ventured beyond Italy, they carried their arms through the whole world.
Of which age, the first hundred years were pure and pious, and, as I
have called them, ‘golden’; free from vice and immorality, as there
yet remained the sincere and harmless integrity of the pastoral life,
and the imminent dread of a Carthaginian enemy supported the ancient
discipline.[115]
“The succeeding hundred, reckoned from the fall of Carthage, Corinth,
and Numantia, and from the inheritance bequeathed us by King Attalus
in Asia, to the times of Cæsar and Pompey, and those of Augustus who
succeeded them, and of whom we shall speak hereafter, were as lamentable
and disgraceful for the domestic calamities, as they were honourable
for the lustre of the warlike exploits that distinguished them. For, as
it was glorious and praiseworthy to have acquired the rich and powerful
provinces of Gaul, Thrace, Cilicia, and Cappadocia, as well as those of
the Armenians and Britons, so it was disgraceful and lamentable at the
same time, to have fought at home with our own citizens, with our allies,
our slaves, and gladiators.
“I know not whether it would have been better for the Romans to have been
content with Sicily and Africa, or even to have been without them, while
still enjoying the dominion of Italy, than to grow to such greatness
as to be ruined by their own strength. For what else produced those
intestine distractions but excessive good fortune? It was the conquest
of Syria that first corrupted us, and the succession afterwards in Asia,
to the estate of the king of Pergamus. Such wealth and riches ruined
the manners of the age, and overwhelmed the republic, which was sunk
in its own vices as in a common sewer. For how did it happen that the
Roman people demanded from the tribunes lands and subsistence, unless
through the scarcity which they had by their luxury produced? Hence there
arose the first and second sedition of the Gracchi, and a third, that
of Apuleius Saturninus. From what cause did the equestrian order, being
divided from the senate, domineer by virtue of the judiciary laws, if
it was not from avarice, in order that the revenues of the state and
trials of causes might be made a means of gain? Hence again it was that
the privilege of citizenship was promised to the Latins, and hence were
the arms of our allies raised against us. And what shall we say as to the
wars with the slaves? How did they come upon us, but from the excessive
number of slaves? Whence arose such armies of gladiators against their
masters, if it was not that a profuse liberality, by granting shows to
gain the favour of the populace, made that an art which was once but a
punishment of enemies? And to touch upon more specious vices, did not
the ambition for honours take its rise from the same excess of riches?
Hence also proceeded the outrages of Marius, hence those of Sulla. The
extravagant sumptuousness of banquets, too, and profuse largesses, were
not they the effects of wealth, which must in time lead to want? This
also stirred up Catiline against his country. Finally, whence did that
insatiable desire of power and rule proceed, but from a superabundance of
riches? This it was that armed Cæsar and Pompey with fatal weapons for
the destruction of the state.”
THE WAR BETWEEN CÆSAR AND POMPEY
“Almost the whole world being now subdued,” Florus continues, “the
Roman empire was grown too great to be overthrown by any foreign power.
Fortune, in consequence, envying the sovereign people of the earth, armed
it to its own destruction. The outrages of Marius and Cinna had already
made a sort of prelude within the city. The storm of Sulla had thundered
even farther, but still within the bounds of Italy. The fury of Cæsar
and Pompey, as with a general deluge or conflagration, overran the city,
Italy, other countries and nations, and finally the whole empire wherever
it extended; so that it cannot properly be called a civil war, or war
with allies; neither can it be termed a foreign war; but it was rather
a war consisting of all these, or even something more than a war. If we
look at the leaders in it, the whole of the senators were on one side
or the other; if we consider the armies, there were on one side eleven
legions, and on the other eighteen; the entire flower and strength of
the manhood of Italy. If we contemplate the auxiliary forces of the
allies, there were on one side levies of Gauls and Germans, on the other
Deiotarus, Ariobarzanes, Tarcondimotus, Cotys, and all the force of
Thrace, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Macedonia, Greece, Ætolia, and all the East;
if we regard the duration of the war, it was four years, a time short in
proportion to the havoc made in it, if we attend to the space and ground
on which it was conducted, it arose within Italy, whence it spread into
Gaul and Spain, and returning from the West, settled with its whole force
on Epirus and Thessaly; hence it suddenly passed into Egypt, then turned
towards Asia, next fell upon Africa, and at last wheeled back into Spain,
where it at length found its termination. But the animosities of parties
did not end with the war, nor subsided till the hatred of those who had
been defeated satiated itself with the murder of the conqueror in the
midst of the city and the senate.
“The cause of this calamity was the same with that of all others,
excessive good fortune. For in the consulship of Quintus Metellus and
Lucius Afranius, when the majesty of Rome predominated throughout the
world and Rome herself was celebrating, in the theatres of Pompey, her
recent victories and triumphs over Pontus and Armenia, the overgrown
power of Pompey, as is usual in similar cases, excited among the idle
citizens a feeling of envy towards him. Metellus, discontented at the
diminution of his triumph over Crete, Cato, ever an enemy to those
in power, calumniated Pompey, and raised a clamour against his acts.
Resentment at such conduct drove Pompey to harsh measures, and impelled
him to provide some support for his authority. Crassus happened at
that time to be distinguished for family, wealth, and honour, but was
desirous to have his power still greater. Caius Cæsar had become eminent
by his eloquence and spirit, and by his promotion to the consulate. Yet
Pompey rose above them both. Cæsar, therefore, being eager to acquire
distinction, Crassus to increase what he had got, and Pompey to add
to his, and all being equally covetous of power, they readily formed
a compact to seize the government. Striving, accordingly, with their
common forces each for his own advancement, Cæsar took the province of
Gaul, Crassus that of Asia, Pompey that of Spain; they had three vast
armies and thus the empire of the world was now held by these three
leading personages. Their government extended through ten years, at the
expiration of this period (for they had previously been kept in restraint
by dread of one another) a rivalry broke forth between Cæsar and Pompey,
consequent on the death of Crassus among the Parthians, and that of
Julia, who, being married to Pompey, maintained a good understanding
between the son-in-law and father-in-law by means of this matrimonial
bond. But now the power of Cæsar was an object of jealousy to Pompey and
the eminence of Pompey was offensive to Cæsar. The one could not bear
an equal nor the other a superior. Sad to relate, they struggled for
mastery, as if the resources of so great an empire would not suffice for
two.”[d]
[Sidenote: [60-50 B.C.]]
