a wider reference of the representation of the Object (as well as of
the subject), whereon we base an extension of judgements of this kind
as necessary for every one. At the basis of this there must necessarily
be a concept somewhere; though a concept which cannot be determined
through intuition. But through a concept of this sort we know nothing,
and consequently it can _supply no proof_ for the judgement of taste.
Such a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible
which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it), regarded
as an Object of sense and thus as phenomenon.[100] For if we do
not admit such a reference, the claim of the judgement of taste to
universal validity would not hold good. If the concept on which it is
based were only a mere confused concept of the Understanding, like that
of perfection, with which we could bring the sensible intuition of the
Beautiful into correspondence, it would be at least possible in itself
to base the judgement of taste on proofs; which contradicts the thesis.
But all contradiction disappears if I say: the judgement of taste is
based on a concept (viz. the concept of the general ground of the
subjective purposiveness of nature for the Judgement); from which,
however, nothing can be known and proved in respect of the Object,
because it is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet
at the same time and on that very account the judgement has validity
for every one (though of course for each only as a singular judgement
immediately accompanying his intuition); because its determining ground
lies perhaps in the concept of that which may be regarded as the
supersensible substrate of humanity.
The solution of an antinomy only depends on the possibility of showing
that two apparently contradictory propositions do not contradict
one another in fact, but that they may be consistent; although the
explanation of the possibility of their concept may transcend our
cognitive faculties. That this illusion is natural and unavoidable
by human Reason, and also why it is so, and remains so, although it
ceases to deceive after the analysis of the apparent contradiction, may
be thus explained.
In the two contradictory judgements we take the concept, on which the
universal validity of a judgement must be based, in the same sense; and
yet we apply to it two opposite predicates. In the Thesis we mean that
the judgement of taste is not based upon _determinate_ concepts; and
in the Antithesis that the judgement of taste is based upon a concept,
but an _indeterminate_ one (viz. of the supersensible substrate of
phenomena). Between these two there is no contradiction.
We can do nothing more than remove this conflict between the claims and
counter-claims of taste. It is absolutely impossible to give a definite
objective principle of taste, in accordance with which its judgements
could be derived, examined, and established; for then the judgement
would not be one of taste at all. The subjective principle, viz. the
indefinite Idea of the supersensible in us, can only be put forward as
the sole key to the puzzle of this faculty whose sources are hidden
from us: it can be made no further intelligible.
The proper concept of taste, that is of a merely reflective aesthetical
Judgement, lies at the basis of the antinomy here exhibited and
adjusted. Thus the two apparently contradictory principles are
reconciled--_both can be true_; which is sufficient. If, on the other
hand, we assume, as some do, _pleasantness_ as the determining ground
of taste (on account of the singularity of the representation which
lies at the basis of the judgement of taste), or, as others will
have it, the principle of perfection (on account of the universality
of the same), and settle the definition of taste accordingly; then
there arises an antinomy which it is absolutely impossible to adjust
except by showing that _both_ the contrary (though not contradictory)
_propositions are false_. And this would prove that the concept on
which they are based is self-contradictory. Hence we see that the
removal of the antinomy of the aesthetical Judgement takes a course
similar to that pursued by the Critique in the solution of the
antinomies of pure theoretical Reason. And thus here, as also in the
Critique of practical Reason, the antinomies force us against our will
to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the supersensible the point
of union for all our _a priori_ faculties; because no other expedient
is left to make our Reason harmonious with itself.
_Remark I._
As we so often find occasion in Transcendental Philosophy for
distinguishing Ideas from concepts of the Understanding, it may be of
use to introduce technical terms to correspond to this distinction.
I believe that no one will object if I propose some.--In the most
universal signification of the word, Ideas are representations referred
to an object, according to a certain (subjective or objective)
principle, but so that they can never become a cognition of it.
They are either referred to an intuition, according to a merely
subjective principle of the mutual harmony of the cognitive powers
(the Imagination and the Understanding), and they are then called
_aesthetical_; or they are referred to a concept according to an
objective principle, although they can never furnish a cognition of
the object and are called _rational Ideas_. In the latter case the
concept is a _transcendent_ one, which is different from a concept of
the Understanding, to which an adequately corresponding experience can
always be supplied, and which therefore is called _immanent_.
An _aesthetical Idea_ cannot become a cognition, because it is an
_intuition_ (of the Imagination) for which an adequate concept can
never be found. A _rational Idea_ can never become a cognition, because
it involves a concept (of the supersensible), corresponding to which an
intuition can never be given.
