Upon November 8, the Senate Committee, having completed its hearings,
made public its report. This document is a strange mixture of
progressive and reactionary principles. In some respects, especially
where it grants, however confusedly, the right of collective bargaining
and the eight hour day, it is just and meets the situation; but in other
respects it is so unfair to the workers' cause as to be grotesque. For
one thing it shoulders upon the unions the entire responsibility for the
failure to postpone the strike, choosing to disregard completely the
clearly established fact that the steel companies were discharging men
so fast that for the unions it was a case of strike or perish. In fact,
the report ignores altogether the bitter grievance of men being
discharged for union membership. Mr. Gary had said that this practice
was not engaged in, and that apparently settled it so far as the
Committee was concerned,--the testimony of dozens of victimized workers
(with thousands more available) to the contrary notwithstanding. Other
sins of the Steel Trust, the suppression of free speech and free
assembly, etc., were passed over lightly; but the alleged virtues of its
housing and welfare plans were very highly lauded.
Nowhere are the workers more ruthlessly robbed and exploited by their
employers than in the steel industry. Speaking recently in Brooklyn on
the subject of profiteering, Mr. Basil Manly, formerly Joint Chairman of
the National War Labor Board, cited Page 367 of the Treasury report as
showing one steel company "earning" $14,549,952 in 1917 on a capital of
$5,000, or a profit of 290,999 per cent. As the department conveniently
suppresses all details, it is impossible to learn the name of this
company or how it made such fabulous profits. On the same page appeared
another steel company with a profit rate of 20,180 per cent. Speaking of
the United States Steel Corporation's returns, which of course were
garbled so that no outsider could understand them, Mr. Manly said:
For this reason I am unable to tell you, on the basis of the
Treasury Department's figures, what the net income of the
Steel Corporation is, but on the basis of its own published
report I can tell you that in two years, 1916 and 1917, the
net profits of the Steel Corporation, after payment of
interest on bonds and after making allowance for all charges
growing out of the installation of special war facilities,
amounted to $888,931,511. This is more by $20,000,000 than
the total capital stock of the Steel Corporation (which is
$868,583,600). In other words, in 1916 and 1917 every dollar
of the capital stock of the Steel Corporation was paid for
in net profits. In this connection it should be remembered
that when the Steel Corporation was formed its entire
$500,000,000 worth of common stock represented nothing but
water.
The other steel companies did as well or better, proportionately. W.
Jett Lauck, acting on behalf of the railroad workers, submitted figures
to the United States Railroad Labor Board (A. P. dispatches May 19,
1920) showing that during the years 1916-18 the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation "earned" average annual profits of $29,000,000, or six times
its pre-war average. In 1916 its profits amounted to 146 per cent. on
its capital stock. Our Johnstown friend, the Cambria Steel Company, in
1916-17 cleaned up $50,000,000 on $45,000,000 capital stock; while the
Lackawanna, Republic, Colorado Fuel and Iron, Jones and Laughlin,
Crucible, etc., companies made similar killings.
As against useless, non-producing drones getting these millions, the
great mass of workers actually operating the industry were receiving the
beggarly wages of from 42 to 48 cents per hour. They had received no
increase for a year before the strike, notwithstanding the skyrocketing
cost of living. Yet the Senate Committee could discover no discontent at
this condition nor see any injustice in it. Upon page 10 of its report
appears the startling statement that "The question of wages is not
involved in this controversy." Forty-two cents per hour would hardly buy
cigars for these smug, well-fed gentlemen; still they would have us
conclude that it is enough for a steel worker to raise a family upon.
The fact is, of course, that an increase in wages was a cardinal demand
of the strikers, even though the Senate Committee did not get to learn
of it.[13] And so great was the steel workers' need for more money that
the strike had scarcely ended when the United States Steel Corporation,
followed soon after by the "independents," granted its lesser skilled
help 10 per cent. increase in wages, and promised "an equitable
adjustment" to the widely advertised small minority of highly paid men.
Part of the strike-breaking strategy of the Steel Trust was to alienate
public sympathy from the strike by denouncing it as an incipient
revolution which had to be put down at all costs. Public opinion was
already violently inflamed against everything savoring no matter how
slightly of radicalism, and it was not difficult for the reactionary
newspapers to make the steel strike unpopular, even as they had, under
various pretexts, the movements of the miners and railroad men of the
period. One weapon they used extensively against the steel strike was an
almost forgotten pamphlet, "Syndicalism," written by Earl C. Ford and
myself eight years ago.
