CHAPTER XII. CLOSE OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

THIRD PERIOD (210-207 B.C.)

[Sidenote: [210-209 B.C.]]

The last year’s campaign was full of heavy discouragement to the Romans.

Syracuse had been taken; but Sicily remained in full revolt. Capua had

fallen; but Tarentum, all except the citadel, was lost. The unmolested

march of Hannibal to the walls of Rome showed that no part of Italy save

the fortified towns and entrenched camps could be called their own,

so long as the Carthaginian general could lead his wild and lawless

mercenaries whithersoever he pleased. The loss of Spain had placed before

them the dreadful possibility that their great enemy might soon be

reinforced by numbers so large as to make him stronger than he had been

since he crossed the Alps.

It is evident that mutterings of discontent were beginning to arise

against Fabius and his friends. The bitter lesson of Cannæ had taught the

Romans the necessity of caution, and proved that, to act with success

against Hannibal, they must act on the defensive. But was this system to

last forever? Were they never to meet Hannibal in the field? Thoughts

like these, no doubt, suggested the experiment of electing a popular

consul for the year 210 B.C. When the votes of the prerogative century

were taken, it appeared that the men of their choice were old T. Manlius

Torquatus, the conqueror of Sardinia, and that same T. Otacilius who had

been ousted from his consulship five years before by his uncle Fabius.

But Manlius immediately rose and declined the consulship; he was, he

said, “old and nearly blind: a general should be able to use his own

eyes. They must choose other and better men.” The century, after some

hesitation, obeyed, and gave one of their votes for Marcellus, as no

doubt Fabius and the senate wished, while they bestowed the other upon M.

Valerius Lævinus, who had served the state well in Epirus.

Valerius probably owed his choice to the fact that he was not disposed

to submit to Fabius and Fulvius. An opportunity soon arose for showing

this. As he passed through Capua on his way to Rome, the Campanians,

smarting under the rule of Fulvius, besought him to let them follow in

his train, that they might lay their grievances before the senate; and

when he arrived at Rome, he was greeted by a deputation of Sicilians, who

had heard with alarm that the imperious Marcellus was about to return to

their island with consular authority. The affairs of both peoples were

brought before the senate. As to the Campanians, the fathers confirmed in

all respects the stern edicts of Fulvius; and not unjustly, for of all

cities Capua had been most generously treated by Rome: her rebellion had

been prompted, not by love of liberty (for she was already free) but by

lust for power. Capua, therefore, now became a prefecture. On the other

hand, Marcellus at once gave up his Sicilian province to his colleague

Lævinus, and agreed to take the command in Italy against Hannibal; and

the senate, though they ratified the previous measures of Marcellus, now

recommended the Sicilians to the special care of Lævinus. Upon this,

the Sicilian envoys, fearing the future anger of Marcellus, fell at his

feet and entreated him to take them as his clients. For many years the

Marcelli, his descendants, are found as patrons and protectors of the

island.

Before the consuls took the field, they were called upon to meet the

financial difficulties under which the state was labouring. The force

which had been maintained by Rome now for many years was very large, and

the cost enormous. The number of legions kept on foot since the battle

of Cannæ had averaged about twenty; so that the number of soldiers,

legionaries and allies, amounted to nearly two hundred thousand men.

While the expenditure was thus prodigiously increased, the revenues were

greatly diminished; and it is a recorded fact that about this time corn

had risen to many times its ordinary price. Although the imposts had

been doubled early in the war, the state was obliged to contract loans

in various ways. An extraordinary measure was now taken for manning the

fleets. All citizens, except the poor, were required to furnish one or

more seamen, with six months’ pay and their full accoutrements. Senators

were called upon to equip eight, and the rest in proportion to their

rated property. Such was the Roman “ship-money.”

The necessities of the present year (210 B.C.) were greater than ever.

Every resource seemed to be exhausted. Among other means, the coinage

had been gradually lowered in value. The as, which had originally been

a pound weight of copper, had now been diminished to one-sixth of that

weight; and all payments for the treasury were no doubt made in this

depreciated coinage. The usual results of such measures had followed. A

temporary relief was gained. But the prices of all articles were raised

to meet the change, and public credit was shaken.

In these difficulties, the senate proposed again to levy ship-money. But

the people were in no mood to bear it. They had been much impoverished

in the last four years--continued increase of taxation had drained

their resources; continued service in the army had prevented the proper

cultivation of their lands; the marauding march of Hannibal in the

year before had ruined many. The ferment caused by this new impost

assumed a formidable appearance. The senate met to deliberate, and the

consul Lævinus proposed that the great council should set an example of

patriotic devotion. “Let us,” said he, “contribute all our treasure for

the service of the state. Let us reserve--of gold, only our rings, the

bullæ worn by our sons, and for the ornaments of our wives and daughters

one ounce apiece: of silver, the trappings of our horses, the family

salt-cellar, and a small vessel, for the service of the gods, of copper,

five thousand pounds for the necessities of each family.” The proposal

was carried by acclamation, and the noble example followed emulously by

all the people. So eager was the throng which pressed to the treasury

that the clerks were unable to make a full register of the names. This

patriotic loan (for it was intended that it should be repaid hereafter)

saved the state; and it was even more valuable in the spirit which

it called forth, than for the actual relief which it afforded to the

treasury.

The consuls now took the field. Marcellus arrived in Samnium only to hear

that Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, the last year’s consul, had shared the fate

of his namesake and predecessor, Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, and had been cut

off with the greater part of his army. The relics of this force were sent

to be added to the remains of the army of Cannæ, which the relentless

senate still kept in banishment in Sicily. Marcellus cautiously advanced

to Venusia, and so dogged Hannibal’s footsteps that he was unable to

strike another blow. The town of Salapia in Apulia--where lived a lady

whom Hannibal loved too well and who is said to have more than once

detained him from the field--was betrayed to Marcellus, as Arpi had

been to Fulvius, and was another example of the altered feeling of the

Italians.

Lævinus, as has above been mentioned, was enabled by a stroke of good

luck to finish the war in Sicily with ease and credit; and he returned

to Rome accompanied by the redoubtable Mutin. Before he left Sicily he

had sent over his fleet to examine the coasts of Africa. The officer

despatched on this service learnt that the Carthaginian government were

actively engaged in collecting troops to be placed under Hasdrubal’s

command for a second invasion of Italy from the north; he immediately

forwarded this intelligence to the consul at Rome. The senate in alarm

ordered Lævinus to return instantly to his province without waiting to

preside at the comitia. He was to name a dictator for that purpose,

and the person submitted to him for nomination was old Q. Fulvius,

the governor of Capua. Lævinus, however, refused to name his personal

enemy, upon which the ruling party referred the matter to the people,

who peremptorily ordered the consul to name Fulvius, and no one else.

But Lævinus, to avoid this necessity, had already left Rome, and the

fathers were obliged to send for Marcellus to execute their orders.

When the old dictator held the comitia, the prerogative tribe gave its

vote for Fulvius himself and Fabius. An objection was taken by two of

the tribunes, that a presiding magistrate could not allow himself to

be elected. But this, like many other ordinances was overruled at this

critical season by the senate, and the election proceeded. The next year

was to see Hannibal confronted with the three men reputed to be the

ablest commanders in Rome--Fabius and Fulvius the consuls, and Marcellus

as proconsul. It was hoped that by their united efforts the enemy might

be crushed before the arrival of Hasdrubal and his Spaniards.

But the result was not equal to expectation. In the very outset of this

year (209 B.C.) the levies were delayed by a circumstance which looked

even more threatening than the financial difficulties of the previous

year. The Latin colonies, now thirty in number, have been mentioned as

the chief stays of Roman power in the subject districts of Italy. They

had hitherto borne the toils and expenses of the war unrepiningly. What

then was the alarm of the consuls and the senate, when twelve of the

thirty openly declined to comply with the requisition to furnish their

contingents for the armies of this year. The refusal was due in part no

doubt to exhaustion and poverty; but it was partly caused by anger at the

fact that most of the defeated soldiers of Centumalus lately banished to

Sicily were citizens of their towns. The consuls endeavoured to reason

with them, but in vain; and when the deputies of the other eighteen

colonies, which comprised all the largest and most important places,

declared their steadfast and unaltered allegiance, they determined to

pass the matter over for the present, saying that they would not deign to

ask assistance from those who would not give it willingly.

[Sidenote: [209-208 B.C.]]

To provide for the current expenses a large treasure of gold, which had

been reserved for the emergency of another Gallic war, was now first

invaded.

Fulvius resumed his station at Capua, Marcellus was to engage Hannibal’s

attention in Apulia, while old Fabius made an attempt to recover

Tarentum. Marcellus found his enemy at Canusium, and a series of

indecisive actions followed, in which (although the Roman annalists claim

the advantage for their hero) it is plain that he must have suffered

greatly, for he remained inactive during the rest of the campaign. But

fortunately for Fabius’ attempt upon Tarentum, Hannibal’s presence

was required in Bruttium to defend his allies from a band of free

mercenaries, who, formerly in the service of the Carthaginians in Sicily,

had now been engaged by Lævinus, and sent to Rhegium to harass their old

masters. The appearance of the great general was enough to scare these

marauders into submission, but scarcely was this done, than he heard the

news that Fabius had invested Tarentum. Instantly he put his army in

motion, and marched day and night to relieve this important city. But

he was too late. By treachery he had won the place, and by treachery he

lost it. The officer in command at Tarentum was a Bruttian. This man

had a mistress, sister to an Italian serving in the army of Fabius; she

it was who persuaded him to open the gates to the consul, and Hannibal,

while yet upon his march, heard this disastrous news. The old consul

gave up the despised city of the Greeks to be plundered by his soldiers,

reserving the public treasure for the service of the state. But when he

was asked whether he would have the statues and works of art taken to

Rome, after the example set by Marcellus at Syracuse, “No,” he said, “let

the Tarentines keep their angry gods.” The capture of Tarentum was the

greatest exploit of Fabius, and it was his last--an honourable close to

an honourable career.

