psychologists should suppose that the facts of behavior, which we
can observe in others, should be _toto genere_ different from the
experiences which these others may have. But the reason is obvious
enough. The “stuff” and the “events” which occur in the “bodily”
world, on the one hand, and in the “conscious” world, on the other,
are believed to have incomparable properties since Descartes. This is
philosophy. And we may perceive at once that, in this connection at
least, it is bad philosophy. For this reason: in the introduction to
this chapter we saw that the noun “body” is dangerously ambiguous.
It may either mean a physical organism which, as such, cannot be
experienced directly any more than the physical structure of an atom,
or it may mean an experienced “thing,” as a segregated visual whole.
Now, if we talk about the “bodily events” and so forth, as the only
material we can have and observe in order to understand others,
the meaning of the word “bodily” can refer only to the experienced
thing and its changes as sensory experiences, since the physical
body of another does not occur _as such_ in any part of our direct
experience. It is as remote and distinct from our sensory experience
as is the “consciousness” of others. Therefore, when we discuss how we
“understand” other people, we have to decide first of all, whether or
not our sensory experience of others as _experienced_ “bodies” contains
a more direct cue for that understanding. Of course, our sensory
experience of others depends ultimately upon stimulation issuing from
their physical bodies. But in the fifth chapter we found that our
sensory experience will sometimes give us more valuable hints about
the realities in which we are interested than the physical events
themselves, which constitute the stimuli for that experience, are able
to give. So, though in the genetic series our sensory experience of
others is more remote from their “mental life” than are the physical
events issuing from the surface of their bodies, we may find something
valuable in the former which we cannot find in the latter. The most
interesting question is whether our sensory experience of the behavior
of others can give us a hint about those events in them which in
ourselves we call _subjective_ experiences. We would regard it as such
a hint if we could discover a similarity between our sensory experience
of the behavior of others and those subjective experiences. Suppose
that there were such a similarity, we could then dispense with the
indirect approach through inferences by analogy, or through association
and assimilation, since theory has approached the subjective experience
of others indirectly only because it had assumed as a prior dogma that
there could not be any similarity at all between the events of the
“bodily world” and of “mental life.”
I will proceed cautiously. In its efforts to assort experiences into
separate classes, psychology has introduced certain rigid distinctions
and barriers among the several classes which, first of all, we shall
try to remove.
One of these barriers, built by Helmholtz, is that between the
qualities of the different senses, as though they were incomparable. I
contend that they are comparable in more than one case. “Brightness,”
for instance, is an attribute of some auditory as well as of visual
experiences. We may go a little farther and say that in the “coolness”
of an object which we touch there is a certain affinity to brightness,
whereas in “warmth” there is something similar to dark nuances. In the
preceding chapter I mentioned the fact that the German word “rauh”
is used for certain auditory experiences as well as for a definite
character of touched surfaces. Again, the German poet Morgenstern
states that
_Die Möwen sehen alle aus, als ob sie Emma hiessen._
(All seagulls look as though their name were Emma.)
To the German at least, because of his pronunciation of the name, its
sound seems to contain something similar to the aspect of the birds.
But we may construct another example. If, looking at these two figures
(18 and 19), the reader is asked to choose which he would rather call
“takete” or “maluma,” he will probably be able to decide with ease.[44]
[Illustration: Fig. 18]
[Illustration: Fig. 19]
I take it for granted, then, that there are some similarities between
the experiences we have through different sense organs. In passing we
may remark that in primitive languages one finds much evidence for
assuming that the names of things and events often originate according
to this similarity between their properties in vision or touch, and
certain sounds or acoustical wholes.[45] In modern languages, it is
true, most of these names have lost much of this character.
For our main problem it is interesting to know what names are given to
subjective experiences. First of all, most of us will agree with the
statement that, if peripheral vision is “confused” in comparison with
foveal vision, in this respect almost all subjective experience is
more similar to peripheral than to foveal vision. And if the reader
agrees with me here, he has admitted that in one point, at least,
subjective experiences may be compared with objective experiences.
Recently Klages has collected a large number of words which we apply
to subjective experiences and all of which have at the same time a
meaning in the realm of objective experience.[46] Here a few instances
must suffice. Something arouses a “bitter” feeling in us. In German one
talks about being in a “soft” mood (_“weiche” Stimmung_). “Sweet” love
seems to occur in all countries, also “bright” joy or “dark” grief, and
not only in my country is wrath called “hot.”
