It was the design of General Burnside that the pontoons should leave

Alexandria on November 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time with

the advance of his army. The right grand division reached Falmouth on

November 17. The pontoons left Alexandria on November 19, and arrived at

Fredericksburgh after the movements of General Burnside had not only

become known, but after General Lee had advanced his forces from

Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, and had

fortified them. They were not used until the night of December 10, owing

to material changes in the plan of the commander-in-chief, necessitated

by new movements of the enemy.

During the night of the 10th of December, therefore, the pontoons were

conveyed to the river, and the artillery to the number of one hundred

and forty-three pieces was placed in position opposite the city. Between

four and five o’clock on the morning of the 11th, the work of building

four bridges was commenced. One was to be made at the point where the

railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two others opposite the city but

nearer Falmouth, and the fourth nearly two miles below for the crossing

of the left wing under General Franklin. A dull haze so obscured the

movement, that it was not discovered for some time by the Confederate

pickets. The bridges were thus partly constructed, when a brisk and

deadly fire of musketry from along the banks of the river and windows of

the houses was opened, which compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to

the cover of the surrounding hills where they formed again, and about

six o’clock the work was recommenced. The Confederates had now become

aroused to a sense of what was going forward, and with reinforcements of

sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and houses. The pontonniers,

nothing daunted by the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely to work.

A storm of bullets covered them. The planks and boats were riddled by

every volley. Once more they were compelled to withdraw, and again fell

back to the cover of the ridge of hills running parallel with the river.

Orders were now given to the artillery to open fire on the city. The

Federal batteries commenced an almost simultaneous bombardment,

directing their fire chiefly at the houses in which the sharpshooters

had concealed themselves. At the first fire they became untenable, and

the riflemen retreated to the rear of the town, and took shelter behind

the buildings unharmed. The fire of the artillery, which commenced at

seven o’clock, was continued incessantly until one o’clock. The fog

somewhat obscured its results, but bodies of the Confederates with great

stubbornness still kept within the city. The Confederate batteries on

the heights in the rear continued silent. Not a gun was fired. About ten

o’clock, the workmen were again formed for a third attempt to build the

bridges. Volunteers joined them from the Eighth Connecticut. Some planks

were seized and carried out to the end of a string of boats and placed

in position, when a galling fire from sharpshooters in rifle pits near

the edge of the water again interrupted them, and they were recalled.

Meantime the bombardment was continued, and several houses in the city

had taken fire. In the afternoon, several pontoon boats, loaded with

volunteers from the Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts, were

sent over. They chased the Confederate sharpshooters from their hiding

places, and the bridges were finished without further interruption. On

the other side a scene of destruction presented itself. The walls of

houses were breached, roofs had fallen in, and the interiors were

destroyed.

No sooner were the bridges completed than the troops began to cross, and

before dusk General Sumner’s grand division had gone over, and a section

of General Hooker’s. All had rations for three days, and blankets for a

bivouac. The grand division of General Franklin, consisting of the corps

of General Reynolds and Smith, crossed over at the lower bridge, which

was built earlier in the day, without interruption, as there was a plain

before it which the artillery could have easily swept. The troops

commenced crossing again early on the morning of the 12th without

molestation. Some sharp resistance had been made by the Confederate

soldiers to those who crossed on the previous day, but those were driven

out of the city, or killed. During the afternoon fire was opened upon

the city by the Confederate batteries on the nearest heights, which was

replied to by the Federal batteries, and soon ceased. The occupation of

Fredericksburg had now been successfully made. No greater opposition had

been presented by the forces of General Lee than was sufficient to tempt

the Federal troops to press forward with greater ardor.

The next movement was to drive the Confederate forces from their

positions on the heights. These positions consisted of two lines of

batteries, one a mile in rear of the other, and both overlooking the

city. They extended, in the form of a semicircle, from Port Royal to a

point about six miles above Fredericksburg. Their right wing, under

General Jackson, extended from Port Royal to Guinney’s Station on the

Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad; the centre, under General

Longstreet, extended to the telegraph road; the left, under General

Stuart, was west of Massaponax creek. A reserve corps was commanded by

General A. P. Hill. This was the force which had fought at Richmond and

in Maryland.

Friday night and Saturday morning, the 13th, were spent by General

Burnside in making a proper disposition of his forces. The left was

occupied by General Franklin with his grand division, the centre by

General Hooker, and the right by General Sumner.

