CHAPTER XI. FIRST HALF OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

War was resolved upon and declared on both sides--a war which

stands forth in the annals of the ancient world without a

parallel. It was not a war about a disputed boundary, about the

possession of a province, or some partial advantage; it was a

struggle for existence, for supremacy or destruction. It was

to decide whether the Greco-Roman civilisation of the West or

the Semitic civilisation of the East was to be established in

Europe, and to determine its history for all future time. The

war was one of those in which Asia struggled with Europe, like

the war of the Greeks and Persians, the conquests of Alexander

the Great, the wars of the Arabs, the Huns and the Tatars.

Whatever may be our admiration of Hannibal, and our sympathy

with heroic and yet defeated Carthage, we shall nevertheless be

obliged to acknowledge that the victory of Rome--the issue of

this trial by battle--was the most essential condition for the

healthy development of the human race.--IHNE.[b]

FIRST PERIOD (218-216 B.C.)

The war which began with the invasion of Italy by Hannibal lasted for

seventeen years. The periods of the war are four. The first comprehends

the victorious career of Hannibal, from the passage of the Alps to Capua.

Each year is marked by a great battle--Trebia, Trasimene, Cannæ (218-215

B.C.). The second is of five years, in which the Romans succeed in

recovering Capua, while they lose Tarentum (215-211 B.C.). The third, of

four years, in which Hannibal, left without support from home, is obliged

more and more to confine himself to the mountain regions of Calabria.

It ends with the disastrous battle of the Metaurus (211-207 B.C.). The

fourth, of four years, in which Hannibal stands at bay in the extremity

of Italy, while the main scene of the war shifts to Spain, Sicily, and

Africa. It terminates with the great battle of Zama, and peace (206-202

B.C.).

But during the former periods of the great war, the Roman arms were also

engaged in Spain, in Sicily, and in Epirus. From the very beginning of

the war they maintained the conflict in Spain. After 215 B.C. they were

obliged to besiege Syracuse and reconquer Sicily, as well as Sardinia. In

212 B.C. they declared war against Philip of Macedon, in order to prevent

him from sending aid to Hannibal in Italy.

The winter of 219 was passed by Hannibal in active preparation. His

soldiers received leave of absence, with orders to be present at New

Carthage at the very beginning of the next spring. He sent envoys into

the south of Gaul and north of Italy, to inform the Celts on both sides

of the Alps of his expedition to win the Transalpine Gauls with hopes of

the plunder of Italy, to rouse the Cisalpine by promises of delivery from

the Roman yoke.

Thus assured, Hannibal reviewed his troops at New Carthage. The army of

invasion amounted to ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse,

with some fifty elephants. The infantry were mostly Spanish, the veteran

soldiers of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, recruited by new levies of his own.

The Spaniards, however, were kept in balance by a large body of Libyan

mercenaries. The light infantry, slingers and archers, were from the

Balearic Isles. Of the cavalry, the heavy troopers were Spanish, while

the light horse were furnished by Numidia; and the whole of this arm was

placed under the command of the fiery Maharbal.

Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, was left at New Carthage, to rule the

lately conquered province of Spain, and to raise an army of reserve for

the Italian war. Mago, his youngest brother, accompanied the general.

Having left New Carthage about the end of May, Hannibal marched with

no interruption to the Ebro; but as soon as he had crossed that river,

the whole country up to the Pyrenees was hostile. By great rapidity of

movement, though with the loss of many men, he reduced all the tribes to

submission in a few weeks, and, leaving an officer, with eleven thousand

men, in charge of this district, he pushed forwards to the Pyrenees.

Here his Spanish soldiers first discovered that they were to be led

into strange and unknown lands; discontent appeared in the camp; three

thousand Carpetanians, a tribe which had not been long conquered, seized

their arms and set off homewards. Upon this, Hannibal, with prudent

frankness, called the troops together, told them his whole design, and

gave all who were unwilling to go on, free leave to return. Nearly eight

thousand more availed themselves of this permission.

He passed round the eastern end of the Pyrenees, where the mountains sink

gently towards the sea, and halted his army for a few days at Ruscino

(Roussillon). On a review, it appeared that the losses he had sustained,

together with the twenty-two thousand men whom he had left in Catalonia

or who had gone home, had reduced his foot to fifty thousand, and his

horse to nine thousand. With this force he advanced almost unopposed to

the banks of the Rhone.

It is now time to inquire what the Romans were doing to meet the

coming danger. The senate had not been idle. But they had acted on the

supposition that the Second Punic War, like the First, would be fought

on foreign soil. It is almost amusing to contrast their expectations

with the result. The plebeian consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, was sent

to Lilybæum with a large fleet, with orders to invade Africa: the other

consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, was to land in Spain and take the field

against Hannibal. And it is plain that the senate thought this service

the least important of the two, because they detained Scipio’s army

rather than that of Sempronius, to quell a rebellion which broke out

in Cisalpine Gaul, in consequence of the proceedings of the triumviri,

who had been sent to distribute the confiscated lands of the Boians and

Insubrians among the colonists of Placentia and Cremona. Just at this

time the envoys of Hannibal arrived, and the Gauls rushed to arms. To

repress this outbreak, one of Scipio’s legions was sent off in all haste,

and the consul could not set sail for Spain till he had raised a new

legion. His troops met at Pisa, and he was just weighing anchor for Spain

when he heard that Hannibal had already crossed the Pyrenees.

On receiving this news, he put in at the allied city of Massilia

(Marseilles), and disembarked there, intending to arrest Hannibal’s

march upon the Rhone. He did not expect him there for some time yet,

and therefore he gave his army some days’ rest, while he despatched a

reconnoitring party of three hundred picked horse up the left bank of

the river, under the trusty guidance of the Massaliots.

But Hannibal had crossed the Rhone while these horsemen were on their

way up the river. The point at which he reached it was not far above

Avignon, about fifty miles from the coast. The river itself is large,

and the rapidity of its stream proverbial. But, besides these natural

difficulties, he found the left bank occupied by a large host of Gauls.

Upon this, he immediately made preparations for forcing the passage.

After two days spent in seizing boats and constructing rafts, he sent

Hanno, son of Bomilcar, with a strong detachment of cavalry, to cross

the river about twenty miles higher up, so as to come round upon the

rear of the Gauls. On the morning of the third day after his departure,

Hanno signalled his arrival to Hannibal by a column of smoke; and the

Carthaginians immediately pushed their boats and rafts into the stream.

The Gauls flocked down to the water’s edge, brandishing their arms and

uttering wild yells of defiance. But while the boats were in midstream,

a cry arose from the rear; and, looking round, the barbarians beheld

their tents in flames. They hastened back, and were charged by Hanno

with his cavalry. Meanwhile, the first divisions of the army, forming

under the general’s eye, completed the defeat of the Gauls; and for the

remainder of the day the Carthaginians lay encamped in the enemy’s late

quarters. All the army, except the elephants, had effected the passage.

It was on this very day that Scipio sent off his three hundred horse from

Marseilles.

On the next morning (the sixth after his arrival on the Rhone) news

reached Hannibal that the Romans had landed. Upon this he instantly

despatched a body of five hundred Numidian horse to reconnoitre, while he

himself spent the day in preparations for bringing over the elephants.

At this moment, some Boian and Insubrian chieftains arrived from Italy

to inform him of what their people were doing and had done against the

Romans, and to describe in glowing colours the richness and beauty of the

land which would welcome him after the toils of the Alpine pass. This

news had a great effect upon the army, which was somewhat dispirited by

the opposition offered by the Gauls upon the Rhone.

[Illustration: HANNIBAL]

In the evening the Numidian horse galloped into camp in great disorder,

having lost half their number. At some distance a body of cavalry

appeared in pursuit, who reined in their horses on coming in view of

the Carthaginian camp, and then turned about and rode off down the

river. This was Scipio’s reconnoitring party, which had encountered the

Numidians and defeated them.

Hannibal, finding the enemy so near at hand, sent off the whole of his

infantry next morning to march up the left bank of the Rhone. He himself

only stayed till he saw his elephants, now about thirty in number,

safely across the stream; and then, with the elephants and cavalry, he

followed the army.

Scipio, on his part, so soon as he heard that the Carthaginians had

already crossed the Rhone, proceeded by forced marches up the river. But

it was three or four days after Hannibal’s departure that he arrived

at the point where the Carthaginians had crossed. It was in vain to

pursue the enemy into unknown regions, peopled by barbarous tribes;

and Scipio had the mortification to reflect that, if he had marched at

once from Marseilles, he might have come in time to assist the Gauls

in barring Hannibal’s passage. Not able to undo the past, he provided

wisely for the future. He despatched his brother Cneius to Spain with the

fleet and the consular army, deeming it of high importance to cut off

communication between Hannibal and that country; and himself returned to

Pisa, to take command of the army which had been left to suppress the

Gallic insurrection. He expected to meet Hannibal’s army shattered by the

passage of the Alps, and to gain an easy victory.

Meanwhile, Hannibal continued his march up the Rhone, and crossing the

Isère found himself in the plains of Dauphiné, then inhabited by the

Allobrogian Gauls. He marched thus far north, about one hundred miles

beyond the place where he had crossed the Rhone, at the invitation of

a chieftain who was contending for the dominion of the tribe with his

younger brother. Hannibal’s veterans put the elder brother in possession;

and the grateful chief furnished the army with arms and clothing,

entertained them hospitably for some days, and guided them to the verge

of his own dominions. This must have brought them to the point at which

the Isère issues from the lower range of the Alps into the plain, near

the present fortress of Grenoble. To this point there is little doubt as

to the route taken by Hannibal; but after this all is doubtful.[c]

Besides the fact that no modern historian can offer any better authority

than Polybius for this portion of history, no more brilliant and dramatic

account of the crossing of the Alps exists than his. We may then quote it

at length.[a]

POLYBIUS’ ACCOUNT OF THE CROSSING OF THE ALPS

Some Authors, who have writ of _Hannibal’s_ passage over the _Alpes_,

entertain us with astonishing and incredible Tales of that Voyage,

without heeding that they have thereby committed two Errors, which

History of all things will not permit, for they are constrain’d thereby

to coin Falsehoods of their own, and often become liable to contradict

themselves. For as they give to _Hannibal_ all the Encomiums of a great

and valiant Leader; so at the same time they make him act with the

greatest Imprudence imaginable. Then when they are taken in their own

fabulous Snares, they are forc’d to bring down the Gods and Demi-Gods to

their Aid, who should not be nam’d but in matters of Truth. Furthermore,

they feign that the _Alpes_ are so desart and inaccessible, that far

from being passable by Armies, Horses, and Elephants, Men cannot without

unspeakable travel pass them on foot. They tell us farther, that some

parts thereof are so waste and destitute of all Succour, that without the

Aid of some Divinity, who led _Hannibal_, as it were by the Hand, through

those wild labyrinths, he and his Army had inevitably perish’d; these,

I say, are two Faults in an Historian, which Men of common Sense easily

discover and dislike. For these Authors make _Hannibal_ in the spring of

his Hopes at the head of a flourishing victorious Army, perform such

things as are not likely would be acted by a People already vanquish’d

and undone, and reduc’d to the last extremity; namely, to ingage their

Troops in Countries and Places totally unknown. For while they tell us

all was waste and desart, and the Country no where passable, do they not

plainly accuse their own Forgeries? But they knew not that the _Gauls_,

who inhabit about the _Rhosne_, had often pass’d the _Alpes_ with

numerous Armies, long before _Hannibal’s_ time; and not only heretofore,

but of late days, they had march’d to the relief of those _Gauls_ who

dwell about the _Po_, during their Wars with the _Romans_. Furthermore,

they were to learn that even the _Alpes_ themselves are inhabited by

numerous Nations; but it was their Ignorance indeed that brought the

Demi-God down to show _Hannibal_ his way. Wherein they follow the Poets,

who in their Tragedies, having for the most part nothing but Fiction and

extravagant Adventures for the subject of their Plays, are able to bring

nothing handsomely to pass without a God or a Machine.

