THE RETURN HOME
After the rupture of diplomatic relations, I entrusted the care
of our interests to the Swiss Legation, and from that time I did
not speak a word to any American official except to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long, who accompanied us as far
as the boat at New York. From the majority of those gentlemen with
whom I had official relations, however, I received very friendly
letters of farewell.
The principal passage in the letter from Lansing, the Secretary
of State, was as follows:
"I shall bear in mind all your earnest efforts in the cause of
peace, and will gladly recall our personal relations, which, in
spite of the difficulties of the situation, were always a pleasure
to me."
In view of the conditions prevailing at the time, the preparations
for our departure took a long time. It was only with difficulty
that we were able to obtain the necessary accommodation for the
large number of German officials and their families on the Danish
ship _Friedrich VIII_. The business of getting the necessary
paper--such, for instance, as the Entente's safe conduct--also
necessitated lengthy negotiations, which were conducted by the Swiss
Legation with the assistance of Prince Hatzfeldt, the Secretary
of the Embassy. Our departure could only take place on the 14th
February.
It was not pleasant to be obliged to remain eleven days longer in
Washington. The moment the rupture of diplomatic relations occurred,
the secret police took possession of the Embassy, and shadowed every
one of my movements. These precautionary measures were supposed
to guarantee my personal safety; but I should have been quite safe
without them, for all Americans behaved towards me with perfect
propriety and courtesy. Our personal friends did not allow the
rupture of diplomatic relations to make any difference in their
attitude towards us. Until the very day of our departure, my wife
and I were the daily guests of American friends. Even the Press,
with but a few exceptions, maintained a friendly attitude; for
all the journalists knew that I had worked hard to maintain peace.
As an example of this, I reproduce below an article from the _New
York Tribune_, which is one of the leading anti-German papers in
America. I give the article, somewhat abbreviated, in the original,
in order to preserve its American character:
"Diplomacy and Friendship twin arts of Bernstorff.
"Departing German Envoy, target of critics here and at home, quits
post with brilliant record and many personal friends.
"The sailing of _Friedrich VIII._ invites the cordial obituary
style, though diplomatic deaths are supposed to warrant no sadness.
And yet, curiously enough, Count Bernstorff probably finds himself
leaving when more people are personally for him and fewer against
him than at any time in the last two years. A less distinguished
diplomat would not have had the art to stay so long.
"A letter from Washington, dated June, 1915, is in my desk. It
tells incidentally about the visit of a friend to the Ambassador
shortly after his interview with the President. 'It's coming out
all right,' the Count said cheerfully, his melancholy eyes lighting
up, and the anxious lines etched in his face during the months
past lightening. 'No, they're not going to get rid of me yet for
a while,' referring to the Press clamor for his dismissal.
"'I'm glad of that,' answered the friend. 'Then you'll stay and
get some more degrees.' (Eight American universities had honored
him.) 'Oh,' he answered with a gesture, 'I may leave by degrees.'
It is winning to catch an Excellency at puns.
"At his departure many persons--close friends of the last eight years
and newspaper correspondents--are going to miss his amazing charm
and the easy candor of his talk. He has had an intimate directness
in his dealings with all sorts and conditions of people, that only
a personage of magnetic personality can adopt.
"Sheer charm alone can forget caste consciousness. Count Bernstorff
has had none of the patent heavy regard for himself that makes
three-quarters of official Germany a chore to meet. 'I'll put you
through' the little telephone girl, at his favorite New York hotel
used to say promptly, when his Excellency was asked for, and knew
that she was safe.
"Reporters will miss seeing him teeter informally by the Embassy
fireplace as he interviewed them, or gave out a significant something
from behind a hastily-raised newspaper.
"The insistent friends of Germany, heavily friendly and advisory,
will miss his English, very soft with an attractive ghost, now and
then, of a lisp. He learned it in London, his first language, for
he was born there fifty-five years ago. His father, Count Albrecht
was on service as Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
"Count Bernstorff came to America from his post as Consul-General
in Cairo. He was stationed there in the trying diplomatic period
of Anglo-French rapprochement and the rise of naval competition
between the English and the German empires. By many, Count Bernstorff
is credited with saving Turkish Egypt and most of the Moslem world
to the German balance. They say he did it over coffee with Khedive
Abbas Hilmy, who never, never was bored by his wit, nor failed to
appreciate the graces bred down from thirteenth-century Mecklenburg
of the tall Herr Consul-General. And in return from the Moslem
Count Bernstorff may have caught some of his comforting regard for
kismet.
"The man is more than a little fatalist. 'What happens must happen,'
he was wont to say, as he sorted the threatening letters from his
morning correspondence. And again: 'What difference does it make?
They've killed so many that one more can make no difference.'
"He goes back to Berlin now, there as here different things to
different people. A rank Social Democrat I have heard him called
in drawing-rooms, where news of his earnest plea to his Government
for a liberal _Lusitania_ Note had leaked out.
"It has not been easy for him to construe and weigh the American
situation for his Government, and have his judgment taken, any
more than it has been easy for Mr. Gerard to convince the German
Foreign Office that the American Notes were really meant. Often
the same agent knocked both men and got in ahead of either as the
authority on what America would do.
"A certain American Baroness, Egeria to the American journalists
in Berlin, who has no use for Bernstorff or Gerard or Zimmermann,
has been one of his many cockle burrs. Most of the German-Americans
who chose to protest about the shipment of munitions and all of
pro-submarine Germany plus an aspirant or two for his post--all
of these have been busy against him. And the Americans are legion
who have seconded the hate. He himself has been silent, with an
occasional wry smile over it all. He has never excused himself
when attacks on him, personally, followed German actions against
which he had counselled.
