or a poem beautiful, a hundred voices all highly praising it will not
force his inmost agreement. He may indeed feign that it pleases him in
order that he may not be regarded as devoid of taste; he may even begin
to doubt whether he has formed his taste on a knowledge of a sufficient
number of objects of a certain kind (just as one, who believes that
he recognises in the distance as a forest, something which all others
regard as a town, doubts the judgement of his own sight). But he
clearly sees that the agreement of others gives no valid proof of the
judgement about beauty. Others might perhaps see and observe for him;
and what many have seen in one way, although he believes that he has
seen it differently, might serve him as an adequate ground of proof
of a theoretical and consequently logical judgement. But that a thing
has pleased others could never serve as the basis of an aesthetical
judgement. A judgement of others which is unfavourable to ours may
indeed rightly make us scrutinise our own with care, but it can never
convince us of its incorrectness. There is therefore no empirical
_ground of proof_ which would force a judgement of taste upon any one.
Still less, _in the second place_, can an _a priori_ proof determine
according to definite rules a judgement about beauty. If a man reads
me a poem of his or brings me to a play, which does not after all suit
my taste, he may bring forward in proof of the beauty of his poem
_Batteux_[67] or _Lessing_ or still more ancient and famous critics
of taste, and all the rules laid down by them; certain passages which
displease me may agree very well with rules of beauty (as they have
been put forth by these writers and are universally recognised): but
I stop my ears, I will listen to no arguments and no reasoning; and I
will rather assume that these rules of the critics are false, or at
least that they do not apply to the case in question, than admit that
my judgement should be determined by grounds of proof _a priori_. For
it is to be a judgement of Taste and not of Understanding or Reason.
It seems that this is one of the chief reasons why this aesthetical
faculty of judgement has been given the name of Taste. For though a
man enumerate to me all the ingredients of a dish, and remark that
each is separately pleasant to me and further extol with justice the
wholesomeness of this particular food--yet am I deaf to all these
reasons; I try the dish with _my_ tongue and my palate, and thereafter
(and not according to universal principles) do I pass my judgement.
In fact the judgement of Taste always takes the form of a singular
judgement about an Object. The Understanding can form a universal
judgement by comparing the Object in point of the satisfaction it
affords with the judgement of others upon it: _e.g._ “all tulips are
beautiful.” But then this is not a judgement of taste but a logical
judgement, which takes the relation of an Object to taste as the
predicate of things of a certain species. That judgement, however, in
which I find an individual given tulip beautiful, _i.e._ in which
I find my satisfaction in it to be universally valid, is alone a
judgement of taste. Its peculiarity consists in the fact that, although
it has merely subjective validity, it claims the assent of _all_
subjects, exactly as it would do if it were an objective judgement
resting on grounds of knowledge, that could be established by a proof.
§ 34. _There is no objective principle of Taste possible_
By a principle of taste I mean a principle under the condition of
which we could subsume the concept of an object and thus infer by
means of a syllogism that the object is beautiful. But that is
absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the
representation of the object, and of that I can be persuaded by no
grounds of proof whatever. Although, as _Hume_ says,[68] all critics
can reason more plausibly than cooks, yet the same fate awaits them.
They cannot expect the determining ground of their judgement [to be
derived] from the force of the proofs, but only from the reflection
of the subject upon its own proper state (of pleasure or pain), all
precepts and rules being rejected.
