CHAPTER II.

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

It was formerly considered necessary for all books on the subject of

thought to begin by a recital of the metaphysical conceptions regarding

the nature and "thingness" of Mind. The student was led through many

pages and endless speculation regarding the metaphysical theories

regarding the origin and inner nature of Mind which, so far from

establishing a fixed and definite explanation in his mind, rather tended

toward confusing him and giving him the idea that psychology was of

necessity a speculative science lacking the firm practical basis

possessed by other branches of science. In the end, in the words of old

Omar, he "came out the door through which he went."

But this tendency has been overcome of late years, and writers on the

subject pass by all metaphysical conceptions regarding the nature of

Mind, and usually begin by plunging at once into the real business of

psychology--the business of the practical study of the mechanism and

activities of the mind itself. As some writer has said, psychology has

no more concern with the solution of the eternal riddle of "What is

Mind?" than physics with the twin-riddle of "What is Matter?" Both

riddles, and their answers, belong to entirely different branches and

fields of thought than those concerned with their laws of operation and

principles of activity. As Halleck says: "Psychology studies the

phenomena of mind, just as physics investigates those of matter." And,

likewise, just as the science of physics holds true in spite of the

varying and changing conceptions regarding the nature of matter, so does

the science of psychology hold true in spite of the varying and changing

conceptions regarding the nature of Mind.

Halleck has well said: "If a materialist should hold that the mind was

nothing but the brain, and that the brain was a vast aggregation of

molecular sheep herding together in various ways, his hypothesis would

not change the fact that sensation must precede perception, memory and

thought; nor would the laws of the association of ideas be changed, nor

would the fact that interest and repetition aid memory cease to hold

good. The man who thought his mind was a collection of little cells

would dream, imagine, think and feel; so also would he who believed his

mind to be immaterial. It is very fortunate that the same mental

phenomena occur, no matter what theory is adopted. Those who like to

study the puzzles as to what mind and matter really are must go to

metaphysics. Should we ever find that salt, arsenic and all things else

are the same substance with a different molecular arrangement, we should

still not use them interchangeably."

For the purposes of the study of practical psychology, we may as well

lay aside, if even for the moment, our pet metaphysical conceptions and

act as if we knew nothing of the essential nature of Mind (and indeed

Science in truth does _not_ know), and confine ourselves to the

phenomena and manifestations of Mind which, after all, is the only way

in which and by which we can know anything at all about it. As Brooks

says: "The mind can be defined only by its activities and

manifestations. In order to obtain a definition of the mind, therefore,

we must observe and determine its various forms of activity. These

activities, classified under a few general heads and predicated of the

unseen something which manifests them, will give us a definition of

mind."

The act of consciousness determines the existence of Mind in the person

experiencing it. No one can be conscious of thought and, at the same

time, deny the existence of mind within himself. For the very act of

denial, in itself, is a manifestation of thought and consequently an

assertion of the existence of mind. One may assert the axiom: "I think,

therefore, I have a mind;" but he is denied the privilege of arguing: "I

think, therefore, I have no mind." The mind has an ultimate and final

knowledge of its own existence.

The older view of Mind is that it is a something higher than matter

which it uses for its manifestation. It was held to be unknowable in

itself and to be studied only through its manifestations. It was

supposed to involve itself, to become involved, in some way in matter

and to there manifest itself in an infinitude of forms, degrees, and

variations. The materialistic view, which arose into prominence in the

middle of the Nineteenth Century, held, on the contrary, that Mind was

merely an activity or property of Matter--a function of matter akin to

extension and motion. Huxley, voicing this conception said: "We have no

knowledge of any thinking substance apart from an extended substance....

We shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of

consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of

heat." But, Huxley, himself, was afterwards constrained to acknowledge

that: "How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness

comes about by the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as

unaccountable as the appearance of the _jinnee_ when Aladdin rubbed his

lamp."

The most advanced authorities of the day, are inclined to the opinion

that both Matter and Mind are both differing aspects of some one

fundamental Something; or, as some of the closest thinkers state it,

both are probably two apparently differing manifestations or emanations

of an Underlying Something which, as Spencer says: "transcends not only

our reason but also our imagination." The study of philosophy and

metaphysics serves an important purpose in showing us _how much we do

not know_, and why we do not know--also in showing us the fallacy of

many things we had thought we did know--but when it comes to telling us

the real "why," actual cause, or essential nature of _anything_, it is

largely a disappointment to those who seek fundamental truths and

ultimate reasons. It is much more comfortable to "abjure the 'Why' and

seek the 'How'"--if we can.

Many psychologists classify the activities of the mind into three

general divisions; _viz._, (1) Thinking; (2) Willing; (3) Feeling. These

divisions, which result from what is known as "the tri-logical

classification," were first distinctly enunciated by Upham although Kant

had intimated it very plainly. For many years before the favored

division was but two-fold the line of division being between the

_cognitive_, or knowing, activities, and the _conative_, or acting,

activities, generally known as the Understanding and the Will,

respectively. It took a long time before the authorities would formally

recognize the great field of the Feelings as forming a class by

themselves and ranking with the Understanding and the Will. There are

certain sub-divisions and shadings, which we shall notice as we proceed,

some of which are more or less complex, and which seem to shade into

others. The student is cautioned against conceiving of the mind as a

thing having several compartments or distinct divisions. The

classification does not indicate this and is only intended as a

convenience in analyzing and studying the mental activities and

operations. The "I" which feels, thinks and acts is the same--one

entity.

As Brooks well says: "The mind is a self-conscious activity and not a

mere passivity; it is a centre of spiritual forces, all resting in the

background of the ego. As a centre of forces, it stands related to the

forces of the material and spiritual universe and is acted upon through

its susceptibilities by those forces. As a spiritual activity, it takes

the impressions derived from those forces, works them up into the

organic growth of itself, converts them into conscious knowledge and

uses these products as means to set other forces into activity and

produce new results. Standing above nature and superior to its

surroundings, it nevertheless feeds upon nature, as we may say, and

transforms material influences into spiritual facts akin to its own

nature. Related to the natural world and apparently originating from it,

it yet rises above this natural world and, with the crown of freedom

upon its brow, rules the natural obedient to its will."

In this book, while we shall fully and unquestionably recognize the

"tri-logical classification" of the activities of the Mind into the

divisions of Thinking, Willing and Feeling, respectively, nevertheless,

we shall, for convenience, use the term "Thought" in its broadest,

widest and most general sense, as: "The power or faculty of thinking;

the mental faculty; the mind," rather than in its narrower and

particular sense of: "the understanding or cognitive faculty of the

mind." Accordingly, we shall include the cultivation of the mental

activities known as Attention, Perception, Imagination, etc., together

with the strictly cognitive faculties, under the general term of

Thought-Culture.

Thought-Culture; Or, Practical Mental Training · 第 2 / 14 章