"He has tried over and over again to explain to the German Foreign
Office the temper of the American people, whose sentimentality is
so different from that which prevails in the Hanover-Bremen-Leipzig
breast. The _Hamburger-Nachrichten_ has reviled him. It has been
hard to see with Hamburg eyes what Count Bernstorff must know--that
hardly a diplomat alive could have stayed so long on friendly terms
with Washington, through these two years, or reaped so heavy a
harvest of understanding from his study of poker and baseball as
well as American commerce and institutions. People like to write--I,
too--of his melancholy eyes, his gently cynical estimates of most
dreamers' hopes. Over one circumstance he has been always hopeful. He
has clung always to the hope that America neutral would be a leader
in the erection of peace machinery, eager that every diplomatic
transaction should perhaps have the possibility of an instrument.
His real object in leaving, I am sure, is that not again will he
turn over a communication from the American State Department to
read a faint hope of peace between lines."
Apart from the measures taken for our security, our departure from
Washington and New York was not very different from what it would
have been in ordinary times, had I been moving to take up my duties
in another country. Many friends came to the railway station at
Washington, and on the boat at New York. Telegrams and letters of
farewell came in hundreds, and our cabins were full of presents,
consisting of baskets of fruit, flowers, cigars, books, beverages
of all kinds, which are the custom at leavetakings in America.
In these circumstances, and after all that I have described in
the foregoing pages, I was nota little astonished when, about a
year later, the American War-Propaganda Department began to hold
me responsible for proceedings which were partly simply fiction,
and for the rest of a kind that had occurred without any assistance
from me whatever. I can understand perfectly the wish of the American
Propaganda Department to create a war spirit, just as the same
department in all belligerent countries strove to do; nevertheless,
it was not necessary to adorn the war propaganda with unjustifiable
personal attacks. Nothing happened after my departure from America
to prompt such attacks. A few of my telegrams were, to be sure,
deciphered and published in order to prove that I had hatched a
conspiracy. When the Military and Naval Attaches were compelled to
leave the United States, I could not very well avoid discharging
the whole of the naval and military business myself. But this does
not prove that I had previously had any dealings with these matters,
even admitting that the Naval and Military Attaches had been guilty
of illegal practices, which, despite all the uproar created by enemy
propaganda, I do not believe to have been proved. Once the fever of
war has died down, no one, presumably, will feel any interest in
devoting any attention to such questions. If, however, later on,
anyone should feel inclined to investigate the "German conspiracies,"
and "German propaganda," in the United States, in an impartial
spirit, he will be astonished to find how many fantastic fictions
were brought to the notice of the Investigation Committee of the
Senate, and what small justification lay at the bottom of the charges
made against the German Embassy.
When, on the afternoon of the 14th of February, we took to sea, we
had no idea that we were to enjoy the hospitality of the gallant
steamer _Friedrich VIII._, and its amiable captain, for four long
weeks. Ever since the establishment of regular lines of passenger
steamers between America and Europe, we must certainly have broken
all records in regard to the length of time we took to complete the
journey. There were on board the _Friedrich VIII._, in addition
to the whole of the staff of the Embassy, together with their wives
and children, the complete personnel of the consulates, as also a
few native Germans, who for some reason or other, happened to be
in America and had not yet had an opportunity of returning home.
A few Scandinavians completed the list of the passengers. The total
number of Germans was approximately two hundred. According to the
wording of the Safe Conduct which we had been granted, we were
allowed to take with us our personal belongings and "a reasonable
amount of money." We were expressly forbidden to carry any papers.
The first twenty-four hours of the journey were the most pleasant.
The sea was calm and the weather was not too cold, and on the following
evening we reached Halifax, which was the port at which we were to
be examined. It was selected in order that we might not have to
enter the war zone. Here we had the first taste of the vexations
of the journey. Our captain wanted to enter the port; but he was
ordered to anchor outside. On the following morning the authorities
allowed us to enter. We were placed under the supervision of the
English cruiser _Devonshire_, and I cannot help admitting that the
English naval officers discharged the undignified and distasteful
duties imposed upon them with great courtesy. The Canadian officials,
on the other hand, behaved with the utmost disrespect and boorishness.
They appeared to be accustomed to dealing only with immigrants and
stowaways.
I do not know to this day, why, in spite of our Safe Conduct, we
were held up twelve days in the Bedford Basin, which, with its
encircling snow-clad hills, was completely shut off from the rest
of the world. The examination in itself could not adequately account
for this strange and uncustomary behavior, particularly towards an
Ambassador: for although the ship's coal was ultimately sifted in
the search for contraband goods, if any good-will had been shown,
the examination could have been finished in three to four days
at the outside. I suppose, however, that the delay was intended
to serve political ends. The English probably wanted to keep us
shut up in Halifax until the United States had entered into the
war. They were perfectly well aware of my views, and feared that
in Berlin I might after all succeed in effecting an understanding
with the American Government. As, however, developments in the
United States dragged on very slowly, and at first only an armed
neutrality was contemplated, the English were ultimately obliged
to allow us to continue our journey, because they could not very
well keep us confined for weeks.
Personally, I cannot complain of the treatment to which I was subjected
at Halifax, for I was the only one among all my fellow passengers
of German nationality who had not to submit to having my person
searched, and was only required to sign a declaration that I was
carrying no papers. Everybody else--even my wife--had to consent to
being searched, an operation which was performed in a humiliating
manner, and which led to many an unpleasant scene. Even little
Huberta Hatzfeldt, who was only three months old, was stripped
of her swaddling clothes. The Canadian authorities assessed the
"reasonable sum of money" allowed at ninety dollars a head, and
confiscated all moneys above that sum as contraband. In this way,
Countess Manfred Matuschka lost 25,000 dollars, which, in ignorance
of the regulations, she had brought with her. The sum was to be
deposited with a Canadian Bank, but has probably been lost forever
by its owner. As I was forbidden to have any communication whatsoever
with the outside world, I was not able to carry out my intention
of lodging a complaint at Washington regarding this breach of the
Safe Conduct that had been granted to us.