Most certain it is that _Hannibal_ did not conduct his Affairs at the

rate these Authors would persuade, but like a wise and able Captain.

And there is no doubt, but he well knew that the Country, into which he

was leading his Army, was fertile and abounding in all things, and the

Inhabitants alien’d in their Inclinations to the _Romans_; that he had

with him for Guides the very People of the Country, who had engag’d to

partake with him in all his Fortunes. For my own particular, I speak of

these things with so much the more assurance, by how much I have not only

been instructed therein by those who liv’d in those Days, but that I

might be less liable to errour, I made my self a Journey into the _Alpes_

for my better information.

_Hannibal_ having march’d near an hundred Miles in ten days along the

River _Rhosne_, met with mighty difficulties after his Army had enter’d

on the Mountains; and in truth the _Allobroges_ had no purpose to attack

them, while they held their March in the Plains, fearing both their

Horse, and the _Gauls_ that accompany’d the Army. But these were no

sooner gone, and that _Hannibal_ began to ascend the Mountains, when they

drew together in great numbers, and possess’d themselves of the Posts

where _Hannibal_ must unavoidably March; and most assuredly, had they

but kept themselves longer conceal’d, the _Carthaginian_ Army had run

a mighty hazard; but being discover’d by _Hannibal_, tho’ they did him

some Mischief, they were requited with equal loss. For _Hannibal_ was no

sooner inform’d, that the _Barbarians_ were Masters of the Passes, when

he made his Army halt, and take their Quarters that night among the Rocks

and Fastnesses. In the mean while, he dispatch’d a Party of _Gauls_, who

serv’d him for Guides, to discover the Posture of the Enemy, and learn

what they could of their purpose. And having understood that they kept

Guard in those Places only by day, but that in the night they retir’d

to a Town not far off; he found this Expedient to obviate the present

Inconvenience: He decamp’d in broad day, and by slow motions advanc’d

with his Army; till arriving not far from the Streights, he then encamp’d

not far from the Enemy; and causing Fires to be made in the Camp about

the first Watch of the Night, where he left the greatest part of his

Troops, himself, in the mean while, with a Detachment of his best Men,

pass’d the Streights in the Night; and while the Enemy was retir’d to the

Town according to their Custom, took possession of those Posts, where

they were wont before to keep their Guard.

When day discover’d to the Enemy what had pass’d, they did not presently

determine what to do; but when they observ’d the great quantity of

Baggage that appear’d, and perceiv’d that the Horse could afford them no

succour, which by reason of the narrow, stony, and broken ways, could

not march but in defiles, they then resolv’d on the Attack. And now as

the Barbarians thus fell on them from all Quarters at once, the Way it

self being almost as terrible as the Enemy, the _Carthaginians_ receiv’d

great loss, especially in their Horses and Beasts of Carriage; for the

Way being streight, stony, and broken, the Beasts of Burden were easily

thrown down, and disorder’d, falling into Precipices. But the Horses that

were wounded gave them the greatest trouble; for falling by their Wounds

among the other Beasts, and labouring to rise and recover their feet in

so narrow a way, so crowded, they cast down others by their striving to

save themselves; which was the occasion of great labour and tumult.

This being observ’d and consider’d by _Hannibal_, who well knew the Army

could not subsist without their Beasts of Burthen which carry’d their

Necessaries, he immediately left the Posts he had taken, and came to

the relief of those who were thus hard press’d in their passage; when

falling on the Enemy from higher ground, he did not fail of doing them

great damage: But the evil was, that his own People were thereby equal

Sufferers; for the fear encreasing everywhere by this new Tumult, many

miscarry’d and were lost in the Crowd; but, in the end, most of the

_Allobroges_ were slain on the place, and the rest sav’d themselves by

flight. And now their Horses and other Beasts, after some time of rest,

were led with great trouble and difficulty through the Streight; but

_Hannibal_, after he had escap’d this Danger, march’d himself with a good

Detachment against the Town, that had harbour’d the Enemy, which he took

without resistance, finding it almost quite deserted, the Inhabitants

being all gone out in hopes of Booty. This adventure prov’d very useful

to his Affairs, both with respect to the present and the future: For he

here recover’d many, both Men and Horses and other Beasts, which had

fallen into the Enemy’s hands, and Cattel and Corn sufficient to sustain

the Army for three Days.

But, above all, the terrour he had given by this success to the

circumjacent places was such, that none of the _Gauls_ inhabiting the

Towns near which he was to pass, gave him the least molestation in his

passage. In this Town _Hannibal_ took up his Quarters, where he remain’d

a Day to rest and refresh his Army, and then prosecuted his Journey. For

three days together he march’d without trouble or alarm; but the fourth

he fell into much danger. The People inhabiting in the Towns on the way

he was to pass having secretly conspir’d against him, met him however,

with Olive-branches and Garlands of Flowers, Signs among the Barbarians

of Peace and Friendship, as the _Caduceus_ is among the _Greeks_.

_Hannibal_, who had now learn’d how far he was to trust these People,

endeavour’d by Questions to inform himself of their Purposes.

They told him, That they had receiv’d notice of his success against the

Town, and of the loss and defeat of those who had attack’d him in his

march; but as to themselves, they came to give him assurance, That they

were resolv’d to do him no injury, nor suffer any to be done to him by

others: And that they were ready to give him Hostages for their Fidelity.

_Hannibal_ remain’d long undetermin’d what to do, having no great Opinion

of their Sincerity; but, in the end, weighing that to make a show of

believing them, might work on their Good-nature, and by degrees win them

to his Friendship, if he seem’d to accept their Tenders, and that in

case of refusal, they might presently become his Enemies, he feign’d to

consent to their proposal, and seem’d, as they did, dispos’d to enter

into terms of Friendship with them. In short, after these Barbarians had

given him security for their peaceable Behaviour, supply’d his Army

with Provisions, and that they convers’d among the _Carthaginians_ with

all manner of freedom and Confidence, _Hannibal_ began to have a better

Opinion of their Sincerity, and accepted their Service for his Guides

through the many remaining difficult ways by which they were to pass.

Howbeit, after they had thus conducted the Army for two Days together,

they assembled at length all into one Body, and attack’d the Rear at a

Defile, or streight Passage, as they were marching in a Valley full of

Rocks and broken Ground.

Great likelihood there was that the _Carthaginian_ Army had here run the

hazard of being entirely destroy’d, had not their General, who reserv’d

a secret doubt of the well-meaning of this People, obviated the mischief

of this treasonable Purpose of theirs, by ordering his Horse and Baggage

to march in the Van of the Army, and his choicest Foot to sustain the

Reer. But having dispos’d matters after this manner, his loss became less

grievous; for his Foot in the Arreer-guard prov’d sufficient to put a

stop to the violence of the Attempt. Nevertheless, they were not without

great loss both of Men and Horses; and the Enemy, who was possess’d of

the Ground above them, brought such terrour into the Army, by rowling

down mighty Stones and Rocks from the Precipices upon them, and showring

Vollies of Stones on their heads, that _Hannibal_ was compell’d to take

up his Quarters for that Night on the top of an Eminence, expos’d to the

open Sky, with that part of the Army that was with him, remote from the

Horse, and the rest of the Troops, and the Baggage, the better to cover

and defend them from danger; who were hardly able, in all that Night,

with great labour to compass their passage through the Valley.

In the morning, the Enemy being now retir’d, _Hannibal_ join’d his

Army and Baggage, and advanc’d towards the top of the _Alpes_. After

this the _Gauls_ attempted no more to attack them in Bodies, but in

smaller Parties, and with less ardour than before; nevertheless, falling

sometimes on the Van, sometimes on the Reer of the Army, they seldom

fail’d of making some spoil of the Baggage. The Elephants happen’d to be

of great use to the _Carthaginians_ in these Conflicts; for wheresoever

they chanc’d to appear, they so terrify’d the Enemy, that the Army

march’d by that means with much less molestation. In nine Days after

this, _Hannibal_ gain’d the top of the Mountains, where he halted two

Days, being willing to give some repose to such of his Army as were come

thus far without wound or sickness, and to attend the coming of the rest

of his Troops that were yet behind. During this stay, many Horses and

Beasts of Carriage, which had fallen and stray’d out of the way, came in

of their own accord, following the Track of the Army to the great wonder

of the Beholders.

But whereas the Snows were yet great in the Mountains (Winter not being

there quite over), _Hannibal_ perceiving his Souldiers to be somewhat

discourag’d by reason of the Sufferings they had already felt, and

out of apprehension of what yet threatned them, caus’d the Army to be

assembled, to the end he might speak to them, and inspire them with new

Resolution; which he could no way better effect, than by giving them a

view and prospect of _Italy_; which, in a word, lies so fairly to the

eye, spreading and extending it self at the foot of those Mountains, that

Nature seems to have design’d them as a Rampart to cover and defend it.

So he gave them a survey of the Champaign Country that spreads it self

all about the River _Po_; and gave them to understand how welcome they

should be to the People that inhabited it. He pointed out likewise to

them whereabout the City of _Rome_ stood; and by this Artifice animated

his harass’d Army.