The right of General Franklin rested on the outskirts of the city, his

centre was advanced about a mile from the river, and his left was on the

Rappahannock, about three miles below. The action commenced on the

extreme left by an annoying fire from a rebel battery, which the Ninth

New York was ordered to charge and capture. In this attempt they were

repulsed. A brigade was brought to their aid by General Tyler, and

another attempt made, but the fire was so deadly that it failed of

success. The battle now became more general, and another attempt was

made to capture the battery. No advantage was gained at this time, but a

severe loss was suffered. The conflict now extended along the whole line

of the left, and a desperate effort was made to drive the Confederates

across the Massaponax creek by turning their position. The ground was

contested most obstinately, but the Confederates gradually fell back,

occasionally making a most desperate stand, until night, when General

Franklin had succeeded in gaining nearly a mile, and his troops occupied

the field. The right of General Franklin’s division, under General

Reynolds, encountered the fire of the Confederate artillery on the

heights, and although the conflict was most deadly, no advantage was

gained.

On the right, under command of General Sumner, the action commenced

about ten o’clock and was furious during the rest of the day. The

Confederate forces occupied the woods and hills in the rear of the city,

from which it soon became evident they could not be driven except at the

point of the bayonet. The charge was ordered to be made by the division

of General French supported by that of General Howard. Steadily the

troops moved across the plain, until they were within a dozen yards of

the ridge, when they were suddenly met by a galling fire from the

Confederate infantry posted behind a stone wall. For a few minutes the

head of the column exhibited some confusion; but quickly forming into

line it retired back to a ravine within musket shot of the rebels. Here

they were reinforced by fresh troops who fearlessly advanced to their

aid under a most destructive fire of artillery. The line of assault was

now formed again, and with bayonets fixed and a double quick step, they

rushed forward to seize the Confederate artillery. From the first step

they encountered a terrific fire of infantry and artillery. No veterans

could face that shock. They were thrown into confusion and brought to a

sudden halt. At this juncture the centre quivered, faltered, and fled in

disorder, but was afterwards rallied and brought back. Three times was

the attack thus made to dislodge those batteries. But each time it was

in vain. The ranks of the storming party, shrunk to small limits,

retired. The entire force of his artillery was now brought by General

Sumner to bear upon the enemy, and thus the contest was kept up until

dark. At night the Confederate force occupied their original position,

and the wounded and the dead remained where they had fallen. Every

attempt to remove them by the Federal troops was defeated by the rebel

infantry.

In the centre under the command of General Hooker, skirmishing commenced

early in the morning; and during the forenoon, while the fog prevailed,

a terrific contest, chiefly with artillery, was kept up on both sides.

The Confederate position appeared to be invulnerable to artillery, and

about noon preparations were made for storming it. The troops marched

steadily up within musket shot of the batteries, and were there met by

such a destructive fire of artillery and rifles as drove them back with

a heavy loss. Reinforcements were obtained, and the attempt to take the

batteries was repeated in the afternoon, but without success. The

contest continued with great fierceness until night. About half past

five the firing of the musketry ceased, but that of the artillery

continued until long after dark.

On the next day, Sunday the 14th, both armies remained comparatively

quiet. Some skirmishing and artillery fire took place for a short time.

On Monday, both armies continued in the same position. The Confederates

had strengthened some of their works. During the ensuing night, the army

evacuated Fredericksburg and retired across the river to its former

position. The artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry, the

last of whom left about daylight. The pontoon bridges were then removed

and all communication cut off. The movement was not perceived by the

Confederates until it was too late to do any injury to the retreating

force. The following is the despatch of General Burnside announcing this

movement:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, }

SIX O’CLOCK, P. M., _December 16, 1862_. }

Major-General HALLECK: The army was withdrawn to this side of the

river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and

it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse

would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night,

without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of

property or men.

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General Commanding.

The Federal loss was as follows: General Sumner’s division on the right,

killed, four hundred and seventy-three; wounded, four thousand and

ninety; missing, seven hundred and forty-eight. Total, five thousand

three hundred and eleven.

General Hooker’s division on the centre, killed, three hundred and

twenty-six; wounded, two thousand four hundred and sixty-eight; missing,

seven hundred and fifty-four. Total, three thousand five hundred and

forty-eight.

General Franklin’s division on the left, killed, three hundred and

thirty-nine; wounded, two thousand five hundred and forty-seven;

missing, five hundred and seventy-six. Total, three thousand four

hundred and sixty-two. Grand total, killed, one thousand one hundred and

thirty-eight; wounded, nine thousand one hundred and five; missing, two

thousand and seventy-eight. Total, twelve thousand three hundred and

twenty-one.

The Confederate loss was comparatively small, having been sheltered by

their works.

General Burnside in his report to the general-in-chief, thus explains

his defeat:

“How near we came to the accomplishment of our object future reports

will show. But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in

building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours to

concentrate his forces in his strong position, we would almost certainly

have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion,

far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected.