Besides the recovery of Tarentum, the Samnites and Lucanians, long

wavering, again returned to their allegiance, and were restored by

Fulvius to their position as allies, without any notice being taken of

their revolt.

Notwithstanding this, men were dissatisfied with the result of the

campaign. Three consular armies had not sufficed to defeat Hannibal;

Marcellus, reputed their best general, had done nothing. But the party

who murmured against Fabius and his friends were as yet feeble. Very

lately Lævinus had been compelled to relinquish his opposition; and when

Marcellus appeared to give a narrative of his services, all men’s hearts

were turned, and not only was he forgiven freely, but was even elected

consul for the ensuing year (208 B.C.). His colleague was T. Quinctius

Crispinus, who had served under him in Sicily.

The defection of the Italians had no doubt weakened Hannibal, and the

two consuls determined to throw themselves upon him with their conjoint

force. They found him near Venusia, and every day they drew out their

forces before his camp and offered him battle. But the odds were too

great even for Hannibal, and he kept close within his entrenchments. It

happened that between his camp and that of the consuls there was a hill,

which Marcellus thought it desirable to occupy. Accordingly he rode up to

the top, accompanied by his colleague and a small detachment of cavalry,

unconscious that a large body of Numidian horse were lurking in the

woods below. In a moment the consuls were surrounded. Marcellus was run

through by the spear of one of these wild horsemen, and fell dead from

his horse; Crispinus escaped mortally wounded to his camp. As soon as

Hannibal heard of this great stroke of good luck he hastened to the scene

of conflict, and saw with his own eyes his ablest antagonist lying dead

before him. His conduct proved the true nobility of his nature. He showed

no triumph; but simply drew the gold ring from the dead man’s finger,

saying: “There lies a good soldier, but a bad general.” He then ordered

the corpse to receive a soldier’s burial. Like his father Hamilcar, he

warred not with the dead, but with the living.

Great was the consternation at Rome when intelligence of this untoward

event arrived. The consul Crispinus lived just long enough to be carried

in a litter to Capua, where he was on Roman ground, and could therefore

execute the command of the senate to name a dictator. He named old

Manlius Torquatus. But no attempt was made to molest Hannibal again this

year. Torquatus only exercised his office in holding comitia for the

election of new consuls. The occasion was a grave one. Never before,

since the beginning of the republic, had she been bereft of both her

consuls at one blow. But in order to understand the full importance of

the choice now to be made, it must be mentioned that Hasdrubal, the

brother of Hannibal, had already set out upon his march from Spain, and

in a short time might be expected to arrive in Italy.

[Sidenote: [211-208 B.C.]]

All notice of the Spanish War since the death of the two Scipios has

purposely been deferred. Here it will be enough to say, that soon after

that event, the senate, well understanding the importance of maintaining

the war in Spain, had endeavoured to retrieve their losses in that

quarter; and in 211 B.C. young P. Scipio, the hero of the latter part of

the war, had accepted the dangerous command left vacant by his father and

uncle. In the next chapter notice will be taken of his splendid successes

during the three years which had passed. But these successes had not

served to divert Hasdrubal from his purpose. This general had collected

an army of tried soldiers, which he skilfully carried through the heart

of Spain, and, crossing the Pyrenees near Bayonne, entered Gaul by the

pass which is now threaded by the high-road from Paris to Madrid. By this

dexterous movement he eluded the vigilance of the Romans, who knew not

whither he was gone. But towards the close of the present year news came

from the friendly people of Marseilles, to the effect that Hasdrubal had

arrived in Aquitania, and intended wintering in Gaul, as the season was

too far advanced for the safe passage of the Alps.

[Sidenote: [208-207 B.C.]]

Such were the grave circumstances under which Torquatus summoned the

people to elect consuls for the year 207 B.C.

It might have been thought that the ablest patrician to be found was

M. Valerius Lævinus, who was still in Sicily. Not only had he restored

that province to order, but had laid in large stores of provisions

for the Italian armies, and had assisted in other ways in lightening

the expenses of the war. But the senate distrusted him: they had not

forgotten the contumacious way in which he had quitted Rome, rather than

name a dictator at their bidding. They therefore turned their eyes on C.

Claudius Nero, a man of known energy, who had served now for many years

under Fulvius and Marcellus. He had been sent to Spain at the first news

of the disasters there, and remained in command till the appointment of

young Scipio. All men agreed that Nero should be the patrician consul.

But who was to be his plebeian colleague? Marcellus was dead, and

Gracchus was dead; and Fulvius was nearly as old as Fabius.

At length it was resolved to choose M. Livius Salinator, a man who was

also well stricken in years, for he had been consul with Æmilius Paulus

in the year before Hannibal’s invasion, and had triumphed with him over

the Illyrians. But he had been accused of unfair division of the spoil

taken in that Illyrian War, and had been condemned to pay a fine by the

vote of all the tribes save one. Indignant at an unjust sentence, he had

withdrawn to his estate in the country, and had only lately reappeared in

the senate at the command of the censors, but when there, he sat in moody

silence, till at length he started up to speak in defence of his kinsman

Livius, the commandant of Tarentum, who was accused of having lost that

city. On this occasion Fabius’ conduct had not been conciliatory. For

when it was urged in defence of the accused that he had mainly assisted

in recovering the city, Fabius dryly remarked that he did not wish to

condemn Livius: certainly he had assisted in recovering Tarentum, for

if he had not lost it, it would not have been recovered at all. These

recollections rankled in the heart of the old senator; and he refused

the proffered consulship. Here, however, he yielded to the command,

rather than the entreaty of the Fathers. But one difficulty remained.

The cross-grained old man was at feud with his colleague Nero; and when

friends tried to reconcile them, he replied that he saw no occasion for

it: if they remained enemies, they would keep a keener watch for each

other’s faults. At last he gave way, and before they took the field the

consuls were in perfect agreement.

[Illustration: A ROMAN HELMET]

They hastened early in the year to their respective stations, Nero to

take the command in southern Italy, against the feeble army of Hannibal;

Livius to Ariminum on the frontier of Cisalpine Gaul, to await the

arrival of Hasdrubal.

As soon as the season permitted, Hasdrubal advanced from his winter

quarters to the passage of the Alps. He avoided the coast-road taken by

his brother, and passed through the country of the Arvernians (who have

left their name in French Auvergne), and thus came straight to the point

where the Rhone and Isère meet, so as to take the same route over the

mountains which had been pursued by his brother eleven years before.

The time of year was favourable: in the period which had elapsed the

Gauls had become better acquainted with the Carthaginians; and Hasdrubal

achieved his passage into Italy with little loss or difficulty. He

straightway marched through the plains of Cisalpine Gaul to the banks of

the Po, where the Roman colony of Placentia, one of the eighteen lately

found faithful, had before defied the arms of Hannibal. Hannibal had not

wasted time in assailing this town; but Hasdrubal probably wished to

oblige the Gauls, whom he expected to swell the numbers of his army. For

hitherto they had not given Hannibal much assistance. In the eventful

year of Cannæ they had cut off the consul-elect Postumius, and still

drank mead out of his skull. But since then they had remained quiet; and

Varro, with a single legion at Ariminum, had sufficed to watch them. And

now they seem to have given Hasdrubal indifferent support, so that the

time he spent at Placentia must have been nearly thrown away.

Before he left his lines at Placentia, he sent off six couriers, four

Gauls and two Numidians, to inform his brother of his intended route.

Hannibal, meantime, had been constantly on the move--marching from

Bruttium into Lucania, from Lucania into Apulia, from Apulia again into

Bruttium, and then once more back into Apulia. We cannot but admire the

skill with which he eluded Nero, who pursued him with a double army

of four legions. Yet it was one of these marches that accidentally

proved the ruin of his cause. The couriers despatched by Hasdrubal from

Placentia made their way into Apulia, but unfortunately arrived just

when Hannibal was absent in Bruttium. They attempted to follow him, but

missed their way, and fell into the hands of the prætor stationed on the

Tarentine frontier. That officer immediately sent off the despatches

found upon them to Nero at Canusium. An interpreter was procured, and the

whole plan of the enemy’s campaign was revealed to the consul. Hasdrubal

told his brother that he intended to advance along the Adriatic, by way

of Ariminum, and proposed that they should join forces in Umbria, in

order to march upon Rome. Nero’s determination was soon taken. Legally,

he had no power to quit his district in southern Italy, but in this

emergency he resolved to set all forms at defiance.

He picked out six thousand foot and one thousand horse, the flower of

his army, and gave out that he would march at nightfall on a secret

expedition into Lucania. As soon as it was dark, he set out; but the

soldiers soon discovered that Lucania was not their destination. They

were marching northwards towards Picenum, and they found that provisions

and beasts of burden were ready for them all along the road, by the

consul’s orders. As soon as he was well advanced upon his march, he

addressed his men, and told them that in a few days they would join

their countrymen under Livius in his camp at Sena Gallica in Umbria;

that combined they would intercept Hasdrubal and his invading army; that

victory was certain; that the chief share of the glory would be theirs.