The Day following he decamp’d, and began to descend the Mountains; and

now saw no more of the Enemy to molest them in their march, saving some

small scatter’d Parties, who rather awaited occasions how to steal than

to fight. Howbeit, _Hannibal’s_ Losses were not lessen’d, by reason of

the great Snows and the exceeding bad march they had had, which much

weaken’d the Army. Nor was their passage much better in the descent;

for what with the streight, steep, and slippery ways, and the depth of

the Snow, the Soldier knew not where to set his foot with safety; for

whenever they slipp’d, they were in danger of being lost and swallow’d

up in the depths and precipices which lay hid and cover’d by the Snow.

Nevertheless, the long practice in those Hardships and Dangers, taught

them to suffer all with constancy: But at length coming to a place

where neither their Elephants nor Horses could pass, the Way, which was

very steep before, being now, by the falling away of some of the Earth,

become more difficult, renew’d their Fears; which was manifest over the

whole Army. Upon this accident, _Hannibal_ took a resolution to attempt

another way, by taking a compass about those Mountains, tho’ there was no

appearance of any passage; but forasmuch as the great Snows render’d that

Resolution too hazardous, all places being cover’d and hid from the view,

he therefore chang’d his purpose.

In the interim, there having fallen much new Snow on that which remain’d

of the Winter before; this last being loose, and not yet deep, yielded

firm footing enough to the Soldiers; but this was no sooner trampled

on, but it dissolv’d into dirt and mire; whereby the Snow of last Year

being frozen under it, it became impossible to march thereon any more

than on Ice it self, none being able to keep their Feet; and when they

endeavour’d to sustain themselves on their Hands and Knees, they often

slid and were lost in Pits and Precipices. When their Horses at any time

slip’d, they by their weight and labouring broke the Ice under them, and

so became buried and frozen to death.

Whereupon _Hannibal_ now desperate of obtaining his passage that way,

encamp’d his Army at the entrance of this Pass, after he had first

order’d the Snow to be remov’d which cover’d all the ground; and then

by the labour of his Soldiers he wrought into the Hill it self, and by

unspeakable pains made his passage at length through it: So in one Day

he made way for his Horses and other Beasts to pass, which immediately

march’d on. And now decamping the Army, he sent his Horse and other

Beasts to forrage and recruit themselves, as they could come at Pasture,

where the Ground was not cover’d with Snow. In the mean time he order’d

the _Numidians_ to make a passage for the Elephants, which cost them

three Days labour with great difficulty to effect; but at length they

made way for those Animals, which had suffer’d much, and were almost dead

with hunger. For there was neither Forrage nor Tree to be found on that

part of the _Alpes_, nor in the neighbourhood; the Ground lying ever

cover’d with Snow Winter and Summer, but the lower Grounds on all sides

produce Woods and Covert, and there is no place thereabout that is not

habitable.

After _Hannibal_ had united his Troops, he prosecuted his march, and in

the space of three Days got past these difficult and incommodius Places,

whereof we have given an account, and recover’d the Plains, howbeit with

the loss of great numbers of his People; for many fell by the Enemy,

many were drown’d in passing the Rivers, and many of Sickness and the

Hardships of their march to and over the _Alpes_. And as he lost many

Men, so his loss of Horses and other Beasts of burthen, was yet much

greater.

In a word, after a march of five Months from his departure from

_New-Carthage_, and fifteen Days passage over the _Alpes_, he boldly

advanc’d into the Champaign Country, lying about the River _Po_, and the

Frontiers of the _Insubrians_. Of the Troops that march’d out with him,

there now remain’d; of _Africans_ about twelve thousand; eight thousand

_Spaniards_, and six thousand Horse, according to his own Register,

left by him, engrav’d on the Column at _Lacinium_, which specify’d that

number. About this time _Publius Cornelius_, who had left his Troops with

_Cneius_ his Brother, to prosecute the War against _Asdrubal_ in _Spain_,

embark’d for _Pisa_.[d]

HANNIBAL IN ITALY

[Sidenote: [218-217 B.C.]]

Hannibal descended among the mountains of the Salassians, and pushed on

into the friendly country of the Insubrians (Milanese), where he rested

his troops for some time, and procured fresh horses for many of his

cavalry. He rewarded the services of the Insubrians by marching against

the hostile tribe of the Taurini, whose capital city (Turin) he took by

assault.

It was now December. He was moving down the left bank of the Po, above

its junction with the Ticinus, on the Piedmontese side of the latter

river, when his cavalry came in conflict with the Roman horse, commanded

by the consul Scipio himself.

Scipio had returned to Pisa, whence he moved northward to encounter

Hannibal on his descent from the Alps. He crossed the Po near Pavia, made

a bridge over the Ticinus to secure his retreat, and, crossing the latter

river, he began to march up the left bank of the Po, just as Hannibal

was coming down it. Both generals were in advance with their cavalry,

and came unexpectedly in sight of each other. A smart action followed,

in which the Romans had the worst. The consul was severely wounded, his

life being saved by the devotion of a Ligurian slave, or, as others said,

by his son Publius, afterwards the great Africanus, then a youth only

seventeen years old. He fell back upon his main body and recrossed the

Ticinus so rapidly that, in breaking up the bridge, he left six hundred

men behind, who fell into the hands of Hannibal. This was the skirmish of

the Ticinus, which proved Hannibal’s superiority in cavalry. It had the

effect of making the Boian Gauls on the south of the Po declare in his

favour.

Hannibal, continuing his march down the Po, crossed somewhere below

Placentia; and Scipio, not finding his position near that town secure,

fell back westward so as to place the Trebia between himself and

Hannibal. On the left bank of this river he fortified a strong camp, with

the purpose of awaiting the arrival of his colleague Sempronius, whom

the senate had ordered to hasten from Sicily into the north of Italy.

Hannibal followed the Romans, and encamped in view of them on the right

bank of the Trebia. Here he received offers from a Brundusian, who was

in charge of the Roman magazine at Clastidium, a town in Scipio’s rear,

to betray the place; and it must have been while he was absent in this

quarter that Sempronius joined Scipio. Sempronius, not daring to sail

direct from Sicily to Pisa at that time of year, had sent his army over

the Straits of Messana, with orders to rendezvous at Ariminum; and so

expeditious were they that they performed the whole march from Lilybæum

to Scipio’s camp in forty days. Scipio endeavoured to dissuade Sempronius

from venturing a general action, but in vain; and being still confined

by the consequences of his wound, he was obliged to leave the whole

army under the direction of his colleague. Hannibal, for his part, was

anxious for a battle. The Gauls began to complain of the burden of two

armies in their country, and victory was necessary to secure them in his

interest.

The Trebia is a mountain stream, which in summer runs babbling over

a broad gravelly bed, so shallow that the foot-traveller walks over

it unheeding; but in winter, or after heavy rains, it rises to a deep

and rapid torrent. It was now nearly the end of December, and Hannibal

resolved that he would not cross the water to attack the Romans, but

would make them cross it to attack him. He executed his purpose with

great skill. On his left there was a sort of gully, thickly grown with

reeds and brushwood, in which he concealed his brother Mago with one

thousand foot and as many horse. Then, early in the morning, he sent his

Numidian riders across the river, and ordered the whole army to prepare

for the cold of the day by rubbing themselves with oil and making a

hearty meal.

As soon as Sempronius saw the Numidians cross the water, he sent his

cavalry, about four thousand strong, to meet them, and then drew out his

whole army, amounting to about thirty-six thousand men, to support the

attack. The Numidians feigned to be beaten and fled across the river.

The Romans pursued, but the water was running breast high and was deadly

cold; sleet was falling, which was driven in their faces by the east

wind; and when they reached the other side, they were half dead with

cold and wet and hunger. Their treacherous foes now opened on both sides

and displayed Hannibal’s infantry in battle order with the rest of the

cavalry and the elephants on either wing. The Roman cavalry, which was

also on the wings, was greatly outnumbered and soon put to flight; but

the legions and allies kept their ground bravely under all disadvantages

till Mago rose from ambush and attacked them in rear. Then the rout

became general. A body of ten thousand men, however, cut their way

through the Carthaginian lines to Placentia; the rest were driven back

with great slaughter to the Trebia, in which many were drowned, but a

large number, with the consul Sempronius himself, recrossed in safety.

The battle of the Trebia ended Hannibal’s first campaign. The two

consuls, with the relics of their armies, contrived to throw themselves

into Placentia and Cremona, and afterwards made good their retreat to

Ariminum. Sempronius had sent home a varnished account of the battle,

but the fatal truth soon betrayed itself. Two consular armies had been

defeated; Cisalpine Gaul was abandoned to the Carthaginians.

The senate, 217 B.C., made great preparations for the next campaign.

Sicily, Sardinia, and Tarentum were garrisoned against the Carthaginian

fleets; the new consuls were to keep Hannibal out of Roman Italy. The

patrician consul for the year was Cn. Servilius; C. Flaminius was the

plebeian. Flaminius, it will be remembered, had held this high office

in 223 B.C., and had won a great battle over the Insubrian Gauls, in

contempt of the orders of the senate. As censor, he still dwells in

memory for having made the Flaminian way, the great high road from

Rome through the Sabine country to Ariminum. He had won extraordinary

popularity by a sweeping agrarian law to divide the coast lands of Umbria

and Picenum among a number of poor citizens. This was the man elected by

popular favour to oppose Hannibal--brave and generous, but adventurous

and reckless. Fearing that the senate might even yet bar his consulship

by an appeal to the omens, he left the city before the ides of March,[51]

which was at that time the day for the consuls to enter upon office.

But no such attempt was made. Servilius was sent to Ariminum to guard

the Flaminian road; Flaminius himself took post at Arretium to watch the

passes of the Apennines.

As the spring approached, Hannibal was anxious to leave Cisalpine Gaul.

His friends the Insubrians and Boians, however much they wished to be

relieved from the Roman yoke, did not relish entertaining a large army.

They were proverbially fickle; and so much did Hannibal mistrust them,

that, to prevent attempts upon his life, he continually wore disguises,

and assumed false hair. Leaving the Roman colonies of Placentia and

Cremona unassailed, he passed the Apennines early in the year by an

unfrequented route, which brought him down into the neighbourhood of

Pistoria and Lucca. From this point eastward he had to march through the

Val d’Arno, which was at that time an unwholesome swamp. Here his men and

horses suffered much; he himself, being attacked by ophthalmia, lost the

sight of one eye, and was obliged to have recourse to the single elephant

which survived the cold of the Alps and a winter in the north of Italy.

In the neighbourhood of Fæsulæ he rested his army, now much increased

by Gallic recruits, and rewarded his men with the plunder of Etruria.