But although critics can and ought to pursue their reasonings so that
our judgements of taste may be corrected and extended, it is not with
a view to set forth the determining ground of this kind of aesthetical
judgements in a universally applicable formula, which is impossible;
but rather to investigate the cognitive faculties and their exercise in
these judgements, and to explain by examples the reciprocal subjective
purposiveness, the form of which, as has been shown above, in a given
representation, constitutes the beauty of the object. Therefore the
Critique of Taste is only subjective as regards the representation
through which an Object is given to us; viz. it is the art or science
of reducing to rules the reciprocal relation between the Understanding
and the Imagination in the given representation (without reference
to any preceding sensation or concept). That is, it is the art or
science of reducing to rules their accordance or discordance, and of
determining them with regard to their conditions. It is an _art_, if
it only shows this by examples; it is a _science_ if it derives the
possibility of such judgements from the nature of these faculties,
as cognitive faculties in general. We have here, in Transcendental
Criticism, only to do with the latter. It should develop and justify
the subjective principle of taste, as an _a priori_ principle of
the Judgement. This Critique, as an art, merely seeks to apply, in
the judging of objects, the physiological (here psychological), and
therefore empirical rules, according to which taste actually proceeds
(without taking any account of their possibility); and it criticises
the products of beautiful art just as, regarded as a science, it
criticises the faculty by which they are judged.
§ 35. _The principle of Taste is the subjective principle of Judgement
in general_
The judgement of taste is distinguished from a logical judgement in
this, that the latter subsumes a representation under the concept
of the Object, while the former does not subsume it under any
concept; because otherwise the necessary universal agreement [in
these judgements] would be capable of being enforced by proofs.
Nevertheless it is like the latter in this, that it claims universality
and necessity, though not according to concepts of the Object, and
consequently a merely subjective necessity. Now, because the concepts
in a judgement constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition
of the Object), but the judgement of taste is not determinable by
concepts, it is based only on the subjective formal condition of a
judgement in general. The subjective condition of all judgements is
the faculty of Judgement itself. This when used with reference to a
representation by which an object is given, requires the accordance
of two representative powers: viz. Imagination (for the intuition and
comprehension of the manifold) and Understanding (for the concept as
a representation of the unity of this comprehension). Now because no
concept of the Object lies here at the basis of the judgement, it can
only consist in the subsumption of the Imagination itself (in the case
of a representation by which an object is given) under the conditions
that the Understanding requires to pass from intuition to concepts.
That is, because the freedom of the Imagination consists in the fact
that it schematises without any concept, the judgement of taste must
rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocal activity of the Imagination
in its _freedom_ and the Understanding with its _conformity to law_.
It must therefore rest on a feeling, which makes us judge the object
by the purposiveness of the representation (by which an object is
given) in respect of the furtherance of the cognitive faculty in its
free play. Taste, then, as subjective Judgement, contains a principle
of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the _faculty_
of intuitions or presentations (_i.e._ the Imagination) under the
_faculty_ of the concepts (_i.e._ the Understanding); so far as the
former _in its freedom_ harmonises with the latter _in its conformity
to law_.
In order to discover this ground of legitimacy by a Deduction of the
judgements of taste we can only take as a clue the formal peculiarities
of this kind of judgements, and consequently can only consider their
logical form.
§ 36. _Of the problem of a Deduction of judgements of Taste_
The concept of an Object in general can immediately be combined with
the perception of an object, containing its empirical predicates, so
as to form a cognitive judgement; and it is thus that a judgement
of experience is produced.[69] At the basis of this lie _a priori_
concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition, by
which the manifold is thought as the determination of an Object. These
concepts (the Categories) require a Deduction, which is given in the
Critique of pure Reason; and by it we can get the solution of the
problem, how are synthetical _a priori_ cognitive judgements possible?
This problem concerns then the _a priori_ principles of the pure
Understanding and its theoretical judgements.
But with a perception there can also be combined a feeling of pleasure
(or pain) and a satisfaction, that accompanies the representation
of the Object and serves instead of its predicate; thus there can
result an aesthetical non-cognitive judgement. At the basis of
such a judgement--if it is not a mere judgement of sensation but a
formal judgement of reflection, which imputes the same satisfaction
necessarily to every one,--must lie some _a priori_ principle; which
may be merely subjective (if an objective one should prove impossible
for judgements of this kind), but also as such may need a Deduction,
that we may thereby comprehend how an aesthetical judgement can lay
claim to necessity. On this is founded the problem with which we are
now occupied, how are judgements of taste possible? This problem
then has to do with the _a priori_ principles of the pure faculty of
Judgement in _aesthetical_ judgements; _i.e._ judgements in which it
has not (as in theoretical ones) merely to subsume under objective
concepts of Understanding, and in which it is subject to a law, but in
which it is, itself, subjectively, both object and law.