At last, however, our imprisonment came to an end, and we were
allowed to pursue our journey. Amid the cheers of all on board,
including particularly those of our excellent captain, who felt
the affront we had received very deeply, we weighed anchor. Judge
of the almost panic-stricken disappointment of all the passengers,
therefore, when at the end of a few knots, the ship turned back
on her course! To the great relief of all concerned, however, it
appeared that we had only forgotten to take on board the wireless
telegraphy apparatus which had been taken from us at Halifax. From
that moment, apart from very bad and cold weather, we continued
our journey without further incident. We took a sweeping curve
northward, then sailed down the Norwegian coast without meeting
either an enemy ship or a German submarine. Some of the neutral
passengers were so much terrified of the latter, that they did
not retire to their beds for many nights at a stretch.
At ten o'clock in the morning we landed in the snow in Christiania.
Meanwhile the Mexico telegram had been published in Washington, and
Michaelis, the German Ambassador, in accordance with instructions,
came on board, in order to learn from me whether I could offer
any explanation of the fact--that is to say, whether I suspected
treachery on the part of any of my staff. It is indeed plain from
the oft-quoted reports of the Committee of the Senate, that a host
of underhand tricks must have been played, particularly in the
Post Office; nevertheless, I am of opinion that in this case the
explanation which I gave above is the correct one. The telegram
in question, like many others, was presumably deciphered by the
English. From the experience gained during the war, we have learned
that the diplomacy of the future will never be allowed to rely,
for important matters, upon the secret of a cipher; for skilful
experts are now able to discover the most complicated code, provided
that they are able to intercept a sufficient number of telegrams.
Over and above this, owing to our isolation in Washington, we were
able to alter the cipher but very seldom. As to the suggestion of
treachery on the part of any member of my staff--I never believed
in this at the time, nor do I believe in it now. In very hard times
they all proved themselves to be thoroughly loyal and efficient.
We had to remain in Christiania longer than we expected, because
the route across the Sound to Copenhagen was entirely ice-bound.
Finally, with the help of ice-breakers, even this obstacle was
overcome, and after a day's halt at Copenhagen, we at last reached
Berlin via Warnemuende. We had received an extremely hospitable
and cordial welcome at Christiania and Copenhagen, at the hands
of the Ambassadors, Michaelis and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau--we
also had an opportunity of convincing ourselves that the feeling
in Denmark and Norway had turned against us just as sharply as
in America. The balance of power was, however, different. If our
neutral neighbors had not been living in fear of German power,
they would at this time have responded to Mr. Wilson's call, and
would have broken off all diplomatic relations with us. I believe
that the President was hoping that events might take this turn,
and that he would thus be spared the need of waging war. If all the
countries in the world were to declare war against Germany and her
Allies--this is what was assumed in Washington--the economic pressure
would alone suffice to compel the Central Powers to yield. The policy
proposed was similar to the one which, in the future, the League of
Nations would pursue against any refractory member of its body,
and which the Entente proposes to adopt to-day against Bolshevist
Russia. The great length of time which it took the United States to
enter the war is, in my opinion, to be explained in this way. The
idea was to wait and see how things would develop. Meanwhile, thanks
to the Mexico telegram, war-propaganda in America was being worked
with great success, and the military preparations made such steady
progress, that even if economic measures did not prove sufficient
to end the war, the United States would have obtained the army
they had longed for for so many years, as also the fleet of war
and merchant ships, for which in times of peace Congress would
never have voted the necessary funds.
On the evening of the day after our arrival in Berlin, I was received
by the Imperial Chancellor, with whom I had a long interview. It
was on this occasion that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg informed me
that he could not help consenting to the U-boat war, as the German
people would never have understood it if we had concluded an
unsatisfactory peace, without attempting to bring about a happy
decision by means of the last and most effective weapon in which
the nation felt any confidence. He also said that he would have
been unable to go before the Reichstag with an offer of mediation
from Mr. Wilson, because such intervention would not have been
popular, public opinion would not have liked it, and it would only
have been accepted by the Social Democrats. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg
declared that the Reichstag would have "thrown him out." This was
the very expression he used. But this did not explain why, a few
weeks previously, Mr. Wilson's mediation had seemed desirable,
if, as a matter of fact, it was impossible to get the Reichstag
to agree to it. Meanwhile, the political situation at that time
has been completely elucidated by the evidence which Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg gave before the Examination Committee of the National
Assembly. In his account of the interview he had with me, he spoke
as follows:
"As regards my interview with Count Bernstorff, on his return from
America, I should like to make the following remarks: I cannot recall
all the details of the conversation I had with Count Bernstorff.
Count Bernstorff has revealed in his evidence what I said to him,
and I have no doubt that he has accurately reproduced my actual
words. My duty was--and this is an idea I already touched upon
earlier in the day--once the policy of an unrestricted U-boat war
was resolved upon, never to reveal to anyone any doubts as to the
efficacy of the scheme. In this case, too, I had to say, we shall
achieve something by means of it. And that is why in my conversation
with Count Bernstorff, I did not reveal my inmost feelings on the
subject--there was no need for me to do so--but simply referred to
the reasons which could be adduced in favor of the U-boat war."
The reception which I was given in Berlin, certainly at first left
nothing to be desired. The Imperial Chancellor, on the occasion of
our first meeting, had thanked me in a very hearty manner for my
work in Washington, and a few days later, proposed that I should go
on an extraordinary mission to Stockholm. On principle I was quite
prepared to do this, seeing that the recent outbreak of revolution
in Russia, and the prospective international Socialist conference
in Stockholm, would offer fresh possibilities of peace, and an
opportunity for useful work. From various things I had noticed in
Berlin, I gathered that--as the evidence before the Examination
Committee proved--the Imperial Chancellor would have preferred
to give up the idea of the U-boat war, and to accept American
intervention in favor of peace, but that he was compelled to give
in, owing to the overwhelming advocacy of the U-boat campaign. It
was to be hoped, therefore, that with the expected speedy failure
of U-boat tactics, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would snatch at the
next opportunity of making peace. As he remained in Office, in spite
of the U-boat war, his chief motive for so doing must certainly
have been that "after his departure the whole of the power, both
of external and internal politics, would have gone over without
resistance to the machinery of war-fever." I regarded any policy
as the right one, which arrived at a prompt conclusion of peace,
provided that we did not make any confession of weakness by ourselves
initiating fresh offers of peace. We had already erred once in this
way. But in Stockholm it seemed likely that opportunities might
occur of winning either the Russians or the foreign Socialists
over to a movement in favor of peace.
