constellation of, 106, 125, 180, 203, 215, 258 f., 264, 275, 311 f.
Stimulus, and response, 120, 166, 179, 217;
error, 176
Stimulation, under the Constancy Hypothesis, 93, 127, 133, 298
Straight line, machine theory for perception of, 204 n.
Stress, 140, 326, 338, 357, 370, 375
Striving, 193
Structure, of two grays, 217;
supralocal, 203, 218
Sub-wholes, 157, 183, 201, 205, 282 f., 313, 318 f.
Subjective phenomena, 21 f., 24 f., 265
Subjectivity, genetic, 24 f.
Successive comparison, 271, 273, 304
Surface tension, 48, 158
Synopses, 387
Task, 330 ff., 339
Tendency, 330, 370, 380 f., 384, 389, 390
Temporal organization, 164, 258
Tension, 250 f., 364
Ternus, J., 130 n.
Thing, one, 129, 155
“Things,” 21 ff., 84, 219 f., 224, 230
Thinking, 19, 83, 193, 244
Time, experience, similar to space experience, 163, 289;
physiological correlate of experienced time, 65
Tinklepaugh, O. L., 277 n., 308
Togetherness, 361
Tonal fusion, 124, 127
Topographical, conditions and arrangements, 112 ff., 133 f., 138,
140, 146, 347
Total field, 320, 324, 327, 329, 332, 336, 343, 350, 352 f., 358,
361, 367, 371 f., 376, 378 ff., 389
Touch, 128, 162, 220, 231, 242, 354
Traces, 278, 291 ff., 302, 304, 307, 309 ff., 315
Training, 207, 303
Transposition, 214, 216 ff., 303
Trial and error, 177
Understanding, of others, 238, 240, 245, 259 ff.
Unknown something, 152 f.
“Units,” retinal, 177;
_see_ segregation
Unrest, 110
Usnadze, 242 n.
Van der Veldt, 275
Verbal report, 69
Vector, 134, 211
Visual space, 225 f., 232
Visual, form, 197 ff., 202, 208, 212 f., 328
Visual depth, 174, 194
Vision, form in V. and touch, 162;
in birds and humans, 159;
localization in, 103, 128;
order in, 114 f.
Visual processes, connection with other sensory processes, 116
Visual units, corresponding to physical objects, 172, 177
Visual organization, _see_ organization
Visual segregation, _see_ segregation
Visceral organs, 19, 245
Visual field, 84, 104, 115, 129, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149, 167, 196,
201, 203, 212, 220, 244, 274, 320, 324
Vitalism, 114, 118, 146
Watson, J. B., 52, 252, 267, 323, 382
Weber’s law, 16
Weiss, A. T., 34
Werner, H., 310 n.
Wertheimer, M., 129, 130 n., 147, 150 n., 157, 163, 186, 215 n., 223,
394
Whitehead, A. W., 394
Witasek, S., 190
Whole, functional, 106 f., 119, 141, 148, 157, 182, 263, 269, 270,
292, 295, 311, 336, 343;
and form, 200 f., 205, 208 f., 209;
and memory, 300, 303;
organized, 288, 294, 300, 311, 337
Wholes, empiristic explanation of, 158 n.;
extended, 126, 156, 169;
motor, 170;
specific properties of, 221 f., 242, 253, 256, 259;
segregated, _see_ Segregation;
preferred, 158, 209;
primitive, 161 f., 216 f.;
_see also_ Sub-wholes
Warmth, as general quality, 241
Words, applying to subjective and objective experiences equally, 243
World, of direct experience, 5, 7, 23, 25, 86;
physical, 6, 8, 10, 20, 22 f., 25 f., 33, 35, 36, 41, 60, 115, 132
f.
Wolf, F., 310
Wundt, W., 79 n.
Yarbrough, J. N., 304, 307, 309
Yerkes, R. M., 278
Zeigarnik, B., 330, 332
FOOTNOTES
[1] It seems more cautious to talk about direct experience than about
“consciousness.” For some people consciousness is rather a function
by or in which we become aware of “immediate experience.” In my
terminology, if some one has a “feeling of becoming aware,” this is
only _one special case_ of direct experience.
[2] The opposition between introspectionism and behaviorism discussed
in this chapter is the opposition between those who use and those
who reject the observation of direct experience. In Chapter III
introspectionism as a special interpretation of the use of direct
experience will be discussed.
[3] By the way, the same warning applies to the relation between my
organism as a physical system and “my body” as I have it in direct
experience. Obviously “my body” is the outcome of certain special
processes in my physical organism--started in the eyes, muscles, skin,
etc.--exactly as the chair before me is the final product of other
special processes in the same physical organism. And if the chair is
seen “before me,” the “me” of this phrase means my experienced body,
of course, not my organism as an object of the physical world. Even
accredited psychologists do not always seem to be clear about this
point. Later on we shall come back to it.
[4] Cf. C. P. Richter, _Animal Behavior and Internal Drives. The
Quarterly Review of Biology_, II, p. 307, 1927.
[5] If it can be demonstrated more generally that the tests measure
“speed” primarily--as Boring and Teak have found in their subjects--the
value of the method would be more restricted than I have here supposed.
[6] Cf. G. E. Müller, _Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 14_, p. 189.
[7] _Loc. cit._
[8] Cf. Chapter VI.
[9] The German word for “eagle.”
[10] This argument has been used by Wundt and Schumann.
[11] _Archiv f. d. ges. Psychol., 36_, 1917.
[12] Cf. J. F. Brown, _Psycholog. Forschung, 10_, 1927.
[13] Cf. v. Kries, _Allg. Sinnesphysiologie_.
[14] This is the famous constancy hypothesis. Some introspectionists
have said that _gestalt_ psychology, as any science must, has also to
acknowledge certain constant relations between given conditions and
subsequent effects. Quite! We do not argue against constant relations
existing between conditions and results in general, but only against a
constant relation between _local_ stimulation and _local_ experience.
For brevity’s sake we call that “the” constancy hypothesis.
[15] _Optische Untersuchungen am Schimpansen und am Haushuhn. Abhandl.
d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss._, 1915.
[16] _Op. cit._ and Frank, _Psychol. Forsch., 7_, 1926; _10_, 1927.
Beyrl, _Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 100_, 1926.
[17] Among the first we may count those anatomical arrangements which,
though not ready in embryonic life and at the time of birth, will
develop to their final form by maturation.
[18] If I say that “attitude” will sometimes have an influence upon
sensory experience, this statement does not mean, that “mental power”
can change the sensory field arbitrarily. First of all, strictly
speaking, it is not the attitude, as an experience, which changes the
sensory facts; the physiological process underlying it changes the
sensory process. Also, such a change is not produced arbitrarily;
it necessarily follows definite antecedents. Furthermore, natural
objective experience does not yield to all slight changes of attitude.
Apart from introspection our attitude will not tend radically to alter
sensory experience. Some very important exceptions will be considered
later on.
[19] _Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 61_, 1912.
[20] Benussi has contributed to our knowledge of these problems by
excellent experimental work. His investigation of similar facts in the
field of touch has been mentioned above. Recently certain extremely
important properties of stroboscopic movement have been investigated by
Wertheimer and Ternus (_Psycholog. Forschung, 7_, 1926).
[21] I am neglecting here the influence of inert velocities which may
be neglected indeed in all discussion of the nervous system.
[22] The reader is asked not to judge the physical side of _gestalt_
theory on the basis only of this short report. The concept of
equilibrium is less fundamental in biology than is that of dynamics.
But the _direction_ of dynamics cannot be defined without it.
Furthermore, we are not allowed to treat the sensory field (or even the
organism) as though it were an isolated system. Therefore the laws of
dynamics do not apply here in their simplest form.
[23] _Psycholog. Forschung, 9_, 1927.
[24] It is well known in photometry that without differences of
brightness figures lose their definite form by diffusion into the
ground.
[25] If the surrounding field is not homogeneous the symmetry of the
circle will be distorted as in the well-known illusion in which two
lateral vertical lines make the circle oblate without, of course,
changing the retinal image. A number of other illusions illustrate the
same principle.
[26] _Psycholog. Forschung, 4_, 1923.
[27] One form of empiristic explanation would say that we have learnt
to regard as wholes whatever always moves together. Wertheimer has
pointed out that, here, we have rather to do with one more principle
of sensory segregation and organization: when some parts of the field
begin to move at the same time and in a somewhat uniform way, they will
become one moving whole at once and _ipso facto_.