This problem then may be thus represented: how is a judgement possible,
in which merely from _our own_ feeling of pleasure in an object,
independently of its concept, we judge that this pleasure attaches to
the representation of the same Object _in every other subject_, and
that _a priori_ without waiting for the accordance of others?
It is easy to see that judgements of taste are synthetical, because
they go beyond the concept and even beyond the intuition of the
Object, and add to that intuition as predicate something that is not a
cognition, viz. a feeling of pleasure (or pain). Although the predicate
(of the _personal_ pleasure bound up with the representation) is
empirical, nevertheless, as concerns the required assent of _every one_
the judgements are _a priori_, or desire to be regarded as such; and
this is already involved in the expressions of this claim. Thus this
problem of the Critique of Judgement belongs to the general problem of
transcendental philosophy, how are synthetical _a priori_ judgements
possible?
§ 37. _What is properly asserted a priori of an object in a judgement
of Taste_
That the representation of an object is immediately bound up with
pleasure can only be internally perceived, and if we did not wish to
indicate anything more than this it would give a merely empirical
judgement. For I cannot combine a definite feeling (of pleasure or
pain) with any representation except where there is at bottom an _a
priori_ principle in the Reason determining the Will. In that case the
pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of the principle,
but cannot be compared with the pleasure in taste, because it requires
a definite concept of a law; and the latter pleasure, on the contrary,
must be bound up with the mere act of judging, prior to all concepts.
Hence also all judgements of taste are singular judgements, because
they do not combine their predicate of satisfaction with a concept,
but with a given individual empirical representation.
And so it is not the pleasure, but the _universal validity of this
pleasure_, perceived as mentally bound up with the mere judgement upon
an object, which is represented _a priori_ in a judgement of taste as
a universal rule for the Judgement and valid for every one. It is an
empirical judgement [to say] that I perceive and judge an object with
pleasure. But it is an _a priori_ judgement [to say] that I find it
beautiful, _i.e._ I attribute this satisfaction necessarily to every
one.
§ 38. _Deduction of judgements of Taste_
If it be admitted that in a pure judgement of taste the satisfaction
in the object is combined with the mere act of judging its form, it is
nothing else than its subjective purposiveness for the Judgement which
we feel to be mentally combined with the representation of the object.
The Judgement, as regards the formal rules of its action, apart from
all matter (whether sensation or concept), can only be directed to the
subjective conditions of its employment in general (it is applied[70]
neither to a particular mode of sense nor to a particular concept of
the Understanding); and consequently to that subjective [element] which
we can presuppose in all men (as requisite for possible cognition in
general). Thus the agreement of a representation with these conditions
of the Judgement must be capable of being assumed as valid _a priori_
for every one. _I.e._ we may rightly impute to every one the pleasure
or the subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation
between the cognitive faculties in the act of judging a sensible object
in general.[71]
_Remark_
This Deduction is thus easy, because it has no need to justify the
objective reality of any concept, for Beauty is not a concept of the
Object and the judgement of taste is not cognitive. It only maintains
that we are justified in presupposing universally in every man those
subjective conditions of the Judgement which we find in ourselves; and
further, that we have rightly subsumed the given Object under these
conditions. The latter has indeed unavoidable difficulties which do
not beset the logical Judgement. There we subsume under concepts,
but in the aesthetical Judgement under a merely sensible relation
between the Imagination and Understanding mutually harmonising in
the representation of the form of the Object,--in which case the
subsumption may easily be fallacious. Yet the legitimacy of the
claim of the Judgement in counting upon universal assent is not thus
annulled; it reduces itself merely to the correctness of the principle
of judging validly for every one from subjective grounds. For as to
the difficulty or doubt concerning the correctness of the subsumption
under that principle, it makes the legitimacy of the claim of an
aesthetical judgement in general to such validity and the principle
of the same, as little doubtful, as the like faulty (though neither
so commonly nor readily faulty) subsumption of the logical Judgement
under its principle can make the latter, an objective principle,
doubtful. But if the question were to be, how is it possible to assume
nature _a priori_ to be a complex of objects of taste? this problem
has reference to Teleology, because it must be regarded as a purpose
of nature essentially belonging to its concept to exhibit forms that
are purposive for our Judgement. But the correctness of this latter
assumption is very doubtful, whereas the efficacy of natural beauties
is patent to experience.