Throughout the hearings the investigating senators went along with this
Steel Trust propaganda, which was not so surprising considering the fact
that of the five active committee men, one was a steel magnate, and
three others typical Bourbons. By playing up the "little red book" they
systematically fed the newspapers with the sensationalism they wanted
and which the steel companies desired them to get. I was called before
the Committee and gruffly ordered to express my opinion on the doctrines
in the booklet. In reply, I stated that the steel movement had been
carried on according to the strictest trade-union principles. It was
overseen by the National Committee, consisting of twenty-four
presidents of large international unions. As secretary of this committee
I had necessarily worked under the close scrutiny of these men and
dozens of their organizers--not to speak of the highest officials in the
American Federation of Labor. Yet none of these trade unionists, keen
though they be to detect and condemn unusual practices and heresy in the
ranks, had found fault with the character of my work. Nor could the crew
of detectives and stool pigeons of the steel companies and Department of
Justice, who had dogged my footsteps for a year past, cite a single word
said, a thing done, or a line written by me in the entire campaign which
would not measure up to most rigid trade-union standards. I contended
that my private opinions were immaterial as they did not and could not
enter into the organizing work or the strike.
But the nation-wide head hunt of the radicals was on in full cry, and
the Senators had a good blood scent. They would follow it to the end.
They insisted that I express my opinion upon the wage system, the state,
morality, patriotism, marriage, etc. Finally, in a last effort to
protect the interests of the 2,000,000 men, women and children affected
by the strike, I stated that if the vulture press, which was bound to
misrepresent what I said, was removed from the room, I would be glad to
oblige the Senators with a frank expression of my views upon any
subject. But this simple fairness to the steel workers and their
families they denied. The newspapers were clamoring for red meat, and
the Senators seemed determined they should have it. Having made my
protest and my prediction, I was compelled to yield; but the first
newspapers on the streets proved the soundness of my fears. My answers
were garbled and twisted against both the steel movement and me.
Then there was the Margolis case. I charge that to be a deliberate
frame-up against the steel strike. To prove the Steel Trust's contention
that the strike was a desperate revolutionary _coup_, engineered by men
seeking to destroy our civilization generally, somewhat more was
required than merely an eight year old booklet. The thing had to be
brought down to date and a far-reaching plot constructed. Hence the
Senate Committee dragged in Mr. Margolis and made him a scapegoat. Mr.
Margolis is a well known Anarchist attorney of Pittsburgh. He has the
reputation of having served ably as counsel for several trade-union
organizations, and has a wide circle of acquaintances among labor men.
The Senate Committee selected him as the man who had organized, with my
hearty support and co-operation, the real force behind the strike, the
I. W. W.'s, Anarchists and Bolshevists.
Now the fact is that Mr. Margolis had nothing whatever to do, officially
or unofficially, with the policies or management of either the
organizing campaign or the strike. He had no connection with the Strike
committee; nor did he ever even speak at a union meeting of steel
workers during the whole movement in question. If he wrote an article in
some radical paper, or spoke to a meeting of Russian workmen in
Youngstown, endorsing the strike, as is said, he did it purely as an
individual sympathizer acting upon his own initiative. Mr. Margolis
freely stated this on the stand, and every union official in Pittsburgh
knew it to be the case. So did the investigating Senators; but it the
better served their purpose to enlarge upon Mr. Margolis' activities, in
the hope that his radical reputation would lend color to the plot theory
which they were laboring so hard to establish, and which was so
advantageous to the Steel Trust.
In their final report the Senators continued their plot "evidence" and
insinuations, so persistently worked up all through their hearings. They
ignored highly important testimony tending to put the movement in its
right light as a strictly trade-union affair, and gave prominence to
everything to the contrary. They elevated unheard-of I. W. W.'s into
powerful strike leaders and surrounded the most ordinary comings and
goings with revolutionary mystery. Where they lacked facts they cast
suspicion, leaving a vicious daily press to draw its own conclusions.
Although they expressed great concern for the sufferings of the public
in strikes, and advocated the establishment of an industrial tribunal to
prevent them in the future, the worthy Senators, nevertheless,
recommended no means to end the steel strike. So far as they were
concerned, apparently they were willing to have the steel strike fought
to a conclusion. At one of the Senate Committee hearings, John
Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the National Committee, agreed to arbitration.
But later Mr. Gary gave an emphatic "No" to this proposition. Mr. Gary's
wishes usually had decisive weight with the Senators, so the matter was
settled.
On October 1-3, 1919, a national conference called by the Industrial
Relations Department of the Interchurch World Movement met at the Hotel
Pennsylvania in New York and adopted a resolution providing for a full
investigation of the steel strike, then a burning public question. Under
the terms of this resolution the Industrial Relations Department set up
an independent Commission of Inquiry, composed of representative
churchmen from all over the country who should be responsible for
carrying out the investigation. This Commission consisted of Bishop
Francis J. McConnell (Methodist), Chairman, Dr. Daniel A. Poling
(Evangelical), vice-Chairman, Dr. John McDowell (Presbyterian), Mrs.