As it was, we came very near success. Failing in the accomplishment of

the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to

decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight me

with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river

unmolested, without the loss of men or property.

“As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their

different positions as if going on parade—not the least demoralization

or disorganization existed.

“To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus

recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe everything. For the failure

in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and

endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the

points had it been possible.

“To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt

sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayer for their

comfort and final recovery.

“The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on this line rather

against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself,

and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me

orders, makes me the more responsible.”

Thus closed the third campaign against Richmond. No further hostile

demonstrations were made by either army during the year.

OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE. BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO’.

DECEMBER 31, 1862.

On the 25th of October General Rosecrans was ordered to Cincinnati to

take command of the Army of the Ohio, which consisted of what remained

of the splendid army formerly commanded by General Buell. The Army of

the Ohio was at this time—October 30, 1862—concentrated at Bowling

Green, Kentucky; and there General Rosecrans took up his headquarters.

This General’s first step was to organize and discipline the army, which

had been, in a measure, demoralized by its reverses, under the command

of General Buell. This was a task of magnitude, requiring both time and

energy. It was accomplished, however, and on the 10th of November,

General Rosecrans transferred his headquarters from Bowling Green to

Nashville, Tennessee.

Six weeks of unavoidable delay occurred, during which time the Army of

the Ohio did nothing to retrieve its past disasters. General Rosecrans

was one hundred and eighty-three miles from Louisville, his base of

supplies; and the only communication between his present headquarters

and the capital of Kentucky was a single line of railroad, not yet

completed from Mitchellsville to Nashville, a distance of fifty miles.

The completion of this piece of railroad occupied three weeks; and after

it was in perfect running order, it required still another three weeks

to collect supplies, sufficient to make it safe for the army to attempt

any movement in advance. Much skirmishing between the patriot troops and

the rebels meanwhile occurred; in most of which the former were

victorious. The only disaster of any moment, that occurred to the Union

army, at this period, was the capture of Colonel Moore’s brigade, at

Hartsville, by the rebel guerrilla, General John A. Morgan, with a

cavalry force, and mounted infantry, numbering about five thousand men.

General Rosecrans proceeded with indefatigable energy in his

preparations to meet the enemy; but, with the utmost dispatch and

patience combined, it was almost the end of December before he was in

condition to offer battle to the rebel Bragg, who was stationed at

Murfreesboro’, having made his headquarters there, after his escape from

Kentucky. The army under General Rosecrans bore no comparison in numbers

with that of Bragg; but its organization was perfect. Being compelled to

leave a large force at Nashville, for the protection of that city,

General Rosecrans’ force, when he advanced, was less than forty-seven

thousand men; while that of General Bragg numbered sixty-five thousand.

General Rosecrans divided his army into three corps; one under command

of General McD. McCook; another under command of General George H.

Thomas; and a third under command of General Thomas L. Crittenden. The

corps of General McCook consisted of three divisions under Generals

Johnson, Davis and Sheridan; General Thomas’ corps consisted of two

divisions, under Generals Rousseau and Negley. The corps of General

Crittenden was composed of three divisions, under Generals Van Cleve,

Wood and Palmer. General D. S. Stanley was chief of cavalry.

The rebel forces under Bragg were also divided into three corps,

commanded respectively by Generals Hardee, Polk and E. Kirby Smith. In

addition General Bragg had two cavalry brigades, under command of

General Forrest and General Morgan; each of these brigades contained

five thousand men.

The moment for attack had come, in the judgment of General Rosecrans.

The rebel cavalry force had been sent north, on a raid, in consequence

of incorrect information received by Bragg, concerning the movements of

Rosecrans.

General McCook received orders to advance upon General Hardee, who

occupied a position on the Nolensville road. General Thomas was ordered

to the Franklin road, so as to threaten Hardee’s flank; and, by a

crossroad, to form a junction with McCook. And General Crittenden was

ordered to advance on the Murfreesboro’ road, as far as Lavergne. These

movements being carried out caused the retreat of Hardee toward

Murfreesboro’. Encountering considerable opposition from the rebels, and

being compelled to feel their way over a totally unknown and wooded

country, the National force had all crossed over to the Murfreesboro’

road.

On the night of Tuesday, the 30th of December, General Rosecrans had his

line formed. The relative positions of the armies were then as follows:

The rebels were intrenched in a thick wood about two miles in front of

Murfreesboro’; their lines extending along both sides of a stream, the

right under command of General Polk, the left commanded by General

Hardee, and the centre by General Smith.

The line of battle of the National troops was drawn up directly opposite

that of the rebels, with General Crittenden holding the left, which

rested on Stone River; General McCook the right, and General Thomas the

centre.

