Here is a scene with the Badenese envoy. The envoy asks compensation

for the duke of Brunswick. The Emperor angrily refuses: not because the

duke is supposed to have incited Prussia to make war against France; but

because, long before this, during the first campaign against France in

1792, he had issued the famous manifesto of Coblenz, in which he had

said that in Paris he would not leave one stone standing on another.

“What harm had this city done to him?” fiercely enquires the Emperor two

decades later, the man who in those days had been Lieutenant Bonaparte.

“This affront must be avenged!”

V

Napoleon’s energy is most conspicuous in his role of conqueror. But in

this case it finds a more spiritual expression than one would be led

to anticipate from a soldier. “I have seldom drawn my sword; I won my

battles with my eyes, not with my weapons.” To gain a knowledge of his

soul, it is not important to understand the new forms of his art of war;

of importance is to understand the way in which his whole being vibrated

before, during, and after a fight. In this, too, he is wholly original.

Even courage, that fundamental virtue of the soldier, assumes in Napoleon

a form peculiar to himself. During his youthful days, and again during

the last campaigns he displayed so much personal courage that he can

venture to say, “no soldier is proof against cowardice”; but such moments

of panic fear must be utilised against the foe. What he believes himself

almost alone to possess is “two-o’clock-in-the-morning courage”: courage

in face of the unforeseen, the sudden; courage which demands presence of

mind and power of determination. But he despises the “chivalrous” courage

of the duel, which he crushingly describes as “cannibal courage.”—“Since

you have both fought at Marengo and Austerlitz you do not need to give

any further proofs of your courage. Women are fickle, and so is good

luck. Go back to your regiments and become comrades again.”

The commander of armies clearly recognises the line of demarcation

between humaneness and coldness. The same man who, in his study, could

exclaim to Metternich: “Such a man as I does not care a snap of the

fingers for the lives of a million men”; will say on the field of battle:

“If the kings of the world could contemplate such a sight as this, they

would hanker less after wars and conquests.” Another time he writes

to Josephine: “The earth is strewn with dead and bleeding men; this

is the obverse of war; the heart is tortured at the sight of so many

victims.” Calculation and feeling are at cross purposes in this case,

and he excuses himself for the duties imposed by his own craft: “He who

cannot look upon a battle-ground dry-eyed, allows many men to be killed

purposelessly.” This is what he wants above all to avoid. For the great

aim, Europe entrusts him with a million men: his lesser aim, the taking

of this trench or that bridge, must be thriftily achieved, for “he who

heedlessly allows ten men to be killed where at most two need have died,

is answerable for the lives of eight men.”

Since most of his wars are fought from political necessity, and are

always conducted without hate, as soon as the fight is finished the foe

ceases to exist. He writes from Schönbrunn: “I am appalled to learn that

the eighteen thousand prisoners on the island of Lobau are suffering from

hunger; this is inhuman and unpardonable. Have twenty thousand rations

of bread sent there immediately; a similar amount of flour for the

bake-houses.” But when, after the truce, soldiers are still being killed

by the embittered Tyrolese, he is furious, and orders that “at least

six of the larger villages are to be plundered and burned, so that the

mountain folk may not soon forget the vengeance that has been exacted.”

War is for him an art, “the most noteworthy art, one which contains

within itself all the other arts.” Like a true artist, he declares that,

in the long run, this art cannot be taught: “You fancy that because

you have read Jomini you are fitted to be a leader in war?... I have

fought in sixty fights, and I can assure you that I have learned nothing

from any of them. Cæsar used the same tactics in his last battle as

he had used in his first.” In typical artist fashion, he contradicts

himself in the definitions of those things in which he is a master.

After the Spanish campaigns, he delivers the following lecture to one

of his generals: “War is decided far more by the power of strategical

calculation than by material forces.” At another time he will maintain

that it is the superior numbers or the moral courage of the troops which

constitutes the deciding factor. Sometimes he even goes so far as to say

that inspiration decides an issue: “The result of a battle hangs on a

thread and is mostly the outcome of a sudden thought. One approaches the

enemy according to a prearranged plan, one comes to blows, one fights for

a while, the critical moment draws near, a spark of inspiration flames

up—and a small reserve division does the rest!”