As I heard nothing, either about the Stockholm Mission, or about an
audience with the Kaiser, which I was led to expect in connection with
it, I went at the end of a few days to find out what had happened,
and I was told that the Kaiser had declined to sanction my mission
to Stockholm. Although I had a second interview with the Imperial
Chancellor, I was never able to ascertain definitely the reason of
the Kaiser's anger against me. Since, however, General Ludendorff,
simply on the grounds of my particular views, made his "impassioned"
attack on me before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly,
I have no longer been in any doubt whatsoever as to the nature of
the influence that was at work at General Headquarters. At the
time, I only suspected the prevalence of some such feelings in
that quarter, because I had heard it whispered that the Monarch
did not like my "democratic views." The reasons for the Kaiser's
anger, which were given me officially, were of too trivial a nature
to be even plausible.
I must next refer to the dispatch box of the Swedish Legation in
Washington. At New York Herr Ekengren had put on board the steamer
_Friedrich VIII._ a box containing Swedish telegrams, which was
to be forwarded to its destination.
This box, the very existence of which we Germans knew nothing about,
was taken possession of by the British authorities in Halifax,
and dispatched to England. The London newspapers then reported
that a dispatch box, belonging to Count Bernstorff, and containing
documents of the German Embassy, had been opened there. Although
the mistake, whether intentional or the reverse, was very soon
elucidated, someone had laid the matter before the Kaiser in a
distorted light. Apparently the Kaiser was allowed to form the
suspicion that the opening of the box had betrayed the secret of
the Mexico telegram.
A further reason for his displeasure, at the time, was told me
subsequently at Constantinople by the Kaiser himself. He said that
I had "let him down most dreadfully," when I had recommended Mr.
Gerard as American Ambassador to Berlin. I ought never to have
supported the nomination of such a "Tammany Hall" creature. If
he--the Kaiser--had only known at the time who Gerard was, and
what Tammany Hall could be, he would never have accepted this
Ambassador. In Constantinople I was able to reply to the Kaiser
pretty fully, as the interview took place during a somewhat long
journey on the Bosphorus. I certainly did recommend Mr. Gerard in
due course, but only after he had already been selected as Ambassador
by Mr. Wilson. Before he had been chosen I was not asked. If at
that time--in the year 1913--I had advised the rejection of Mr.
Gerard, it would only have created a lot of unnecessary ill-feeling,
as was the case at the nomination of Mr. Hill. It is the custom
in America to select the Ambassadors from politically influential
circles of the triumphant party; irrespective of whether Tammany
Hall or any other organization is concerned.
Moreover, in 1903 I believed that Mr. Gerard would be welcome in
Berlin, for social reasons alone. Everybody knew that the Kaiser
liked to have Ambassadors who entertained on a lavish scale. Mr.
Gerard was the only man, among all the candidates of that day, who
seemed fitted for this and in a position to live up to it, while
his rich and amiable wife was admirably suited to help him in his
task. Before the war, an American Ambassador in Berlin really never
had any political business to transact, for it was the tradition
with the United States Government to conduct all negotiations almost
exclusively with the diplomatic corps in Washington. In 1913, therefore,
I had no reason to advocate the rejection of Mr. Gerard in Berlin.
Unfortunately, it was precisely in the social sphere that he had,
before the war, experienced certain disappointments in Berlin,
which, as far as we were concerned, might have been avoided, and
it is possible that Mr. Gerard may have been influenced by these
regrettable incidents. In any case, the Ambassador did not like
Berlin, and he took too little pains to conceal the fact. Mr. Gerard
was not the sort of man to be able to swim against the tide of
anti-German feeling, once it had become the proper thing in America
to be pro-Ally. As to whether any other United States Ambassador
would have shown less hostility to us, however, may be reasonably
doubted. I have already singled out the Adlon dinner as a proof
of the fact that Mr. Gerard could behave differently.
Be all this as it may, the reasons which were alleged genuinely
to justify the hostile attitude of General Headquarters towards
myself, struck me as not being sufficiently weighty. I say "General
Headquarters" intentionally, for the Kaiser was manifestly only
prejudiced against me by the usual whisperings that characterized
the Wilhelminian epoch.
Nevertheless, I had conducted the most important negotiations of
the war, and the Monarch must, in any case, have had the wish to
hear the report of it all from the person chiefly concerned. Besides,
the Kaiser knew as well as I did, that in Washington I had pursued
the policy of which he and the Chancellor were actually in favor.
Otherwise, the Imperial Memorandum, which was sent to me about
the U-boat war, and to which I have already referred, would be
inexplicable. Meanwhile, however, this policy had not been able
to prevail against the preponderating influence of the military
party, who demanded the U-boat campaign. Now, of course, I have no
longer any doubt that the views which General Ludendorff expressed
against me before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly,
simply as his personal opinion and without proof, constituted more
or less what was suggested to the Kaiser at this time. Briefly, they
wished to make me the scapegoat for the United States' entry into
the war, and this, despite the fact that all that I had prophesied
in regard to American policy had proved correct, and all that my
opponents had prophesied had proved wrong. In their efforts to
accomplish this end, they found that a poisonous mixture could be
brewed out of my efforts for peace, and my well-known democratic
views, which the Kaiser was not able to resist.
The unhappy Monarch unfortunately never once realized that the
"Democrats" were his best friends. The Imperial power could, in
the long run, only be upheld, if it found both its support and
its counter-weight in a strong democracy. Like Friedrich Wilhelm
IV., William II. was also unable to adapt himself to the changing
circumstances of his time. The one-sided composition of his entourage,
which was always recruited from among people who held his own views,
was, at all events, chiefly to blame for this.