Fred Bennett (Board of Foreign Missions), Dr. Nicholas Van Der Pyl
(Congregational), Dr. Alva W. Taylor (Disciples), and Mr. Geo. W.
Coleman (Baptist).
In order to commit the investigation of technical data to the hands of
trained men, the Industrial Relations Department obtained the services
of the Bureau of Industrial Research, New York, which, besides its own
researches, obtained the co-operation of various other scientific
agencies and organized a staff of field workers whose principal members
were: Mr. George Soule, Mr. David J. Saposs, Miss Marian D. Savage, Mr.
Marion K. Wisehart and Mr. Robert Littell. A member of the Bureau of
Industrial Research, Mr. Heber Blankenhorn, had charge of the field work
and later acted as Secretary to the Commission of Inquiry, which held
hearings in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and other steel centres.
The Interchurch World Movement, representing as it does the organized
Protestant millions of America, is a conservative and respectable body,
if there is such in this country. Yet when it stepped upon the toes of
the Steel Trust by starting the investigation it found itself soon
classed among the revolutionaries. Persistent rumors were sent
broadcast, and even newspaper stories, to the effect that the
Commission's investigators were "Bolsheviks" and that the Interchurch
World Movement was permeated with "anarchists." This hampered the work
greatly, especially among employers. Finally a threat of legal action
was necessary against a large commercial organization which had
circulated the rumors officially. It eventually retracted in full. As
for the workers, they gave the fullest co-operation to the
investigation.
Impressed by the scientific methods and apparent desire to get at the
truth of the strike situation manifested in the Interchurch
investigation--which stood in striking contrast to the slipshod,
haphazard system, "red" mania, and violent partiality towards the steel
companies shown by the Senate Committee,--the strike leaders decided to
ask the Commission to undertake a settlement of the strike by mediation,
which the Commission had the power to do under the resolution creating
it. The workers' representatives felt that no stone should be left
unturned to get a settlement, and that if the powerful Interchurch
movement stirred in their behalf possibly Mr. Gary would be dislodged
from his position.
Consequently, John Fitzpatrick, Chairman of the National Committee, put
before Mr. Blankenhorn a plan for the settlement of the strike by
mediation. Mr. Blankenhorn felt, however, that it might be better to
recommend that the Commission move independently, rather than as merely
representing the strikers, and submitted the following plan, which was
adopted by the Commission:
1. To mediate in behalf of all the steel workers, both those
on strike and those who had gone back to work.
2. That the purpose of the mediation should be to establish
a new deal in the steel industry rather than merely to end
the strike.
3. That the ending of the strike should be arranged solely
with a view to giving the new deal the best possible chance.
On December 1, the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel
Workers met and formally accepted this proposition of mediation. What
happened next is told in an official statement to the writer of this
book:
On December 5 a committee from the Commission, consisting of
Bishop McConnell, Dr. Poling and Dr. McDowell, called on Mr.
Gary with the purpose of, first, ascertaining if he would
accept their office as mediators; next, of proposing their
plan of mediation and pressing the acceptance of it by the
employers; and, finally, of ordering the men back to work,
the strike leaders to step out of the situation, and the
Commission to set up a permanent mediation body to bring
about a conference between employers and employees in the
steel industry. There was the feeling in the Commission that
extraordinary concessions had been made by the leaders of
the strike and that any reasons advocated by the employers
for not accepting the mediation plan would have to be
weighty.
Mr. Gary received the Commission courteously and after
minutely cross-examining them concerning the "anonymous"
report of the presence of "Bolsheviks" among them, he heard
the Commission to the extent of learning the first step in
their proposal. He made his reply immediately, an absolute
refusal of arbitration or mediation. The Commission
therefore never had any opportunity to present the
authorized acceptance of the mediation plan by the other
side and in no sense conveyed to Mr. Gary the extent of the
concessions which the strikers were then willing to make.
Mr. Gary, however, clearly understood that acceptance of the
mediation plan would mean that the men would all return to
work at once.
Mr. Gary based his refusal on the grounds that any dealings
which in any way involved representatives of the men then on
strike would be an acceptance of the closed shop, sovietism,
and the forcible distribution of property. Mr. Gary said
that if the Commission represented the men who had gone back
to work, those men were content; if the Commission
represented the men who had not gone back to work, those men
are nothing but red radicals whom the plants did not want
anyway. He said that there was absolutely no issue for
discussion with the U. S. Steel Corporation.
The Commission presented its viewpoint on the advisability
of mediation at great length and with insistence. Mr. Gary
did not in any respect modify his immediate decision.