It was particularly fortunate for Cæsar that the conquest of Gaul was
completed before his enemies at Rome combined against him, and that
Vercingetorix was vanquished before Pompey took up arms against him. The
meeting at Lucca and the decisions thereof had again put a great deal of
power in the hands of Pompey.
At Lucca, Cæsar had been promised the consulate for the year 48. This aim
attained and supported by his victorious army, with the prestige of his
deeds and his superior intellect he could easily have overreached Pompey,
who was no statesman. Cæsar would have organised the popular party, and
completed in some form or other the work of a democratic monarchy which
had been commenced by Gracchus and had failed in the unskilful hands of
Marius; the achievement would have been more glorious for him if it had
been accomplished without the aid of military force.
But the most enthusiastic of Pompey’s partisans now adopted a high tone.
They declined to concur in any compromise or compact which involved
danger to the republic; and at the beginning of the year 51 they threw
down the gauntlet to Cæsar. M. Claudius motioned for the newly appointed
consuls to be sent on the 1st of March in the year 49 to Cæsar’s two
vicegerencies of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul. The party also demanded
Cæsar’s disbandment of his army and maintained that his grant of citizen
rights to the colonies which he had founded, was not legal. An inhabitant
of Novum Comum, a town to which Cæsar had granted the Latin privilege,
was struck with rods.
Cæsar’s followers showed the unreasonableness of these views and courses
by references to Pompey’s position, and Pompey delayed doing anything or
declaring himself. The debate on the business of the nomination was fixed
for the 1st of March in the year 50. The union between Pompey and the
aristocrats became closer and closer, and the time they lost was to the
advantage of Cæsar.
[Sidenote: [50-49 B.C.]]
In the mean time he suppressed the rebellion of Vercingetorix, and Gaul
began to calm down. To show his desire for peace, Cæsar followed the
senate’s command to disband two legions, the one he had borrowed some
years before from Pompey and the other which he had raised himself. He
recompensed both before he dismissed them. However, the government did
not keep to the agreement of sending them to the Euphrates, but retained
them in the Campania for any emergency closer at hand. Cæsar also gained
increasing ground at Rome, where clever agents worked for him, and he won
an important victory through Curio, the plebeian tribune, a dissolute but
talented and wide-awake man, whom he gained over to his side by paying
his debts.[116] This ally maintained that what was due from Cæsar was
also due from Pompey, and threatened to put his veto upon all one-sided
courses against Cæsar.
The aristocrats hesitated, and in the meantime Cæsar arrived but without
his army, at Ravenna, the most southern point of his province. Then Curio
formulated his measure that Cæsar and Pompey should simultaneously resign
their provinces and thus allay the fears of the Roman people. The plan
was very well laid, and as the event showed, very cleverly arranged. The
measure was put to the vote of the senate and to the astonishment of all
concerned it resulted in 370 voting for the motion and twenty against it.
It therefore seemed that there were only twenty in the senate upon whom
Pompey could implicitly rely. “Then take Cæsar as your chief!” exclaimed
the consul Marcellus in a rage as he closed the sitting.
Pompey’s party was in fact in a great strait; and Cæsar (probably at a
high price) had attained what he wished. He had forced his adversaries to
enter the list as insurrectionists. Pompey began raising troops without
the necessary authority, whilst Cæsar, who was with a legion at Ravenna,
sent the order to his assembled troops to disband without delay. He also
despatched a letter to the senate, in which he offered to resign the
governorship of Cisalpine Gaul, to reduce his ten legions to two, if he
were allowed to retain these and the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul until
the election of the consul for 48. This document was delivered to the
senate by Curio. The tribunes Mark Antony and C. Cassius insisted on its
being read aloud. The sitting was stormy, and the two consuls C. Claudius
Marcellus, and L. Cornelius Lentulus made a point of Cæsar’s appearing as
a private individual before the judicature.
In accordance with their views, the motion was carried for Cæsar to
resign his province and to disband his army within a fixed time; his
neglect to concur with this decree was to be considered high treason.
In that case L. Domitius was nominated as his successor. This motion
was passed on the 1st of January, 49, but the tribunes put their veto
on it, and a great excitement prevailed in the city, into which Pompey
had brought two legions. With this support the terrified senate, after
expelling the dissentient tribunes from the curia, issued the decree
which involved the declaration of war. The senate solemnly conjured the
leaders, the officials supported by a military force in the city and its
neighbourhood, to watch over the safety of the endangered state. The
tribunes renewed their veto, but threatened by the soldiers of Pompey,
against whom they were powerless, they fled from Rome and repaired
to Cæsar’s headquarters. The decisive step was taken, the swords were
unsheathed. Cæsar still remained with his single legion at Ravenna when
the tribunes arrived in the character of fugitives. He had already
carefully weighed the matter, and had conceived a clear decided course.
He had his own army which had served him for ten years in danger and in
victory. He knew every cohort, almost every soldier in his command; and
every single man was devoted to the general who shared danger and honour
with them all, and who had never deserted them in any strait. Moreover he
had the Transpadian, or Romanised Gauls of the Po district, to whom he
had granted full civic rights on his own authority; this however was the
end of his resources.
CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON
[Sidenote: [49 B.C.]]
On the other side all the other forces of Rome, the legions in Spain, the
state treasure, the fleet, the tribute of the dominions, the contingents
and the money of the whole of the East, and the respected name of the
republic were at the disposal of Pompey, who boasted, and not without
cause, that he had only to stamp upon the ground for armies to appear.
Perhaps the charm of the old fame of Pompey exceeded the attraction of
the more recent victories of Cæsar. But Cæsar did not hesitate. On the
other side of the little river Rubicon which separated the Cisalpine
province from Italy, lay his native land, and the civil war which could
only end with his overthrow or his complete victory.[b]
[Illustration: CÆSAR CROSSING THE RUBICON]
“Cæsar had sent people to bring his army,” says Appian, “but being
accustomed to succeed more by diligence, striking a terror and hardiness,
than any mighty preparations, he resolved to begin this great war with
his five thousand men, and to seize some places of Italy that were
commodious for him. First he sent before to Ariminum some centurions and
men who were to enter the city as passengers, and then all of a sudden to
seize on that city (the first that offers itself coming from Gaul); and
himself, in the evening, going out as if he had found himself ill after
a feast, leaves his friends, and mounting in a chariot drove himself
the same way, followed at a distance by his cavalry. When he came to
the banks of Rubicon he stopped some time, looking upon the water, and
thinking of the calamities he was about to be the cause of, if he passed
that river in arms.
“At length turning to those of his train, ‘My friends,’ said he, ‘if
I pass not this river immediately, it will be to me the beginning of
all misfortunes; and if I do pass it, I go to make a world of people
miserable’; and there withal, as if he had been pressed forward by
some divinity, he drove into the stream, and crossing it, cries with a
loud voice, ‘The lot is cast.’ From whence, continuing on his way with
speed, he seized Ariminum by break of day, and all in an instant places
garrisons in all the good places of that country, which he reduced either
by force or favour.
“Meanwhile, as it happens in these unexpected alarms, the whole
country was filled with people flying, the countrymen forsaking their
habitations, and nothing was to be heard but cries, and lamentations, and
groans, yet no man knew from whence this disorder came, but all imagined
that Cæsar was upon them with all his forces. The consuls receiving the
news, gave not Pompey, who perfectly understood war, leisure to prepare
himself, and take his own time; they began to press him to be gone out
of the city, and make levies of forces in Italy, as if Rome had been in
immediate danger of being taken and plundered. And the senate surprised
with so unlooked for an irruption, were terrified, and began to repent
they had not accepted those reasonable conditions offered by Cæsar; but
this was not till fear had opened their eyes, and led them back from
partiality to reason; for now men talked of a great many prodigies and
extraordinary signs which had appeared in the heavens, that it had rained
blood in many places, that in others the statues of the gods had sweat,
that many temples had been struck with thunderbolts, that a mule had
engendered, besides an infinite of other things which seemed to foretell
the change of the present state, and the ruin of the commonwealth, so
as it should never be re-established; wherefore they made vows and
prayers as in a public consternation. And the people, remembering again
the miseries they had suffered because of the dissensions of Sulla and
Marius, cried out that they ought to take away the command as well from
Cæsar as from Pompey, since that was the only means to prevent a war.
Cicero himself was of opinion that deputies should be sent to Cæsar to
treat an accommodation, but the consuls absolutely opposed it.
“Favonius, quipping at Pompey because of a word he had once said with too
much arrogance, bade him stamp on the ground with his foot, and see if
any armed men would rise. To which Pompey answered: ‘You will want none
so you will follow me, and are not troubled to leave the city, and Italy,
itself, if there be occasion; for people of courage,’ said he, ‘do not
make liberty consist in the possession of lands and houses; they cannot
want in any place they come to; and if they lose not their courage, will
soon recover their houses and lands.’
“After having said these words, and protested he would hold him for
an enemy, who out of fear to lose what he possessed, deserted the
commonwealth in extreme danger, he went out of the palace, and soon
after out of the city, to join the army that was at Capua. The consuls
followed him presently, but the other senators weighed it a little
longer, and spent all the night in the palace, without resolving
anything; and at length as soon as it was break of day, the greater part
followed the same way after Pompey. Meantime, Cæsar having reached at
Corfinium, L. Domitius, whom they had sent for his successor with four
thousand men (of which he had already lost a part), he besieged him in
the city, from whence, endeavouring to escape, the inhabitants stopped
him at the gate, and brought him to Cæsar, to whom the remainder of his
forces yielded themselves; he received them kindly, that he might draw
others by their example, and without doing any wrong to Domitius, he
suffered him to go whither he pleased, with all his equipage, hoping by
this courtesy to oblige him to take his party, yet without hindering
him from going to find out Pompey. Pompey on the other side marched
from Capua to Brundusium, that he might thence pass to Epirus, where
he designed to establish the seat of war; he sent to all provinces and
to kings themselves that they should send him what forces they could
supply.”[c]
Pompey having accordingly decided that the most prudent course to adopt
was to quit Italy and retire across the sea, had assembled all the
available troops at Brundusium, though the greater half had already
happily crossed to Greece. Cæsar reached the city accompanied by his
legions. But Pompey, until the return of the fleet, succeeded in baffling
his efforts to close the mouth of the harbour. He now barricaded the city
and the two roads leading to the harbour; the rest of the army embarked,
and the retreat was made on the ships, which they carried across the
sea.[117] Cæsar being left with the empty town, found his hope had failed
of ending the war as quickly as he had commenced it.
