internal purpose, can only be pure, if either the person judging
has no concept of this purpose, or else abstracts from it in his
judgement. Such a person, although forming an accurate judgement of
taste in judging of the object as free beauty, would yet by another
who considers the beauty in it only as a dependent attribute (who looks
to the purpose of the object) be blamed, and accused of false taste;
although both are right in their own way, the one in reference to what
he has before his eyes, the other in reference to what he has in his
thought. By means of this distinction we can settle many disputes about
beauty between judges of taste; by showing that the one is speaking of
free, the other of dependent, beauty,--that the first is making a pure,
the second an applied, judgement of taste.
§ 17. _Of the Ideal of beauty_
There can be no objective rule of taste which shall determine by
means of concepts what is beautiful. For every judgement from this
source is aesthetical; _i.e._ the feeling of the subject, and not
a concept of the Object, is its determining ground. To seek for a
principle of taste which shall furnish, by means of definite concepts,
a universal criterion of the beautiful, is fruitless trouble; because
what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal
communicability of sensation (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) without
the aid of a concept--the agreement, as far as is possible, of all
times and peoples as regards this feeling in the representation of
certain objects--this is the empirical criterion, although weak and
hardly sufficing for probability, of the derivation of a taste, thus
confirmed by examples, from the deep-lying grounds of agreement common
to all men, in judging of the forms under which objects are given to
them.
Hence, we consider some products of taste as _exemplary_. Not that
taste can be acquired by imitating others; for it must be an original
faculty. He who imitates a model shows, no doubt, in so far as he
attains to it, skill; but only shows taste in so far as he can judge
of this model itself.[34] It follows from hence that the highest
model, the archetype of taste, is a mere Idea, which every one must
produce in himself; and according to which he must judge every Object
of taste, every example of judgement by taste, and even the taste
of every one. _Idea_ properly means a rational concept, and _Ideal_
the representation of an individual being, regarded as adequate to
an Idea.[35] Hence that archetype of taste, which certainly rests on
the indeterminate Idea that Reason has of a maximum, but which cannot
be represented by concepts, but only in an individual presentation,
is better called the Ideal of the beautiful. Although we are not in
possession of this, we yet strive to produce it in ourselves. But
it can only be an Ideal of the Imagination, because it rests on a
presentation and not on concepts, and the Imagination is the faculty of
presentation.--How do we arrive at such an Ideal of beauty? _A priori_,
or empirically? Moreover, what species of the beautiful is susceptible
of an Ideal?
First, it is well to remark that the beauty for which an Ideal is to
be sought cannot be _vague_ beauty, but is _fixed_ by a concept of
objective purposiveness; and thus it cannot appertain to the Object
of a quite pure judgement of taste, but to that of a judgement of
taste which is in part intellectual. That is, in whatever grounds of
judgement an Ideal is to be found, an Idea of Reason in accordance with
definite concepts must lie at its basis; which determines _a priori_
the purpose on which the internal possibility of the object rests.
An Ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beautiful piece of furniture,
of a beautiful view, is inconceivable. But neither can an Ideal be
represented of a beauty dependent on definite purposes, _e.g._ of a
beautiful dwelling-house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, etc.;
presumably because their purpose is not sufficiently determined and
fixed by the concept, and thus the purposiveness is nearly as free as
in the case of _vague_ beauty. The only being which has the purpose of
its existence in itself is _man_, who can determine his purposes by
Reason; or, where he must receive them from external perception, yet
can compare them with essential and universal purposes, and can judge
this their accordance aesthetically. This _man_ is, then, alone of all
objects in the world, susceptible of an Ideal of _beauty_; as it is
only _humanity_ in his person, as an intelligence, that is susceptible
of the Ideal of _perfection_.
But there are here two elements. _First_, there is the aesthetical
_normal Idea_, which is an individual intuition (of the Imagination),
representing the standard of our judgement [upon man] as a thing
belonging to a particular animal species. _Secondly_, there is the
_rational Idea_ which makes the purposes of humanity, so far as they
cannot be sensibly represented, the principle for judging of a figure
through which, as their phenomenal effect, those purposes are revealed.
The normal Idea of the figure of an animal of a particular race must
take its elements from experience. But the greatest purposiveness
in the construction of the figure, that would be available for the
universal standard of aesthetical judgement upon each individual of
this species--the image which is as it were designedly at the basis of
nature’s Technic, to which only the whole race and not any isolated
individual is adequate--this lies merely in the Idea of the judging
[subject]. And this, with its proportions, as an aesthetical Idea, can
be completely presented _in concreto_ in a model. In order to make
intelligible in some measure (for who can extract her whole secret
from nature?) how this comes to pass, we shall attempt a psychological
explanation.