The men answered such an address as soldiers should; and everywhere, as

they passed, the inhabitants came out to meet them, pressing upon them

clothes, victuals, horses--all, and more than all, that they could want.

In a week’s time they accomplished a distance of about 250 miles, and

found themselves within a short distance of Sena. Nero halted till it was

dark, that he might enter his colleague’s camp unperceived by Hasdrubal.

Nero had previously written to the senate, informing them of his march,

and urging them to throw forward a strong force to defend the defile

through which the Flaminian road passes at Narnia, in case the consuls

should be beaten by Hasdrubal. Answers had reached him, fully approving

his bold design, and promising all support. It was, therefore, with

full confidence that he entered his colleague’s camp, and beheld the

watch-fires of Hasdrubal at not more than half a mile’s distance in

front. His men were warmly greeted by their comrades, and received within

the camp of Livius, that Hasdrubal might not observe the increase of

the army. After one day’s rest, Nero urged immediate action, lest his

absence from Apulia might be discovered by Hannibal, or his presence in

Umbria by Hasdrubal. Accordingly, the two legions of Livius, the two

commanded by the prætor Porcius, together with Nero’s troops, drew out

before Hasdrubal’s camp and offered battle. The experienced eye of the

Carthaginian was struck by an apparent increase of numbers; and his

suspicions were confirmed, when he heard the trumpet sound twice in the

consuls’ lines. This convinced him that Nero had joined his colleague,

and full of anxious fear as to the fate of his brother, he determined to

retreat under cover of night; and when the next day broke, they found

Hasdrubal’s camp deserted. Orders were given to pursue. The Romans came

up with the Carthaginian army on the banks of the Metaurus, about twelve

or fourteen miles north of their former position. The river was swollen

by rains, so that the Carthaginians could not pass it except at certain

places; and, their guides having deserted them, they could not find the

fords. Hasdrubal, therefore, was obliged to give battle with the river in

his rear.[b]

THE DEATH OF HASDRUBAL DESCRIBED BY POLYBIUS

[Sidenote: [207 B.C.]]

Hasdrubal was in all respects dissatisfied with the state in which things

appeared. But as it was now too late to take other measures, because the

Romans were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he was

constrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him,

in order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in

front; increased the depth of his files; and ranged his whole army upon

a very narrow ground. He then took his post in the centre of the line,

behind the elephants; and moved to attack the left of the enemy; having

before determined that in this battle he would either conquer or die.

Livius, leading on his troops with a slow and haughty pace, began the

combat with great vigour. But Claudius [Nero] who commanded on the

right, was unable to advance so as to surround the enemy; being utterly

obstructed by those difficulties of the ground which have before been

mentioned, and which had determined Hasdrubal to make his whole attack

upon the left. Anxious therefore, and not willing to remain inactive, he

had recourse to the measure which the occasion itself suggested to him.

For having drawn away his troops from the right, he led them round the

field of battle; and, passing beyond the left of the Roman army, attacked

the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this moment the

success of the battle had remained doubtful. For both the Carthaginians

and the Romans, well knowing that they had no hopes of safety but in

victory, maintained the fight with equal bravery. The service also, which

the elephants performed, had been the same to both. For these beasts,

being enclosed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, spread

no less disorder among the ranks of the Spaniards, than among those of

the Romans.

But when Claudius [Nero] fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement

was no longer equal. The Spaniards, pressed at once both in front and

rear, were almost all slaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants

were killed, together with the men that conducted them; and four, which

had forced their way through the disordered ranks, were afterwards taken,

but without their leaders. Hasdrubal, who had so often distinguished

himself upon former occasions, displayed no less courage in this last

action, and fell in the battle.

The Romans, as soon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp

of the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and sleeping upon their

straw, they slaughtered them as victims without resistance. The prisoners

were then collected together; and from this part of the booty more than

three hundred talents were brought into the public treasury. Not fewer

than ten thousand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement; and

about two thousand of the Romans. Some of the Carthaginians that were of

eminent rank were taken alive; the rest were destroyed in the action.[c]

REJOICING AT ROME. NERO’S INHUMANITY AND TRIUMPH

At Rome, as may be well imagined, the news of Nero’s march had filled

all hearts with hope and fear. And now, after some ten days of intense

anxiety, vague rumours came that a battle had been fought and won. Still,

men feared to believe what they wished; and the anxiety rose higher and

higher, till the officer in command at Narnia sent home despatches to

say that two horsemen had arrived at that place from the field of battle

with certain news of a great victory. So eager were the people, that

the prætor had great difficulty in preventing the despatches from being

seized and torn open before they had been read in the senate. And when he

brought them out from the senate house, and read them publicly from the

rostra, a burst of exultation broke from every tongue; and men, women,

and children thronged to the temples to bless the gods for their great

deliverance. Thanks were decreed to the consuls and their armies; three

days were appointed for a public thanksgiving to the gods. Never was

public joy and gratitude more deserved. The battle of the Metaurus was

the salvation of Italy; and Horace spoke with as much historic truth as

poetic fervour when he said that “then, by the death of Hasdrubal, then

fell all the hope and fortune of Carthage.”

The news was conveyed to Hannibal in a barbarous fashion. Nero had

returned to his camp at Canusium as speedily as possible, and his

lieutenants had kept the secret so well that Hannibal had remained

ignorant of his absence; when one morning a grisly head was thrown into

his camp, and Hannibal knew the features of his brother. Two prisoners

sent in, and a large body paraded before the Roman camp, confirmed the

dismal forebodings of the general, and he said with a heavy heart that

“the doom of Carthage was spoken.” This treatment of his brother’s

remains was an ill return for the generosity shown by Hannibal to the

corpses of his opponents; and Nero, by this act, forfeited all claim to

admiration, except such as must be bestowed on a skilful general and a

resolute man.

Hannibal now retreated into Bruttium. The people of this wild country,

still nearly as wild as it was then, clung to his fallen fortunes with

unshaken fidelity. Here he maintained himself for four years longer,

almost more admirable in adversity than in prosperity. Even now no Roman

general was able to gain a victory over him; even now every veteran

soldier remained faithful to his great leader. But he was driven into a

corner, and stood like a lion at bay--still terrible, but without hope.

The war in Italy may now be considered at an end.

The victory of the Metaurus was held to be an occasion for allowing a

triumph to the victorious generals. No triumphal procession had passed

down the Sacred Way and ascended to the Capitol since Æmilius Paulus

and Livius Salinator had led up the captive Illyrians in the year

before Hannibal’s invasion. All former successes in the war had been

but the recoveries of losses, all except the capture of Syracuse; and

Marcellus was refused a full triumph then, because he left the Sicilian

War unfinished. But now there was no drawback. The two consuls met at

Præneste, and advanced with the army of Livius and the captives in

long procession to the temple of Bellona, in the Campus Martius. Here

they were received by the senate and people in festal array. Livius

appeared in the triumphal car drawn by four white horses, attended by

his army; Nero rode on horseback beside him unattended: for the battle

had been fought in Livius’ district. Yet all men turned their eyes on

the patrician consul, and the acclamations of the crowd showed to whom

belonged the true honours of the triumph.

Notwithstanding these honours, Nero (strange to say) was never again

employed during the war; and it was not till the Neros became heirs of

the empire of Augustus that poets sang of the debt which Rome owed to

that name. A star was appearing in the west which soon eclipsed the

brightness of Nero’s fame. The remaining period of the war will be little

more than a history of the deeds of Scipio.

THE FOURTH AND LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR

[Sidenote: [210-207 B.C.]]

The history of the war in Spain has been left almost unnoticed, since the

death of the two Scipios in 212 or 211 B.C. It is now time to return to

that country; for the issue of the war between Rome and Hannibal was in

reality determined on Spanish soil.

After the disasters of that campaign, the senate determined to despatch

reinforcements without delay; and the officer appointed to take the

temporary command was C. Claudius Nero, the future hero of the Metaurus.

But the senate resolved to take the unusual course of calling upon the

people to elect a proconsul for Spain at the great comitia. The policy

of continuing the Spanish War was manifest; but the risk of failure was

so great, that the senate thought fit to throw the responsibility upon

the people. But when the day came that candidates for the proconsulate

should present themselves in the Campus Martius, no candidate appeared.

Men looked at one another in blank dismay. It seemed that none of the

soldiers of the republic dared to undertake so great and hazardous an

enterprise; when, to the surprise and admiration of all, P. Cornelius

Scipio, son and nephew of the slain proconsuls, arose and offered himself

to the suffrages of the people. He was barely twenty-six years of age;

but his name and character were well known, and though he had hitherto

held no office higher than that of ædile, he was elected by acclamation.

THE CHARACTER OF SCIPIO

Scipio presents in almost all respects a striking contrast to the men who

had hitherto conducted the affairs of Rome in the Second Punic War. They

were far advanced in years, cautious and distrustful; he was in the prime

of youth, enterprising and self-confident. They had been trained in the

severity of the old Roman discipline; he is said to have been dissolute

in early years, and was still thought to affect too much the easy laxity

of Grecian manners. They were strictly obedient to the letter of the

law; he was accustomed from his very youth to put himself above the laws

and customs of Rome. They always acted as the faithful ministers of the

senate; he very soon showed that the senate must be content to follow his

policy, rather than guide it. They, however, gentle to their countrymen,

were to foreigners harsh, arrogant, and cruel; he treated foreigners with

a humanity and courteousness that made his name better loved in Spain

than in Italy. Yet in some respects he was a true Roman. Notwithstanding

the excesses charged upon his youth, he had long learned to control his

passions absolutely, and to submit every desire to his own views of duty.