CÆSAR’S SERIOUS POSITION
This success was great, but the seriousness and danger of Cæsar’s
position were now evident. He could not follow Pompey as long as the
general’s seven powerful Spanish legions under their legates M. Petreius
and L. Afranius were behind him; and if he went to Spain against them,
where was he, who had no fleet, to get the means to oppose the return
to Italy of Pompey, who ruled the seas? Moreover, Italy was more
surprised than conquered. He had not been able in two months to gain the
influence which Pompey had spent ten years to win. What would happen
if insurrection broke out against him, and if Pompey’s fleet stopped
supplies? The one mode of contravening these dangers was to double
his force by the swiftness of his movements. But the difficulties of
his position did not end here. If he plundered like Marius and Sulla,
he would arouse the diverse elements of resistance against him; if he
protected life and property, he would estrange such men of his own force
as Mark Antony and P. Cornelius Dolabella, who expected to pay their
debts by Cæsarian proscription lists.
In the hope of subsequently disbanding Pompey’s Spanish army, Cæsar
repaired first to Rome, untiring in his efforts to win over to his
side the peaceful burgesses who formed the party of order. The feared
proscription lists did not appear, and pardons were bruited from all
sides. Perhaps this was the reason Cæsar found that the assembly of the
remaining senators which he summoned were not very willing to endow
him with all-embracing legal authority. Pompey was still considered the
stronger; Cæsar’s success seemed only transient, and his moderation was
put down to a sense of weakness. Hence Cicero, who played a pitiful part
in these days and stood undecided between both parties, did not appear in
the Cæsarian senate. He like many other weaklings cast longing glances to
the other camp beyond the sea without mustering courage to join either
party. There was at least an attempt at resistance in Rome. The plebeian
tribune L. Metellus covered with his body the door leading to the public
treasure. Cæsar calmly gave the necessary commands regardless of the
senate, and the obstinate tribune was quietly carried from the door,
which Cæsar then forced open. The gold discovered proved a powerful ally.
The Pompeian party left behind in the haste of their flight not less than
£3,500,000.
Cæsar then took measures and did all that was necessary to create a
fleet. He gave the prætor M. Æmilius Lepidus the appointment of city
prefect, and despatched his officers. The legate Valerius was sent with
a legion against Sardinia, and M. Cotta, Pompey’s follower who was there
in command. C. Curio was commissioned to go with three legions to Sicily
against M. Porcius Cato and thence to Africa. To others he deputed
the organisation of the fleet, and with the remaining nine legions he
repaired to Spain.
CÆSAR LORD FROM ROME TO SPAIN
[Sidenote: [49-48 B.C.]]
The seven Pompeian legions were stationed on the Ebro under Afranius
and Petreius. The important city of Massilia (Marseilles) had gone over
to Pompey through the L. Domitius whom Cæsar had released after he fell
into his hands at Corfinium. Cæsar was moreover prevented from taking
the Pyrenean passes by the legates of his foe who now took up a position
somewhat north of the Iberus at Ilerda (Lerida) on the Sicoris (the left
tributary of the Ebro). Cæsar took up a position opposite, whilst he left
Decimus Brutus at Massilia.
During the month of June the strength of both armies was tested in
numerous battles and difficult movements, until finally Cæsar, whose
knowledge of war was quite different from that of his enemies, succeeded
in getting the army on to the left bank of the Sicoris and cutting his
enemy off from the Ebro. Having put the enemy into this position his
men began to fraternise with the Pompeians. Further bloodshed seemed
superfluous. At the beginning of August, 49, the Pompeians capitulated,
part of the army disbanding and part joining Cæsar. The capitulation of
the army on this side led to that of Further Spain also. The province was
under the command of Terentius Varro, a celebrated scholar and a zealous
republican, and Massilia surrendered at the same time and escaped further
condemnation by resigning its arms and fleet, a part of its territory and
its garrison.
Things did not go so well in places where Cæsar could not himself be
present. During his absence in Spain, M. Æmilius Lepidus, whom he had
left as prefect of the city to govern Italy, had named him dictator.
He assumed the great dignity thus conferred upon him, but held it only
eleven days. In that period he presided at the comitia and was elected
consul, together with P. Servilius Isauricus, one of his old competitors
for the chief pontificate. He also passed several laws. One of these
restored all exiles to the city, except Milo, thus undoing one of the
last remnants of Sulla’s dictatorship. A second provided for the payment
of debts, so as to lighten the burdens of the debtors without satisfying
the democratic cry for an abolition of all contracts. A third conferred
the franchise on the citizens of Transpadane Gaul, who had since the
Social War enjoyed the Latin right only. Certainly Sardinia and Sicily
were held by Cæsarian lieutenant-generals who kept the Pompeian force in
check; and Curio, who here again gave evidence of his great talent, was
at first victorious over the soldiers of Pompey when he was transferred
from Sicily to Africa. He was victorious at Utica, and commenced the
siege of the city. But a false report which led him to believe he had
only to deal with a small force of the foe drew him into the Bagradas
plain. He began the battle boldly, but it ended in his entire defeat when
King Juba of Numidia, the ally of the Pompeians appeared in the vicinity
with his ready prepared army. Curio himself fell. The rest of his troops
surrendered the following day to P. Atius Varus, the Pompeian governor
of Africa. Cæsar met with another reverse in Illyricum. The ships under
P. Dolabella, and the land forces under C. Antonius were seized and
destroyed by superior Pompeian forces in the attempt to avoid an attack
of Pompey on this side.
Pompey himself had done nothing all the summer but make preparations on
a colossal scale. He was probably hampered in doing what he knew would
be advisable by the brainlessness, the inaccuracy, and the pride of the
aristocrats about him, which, from all we know, we cannot overestimate.
But it certainly gives us a very poor idea of his talent as a general
when we see that whilst he was engaged, during the whole of the important
summer of 48, in these fruitless preparations, he let his enemy gain
possession of Spain, Italy, Sardinia, the cities of Sicily and as far as
he was concerned, Africa too, without making any resistance, and even
allowing the foe time to collect a naval force.