Now I believe we might call the aesthetical Idea an _inexponible_
representation of the Imagination, and a rational Idea an
_indemonstrable_ concept of Reason. It is assumed of both that they are
not generated without grounds, but (according to the above explanation
of an Idea in general) in conformity with certain principles of the
cognitive faculties to which they belong (subjective principles in the
one case, objective in the other).
_Concepts of the Understanding_ must, as such, always be demonstrable
[if by demonstration we understand, as in anatomy, merely
_presentation_];[101] _i.e._ the object corresponding to them must
always be capable of being given in intuition (pure or empirical); for
thus alone could they become cognitions. The concept of _magnitude_
can be given _a priori_ in the intuition of space, _e.g._ of a right
line, etc.; the concept of _cause_ in impenetrability, in the collision
of bodies, etc. Consequently both can be authenticated by means of
an empirical intuition, _i.e._ the thought of them can be proved
(demonstrated, verified) by an example; and this must be possible,
for otherwise we should not be certain that the concept was not empty,
_i.e._ devoid of any _Object_.
In Logic we ordinarily use the expressions demonstrable or
indemonstrable only in respect of _propositions_, but these might
be better designated by the titles respectively of _mediately and
immediately certain_ propositions; for pure Philosophy has also
propositions of both kinds, _i.e._ true propositions, some of which
are susceptible of proof and others not. It can, as philosophy, prove
them on _a priori_ grounds, but it cannot demonstrate them; unless
we wish to depart entirely from the proper meaning of this word,
according to which _to demonstrate_ (_ostendere_, _exhibere_) is
equivalent to presenting a concept in intuition (whether in proof or
merely in definition). If the intuition is _a priori_ this is called
construction; but if it is empirical, then the Object is displayed by
means of which objective reality is assured to the concept. Thus we say
of an anatomist that he demonstrates the human eye, if by a dissection
of this organ he makes intuitively evident the concept which he has
previously treated discursively.
It hence follows that the rational concept of the supersensible
substrate of all phenomena in general, or even of that which must be
placed at the basis of our arbitrary will in respect of the moral law,
viz. of transcendental freedom, is already, in kind, an indemonstrable
concept and a rational Idea; while virtue is so, in degree. For there
can be given in experience, as regards its quality, absolutely nothing
corresponding to the former; whereas in the latter case no empirical
product attains to the degree of that causality, which the rational
Idea prescribes as the rule.
As in a rational Idea the _Imagination_ with its intuitions does
not attain to the given concept, so in an aesthetical Idea the
_Understanding_ by its concepts never attains completely to that
internal intuition which the Imagination binds up with a given
representation. Since, now, to reduce a representation of the
Imagination to concepts is the same thing as to _expound_ it, the
aesthetical Idea may be called an _inexponible_ representation of the
Imagination (in its free play). I shall have occasion in the sequel to
say something more of Ideas of this kind; now I only note that both
kinds of Ideas, rational and aesthetical, must have their principles;
and must have them in Reason--the one in the objective, the other in
the subjective principles of its employment.
We can consequently explain _genius_ as the faculty of _aesthetical
Ideas_; by which at the same time is shown the reason why in the
products of genius it is the nature (of the subject) and not a
premeditated purpose that gives the rule to the art (of the production
of the beautiful). For since the beautiful must not be judged by
concepts, but by the purposive attuning of the Imagination to agreement
with the faculty of concepts in general, it cannot be rule and precept
which can serve as the subjective standard of that aesthetical but
unconditioned purposiveness in beautiful art, that can rightly claim
to please every one. It can only be that in the subject which is
nature and cannot be brought under rules or concepts, _i.e._ the
supersensible substrate of all his faculties (to which no concept of
the Understanding extends), and consequently that with respect to which
it is the final purpose given by the intelligible [part] of our nature
to harmonise all our cognitive faculties. Thus alone is it possible
that there should be _a priori_ at the basis of this purposiveness, for
which we can prescribe no objective principle, a principle subjective
and yet of universal validity.
_Remark II._
The following important remark occurs here: There are _three kinds of
Antinomies_ of pure Reason, which, however, all agree in this, that
they compel us to give up the otherwise very natural hypothesis that
objects of sense are things in themselves, and force us to regard them
merely as phenomena, and to supply to them an intelligible substrate
(something supersensible of which the concept is only an Idea, and
supplies no proper knowledge). Without such antinomies Reason could
never decide upon accepting a principle narrowing so much the field of
its speculation, and could never bring itself to sacrifices by which so
many otherwise brilliant hopes must disappear. For even now when, by
way of compensation for these losses, a greater field in a practical
aspect opens out before it, it appears not to be able without grief to
part from those hopes, and disengage itself from its old attachment.