Although the Imperial Chancellor had told me that he would overcome
the Kaiser's displeasure in regard to myself, almost two months
elapsed before I was received at General Headquarters, and even
then, it was only because a question had been asked about the matter
in the Reichstag. When I saw the Kaiser, towards the beginning of
May, in Kreuznach, the American question was of interest merely to
historians, and no longer to politicians. Consequently, my interview
with the Monarch, which took place on a walk, was not of very great
moment. With his customary skill, the Kaiser steered clear of any
attempt to enter deeply into the political problems of the hour,
and behaved towards me, for the rest, just as affably as he had
been wont to do in the past.
I had made the journey to Kreuznach in the company of my late friend,
Ballin, whom I was never to see again. Whereas I was invited to
lunch at the Imperial board, Herr Ballin was only asked to dinner.
Among the many and various charges which were brought against me
in my Washington days, was the allegation that I was principally
an agent of Ballin's. I had, in cordial agreement with Herr Ballin,
always energetically supported the interests of German Shipping
Companies; but even my most bitter enemies can only justify their
charge against me for the period preceding the war. For, during
the war, Herr Ballin had no influence at all, either in America or
at home. He was, for instance, kept aloof from the Kaiser, because
he was regarded as an "interested party" and as a pessimist. On
the occasion in question, a high official of the Court said to me
at the Imperial table that if I was seeing Ballin again before I
left Kreuznach, would I please tell him that he was not to speak
so pessimistically to the Emperor as he was wont to do. The Emperor
ought not to be allowed to hear such stuff, otherwise he would
lose nerve. This little passage of conversation is a proof of the
carefully "insulated" position in which, as everyone knows, the
Kaiser was kept.
After lunch I paid a visit to both of our great Army Commanders,
whose acquaintance I made for the first time on this occasion.
"Bowing to necessity rather than to my own personal tastes," I must
now, unfortunately, enter into personal matters, which hitherto
I have diligently avoided in this book. I cannot, however, help
referring here to the utterly unwarranted attacks made upon me by
General Ludendorff, in his evidence before the Examination Committee
of the National Assembly, with the view of refuting my own account of
the interview which we had at G. H. Q. At all events, the General so
completely lost control of himself before the Examination Committee,
that this possibly explains his false interpretation of my evidence.
To deal first with the reason which actuated me in visiting General
Ludendorff, I reproduce below the dialogue which took place thereanent
before the Examination Committee:
_Delegate Dr. Cohn:_ Was your interview with Field-Marshal Hindenburg
and General Ludendorff brought about by any particular person or
persons--either by yourself, by the Imperial Chancellor, or by
the Foreign Office; or was it purely accidental?
_Witness Count von Bernstorff:_ It was the outcome of the circumstances.
I received a telegram which informed me, through the Foreign Office,
that I was to report to the Kaiser at Kreuznach on the 4th of May.
Now, Field-Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff were also
present at the lunch table, and I felt that I was bound in courtesy
to pay a visit to the two gentlemen after the meal.
_Delegate Dr. Cohn:_ Good. If I understand you correctly, my lord,
G. H. Q. did not even feel the need of speaking with the Ambassador
just recently returned from America?
_Witness Count von Bernstorff:_ No. I never received any summons
for that purpose.
I abide by these utterances to this day, because I actually remained
seven weeks without being summoned to an interview with General
Ludendorff, and then only visited him of my own free will, on the
occasion when I reported to the Kaiser. In these circumstances,
therefore, I was entirely justified in describing my visit as simply
an act of courtesy. In view of the circumstances, I might perhaps
say: an act of super-courtesy.
I do not dispute General Ludendorff's statement that I had expressed
the wish to see him; for if I had not had the wish, I should have
left Kreuznach without paying him a visit. As, however, General
Ludendorff, in his evidence before the Examination Committee, allowed
it to be plainly understood that, owing to the difference of our
views, he did not like to have anything to do with me, I will at
once emphasize the fact, that my wish to see him was actuated by
purely official motives. In politics I have at all times laid all
personal feelings entirely aside, and, have thought only of the
business and the interests of my country. While I was kicking my
heels in Berlin for all those weeks, waiting upon a summons to the
Emperor, I was urged by many people to try and obtain an interview
with General Ludendorff, in order to enlighten him regarding American
affairs, as in this respect he was very badly informed. The latter
fact, has, at all events, been substantiated by General Ludendorff
himself, in his evidence before the Committee. The gentlemen who
urged me to obtain this interview, themselves made efforts to bring
it about. But these efforts were of no avail, and I therefore regarded
them as too insignificant to be mentioned in my own evidence. In all
my utterances before the Committee, I refrained from all allusion
to personal and subjective matters.
General Ludendorff has further maintained that I impugned his honor
by declaring that, generally speaking, he did not wish to conclude
peace. I naturally never made such a nonsensical statement. Immediately
after my visit to General Ludendorff at G. H. Q., I made notes
of the essential passages of our interview; because I suspected,
what in my opinion has since become a certainty, to wit, that the
General wished to heap all the blame of the war with America upon
my shoulders. Every impartial reader who examines the Notes given
below, will be forced to admit, that they contain nothing whatsoever
except assertions, which have been confirmed by all the evidence
given before the Committee of the National Assembly; that is to
say:
(1) That I wished to accept Mr. Wilson's offer of mediation.
(2) That the Imperial Government--that is to say, G. H. Q. or whoever
was responsible for taking the final decision--did not wish to
accept Mr. Wilson's offer of mediation, in order to declare the
unrestricted U-boat war instead.
(3) That the Naval Authorities had declared themselves in a position
to bring about a desire for peace in England in five months from
the 1st of February.
My notes about the interview I had with General Ludendorff ran as
follows:
General Ludendorff received me with the following words:
"In America you wanted to make peace. You evidently thought we were
at the end of our tether."
I replied:
"No, I did not think that; but I wanted to make peace before we
came to the end of our tether."