The place of assembly of the aristocrats and Pompeians was Macedonia.
Their senate was held at Thessalonica where its members numbered two
hundred. To their remarkable incapacity for politics the aristocrats
added a deplorable want of judgment; the useless rage of this class
expended itself in wild talk and revengeful plans. Defeated through
their own fault, they avenged themselves with fine words for Cæsar’s
energetic deeds. Their obstinate pride rejected every peace negotiation
offered by Cæsar, and regaled itself in vengeance-breathing declamations.
“They are,” writes Cicero, who had finally decided which party to join,
“devastating in war and in their speech so wild, that I shudder at their
success. They are an exalted people, but deeply in debt--but what would
you have? They have nothing good about them but the cause.” Yet even the
cause was bad if it had no other supporters. It was natural for Pompey
to feel crippled with these generals of high rank, these incompetent
officers. But he at least knew how to use the rich supplies which came to
him from the East, over which he still exercised unconditional control.
Eleven legions, seven thousand horsemen, Celts, Thracians, Commagenian
archers, Armenians, Numidian cavalry, a fleet of 500 sail, and a
well-filled treasure chest were placed at his disposal. He assembled his
forces on the coast of Epirus.
CÆSAR IN GREECE
[Sidenote: [49 or 48 B.C.]]
In the meanwhile Cæsar had returned from Spain, and after a short
dictatorship, he was elected in Rome consul for the year 48, and at the
beginning of the year [or by the rectified calendar in November 49]
collected his troops at Brundusium. He had succeeded with great trouble
in collecting a fleet which, to the great surprise of the crews, brought
him and his six legions safely to the Acroceraunian coast. But the bold
venture might have been fatal. The fleet of the foe commanded the sea and
the second fleet of transports did not appear. Cæsar found himself cut
off from Italy with scarcely twenty-five thousand men. He would have been
lost if Pompey had promptly advanced against him from Dyrrhachium.[b]
APPIAN DESCRIBES THE BATTLE OF DYRRHACHIUM
[Sidenote: [48 B.C.]]
“Cæsar pitched his camp directly against him, on the other side of the
river Alora, which parted the two armies, where yet there happened some
horse skirmishes, now one party and then another passing the river, but
neither would engage with all their forces, because Pompey thought good
first to exercise his forces that were newly levied, and Cæsar expected
those that were to come from Brundusium. He thought if they stayed till
spring, and then should come over with ships of burden (and he had no
other) they could no way be secured, Pompey having such a number of
galleys to defend the passage; but if they embarked during winter, they
might slip by their enemies, who now lay harboured in the islands, or if
they were engaged, might open themselves a passage by the violence of the
winds, and the bulk of their vessels; wherefore he did all he could to
hasten their coming.
“And therefore out of impatience that the rest of his army came not from
Brundusium, he resolved himself to go privately over, thinking they
would sooner follow him than any other; wherefore without discovering
his design to any one, he sent three of his slaves to a river not above
twelve furlongs distant, to secure some very light boat, and a good
pilot, as if he had an intention to send him upon some design, and
feigning himself ill, rose from the table where he desired his friends to
continue, and taking the habit of a private man, mounting his chariot,
came to the boat as Cæsar’s messenger.
“He had given orders to his slaves to command the mariners what they had
to do, whilst he kept himself concealed under coverlids and the darkness
of the night. Though the wind were contrary, and very raging, the slaves
made the pilot put off, bidding him be of courage, and make use of his
time to escape the enemy, who were not far from them, they laboured so
hard, that by force of oars they got the mouth of the river, where the
waves of the sea beating against the stream of the river, the pilot (who
on the other side was afraid of falling into the enemies hands) did
all that was possible for man to do, till seeing they gained nothing,
and the seamen not able to pull any longer, he left the helm. Then the
consul discovering his head, cried out, ‘Courage, pilot, fear no storm,
for thou carriest Cæsar and his fortune.’ Whereupon the pilot and his
crew astonished at these words, redoubling their force, passed the mouth
of the river; got out to sea; but because the winds and the waves still
drove them towards the lee shore in spite of all their endeavours, and
day approaching, the mariners fearing to be discovered by the enemy,
Cæsar angry at fortune that envied him, suffered the pilot to regain
the river, and the boat presently running afore the wind, came to the
place from whence they set out: Cæsar’s friends admired at his boldness,
others blamed him for having done an action more proper for a private
soldier than a general; and he seeing his design had not succeeded, and
that it was impossible for him to pass over without being known, sent
Postumius in his place. He first had charge to tell Gabinius that he
should presently embark the army, and bring it to him; and if he refused,
then to address himself to Antony, and at last to Calenus, and if none of
these three had spirit enough to execute these orders, he had a letter
for the army in general, by which the soldiers were exhorted to come over
and follow Postumius, landing at any place they could, without regarding
the ships; for he had more need of men than ships, so much confidence had
he in fortune, indeed more than in prudence.
“Pompeius then judging he ought no longer to delay, drew out his army
in battalia, and caused them to advance against Cæsar; but two of his
soldiers being entered into the river to sound the ford, and one of
Cæsar’s men having slain them both, he took this as an ill presage, and
led back his forces into the camp, though many lamented the loss of so
fair an occasion.