The Commission felt it necessary therefore to drop the plan
and transmitted the following to the National Committee:
December 6, 1919
Memorandum for Mr. Fitzpatrick:
The independent Commission of Inquiry, instituted by the
Interchurch World Movement to investigate the steel strike,
received on December 2 a communication marked
"confidential," dealing with an official action taken by the
National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers,
signed by Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Foster.
On December 5, members of the Commission informally
conversed with Mr. Gary for two hours, proposing to plan a
new basis of relations in the steel industry, with an ending
of the strike best calculated to further better relations.
They offered to act as mediators both on behalf of the men
still on strike, whose leaders were to order them back and
then step out of the situation, and on behalf of still
dissatisfied men who had nevertheless returned to work.
Mr. Gary refused to confer with these representatives of the
churches as mediators in behalf of any interests represented
by you in the strike, on the ground that the men still out
were Bolshevist radicals who were not wanted in the mills
and who would not be taken back.
And as to mediating in behalf of any other interests, Mr.
Gary said that the men were contented and that "there is no
issue."
I am requested to communicate the above information to you
by the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry.
Very truly yours,
H. BLANKENHORN.
At the time this book goes to press the findings and recommendations of
the Commission have not yet been made public.
This made the sixth attempt of the National Committee to settle the
steel controversy--not to mention the individual effort of the
Amalgamated Association. They were: (1) The letter from Mr. Gompers to
Mr. Gary requesting a conference; (2) the visit to his office of the
National Committee conference committee, equipped with the power to set
a strike date; (3) the appeal to President Wilson to arrange a
conference; (4) Organized Labor's resolution in the National Industrial
Conference to have that body select an arbitration board; (5) The offer
of arbitration by John Fitzpatrick while testifying before the Senate
Committee; and, (6) the Interchurch mediation incident.
But they were all futile. Mr. Gary's policy is the time-honored one of
all tyrants, rule or ruin. The unions had no option but to fight, and
this they did to the best of their ability.
FOOTNOTE:
[13] There seemed to be many important things of which this committee
had never heard. For instance, when in my testimony I referred to Lester
F. Ward, Senator Sterling innocently inquired who he was. He had
apparently never even heard of this eminent American sociologist, who
was perhaps the greatest scholar ever born in the western hemisphere,
and whose name is honored by scientific minds the world over. And what
makes Senator Sterling's ignorance the more inexcusable is that he was
actually holding office in Washington at the same time that Professor
Ward was carrying on his brilliant studies in that very city. For one
who stresses so much his 100 per cent. Americanism as does the Senator
it is indeed a sad showing not to be familiar with this great native
product.
X
THE COURSE OF THE STRIKE
PITTSBURGH DISTRICT--THE RAILROAD MEN--CORRUPT NEWSPAPERS
--CHICAGO DISTRICT--FEDERAL TROOPS AT GARY--YOUNGSTOWN
DISTRICT--THE AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION--CLEVELAND--THE ROD
AND WIRE MILL STRIKE--THE BETHLEHEM PLANTS--BUFFALO AND
LACKAWANNA--WHEELING AND STEUBENVILLE--PUEBLO--JOHNSTOWN
--MOB RULE--THE END OF THE STRIKE.
Although the Steel strike was national in scope and manifested the same
general, basic tendencies everywhere, nevertheless it differed enough
from place to place to render necessary some indication of particular
events in the various districts in order to convey a clear conception of
the movement as a whole. It is the purpose of this chapter to point out
a few of these salient features in the several localities and to draw
some lessons therefrom.
In the immediate Pittsburgh district, due to the extreme difficulties
under which the organizing work was carried on and the strike
inaugurated, the shut-down was not so thorough as elsewhere.
Considerable numbers of men, notably in the skilled trades, remained at
work, and the mills limped along, at least pretending to operate. This
was exceedingly bad, Pittsburgh being the strategic centre of the
strike, as it is of the industry, and the companies were making
tremendous capital of the fact that the mills there were still producing
steel. Accordingly, the National Committee left no stone unturned to
complete the tie-up, already 75 per cent. effective. But under the
circumstances, with meetings banned and picketing prohibited, it was out
of the question to reach directly the men who had stayed at work. The
key to the situation was in the hands of the railroad men.
Operating between the various steel plants and connecting them up with
the main lines, there are several switching roads, such as the Union
Railroad and the McKeesport and Monongahela Connecting Lines. They are
the nerve centers of the local steel industry. If they could be struck
the mills would have to come to a standstill. The National Committee
immediately delegated organizers to investigate the situation. These
reported that the body of the men in the operating departments were
organized; that they had no contracts with the steel companies, and that
they were ready for action, but awaiting co-operation from their
respective national headquarters.