Whereupon the General said:
"We, however, did not want to. Besides, it would not have been
surprising if you had thought that we had come to the end of our
resources. The communications you received, which I read from time
to time, certainly led to that conclusion."
Later on in the conversation, General Ludendorff asked me when,
in my opinion, the Americans would participate in the war with
great force. I replied that in twelve months a large American army
was to be expected in France, and that this army would be organized
with comparative ease. To this the General rejoined that in that
case we had ample time to end the war meanwhile; for the U-boats
would force England to a peace in three months. He had received
absolutely certain information on this point. When I was on the
point of leaving, General Ludendorff repeated this remark very
positively.
Though the sense was the same, the actual wording of my evidence
before the Examination Committee differs somewhat from that of
the notes given above. This is explained, however, by the fact
that I spoke quite freely, and therefore prefaced my remarks with
the words: "So far as I can remember, and so far as I am able to
say, under oath, the conversation was more or less as follows,"
etc.
I did not enter into the personal views which General Ludendorff
thought fit to express in his evidence before the Examination Committee;
for I am of the opinion that the duty of the Committee was simply to
establish the real truth by an inquiry into the facts. It is open
to the Committee to put to me any questions they like concerning my
activities in Washington, and I will answer them frankly; but I think
that a quarrel between witnesses about their own personal opinions
would have been an undignified spectacle, in which I distinctly
refused to participate. I gladly leave it to the reader of the present
volume to form his own ideas regarding my work in America.
In May, 1917, I left G. H. Q., feeling quite convinced that for
the moment there was no room for me in German diplomacy; for the
only policy which I regarded as right, had no prospect of being
realized. After my return from America, I was placed on half-pay.
I was therefore at liberty to return home, however unwilling I may
have felt, at that moment of great tribulation for my country,
to give myself up to a life of ease and idleness. During my period
of rest, a Reichstag resolution was passed, and there was a change
of Chancellors.
When Herr von Kuehlmann, who is a friend of mine, took over the
Foreign Office, he summoned me by telegram to Berlin, and told
me that the Imperial Chancellor, Michaelis, was going to offer me
the post of Ambassador in Constantinople. Some years previously
Herr von Kuehlmann and I had worked together in London. We had been
on very good terms, and since then I had never lost touch with him.
As he assured me very positively that he had taken over the Foreign
Office in order to conclude peace, I felt no qualms about returning
once more to diplomatic duties. I did not, however, conceal from
Herr von Kuehlmann, that I expected that there would be very strong
opposition at G. H. Q. to my being employed again on Foreign Service.
The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we might confidently
leave this side of the question to the Imperial Chancellor, who at
that moment was on his honeymoon, and was therefore admirably situated
to carry things through. My interview with Herr Michaelis only made
me more eager than ever to undertake the Mission to Constantinople.
He said to me that he was offering me a very difficult and unpleasant
billet, for I should have to wring concessions from the Turks with
the object of bringing about peace. This view of the situation
corresponded entirely with my own. Contrary to my expectations, the
Imperial ratification of my appointment arrived; but the Monarch
also seized the opportunity of making certain remarks about my
democratic views, without, however, withholding his signature from
my credentials.
In September I set out for Constantinople, where thirty years previously
I had started my diplomatic career, and where I was now to end it.
INDEX
INDEX
Ackerman, Karl
Albert, Privy Councillor, appointment of; financial affairs of; office
of; propaganda work of; moving picture work of; shipping activities
of; hindrance of; marine insurance and; "conspiracies" and; duties
of; robbing of
Albrecht, Count
Algeciras Conference
Alsace
America, see United States
American Criminal Court
Embassy in London
Institute in Berlin
Law Department
Peace League
Peace Note
Press
Press Bureau
Secret Service
War Propaganda Department
Amsinck and Company, 261
_Ancona_, sinking of; Lansing and sinking of
_Andrew_
Anglo-Saxons
_Annie Larsen_
_Appam_
_Arabia_
_Arabic_, sinking of; effect of sinking of; negotiations concerning;
defense of sinking of; settlement of
Arbitration Treaty
Archibald, James
_Armenian_ sinking of
Asquith, Herbert
Associated Press
Atlanta
_Atlantic_
Austria-Hungary, Germany allied with; Serbian threat to; battle front of;
desire for peace in
Bagdad
Bakmetieff
Balkans
Ballin
Baltimore
Baltimore _Sun_
Bartelli
Baumgarten, Prof.
Beachy Head
Beecher, Henry Ward
Belgium, invasion of; atrocities in; atrocities of; American aid to;
proposed restoration of; deportations from
Berchtold, Count
Berlin
Bern _Freie Zeitung_
Bernstorff, Count, in London; pre-war policy of; arbitration efforts of;
American relations with; peace efforts of; appointment of; Roosevelt
and; newspapermen and; Bryan and; munition traffic and; Col. House and;
forged passports and; "conspiracies" and; submarine warfare and;
_Lusitania_ affair and; _Lusitania_ reports of; Lansing and; _Arabic_
affair and; _Arabic_ reports of; German telegram on _Arabic_ affair to;
Archibald affair and; Boy-Ed, report of; _Sussex_ reports of; Bolo
affair and; Polish relief report of; mediation reports of; 1916 election
and; Commission of National Assembly and; "American opinion" described
by; Wilson's speech reported by; departure of; article on; arrival in
Germany of; German examination of
Bethlehem Steel Works
Bethmann-Hollweg, von
Bielaski, Commissioner Bruce
Bismarck
Bissing, von
Bode
Bopp
Bosch Magneto Company
Boston
Boston _Evening Transcript_
Boy-Ed, Captain, office of; recall of; conspiracies of; Rintelen and;
attacks on
Bremen
Bridgeport Projectile Company
Brinken, von
British Royal Mail Steam Packet Company
_Brooklyn Daily Eagle_
Brown, Cyril
Bryan, William Jennings; character of; pacifism of; submarine warfare and;
peace efforts of; resignation of
Bukarest
Bulgaria
Buelow, Prince
Buenz, Dr.