More dynamically, one talks about a tense expectation, this subjective
experience being compared with what we feel when we touch a taut
string. A certain kind of thinking is called “straight,” and every
one knows immediately what is meant by it. We may have “rest” or
“restlessness” in a visual field, but we apply the same terms to
something similar in our subjective experience. When one feels nervous
one might use “flickery” as an appropriate word for his subjective
state, it being similar to visual flicker, for instance. Again, we
feel “attracted” towards something or inclined to “reject” the idea
of it; our spirits are “high” or “low,” and so forth. The reader will
be able to fill out the list by dozens of other terms which, as these
few examples, are used both for objective and subjective experiences
without creating difficulties of understanding in communication. Some
psychologists may refuse to draw any conclusions from such verbal
hints. They will say that here we have to do with mere analogies. I
cannot accept this as an argument, however, because what else is an
analogy but some kind of similarity? Language does not use the words
generally applied to sensory experiences in a haphazard way as terms
for subjective experiences. If one of these terms is applied to just
one class of subjective states or experiences, and not to others, and
a second of these terms is applied exclusively to a second class, and
so on, there must be some principle which regulates this definite
extension of meaning. Furthermore, there must be something at the basis
of the correct _understanding_ of this kind of verbal practice, when
a _new_ application and transfer of meaning is suddenly invented by
some one trying to describe his subjective state in a lively manner. I
contend that this _something_ is a certain degree of similarity between
definite experiences of the “inner” and “outer” world.
Though I realize that there is some truth in the James-Lange theory
of emotional experiences, I do not wish to make my statements seem to
depend upon this theory. Of course, if the so-called emotional aspect
of subjective experience _is_ sensory experience issuing from our
muscles, viscera, and so forth, it will be a truism that emotional
experiences are “similar” to certain “sensory” experiences, since
they are declared even to be identical by that hypothesis. But we
may recognize a similarity without accepting the identity. From this
viewpoint, maintaining a certain cautiousness toward the James-Lange
theory, we may find a similarity even between subjective experiences
and those of vision or hearing, so that, in this respect, our theory
would be more general than that of James and Lange.
With this preparation we can approach the problem, whether our
objective experience of the behavior of others is capable of showing us
something essentially similar to their “mental life”--a question which
has a reasonable meaning if understood in terms of the last paragraphs.
I shall discuss a few concrete cases in which unprejudiced observation
seems to give a clear answer.
Two scientists in Poland are talking about the difference of their
theories. I can observe their behavior as it develops before me in my
visual and acoustical experience but, since they talk in a foreign
language, I cannot understand their words. For a while the aspect
of the scene is calm, both visually and acoustically. But suddenly
the man to the left, as though “struck” by some of his colleague’s
words, makes but a slight receding movement of the head and, from this
moment, the quality of his voice and the expression of his face show a
certain character of hardness. To this change there seems to correspond
immediately a transformation of the other’s behavior, insofar as, from
now on, the man to the right becomes a picture of what the musician
calls “crescendo,” both as I see and as I hear him. Soon the first
person also becomes increasingly dynamic, and the whole scene is
approaching an extreme state of agitation, when presently I see the
man to the right looking at a placard on the wall and smiling. He says
a few words to the other, who also looks in that direction, a certain
brightness appearing on his face at the same time; and from this moment
their conversation resumes its initial smoothness and placid quality.
These scientists happen to know the German language. So, when the
discussion is over, the man to the left tells me that a short while
after the conversation started some unexpected words of his friend
appeared to him as a personal offense or insult, and that he could
not avoid having a bitter feeling as a result of it. The friend, on
the other hand, reports that, beginning rather abruptly, the man to
the left manifested such a closed and hard appearance, as though to
indicate that he would never surrender his position or be open to
persuasion, and that as a result he felt anger continually rising and
increasing within himself. The first, the man to the left, reports that
a similar wave of irritation occurred in himself after a while; and
both of them tell me that the placard on the wall reads “Keep smiling”
in their language, and that, almost at once after becoming aware of it,
they felt much more relaxed and calm.
Is it really possible to deny that in such a case my objective
experience pictures some essential traits of what the others experience
subjectively? I see the two scientists as one visual group, the members
of which are directed towards each other in all their attitudes.
Similarly, each of them feels that he is attacking the other or
defending his own opinions against an attack directed toward them.