That there are three kinds of antinomies has its ground in this, that
there are three cognitive faculties,--Understanding, Judgement, and
Reason; of which each (as a superior cognitive faculty) must have
its _a priori_ principles. For Reason, in so far as it judges of
these principles and their use, inexorably requires, in respect of
them all, the unconditioned for the given conditioned; and this can
never be found if we consider the sensible as belonging to things
in themselves, and do not rather supply to it, as mere phenomenon,
something supersensible (the intelligible substrate of nature both
external and internal) as the reality in itself [Sache an sich selbst].
There are then: (1) _For the cognitive faculty_ an antinomy of Reason
in respect of the theoretical employment of the Understanding extended
to the unconditioned; (2) _for the feeling of pleasure and pain_ an
antinomy of Reason in respect of the aesthetical employment of the
Judgement; and (3) _for the faculty of desire_ an antinomy in respect
of the practical employment of the self-legislative Reason; so far as
all these faculties have their superior principles _a priori_, and, in
conformity with an inevitable requirement of Reason, must judge and be
able to determine their Object, _unconditionally_ according to those
principles.
As for the two antinomies of the theoretical and practical employment
of the superior cognitive faculties, we have already shown their
_unavoidableness_, if judgements of this kind are not referred to
a supersensible substrate of the given Objects, as phenomena; and
also the _possibility of their solution_, as soon as this is done.
And as for the antinomies in the employment of the Judgement, in
conformity with the requirements of Reason, and their solution which
is here given, there are only two ways of avoiding them. _Either_:
we must deny that any _a priori_ principle lies at the basis of the
aesthetical judgement of taste; we must maintain that all claim to
necessary universal agreement is a groundless and vain fancy, and that
a judgement of taste only deserves to be regarded as correct because
_it happens_ that many people agree about it; and this, not because we
_assume_ an _a priori_ principle behind this agreement, but because
(as in the taste of the palate) of the contingent similar organisation
of the different subjects. _Or_: we must assume that the judgement of
taste is really a disguised judgement of Reason upon the perfection
discovered in a thing and the reference of the manifold in it to a
purpose, and is consequently only called aesthetical on account of the
confusion here attaching to our reflection, although it is at bottom
teleological. In the latter case we could declare the solution of the
antinomies by means of transcendental Ideas to be needless and without
point, and thus could harmonise these laws of taste with Objects of
sense, not as mere phenomena but as things in themselves. But we have
shown in several places in the exposition of judgements of taste how
little either of these expedients will satisfy.
However, if it be granted that our deduction at least proceeds by the
right method, although it be not yet plain enough in all its parts,
three Ideas manifest themselves. _First_, there is the Idea of the
supersensible in general, without any further determination of it, as
the substrate of nature. _Secondly_, there is the Idea of the same
as the principle of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our
cognitive faculty. And _thirdly_, there is the Idea of the same as the
principle of the purposes of freedom, and of the agreement of freedom
with its purposes in the moral sphere.
§ 58. _Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as
the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement_
To begin with, we can either place the principle of taste in the fact
that it always judges in accordance with grounds which are empirical
and therefore are only given _a posteriori_ by sense, or concede that
it judges on _a priori_ grounds. The former would be the _empiricism_
of the Critique of Taste; the latter its _rationalism_. According to
the _former_ the Object of our satisfaction would not differ from
the _pleasant_; according to the latter, if the judgement rests on
definite concepts, it would not differ from the _good_. Thus all
_beauty_ would be banished from the world, and only a particular name,
expressing perhaps a certain mingling of the two above-named kinds of
satisfaction, would remain in its place. But we have shown that there
are also _a priori_ grounds of satisfaction which can subsist along
with the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be comprehended
in _definite concepts_.
On the other hand, the rationalism of the principle of taste is either
that of the _realism_ of the purposiveness, or of its _idealism_.
Because a judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement, and beauty
is not a characteristic of the Object, considered in itself, the
rationalism of the principle of taste can never be placed in the fact
that the purposiveness in this judgement is thought as objective,
_i.e._ that the judgement theoretically, and therefore also logically
(although only in a confused way), refers to the perfection of the
Object. It only refers _aesthetically_ to the agreement of the
representation of the Object in the Imagination with the essential
principles of Judgement in general in the subject. Consequently, even
according to the principle of rationalism, the judgement of taste
and the distinction between its realism and idealism can only be
settled thus. Either in the first case, this subjective purposiveness
is assumed as an actual (designed) _purpose_ of nature (or art)
harmonising with our Judgement; or, in the second case, as a purposive
harmony with the needs of Judgement, in respect of nature and its forms
produced according to particular laws, which shows itself, without
purpose, spontaneously, and contingently.