[28] _Zeitschrift für vergleichende Physiologie, 7_, 1928.
[29] _Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 41_, 1918.
[30] One chapter of _Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im
stationären Zustand_ has the title: “Denn was innen, das ist aussen.”
Should these words of Goethe have produced the misapprehension? Who
reads the chapter will see at once that that title refers to the
similarity between sensory experience and the physiological processes
accompanying it, not to the relationship between organic processes and
the environment (cf. § 181).
[31] Not all subjects are equally suitable for this experiment.
[32] There is some suspicion that the color process, mainly as a
chemical affair, may even _follow_ other more physical sides of the
whole dynamical event on some occasions. In an electrolyte some
chemical reaction at the electrodes may begin after the distribution of
current is established throughout. Similarly, we need not see colors
or differences of color in order to experience definite results of
dynamical self-distribution.
[33] In the theory of F. Krueger, rather the opposite view was held
originally under the influence of von Ehrenfels and Cornelius.
Recently, however, the concept of _gestalt_ in our meaning of the word
is given more attention by Krueger.
[34] Köhler, _Gestaltprobleme und Anfänge einer Gestalttheorie_.
Jahresberichte über die gesamte Physiologie, herausgeg. von Rona,
Berlin, 1924.
[35] Of course, even this expression is not justified. There is no
“line” unified and segregated _as such_ in the mosaic of retinal
stimuli. There is not more than a definite series of spots, which
qualitatively are stimulated in a manner different from their neighbors.
[36] Under certain abnormal conditions both forms may be seen at the
same time.
[37] _Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren_, Kopenhagen, Berlin, London, 1921.
[38] Once, Bühler tried to give an explanation of at least one very
characteristic form, viz., the straight line. As he assumed that all
retinal points which form a straight line are connected with each other
in a special manner anatomically and that, therefore, the straight
line is something specifically determined, his hypothesis has the
character of a machine theory. I do not think that this is the way
in which we may hope to solve our problem. There are a great many
particularly characteristic forms besides the straight line. Shall we
assume for each of them a preëxisting anatomical apparatus? or rather,
a great many for each single form, since it may be projected upon
many different parts of the retina? If not, “form” must be explained
_dynamically_ in general, and the most characteristic or regular forms
must be explained by the special regularity of dynamics occurring under
appropriate conditions.
[39] _Psychol. Forsch., 8_, 1926. Figures 11-13 are reproduced from
Gottschaldt’s paper.
[40] We may remark however that, for adults, one more condition must
be fulfilled if we wish to transpose, without altering, specific
form: most forms show a changed aspect _as_ forms when they are
turned around, for instance, upside down. This fact reveals a curious
anisotropy of the visual field, which does not seem to exist in early
childhood (Cf. W. Stern, _Zschr. f. angew. Psychol._, 1909, and F.
Oetjen, _Zschr. f. Psychol., 71_, 1915). On the other hand, Wertheimer
has laid stress upon the point that, for a given form, not all
relations of stimulation are equally important. Some of them may be
changed considerably without any remarkable effect upon the actual form.
[41] _Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand_, pp.
230, 231.
[42] Obviously it does not matter in this connection whether or not
this localization, for instance of sounds in relation to visual
objects, be _correct_ in all cases. If it is _not_ correct, then
precisely the fact that we are able to state and measure the error is
in itself a proof that the two appear in the same space.
[43] The boundary between “ourselves” and objective experience around
us is not altogether sharp and constant. Experiences of touch, for
instance, are rather variable in this respect. Sometimes they are felt
as things and their properties; but they _may_ also be experienced as
“subjective.”
[44] Usnadze, _Psychologische Forschung, 5_, p. 24 f., 1924.
[45] von Hornbostel, _Festschrift Meinhof_, 1927.
[46] L. Klages, _Vom Wesen des Bewusstseins_, Leipzig, 1921.
[47] _Psychologies of 1925_, pp. 52 and 54, Clark University Press.
[48] In this case there is a complication, since weather influences our
physical body and its nervous system, apart from our sensory experience
of the weather.
[49] We may say, then, that the second noise has a definite rôle or
property which belongs to it as to the second member of a pair (cf.