Again, the sudden receding movement of one of them pictures very well
the felt increase of social distance which followed from something like
an offense. Neither will deny that, from this moment, there began an
emotional crescendo, which found an adequate expression in the visual
and acoustical crescendo of my sensory experience of the total scene.
Finally, I could see the return to calmness, resulting from their
looking at the placard for a moment. And this calmness itself, as seen
and heard by me, is similar to what both tell me about their subjective
state at that time.
But the lesson which this example teaches seems extremely general
to me. It seems to teach that all forms of dynamical development
occurring in subjective experiences may be expressed by similar forms
of objective experiences in the sensory field of an observer. Quite
generally the inner processes, whether emotional or intellectual, show
types of development which may be given names, usually applied to
musical events, such as: _crescendo_ and _diminuendo_, _accelerando_
and _ritardando_. As these qualities occur in the world of auditory
experiences, they are found in the visual world too, and so they can
express _similar_ dynamical traits of inner life in directly observable
behavior. Who has not found himself occasionally walking faster when
thinking about the disagreeable attitude of an adversary! Again,
to the increasing inner tempo and dynamical level there corresponds
a _crescendo_ and _accelerando_ in visible movement. Of course, the
same inner development may express itself acoustically, as in the
_accelerando_ and _reforzando_ of speech. Or look at your friend on
different mornings. Sometimes his movements will be even and calm,
sometimes his whole visible surface, his face and his fingers, will be
unstable and restless. He does not need to tell you in the first case
that he is well and at rest, nor in the second that he feels restless
subjectively, because both states are apparent directly in your
objective experience. In the same way, hesitation and lack of inner
determination become visible in a form obviously similar to them as
subjective experiences, as _ritardando_ of visible or audible behavior,
or as slight, disorderly, starting movements in different directions,
not organized into one whole. As long as human beings behave naturally,
any _sudden_ change of inner direction, any sudden event in their
subjective life, will appear as a sudden event on their visible surface
or in their speech-melody. In a moment of _sudden_ fright, human beings
_jump_ back, or start. When some one experiences that flash by which a
new idea or the solution of a problem comes to him, he will suddenly
interrupt his walking or abruptly strike his head. Here both his inner
experience and his outer aspect will exhibit the same interruption
of continuity. For similar reasons the activity of a man, as it is
seen by us, will often show an organization which corresponds to the
organization of his doing and planning, as experienced subjectively.
Actions which flow from one determining source appear as one stream of
visible events in most cases. Where a new “idea” leads to new action
in subjective experience, the observer will see one stream of visible
development ceasing and another one starting independently. If one
action consists of relatively segregated members, subjectively, the
same “articulation” will frequently prevail in visible behavior. So
with regard to dynamical structure, not only the so-called expressive
movements but also the practical behavior of human beings is a good
picture of their inner life, in a great many cases. The reader who
may have lost the feeling here that I am discussing concrete things
should review an earlier chapter in which, among other examples, the
organization of seen movement was considered. In my book _The Mentality
of Apes_ the description of animal behavior includes a great many
instances of this type.
It will be convenient, however, to treat in detail a few examples
which are of a somewhat different kind. In objective as well as in
subjective experience we find states to which the names of “tension”
and “direction” may be applied. If my attention is attracted by a
strange object, a snake for instance, I feel directed toward it and
at the same time a feeling of tension is experienced. A friend, even
if he has not recognized the snake, will see me and especially my
face and eyes directed toward it; in the tension of my face he will
have a visual picture of my inner tension, as in its direction he has
a direct picture of the direction which I experience. It cannot be
said in objection that vision will not apprise him in any way of my
“connection” with the object, since there is nothing in space between
my eyes and the snake, which might be a “stimulus” for his seeing that
connection. Such an argument seems to forget what has been said about
grouping in visual space. As soon as my eyes are seen looking in a
definite direction--and in this respect our eyes are astonishingly
expressive--a segregated whole or object, which in the field of an
observer is situated in that line of direction, may become immediately
connected with my gaze and my whole person. This case of grouping is
not more problematic than all the others we have discussed. We may at
once add the case in which the direction of attitude is the opposite,
i.e., away from something. Again, grouping may become so striking that
no one can see such a movement or reaction without referring it to a
definite object, from which it is averted, exactly as the event is felt
subjectively by the person whom we are observing. As an example, I give
the following statements, taken from a famous experiment, literally:
“He started to reach for the head of the animal with the forefinger of
his left hand but withdrew it suddenly before contact.”