More logically, but not less as the artist, he speaks of the decisive

moment which, after a couple of engagements, one can find out for oneself

without any difficulty. “Such moments are not more than quarter hours....

In every battle a moment comes when the bravest of soldiers would like

to turn tail: it needs but a trifle, but a plea, to put heart into him

again.” This power of suggestion has won him many a victory, for soldiers

constitute the only mass to which he can speak with effect. The soldier

understands him, because Napoleon is simple. The Emperor even describes

war as “a simple art like everything that is beautiful.” By this

contention he seems to uphold the idea that war is the highest of all

arts. “The military profession is a freemasonry ... and I am the grand

master of its lodge.”

He draws this personal influence from the history of his own rise, which

is known to every soldier. As a young general, he had learned to put

up with his dependence on the civil authority; and as emperor he still

commiserates his royal adversaries because their generals’ activities

are frustrated by civilian control. On the other hand, he knows the

dangers of amateurishness, and writes to Joseph: “When the king himself

commands, the soldier does not feel commanded. The army applauds him as

when a queen is riding by. If one is not oneself a general, one must give

the generals full power of command.”

Because he is the only ruler in Europe who has risen from the ranks, from

youth upwards he remains familiar with details, and always understands

how things look to an officer on the fighting front. “There is nothing

connected with the art of war which I cannot do with my own hand: power,

siege engines, artillery.” But he does not concern himself with these

details unless it is necessary, and laughs at the romantic anecdote in

a book where he is said, one night, to have taken over the duties of a

sentry who had gone to sleep at his post: “That is a civilian’s idea, the

sort of thing a lawyer would think of, and was certainly not written by a

soldier.”

But he is a stickler for equality in the army, and in this matter

remains true to the revolution until the very end of his career. No one

is promoted unless his record in the service justifies the advancement.

If Napoleon makes an exception in the case of his brothers, we must

remember that after he has made them kings he continues to scold them

as if they were subalterns. He writes to Jerome, commenting on a report

from Silesia: “Besides, your letter is too clever for my taste.... What a

man needs in war is precision, firmness, simplicity.” When Joseph plays

the prince in Boulogne, and vies with Marshal Soult in the splendour of

his receptions, Napoleon scolds him. “In the army, no one must put the

commander in the shade. On review days, it is the general and not the

prince who must give a dinner. At a review, a royal colonel is a colonel

and nothing more. Discipline can tolerate no exceptions. The army is a

whole. Its commander is everything. Keep to your own regiment.”

[Illustration: Napoleon as Emperor in 1815. Woodcut, after a medal.]

Nevertheless, a wounded commander-in-chief has become a private soldier.

At Eylau, where there have been heavy losses, the Emperor forbids a

famous surgeon to go out of his way in order to care for a wounded

general: “Your business is to attend to all the wounded, and not to any

one in particular.” A German officer reports that after a fight Napoleon

would often stand by the wounded and see that they were carefully lifted

into the stretchers: “If this good fellow pulls through, there will be

one victim the less.”

In all the memoirs, we read how in camp the Emperor would foregather

with his men at the bivouac fire, ask whether their food was being

properly cooked, and laugh at their replies. When they confided all their

troubles to him, and often said “thou” to him, this was not the assumed

good fellowship of a condescending monarch, but a genuinely paternal

relationship. If he calls them “my children,” to them he is their “little

corporal,” meaning the comrade who takes the responsibility. “I have

received your letter, dear comrade,” he writes to a veteran grenadier

who wishes to re-enter the service. “You need not speak to me of your

deeds, for I know you to be the bravest grenadier in the army. It will be

a pleasure to see you once more. The Minister for War will send you your

orders.”

