In answer to Edson’s repeated requests, the rear echelon of his
battalion (less the 81mm mortar platoon) finally joined up with him
on 3 July in Samoa. The entire unit then moved on to New Caledonia.
The 1st Raiders received definitive word on Watchtower on 20 July.
They would seize Tulagi, with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in
support. The 1st Parachute Battalion would take the conjoined islets
of Gavutu-Tanambogo. The 1st Marine Division, less one regiment in
reserve, would capture the incomplete airfield on Guadalcanal.
Edson offered to make amphibious reconnaissance patrols of the
objectives, but the naval commander rejected that idea. Most of the
information on Tulagi would come from three Australians, all former
colonial officials familiar with the area. Tulagi was 4,000 yards long
and no more than 1,000 yards wide, and a high ridge ran along its
length, except for a low, open saddle near the southeast end. The only
suitable landing beaches from a hydrographic standpoint were those on
either side of this low ground, since coral formations fringed the
rest of the island. Intelligence officers estimated that the island
held several hundred men of the Japanese _Special Naval Landing
Force_; these were elite troops of proven fighting ability. Aerial
reconnaissance indicated they were dug in to defend the obvious landing
sites. Planners thus chose to make the assault halfway up the western
coast at a place designated as Beach Blue. They wisely decided to
make the first American amphibious assault of the war against natural
obstacles, not enemy gunfire.
The raiders sailed from New Caledonia on 23 July and joined up with the
main task force for rehearsals on Koro Island in the Fijis. These went
poorly, since the Navy boat crews and most of the 1st Marine Division
were too green. On the morning of 7 August the task force hove to and
commenced unloading in what would become known as Ironbottom Sound.
Although Edson’s men had trained hard on their rubber boats, they would
make this landing from Higgins boats. After a preliminary bombardment
by a cruiser and destroyer, the first wave, composed of Companies B and
D, headed for shore. Coral forced them to debark and wade the last 100
yards, but there was no enemy opposition. Companies A and C quickly
followed them. The four rifle companies spread out across the waist
of the island and then advanced in line to the southeast. They met
only occasional sniper fire until they reached Phase Line A at the end
of the ridge, where they halted as planned while naval guns fired an
additional preparation on the enemy defenses.
The attack jumped off again just before noon, and promptly ran into
heavy Japanese resistance. For the remainder of the day the raiders
fought to gain control of the saddle from the entrenched enemy, who
would not surrender under any circumstances. The Marines quickly
discovered that their only recourse was to employ explosives to destroy
the men occupying the caves and bunkers. As evening approached, the
battalion settled into defensive lines that circled the small ridge
(Hill 281) on the tip of the island. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had
already scoured the remainder of the island and now took up positions
in the rear of the raiders.
The Japanese launched their classic banzai counterattack at 2200 that
night. The initial effort punched a small hole in the raider lines
between Companies A and C. A second assault, which might have exploited
this gap, instead struck full against Company A’s front. This time
the raiders held their ground. For the remainder of the night the
Japanese relied on infiltration tactics, with individuals and small
groups trying to make their way into the American rear by stealth. By
this means they attacked both the 2d Battalion’s command post (CP)
and the aid station set up near Blue Beach. They also came within 50
yards of the raider CP. Edson tried to call for reinforcements, but
communications were out.
In the morning things looked much better, just as they had on Makin.
At 0900 two companies of the 5th Marines passed through raider lines
and swept over the southern portions of Hill 281. The remaining enemy
were now isolated in a ravine in the midst of the small ridge. After a
lengthy barrage by the 60mm mortars of Company E and their heavier 81mm
cousins of the rifle battalion, infantrymen from both outfits moved
through the final enemy pocket. Grenades and dynamite were the weapons
of choice against the Japanese still holed up in their caves and
dugouts. At 1500 Edson declared the island secured. That did not mean
the fighting was entirely over. For the next few days Marines scoured
the island by day, and fended off occasional infiltrators at night,
until they had killed off the last enemy soldier. In the entire battle,
the raiders suffered losses of 38 dead and 55 wounded. There were an
additional 33 casualties among other Marine units on the island. All
but three of the 350 Japanese defenders had died.
On the night of 8 August a Japanese surface force arrived from Rabaul
and surprised the Allied naval forces guarding the transports. In
a brief engagement the enemy sank four cruisers and a destroyer,
damaged other ships, and killed 1,200 sailors, all at minimal cost to
themselves. The American naval commander had little choice the next
morning but to order the early withdrawal of his force. Most of the
transports would depart that afternoon with their cargo holds still
half full. The raiders were in a particularly bad way. They had come
ashore with little food because the plan called for their immediate
withdrawal after seizing the island. Moreover, since they had not
cleared the enemy from the only usable beaches until D plus 1, there
had been little time to unload anything. The result would be short
rations for some time to come.
The 1st Raiders performed well in their initial exposure to combat.
Like their compatriots in the 2d Raiders, they were both brave and
daring. Major Kenneth D. Bailey demonstrated the type of leadership
that was common to both units. When an enemy machine gun held up the
advance of his company on D-day, he personally circled around the
bunker, crawled on top, and pushed a grenade into the firing port. In
the process he received a gunshot wound in the thigh. Edson established
his reputation for fearlessness by spending most of his time in the
front lines, where he contemptuously stood up in the face of enemy
fire. More important, he aggressively employed his force in battle,
while many other senior commanders had grown timid after years of
peacetime service. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, commander of
the 1st Marine Division, soon wrote Commandant Holcomb that “Edson is
one of the finest troop leaders I ever saw.”
[Illustration: