of the Mississippi, immediately preceding the transfer of General
Rosecrans from that army to the command of the Army of the Ohio.
Corinth, as we have seen, had been captured by the national forces on
the 30th of May, 1862. Its importance as a military position, (early
recognized by the rebel General Beauregard) continually tempted the
rebels to undertake its recapture. Many endeavors to effect this had
been made, during the summer of 1862. One of these occasioned severe
engagements at Bolivar Station, on the 30th and 31st of August, and at
Britton’s Lane, on the 1st of September. The rebels lost heavily in
these fights.
The rebel strategy at this time contemplated severing the railroad
communication between Memphis and Corinth. To prevent that disaster, and
effectually to check the advance of the insurgents, General Rosecrans,
on the 19th of September, gave battle to the rebels under General Price,
attacking them near the village of Iuka. The battle commenced toward
evening, the attack being made by two brigades of Missouri cavalry,
commanded by General Stanley and General Hamilton, supported by the
Fifth Ohio, Colonel Matthias—an excellent officer and a brave man—and
the Eleventh Ohio battery. The latter, placed in position on the brow of
a hill, commanded the road in front, and did great service. The Fifth
Ohio and the Twenty-sixth Missouri occupied a position on the right
under cover of woods. On the left of the road and slightly in advance of
the battery, was stationed the Forty-eighth Indiana. The rebel forces,
comprising eighteen regiments, were commanded by General Price, in
person.
The rebels, largely outnumbering the Unionists, hurled themselves, at
the outset, in a dense mass upon the front of the National line, and
strove to break it. To bring up new troops to its support was
impossible. At first, it appeared that the Federals would give way;
great confusion prevailed; but just at the critical moment General
Stanley pushed to the front, to aid General Hamilton in reforming the
disordered troops. His presence had a magical effect; and when at length
the Eleventh Missouri, a part of his division, was pushed to the right,
where it united with the Twenty-sixth Missouri and the Fifth Iowa, a
gallant and successful stand was made against the enemy, who was finally
driven back with great loss. From this time, until darkness put an end
to the battle, the rebels, confident in their great numerical strength,
made repeated and desperate attacks upon the National forces—attacks
which, in every instance, were bravely met, and successfully repulsed.
[Illustration: JEFFERSON DAVIS.]
The brunt of the battle was borne by General Hamilton’s regiments, who
well deserve the honor due to dauntless bravery. General Stanley’s
division, being in the rear, was, with the exception of the Eleventh
Missouri, before named—which rendered signal service—prevented from
taking an active part in the conflict.
On the morning of the 20th, it was found that the rebels had fled—in a
southerly direction. General Hamilton and General Stanley immediately
started in pursuit with cavalry, following the foe for fifteen miles.
Then, worn out with labor and fighting, and famished for want of food,
they discontinued the pursuit and returned to camp.
BATTLE OF CORINTH, MISS.
OCTOBER 3 AND 4, 1862.
Immediately after the battle of Iuka, the rebel forces of Price and Van
Dorn formed a junction, for the purpose of making another attempt upon
Corinth. General Rosecrans, meanwhile, always watchful and energetic,
speedily divined their plans, and at once made the requisite
preparations to check their advance. Nor was the collision long
deferred. On the morning of the 3rd of October, the Union forces were
attacked by a body of insurgents, largely superior in numbers,
(officially stated at thirty-eight thousand,) and on that day and the
next was fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war, which is known
as the battle of Corinth. The rebel force was commanded by Generals
Price, Van Dorn, Lovell, Villipigue and Rusk.
The following was the disposition of the Union troops, on the 3rd of
October: General McKean with his division occupied Chewalla; General
Davis with his division, occupied the line between the Memphis and
Columbus road: General Hamilton, with his division, had taken position
between the rebel works, on the Purdy and Hamburgh roads; and General
Stanley held his division in reserve, near the old headquarters of
General Grant. This disposition of the troops placed General Hamilton on
the right, General McKean on the left, and General Davis in the centre.
McKean had an advance of three regiments of infantry, and a section of
artillery under Colonel Oliver, on the Chewalla road, beyond the enemy’s
breastworks.
On the morning of the 3rd, the advance under Colonel Oliver, took a
strong position on a hill, near an angle in these breastworks: and at
about nine o’clock they were strongly pressed by the enemy, who
manœuvred to outflank them. At ten o’clock General Rosecrans was
informed that Colonel Oliver was imperatively in need of reinforcements,
and must yield his position unless they were furnished. The hill would
be of great value to the enemy; and it was therefore necessary that the
Union forces should hold possession of it; and two regiments of Colonel
Davies’ brigade were sent to Colonel Oliver’s assistance. It was
presently demonstrated that Brigadier-General Arthur had taken up four
more regiments from McKean’s division; and Colonel Oliver’s position
upon the hill was being strongly contested. An advance, leaving an
interval between McArthur’s and Davies’ left, was now made upon the
enemy’s breastworks; but the rebels cleverly pushed on behind Davies’
left, and, after a fierce and determined resistance, forced the brigade
to a rapid retreat of nearly a thousand yards, in which movement it lost
two heavy guns. Of the fighting, in this engagement, on the 3rd of
October, General Rosecrans speaks thus:
“Our troops fought with the most determined courage, firing very low. At
one P. M. Davies having resumed the same position he had occupied in the
morning, and McArthur’s brigade having fought a heavy force, it became
evident that the enemy were in full strength, and meant mischief. McKean
with Crocker’s brigade had seen only skirmishers; there were no signs of
any movement on our left, and only a few cavalry skirmishers on our
right. It was pretty clear that we were to expect the weight of the
attack to fall on our centre, where hopes had been given of our falling
back.
“Orders were accordingly given to McKean to fall back to the next ridge
beyond our intrenchments, to touch his right on Davies’ left, for
Stanley to move northward and eastward, to stand in close echelon, but
nearer town. General Hamilton was ordered to face toward Chewalla and
move down until his left reached Davies’ right. Davies was informed of
these dispositions, told to hold his ground obstinately, and then, when
he had drawn them in strongly, Hamilton would swing in on their front
and rear and close the day. Hamilton was carefully instructed on this
point, and entered into the spirit of it.”
The result of this day’s battle was not favorable to the National
troops; the fighting of each and every division engaged was superb, but
the number of the enemy so far exceeded that of the Union army that when
the engagement for the day was closed by the approach of night, the
whole National force was driven back, and had lost a great many men.
General Oglesby was wounded, and General Hackleman was killed.
Very early on the following morning the opening of fire from the enemy’s
artillery gave indications of a very hard fight to come.
At seven o’clock the heads of the rebel column were seen, emerging from
the woods in front of the Union forces, and slowly bearing down upon
their centre—first on Davis, next on Stanley, and last on Hamilton. The
rebel force was so overpowering that the jaded and worn troops of the
Union fell back before it. A contemporary correspondent describing this
portion of the battle on the 4th, writes as follows: “It was perhaps
half-past nine o’clock when the bitter tragedy began to develop in
earnest. A prodigious mass, with gleaming bayonets, suddenly loomed out,
dark and threatening on the east of the railroad, moving sternly up the
Bolivar road in column by divisions. Directly it opened out in the shape
of a monstrous wedge, and drove forward impetuously toward the heart of
Corinth. It was a splendid target for our batteries, and it was soon
perforated. Hideous gaps were rent in it, but those massive lines were
closed almost as soon as they were torn open. At this period the skilful
management of General Rosecrans began to develop. It was discovered that
the enemy had been enticed to attack precisely at the point where the
artillery could sweep them with direct, cross and enfilading fire. He
had prepared for such an occasion. Our shell swept through the mass with
awful effect, but the brave rebels pressed onward inflexibly. Directly
the wedge opened and spread out magnificently, right and left, like
great wings, seeming to swoop over the whole field before them. But
there was a fearful march in front. A broad turfy glacis, sloping upward
at an angle of thirty degrees to a crest fringed with determined,
disciplined soldiers, and clad with terrible batteries, frowned upon
them. There were a few obstructions—fallen timber—which disordered their
lines a little. But every break was instantly welded. Our whole line
opened fire, but the enemy, seemingly insensible to fear, or infuriated
by passion, bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death,
_with their faces averted like men striving to protect themselves
against a driving storm of hail_. The Yates and Burgess sharpshooters,
lying snugly behind their rude breastworks, poured in a destructive
fire, but it seemed no more effectual than if they had been firing
potato-balls, excepting that somebody was killed. The enemy still
pressed onward undismayed. At last they reached the crest of the hill in
front and to the right of Fort Richardson, and General Davies’s division
gave way. It began to fall back in disorder. General Rosecrans, who had
been watching the conflict with eagle eye, and who is described as
having expressed his delight at the trap into which General Price was
blindly plunging, discovered the break and dashed to the front, inflamed
with indignation. He rallied the men by his splendid example in the
thickest of the fight. Before the line was demoralized he succeeded in
restoring it, and the men, brave when bravely led, fought again. But
they had yielded much space, and the loss of Fort Richardson was
certain. Price’s right moved swiftly to the headquarters of General
Rosecrans, took possession of it, and posted themselves under cover of
the portico of the house, and behind its corners, whence they opened
fire upon our troops on the opposite side of the public square. Seven
rebels were killed within the little inclosure in front of the General’s
cottage. The structure is a sort of sieve now—bullets have punctured it
so numerously. But the desperate men got no further into town.
“Battle was raging about Fort Richardson. Gallant Richardson, for whom
it was named, fought his battery well. Had his supports fought, as his
artillerymen did, the record would have been different. The rebels
gained the crest of the hill, swarmed around the little redoubt, and
were swept away from it as a breath will dissipate smoke. Again they
swarmed like infuriated tigers. At last a desperate dash with a yell.
Richardson goes down to rise no more. His supports are not at hand. The
foe shouts triumphantly and seizes the guns. The horses are fifty yards
down the hill toward Corinth. A score of rebels seize them. The
Fifty-sixth Illinois suddenly rises from cover in the ravine. One
terrible volley, and there are sixteen dead artillery horses, a dozen
dead rebels. Illinois shouts, and charges up the hill, across the
plateau into the battery. The rebels fly out through embrasures and
around the wings. The Fifty-sixth yells again and pursues.
“The rebels do not stop. Hamilton’s veterans, meantime, have been
working quietly—no lung-work, but gun-work enough. A steady stream of
fire tore the rebel ranks to pieces. When Davies broke it was necessary
for all to fall back. General Rosecrans thought it well enough to get
Price in deeply. A rebel soldier says Van Dorn sat on his horse grimly
and saw it all. ‘That’s Rosecrans’s trick,’ said he; ‘he’s got Price
where he must suffer.’ Maybe this is one of the apocrypha of battle. A
rebel soldier says it’s true. But Hamilton’s division receded under
orders—at backward step, slowly, grimly, face to the foe, and firing.
But when the Fifty-sixth Illinois charged, this was changed. Davies’
misfortune had been remedied. The whole line advanced. The rebel host
was broken. A destroying Nemesis pursued them. Arms were flung away
wildly. They ran to the woods. They fled into the forests. Oh! what a
shout of triumph and what a gleaming line of steel followed them. It is
strange, but true. Our men do not often shout before battle. Heavens!
what thunder there is in their throats after victory. ‘They’’ report
that such a shout was never before heard in Corinth. Price’s _once_
‘invincible’’ now invisible legions were broken, demoralized, fugitive,
and remorselessly pursued down the hill, into the swamps, through the
thickets, into the forests. Newly disturbed earth shows where they fell
and how very thickly.”
During this hot fighting on the right, General Van Dorn, with his corps
arranged in four dense columns, made an attack on the Union left,
advancing on Battery Robinette. As the rebels came on they were received
with a volley of grape and canister; and as they drew nearer, a
murderous fire of musketry, from the Ohio brigade, met them directly in
the front, and caused them to reel back in confusion to the woods in
their rear. But the enemy were not yet defeated; they reformed
immediately, and boldly advanced to the charge again, led on by Colonel
Rogers, of the Second Texas; but a second time the dread musketry of the
Ohio brigade broke over them in a perfect shower of death. The rebels
held their ground with a front of desperate bravery, but when the
Twenty-seventh Ohio and the Eleventh Missouri, at the order to charge,
rushed forward upon them, their thinned ranks broke into fragments, and
they fled wildly back to the shelter of the woods pursued by the Union
soldiers, and the battle of Corinth was over—an entire and triumphant
victory to the National arms.
The enemy’s loss in killed was one thousand four hundred and
twenty-three officers and men; their loss in wounded amounted to five
thousand six hundred and ninety-two. The Unionists took two thousand two
hundred and forty-eight prisoners, among whom were one hundred and
thirty-seven field-officers, captains, and subalterns, representing
fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry,
thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine
regiments, six battalions, and thirteen batteries, beside separate
companies.
The National troops took also fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of
artillery, three thousand three hundred stand of arms, four thousand
five hundred rounds of ammunition, and a large lot of accoutrements. The
enemy blew up several wagons between Corinth and Chewalla, and beyond
Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages were destroyed, and the
ground was strewn with tents, officers’ mess-chests, and small arms.
When it was finally ascertained that the enemy, utterly routed, were in
full retreat, General Rosecrans ordered preparations for an immediate
pursuit. General Grant also sent a force under General Ord and General
Hurlbut to intercept and cut off the enemy’s retreat; and thus, when the
rebels reached Hatchie river, they found themselves completely hemmed
in—caught between two rivers—the Hatchie in front of them, the Tuscumbia
behind them. For a time the capture of the entire rebel army seemed
inevitable, pursued as they were by General Rosecrans, and assailed in
front by the reinforcements from General Grant. Unfortunately, the Union
army was too much exhausted by its recent severe efforts, to follow up
the advantage; and General Price, always accomplished in carrying out a
retreat, made a successful attempt to cross the Hatchie a few miles
above the point where his first effort had been disputed, and so escaped
with his imperilled army.
GENERAL BURNSIDE TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
NOVEMBER 10, 1862.
On the 12th of November General Burnside issued the following address to
the army:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, _Nov. 10, 1862_.
In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of
the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac.
Patriotism, and the exercise of every energy in the direction of this
army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and
men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.
Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery
of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully
identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for
General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly
association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume
command.
To the Ninth army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I
need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for
myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and
determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept
its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must
prevail.
[Signed] A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major-General Commanding.
This was a position that was by no means coveted by General Burnside. He
well knew the difficulties and responsibilities of the office, and
expressed his misgivings of his ability to perform its duties. But he
was a brave and gallant soldier, and had already won the confidence of
the Government, and the admiration of his companions in-arms. It was
only after mature deliberation, and the consultation and advice of the
principal corps commanders that he consented to take upon himself the
chief command. In this determination he recognized the soldier’s duty of
obedience as a paramount consideration.
On the 12th the general-in-chief, (Halleck) and General Meigs proceeded
from Washington to the headquarters to confer with General Burnside. On
the same day the advance of the army was across the Rappahannock and
fifteen miles south of Warrenton. On the 14th General Burnside issued
the following order reorganizing a portion of army:
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
WARRENTON, VA., _Nov. 14, 1862_. }
_General Order, No. 184._
First. The organization of a part of this array in three grand
divisions is hereby announced. These grand divisions will be formed
and commanded as follows:
The Second and Ninth Corps will form the right grand division, and
will be commanded by Major-General E. V. Sumner.
