At 1130 two enemy aircraft appeared over the island and scouted the
scene of action. Carlson had trained his men to remain motionless
and not fire at planes. With no troops in sight and no contact from
their own ground force, the planes finally dropped their bombs, though
none landed within Marine lines. Two hours later 12 planes arrived on
the scene, several of them seaplanes. Two of the larger flying boats
landed in the lagoon. Raider machine guns and Boys antitank rifles
fired at them. One burst into flame and the other crashed on takeoff
after receiving numerous hits. The remaining aircraft bombed and
strafed the island for an hour, again with most of the ordnance hitting
enemy-occupied territory. Another air attack came late in the afternoon.
[Illustration: _Sgt Clyde Thomason was posthumously decorated with
the Medal of Honor for his leadership in turning back a Japanese
counterattack during the Makin raid. He was the first enlisted Marine
so decorated in World War II._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 310616
]
The natives on the island willingly assisted the Americans throughout
the day. They carried ammunition and provided intelligence. The latter
reports suggested that enemy reinforcements had come ashore from the
seaplanes and from two small ships in the lagoon. (The submarines
later took the boats under indirect fire with their deck guns and
miraculously sunk both.) Based on this information, Carlson was certain
there was still a sizable Japanese force on the island. At 1700 he
called several individuals together and contemplated his options.
Roosevelt and the battalion operations officer argued for a withdrawal
as planned in preparation for the next day’s landing on Little Makin.
Concerned that he might become too heavily engaged if he tried to
advance, Carlson decided to follow their recommendation.
This part of the operation went smoothly for a time. The force broke
contact in good order and a group of 20 men covered the rest of the
raiders as they readied their rubber boats and shoved off. Carlson,
however, forgot about the covering force and thought his craft
contained the last men on the island when it entered the water at
1930. Disaster then struck in the form of heavy surf. The outboard
engines did not work and the men soon grew exhausted trying to paddle
against the breakers. Boats capsized and equipment disappeared. After
repeated attempts several boatloads made it to the rendezvous with the
submarines, but Carlson and 120 men ended up stranded on the shore.
Only the covering force and a handful of others had weapons. In the
middle of the night a small Japanese patrol approached the perimeter.
They wounded a sentry, but not before he killed three of them.
With the enemy apparently still full of fight and his raiders
disorganized and weakened, Carlson called another council of war.
Without much input from the others, he decided to surrender. His
stated reasons were concern for the wounded, and for the possible fate
of the president’s son (who was not present at the meeting). At 0330
Carlson sent his operations officer and another Marine out to contact
the enemy. They found one Japanese soldier and eventually succeeded in
giving him a note offering surrender. Carlson also authorized every
man to fend for himself--those who wished could make another attempt
to reach the submarines. By the next morning several more boatloads
made it through the surf, including one with Major Roosevelt. In the
meantime, a few exploring raiders killed several Japanese, one of them
probably the man with the surrender note.
With dawn the situation appeared dramatically better. The two-man
surrender party reported that there appeared to be no organized enemy
force left on the island. There were about 70 raiders still ashore,
and the able-bodied armed themselves with weapons lying about the
battlefield. Carlson organized patrols to search for food and the
enemy. They killed two more Japanese soldiers and confirmed the
lack of opposition. The raider commander himself led a patrol to
survey the scene and carry out the demolition of military stores and
installations. He counted 83 dead Japanese and 14 of his own killed
in action. Based on native reports, Carlson thought his force had
accounted for more than 160 Japanese. Enemy aircraft made four separate
attacks during the day, but they inflicted no losses on the raider
force ashore.
[Illustration: Nautilus (_SS 168_) _enters Pearl Harbor on 26 August
1942 following the 2d Raider Battalion raid on Makin. On deck besides
the crew are members of Companies A and B, some wearing Navy-issue
clothing to replace that which was lost in the surf attempting to
return to the sub. A number of raiders are dressed in black-dyed khaki
that they wore in the raid._]
The Marines contacted the submarines during the day and arranged an
evening rendezvous off the entrance to the lagoon, where there was no
surf to hinder an evacuation. The men hauled four rubber boats across
the island and arranged for the use of a native outrigger. By 2300
the remainder of the landing force was back on board the _Nautilus_
and _Argonaut_. Since the entire withdrawal had been so disorganized,
the two companies were intermingled on the submarines and it was not
until they returned to Pearl Harbor that they could make an accurate
accounting of their losses. The official tally was 18 dead and 12
missing.
Only after the war would the Marine Corps discover that nine of the
missing raiders had been left alive on the island. These men had
become separated from the main body at one point or another during the
operation. With the assistance of the natives the group evaded capture
for a time, but finally surrendered on 30 August. A few weeks later the
Japanese beheaded them on the island of Kwajalein.
The raid itself had mixed results. Reports painted it as a great
victory and it boosted morale on the home front. Many believed it
achieved its original goal of diverting forces from Guadalcanal, but
the Japanese had immediately guessed the size and purpose of the
operation and had not let it alter their plans for the Solomons.
However, it did cause the enemy to worry about the potential for other
such raids on rear area installations. On the negative side, that
threat may have played a part in the subsequent Japanese decision
to fortify heavily places like Tarawa Atoll, the scene of a costly
amphibious assault later in the war. At the tactical level, the 2d
Raiders had proven themselves in direct combat with the enemy. Their
greatest difficulties had involved rough seas and poor equipment;
bravery could not fix those limitations. Despite the trumpeted success
of the operation, the Navy never again attempted to use submarines to
conduct raids behind enemy lines.
Carlson received the Navy Cross for his efforts on Makin, and the
public accorded him hero status. A few of those who served with him
were not equally pleased with his performance. No one questioned
his demonstrated bravery under fire, but some junior officers were
critical of his leadership, especially the attempt to surrender to a
non-existent enemy. Carlson himself later noted that he had reached “a
spiritual low” on the night of the 17th. And again on the evening of
the 18th, the battalion commander contemplated remaining on the island
to organize the natives for resistance, while others supervised the
withdrawal of his unit. Those who criticized him thought he had lost
his aggressiveness and ability to think clearly when the chips were
down. But he and his raiders would have another crack at the enemy in
the not too distant future.
_Tulagi_
The Makin operation had not been Nimitz’s first choice for an
amphibious raid. In late May he had proposed an attack by the 1st
Raiders against the Japanese seaplane base on Tulagi, in the lower
Solomon Islands. The target was in the Southwest Pacific Area, however,
and General Douglas MacArthur opposed the plan. But Tulagi remained a
significant threat to the maritime lifeline to Australia. After the
Midway victory opened the door for a more offensive Allied posture,
the Japanese advance positions in the Solomons became a priority
objective. In late June the Joint Chiefs of Staff shifted that region
from MacArthur’s command to Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean Areas command,
and ordered the seizure of Tulagi. The Americans soon discovered
that the Japanese were building an airfield on nearby Guadalcanal,
and that became the primary target for Operation Watchtower. The 1st
Marine Division, with the 1st Raider Battalion attached, received the
assignment.
[Illustration: TULAGI