He never confides his plans to any one; but when it is a question of

rewarding merit, he calls in Everyman as adviser. After a fight, he often

forms a circle, speaks to the officers, the non-commissioned officers,

and the rankers individually, asking who were the most valiant, rewarding

then and there, allotting eagles with his own hand. “The officers pointed

out, the soldiers confirmed, the Emperor approved,” relates Ségur as

eyewitness.

It is true that Napoleon loves war, but as a fine art, just as he loves

power. It is true that he laughs incredulously at a traveller who tells

him a tale of a Chinese island where there are no weapons.

“What do you mean? But they must have weapons!”

“No, Sire.”

“Pikes, anyhow; or bows and arrows?”

“Neither the one nor the other.”

“Daggers!”

“Not even daggers.”

“But how the devil do they fight there?”

“There has never been a war on the island.”

“What, no war?”

It sounds to the traveller as if the very existence of such people under

the sun outrages the Emperor. The thought stirs a soldier’s bile!

All the same, he looked forward to the coming of peaceful days, not with

an ardent desire for them perhaps, but with the seer’s vision. He showed

his superiority to all the modern commanders against whom he fought, in

that he, the greatest soldier of the new times, declared the primacy of

the spirit over the sword. When Canova made a statue of him in which he

was shown with a threatening mien, he said contemptuously: “Does the man

think I achieved my conquests with blows of my fist?” But, more than

this, he himself defined a commander as something above and beyond a

soldier. When First Consul, he said in the Council of State:

“In what does the commander’s superiority consist? ‘In his mental

qualities: insight, calculation, decision, eloquence, knowledge of men.’

But all these qualities are what make a man shine in civil life.... If

bodily vigour and courage sufficed the commander, any brave private could

be a leader of armies. Everywhere, crude force now yields ground to moral

qualities. The man with the bayonet bows before the man who possesses

exceptional knowledge and understanding.... I knew perfectly well what I

was about when, as the head of the army, I bore the title of Member of

the Institute; and the youngest drummer understood what I meant.”

At a later date, he spoke more decisively.

“_War is an anachronism. Some day, victories will be won without cannon

and without bayonets.... Whoever troubles the peace of Europe, wants

civil war._”

Remember that these are the words of Napoleon, the military commander.

VI

His energy is concentrated on human beings. Very rarely does he come into

conflict with natural forces; and whenever he does so, he is beaten.

But, in general, all he has to do is to compel men to conquer, for him,

the mountains and the miles. Human beings are the material in working

with which the energy and the imagination of this artist are destined

to become weary; them he must overcome if he is to do his work at all.

No mortal ever conquered more men than did Napoleon. He subjugated, not

only armies and peoples, but something more: individuals, and the best of

these.

To achieve his goal, he followed the road of contempt; and used as his

means, glory and money. Self-confidence and experience had convinced him

that every one acts only from self-interest; that some are driven to

grasp at money through love of pleasure, or avarice, or clannishness;

that others seek public recognition in order to gratify their vanity,

their jealousy, or their ambition. Denying the force of ideal motives,

Napoleon relied exclusively upon material means; and if the spur of

ambition occasionally assumed the aspect of a desire for eternal glory,

this occurred against his will, but the magic of his personality

sometimes exercised a more puissant lure than the well-calculated

material attractions offered by others. To quote Goethe: “Napoleon, who

lived wholly for ideas, was nevertheless unable to grasp the nature of

ideal motives; he repudiated the ideal, denied that there was any such

thing, at the very time when he himself was eagerly trying to realise the

ideal.”

Yet to Napoleon the Mephistophelian conception of men was as alien as it

was to Goethe. He said: “Most people bear within themselves the seeds

of good and of evil, of courage and of cowardice. Thus is human nature

created: upbringing and circumstance do the rest.” Since, for twenty

years, he needed this human nature, daily and in quantities of a hundred

at a time, the subtlest knowledge of it was a primary condition of his

success. Among all the materials which Napoleon bent to his uses, the

human heart was the most familiar.