We must remark that, in a way quite incomprehensible by us, the
Imagination can not only recall, on occasion, the signs for concepts
long past, but can also reproduce the image of the figure of the object
out of an unspeakable number of objects of different kinds or even of
the same kind. Further, if the mind is concerned with comparisons, the
Imagination can, in all probability, actually though unconsciously let
one image glide into another, and thus by the concurrence of several of
the same kind come by an average, which serves as the common measure
of all. Every one has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if you wish
to judge of their normal size, estimating it by means of comparison,
the Imagination (as I think) allows a great number of images (perhaps
the whole thousand) to fall on one another. If I am allowed to apply
here the analogy of optical presentation, it is in the space where
most of them are combined and inside the contour, where the place is
illuminated with the most vivid colours, that the _average size_ is
cognisable; which, both in height and breadth, is equally far removed
from the extreme bounds of the greatest and smallest stature. And this
is the stature of a beautiful man. (We could arrive at the same thing
mechanically, by adding together all thousand magnitudes, heights,
breadths, and thicknesses, and dividing the sum by a thousand. But the
Imagination does this by means of a dynamical effect, which arises
from the various impressions of such figures on the organ of internal
sense.) If now in a similar way for this average man we seek the
average head, for this head the average nose, etc., such figure is at
the basis of the normal Idea in the country where the comparison is
instituted. Thus necessarily under these empirical conditions a negro
must have a different normal Idea of the beauty of the [human figure]
from a white man, a Chinaman a different normal Idea from a European,
etc. And the same is the case with the model of a beautiful horse or
dog (of a certain breed).--This _normal Idea_ is not derived from
proportions got from experience [and regarded] _as definite rules_; but
in accordance with it rules for judging become in the first instance
possible. It is the image for the whole race, which floats among all
the variously different intuitions of individuals, which nature takes
as archetype in her productions of the same species, but which seems
not to be fully reached in any individual case. It is by no means the
whole _archetype of beauty_ in the race, but only the form constituting
the indispensable condition of all beauty, and thus merely
_correctness_ in the [mental] presentation of the race. It is, like the
celebrated _Doryphorus_ of _Polycletus_,[36] the _rule_ (_Myron’s_[37]
Cow might also be used thus for its kind). It can therefore contain
nothing specifically characteristic, for otherwise it would not be
the _normal Idea_ for the race. Its presentation pleases, not by its
beauty, but merely because it contradicts no condition, under which
alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The presentation is merely
correct.[38]
We must yet distinguish the _normal Idea_ of the beautiful from the
_Ideal_, which latter, on grounds already alleged, we can only expect
in the _human_ figure. In this the Ideal consists in the expression
of the _moral_, without which the object would not please universally
and thus positively (not merely negatively in a correct presentation).
The visible expression of moral Ideas that rule men inwardly, can
indeed only be got from experience; but to make its connexion with
all which our Reason unites with the morally good in the Idea of the
highest purposiveness,--goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace,
etc.,--visible as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of
that which is internal), requires a union of pure Ideas of Reason with
great imaginative power, even in him who wishes to judge of it, still
more in him who wishes to present it. The correctness of such an Ideal
of beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm to mingle with
the satisfaction in the Object and yet allowing us to take a great
interest therein. This shows that a judgement in accordance with such
a standard can never be purely aesthetical, and that a judgement in
accordance with an Ideal of beauty is not a mere judgement of taste.
EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT
_Beauty_ is the form of the _purposiveness_ of an object, so far as
this is perceived in it _without any representation of a purpose_.[39]
FOURTH MOMENT
OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE MODALITY OF THE
SATISFACTION IN THE OBJECT
§ 18. _What the modality in a judgement of taste is_
I can say of every representation that it is at least _possible_
that (as a cognition) it should be bound up with a pleasure. Of a
representation that I call _pleasant_ I say that it _actually_ excites
pleasure in me. But the _beautiful_ we think as having a _necessary_
reference to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a peculiar kind.
It is not a theoretical objective necessity; in which case it would be
cognised _a priori_ that every one _will feel_ this satisfaction in
the object called beautiful by me. It is not a practical necessity;
in which case, by concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule
for freely acting beings, the satisfaction is the necessary result of
an objective law and only indicates that we absolutely (without any
further design) ought to act in a certain way. But the necessity which
is thought in an aesthetical judgement can only be called _exemplary_;
_i.e._ a necessity of the assent of _all_ to a judgement which is
regarded as the example of a universal rule that we cannot state. Since
an aesthetical judgement is not an objective cognitive judgement, this
necessity cannot be derived from definite concepts, and is therefore
not apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of
experience (of a complete agreement of judgements as to the beauty
of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly furnish
sufficiently numerous vouchers for this; but also, on empirical
judgements we can base no concept of the necessity of these judgements.