While General Rosecrans was deciding the method of attack, and

explaining it to his corps commanders, the rebel General had decided to

take the aggressive.

The rebel attack was cleverly managed. Without any demonstration, the

enemy suddenly emerged from the woods in which they had been concealed,

at about seven o’clock on the morning of the 31st of December, and

steadily and noiselessly advanced toward the National line. The troops

had fallen in line on the first news of the enemy’s approach, and

quietly awaited their coming; but notwithstanding this, however, the

unexpected nature of the attack threw the Union troops into confusion,

in a very short time the infantry breaking and retreating without a

single shot. There was much brave but fruitless fighting. The dense

masses of the enemy bore down upon the enfeebled National line, and were

bravely met; but continued resistance was impossible. A large part of

McCook’s ammunition and subsistence trains were captured by the enemy.

The day was plainly against the Federals; and, for the time, it might

have been said that General Rosecrans was defeated even before his

attack had begun. Unless the battle-field was at once given up to the

rebels, it became evident that a complete and immediate change of plan

was essential to the maintenance of even a show of resistance to the

enemy. General McCook’s army was almost broken up; and upon the centre

the firing only increased in fury.

General Rosecrans, with the energy, bravery, and promptness that ever

characterized him, saw the danger of defeat, and instantly determined on

a means of retrieving his fortunes. Having sent his staff along the

lines, he dashed right into the furious fire upon the centre, and sent

forward Beatty’s brigade. Immediately a scorching fire was opened from

six batteries at once; and as a loud, prolonged cheer burst from the

Union troops, it was plain that the rebels were falling back before

them. This so encouraged the patriots that every man bent with renewed

vigor and enthusiasm to the work before him. A large force of cavalry,

which had been sent down the Murfreesboro’ road, had arrested the flying

men of McCook’s division, and sent them back to their regiments. General

Rosecrans continued to urge his encouraged troops forward, and the

rebels fled before them for nearly a mile. The foe now prepared to fall

upon the left of the Union line; and although that portion of the army

had already received orders to charge upon the enemy, before the advance

could be made, the rebels had meanwhile again burst upon the centre,

which had begun to break. The breech was instantly filled by the gallant

General Rousseau, at the head of his division, and the enemy was beaten

back into the cedar thicket in their rear.

Once more the rebels fell upon the Union right, driving it back; and, as

the men, fled in disorder before the attack, the sight was very

discouraging: but happily no panic ensued. General Rosecrans now massed

his divisions against the rebel left, crossed the river, and gave them

desperate battle for the space of two hours, during which time the

rebels had all the advantage of position and attack till they were at

last checked by a terribly destructive fire of musketry and artillery.

“The scene at this point,” says a correspondent of the day, “was

magnificently terrible.” The whole battle was in full view, the enemy

deploying right and left, bringing up their batteries in fine style—our

own vomiting smoke and iron missiles upon them with awful fury, and our

gallant fellows moving to the front with unflinching courage, and lying

flat upon their faces to escape the rebel fire until the moment for

action. Shell and shot fell around like rain. General Rosecrans was

himself incessantly exposed. It is wonderful that he escaped. His

chief-of-staff, the noble Lieutenant-Colonel Garesché, had his head

taken off by a round shot, and the blood bespattered the General and

some of the staff. Lieutenant Lylam Kirk, just behind him, was thrown

out of his saddle by a bullet which shattered his left arm. The enemy at

about six o’clock took up a position not assailable except by artillery;

and being evidently exhausted by the repeated and rapid assaults, the

firing on both sides gradually slackened, and ceased entirely as the

darkness deepened,—the battle having continued almost without

intermission for eleven hours. The losses on both sides were heavy.

Major Rosengarten and Major Ward were both killed, during a cavalry

charge: General Rousseau at the head of his splendid division, was

wounded, after having made two bayonet charges, and fought during five

hours. General Stanley and General Palmer were also wounded.

At dawn of the following morning, General Rosecrans opened fire

furiously upon the enemy, with his left endeavoring to beat him back

from the right. The enemy met the attack bravely, holding their ground;

and the battle continued in that direction for several hours. Matters

did not look favorable for the National army; but at twelve o’clock new

supplies of ammunition were received, the batteries were replenished and

massed, and a murderous fire was opened upon the rebel line. It began to

give way: and, with General Thomas pressing on its centre, and General

Crittenden on its left, was handsomely repulsed.

For the remainder of the day, the battle changing from one point to

another, continued to rage with varied success—now the Unionists were

victors, and now the rebels; till night again closed the conflict, and

no decisive victory had been gained on either side.

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