Chapter VI).
[50] _Psychologische Forschung, 4_, 1923.
[51] _L’Apprentissage du mouvement et l’automatisme_, Louvain, Paris,
1928.
[52] Becher, _Gehirn und Seele_, Heidelberg, 1911.
[53] Or in the organization of a larger whole, as O. L. Tinklepaugh has
shown (_The Journal of Compar. Psychol., 8_, 1928).
[54] Cf. the schemes given by Frings, _Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 30_,
p. 430 f., 1914.
[55] _Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 23_, p. 156 f., 1912.
[56] Kühn, _Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 68_, 1914. Also Poppelreuter,
_Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 61_, 1912.
[57] G. E. Müller, _Abriss der Psychologie_, p. 25, Göttingen, 1924.
[58] _The Ped. Seminary, 32_, p. 681, 1925.
[59] Here as always when I talk about animals I use terms like “seeing”
for simplicity’s sake. Whether or not the chick experiences a visual
field or anything else, the terms have a definite functional meaning in
which alone I am interested.
[60] _The Journal of Animal Behavior, 7_, p. 87 ff., 1917.
[61] Something of the kind has been done in the meantime by Mr.
Tinklepaugh insofar as his “substitution method” is an excellent
means for studying certain properties of the traces. (_The Journal
of Comparative Psychology, 8_, p. 224 ff., 1928.) Cf. also _Psychol.
Forsch., I_, p. 10, 1921.
[62] _Psychol. Forsch., I_, p. 333 ff., 1922. Cf. also Werner, _Ztschr.
f. Psychol., 94_, 1924.
[63] _Psychol. Review, 20_, 1913.
[64] _Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 30_, 1914. These experiments were
planned by Bühler.
[65] It will be the theme of the last chapter.
[66] Cf. _Psychologische Forschung, 9_, 1927.
[67] This means that if the average person remembered n finished tasks
he remembered 90 per cent. more unfinished ones; that is, n + 90/100 n.
[68] In passing we may remark that, here at least, a relationship
becomes discernible between a result of experimental psychology and
Freudian theory.
[69] _Psychologische Forschung, 1_ and _2_, 1922. Somewhat similar
experiments had been done before by Poppelreuter (_Zeitschrift für
Psychologie, 61_, 1912), who was also the first to bring forward the
criticism mentioned in the last paragraph.
[70] _Op. cit._
[71] From these results it would follow that we are not able directly
to measure conation by antagonistic association, as Ach has proposed.
[72] I have not yet been able to see McCarthy’s book _The Measurement
of Conation_ (Chicago, 1926). From what I have heard about it, it would
seem to be a highly valuable contribution to the problems discussed in
this chapter.
[73] _Gehirn und Seele_, 1911. Lashley has done similar experiments
with rats. I can confirm his findings: after learning certain visual
discriminations with one eye blindfolded, a chick will react according
to the new habit when, afterwards, the other eye is blindfolded.
Becher’s experiments, however, still seem to me to be more conclusive
anatomically.
[74] I have not been able to find an adequate translation of the German
adjective _sachlich_ in this connection. “Intrinsic” would come near to
it, perhaps.
[75] Lewin and Karsten, _Psychol. Forschung, 10_, 1927.
[76] In some of Plato’s discussions about the properties of the truly
real world, the same tendency is quite obvious.
[77] _The Meaning of Truth_, Preface.
[78] _Some Problems of Philosophy_, p. 213.
[79] _A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 376.
[80] Since James’ time this view has been defended by several authors
whose names will be found in the bibliography at the end of this
chapter.
[81] For brevity’s sake the term “self” is applied here, though for
more correct expression I should say: “the actual process corresponding
to the self in actual experience.”
[82] I do not forget, of course, that subordinate parts of our organism
will show reactions, externally similar to those described, though
belonging to the reflex type of movement. Stimulated by a prick, the
foot will be withdrawn by reflex. In no case would this fact create
an objection against the theory of insight-reaction. In some of its
activities the organism is doubtlessly similar to a very practical
machine; at the same time in others, and most of all those in which it
behaves as a whole, direct dynamics may decide what happens.
Transcriber’s notes
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subscript with an underscore followed by braces: H_{2}O. Italic text is
surrounded by underscores.
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