The First and Sixth Corps will form the left grand division, and will
be commanded by Major-General W. B. Franklin.
The Third and Fifth Corps will form the centre grand division, and
will be commanded by Major-General Joseph Hooker.
The Eleventh Corps, with such others as may hereby be assigned to it,
will constitute a reserve force, under the command of Major-General F.
Sigel.
Assignments of cavalry and further details will be announced in future
orders.
By command of Major-General BURNSIDE.
S. WILLIAMS, A. A.-G.
Meanwhile the mass of General Lee’s forces retired to Gordonsville. On
the 16th the forces of General Burnside began to move for
Fredericksburg, as had been previously determined in consultation on the
12th between Generals Halleck and Burnside. On the 15th the evacuation
of Warrenton and the adjacent places was commenced, and by the morning
of the 18th it was entirely completed. The advance was led by General
Sumner. At the same time supplies were sent to Acquia Creek, and the
repairs of the railroad track to Fredericksburg commenced, and the army
concentrated at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.
The march to Richmond was to be made by the route from Fredericksburg.
This city is on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and sixty-five miles
distant from Richmond. It is connected with the latter place by a
railroad, of which there is a double line nearly to Hanover Junction,
twenty-three miles from Richmond. The railroad crosses the Matapony
river at Milford, thirty-seven miles from Fredericksburg, and the
Pamunkey, twenty-five miles from Richmond, besides a number of smaller
streams. Between Falmouth, where the Federal army concentrated, and
Richmond, there are two main and two minor lines of defence. The first
that of the Rappahannock river. Above Falmouth its abrupt banks, which
are lined with high hills, difficult of access, and its narrow fords and
rocky bottom render a rapid crossing for a large force almost
impossible. Below, the valley of the river expands, spreading often into
spacious plains, while the winding course of the stream forms numerous
necks of land, easily commanded from the north side, and giving secure
crossing places, and ample ground for the formation of troops. At
Fredericksburg the north commands the south bank, and much of the
distance, which is a mile and a half, to the frowning hills or table
land beyond. But these heights equally command this intermediate plain,
and are unassailable in front except by infantry. Next in the rear, and
twelve miles distant, is the line of the Po river and Stannard’s Marsh,
which is hardly available except to hold a pursuing foe in check. The
North Anna is about forty miles from the Rappahannock, and affords
another principal line of defence. It is a deep and rapid stream, with a
narrow valley. The table-land on its north bank is about one hundred
feet above the bed of the river, and about one hundred and fifty feet on
the south bank. The extension of its line after it turns to join the
South Anna, and becomes the Pamunkey, presents scarcely less obstacles
than the river itself, so well is the ground guarded by swamps and
flanked by streams. The last and a minor line of defence is the South
Anna river, with the southern commanded by the northern bank, and too
near the North Anna for a second formation by a force that has been
badly defeated. Numerous small streams parallel to the line of advance
present suitable points for resistance, and protect foes attacking the
line communication, while the bridges over them are weak points
necessary to be securely guarded.
By the 20th a considerable force had reached Falmouth. General Sumner on
the next day sent a summons to surrender, which elicited a
correspondence from Mayor Slaughter, showing that the town was at the
mercy of the combatants, and beyond the control of the city authorities.
As General Burnside’s army concentrated on the north bank, General Lee’s
forces concentrated on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Had
the pontoon bridges been at hand when the advance reached Falmouth, the
line of the Rappahannock would have been taken without opposition. Then,
with proper supplies and bridges, thirty of the sixty miles to Richmond
would have been placed within the reach of General Burnside, and perhaps
a lodgment have been effected on the banks of the North Anna. Nearly
thirty days elapsed before the pontoons arrived and the bridges were
completed.