The beautiful formations in the kingdom of organised nature speak
loudly for the realism of the aesthetical purposiveness of nature;
since we might assume that behind the production of the beautiful there
is an Idea of the beautiful in the producing cause, viz. a _purpose_
in respect of our Imagination. Flowers, blossoms, even the shapes
of entire plants; the elegance of animal formations of all kinds,
unneeded for their proper use, but, as it were, selected for our taste;
especially the charming variety so satisfying to the eye and the
harmonious arrangement of colours (in the pheasant, in shell-fish, in
insects, even in the commonest flowers), which, as it only concerns the
surface and not the figure of these creations (though perhaps requisite
in regard of their internal purposes), seems to be entirely designed
for external inspection; these things give great weight to that mode of
explanation which assumes actual purposes of nature for our aesthetical
Judgement.
On the other hand, not only is Reason opposed to this assumption in
its maxims, which bid us always avoid as far as possible unnecessary
multiplication of principles; but nature everywhere shows in its
free formations much mechanical tendency to the productions of forms
which seem, as it were, to be made for the aesthetical exercise of
our Judgement, without affording the least ground for the supposition
that there is need of anything more than its mechanism, merely as
nature, according to which, without any Idea lying at their root,
they can be purposive for our judgement. But I understand by _free
formations_ of nature _those_ whereby from a _fluid at rest_, through
the volatilisation or separation of a portion of its constituents
(sometimes merely of caloric), the remainder in becoming solid
assumes a definite shape or tissue (figure or texture), which is
different according to the specific difference of the material, but
in the same material is constant. Here it is always presupposed that
we are speaking of a perfect fluid, _i.e._ that the material in it
is completely dissolved, and that it is not a mere medley of solid
particles in a state of suspension.
Formation, then, takes place by a _shooting together_, _i.e._ by a
sudden solidification, not by a gradual transition from the fluid to
the solid state, but all at once by a _saltus_; which transition is
also called _crystallisation_. The commonest example of this kind of
formation is the freezing of water, where first icicles are produced,
which combine at angles of 60°, while others attach themselves to each
vertex, until it all becomes ice; and so that, while this is going
on, the water does not gradually become viscous, but is as perfectly
fluid as if its temperature were far higher, although it is absolutely
ice-cold. The matter that disengages itself, which is dissipated
suddenly at the moment of solidification, is a considerable quantum
of caloric, the disappearance of which, as it was only required for
preserving fluidity, leaves the new ice not in the least colder than
the water which shortly before was fluid.
Many salts, and also rocks, of a crystalline figure, are produced thus
from a species of earth dissolved in water, we do not exactly know
how. Thus are formed the glandular configurations of many minerals,
the cubical sulphide of lead, the ruby silver ore, etc., in all
probability in water and by the shooting together of particles, as they
become forced by some cause to dispense with this vehicle and to unite
in definite external shapes.
But also all kinds of matter, which have been kept in a fluid state
by heat, and have become solid by cooling, show internally, when
fractured, a definite texture. This makes us judge that if their own
weight or the disturbance of the air had not prevented it, they would
also have exhibited on the outer surface their specifically peculiar
shapes. This has been observed in some metals on their inner surface,
which have been hardened externally by fusion but are fluid in the
interior, by the drawing off the internal fluid and the consequent
undisturbed crystallisation of the remainder. Many of these mineral
crystallisations, such as spars, hematite, arragonite, etc., often
present beautiful shapes, the like of which art can only conceive; and
the halo in the cavern of Antiparos[102] is merely produced by water
trickling down strata of gypsum.
The fluid state is, to all appearance, older than the solid state, and
plants as well as animal bodies are fashioned out of fluid nutritive
matter, so far as this forms itself in a state of rest. This last
of course primarily combines and forms itself in freedom according
to a certain original disposition directed towards purposes (which,
as will be shown in Part II., must not be judged aesthetically but
teleologically according to the principle of realism), but also perhaps
in conformity with the universal law of the affinity of materials.
Again, the watery fluids dissolved in an atmosphere that is a mixture
of different gases, if they separate from the latter on account of
cooling, produce snow figures, which in correspondence with the
character of the special mixture of gases, often seem very artistic and
are extremely beautiful. So, without detracting from the teleological
principle by which we judge of organisation, we may well think that
the beauty of flowers, of the plumage of birds, or of shell-fish,
both in shape and colour, may be ascribed to nature and its faculty
of producing forms in an aesthetically purposive way, in its freedom,
without particular purposes adapted thereto, according to chemical laws
by the arrangement of the material requisite for the organisation in
question.