§ 19. _The subjective necessity, which we ascribe to the judgement of
taste, is conditioned_
The judgement of taste requires the agreement of every one; and he
who describes anything as beautiful claims that every one _ought_
to give his approval to the object in question and also describe it
as beautiful. The _ought_ in the aesthetical judgement is therefore
pronounced in accordance with all the data which are required for
judging and yet is only conditioned. We ask for the agreement of every
one else, because we have for it a ground that is common to all; and we
could count on this agreement, provided we were always sure that the
case was correctly subsumed under that ground as rule of assent.
§ 20. _The condition of necessity which a judgement of taste asserts is
the Idea of a common sense_
If judgements of taste (like cognitive judgements) had a definite
objective principle, then the person who lays them down in accordance
with this latter would claim an unconditioned necessity for his
judgement. If they were devoid of all principle, like those of the
mere taste of sense, we would not allow them in thought any necessity
whatever. Hence they must have a subjective principle which determines
what pleases or displeases only by feeling and not by concepts, but
yet with universal validity. But such a principle could only be
regarded as a _common sense_, which is essentially different from
common Understanding which people sometimes call common Sense (_sensus
communis_); for the latter does not judge by feeling but always
by concepts, although ordinarily only as by obscurely represented
principles.
Hence it is only under the presupposition that there is a common sense
(by which we do not understand an external sense, but the effect
resulting from the free play of our cognitive powers)--it is only under
this presupposition, I say, that the judgement of taste can be laid
down.
§ 21. _Have we ground for presupposing a common sense?_
Cognitions and judgements must, along with the conviction that
accompanies them, admit of universal communicability; for otherwise
there would be no harmony between them and the Object, and they would
be collectively a mere subjective play of the representative powers,
exactly as scepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to admit of
communicability, so must also the state of mind,--_i.e._ the accordance
of the cognitive powers with a cognition generally, and that proportion
of them which is suitable for a representation (by which an object is
given to us) in order that a cognition may be made out of it--admit of
universal communicability. For without this as the subjective condition
of cognition, knowledge as an effect could not arise. This actually
always takes place when a given object by means of Sense excites the
Imagination to collect the manifold, and the Imagination in its turn
excites the Understanding to bring about a unity of this collective
process in concepts. But this accordance of the cognitive powers has
a different proportion according to the variety of the Objects which
are given. However, it must be such that this internal relation, by
which one mental faculty is excited by another, shall be generally the
most beneficial for both faculties in respect of cognition (of given
objects); and this accordance can only be determined by feeling (not
according to concepts). Since now this accordance itself must admit
of universal communicability, and consequently also our feeling of it
(in a given representation), and since the universal communicability
of a feeling presupposes a common sense, we have grounds for assuming
this latter. And this common sense is assumed without relying on
psychological observations, but simply as the necessary condition of
the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in
every Logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical.
§ 22. _The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a
judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as
objective under the presupposition of a common sense_
In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful, we
allow no one to be of another opinion; without however grounding our
judgement on concepts but only on our feeling, which we therefore
place at its basis not as a private, but as a communal feeling.[40]
Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience; for it aims at
justifying judgements which contain an _ought_. It does not say that
every one _will_ agree with my judgement, but that he _ought_. And so
common sense, as an example of whose judgement I here put forward my
judgement of taste and on account of which I attribute to the latter an
_exemplary_ validity, is a mere ideal norm, under the supposition of
which I have a right to make into a rule for every one a judgement that
accords therewith, as well as the satisfaction in an Object expressed
in such judgement. For the principle, which concerns the agreement of
different judging persons, although only subjective, is yet assumed as
subjectively universal (an Idea necessary for every one); and thus can
claim universal assent (as if it were objective) provided we are sure
that we have correctly subsumed [the particulars] under it.
This indeterminate norm of a common sense is actually presupposed by
us; as is shown by our claim to lay down judgements of taste. Whether
there is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of
the possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of
Reason makes it only into a regulative principle for producing in us
a common sense for higher purposes: whether therefore Taste is an
original and natural faculty, or only the Idea of an artificial one yet
to be acquired, so that a judgement of taste with its assumption of a
universal assent in fact, is only a requirement of Reason for producing
such harmony of sentiment; whether the “ought,” _i.e._ the objective
necessity of the confluence of the feeling of any one man with that of
every other, only signifies the possibility of arriving at this accord,
and the judgement of taste only affords an example of the application
of this principle: these questions we have neither the wish nor the
power to investigate as yet; we have now only to resolve the faculty of
taste into its elements in order to unite them at last in the Idea of
a common sense.
EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FOURTH MOMENT
The _beautiful_ is that which without any concept is cognised as the
object of a _necessary_ satisfaction.
GENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ANALYTIC
If we seek the result of the preceding analysis we find that everything
runs up into this concept of Taste, that it is a faculty for judging
an object in reference to the Imagination’s _free conformity to law_.
Now if in the judgement of taste the Imagination must be considered in
its freedom, it is in the first place not regarded as reproductive,
as it is subject to the laws of association, but as productive and
spontaneous (as the author of arbitrary forms of possible intuition).
And although in the apprehension of a given object of sense it is
tied to a definite form of this Object, and so far has no free play
(such as that of poetry) yet it may readily be conceived that the
object can furnish it with such a form containing a collection of
the manifold, as the Imagination itself, if it were left free, would
project in accordance with the _conformity to law of the Understanding_
in general. But that the _imaginative power_ should be _free_ and yet
_of itself conformed to law_, _i.e._ bringing autonomy with it, is a
contradiction. The Understanding alone gives the law. If, however,
the Imagination is compelled to proceed according to a definite law,
its product in respect of form is determined by concepts as to what
it ought to be. But then, as is above shown, the satisfaction is not
that in the Beautiful, but in the Good (in perfection, at any rate
in mere formal perfection); and the judgement is not a judgement of
taste. Hence it is a conformity to law without a law; and a subjective
agreement of the Imagination and Understanding,--without such an
objective agreement as there is when the representation is referred
to a definite concept of an object,--can subsist along with the
free conformity to law of the Understanding (which is also called
purposiveness without purpose) and with the peculiar feature of a
judgement of taste.
Now geometrically regular figures, such as a circle, a square, a
cube, etc., are commonly adduced by critics of taste as the simplest
and most indisputable examples of beauty; and yet they are called
regular, because we can only represent them by regarding them as mere
presentations of a definite concept which prescribes the rule for the
figure (according to which alone it is possible). One of these two must
be wrong, either that judgement of the critic which ascribes beauty to
the said figures, or ours, which regards purposiveness apart from a
concept as requisite for beauty.
Hardly any one will say that a man must have taste in order that he
should find more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled outline,
in an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one which is
oblique, irregular, and as it were deformed, for this belongs to the
ordinary Understanding and is not Taste at all. Where, _e.g._ our
design is to judge of the size of an area, or to make intelligible
the relation of the parts of it, when divided, to one another and
to the whole, then regular figures and those of the simplest kind
are needed, and the satisfaction does not rest immediately on
the aspect of the figure, but on its availability for all kinds
of possible designs. A room whose walls form oblique angles, or a
parterre of this kind, even every violation of symmetry in the figure
of animals (_e.g._ being one-eyed), of buildings, or of flower beds,
displeases, because it contradicts the purpose of the thing, not only
practically in respect of a definite use of it, but also when we pass
judgement on it as regards any possible design. This is not the case
in the judgement of taste, which when pure combines satisfaction
or dissatisfaction,--without any reference to its use or to a
purpose,--with the mere _consideration_ of the object.
The regularity which leads to the concept of an object is indeed the
indispensable condition (_conditio sine qua non_) for grasping the
object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its
form. This determination is a purpose in respect of cognition, and
in reference to this it is always bound up with satisfaction (which
accompanies the execution of every, even problematical, design). There
is here, however, merely the approval of the solution satisfying a
problem, and not a free and indefinite purposive entertainment of the
mental powers with what we call beautiful, where the Understanding is
at the service of Imagination and not _vice versa_.
In a thing that is only possible by means of design,--a building, or
even an animal,--the regularity consisting in symmetry must express
the unity of the intuition that accompanies the concept of purpose,
and this regularity belongs to cognition. But where only a free play
of the representative powers (under the condition, however, that the
Understanding is to suffer no shock thereby) is to be kept up, in
pleasure gardens, room decorations, all kinds of tasteful furniture,
etc., regularity that shows constraint is avoided as much as possible.
Thus in the English taste in gardens, or in bizarre taste in furniture,
the freedom of the Imagination is pushed almost near to the grotesque,
and in this separation from every constraint of rule we have the case,
where taste can display its greatest perfection in the enterprises of
the Imagination.