(Wool is presented to a child in a paper package).... “He then began
to play with the paper, avoiding contact with the wool itself.” Both
statements occur in Dr. Watson’s description of his experiments with
children.[47] In the first, the movement of a finger is compellingly
seen as _directed toward the animal_, though “objective” methods of
observation, as Dr. Watson understands the term, would not find the
slightest connection in space between the finger and the animal, and
though, therefore, his description seems to imply an almost purposive
psychology. In the second statement, the same observation applies
to the words “avoiding contact with the wool.” “Avoid” is a term
which may surprise us in a description governed by the ideal of the
natural sciences and the fear of so-called “purpose.” However that
may be, the example shows that, in visual experience, the tendency
toward grouping and directed reference is so strong that even the most
radical behaviorist cannot resist it. Therefore, if I “avoid contact”
with a definite object or if I “reach for” another, these facts of my
experience must be excellently pictured in the organized field which an
observer of my behavior himself beholds as his _objective_ experience.
In the last few examples it is the spatial, more than the temporal,
side of visible behavior which resembles the inner experiences of
a person. This is also the case, where a state of inner depression
expresses itself in a drooping carriage of the body as a visual
whole, similar to the posture of the normal person in a period of
extreme fatigue or sorrow, but even more decidedly in the attitude
characteristic of certain insane patients. Just the contrary is seen
in those patients who enjoy a supranormal euphoria or “elevation.”
Usually, their body as a visual thing will show most clearly a
corresponding erectness, and in one case, which Dr. Janet described
admirably at the last International Congress, the patient began to walk
on tiptoe.
Most readers will be well acquainted with the next case which, by
the way, is particularly interesting for social psychology. A man in
a leading position, but perhaps a little too good-hearted for his
office, treats his inferiors as friends. When he sometimes finds
himself obliged to censure one of them severely, and to make him feel
that friendly relations are over, such a man becomes a most suggestive
object of observation. If he has not already trained himself on
previous occasions, he will have the greatest difficulty in uttering
those decisive words which will show the other quite openly and
definitely that the superior has radically changed his mind. In spite
of the best intentions provided by a feeling of duty, those words will
not be uttered, but in their place others which do not go to the
center of the affair. They come near to it; the other man may guess
the whole truth from them if he is sensitive enough, but they leave
something like a screen around the main point. Viewed from without the
official’s activity is a picture of his inner perturbation. The stress
of firm intention is in him, but social factors prevent his behaving
entirely according to his intentions. Consequently you may see him
walking up and down before the other, as a magnetic needle swings in
the field of force. He himself feels the strain and the obligation to
act directly, but also feels that he is constantly “deflected.” When
he stops, his eyes are worth observing. All the inner direction and
difficulties of a person become visible more easily in the sensitive
play of the eyes than elsewhere, particularly under the pressure of
“social forces.” Of course, it is rather easy to say nice things (which
one does not believe) to another man, while looking into his eyes
steadily. Social forces are not opposed to that; on the contrary, they
operate precisely in that direction. But try to look into another’s
eyes, i.e., toward what we experience for some reason as the center of
the other man’s personality, and then tell him what obligates you to
be less friendly toward him, and, as it were, to reject him socially!
For some persons this is an extremely onerous task. So the man in our
example may well intend to look into the other’s eyes; but his own
eyes will either stop short somewhere, at the mouth or the nose, for
instance, or when they reach the full glance of the other man, they
will be deflected very soon as though by an irresistible force. Just
as this man feels his intentions bending around and his words avoiding
the socially decisive step, his visible behavior appears to us as
persistently deflected from the main direction, which is toward the
other, and especially from the visible center of his personality, i.e.,
his eyes.
This may suffice as a description of cases in which the similarity
of the objective and the subjective experiences of the same behavior
seems to me obvious. The reader will find a great many other examples,
as soon as he begins to observe other people from this point of view.
If that similarity is not a familiar fact to the psychologist, the
reason may be the analytical tendency of our science. Indeed, when
we think of other people’s appearance in terms of local nuances of
brightness, chroma, and so forth, we feel inclined to deny the idea of
such similarity. But as soon as we look upon behavior more naïvely and
are not afraid to recognize grouping, and a great many qualities of the
von Ehrenfels type, as realities in sensory experience, the similarity
becomes obvious in thousands of cases.