Flaminius now found that his dexterous enemy had stolen a march upon him,

and Hannibal, on his part, heard with delight the rash and adventurous

character of the new consul. Trusting to this, he led his army past

Arretium, where Flaminius lay encamped, and leaving Cortona on the left,

passed on towards Perusia along the northern side of Lake Trasimene. As

soon as Flaminius found that the Carthaginian had passed him in this

disdainful way, he immediately marched in pursuit.

As the traveller comes upon the northwestern corner of Lake Trasimene,

the road ascends a low ridge, now called Monte Gualandro. The broad lake

lies to his right and the road descends into a crescent-shaped plain,

skirted on the left by hills of some height, while between the road and

the lake the ground undulates considerably. After traversing this open

space the road passes the modern village of Passignano, and ascends a

hill. This was the ground Hannibal chose for awaiting Flaminius. He

placed his Balearians and light troops in ambush along the hills on

the left; he himself, with his infantry, lay in front somewhere near

Passignano, while his cavalry were ensconced in the uneven ground next

the lake, ready to close upon the rear of the Romans so soon as they

were fairly in the plain. While the Carthaginians were thus disposed,

Flaminius was encamping for the night on the Tuscan side of Monte

Gualandro. In the morning a thick mist hung over the lake and low lands,

so that, as the consul advanced, he could see nothing. Hannibal suffered

the Roman vanguard, consisting of six thousand men, to pass Passignano

before he gave the signal for attack. Hearing the cries of battle behind,

the vanguard halted anxiously on the hill which they were then ascending,

but could see nothing for the mist.

Meantime the consul, with the main army, was assailed on all sides.

Charged in front by the Spanish and African infantry, on his right and

rear by the Gauls and cavalry, exposed on his left flank to the ceaseless

fires of the slingers and javelin-men, Flaminius and his men did all that

brave men could. They fought valiantly and died fighting. Not less than

fifteen thousand Italians fell on that fatal field. Such was the scene

disclosed to the soldiers of the vanguard when the mist cleared off.

Hannibal now sent Maharbal to pursue this division, which surrendered

at discretion. Such of them as were Romans or Latins were all thrown

into chains; the Italian allies were dismissed without ransom. Thus did

Hannibal’s plan for the conquest of Rome begin to show itself; he had

no hope of subduing Rome and Italy with a handful of Spanish and African

veterans. These were to be the core of a great army, to be made up of

Italians, who (as he hoped) would join his victorious standard, as the

Gauls had already done. He had come, he said, “into Italy, not to fight

against the Italians, but to fight for the liberty of the Italians

against Rome.”

Such was the battle of Lake Trasimene. So hot was the conflict that the

combatants did not feel the shock of an earthquake, which overthrew many

cities of Italy.

Stragglers escaping from the slaughter carried the evil tidings to Rome,

and the prætor, unable to extenuate the loss, came into the Forum,

where the people were assembled, and ascending the rostra uttered the

brief but significant words: “We have been defeated in a great battle.”

Dreadful was the terror. The gates were thronged with mothers and

children, eagerly questioning the fugitives about the fate of their

sons, and fathers, and kinsfolk. Every hour Hannibal was expected. Three

days passed and he came not; but the news of a fresh disaster came. Cn.

Servilius, the other consul, as soon as he heard of Hannibal’s presence

in Etruria, resolved to join his colleague immediately, and sent on his

horse, four thousand strong, as an earnest of his own arrival. Hannibal,

informed of their approach, detached Maharbal with a division of cavalry

and some light-armed troops to intercept them, and half of the Romans

were cut in pieces.

Amid the terror which prevailed the senate alone maintained their

calmness. They sat, without adjournment, to receive intelligence and

deliberate on measures of safety. It was resolved (an extraordinary

measure) to call upon the people to elect a dictator, the person

recommended being Q. Fabius Maximus, a man of known discretion; M.

Minucius Rufus was also elected as his master of the horse. Fabius

consulted the Sibylline books, and advised the senate to decree a “sacred

spring,” according to the ancient custom of the Sabines. Then, collecting

the troops that had escaped, and filling up their ranks by a new levy,

he sent for the army of Servilius, and thus with four legions and their

auxiliary troops he prepared to take the field.

Meanwhile the movements of Hannibal had relieved the Romans of all

immediate fear. It seems that he had little hopes of the Etruscans, for

he straightway passed northwards by the Flaminian road into Picenum,

collecting plunder from all the Roman settlements as he went. Here he

lay quiet during the heat of summer. As the weather became cooler, he

advanced along the coast of the Adriatic into Apulia, still plundering

as he went. The soldiers revelled in the abundance of Italy: it is

said they bathed their horses in wine. But the colonies of Luceria and

Venusia, as of old, refused entrance to the invader, and Hannibal passed

the Apennines again into lower Samnium, where Beneventum, also a colony,

defied him like the rest.

By this time Fabius had taken the field. He had made up his mind not to

risk a battle. His plan of campaign was to move along the heights, so

as to keep Hannibal in view, cutting off his supplies, intercepting his

communications, and harassing him in all ways without a general action.

This was not for Hannibal’s interest. He wished to fight another great

battle and win another great victory (the things were synonymous with

him), in order that the Samnites and Italians lately conquered might rise

and join him. It was no doubt with the purpose of provoking Fabius to a

battle, or of showing the Italians that the Romans dared not fight him,

that Hannibal descended from Beneventum down the Vulturnus into the rich

Falernian plain.[52]

Here dwelt Roman citizens; this was the garden of Italy: would not the

dictator fight to defend them and their country from the spoiler? No:

Fabius persisted in his cautious policy. He closed all the passes leading

from the plain, where Hannibal’s soldiers were now luxuriating, and

waited patiently, thinking he had caught the invader in a trap. But the

wily Carthaginian eluded him by a simple stratagem. Collecting the oxen

of this favoured region, he ordered fagots to be tied to their horns

and lighted as soon as it was night; and thus the animals were driven,

tossing their heads with fright and waving the flames, up the pass which

leads from Teanum to Allifæ. The troops who guarded this pass fled

panic-stricken to the heights of Mount Callicula, and left free passage

for the Carthaginian army. When morning broke Hannibal was lying safely

encamped near Allifæ. Thence he pursued his devastating course through

the Pelignian and Frentanian lands, till he again reached Apulia, and

there fixed on a strong position near Geronium for his winter quarters.

The place was warm and sunny; corn and provisions were abundant.

[Illustration: A ROMAN GENERAL]

Fabius, however discomfited by Hannibal’s escape from Campania, persisted

in earning his name of “The lingerer”; and following Hannibal as before,

took post at Larinum, within five or six miles of the enemy’s camp.

He was now recalled to Rome, ostensibly to preside over certain sacred

offices, but really to give an account of his conduct. He found the

people much discontented. He had been in command of two consular armies

for several months, and had done worse than nothing; he had allowed the

lands of the Roman colonists in Apulia and Samnium, the lands of Roman

citizens in Campania, to be wasted and spoiled before his eyes.

These discontents were fomented by Minucius, the master of the horse,

who had been left in command at Larinum. Though charged by the dictator

not to risk an action, he pushed his camp forward within two miles of

Hannibal, gained some advantages in skirmishing with the Carthaginian

foraging parties, and sent home highly coloured despatches describing

his successes. Popular feeling rose to its height, and Terentius Varro

became its mouthpiece. This man was a petty merchant by trade, the

son of a butcher; but he had been prætor the year before, and was now

candidate for the consulship. His eloquence was great; and he forced the

senate to consent to a law which gave Minucius an equal command with the

dictator. Fabius quietly gave up half the army to his late subordinate,

and was soon repaid for his moderation. Hannibal discovered the rash

character of the new commander, and drew him out to battle. Minucius

would have been defeated as utterly as Flaminius at Lake Trasimene, had

not the watchful Fabius come up; upon which Hannibal drew off his men and

Minucius, acknowledging Fabius as his deliverer, craved his pardon and

resumed his post of master of the horse. The whole army returned to its

old quarters at Larinum.

[Sidenote: [217-216 B.C.]]

Thus ended the second campaign, not greatly to the satisfaction of either

party. Hannibal had hoped that ere this all southern Italy would have

risen like one man against Rome. He had shown himself her master in

the field; wherever her soldiers had dared to meet his, they had been

grievously defeated. He had shown all indulgence for Italian prisoners,

though he had put to the sword all Roman citizens. But not one city had

yet opened its gates to receive him. The Gauls of the north were the only

people who had joined him since he crossed the Alps. The Romans, indeed,

continued to suffer cruelly, and their ordinary revenues were grievously

curtailed. It was agreed that a great effort must be made in the ensuing

campaign; an overpowering force was to be brought against Hannibal; he

was to be crushed, if not by skill, by numbers.

When the day of electing the consuls came, out of six candidates C.

Terentius Varro alone obtained a sufficient number of votes in any tribe

to be returned. It is difficult to ascertain the true character of this

man. His vigorous eloquence had won the confidence of the people; but so

much is plain, that he was no general, and his election was esteemed a

public misfortune by the senate. Varro himself presided at the election

of his colleague, and the senate, anxious to provide an able general,

put forward L. Æmilius Paulus as a candidate. Paulus had shown his

ability in his former consulship, when he concluded the Illyrian War in

a single campaign. His manners were unpopular; but so earnestly did the

senate represent the necessity of the case, that he was returned without

opposition.

These were the consuls elected to fight Hannibal. Their four legions

were to be added to the four which Fabius commanded just before; and

these eight legions were raised to more than their usual complement, so

that the whole army to be commanded by the consuls must, with the allied

force, have amounted to at least eighty thousand foot and more than six

thousand horse.

In 216, the late consuls (Atilius had succeeded Flaminius), now serving

as proconsuls, moving from Larinum southwards towards Venusia, had

busied themselves with forming magazines at Canusium and Cannæ; and on

the plain near the latter place their camp was formed. Hannibal, as the

spring advanced, exhausted his supplies; and having by this time received

recruits from Cisalpine Gaul, he made a rapid movement and seized the

Roman magazine at Cannæ, encamping not far from that place, on the left

bank of the Aufidus. The proconsuls sent home word of this disaster, but

received strict orders to continue on the defensive till the consuls

arrived to take the command. Yet it was some time before this took place,

certainly not till near the end of July, for the great battle, which is

now to be described, was fought on the second of August,[53] and it was

fought soon after the arrival of the consuls.

The consuls immediately moved the army to the neighbourhood of Hannibal,

with the intention of offering battle. But when Paulus observed the open

plain, he was desirous to put off an engagement, and manœuvre so as to

draw the enemy into ground less favourable for the action of cavalry.