Notwithstanding the grace and affability of his manner, he preserved a

loftiness of deportment which kept men at a certain distance from him.

Few shared his intimacy; but where he gave his confidence, as to his

friend C. Lælius, that confidence was complete and unreserved.

One point in his character calls for particular attention--the

religiousness of his life. Never, from his first appearance in public,

had he been known to undertake any enterprise without first resorting to

the great temple on the Capitol, and remaining there for hours absorbed

in devotion. The religion of Scipio might not be consistent; yet, on

the whole, it would be unjust to doubt that he acted in reliance on the

support of higher powers. In this lies the secret of his character. That

self-confidence, which prompted him to shrink from no responsibility,

led him also to neglect the laws, when they seemed to oppose what he

thought necessary. Every incident in his youth shows this confidence. Not

to insist on the doubtful story of his saving his father’s life, when

he was yet a boy, we have seen him a tribune of the legions at the age

of twenty, assisting to rally the broken remains of the army of Cannæ,

and barring the secession of the young nobles after that disastrous day.

Three years after, we find him offering himself as candidate for the

curule ædileship; and, when it was objected that he was yet too young for

the office, promptly answering, “If the people vote for me, that will

make me old enough.” And now, after the death of his father and uncle in

Spain, we see him modestly waiting till it was clear that no experienced

commander would claim the dangerous honour of succeeding them, and then

bravely offering himself to the acceptance of the people.

SCIPIO IN SPAIN

[Sidenote: [210-209 B.C.]]

Scipio arrived in Spain late in the summer of 210, or perhaps not till

the spring of 209 B.C. He landed at Emporiæ, with his friend Lælius and

his elder brother Lucius, who accompanied him as legates. He found that

the three generals commanding the Carthaginians in Spain--Hasdrubal

and Mago, brothers of Hannibal, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisco--were at

discord one with another. Their forces lay scattered over a wide extent

of country from Gades to Celtiberia; and there seems to have been no

disposition to act on the offensive against the Romans. Scipio, taking

advantage of these circumstances, determined to strike a blow which would

confirm the enthusiastic feelings of the Roman people towards him, and

would mark that a general had arisen who would not rest content with

the timid discretion of the Fabian policy. By a bold stroke it might

be possible to surprise New Carthage itself. His purpose was revealed

to none save Lælius, who sailed in command of the fleet, while Scipio

himself led his army across the Ebro, and arrived in an incredibly short

time under the walls of the city.

New Carthage lay on a hilly peninsula jutting out into a fine bay, which

forms the harbour. On the land side its walls were covered by a marsh

or lagoon, which was overflowed by the sea, so that the place was only

approachable by a narrow neck of land between the lagoon and the harbour.

On this neck of land Scipio took up his position, entrenching himself in

rear, but leaving the front of his camp open towards the city. No time

was to be lost; and next morning he gave orders to assault the walls. He

addressed his soldiers and assured them of success; Neptune, he said, had

appeared to him in a dream, and promised to fight with the Romans. The

men advanced gallantly to the escalade, confident in their young general.

But the walls were high and strong; the garrison made a stout defence;

and before noon Scipio called off his soldiers. But he did not give up

his enterprise. In the afternoon, he was informed, the water in the

lagoon would be very low, in consequence of a fall in the tide assisted

by a strong wind. He therefore picked out five hundred men, who were

ordered to take a number of scaling-ladders and dash through the water so

as to mount the walls unobserved, while the main body of the army made a

feigned attack by the neck of land. Thus Neptune would fulfil his promise.

The device succeeded completely. The garrison had retired to their

noonday’s sleep, and while they were hurrying to repel the feigned

attack, the five hundred got into the town unopposed, and rushing to the

main entrance threw open the gates. Scipio, with a chosen detachment,

pushed on to the citadel, into which the garrison had fled; and the

commandant surrendered at discretion. All pillaging and slaughter were

now stopped; and at the close of the day the young general found himself

master of this important city, with a very large treasure and an immense

supply of stores.

[Illustration: A ROMAN GENERAL

(From a statue)]

The Carthaginian rule was no longer beloved in Spain, and Scipio turned

this disposition to his own advantage with admirable dexterity. He set

free all the hostages retained by the Carthaginians, as well as all of

Spanish blood who had been taken prisoners in the city. Among these

hostages was the wife of Mandonius, brother of Indibilis, a powerful

chief who had formerly been the friend of Carthage, and the daughters

of Indibilis himself. He sent them home with as much care as if they

had been his own kinswomen, although Indibilis and Mandonius had been

actively engaged against his unfortunate father and uncle. Then the

soldiers brought him a beautiful girl, whom they had reserved as a

special gift for their youthful commander. But Scipio observing her

tears, inquired into her condition; and finding she was the betrothed

of Allucius, a young Celtiberian chief, he sent for the youth, and

restored his bride unharmed, without ransom or condition. This generous

conduct was not without its reward. The Spaniards, quick in feeling and

romantic in disposition, regarded the young conqueror as a hero sent to

deliver them from the yoke of Carthage. His noble bearing, his personal

beauty, confirmed the favourable impressions caused by his conduct to the

hostages; and when he advanced next year into Celtiberia, he was welcomed

by Indibilis and Mandonius at the head of their vassals. Soon after, a

deputation of Spaniards came to him with entreaties to become their king.

But Scipio courteously declined the offer, informing them that he was but

the general of the Roman people, in whose ears the name of king was a

by-word and a reproach.

[Sidenote: [209-206 B.C.]]

The Carthaginian generals were quite unable to make head against the

well-earned popularity of the youthful Roman. Hasdrubal Barca attempted

to retake New Carthage by surprise, but in vain; and the year 208 B.C.

found him too busily engaged in preparing for his Italian expedition

to act with energy against the Romans. All Spain north of the Bætis

(Guadalquivir) was relinquished; but at length Hasdrubal found himself

obliged to give battle at a place called Bæcula, near that river. The

Romans won the day; but the Carthaginian commander made a skilful

retreat, leaving his camp and baggage in the hands of the enemy.

Hasdrubal now drew back into Lusitania, leaving his brother Mago and

Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, to cover the borders of that district, which

with the province now called Andalusia were the only parts of Spain

left to the Carthaginians. Meanwhile he himself crossed the Tagus, and

marching northwards (as we have seen) by ways unknown to the Romans,

crossed the Pyrenees near the shores of the Bay of Biscay. Scipio was

informed of his intentions to pass into Italy, and had expected him to

follow the course of his brother Hannibal. But in the beginning of 207

B.C., while he was lying upon the Ebro, he heard that his able opponent

had eluded him, and was already in the heart of Gaul.

In that year the Carthaginians made great efforts to retrieve their

falling fortunes. Fresh forces were sent from Africa, and young

Masinissa, son of Gala, a powerful Numidian chief, also took the field

with a large body of his formidable horsemen. Scipio himself did not

appear in the south till late in the season, when he found that his

brother Lucius, with his legate Silanus, had kept the Carthaginians in

check. But the news of the Metaurus had reached him, and he burned with

eagerness to eclipse the glory of Nero.

Late in this year, therefore, or early in 206, Scipio with his whole

force prepared to pass the Bætis and bring the enemy to action. The

Carthaginians, confident in their numbers, were equally ready, and their

united forces boldly faced the enemy. The place of the battle is unknown;

its name is variously given as Silpia or Elinga. But the result is

certain. Scipio’s victory was complete; the whole Carthaginian army was

broken and destroyed; its scattered remains took refuge behind the walls

of Gades, with Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago; while the wily Masinissa entered

into secret negotiations with the Romans. The senate, therefore, at the

commencement of the year 206, had to congratulate the people not only on

seeing Italy almost delivered from the army of Hannibal, but also on the

important fact that all Spain, except the town of Gades, was in the hands

of the Roman armies.

But Scipio regarded Spain as a mere stepping-stone to Africa. Here,

and here only, he felt convinced, could the war be concluded. Already

Valerius Lævinus had made descents upon the African coast, and found

the country nearly as defenceless as in the days of Agathocles and of

Regulus. Scipio determined not to return to Rome till he had laid the

train for an invasion of Africa; and then, with the confidence that

marked his whole career, he would offer himself for the consulship, and

force the senate to allow him his own way.

At that time the country to the west of the Carthaginian territory,

from Bona to Oran, was known by the name of Numidia; and the Numidians

themselves were divided into two great tribes, the eastern Numidians

or Masæsylians, and the western or Massylians. Of the Masæsylians,

Syphax was king; his capital being Cirta, now well known under the

name of Constantine as the chief fortress of Algeria. Gala, father of

Masinissa, was ruler of the Massylians; and Scipio had already entered

into negotiations with Masinissa. But Masinissa had not yet any power

of his own; while the position of Syphax on the Carthaginian frontier

necessarily made him the most dangerous enemy of Carthage. It was

therefore of the greatest importance to secure the friendship of this

powerful but unstable chieftain. Scipio resolved, with a boldness almost

romantic, to pay a visit to the Numidian capital; and, to show his

confidence in Syphax, he sailed from New Carthage to Africa with two

ships only. It happened that Hasdrubal Gisco, who had before this left

Spain in despair, appeared at the court of Syphax at the self-same time,

with the self-same purposes. Both the rivals were entertained by the

Numidian; but the winning manners and personal grace of Scipio prevailed

for the present, and Syphax formed an alliance with the Romans.