“As for the forces at Brundusium, Gabinius, refusing to follow the
orders brought by Postumius, with all that would follow him, went the
way of Illyricum by land, taking such long marches that his men being
quite tired the inhabitants of the country cut them all in pieces, for
which Cæsar could not yet be revenged, being engaged in affairs of more
importance. Antony shipped away the rest, and having the wind right aft,
passed in sight of Apollonia with a merry gale; but about noon the wind
beginning to slacken, they were discovered by twenty of Pompey’s galleys,
who made up towards them; they were fearful lest the stems of the long
ships running on board them should pierce through and sink them. However,
they were preparing to fight, every man laying hold of his sling, his
javelin, or arms of the like nature; when on a sudden there sprung up
a fresher gale than the former; so that Antony, setting his low sails,
went spooning away before, whilst the others, not able to bear sail, were
tossed to and fro where the winds and waves pleased, and at length driven
into the narrows and cast upon lee shores where there was neither port
nor harbour. Thus Antony safely recovered the port of Nymphæum without
losing more than two ships, which unfortunately running upon the flats
were taken by the enemies.
“Cæsar having now with him all his forces as well as Pompey, they pitched
their camps in sight of each other upon eminences where each entrenched
themselves, raising out forts, which were often attacked by one party and
the other, one general still striving to block up the other’s army and
cut them off from provisions, so that there happened many skirmishes. In
this new mode of making war, as Cæsar’s men one day proved the weaker in
a fort assailed by the enemy, a centurion called Scæva, famous before for
many gallant actions, being wounded in an eye, leaped from the rampart,
and making a sign with his hand for silence, as if he had something to
say, he called to one of the centurions of the contrary party, a man of
reputation, to whom he said, ‘Save the life of one of thy own quality,
save the life of thy friend; send somebody to lead me by the hand, thus
wounded as I am.’ Whereupon two soldiers stepping in to receive him as
a runaway, he slew one before he suspected the deceit, and knocked the
other down. He did this action out of the pure despair he was in of being
able to defend the place; but it succeeded better than he imagined,
for this happy success so raised the courage of his companions that
they repulsed the enemy and remained masters of the fort. Minucius, who
commanded, had a great share in the glory as well as in the danger of
this assault, for ’tis said that his buckler was six and twenty times
pierced through, and he was wounded in the eye as well as Scæva; so Cæsar
honoured them both with many military recompenses.
“Meantime he had formed intelligence in Dyrrhachium, and upon hopes the
place would be delivered to him, he came with a small company to the gate
which is near the temple of Diana; but his design being discovered, came
off again without doing anything. The same winter Scipio, father-in-law
to Pompey, bringing him another army out of Syria, was set upon in
Macedon by C. Calvisius, whom he defeated, and slew him a whole legion,
fourscore soldiers only escaping. There came now no more provisions to
Cæsar by sea, Pompeius being the stronger, wherefore the soldiers were
forced to make bread of a certain kind of herb, pieces of which being by
some runaways brought to Pompey, thinking it would be to him a joyful
present. Instead of rejoicing at it, ‘What sort of beasts,’ said he,
‘have we to deal with?’ Cæsar now pinched with necessity drew together
his forces, resolving to engage Pompey whether he would or no; but Pompey
being now possessed of several good forts, kept close in his trenches,
which so much troubled Cæsar that he undertook a work almost impossible,
and scarcely credible, which was to enclose all the forts Pompey had with
a trench drawn from the sea, judging that though his design took not
effect, he should gain the reputation of a man capable of great things;
for this trench must have been twelve hundred furlongs in length. Pompey
on his part, drew lines and trenches directly opposite to Cæsar’s works;
thus one eluded the enterprises of the other.
“At length there happened a great fight between them, wherein Pompey
bravely repulsing Cæsar’s men and having put them to flight, pursued them
to their very camp. Many colours they took and had taken the eagle of a
legion, if the standard-bearer who carried it had not thrown it with all
his force into the trenches, that he might preserve it for Cæsar; for
the Roman soldiery have a great respect for their standards. Cæsar with
other companies came to the relief of those that fled, but so terrified
were these too, that as soon as they beheld Pompey at a distance, though
they were near the camp, it was not possible for Cæsar to stop them,
nor to make them go in again, nor so much as to hearken to him; the
soldiers fled away in disorder without shame, without reason, or without
anything to oblige them to it; Cæsar might well run up and down, and with
reproaches show them that Pompey was yet a great way off. This hindered
them not from throwing down their arms and flying, or else standing
still, silent and immovable, fixing their eyes upon the ground with shame
and confusion, so great was that panic fear that possessed them. There
was an ensign who, as his general would have stopped him, presented him
the point of his javelin, but he was upon the spot punished by the gods
as he deserved. Those who escaped into the camp were so cast down that
they kept no guard at the gates nor lined the rampire, but the trenches
were left without any to defend them. All men believed that Pompey might
have thrown himself into the camp with the flyers, and so have made an
end of the war, if Labienus (for God would have it so) had not persuaded
him rather to pursue those he had routed, then march up to the trenches;
him therefore he believed, whether it were that he was not in such haste
as to make an end of all at once, or that seeing the camp defenceless,
he feared some ambuscade, or else being victorious, scorned that little
advantage. Going therefore to charge those that were still abroad, he
made yet a great slaughter, so that in two engagements in one day he
gained twenty-eight colours, and twice lost the opportunity of ruining
his enemy beyond redress. And Cæsar himself stuck not to say that that
day the war had been ended, had his enemy known how to make use of his
victory.
“Pompey after this glorious success wrote largely of it to the kings and
commonalties; and conceived hopes that in a short time Cæsar’s army,
either oppressed by famine or terrified with disgrace, would yield
themselves to him; especially the tribunes, fearful of being punished for
a fault they knew themselves guilty of. But they and all the soldiers
touched with repentance as by divine inspiration, confessed themselves
criminals; and afflicted themselves the more, that their general spoke
kindly to them, and granted them pardon before they asked it: they
would not forgive themselves; but with a wonderful change desired, as
a punishment of their fault, they might be decimated according to the
custom of their ancestors, but he would by no means admit it; which
increased their shame the more that they should be guilty of such
cowardice in prejudice of the best man of the world, and who most
deserved their faith and their services.