"Bureau for Employment of German Workers"
Buroede
Cairo
Canada
Canadian Bank
Canadian Pacific Railway
Capelle, von
Caprivi
_Carolyn_
Carranza
Cavell, Edith
"Central Office for Foreign Service"
"Central Purchasing Company"
Charlotte
Chicago
Chicago _Herald_
Chicago _Tribune_
China
Christiania
Cincinnati
"Citizen's Committee for Food Shipments"
Claussen, M. B.
Clemenceau
Cleveland
Collector of the Port of New York
Commission of Inquiry
Commission of National Assembly
Congress
Constantinople
Copenhagen
Creel, George
Current History
Czechs
Daecher
Danger Zone
Declaration of London
Democratic Party
Denmark
Department of Justice
Dernburg, Dr., appointment of; duties of; failure of mission of; propaganda
of; funds of; unpopularity of; submarine warfare and; _Lusitania_ affair
defended by; withdrawal of; Bernstorff supported by
Deutsche Bank
_Deutsche Tageszeitung_
Deutscher Verein
_Deutschland_
Dewey, Admiral
De Wiart, Carton
Diedrichs, Admiral
Dieppe
Dobrudja
Dohna, Count
"Dollar Diplomacy"
Dover
Dumba, Dr.; peace efforts of; Archibald affair and; recall of
_Dunele_
_Duneyre_
Dungeness
East Asiatic Squadron
Eastern Policy
Eckhart, von
_Eir_
Eitel Friedrich
Ekengren
Encirclement Policy
England; German relations with; Venezuela affair and; cables cut by;
international law violated by; propaganda expenses of; American press
and; American relations with; blockade by; Wilson and; American notes
to: February 22, 1915; January 18, 1916; July 21, 1915; October 21,
1915; Lansing's note to; debt of; merchantmen armed by; Polish relief
and; mediation and; resources of; submarine warfare and; peace feeling
in; wheat embargo against; peace terms of; American financial aid of
English Press
propaganda
Secret Police
White Book
Entente Note, quotations from
Entente Powers, see England, France
Falmouth
_Fatherland_
Fay, Lt.
Federal Reserve Act
Federal Reserve Board
Five Years War
Flood, Representative
Folkestone
Ford, Henry
Franc-tireurs
France; German relations with; desire for war in; propaganda expenses of;
munitions sent to; mediation and; pacifist agitation in; American
sympathy for; resources of; public opinion in; peace terms of; hope of
American aid in; American army in
Francis-Ferdinand, Archduke
Frederick, Emperor
Frederick the Great
Free Poland
Frelinghuysen, Senator
Friedjung, Heinrich
_Friedrich VIII_
Fritzen
Fuehr, Dr. Alexander; duties of; Hoff affair and
Gerard, Ambassador, _Lusitania_ affair and; German memorandum to;
memorandum from; submarine warfare and; return of; negotiations with
Gerhardt, Meyer; mission of
German-Americans; illegal activities of; Red Cross work of
German-American Chamber of Commerce
Press
German Embassy in London
Embassy in Washington
Foreign Office
"Information Service"
Mercantile Marine
"Peace"
Red Cross
Union
Germany, policy of; English relations with; American relations with;
French relations with; Russian relations with; statesmen of; world
politics of; attempt to avoid war by; spirit of; Philippine affair
and; Venezuelan affair and; propaganda of; object of war in; opinion
of Wilson in; wireless stations of; American notes to; finances of;
American exports to; conspiracies of; concessions of; 1916 conditions
in; 1916 peace offer of; American offer refused by; submarine warfare
adopted by; American Press and; desire for peace in; rupture of
American relations with
Goltz, Horst von der
Goschen, Sir Edward
Greece, violation of
Hague Conference
Hale, William Bayard
Halifax
Hamburg
Hamburg-Amerika Line
_Hamburger Nachrichten_
Hampton Roads
Hapag Case
Harding, Senator
Hatzfeldt, Prince
Hatzfeldt, Huberta
Hay, John
Hearst, William Randolph
Hearst Press
Hecker, Rittmeister; Red Cross work of
Helfrerich, Karl
Henry, Prince
Hermann, F. & Co.
Hilmy, Khedive Abbas
Hindenburg, Marshal
Hirsch, Gilbert
Hoff, Alfred
Hofmeister
Holland; allied measures against
Holstein, von
Hong Kong
Horn, Werner
House, Col.; mediation supported by; Bernstorff and; neutrality of;
German peace offer and
Huerta
Hughes, Charles Evans
"Hull Insurance"
Igel, von
India, German plots in
Indianapolis _News_
International Commission of Inquiry
Law
News Service
Ireland; Easter rebellion in
Italy; Austrian relations with; English relations with
Iturbide, General
Jaeger
Jagow, von
Japan, policy of; American relations with; entry into war of
Java
Joffre, Marshal
_Journal of Commerce_
Jusserand, M.
Kaiser William, note from; submarine warfare and; mediation and;
Bernstorff and
Kaltschmidt, Albert
Karlsruhe
Kerensky
Kirkwall
Kitchener, Lord
Kleist, von
Knox, Philander
Koeter
Koenig, Capt.
Kreuznach
_Kronpriz Friedrich Wilhelm_
Kruger Telegram
Kuehlman, von
Lake Erie
Ontario
Lamar
Lansing, Robert; German note to; appointment of; qualities of; _Lusitania_
negotiations and; _Arabic_ negotiations with; January, 1916, note of;
_Sussex_; and; Anglo-American agreement and; Belgian deportations and;
peace note and; submarine warfare and
Law, Bonar
League of Nations
League to Enforce Peace
Lechartier, G.
Le Havre
Lester, Capt.