When Scipio returned to Spain, he found that his short absence had

produced a serious change. Three important cities in the vale of the

Bætis, Illiturgi, Castulo, and Astapa, had closed their gates and

declared their independence. Without delay, he laid siege to Illiturgi.

The town was taken after an obstinate defence, and given up to massacre

and pillage. This dreadful fate of their countrymen produced immediate,

but opposite, effects on Castulo and Astapa. The men of Castulo, stricken

with fear, surrendered at discretion. The men of Astapa collected all

their property into a huge funeral pile in the market-place, and placed

their wives and daughters under a guard, who had orders to slay them and

fire the pile as soon as the gates should be forced. The rest of the

citizens fell fighting bravely, and the Romans were left masters of a

heap of ashes.

Another circumstance showed that the Roman power in Spain rested on a

precarious tenure. Scipio fell ill at New Carthage, and a report was

spread that he was dead. Upon this, Indibilis and Mandonius, believed

to be his most faithful friends, raised the standard of revolt and

advanced into Celtiberia. A division of Italian troops, eight thousand

strong, stationed upon the Sucro, broke into open mutiny, driving away

their Roman officers, and choosing two Italians as their chiefs. The

prompt and decisive way in which Scipio quelled this dangerous mutiny

recalls the conduct of Clive in Bengal on a similar occasion. He sent

messengers to the mutineers, desiring them to come to New Carthage and

state their grievances; and as they approached the town, he ordered the

division of the army in that place to prepare for marching against the

revolted Spaniards. The Italians, therefore, met the army leaving New

Carthage as they entered it, and fondly deemed that the general would

now be completely at their mercy. But when they appeared next morning

before Scipio, they found that thirty-five persons, the ringleaders of

the mutiny, had been arrested during the night; and the clash of arms

in the streets leading to the Forum apprised them that the army had

returned from its pretended march. Scipio reproved the mutineers with

much severity. He ordered the ringleaders for execution, and pardoned the

rest on their taking the oath of allegiance anew. Indibilis and Mandonius

hastened to make full submission. But no sooner had Scipio left Spain,

than these discontented chiefs again took arms. Indibilis fell in battle;

Mandonius was taken prisoner and put to death.

It was now apparent that the Carthaginians had no longer any hope of

recovering their ground in Spain. Hasdrubal Gisco had returned to Africa.

Masinissa obtained an interview with Scipio, and renewed his promises

of friendship. Mago, the last remaining brother of Hannibal, after a

vain attempt to surprise New Carthage, returned to Gades, and found

that the inhabitants shut their gates against him. He enticed the chief

magistrates, called suffets (as at Carthage), into a negotiation, and

seizing their persons, crucified them in sight of the town. This brutal

and treacherous act forfeited his last claim on the sympathies of the

people of Gades. They surrendered to the Romans, while Mago sailed off to

the Balearic Isles, and occupied himself in preparing a descent upon the

coast of Italy, as a last chance of relieving his illustrious brother.

The soil of the Spanish peninsula was now completely cleared of the

Carthaginians, and Scipio prepared to return to Rome. Three years before,

he had left his country amid the hopes and expectations of all men. He

now returned, having more than fulfilled those hopes and expectations.

His friend Lælius had been sent home to announce his first great success;

his brother Lucius had lately arrived to prepare the senate and people

for the speedy arrival of the hero; and no one doubted that at the

approaching elections Scipio would be raised to the consulship by the

unanimous voice of the people.

SCIPIO RETURNS TO ROME

[Sidenote: [206-204 B.C.]]

It was towards the close of the year 206 B.C. that he returned. The

senate met him at the temple of Bellona; but refused him a triumph on the

ground that he had not held any regular magistracy during his absence.

He therefore entered the city, and offered himself candidate for the

consulship. Every tribe united in giving him their suffrages, though he

was not yet thirty years old. But the common rules of election had been

neglected throughout the war, and no difficulty seems to have been raised

on the score of age. His colleague was P. Licinius Crassus, who was

pontifex maximus, and therefore unable to leave Italy. Whatever foreign

enterprise was undertaken must fall to the lot of Scipio. He himself was

at no pains to conceal his intention of carrying the war into Africa;

and it was generally understood that, if the senate refused leave, he

would bring a special bill for the purpose before the people. Fabius,

with Fulvius and the old senatorial party, vehemently opposed these bold

projects. But the time was gone by when they could use the votes of the

people against an enterprising consul, as they had done some years before

against Lævinus. The senate was fain to compromise the matter by naming

Sicily as his province, with permission to cross over into Africa if he

deemed it expedient. They refused him, however, the additional levies

and supplies which he required. But the Etruscans and other Italians

enthusiastically volunteered to give all he wanted. Yet he was unable

during the year of his consulate to make any attempt on Africa, and was

continued in his command as proconsul.

The enemies of Scipio made one more attempt to thwart his African

enterprise. Hearing that the citadel of Locri had been taken by Q.

Pleminius, who commanded as proprætor in Bruttium, but that Hannibal had

come to the relief of the place, he left his province without hesitation,

and sailing into the harbour of Locri obliged the Carthaginian to retire.

Pleminius was no sooner left in command there than he indulged in gross

and brutal outrages, not only against the people of Locri, but against

such Romans as ventured to oppose his will. Scipio was appealed to, but

declined to interfere, desiring the Locrians to lay their complaints

before the senate at Rome. These complaints arrived early in the year

204 B.C., and old Fabius again loudly inveighed against the presumptuous

audacity of his young rival. He ended his speech by proposing that he

should be deprived of his command. Other complaints were made against

Scipio--that by going to Locri he had transgressed the limits of his

province, as he had done before by visiting Syphax in Numidia; moreover,

that he spent his time in pursuits unfit for a Roman soldier, frequenting

the schools and gymnasia of the Greek cities, and wearing a Greek dress;

while his men were daily becoming corrupted by licentious living and want

of discipline. The senate ventured not to act on these vague accusations

without previous inquiry; and it was therefore resolved to send a

commission into Sicily to examine into the truth of the charges. The

result was highly favourable to the general. It was reported that he was

guiltless of the excesses of Pleminius, who was arrested, and left to die

in prison; that his troops, instead of being neglected or undisciplined,

were in the highest order; and that arms, engines, and supplies of

every kind were provided for the invasion of Africa. It was universally

resolved that Scipio should retain his command till he should bring the

war to a close.

The confidence which the senate felt in the altered state of affairs is

fully shown by two decrees passed in this same year. The first respected

the twelve Latin colonies, which five years before had refused to

furnish soldiers. At the time, it had been thought prudent to pass over

this contumacious conduct. But now they were required to furnish twice

their proper contingent till the end of the war. They murmured, but

submitted. The other decree was moved by Lævinus for the repayment of the

patriotic loan advanced during his consulship in the year 210 B.C. It was

apparent, therefore, that the battle of the Metaurus, backed by the great

successes of Scipio in Spain, had raised the republic above all fear of

disaffection in her colonies, or of bankruptcy at home. Other signs of

confidence appear. A huge stone, supposed to represent the Great Mother

of the gods, was brought in state to Rome from Pessinus in Sicily. The

Sibylline books directed that the care of this precious relic should be

given to “the best man” at Rome; and the senate adjudged the title to P.

Scipio Nasica, son of Cn. Scipio, who had died in Spain, and first cousin

to the great man who was now making the name illustrious.

SCIPIO INVADES AFRICA

[Sidenote: [204-203 B.C.]]

All obstacles being now removed, Scipio prepared to cross over into

Africa. His army and fleet were assembled at Lilybæum under his own

eye. His brother Lucius and his friend Lælius still attended him as

legates; and his quæstor was a young man destined hereafter to become

famous, M. Porcius Cato. It was towards the close of 204 B.C. that he

set sail. His army was not so numerous as it was well appointed and well

disciplined, composed of men who had grown old in service, skilful in

sieges, prepared for all dangers; for the greater part knew that in the

successful termination of the war lay their only chance of returning home

to end their days in peace. As the ships left the harbour at daybreak,

Scipio prayed aloud to all the gods, that his enterprise might be blessed

by their favour; that the evils which Carthage had wrought against Rome

might now be visited upon her own head. When the second morning broke,

they were in sight of land; and Scipio, when he heard that they were off

the Fair Promontory, said that the omen was good, and there should be

their landing-place.

Masinissa joined him with only two hundred of his Numidian horse; but his

knowledge of the country, and his ceaseless activity, would have made him

welcome, even if he had come alone.

Scipio immediately laid siege to Utica. Terror at Carthage rose to

its highest pitch. For a time he was left to carry on his operations

unmolested. But as winter advanced, Hasdrubal Gisco succeeded in

collecting a considerable force, and persuaded Syphax, his son-in-law,

to lend his aid in relieving Utica. Scipio was encamped on a headland

to the eastward of this town, on a spot which long retained the name of

“the Cornelian camp,” where the ruins of his entrenchments are still to

be traced; and the Carthaginians hoped that they might blockade him here

both by land and sea. Scipio remained quiet the whole winter, except

that he amused Syphax by entering into negotiations for peace. But these

negotiations were carried on to mask a design, which, as spring came on,

he was enabled to put in practice. He observed that Hasdrubal occupied

one camp, and Syphax another. The huts occupied by the Numidians were

formed of stakes wattled and thatched with reeds; and the quarters of

the Carthaginians, though somewhat more substantial, consisted solely

of timber. Scipio contrived to obtain an accurate knowledge of the plan

and disposition of these camps; and when the time for the execution of

his design was arrived, he suddenly broke off the negotiations, and told

Syphax that all thoughts of peace must be deferred till a later time.