“They besought him that at least he would punish the ensigns, who had
been the cause of this rout; for in flying they had only followed their
colours; and seeing Cæsar could not resolve to do that, but with much ado
would consent to the punishment of a few, his moderation begot in the
mind of the soldiers a general joy.
“They began all with one voice to cry out that he should lead them
against the enemy, that by gaining a new victory they might wipe
away their infamy; and in the sight of their general they swore by
whole companies one to the other, never to return from the fight but
victorious. Wherefore his friends advised him to take the army at their
words, and make trial of them upon this height of repentance before their
zeal grew cooler; but he answered them before all the multitude that he
would choose a time more proper to show them the enemy; exhorting them
then to remember the good will they now protested, and in private he told
his confidants that it was convenient to let that fear which so late a
loss had imprinted be worn a little out of the minds of the soldiery; and
by temporising, let the fierceness of his enemies heightened by their
late victory, be likewise a little cooled: He confessed withal he had
committed a great fault in coming to a camp so near Dyrrhachium, where
Pompey had all things in abundance; whereas if he had drawn himself
farther off, they might have met with equal difficulties.
“After having discoursed in this manner, he came to Apollonia, and
from thence privately by night took his march towards Thessaly; and on
the way, coming to a little city called Gomphi, that refused to open
their gates, he took it by storm and gave the plunder to his soldiers;
who having long endured scarcity, fed now beyond measure, and filled
themselves with wine, especially the Alamanni, whose drunkenness made
them ridiculous to all the rest: so that here again in all appearance
Pompey lost a fair occasion of victory by not pursuing an enemy he
despised; but lying still, whilst in seven days’ march he got into
Thessaly, and encamped near Pharsalia.”[c]
The pride of the victorious party after the success of Dyrrhachium knew
no bounds. They were in no hurry to follow the advice of prudent men and
to get possession of Italy again. The danger, if it had ever existed, now
seemed past. The rest of the campaign would be nothing more than a safe
march; the wild plans of revenge with which they had hoped to exceed the
Sullanian restoration and its terrors seemed quite near their fulfilment.
Such was the mood of the army, especially of the conceited young
aristocracy, when Pompey’s army joined with Scipio’s corps at Larissa,
whilst Cato remained with eighteen cohorts at Dyrrhachium, and the
Pompeian fleet of three hundred ships dropped anchor at Corcyra.
PHARSALIA
Cæsar had stationed himself by the town of Pharsalia on the left bank of
the river Enipeus, which traverses the plain between the line of hills
of Cynoscephalæ in the north and the mountains of Othrys in the south,
and Pompey took up his stand on the right bank, at the foot of the
Cynoscephalæ hills. Pompey could have conquered his foe by prolonging the
war, and he, with his own experience of war, was himself conscious of the
fact. But he had long ceased to be master in his camp. It was ruled by
a hydra-headed regiment of high-born people, and the hot-blooded noble
youth were already, as if victory was assured, disputing the division of
the honours of Cæsar and the property of his allies. They pressed for a
decisive blow, and they gave Pompey to understand that he was too fond of
playing the part of Agamemnon, the king of kings, the commander-in-chief
of so many prætors and consuls, the king of vassals and the prince of
clients.[118] Confident of success they pointed to the forty-seven
thousand foot-soldiers, and the seven thousand horsemen of their own
army, which far exceeded the twenty thousand of Cæsar’s beaten force.
Pompey could not resist the pressure. He had put himself into this
position, so he ceased to delay; and on the fateful 9th of August 48 [6th
of June by the rectified calendar] he led his army over the river Enipeus.
Success seemed to favour the aristocrats when their numerous superior
cavalry surrounded Cæsar’s right wing, which faced the plain, whilst
the fighting by Cæsar’s left wing was resultless, and the weak cavalry
of Cæsar could not long withstand the masses of Pompeian horsemen. T.
Labienus commanded the corps against his former imperator, but as he
pressed forward victoriously he was opposed by the two thousand picked
legionaries which Cæsar, foreseeing the enemy’s attack, had placed there.
“Strike the pretty young dancers on the face,” cried their general to
them, and the determined, unexpected method in which they, contrary to
custom, used the pila as lances threw the enemy’s cavalry into disorder
and forced it to flight.
Cæsar profited by this movement to make his reserve line advance for a
general attack. Pompey’s legions, greatly inferior to Cæsar’s veterans
in military prowess, began to retreat across the Enipeus. All was not
yet lost, but Pompey, too spoiled by success to bear a moment’s reverse,
neglected his duty, and throwing up the sponge he rode back to the camp.
The vanquished legions gradually followed suit, as it became known in
their ranks that mercy and consideration would be shown them by the
enemy. They were driven from the camp by fresh onslaughts, and at midday
it was stormed by the Cæsarians.
But Pompey had already mounted his horse and fled. His soldiers, in
increasing disorder, destitute of command albeit fighting continuously,
withdrew to the hills in the attempt to reach Larissa by that route.
But the dissolution was at hand; a number cast down their arms trusting
to the victors’ promised mercy, and those who reached the heights
were disappointed in their hope of getting to Larissa, for they were
surrounded in the evening by Cæsar’s lines. The next morning twenty
thousand men, a whole army, laid down their arms; fifteen thousand
capitulated the previous day, whilst not more than six thousand lost
their lives.
The victory did not cost Cæsar more than one thousand men. The enemy’s
army was destroyed, but the results of the battle were not foreseen. They
depended upon the course Pompey would take. Of him nothing was known but
that he had taken the road to the sea and had escaped.