Varro, however, thought otherwise; and now appeared the evil of both

consuls being joined in command of the same army. It was a repetition

of the arrangement which had answered so ill in the last years with

Fabius and Minucius; with this additional evil, that the consuls, instead

of dividing the army between them, took the command of the whole on

alternate days. The consuls were, by the constitution, equal, and Varro

was far too confident of success to give way to his more experienced

colleague. Æmilius felt bitterly the truth of Fabius’ parting injunction:

“Remember that you will have to oppose not only Hannibal, but also Varro.”

On the first day of his sole command, Varro moved the whole army to the

right bank of the Aufidus, between Cannæ and the sea, so that only the

river separated the Roman camp from that of the Carthaginians. Next day

Æmilius fortified a smaller camp on the left side of the river, fronting

Hannibal, so as to secure the passage of the river, but resolutely

declined battle. On the third day, however, when morning broke, the red

standard, which was the Roman signal for battle, was seen flying from

Varro’s tent. The men rejoiced at this; they were weary of their long

inactivity; they were confident in their numbers, and the resolution of

their favourite Varro was highly applauded.

When Æmilius found that a battle must be fought on the plain of Cannæ,

he did his best to support his colleague. The whole army was drawn up

facing nearly south, with the right resting on the river Aufidus. The

Roman cavalry, only twenty-four hundred strong, were on this right flank;

the left was covered in like manner by the cavalry of the allies. Æmilius

commanded on the right, Varro on the left; the centre was under the

orders of Servilius and Atilius, the proconsuls. It must be especially

observed that the legionaries and allied infantry were not drawn up, as

usual, in an open line, but with the ranks made deep and closed up almost

like the phalanx. It has been above observed how serviceable the phalanx

was on plain ground; and probably the consuls imagined that by these

compact masses of infantry they might offer a more complete resistance to

the formidable cavalry of Hannibal.

But Hannibal skilfully availed himself of this close array, and formed

his line accordingly. He had crossed the river early, as soon as he saw

the Romans in motion. The Spanish and Gallic infantry, much inferior in

number to the Romans, he drew out in an extended line, equal in length to

that of the enemy, but much less deep and massive. This line advanced in

a convex form, and at each end he placed his Africans, so as to form two

flanking columns of narrow front but great depth. He himself, with his

brother Mago, commanded the infantry. On his left flank, next the river,

were the heavy cavalry of Spain and Gaul, commanded by an officer named

Hasdrubal, not the brother of the general. On the right were the Numidian

light horse, under the orders of Maharbal.

After some indecisive skirmishing between the light troops, the real

battle began with a conflict on the river side between the Roman cavalry

and the horse of Hasdrubal. The latter were greatly superior in force,

and charged with such effect as to drive the Roman horse across the river.

Meantime the Roman legions, and their allied infantry, advanced steadily

against Hannibal’s centre. The long crescent-shaped line above described

was unable to withstand the shock. Nor had the general expected it. On

the contrary, he had instructed the centre so to fall back as to form a

concave figure, and then the whole line retired slowly, so as to draw on

the Roman masses between the African flanking columns. The Romans pressed

eagerly on the retiring foe; but as they advanced, the Africans attacked

the Romans on both flanks. The latter, jammed together, and assailed on

both sides, fell into great disorder, very few of their vast army being

able to use their weapons. But the consul, Æmilius, who had been wounded

by a sling in an early part of the action, contrived to restore some sort

of order, and it seemed as if the battle was not lost; when Hasdrubal

fell upon the rear of the legions and the rout became complete.

This able officer, after destroying the Roman cavalry, had led his heavy

horse round to the other wing, where he found the Numidians engaged with

the allied cavalry. The latter fled in confusion; and Hasdrubal, leaving

Maharbal to pursue them, made that decisive charge upon the rear of the

legions which completed the defeat of the Roman army.

Then the battle became a mere massacre. The Romans and allies, mingled

in a disorderly mass, were cut down on all sides. The consul, Æmilius,

fell. Varro, with but seventy horsemen, escaped to Venusia. Other parties

of fugitives made good their retreat to Canusium; some thousands took

refuge in the camps. But on the bloody field that evening, there lay

dead, at the lowest computation, more than forty thousand Roman foot

and three thousand horse. The loss in the cavalry involved the death of

some of the wealthiest and most distinguished men at Rome. With them had

fallen one consul, two proconsuls, two quæstors, one-and-twenty out of

eight-and-forty tribunes, and not less than eighty senators. All who had

taken refuge in the camp surrendered at discretion next day. Hannibal’s

loss is variously stated at from six to eight thousand.

This, then, was the battle of Cannæ. History does not record any defeat

more complete, and very few more murderous. The great army levied to

conquer Hannibal had been annihilated. The feverish anxiety with which

all men at Rome followed the consuls in thought may be imagined; those

who stayed behind in horrible suspense, flocked to the temples, offered

vows, consulted the auguries, raked up omens and prophecies, left no

means untried to divine the issue of the coming battle. What must have

been the dismay, what the amazement, with which they received the first

uncertain tidings of defeat! What the despair, what the stupor, which the

dreadful reality produced!

Among the fugitives who came in with the tidings, was a tribune of

the legions, Cn. Lentulus by name. As he rode off the field he had

seen Æmilius the consul sitting on a stone, mortally wounded. He had

dismounted and offered him his horse. But the consul replied, “No, my

hours are numbered: go thou to Rome, seek out Q. Fabius, and bid him

prepare to defend the city; tell him that Æmilius dies, as he lived,

mindful of his precepts and example.” To Fabius, indeed, all eyes were

now turned. The senate instantly met; and at his motion each senator

was invested with the power of a magistrate; they were to prevent all

public lamentations; to hinder the people from meeting in the Forum,

lest they should pass resolutions in favour of peace; to keep the gates

well guarded, suffering no one to pass in or out without a special

order. Every one feared to see the army of Hannibal defiling through the

Apennines upon the plain of Latium.

What the Romans feared the Carthaginians desired. “Only send me on,” said

Maharbal to the general, “with the cavalry, and within five days thou

shalt sup in the Capitol.” But Hannibal thought otherwise. His army was

small; he was totally unprovided with materials for a siege; Rome was

strongly fortified. He felt that the mere appearance of his army before

the walls would rather rouse to action than terrify into submission; and

meanwhile the golden time for raising the Samnites and other nations

of Italy might be lost. Already he was in negotiation with the leading

men at Capua, a city second only to Rome in point of size, superior

in wealth. To this place he resolved to march as soon as his men were

rested. When their allies had deserted, Rome must agree to his terms,

without giving him the trouble of a siege.

He resolved, however, to try the temper of the Romans, and accordingly

sent ten of the chief men among his prisoners, with offers to hold all

whom he had taken to ransom. The senate, on the motion of T. Manlius

Torquatus, a man who had inherited the stern decision of his ancestor,

refused to admit the messengers to an audience, and ordered all to

return, as they had bound themselves, to Hannibal’s camp. Hannibal,

greatly provoked at this almost contemptuous reply to his advances,

sold the greater part of his prisoners into slavery. This was but the

common custom of the times. But besides this, he reserved the bravest and

noblest youths to fight as gladiators for the amusement of his army; and

on their refusal he put them to death by torture. The fact shows that in

moments of passion Hannibal was too justly liable to the accusation of

barbarous cruelty.

The senate were now busily occupied in taking all steps possible for

the safety of Rome. The public horror was increased by a discovery that

two vestal virgins had been guilty of unchastity. One was, as the law

directed, buried alive; the other put herself to death. To avert the

wrath of the gods, Fabius Pictor was sent to consult the Greek oracle at

Delphi; and by the orders of the Sibylline books, a Greek man and woman

and a Gallic man and woman were buried alive in the Forum, according

to the same horrid practice used in the last Gallic War. But to these

superstitious rites were added wiser precautions. Fabius, with the

coolness of age and experience, continued to direct their measures. M.

Claudius Marcellus, now prætor, was sent to take the command of the

fugitives in Apulia; for despatches had arrived from Varro, stating that

he had been joined by about four thousand men at Venusia, and that about

the same number had assembled at Canusium under Appius Claudius, young

P. Scipio (now about nineteen years of age), and other tribunes. It was

added that some of the young nobles at Canusium, headed by a Metellus,

had formed a plan to fly from Italy and offer their services to some

foreign prince, despairing of the republic; that young Scipio had gone

instantly to the lodgings of Metellus, and standing over him with a drawn

sword, had made him swear that neither would he desert the republic, nor

allow others to do so; that, to support the noble conduct of Scipio,

Varro had himself transferred his headquarters to Canusium, and was using

all his efforts to collect the remains of the defeated army.

Having given up his command to Marcellus, Varro set out for Rome. With

what feelings he approached the city may be imagined. But as he drew

near, the senate and people went out to meet him, and publicly thanked

him, “for that he had not despaired of the republic.” History presents no

nobler spectacle than this. Had he been a Carthaginian general, he would

have been crucified.

The dictator ordered levies in Rome and Latium. But the immense losses

sustained in the three past years had thinned the ranks of those who

were on the military list. From the action on the Ticinus to Cannæ, the

loss of the Romans and their allies, in battle alone, could not have

been less than eighty thousand men. The dictator, therefore, proposed to

buy eight thousand slaves to serve as light troops; and also to enrol

debtors, prisoners, and other persons by law incapable of serving in the

Roman legions. Marcellus, with the remains of the army of Cannæ, took

his post at Casilinum. All commanders were instructed to keep to the

defensive system of Fabius, and on no account to risk another battle.

Meanwhile Hannibal had advanced through Samnium to Capua, where he

found all prepared to receive him. The senate, being in the interest of

Rome, was dismissed, and the chief power committed to a popular leader,

named Pacuvius Calavius. His first act was to seize on Roman residents

and put them to death; he then made an agreement with Hannibal that no

Carthaginian officer should exercise authority in Capua; and demanded

that three hundred Roman prisoners should be put into his hands as

hostages for the safety of three hundred Capuan knights who were serving

in the Roman army in Sicily. Hannibal agreed to these demands, and

entered Capua in triumph. One man only, by name Decius Magius, ventured

to oppose these measures. Hannibal treated him with magnanimous clemency,

and contented himself with sending him off to Africa.

All southern Italy had by this time declared in Hannibal’s favour. Most

of the Apulians, the Hirpinian and Caudinian Samnites, the Surrentines,

most of the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and all the Greek cities of the

south which were not held by Roman garrisons, welcomed him as their

deliverer. It seemed as if he were now about to realise his great project

of raising Italy in insurrection against Rome.