On the first dark night that followed, he sent Lælius and Masinissa

against the camp of Syphax, while he moved himself towards that of

Hasdrubal. Masinissa obtained an easy entrance into the lines of his

countrymen, and straightway set fire to their inflammable habitations.

The unfortunate men rose from their beds or from their wine-cups, and

endeavoured to extinguish the flames. But the work had been too well

done; and as they attempted to escape, they found that every avenue of

the camp was beset by enemies. Fire was behind them, death by the sword

before; and though Syphax escaped, his army was destroyed. The same fate

befell Hasdrubal. On the first alarm, he conjectured the truth, and made

off, leaving his men a prey to Scipio. When morning broke, the Romans

pursued the fugitives; and it is not too much to say that the whole force

on which Carthage depended for safety was cut off in this horrible way.

The recital makes the blood run cold. Yet neither the act itself, nor the

duplicity by which it was carried into execution, were ever thought to

cast any slur on the fair fame of Scipio.

[Illustration: A ROMAN CITIZEN]

The Carthaginian senate were ready to give up matters as lost. But at

this juncture ten thousand Celtiberians landed in Africa and offered

their services to Syphax; and this prince was persuaded by the entreaties

of his wife Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco, to renew the

struggle. Hasdrubal also exerted himself to collect a new army; and in

the course of thirty days the two allied generals appeared on the great

plains, which lie about seventy or eighty miles to the southwest of

Utica and Carthage. Scipio, leaving his fleet and a division of his army

to continue the blockade of Utica, advanced to give them battle without

delay. The Celtiberians made a stout resistance; but, being deserted by

the rest of the army, they were entirely cut to pieces. Hasdrubal fled to

Carthage, Syphax to his own kingdom; so that the whole country was left

to the mercy of the Romans. Scipio advanced towards Carthage, receiving

the submission of the different towns by which he passed. Encamping at

Tunis, within sight of the capital, he awaited the submission of the

government.

Meanwhile Lælius and Masinissa, with the Italian and Numidian

cavalry, pursued Syphax to Cirta. The unlucky king made a faint show

of resistance; but he was defeated, and his capital surrendered at

discretion. Masinissa now received his reward, and was proclaimed king of

all Numidia. When he entered Cirta, he was met by Sophonisba, formerly

his betrothed, and now the wife of his rival. Her charms melted his

heart; and fearing lest Scipio might claim her as his captive, to lead

her in triumph by the side of Syphax, he took the bold step of marrying

her at once. Scipio sent for the young chief and rebuked him sternly for

venturing to take possession of a Roman captive. Masinissa felt that he

was unable to protect his unhappy bride; but, resolved that at least

she should have the option of escaping from the degradation of a Roman

triumph, he sent her a cup of poison, telling her that herein lay her

only possible deliverance. She took the potion, saying that she accepted

the nuptial gift, and drained it to the dregs. When the tragical fate of

Sophonisba reached the ears of Scipio, he feared that he had dealt too

harshly with his Numidian ally. He sent for him, and, gently reproving

him for his haste, he publicly presented him with the most honourable

testimonies to his bravery and fidelity which a Roman general could

bestow. In the delights of satisfied ambition and the acquisition of a

powerful sovereignty, Masinissa soon forgot the sorrows of Sophonisba.

While Scipio remained at Tunis, the Carthaginian fleet made an attack

on the Roman ships in the harbour of Utica, and gained some advantage.

Intelligence also reached the government that Mago, on landing in Italy,

had been welcomed by the Ligurians and a portion of the Gauls, and had

lately taken position on the Po with a considerable force. Here, however,

he was encountered by a Roman army and defeated after a severe struggle.

Mago, himself wounded, took refuge among the Ligurians, who still

remained faithful to his cause.

Ambassadors were now despatched by the Carthaginians to Rome to treat

for peace, while orders were sent to Hannibal and Mago to return with

such forces as they could bring. Mago obeyed the orders immediately, but

died of his wound upon the passage. Hannibal also with bitter feelings

prepared to obey. For sixteen years had the indomitable man maintained

himself on foreign ground; and even now the remains of his veteran army

clung to him with desperate fidelity. He felt that, so far as he was

concerned, he had been more than successful; if he had failed, it had

been the fault of that ungrateful country, which had left him long years

unsupported, and now was recalling him to defend her from the enemy. What

Scipio was now to Carthage, that might Hannibal have been to Rome. Still

he saw that no advantage could be gained by remaining longer in Italy: he

therefore bade farewell to the foreign shores, so long his own, and set

sail for that native land which had not seen him for nearly forty years.

[Sidenote: [203-202 B.C.]]

Great was the joy at Rome when the news came that their dire enemy

had been at length compelled to leave the shores of Italy. A public

thanksgiving was decreed; sacrifices offered to all the great gods of

Rome, and the Roman games, which had been vowed by Marcellus in his

last consulship, were now at length performed. It was at this moment of

triumph that the Carthaginian ambassadors arrived. The senate received

them (inauspicious omen!) in the Temple of Bellona. Lævinus moved that

they should be at once dismissed, and that orders should be sent to

Scipio to push on the war with vigour. After some debate, his proposition

was adopted. The close of the year 203 B.C. therefore rendered it certain

that the war must be decided by a trial of strength between the two

great generals, who, each triumphant in his own career, had never yet

encountered each other in arms. About the same time old Fabius died

in extreme old age. He has the merit of first successfully opposing

Hannibal; but his somewhat narrow mind, and the jealous obstinacy

which often accompanies increasing years, prevented him from seeing

that there is a time for all things; that his own policy was excellent

for retrieving the fortunes of the republic, but that the weakness of

Hannibal left the field open for the bolder measures of Scipio.

Hannibal landed at Leptis, to the south of Carthage, with his veterans;

and thence marching northwards, took up his position on the plain of

Zama, within five days’ march of Carthage. Scipio, early in the year (202

B.C.), advanced from Tunis to meet him; and finding that the Carthaginian

general had sent spies to ascertain his strength, he ordered them to be

led through his camp, and bade them make a full report of what they had

seen. Hannibal felt that he had to deal with a superior force, led by a

general only second in ability to himself. His own veterans were few in

number; the remainder of his army were raw levies or allies little to

be trusted; the Numidian horse, his main arm in Italy, were now arrayed

against him under the enterprising Masinissa. He therefore proposed a

personal conference, in the faint hope that he might effect a treaty with

Scipio. But it was too late. The generals parted from their conference

with feelings of mutual esteem, and prepared to decide the fate of the

civilised world by battle.[b]

THE BATTLE OF ZAMA DESCRIBED BY POLYBIUS

[Sidenote: [202 B.C.]]

On the following day, as soon as the dawn appeared, they drew out their

forces on both sides and prepared to engage; the Carthaginians, for their

own safety and the possession of Africa; the Romans, for the sovereignty

of the whole, and for universal empire. Is there any one that can forbear

to pause at this part of the story or remain unmoved by the relation?

Never were there seen more warlike nations; never more able generals, or

more completely exercised in all the art and discipline of war; never was

a greater prize proposed by fortune than that which was now laid before

the combatants. For it was not Africa alone, nor Italy, that waited to

award the conquerors, but the entire dominion of the whole known world.

And this, indeed, was not long afterwards the event.

Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following manner: He placed in

the first line the Hastati, leaving intervals between the cohorts. In the

second, the Principes; but posted their cohorts, not, as the Roman custom

was, opposite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former line

and at a considerable distance from them, on account of the great number

of elephants that were in the Carthaginian army. Last of all, in the

third line, he drew up the Triarii. Upon the left wing he stationed Caius

Lælius, with the cavalry of Italy; and Masinissa and the Numidians upon

the right. The intervals of the first line he filled with companies of

the light-armed troops, who were ordered to begin the action, and if they

should find themselves too violently pressed by the elephants, that the

swiftest of them should retire through the strait intervals to the rear

of all the army, and the rest, if they should be intercepted on their

way, direct their course to the right or left along the open distances

that were between the lines. When his disposition was thus completed, he

went round to all the troops and harangued them in a few words, but such

as the occasion seemed to require.

“Remember,” said he, “your former victories, and show now a courage

worthy of yourselves and of your country. Let it ever be present to

your view that by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will

become the masters of all Africa, but secure to Rome the undisputed

sovereignty of the rest of the world. If, on the other hand, you should

be conquered, they who fall bravely in the action will obtain an honour

far more glorious than any rights of sepulchre, the honour of dying for

their country; while those that shall escape must be condemned to pass

the remainder of their lives in the extremity of disgrace and misery.

For Africa will afford no place of safety, and if you fall into the

hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition must be your own reason

will easily instruct you to foresee. But may none of you ever know it by

experience. When fortune, then,” continued he, “has offered to us upon

either side so noble a prize, universal empire or glorious death, how

lost must we be both to honour and to sense, if we should reject these,

the greatest of goods, and choose, through a desire of life, the most

insupportable of evils. When you advance, therefore, against the enemy,

carry that resolution with you into action, which is sure always to

surmount the strongest resistance. Be determined either to conquer or to

die. Retain not so much as a thought of life. With such sentiments, the

victory cannot fail to be your own.”