It is evident that this battle was mainly lost from want of command. But
why did Pompey so quickly give it up for lost without any attempt to
arrest the course of fate? We have no record from his headquarters which
can throw light upon these facts, but it seems that the party of which
he was the chief had grown too much for him; that a deep discontent and
ill-humour took possession of him, and both the party and the cause for
which he had sacrificed himself had become loathsome to him before the
battle took place. This is the only explanation of his conduct at the
battle. How could it be otherwise? His aim and object were quite opposed
to those of the party to which he was chained, and he was so entirely in
its power that even complete victory would have only benefited them, not
him. Perhaps the shame of appearing before his own party drove him to
this hasty flight; perhaps he was afraid of personal danger at the hands
of his colleagues, for this Pompeian camp was torn with every passion.
Suffice it to say he escaped, and this flight made the defeat dangerous,
for his person was the rallying point for the resistance of his party.
He hastened to Larissa; then disguised, and with a few companions, he
proceeded to the mouth of the Peneus, the celebrated Vale of Tempe, and
from thence by ship to Amphipolis.
At Mytilene he took his wife Cornelia and his son Sextus on board, but
he did not stop there, as the news of the disastrous battle and the
unexpected consequence had spread all over Asia Minor. It did not seem
advisable to attempt anything here. But he conceived the plan of putting
himself at the head of his large fleet and joining the victorious land
force in Africa. Choosing another course and another country, he might,
perhaps, hope to be more independent. So he decided to turn to Egypt and
start fresh undertakings, with this excellent position as a basis. But
they were undertakings in which he had no real confidence, through having
once been crossed by fortune.
Whilst the princes and powers of the East hastened to lay down their arms
and cast themselves upon the mercy of the conqueror after the battle of
Pharsalia, Pompey pursued the lonely course in which he met his fate.
From the coast of Asia Minor he sailed to Cyprus and from thence to the
Egyptian shore after announcing his intended arrival to the king who was
still a minor. The eunuch Pothinus persuaded Ptolemy, a thirteen year old
boy, to secure as he thought, by a bloody deed, the favour of the victor
whose support he would need against the claims of his sister, Cleopatra,
who disputed his claim to the throne.
The ships of Pompey came in sight east of Pelusium by the Cassian
Mountains. Egyptian troops were assembled on the shore, and in their
midst stood the king. Then there pushed off from the shore a little boat,
in which were Achillas, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, and
two Roman officers. One of them greeted the imperator and invited him to
board the boat as the shallow water of the shore prevented a large ship
being sent. His party was suspicious. But Pompey, deaf to their warning
and adjurations, embarked in the boat with two companions. Before he
left he was heard to repeat to Cornelia the lines of Sophocles:
“Who to the tyrant turns his step
Becomes his slave altho’ he went as a liberator.”
The boat approached the shore. “Do I see in thee one of the dangers of
war?” said Pompey to one of the officers who bowed his head in silence,
whereupon Pompey without further parley took a leaf in his hand and wrote
a message to the king in the Greek language. The boat arrived, Pompey
arose to disembark. At that moment he received a blow from behind and
the two other men straightway fell upon him. Resistance was impossible.
Pompey resigned himself to his fate without making a sound, he covered
his face and fell dying to the ground. He was in the fifty-eighth year
of his life and he died in the thirty-fifth of his career as a general.
The body was left upon the beach, a prey to animals, but perhaps some
faithful followers may have secretly saved it; the head, the witness of
their scandalous deed, was taken off by the Egyptians.
Such was the sad end of a man whom the freaks of fortune and the great
confusion of the Roman state raised to a height beyond his natural
power. He, like Marius, was above all, a great soldier, clever enough to
accomplish deeds when favoured by fortune but not independent enough to
attain them against odds. He was unequalled in warlike courage, military
skill, and personal bravery, and his moderate life in spite of his great
wealth put the aristocrats of his time to shame. But he was utterly
wanting in the higher qualities which secure lasting success, overthrow
effete state organisations and construct new ones in their places. He
was hard, selfish, and cruel. “As oppressor,” as a Roman subsequently
said of him, “not better than Marius or Sulla.” Neither did he retain his
position as a great general when the time came to prove his real worth,
and his utter want of independence and capacity as a statesman was the
rock upon which his life was wrecked; whilst Cæsar’s success was due
to his capacity as a general as well as a statesman, and the power of
bringing both these qualities to bear upon his course.[b]
FOOTNOTES
[115] [The purity of this primitive age has been universally exaggerated.
Early Roman virtue was based on poverty and ignorance.]
[116] [Of him Velleius Paterculus[e] says, “For producing the civil war
and all the calamities that ensued from it for twenty successive years,
there was no one that supplied more flame and excitement than Caius
Curio. He was of noble birth, eloquent, intrepid, prodigal alike of his
own reputation and fortune and those of others; a man ably wicked and
eloquent to the injury of the public, and whose passions and designs no
degree of wealth or gratification could satisfy.”]
[117] [Says Florus:[d] “Dishonourable to relate! he that was recently as
the head of the senate, the arbiter of peace and war, fled across the sea
over which he had once triumphed, in a single vessel that was shattered
and almost dismantled.”]
[118] [“Thus the fates hurrying him on, Thessaly was chosen as the
theatre for battle, and the destiny of the city, the empire, and the
whole of mankind, was committed to the plains of Philippi. Never did
fortune behold so many of the forces, or so much of the dignity, of the
Roman people collected in one place. More than three hundred thousand men
were assembled in the two armies, besides the auxiliary troops of kings
and nations. Nor were there ever more manifest signs of some approaching
destruction; the escape of victims, swarms of bees settling on the
standards, and darkness in the daytime; while the general himself, in a
dream by night, heard a clapping of hands in his own theatre at Rome,
which rung in his ears like the beating of breasts in sorrow; and he
appeared in the morning (an unlucky omen!) clad in black in the centre of
the army.”--FLORUS.[d]]
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