He was obliged to send detachments of his army into these several

districts; and he employed what small force he still retained in

attempting to gain possession of the cities in the plains of Campania.

Nuceria, Acerræ, and others submitted, as Capua had done. But Neapolis

and Cumæ closed their gates; and the senate of Nola, fearing that the

people might rise against them, as at Capua, sent for Marcellus to

Casilinum. This bold officer threw himself into the city, and by a

successful sally repulsed Hannibal from the gates. He then seized and

executed seventy persons who were suspected of treason, and entrenched

himself strongly in a fixed camp near the city. Hannibal, thus repulsed

from Nola, determined to invest Casilinum, which from its proximity to

Capua was likely to prove a troublesome neighbour.[54] The garrison held

out obstinately, but were at length obliged to yield. This was almost the

only town in Italy which Hannibal took by a regular siege.

Hannibal now went into winter quarters at Capua, in expectation of

receiving succours from home. Soon after the battle he had sent off his

brother Mago to carry home the tidings of his great success. For three

years he had pursued a career of victory unassisted by the government;

Rome was at his feet; he only wanted force enough to crush her. In proof

of the greatness of the victory of Cannæ, Mago poured out on the floor

of the senate-house a bushel of gold rings, which had been worn by Roman

knights who had fallen on that fatal field. But the jealous government,

headed by a Hanno, the mortal enemy of the Barcine family, listened

coldly to Mago’s words; they asked “whether one Roman or Latin citizen

had joined Hannibal? He wanted men and money; what more could he want,

had he lost the battle instead of winning it?” At length, however, it

was agreed that Mago should carry reinforcements to Hannibal. But the

war in Spain assumed so threatening an aspect, that these succours were

diverted to this nearer danger, and Mago was ordered to the support of

his brother Hasdrubal in that country. All that reached Hannibal was a

paltry force of four thousand Numidian horse, with about forty elephants,

and a stinted supply of money.

[Sidenote: [216-215 B.C.]]

Perhaps the general had not expected much from this quarter. No doubt the

person to whom he looked for chief support was his brother Hasdrubal in

Spain. But here he was doomed to disappointment. It will be remembered

that P. Scipio, the consul of the year 218, when he returned from

Marseilles to Pisa, had sent on his brother Cneius into Spain, according

to the original orders of the senate. The wisdom of this step was proved

by the event. Cn. Scipio landed at Emporiæ (Ampurias), an old Greek

colony. Within the year he had driven Hanno across the Ebro. In the next

year, the year of Trasimene, he defeated Hasdrubal by sea, ravaged the

coast up to the suburbs of New Carthage, and made large booty in one of

the Balearic Isles. P. Scipio joined his brother towards the close of the

same year; and when the battle of Cannæ made Hannibal master of southern

Italy, the two brothers had subdued all northern Spain.

Hannibal’s hopes, therefore, of reinforcements for the next campaign

rested with his new Italian allies. The additional cavalry and elephants

from Carthage would still give him the command of the open country. But

the Romans had learned wisdom by sore experience, and Hannibal could

not expect to win great victories, such as had marked his first three

campaigns. What he wanted was a good engineer corps and siege apparatus,

to take the Latin colonies and other free towns, which even in the

districts that had joined him still maintained the cause of Rome. Why he

did not employ his winter at Capua in organising a force of this nature

we know not. But, whatever was the cause, he was never able to take towns

by force; and the Romans never gave him an opportunity of winning another

great battle. Consequently all the Latin colonies and free towns remained

faithful to Rome, and Hannibal was only half master even of southern

Italy.

The Romans, for their part, passed the winter[55] in the most active

preparations. The first step necessary was to fill up the numerous

vacancies caused in the senate by the late disastrous battles. It

appeared, on calling over the list, that not fewer than 177 members

were missing. Sp. Carvilius proposed to recruit the ranks of the senate

by admitting the chief citizens of the Latin towns. But this liberal

proposal was not listened to, and it was resolved to commit the whole

business to the care of a dictator, specially appointed for the purpose.

The person chosen was M. Fabius Buteo, the same who had been sent as

chief ambassador to Carthage in the year 219 B.C. He was an old man,

universally respected, and the way he discharged the duty laid upon

him gave great satisfaction. The bravest and the worthiest men were

named as the new members. The consuls elected for the ensuing year were

Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, and L. Postumius, now prætor commanding in

Cisalpine Gaul. But before the ides of March came the sad intelligence

that Postumius, with all his army, had been cut off by the Gauls. Fabius

Maximus himself was elected consul for the third time, to supply his

place. Marcellus and Varro were to remain in command as proconsuls.

To add to the difficulties of the Romans, means were scanty to support

the vast expenses of the war; for the revenues of the whole of southern

Italy were cut off.

It must have been a further discouragement to find that Hannibal had

entered into negotiations with Philip, king of Macedon. The messengers of

the king were taken on their way to Capua. For the present, therefore,

the danger to be expected from this quarter was averted; but for the

future the prospect was made more gloomy.

Few things, probably, could mark the public feeling more than a law which

was passed in the next year at the instance of the tribune, Oppius, by

which it was forbidden that any woman should wear a gay-coloured dress,

or have more than half an ounce of gold to ornament her person, and that

none should approach within a mile of any city or town in a car drawn by

horses. Public need must be very urgent before it is possible to restrain

private expense by enactments so rigid as those of the Oppian law.

SECOND PUNIC WAR: SECOND PERIOD (215-211 B.C.)

[Sidenote: [215 B.C.]]

The first period of this great war closed with the revolt of Capua. That

which now claims our attention ends with the recovery of that important

city by the Romans.

After the battle of Cannæ, Q. Fabius Maximus, great-grandson of that Q.

Fabius who won so high a name in the Second Samnite War, became for some

years the virtual chief of senate and people. He was already an old man;

more than seventy summers had passed over his head. His disposition was

so mild or so apathetic that he was known by the popular name of Ovicula,

or the lamb. His abilities seem not to have been great. His merit was

that he had the hardihood to avow that the Roman militia were no match

for Hannibal’s veterans, and the courage to act on his belief. The

cautious system which he had practised after the battle of Lake Trasimene

had excited discontent; but the great defeat of Cannæ had most unhappily

vindicated it. For some years it was rigorously carried out by commanders

more skilful in war than Fabius himself.

Of these coadjutors the ablest was unquestionably M. Claudius Marcellus,

who was called the Sword of Rome, as Fabius was called the Shield. He

also was past the middle age, being at this time more than fifty. In his

first consulship he had distinguished himself by a brilliant victory over

the Insubrian Gauls; and his name now stood very high, for having given

the first check to Hannibal in his career of victory. Marcellus was a

true Roman soldier--prompt and bold in action, resolute in adversity,

stern and unyielding in disposition, blunt and illiterate, yet not

without touches of finer feeling, as was proved at the siege of Syracuse.

With him must be mentioned Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, a man of humane and

kindly temper, and possessing high talents for command. Had he not been

cut off so early, he might have rivalled the fame of Marcellus.

Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who, like Marcellus, had already been twice consul,

disdained not for the two following years to act as prætor of the city.

He enjoyed the confidence of Fabius and the senate, and this office gave

him, in the continued absence of the consuls, the whole management of the

home government. He was not less than sixty years of age, discreet and

cautious as Fabius himself, but more active, energetic, and relentless.

To carry out the defensive system of war now adopted, the two consuls and

a proconsul were stationed in Campania, each with two legions and their

auxiliary cohorts. In the present year Fabius took post on the Latin

road, between Cales and Casilinum; Gracchus occupied the entrenched camp,

which had been formed by Marcellus near Sinuessa; and Marcellus himself

occupied a similar camp near Nola. Thus these commanders were always

ready to harass Capua, and were also able to make forays into Samnium,

Apulia, and Lucania whenever Hannibal was absent. Their connection with

the sea was maintained by the great seaports of Naples and Cumæ.

Hannibal, on the other hand, formed a strong camp on the ridge of Mount

Tifata above Capua. But he was often obliged to move his forces into the

south, leaving the Capuans to defend themselves. We have no means of

estimating the amount of Hannibal’s army, but it may be inferred that it

was small; we never find him able to act in force both in Campania and in

the south.

[Illustration: A ROMAN GENERAL

(Based on De Montfaucon)]

He soon came in collision with the consul Gracchus. This general was in

his camp at Sinuessa, busily employed in training two legions of slaves,

who, by the name of volones or volunteers, served under his command. Here

he received information from the people of Cumæ that the Capuans were

coming to hold a festival near their city, and he was enabled to fall

upon the Capuans by night, and slaughter a great number. The news soon

reached Hannibal, who descended from his camp, only to find Gracchus safe

behind the walls of Cumæ.

While Gracchus was thus engaged at Cumæ, Fabius had occupied his camp at

Sinuessa, and Marcellus was making forays in the Samnite country. The

sufferers sent earnest appeals for defence to Hannibal, who now appeared

a second time before the walls of Nola, being induced by some of the

popular party, which in all the cities was hostile to Rome, to hope that

the place might be betrayed. But Marcellus made a well-timed sally, in

which he cut off a large body of the Carthaginian army; and Hannibal,

again retiring in disappointment, went into winter quarters at Arpi in

Apulia.

[Sidenote: [214-212 B.C.]]

Returning spring (214 B.C.) found Hannibal again in his camp on Tifata,

and the same Roman commanders opposed to him. Fabius was still consul,

with Marcellus for his colleague; while Gracchus had taken the place

of the latter as proconsul. The circumstance of the election of these

consuls deserves noting, because it shows that the people had completely

surrendered their right of free choice into the hands of Fabius. The old

consul purposely halted in the Campus Martius, and held the election

without having entered the city, by which means he retained his imperium.

The prerogative century, which happened to be the juniors of the Aniene

tribe, gave their vote for M. Æmilius Regillus and T. Otacilius Crassus.

Otacilius was a nephew of Fabius, and had served as prætor in command of

the fleet during the current year, but without much credit. Upon this

vote being given, the old consul stopped the proceedings. “The republic,”

he said, “was struggling for existence; she was maintaining nearly twenty

legions; and that with revenues diminished and citizens thinned: what

was the use of all her exertions if she committed her armies to untried

men? Therefore,” he concluded, “go, lictor, call back the juniors of the

Aniene tribe to give their vote anew.” All men felt that the old man had

not only power, but reason on his side. The same century, which had voted

for other men, now gave their voices for Fabius himself and Marcellus.

At the same time the senate gave an earnest of their stern determination

by passing a decree that the soldiers of Cannæ should be sent to serve in

Sicily, without hope of honour and glory, till the end of the war. And

the censors, in the course of this year, summoned before them Metellus

and the others who had wished to desert the republic after the defeat of

Cannæ, and deprived them of their civic rights.