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Hannibal, on his part, having placed

the elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army,

formed his first line of the mercenaries, who were a mixed multitude

of Gauls, Ligurians, Balearics, and Maurusians, and amounted together

to about twelve thousand men. Behind these were the Carthaginians and

the subject Africans. The third line was composed of the troops which

he had brought with him from Italy, and was placed at the distance

of more than a stadium from the second line. The cavalry was posted

upon the wings; that of the Numidian auxiliaries upon the left, and

the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He ordered the officers who

commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries to exhort severally

their own soldiers, and to encourage them to be assured of victory, since

they were now joined by Hannibal and his veteran forces. The leaders of

the Carthaginians were instructed, on the other hand, to lay before their

view the fatal consequences of a defeat, and to enumerate all evils to

which their wives and children would be exposed. And while these orders

were obeyed, he himself, going round to his own troops, addressed them

with the greatest earnestness, and in words like these:

“Remember, soldiers, that we have now borne arms together during the

course of seventeen years. Remember in how many battles we have been

engaged against the Romans. Conquerors in them all, we have not left

to the Romans even the smallest hope that they ever should be able to

defeat us. But beside the other innumerable actions in which we always

obtained the victory, remember also, above all the rest, the battle

of Trebia, which we sustained against the father of that very general

who now commands the Roman army; the battle of Thrasymene, against

Flaminius, and that of Cannæ, against Æmilius. The action in which we are

now ready to engage is not to be compared with those great battles, with

respect either to the number or the courage of the troops. For, turn now

your eyes upon the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer; they

scarcely make even a diminutive part of the numbers against which we

were then engaged. Nor is the difference less with respect to courage.

The former were troops whose strength was entire, and who had never been

disheartened by any defeat. But these before us are either the children

of the former or the wretched remains of those very men whom we subdued

in Italy, and who have so often fled before us. Lose not then upon this

occasion the glory of your general and your own. Preserve the name which

you have acquired, and confirm the opinion which has hitherto prevailed,

that you are never to be conquered.”

When the generals had thus on both sides harangued their troops, and the

Numidian cavalry for some time had been engaged in skirmishing against

each other, all things being now ready, Hannibal ordered the elephants

to be led against the enemy. But the noise of the horns and trumpets,

sounding together on every side, so affrighted some of these beasts that

they turned back with violence against their own Numidians, and threw

them into such disorder that Masinissa dispersed without much difficulty

that whole body of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian

army. The rest of the elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces

of the Romans in the space that was between the armies, suffered much

in the conflict, and made great havoc also among the enemy; till at

last, having lost all courage, some of them took their way through the

intervals of the Roman army, which afforded an open and safe passage

for them, as Scipio wisely had foreseen; and the rest, directing their

course to the right, were chased by darts from the cavalry, till they

were driven quite out of the field. But as they occasioned likewise some

disorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lælius also seized

that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian cavalry; and having forced them

to turn their backs, he followed closely after them, while Masinissa, on

his side, was pursuing the Numidian cavalry with no less ardour.

And now the heavy-armed forces on both sides advanced to action with a

slow and steady pace, those troops alone excepted which had returned

with Hannibal from Italy, and which remained still in the station in

which they at first were placed. As soon as they were near, the Romans,

shouting all together, according to their custom, and rattling their

swords against their bucklers, threw themselves upon the enemy. On

the other side, the Carthaginian mercenaries advanced to the charge

with confused and undistinguishable cries. For as they had been drawn

together, as we have said, from different countries, there was not among

them, as the poet expresses it (_Iliad_, IV, 437):

“One voice, one language found;

But sounds discordant as their various tribes.”

In this first onset, as the combatants were so closely joined that they

were unable to make use of their spears, or even of their swords, and

maintained the action hand to hand and man to man, the mercenaries,

by their boldness and dexterity, obtained at first the advantage, and

wounded many of the Romans; but the latter, assisted by the excellence

of their disposition and the nature of their arms, pressed forward and

still gained ground, being supported by the rest of their own army, who

followed and encouraged them from behind.

The mercenaries, on the other hand, were neither followed nor supported.

For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to assist them

in the action, but stood like men who had lost all courage. At last,

therefore, the strangers turned their backs; and, thinking themselves

manifestly to have been deserted by their own friends, they fell, as

they retired, upon the Carthaginians that were behind, and killed them.

The latter, however, fell not without a brave and vigorous defence; for,

being thus unexpectedly attacked, and compelled to fight both with their

own mercenaries and the Romans, they exerted their utmost efforts; and

engaging with a frantic and disordered rage, made a promiscuous slaughter

of friends and enemies. Amidst this confusion, the Hastati also were so

pressed that they were forced to break their ranks. But the leaders of

the principes, perceiving the disorder, brought up their troops close

behind to support them; so that, in the end, the greatest part of the

Carthaginians and the mercenaries were destroyed in the place, partly by

themselves and partly by the Hastati. Hannibal would not suffer the rest

that escaped to be received into the third line towards which they fled,

but ordered the foremost ranks to point their spears against them as they

approached. They were forced, therefore, to retire along the wings into

the open plain.

[Illustration: BATTLE BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS OF SCIPIO AND HANNIBAL

(After Mirys)]

As the whole ground that was between the forces that now remained was

covered with blood and slaughter and dead bodies, the Roman general was

in no small degree perplexed, being apprehensive that this obstacle would

prevent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it seemed

to be no easy thing to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks,

over bleeding and slippery carcasses, thrown one upon another, and over

arms which were scattered in confusion, and preposterously intermingled

with the heaps of the dead. Having ordered the wounded, however, to be

carried into the rear of the army, he called back the Hastati from the

pursuit, and drew them up in order, as they returned, in the forepart

of the ground upon which the action had passed, and the opposite to the

centre of the enemy. He then commanded the principes and the Triarii to

close their ranks, to form a wing on either side, and to advance over

the dead. And when these troops, having surmounted all the intermediate

obstacles, were come into the same line, with the Hastati, the action

was then begun on both sides with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As

the numbers were nearly equal, as the sentiments, the courage, and the

arms on both sides were the same, the battle remained for a long time

doubtful; for so obstinate was the contention that the men all fell in

the place in which they fought. But Lælius and Masinissa, returning back

from the pursuit of the routed cavalry, arrived most providentially in

the very moment in which their assistance was chiefly wanted, and fell

upon the rear of Hannibal. The greatest part, therefore, of his troops

were now slaughtered in their ranks; and among those that fled, a very

small number only were able to escape, as they were followed closely by

the cavalry through an open country. Above fifteen hundred of the Romans

fell in the action; but on the side of the Carthaginians, more than

twenty thousand were killed, and almost an equal number taken prisoners.

Such was the battle between Hannibal and Scipio,--the battle which gave

to the Romans the sovereignty of the world.

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had for some time pursued

those that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned

back to his own camp. Hannibal, with a small number of horsemen,

continued his retreat without stopping, and arrived safe at Adrumetum,

having performed, upon this occasion, all that was possible to be done by

a brave and experienced general. For first, he entered into a conference

with his enemy, and endeavoured by himself alone to terminate the

dispute. Nor was this any dishonour to his former victories, but showed

only that he was diffident of fortune and willing to secure himself

against the strange and unexpected accidents which happen in war. In the

battle afterwards, so well had he disposed things for the action, that

no general, using even the same arms and the same order of battle as the

Romans, could have engaged them with greater advantage.

The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken, because

the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready

always to present a front to their enemies on which side soever they

appear. For the cohorts by a single movement turn themselves together as

the occasion requires towards the side from whence the attack is made.

Add to this that their arms also are well contrived both for protection

and offence, their bucklers being large in size, and their swords

strong, and not easily injured by the stroke. Upon these accounts, they

are very terrible in action, and are not to be conquered without great

difficulty. But Hannibal opposed to each of these advantages the most

effectual obstacles that it was possible for reason to contrive. He had

collected together a great number of elephants, and stationed them in the

front of his army, that they might disturb the order of the enemy and

disperse their ranks. By posting the mercenaries in the first line, and

the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to disable

the Romans by fatigue before the battle should be brought to the last

decision, and render their swords useless by continual slaughter. As he

had thus placed the Carthaginians also between two lines, he compelled

them to stand, and, as the poet has said (_Iliad_, IV, 430):

“Forced them by strong necessity to fight,

However loth.”

In the last place he drew up the bravest and the firmest of his troops

at a distance from the rest; that, observing from afar the progress

of the action, and possessing their whole strength as well as their

courage entire, they might seize the most favorable moment, and fall

with vigour upon the enemy. If therefore, when he had thus employed all

possible precautions to secure the victory, he was now for the first

time conquered, he may very well be pardoned. For fortune sometimes

counteracts the designs of valiant men. Sometimes again, according to the

proverb,

“A brave man by a braver is subdued.”

And this indeed it was which must be allowed to have happened upon the

present occasion.