§ 39. _Of the communicability of a Sensation_
If sensation, as the real in perception, is related to knowledge, it
is called sensation of the senses; and its specific quality may be
represented as generally communicable in a uniform way, if we assume
that every one has senses like our own. But this cannot at all be
presupposed of any single sensation. To a man who is deficient in the
sense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and
even if it is not wholly deficient, we cannot be certain that he gets
exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have. But even more
must we represent men as differing in respect of the _pleasantness_
or _unpleasantness_ involved in the sensation from the same object of
sense; and it is absolutely not to be required that every man should
take pleasure in the same objects. Pleasure of this kind, because it
comes into the mind through the senses, in respect of which therefore
we are passive, we may call the pleasure of _enjoyment_.
Satisfaction in an action because of its moral character is on the
other hand not the pleasure of enjoyment, but of spontaneity and its
accordance with the Idea of its destination. But this feeling, called
moral, requires concepts, and presents not free purposiveness, but
purposiveness that is conformable to law; it therefore admits of being
universally communicated only by means of Reason, and, if the pleasure
is to be homogeneous for every one, by very definite practical concepts
of Reason.
Pleasure in the Sublime in nature, regarded as a pleasure of rational
contemplation, also makes claim to universal participation; but
it presupposes, besides, a different feeling, viz. that of our
supersensible destination, which, however obscurely, has a moral
foundation. But that other men will take account of it, and will find
a satisfaction in the consideration of the wild greatness of nature
(that certainly cannot be ascribed to its aspect, which is rather
terrifying), I am not absolutely justified in supposing. Nevertheless,
in consideration of the fact that on every suitable occasion regard
should be had to these moral dispositions, I can impute such
satisfaction to every man, but only by means of the moral law which on
its side again is based on concepts of Reason.
On the contrary, pleasure in the Beautiful is neither a pleasure
of enjoyment nor of a law-abiding activity, nor even of rational
contemplation in accordance with Ideas, but of mere reflection. Without
having as rule any purpose or fundamental proposition, this pleasure
accompanies the ordinary apprehension of an object by the Imagination,
as faculty of intuition, in relation with the Understanding, as faculty
of concepts, by means of a procedure of the Judgement which it must
also exercise on behalf of the commonest experience; only that in
the latter case it is in order to perceive an empirical objective
concept, in the former case (in aesthetical judgements) merely to
perceive the accordance of the representation with the harmonious
(subjectively purposive) activity of both cognitive faculties in their
freedom, _i.e._ to feel with pleasure the mental state produced by
the representation. This pleasure must necessarily depend for every
one on the same conditions, for they are subjective conditions of the
possibility of a cognition in general; and the proportion between
these cognitive faculties requisite for Taste is also requisite for
that ordinary sound Understanding which we have to presuppose in
every one. Therefore he who judges with taste (if only he does not go
astray in this act of consciousness and mistake matter for form or
charm for beauty) may impute to every one subjective purposiveness,
_i.e._ his satisfaction in the Object, and may assume his feeling to be
universally communicable and that without the mediation of concepts.