“I am a great friend of analysis.... ‘Why’ and ‘How,’ are such useful

questions, that they cannot be uttered too often.” Coldly and clearly as

a nerve specialist, he controls all psychical symptoms, utilises every

method for the attainment of such control, and trusts especially to

physiognomy—for he knows his Lavater. He is fond of reproving people.

“According as they react, I discover the pitch of their souls. If I

strike brass with a glove, it gives back no tone: but if I strike with a

hammer, it rings out.” A person meeting Napoleon for the first time, is

gripped by the magnetism of his glance.

By talking and questioning, he makes himself acquainted with the atlas of

human types, an atlas he is ever enlarging. He questions so long that a

stranger grows embarrassed, confused, and alarmed; he questions until his

questions become ridiculous; but he must at all costs get the information

he needs, even if he is not negotiating. In what way can the twenty

minutes that a doctor sits at Napoleon’s table in St. Helena be put to

the best use by the ex-Emperor?

“How many patients suffering from ailments affecting the liver had you on

board? How many cases of dysentery? What is the fee for a consultation

in England? What is the pension awarded to an army surgeon?... What is

death, or how would you define it? When does the soul quit the body? When

does a body first receive a soul?”

Another means is monologue. One of his intimates declares that the right

of the Emperor to hold forth in monologue was the only real pleasure his

high estate awarded him! We have testimonies concerning other men of

action: but who ever talked so much as Napoleon! Since he always faces

the world alone, he must continually hold forth that he may convey his

suggestions to the world. His conversations often lasted from five to

eight hours, some of them ten or eleven hours; and during the greater

part of them Napoleon took the floor. We must admit that this was more in

accordance with the Italian manner than the Roman; Italian, too, were the

rapidity of his utterance, and his foreign accent: but he gesticulated

little; and only when much moved did he unclasp his hands—generally they

were clasped behind his back, as if he wished to throw out his chest

against the world.

Upon all who serve him, he lavishes money with oriental profusion. But

as far as his personal expenditure is concerned, he is thrifty. During

the Consulate he says: “A man who has been through so many wars will have

acquired a little property whether he will or no. I have a private income

of from frs. 80,000 to frs. 100,000, with a house in town and a country

mansion. What more do I need? If I should get out of humour with France,

or France with me, I should retire from public life without a qualm....

But every one round me is stealing; the ministers are weak. Some people

must be laying by vast sums.... What is to be done about it? France is

corrupt through and through. It has always been like that; as soon as a

man becomes a minister, he builds himself a palace.... Do you know what

they are trying to make me pay for my installation in the Tuileries?

Two millions!... It must be cut down to eight hundred thousand. I am

surrounded by a pack of scoundrels.”

“Your great operations,” answers Roederer, “must cost you much more than

these domestic defalcations.”

“All the more reason why I should watch over my personal expenditure.”

This conversation tells us how the head of the State, a man of thirty,

regards money. He needs nothing for himself, and complains of the

venality and profusion of those by whom he is surrounded; acknowledges

that he has himself made money out of the wars; rails at the tradesmen

who want to charge two millions for the equipment of a palace, when,

as far as his own taste is concerned, he sees no reason for spending

anything at all. Amid the frightful corruption which is a heritage of the

revolution, he fights with the army contractors and war profiteers; but

as soon as, by drastic punishments, he has succeeded in putting an end to

this scandal, he assigns preposterous incomes to his marshals, some of

whom receive more than a million francs a year. As Consul, he rids the

State of the thieves who are making away with the national property; and

then, as Emperor, he burdens this same State with extortionate salaries.

Still, there are a few persons who make money thanks to their

relationship with him, though without his aid. “When I have nothing

left,” he says to Talleyrand, “I shall turn to you. Tell me honestly, how

much have you made out of me?”

“I am not a rich man, Sire, but all that I have is at your service.”

Napoleon’s way of dealing with men is modified by a hundred and one

considerations. If we wish to study the variations of his technique, we

must class his instruments in groups.

Generals and marshals are the easiest to keep dependent, for they have

unceasing opportunities of winning military renown; and, since he pays

them so liberally for their services, they grow more and more wealthy.