Early in this campaign, Hannibal was enticed from Campania by a

message sent from certain friends whom he had made within the walls of

Tarentum, and left Hanno to cover Samnium and Campania. Hanno seems

to have had hopes of surprising the Roman colony of Beneventum. But

the proconsul Gracchus threw himself into the town; “And now,” he told

his slave-soldiers, “now the time was come when they might win their

liberty. Every one who brought in an enemy’s head should be made free.”

In the battle which followed, victory was long undetermined; till

Gracchus proclaimed that without victory none should be enfranchised,

but if they conquered, none should remain a slave. Thus the desperate

conflict was determined in favour of the Romans, and Hanno, after great

loss, made good his retreat back into the Bruttian territory. Then

Gracchus fulfilled the promise made to his volones, and celebrated their

enfranchisement by a public festival, in which they all appeared wearing

white caps in token of liberty. So pleased was their commander with the

scene, that he had a picture painted to commemorate it on the walls of

the temple of Liberty on the Aventine Hill.

Hannibal, therefore, had the mortification to hear of this reverse,

without the satisfaction of succeeding in his own expedition. For M.

Valerius Lævinus, the Roman prætor stationed at Brundusium, being

informed of the plot to betray Tarentum, threw a strong garrison into

the place under the command of M. Livius, and the conspirators could not

fulfil their promises.

The next year (213 B.C.) was still less fruitful in decisive events

than the two foregoing. That is, it was favourable to the Romans; for

to Hannibal’s cause inaction was fatal. And there are not wanting

indications to show that the Italians who had joined him began even

now to falter in their resolution, and to look with fearful eyes on

the little progress he had made since the battle of Cannæ, and on the

tenacity with which the Romans kept hold of every city. Arpi in Apulia,

Hannibal’s late winter quarters, was betrayed to Fabius the Younger,

who was now consul, assisted by his father as legate. The three hundred

Capuan knights, who were in the service of Rome at the time when their

city threw itself into Hannibal’s arms, had shown their disapprobation

of this step by enrolling themselves as citizens of Rome; and about this

time one hundred and twelve more of the same order came in to the Roman

camp at Suessula. But out of Italy, Hannibal’s skilful negotiations had

raised up enemies to Rome wherever his envoys could find an opening--in

Macedonia, in Sardinia, in Sicily.

It has been mentioned that the first letters of Philip of Macedon to

Hannibal had been intercepted by the Romans; and through fear of an

attack from this quarter they had stationed Lævinus with a fleet at

Brundusium. A second embassy was more successful, and an alliance was

concluded by Hannibal with the king, by which the latter bound himself

to send an auxiliary force to support the Carthaginians in Italy. But

Lævinus and his successors carried the war into Epirus, and Philip was

unable to send the promised succours.

In Sardinia an insurrection broke out in the year after Cannæ. Q.

Fulvius, the city prætor, was ordered to provide for its suppression,

with leave to appoint any commander whom he thought fit. He straightway

made choice of T. Manlius Torquatus, a man as stern and uncompromising as

himself, who in his consulship twenty years before had first conquered

the island. The old general landed with little delay, and in one decisive

battle completely restored Sardinia to subjection.

Affairs in Sicily gave much more trouble. Indeed in the years 211 and

212 this island became the chief seat of the war. Hiero, the old king of

Syracuse, who for fifty years had never faltered in his alliance with

Rome, died soon after the fatal day of Cannæ. He was succeeded by his

grandson Hieronymus, a youth of fifteen years of age, whose imagination

was captivated by the brilliant career of Hannibal. The able Carthaginian

soon availed himself of the opportunity which thus presented itself

to send over agents, into whose hands the young prince completely

surrendered himself. These were two brothers named Hippocrates and

Epicydes, Syracusan Greeks by descent, but natives of Carthage. The young

king, however, after little more than a year’s reign, was assassinated by

a gang of obscure conspirators; a republic was proclaimed at Syracuse;

and shortly after, all the remaining members of the royal family were

massacred with circumstances of singular atrocity. The question now

was whether the new government should side with Rome or Carthage. The

brothers, Hippocrates and Epicydes, at first resolved to return to

Hannibal; but they changed their plan, and pretending to fall in with

the views of the conspirators, were elected generals-in-chief with

several others. Yet the popular feeling seems to have inclined towards

Rome, and Hippocrates, unable to control it, contrived to leave Syracuse

with a body of troops, and repaired to Leontini, where he was joined by

his brother Epicydes. They then threw off the mask, and the Leontines

declared themselves independent of Syracuse.

This was probably late in the year 214 B.C. And about that time the

consul Marcellus arrived to take the command of the army in Sicily.

Marcellus, without delay, laid siege to Leontini, and took the town

by assault. He did what he could to spare the inhabitants; but he was

guilty of a piece of most imprudent severity in scourging and putting to

death as deserters two thousand of the garrison, who had once been in

the service of Rome. It appears that there were many soldiers of like

condition now in the Syracusan army. When they heard of the cruel death

of their comrades at Leontini, they lent a ready ear to the persuasion of

Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had escaped from Leontini, and turned the

severity of Marcellus to good account. These two adventurers were elected

sole generals, and Syracuse closed her gates against Rome. Marcellus made

some fruitless attempts at negotiation and finally commenced the siege of

Syracuse.

The city of Syracuse had been greatly enlarged since the Athenian

expedition. The island of Ortygia had become the citadel, and the suburb

along the seacoast, called Achradina, was now part of the town. The

rugged triangular surface called Epipolæ was well fortified, and its

northern approaches, especially, were strongly defended by a fort called

Hexapylum.

Marcellus at first attempted to take the city by assault. He himself

attacked the sea wall of Achradina, while his officers attempted to

force Hexapylum. The Romans were always famous for their skill in the

attack and defence of fortifications, and Marcellus was well provided

with engines of all kinds. But within the walls was an engineer more

skilful than any the Romans possessed. Archimedes, the most celebrated

mathematician of ancient times, was now seventy-five years old, but age

had not quenched the inventive vigour of his mind. He was so devoted to

abstruse calculations that sometimes he forgot even to take his meals;

yet speculation had not unfitted him for practical pursuits. Marvellous

are the stories told of the engines which he invented to thwart the

assaults of the Romans, both by sea and land. The whole wall was armed

with ballists and catapults of immense power, so that the ships dared

not come within shot. If they ventured to get close under the walls,

favoured by the darkness of night, they were galled by a fire from

myriads of loopholes, and nearly crushed by enormous stones let drop from

the battlements; or one end of the ship was grasped by an “iron hand”

let down from a projecting crane, which suddenly lifted it up, and as

suddenly let it go, so that first one end and then the other was plunged

in the water. It is said also that burning-glasses of great power were

so placed as to set on fire ships which approached within their reach.

This is probably a fiction. But this much is certain, that Marcellus was

compelled to desist from his assault, and began to blockade it by regular

lines of circumvallation. After many months the Romans were as far from

taking Syracuse as ever.

Meantime, the Roman cause was daily losing ground in Sicily. Even

Morgantium, the headquarters of the fleet, surrendered to Carthage;

and Enna, a strong fortress, was only saved by the prompt cruelty of

the commandant, who massacred the whole of its inhabitants. But this

barbarous act, though efficacious on the spot, served still more to

alienate the Sicilians from Rome. Agrigentum surrendered, and numerous

other towns threw off the yoke.

[Sidenote: [212 B.C.]]

But there was treason within the walls of Syracuse. Marcellus at length

succeeded in scaling the walls of Hexapylum by night, when by reason of

a festival they were left unguarded. He soon gained possession of the

whole upper city; and as he gazed from the heights of Epipolæ on the fair

view beneath him, even his rude nature was so affected by the beauty of

the scene and the greatness of his success, that he burst into a flood

of tears. The southern quarters of the town surrendered; but Epicydes,

within Achradina, prepared for a desperate defence; and Hippocrates,

who had gone to obtain succours from Carthage, soon returned with a

considerable force. But Marcellus lay safe within the upper city, and

the army of Hippocrates, encamped on the marshy ground at the mouth of

the Anapus, was thinned by disease as the hot weather came on: among

the dead was Hippocrates himself. Still the sea was open, and a fleet

was daily expected from Carthage. At length it came in view; but the

Roman squadron put out to meet it, and great was the disappointment of

Epicydes, when he saw the Carthaginians bear away towards Italy. He left

the city secretly and fled to Agrigentum.

Many of the garrison were deserters from the Romans, who could expect

little mercy from the severe Marcellus. But the rest, when they found

themselves deserted by their general, slew their officers, and admitted

Marcellus by night within the walls of Achradina. Next morning, the city

was given up to plunder; and in the massacre which followed, Archimedes

was slain by a soldier, whose question he did not answer, being absorbed

in a geometrical problem. For the honour of Marcellus, it should be

recorded that he was deeply grieved by this mischance, that he gave

honourable burial to the corpse of the philosopher, and showed great

kindness to his relations. The royal treasure was reserved for the state;

and the exquisite works of the Grecian chisel which adorned the splendid

city were sent to Rome--a beginning of that system of plunder which

enriched Rome at the expense of Greece.

[Illustration: DEATH OF ARCHIMEDES

(After Mirys)]

Thus fell Syracuse, in the summer of 212 B.C., after a siege of nearly

two years. But though Syracuse was taken, Sicily was not conquered. It

will be well to anticipate events a little, so as to finish our narrative

of this war in this place.

[Sidenote: [212-210 B.C.]]

Epicydes, who had escaped to Agrigentum, continued his ceaseless

activity, and persuaded the Carthaginian government to send out another

large force to his aid. Hannibal also sent over an officer named Mutin or

Mutton, who henceforth became the soul of the war in Sicily. This man was

a half-bred Carthaginian; and the African blood in his veins degraded

him as much in the eyes of pure Carthaginians, as the taint of black

blood degrades a man in the United States. But his abilities as a soldier

made Hannibal overlook vain distinctions, and Mutin took the command of

the Numidian horse in the army of Hanno and Epicydes. With such skill

did he use this formidable cavalry, that Marcellus rather lost ground

than gained it. But the Carthaginian officers, jealous of the upstart

commander, took occasion to give battle to the Romans during his absence.

Marcellus accepted the challenge, and gained a signal victory (211 B.C.).