§ 40. _Of Taste as a kind of_ sensus communis
We often give to the Judgement, if we are considering the result rather
than the act of its reflection, the name of a sense, and we speak of
a sense of truth, or of a sense of decorum, of justice, etc. And yet
we know, or at least we ought to know, that these concepts cannot
have their place in Sense, and further, that Sense has not the least
capacity for expressing universal rules; but that no representation
of truth, fitness, beauty, or justice, and so forth, could come into
our thoughts if we could not rise beyond Sense to higher faculties
of cognition. _The common Understanding of men_, which, as the mere
sound (not yet cultivated) Understanding, we regard as the least to
be expected from any one claiming the name of man, has therefore the
doubtful honour of being given the name of common sense (_sensus
communis_); and in such a way that by the name _common_ (not merely
in our language, where the word actually has a double signification,
but in many others) we understand _vulgar_, that which is everywhere
met with, the possession of which indicates absolutely no merit or
superiority.
But under the _sensus communis_ we must include the Idea of a
_communal_ sense, _i.e._ of a faculty of judgement, which in its
reflection takes account (_a priori_) of the mode of representation
of all other men in thought; in order _as it were_ to compare its
judgement with the collective Reason of humanity, and thus to escape
the illusion arising from the private conditions that could be so
easily taken for objective, which would injuriously affect the
judgement. This is done by comparing our judgement with the possible
rather than the actual judgements of others, and by putting ourselves
in the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations
which contingently attach to our own judgement. This, again, is
brought about by leaving aside as much as possible the matter of our
representative state, _i.e._ sensation, and simply having respect to
the formal peculiarities of our representation or representative state.
Now this operation of reflection seems perhaps too artificial to be
attributed to the faculty called _common_ sense; but it only appears
so, when expressed in abstract formulae. In itself there is nothing
more natural than to abstract from charm or emotion if we are seeking a
judgement that is to serve as a universal rule.
The following Maxims of common human Understanding do not properly
come in here, as parts of the Critique of Taste; but yet they may
serve to elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are: 1° to
think for oneself; 2° to put ourselves in thought in the place of
every one else; 3° always to think consistently. The first is the
maxim of _unprejudiced_ thought; the second of _enlarged_ thought;
the third of _consecutive_ thought.[72] The first is the maxim of a
Reason never _passive_. The tendency to such passivity, and therefore
to heteronomy of the Reason, is called _prejudice_; and the greatest
prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to the rules
that the Understanding places at its basis by means of its own
essential law, _i.e._ is _superstition_. Deliverance from superstition
is called _enlightenment_;[73] because although this name belongs to
deliverance from prejudices in general, yet superstition specially
(_in sensu eminenti_) deserves to be called a prejudice. For the
blindness in which superstition places us, which it even imposes on
us as an obligation, makes the need of being guided by others, and
the consequent passive state of our Reason, peculiarly noticeable. As
regards the second maxim of the mind, we are otherwise wont to call
him limited (_borné_, the opposite of _enlarged_) whose talents attain
to no great use (especially as regards intensity). But here we are not
speaking of the faculty of cognition, but of the _mode of thought_
which makes a purposive use thereof. However small may be the area
or the degree to which a man’s natural gifts reach, yet it indicates
a man of _enlarged thought_ if he disregards the subjective private
conditions of his own judgement, by which so many others are confined,
and reflects upon it from a _universal standpoint_ (which he can only
determine by placing himself at the standpoint of others). The third
maxim, viz. that of _consecutive_ thought, is the most difficult to
attain, and can only be attained by the combination of both the former,
and after the constant observance of them has grown into a habit. We
may say that the first of these maxims is the maxim of Understanding,
the second of Judgement, and the third of Reason.
I take up again the threads interrupted by this digression, and I say
that Taste can be called _sensus communis_ with more justice than sound
Understanding can; and that the aesthetical Judgement rather than the
intellectual may bear the name of a communal sense,[74] if we are
willing to use the word “sense” of an effect of mere reflection upon
the mind: for then we understand by sense the feeling of pleasure. We
could even define Taste as the faculty of judging of that which makes
_universally communicable_, without the mediation of a concept, our
feeling in a given representation.