TERMS DICTATED TO CARTHAGE; SCIPIO’S TRIUMPH

When men, in lamenting the wretchedness of their fortunes, exceed in

their actions all the customary forms of grief, if their behaviour seems

to be the effect of genuine passion, and to arise only from the greatness

of their calamities, we are all ready to be moved by the strangeness of

the sight, and can neither see nor hear them without commiserating their

condition. But if these appearances are feigned, and assumed only with an

intention to deceive, instead of compassion, they excite indignation and

disgust. And this was now what happened with respect to the Carthaginian

ambassadors. Publius told them in few words: That with regard to

themselves, they had clearly no pretensions to be treated with gentleness

or favour, since by their own acknowledgment they had at first begun the

war against the Romans, by attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaty; and

now lately again had violated the articles of a convention which they had

ratified in writing, and bound themselves by oaths to observe. That the

Romans, however, as well upon their own account as in consideration also

of the common condition and fortune of humanity, had resolved to display

towards them upon this occasion a generous clemency. That such indeed it

must appear to themselves to be, if they would view all circumstances

in a proper light, for since fortune having first precluded them by the

means of their own perfidious conduct, from every claim to mercy or to

pardon, had now thrown them wholly into the power of their enemies, no

hardships which they should be forced to suffer, no conditions which

should be imposed, no concessions which should be exacted from them,

could be considered as rigorous or severe; but rather it must appear to

be a matter of astonishment if any article of favour should be yielded to

them. After this discourse he recited first the conditions of indulgence

which he was willing to grant, and afterwards those of rigour, to which

they were required to submit. The terms which he proposed to them were

these:

That they should retain all the cities which they held in Africa before

the beginning of the last war which they had made against the Romans; and

all the lands likewise which they had anciently possessed, together with

the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them. That from the

present day all hostilities should cease. That they should be governed by

their own laws and customs, and not receive any garrison from the Romans.

Such were the articles of favour; the others, of a contrary kind, were

these:

That the Carthaginians should restore all that they had taken unjustly

from the Romans during the continuance of the truce. That they should

send back all the prisoners and deserters, that had at any time fallen

into their hands. That they should deliver up all their long vessels, ten

triremes only excepted; and likewise their elephants. That they should

not make war at any time upon any state out of Africa, nor upon any in

Africa, without the consent of the Romans. That they should restore to

King Masinissa the houses, lands, and cities, and everything besides that

had belonged to him, or to his ancestors within the limits which should

hereafter be declared. That they should furnish the Roman army with corn

sufficient for three months, and pay also the stipends of the troops,

till an answer should be received from Rome confirming the conditions

of the treaty. That they should pay ten thousand talents of silver in

the course of fifty years, bringing two hundred Euboic talents every

year. That, as a security for their fidelity, they should give a hundred

hostages which should be chosen by the Roman general out of all their

youth, between the ages of fourteen and of thirty years.

As soon as Publius had finished the recital of these articles, the

ambassadors returned in haste to Carthage, and reported the terms that

were proposed. Upon this occasion, when one of the senators was going to

object to the conditions and had begun to speak, Hannibal, it is said,

stepped forward, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his

seat. And, when the rest of the senate appeared to be much displeased at

an action so injurious to the customs of that assembly, he again stood

up and said, That he might well be excused, if his ignorance had led him

to offend against any of their established forms. That they knew that he

had left his country when he was only nine years old and had now returned

to it again at the age of more than forty-five. He entreated them,

therefore, not so much to consider whether he had violated any custom, as

whether he had been moved by a real concern for the distressed condition

of his country. That what he had felt upon that account was indeed the

true cause of his offence. For that it appeared to him to be a most

astonishing thing, and altogether preposterous, that any Carthaginian,

not ignorant of all which their state in general, as well as particular

men, had designed against the Romans, should not be ready to worship

his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now found

himself treated by them with so great clemency. That if the Carthaginians

had been asked but a few days before what their country must expect to

suffer if they should be conquered by the Romans, they would not have

been able to make any answer, so great, so extensive were the calamities

which were then in prospect. He begged therefore that they would not

now bring the conditions into any debate, but admit them with unanimous

consent; offering sacrifices at the same time to the gods, and joining

all together in their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the

Roman people. This advice appeared to be so sensible and so well suited

to the present exigency, that the senate resolved to consent to a peace

upon the terms which have been mentioned, and immediately sent away some

ambassadors to conclude the treaty.

[Sidenote: [201 B.C.]]

Not long after this time [in the beginning of the year 201 B.C.], Publius

Scipio returned to Rome from Africa. As the greatness of his actions had

raised in men a very high and general expectation, he was surrounded

by vast crowds upon his entrance and received by the people with the

greatest marks of favour. Nor was this only reasonable, but an act also

of necessary duty. For they who not long before had not so much as dared

to hope that Hannibal ever could be driven out of Italy, or the danger be

removed from their own persons and their families, now saw themselves not

only freed from apprehension of any present evils, but established also

in a lasting and firm security by the entire conquest of their enemies.

Upon this occasion, therefore, they set no bounds to their joy. On the

day likewise in which he entered the city in triumph, as the objects that

were viewed in the procession represented most clearly to the senses of

the people the dangers from which they had escaped, they stood as in an

ecstasy of passion, pouring out thanks to the gods, and acknowledgments

to the author of so great a deliverance. Among the rest of the prisoners

Syphax also, the Masæsylian king, was led along a captive in the

procession; and after some time he died in prison. When the solemnity of

the triumph was finished, there was afterwards in Rome, during many days

a continual succession of games and spectacles, the expense of which was

defrayed by Scipio with a generosity which was worthy of him.[c]

AN ESTIMATE OF HANNIBAL

[Sidenote: [201-202 B.C.]]

Scipio’s great antagonist lived a good many years after the battle of

Zama, finally dying in exile, as we shall see. But his career as the

foremost man of his time practically terminated with his defeat at Zama,

and we may fitly pause for a moment here to attempt an estimate of his

character and influence. One of the most recent historians of the Punic

Wars, Dr. Fuchs, thus characterises the greatest of Carthaginians:

Hannibal doubtless stands in the first rank of warrior heroes. Many

indeed would, and not without justice, give him the first place.

Certainly Alexander conquered the enormous kingdom which overspread the

whole of Asia Major and once stretched its arm over Europe and Africa;

but the feet of this colossus were of clay and it was long known to the

world that its power was not in proportion to its size. Seventy years

before, a prince of the reigning house conceived the valiant idea of

attacking it with ten thousand Greek heavy-armed soldiers, and Agesilaus

had the bold design of piercing the heart of the giant with eight

thousand men. Alexander’s father not only bequeathed him the means of

carrying out this great plan, but left him a powerful peasant class, a

nobility ready for service, well-ordered finances, and the majesty of the

royal name.

Cæsar and Napoleon also excited the admiration of their times. The former

traversed three parts of the world with his victorious legions, and the

latter shook to the foundation the whole of Europe and her constitutions.

Less fortunate than the royal heir, Agesilaus, they were not only the

leaders but the creators of their armies. But the supremacy of the might

environing the Roman government, and the power of the French consulate

and imperialism were due to their being founded on law. Thus having full

and free scope, it cheerfully sacrificed the prevalent enthusiasm for

young liberty, and enthusiasm never weighs what it gives. The strength of

the enemy in the first case was weak in that it was founded on a decadent

system, the unity of leadership had been destroyed by the arrogance of

the high-born Romans who reaped but did not sow; and in the latter case,

the art of war was divorced from nature and made as pedantic as the whole

trend of the time.

It was not so easy for Hannibal. He also had an inheritance--the

inheritance of a resemblance to his great father, which gained him the

commander’s staff. Hannibal had made too great an impression upon the

minds of the Carthaginian mercenaries for them to withhold the leadership

from the son on the threshold of manhood, who bore the features of his

father. But flattering as this choice was to the father, it was fraught

with danger to the son. It certainly put him at the head of the army,

but it did not endow him with the authority which hedges a royal heir

or one empowered by government to hold a high position in the state; he

was placed in the difficult situation of either compensating for this

drawback by his own personality or gradually becoming the tool of a

licentious soldiery.

This danger was increased by the character of the troops which chose

him, whose will was undirected by the moral force of patriotism, and

uninspired with the desire for freedom; they were brought together only

by a common desire for loot. But Hannibal succeeded by his own force of

character in giving a moral turn to this mass, in disciplining them, and

imbuing them with the spirit of military honour. He not only dared to

impose the greatest fatigue upon the troops, but always remained their

master; and even in the supreme effort of crossing the Alps not a sound

of complaint or cowardice is recorded in history--and such a difficult

march is an infallible test of military discipline. Hannibal, therefore,

proved himself to be an incomparable leader of men and performed a task

which neither Alexander, Cæsar, nor Napoleon could have accomplished. He

surpasses them in this deed, high as they may stand in the estimation of

history.[56]

And Hannibal was not favoured by fate in death. Alexander was right in

envying the heroes of antiquity because they had in Homer a recorder of

their greatness. For every heroic deed lies dead and is belittled and

made of no account if there be no clever pen inspired by enthusiasm to

raise it to its fitting place of greatness. Alexander has found grateful

pens which have acquainted the astonished world with his deeds; Cæsar

himself gave to posterity an account of his campaigns with incomparable

clearness and remarkable simplicity; and our own military era calls

Napoleon the professor of the field of war. But Hannibal’s portrait has

been given only by his enemies. However, try as they may to call wisdom

cunning, and strong measures, necessitated by war, cruelty, they cannot

cast down this colossal figure, deface as they may the regularity of its

features. Clouds may envelop the contour of a great mountain, but its

summit shows its height.[d]

FOOTNOTES

[56] [It is in fact impossible to say what Cæsar or Napoleon could or

could not have done, had either been in Hannibal’s place. Most modern

estimates of Hannibal are favourable; cf. especially R. B. Smith.[e]]

[Illustration: ROMAN CISTERN]

[Illustration]