In the next year (210 B.C.) Valerius Lævinus took the command in Sicily,

where Mutin still continued to defy the Romans. But the jealousy of the

Carthaginians so provoked the hot-blooded African, that he put himself

at the head of his faithful Numidians, and threw open the gates of

Agrigentum to the Roman consul. Epicydes escaped to Carthage, leaving

the army an easy prey to the Roman legions. The town was sacked and

plundered, and the inhabitants reduced to slavery. And in a short time

Lævinus was able to send despatches to the senate, reporting the entire

submission of all Sicily. Mutin was made a Roman citizen, and received

five hundred jugera of state land. His Numidian horse took service with

Rome.

It is now time to return to Italy, where also the war had resumed a more

active form. Early in 212 B.C. Hannibal once more marched southward to

Tarentum, and this time with better success than before. He encamped

at a distance of about three miles, and was constantly visited by two

young Greeks, who left the city under pretence of hunting. It was by the

landward side that the conspirators proposed to admit Hannibal; and the

time they chose was a night on which it was well known that M. Livius,

the commandant, would be engaged in a drinking bout. The Romans went to

bed in drunken security, and at daybreak found the city in the hands of

the Carthaginians. A great part of the garrison were put to the sword,

but Livius made good his escape to the citadel. Hannibal immediately took

measures for besieging it; and the Tarentines, having dragged their ships

overland from the harbour into the open sea, blockaded it both by sea and

land.

Meanwhile the consuls--Appius Claudius and old Q. Fulvius Flaccus--were

preparing to besiege Capua. Gracchus, with his volones, was stationed in

Lucania; one prætor, Claudius Nero, occupied the old camp at Suessula;

another, Cn. Fulvius, brother of the consul, lay in Apulia. The Capuans,

fearing they should be cut off from all supplies, sent a hasty message

to Hannibal at Tarentum: and he straightway sent orders to provision

the town, in case it should be besieged. Hanno executed his difficult

task with success; but near Beneventum, the consuls fell upon him, and

captured the supplies. He was obliged to retire into Bruttium, and leave

Capua to its fate.

The Roman armies now began to close round that devoted city. But they

were destined to suffer heavy losses before they were able to invest it.

First, Gracchus, who was coming northwards from Lucania, to reinforce the

consuls, was slain in an ambuscade, and his volones, so long faithful to

their favourite leader, dispersed and fled, each man to his own home.

Next, Hannibal himself once more appeared in Campania. He had already

sent Mago with a division of cavalry to encourage the Capuans; and now

he entered the city in person without the knowledge of the consuls. He

was in high spirits at his successes in the south. Not only Tarentum,

but also Metapontum and Thurii, had joined him; and though Syracuse had

fallen, the war was raging fiercely in Sicily. But the Roman commanders

were cautious; and Hannibal, finding he could not bring on a battle, was

anxious to return to press the siege of the citadel of Tarentum. He went

by way of Lucania, and on his route met a Roman army, commanded by M.

Centenius, an old centurion, who had collected an army, and with equal

courage and folly attempted to bar Hannibal’s march. He fell as a valiant

soldier should fall; and many thousand brave men paid the penalty of

trusting to his promises. Hannibal now passed the mountains into Apulia;

and here, near Herdonea, he surprised the prætor, Cn. Fulvius. He was

like Centenius in rashness, but unlike him in being a profligate and a

coward. In this action also many thousand Romans were cut to pieces.

But notwithstanding these thick-coming losses, the consuls held to their

resolution of blockading Capua. No sooner was Hannibal’s back turned

than they again appeared before the city; and before the expiration of

the year the lines of circumvallation were completed. The armies of

Rome always contained good workmen; their common agricultural habits

accustomed them to the use of the spade; the great works that had for

some time been going on, roads and aqueducts, had trained a number of

men for military work. Yet the rapidity with which the vast extent of

lines necessary to enclose a great city like Capua was completed, cannot

but surprise us. These lines were secured by a double wall, and care was

taken to supply the besiegers with provisions.

The consuls for the next year (211 B.C.) were not allowed to supersede

Appius and Fulvius: to them was left the glory of completing well what

they had well begun.

When the Capuans found themselves blockaded, their spirits fell, and

they again sent an urgent message to Hannibal. In an assault upon the

Roman lines, he was beaten off with loss. And now only one hope remained.

It was possible that, if he threatened Rome itself, the besieging army

might be recalled to defend the capital. Accordingly, he sent the Capuans

notice of his purpose by means of a pretended deserter, and the next

morning the proconsuls saw his camp on Mount Tifata empty. They thought,

probably, that he had returned to the south. But they soon discovered

the truth from country people, who came in full of horror to tell that

Hannibal’s wild Numidians and monstrous elephants were in full route

for Rome. Fulvius sent word to the senate of this fearful visitation;

and the opinion of Fabius was unanimously adopted, that one of the

proconsuls should be recalled to defend the city with part of his army

and the city legions, while the other was left to maintain the blockade

of Capua. Accordingly, Fulvius marched straight to Rome by the Appian

road, while Hannibal took a circuitous route by the north, to avoid

the thick-studded cities which might have barred his passage. Fulvius,

therefore, arrived at Rome before Hannibal, and encamped within a mile or

two of the city. The consternation at Rome was in some measure quelled

by the arrival of Fulvius; and still more, when Hannibal himself, after

riding up to the Colline gate, and then skirting the walls, was attacked

by the old proconsul, and obliged to fall back upon his camp. It is said

that, while he lay there, the land occupied by his camp was put up to

sale and bought at a price not at all below its value. Hannibal laughed,

and bade an auctioneer put up the silversmiths’ shops in the Forum for

sale. But though he put a bold face upon the matter, he felt in his heart

that he had failed. Rome was able to defend herself, and yet had left a

sufficient force at Capua to continue the blockade.

The line of his retreat is as uncertain as that of his advance. It is

known, however, that he conducted his army through Apulia into Bruttium,

which became thenceforth his headquarters in Italy.

Meanwhile, Fulvius had returned to the lines round Capua, full of

exultation. Time wore on, and famine began to oppress the wretched

inhabitants. How long the desperate resistance was prolonged we know not.

But at length it appeared manifest that surrender must ensue within a

few hours; upon which Vibius Virrius, one of the insurgent chiefs, gave

a splendid banquet to all senators who would partake of it. Twenty-seven

came, and when the feast was over, a poisoned cup went round, in which

the guests pledged their host. They went home to die; and next morning

the city was surrendered. The savage old Fulvius determined to wreak a

bloody vengeance upon the leaders of the insurgents. Five-and-twenty were

sent to Cales, to Teanum eight-and-twenty, there to await their doom. In

vain Appius pleaded for milder measures. Fulvius heeded no intercession.

On the morning after the capture, he rode in person to Teanum, and saw

all the prisoners beheaded. He then galloped off to Cales; but when the

prisoners there were being bound, a messenger from Rome brought him

letters from the senate. He put them into his bosom, and ordered the

executions to proceed; nor till all the heads had fallen, did he open the

letters, which contained orders to reserve the prisoners for the judgment

of the senate. Others of the chief men were imprisoned, and all the

commoner sort were sold into slavery. The city itself was confiscated to

Rome.

The fall of Syracuse and Capua had given a decided superiority to the

Roman arms. Yet, though Hannibal was at present so weak that he could

not leave the south, nor give effectual succour to his Campanian allies,

there were many causes to give him hopes of retrieving his fortunes.

The diversions made by Mutin in Sicily had proved most successful, and

it was not till a year later that the cause of Carthage in that island

was betrayed. Though the citadel of Tarentum still held out, that great

city itself, with all Magna Græcia, except Rhegium, had joined Hannibal:

and he lived in hope that at length Philip of Macedon would come over to

oppose the common enemy.

Now also he looked with confidence to Spain. For a long time the

successes of the Scipios had cut off all hope of succour from his brother

Hasdrubal. The successes continued, notwithstanding the arrival of

Mago with reinforcements from Carthage; many of the Celtiberian tribes

enlisted under their banners, eager to try a change of masters; Syphax,

a prince of the Numidians, formed an alliance with them, and they seemed

thus early to have formed the design of carrying the war into Africa.

In the year 212 B.C., the same which witnessed the fall of Syracuse and

the investment of Capua, the two brothers entertained high hopes of a

successful campaign. Cn. Scipio marched against Hasdrubal, the brother of

Hannibal; Publius directed his course against a second Carthaginian army,

under Mago. But the Celtiberians in the army of Cneius deserted: and

the Roman proconsul was in full retreat, when he heard that his brother

Publius had been surprised and slain with a great portion of his army.

The united Carthaginian armies now threw themselves on the retreating

army of Cn. Scipio. He fell fighting bravely, with most of his officers.

The remains of the Roman armies were collected by a brave knight, by name

L. Marcius. But for the time the defeat and death of the two Scipios

gave back to the Carthaginians all that they had lost in Spain since the

departure of Hannibal.

The road now lay open for Hasdrubal to lead a large force to the

assistance of his brother in Italy. Notwithstanding his losses, no Roman

general had dared to meet him in a fair field of battle since Cannæ. What

might he not hope when largely reinforced? It belongs to the history of

the next period to show how irremediably these hopes were blighted.[c]

FOOTNOTES

[51] From the year 223 to 153 B.C., the consuls entered office on the

ides of March; after the latter date, on the calends of January.

[52] This is the statement of Polybius.[d] The story in Livy,[c] that

Hannibal told the guides to lead him to Casinum, and that they by a

mistake took him to Casilinum in Campania, is not noticed by the graver

historian.

[53] It is probable, however, that the Roman Calendar was in error, and

that the battle was really fought earlier in the year.

[54] Casilinum is the modern Capua. It lies on the river. The site of the

ancient Capua is about two miles eastward, on an eminence.

[55] [“During this winter, at Rome, and in its vicinity, many prodigies

either happened, or, as is not unusual when people’s minds have once

taken a turn towards superstition, many were reported and credulously

admitted. Among others, it was said, that an infant of a reputable

family, and only six months old, had, in the herb-market, called out,

‘Io Triumphe’; that, in the cattle-market, an ox had, of his own accord,

mounted up to the third story of an house, whence, being affrighted by

the noise and bustle of the inhabitants, he threw himself down; that a

light had appeared in the sky in the form of ships; that the temple of

Hope, in the herb-market, was struck by lightning; that, at Lanuvium the

spear of Juno had shaken of itself; and that a crow had flown into the

temple of Juno and pitched on the very couch; that, in the district of

Amiternum, in many places, apparitions of men in white garments had been

seen at a distance, but had not come close to anybody; that in Picenum,

a shower of stones had fallen; at Cære, the divining tickets were

diminished in size; in Gaul, a wolf snatched the sword of a soldier on

guard out of the scabbard, and ran away with it.”--Livy.[e]]

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