_Liebenfels_
Lincoln, Abraham
Lloyd-George, David
Lodge, Henry Cabot
London
_Daily Graphic_
_Daily Telegraph_
_Morning Post_
_Times_
Long, Breckenridge
Long Island
Lorraine
Los Angeles
Luebau Bureau
Luckenbach
Ludendorf, General
Luedentz
_Lusitania_, effect of sinking of; sailing of; sinking of; defence of
sinking of; negotiations concerning
McAdoo, William
McClure
McCumber, Senator
Macao
Mach, von
Madden
Manchester _Guardian_
Manchuria
Manila
Mannheimer Versicherungsgesellschaft
_Marina_
Marne, battle of
Marschall
Martin
Matuschka, Countess Manfred
_Maumee_
Mechlenburg, Dr.
Mediterranean, English power on
Meloy
Metropolitan Club
Mexico; punitive expedition into; American relations with; Dispatch
Michaelis
Milwaukee
_Free Press_
Monroe Doctrine
Montenegro, sacrifice of
Morgan, J. P. & Co.
Munich
Nauen
Nelson, Senator
New England
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New London
Newmann
Newport
New Republic
New York
_American_
_Evening Post_
_Evening Sun_
_Evening Telegram_
New York Exchange
_Staats-Zeitung_
_Globe_
_Herald_
_Journal_
_Press_
_Sun_
_Times_
_Tribune_
_World_
_Noordam_
Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft
Northcliffe, Lord
Norway
Olsen
"Open Door" Policy
Oriental Policy, see Eastern Policy
Overman, Senator
Paderewski, Ignace
Panama Canal
Pan-German Party
Papen, van, office of; financial affairs of; conspiracies of;
recall of; Rintelen and; attack on
Paris
Parker, Sir Gilbert
Pavenstedt
Peace of Portsmouth
Philadelphia
Philadelphia _Inquirer_
_North American_
_Public Ledger_
Philippines, American policy toward; Taft in
Pittsburgh
_Post_
Plage; Herr
Poland, plan for relief of; autonomy of
Poppinghaus
Posen
Prince Waldemar
Princess Royal of England
Providence _Journal_
Ram Chandra
Ratcliffe, S. K.
Reed, Senator
Reinsurance Treaty
Republican National Committee
Party
Rheims Cathedral, destruction of
Riano, Senor
Rintelen, Franz
_Risikofiotte_
Ritz-Carlton
Roosevelt, Theodore; policies of; Venezuela affair and; "trusts" and;
Bernstorff's personal relations with; _Lusitania_ affair and;
Russo-Japanese war and; 1916 election and
Rotterdam
Rumania; sacrifice of; conquest of
Ruroede, Carl
Russia, German relations with; desire for war in; Japanese relations with;
war begun by; German conspiracy against; Poland oppressed by; peace
terms for; revolution in; Bolshevism in
Russo-Japanese War
St. Louis _Globe-Democrat_
St. Paul _Pioneer Press_
St. Regis Hotel
Salonika
San Francisco
Sayville Wireless Station
Scandinavia; Allied measures against
Scandinavia-American Line
Schack, von
Scheele
Schiff, Jacob
Scholtz
Schurz, Carl
Serbia, war declared on; sacrifice of
Seven Years War
Sherman Act
Siam
Sielcken, Hermann
Silesia
Smith, Louis J.
Soloman
Somme Front
South America
Spain
Spanish-American War
Speyer, James
Springfield _Republican_
Stahl
Starnberg
Stegler
Sternberg
Stockholm
Stone, Senator; Wilson's note to
Straus, Oscar
Struve, Gothein & Co.
Stumm, von
Stuttgart
Suedenhorst, Zwiedeneck von
_Sussex_; sinking of; result of sinking of; negotiations over; settlement
of
Switzerland
Swope, Herbert
Taft, William, policy of; Bernstorif's personal relations with
Tammany Hall
Tauschen, Hans
Taylor, Dr. E. A.
Thierichens
Tirpitz, von
Trans-Ocean Bureau
Treaty of Amiens
Triple Alliance
Tuckerton Wireless Station
Tumulty
Turkey
U-Boat campaign, opening of; prosecution of; negotiations concerning;
"armed merchantmen" and; surrender of; American coast; proposed
reopening of; German desire for; reopening of
U-53, visit of; piracy of
Ultimatum of April 18, 1916
United States, German relations with; pre-war conditions in;
pan-American policy of; Japanese relations with; Philippine affair
and; characteristics of; English relations with; _Lusitania_ affair
and; public opinion in; German wireless stations in; neutrality of;
munition traffic; German notes to; German propaganda in; propaganda
work of; German ships coaled in; German finances in; port control
in; German economic activities in; German dyestuffs exported to;
German conspiracies in: coaling; forged passports; bomb outrages;
submarine warfare against; _Arabic_ affair and; _Arabic_
negotiations with; English intrigue in; _Ancona_ affair in;
_Sussex_; affair in; desire for peace in; rupture of German
diplomatic relations with; army of
University of Berlin
Vaneboro
_Vaterland_
Venezuela, American relations with; English and German ultimatum to
Vera Cruz
Verdun
Versailles, Wilson at; Peace Conference at; Peace of
Vienna
Viereck, G. S.
Villa, Pancha
Wall Street
Warburg, Paul
Warm
Washington, D. C.
Washington _Post_
Wedell, H. A. von
Welland Canal Case
Western Policy
West Prussia
White, Andrew D.
Whitehouse, Mrs. Norman
Wiegand, von
Wilson, President; character of; English influence on; Vera Cruz speech
of; public opinion and; foreign loans prohibited by; neutrality of;
munition traffic and; _Lusitania_ speech of; _Lusitania_ negotiations
with; _Arabic_ affair and; policy of; description of; Congress opened
by; _Ancona_ affair and; autocracy of; marriage of; mediation efforts
of; candidacy of; changed attitude of; submarine warfare and; _Sussex_
and; Kaiser's letter to; Polish relief and; League of Nations proposed
by; reelection of; Belgian deportations and; German peace offer
supported by; peace note of; peace speech by; German relations broken
by; Germany condemned by.
Wolff Bureau
Woolpart
Wunmerburg
"Yellow Press"
Zimmermann