By loading them with money, he gains two ends, spreading effulgence

around himself, and keeping his most powerful officers in a state of

dependence. It delights him to see these soldiers unused to money

spending extravagantly, running into debt, and then turning to him for

help in their difficulties. He leads them from profusion to want, and

then back to profusion again. At the same time, he gives them little

scope for originality, reserving important decisions for himself, so that

even the commanders of armies rarely have a chance of proving themselves

men of genius. He shrewdly regulates his public mention of them in his

bulletins, both in respect of time and form, so that, through their

vanity and jealousy, he can get his way with his generals.

The result is that their sentiments towards him are a mingling of hatred

and love, whereby they are chained to his service more firmly than if

the feeling had been one of pure affection. Perhaps only two of them are

wholly devoted to him, Berthier and Duroc, whose love for him he compares

with that of a child and a dog. Ney speaks of himself as a loaded musket

which is fired when and where the Emperor orders. Napoleon, for his part,

has a personal affection for those only who have risen with him, and

in his memoirs he pays his tribute to them. He extols Desaix’s mental

balance. Moreau has “more instinct than genius”; whereas Lannes has “more

courage than sense,” though as time goes on he makes good in the latter

respect. Kléber seeks glory only as a means of enjoyment. Masséna is

not really courageous until he is under fire. Murat “has not a spark of

intelligence, but what dash! He is a duffer and a hero.” Napoleon cannot

break away from these witnesses of his rise, although almost all of them

have learned the weight of his anger. In his tent, after Wagram, Napoleon

thunders at Marmont for having made a mess of things, and a quarter of an

hour later appoints him marshal.

Sometimes the Emperor’s misanthropy got the better of him. “In those

moods, I begin to distrust even my companions-in-arms; that causes me

intense suffering, and I do everything I can to rid myself of such

horrible suspicions.” Yet he really knew. Lannes’ death touched him to

the quick, but he never really uttered the moving farewell words which

he publishes. Indeed, he confided to Metternich: “Lannes hated me. When

I heard that, on being wounded, he had called out my name, I knew it was

all up with him. He called on me as a dying atheist calls on God.”

The remembrance of friendships formed in youth does not prevent him

from scolding the most exalted of his marshals like schoolboys when he

considers they have behaved foolishly or have been wanting in courage.

He says to Junot: “Your conduct was unprecedented, extraordinarily

indiscreet.... You have a strange notion of your military duties. I don’t

recognise you!” To a general in Lombardy: “Under your command, there has

been very little honesty and a great deal of avarice; but I never knew

until to-day that you were a coward. Leave the army, and never let me see

your face again!” In Spain, one of his generals capitulated in the open

field. Six months later, this man ventured to appear before Napoleon at a

review. The Emperor stormed at him in full hearing of the troops; would

not be appeased. The witnesses say that the scene lasted a whole hour. “A

man may have to surrender a fortress. The fortune of war is uncertain,

and defeat is always possible. Any one can be taken prisoner. The thing

may happen to me to-morrow. But honour, before all! On the battle-field,

a commander’s business is to fight: and if he capitulates instead, he

deserves to be shot.... A soldier must know how to die. Have we not all

to face death?... As a subject, you committed a crime in capitulating; as

a general, a stupid blunder; as a soldier, your action was cowardly; but

as a Frenchman, your surrender was dishonourable!”

He alarmed the diplomats of his day by a frankness which none of them

trusted. “Tact, and putting all the cards on the table, will do better

service in diplomacy than cunning. The tricks of the diplomats of the

old school are out of date; all their rogueries have been exposed long

since.... Nothing betrays weakness more than the attempt to deceive.”

Just before the renewal of the war with England, he tells the British

envoy how many years it will take before France can face England at sea,

but he explains how quickly he can increase his army to four hundred

thousand. In Schönbrunn, he says to the Austrian negotiator: “That is my

last word. If you defeat me, I shall propose more favourable terms; but

if I gain the victory, I shall make them harder. What I want is peace.”

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