THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
Before I received official notice of the opening of the unrestricted
U-boat campaign, I had a further interview with Mr. House, concerning
the peace activities of the President, and the telegram describing
it which I sent to the Foreign Office, Berlin, is reproduced below:
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 212
"(Answer to Telegram No. 149 of the 7th January.)
"Washington, January 16th, 1917.
"Your Excellency's authority in regard to Mr. House duly availed
of. He told me Wilson considered this pronouncement of Imperial
Government supremely valuable. As regards further developments
of Wilson's efforts for peace, I can say nothing definite. This
much only is certain, that at present moment President has no other
thought than that of bringing about peace, and will endeavor to
achieve this end with the utmost energy and all means in his power.
A further pronouncement of Wilson's is expected almost immediately;
it will probably take form of a communication to Congress. Apparently
it will consist of an appeal to the American people to help him to
enforce peace; in any case both he and House praise the Hearst
Press article, which is written from that point of view. Whether
means adopted will be to place an embargo on all exports is difficult
to say. Maybe the threat of an embargo will be enough to force our
enemies to a conference.
"From the above it is clear that we cannot afford to have any
difficulties over the old U-boat question. As regards the question
of armed merchant vessels, I hope to arrive at a _modus vivendi_.
But we must be careful not to act hastily and carelessly, so as
not to create conflict before President has taken further steps.
Remarkable as this may sound to German ears, Wilson is regarded here
very generally as pro-German. His Note was traced to our influence,
and Gerard's speech strengthened this impression. This speech is in
accordance with instructions which Mr. Gerard is receiving. Our
present enemies have gone literally raving mad, and leave no stone
unturned in order to put obstacles in Wilson's way. This explains
the attacks against the President, as also the scurrilous attempt
engineered by the Republicans to charge the Administration with
Stock Exchange speculations. Without any justification, of course,
my name also was mentioned in this regard. The German Embassy, as
is well known, is held responsible for everything by our enemies
in this country."
At the same time as the above telegram, I wrote the following report
describing the prevailing political attitude in Washington:
CIPHER REPORT
"Washington, 14th January, 1917.
"Ever since the Presidential election the political situation here
has not changed. Apart from the question of ending the world-war,
the public mind has not been constantly or earnestly concerned
with any matter.
"Congress has dealt with the customary Budget proposals, and the
fruitless negotiations about the Mexican question drag slowly on.
"Meanwhile, the attitude towards ourselves, which after the _Sussex_
incident took a decided turn for the good, has slowly improved.
This change in the public temper can be observed on all sides. It
is true that it is only very slightly noticeable, if at all, in
the Press, and our most rabid opponents are driven, owing to the
general improvement in German-Americans' relations, to ever more
violent attacks against us. Since President Wilson dispatched his
Peace Note, our enemies' fury knows no bounds. Without exaggeration,
it can be said that this note voices the spirit of almost the whole
American people.
"Only Wall Street and the anti-German ring, as also their friends
in the press, are dissatisfied and are endeavoring to put obstacles
in the President's way. In these circles, which are always under
English influence, the belief has taken root, that Mr. Wilson has
fallen under German spell. The well-known anti-German Republican,
Senator Lodge, boldly expressed this view in the Senate; but he
could not prevent the Senate from voting in favor of Mr. Wilson's
Peace Note, by a huge majority.
"The public mind is engaged principally with the question why precisely
the President dispatched his note immediately after the German offer
of peace. It is well-known that this Note had been prepared for some
time, and would have been sent off at Christmas, quite irrespective
of our own proposals, although, in view of Mr. Wilson's inclination
to temporize, and to treat all questions somewhat dilatorily, this
is by no means certain. I believe that the President's principal
motive was his pressing desire to play the role of mediator--a
prospect which seemed to be imperilled if our enemies agreed to deal
directly with us. This may possibly explain why that particular
moment was chosen, for which our enemies regard Mr. Wilson so
unfavorably. A cartoon published by that most anti-German paper,
the _New York Herald_, depicts Mr. Wilson's dove of peace as a
parrot, faithfully babbling out the German proposals.
"Apart from the choice of this particular moment for its expression,
the President's desire to bring about peace is in any case very
comprehensible, seeing that he was re-elected principally on the
basis of this programme. Furthermore, the Americans are genuinely
alarmed by the extension of Japanese power in the Far East, and
finally, since our Rumanian victories, Mr. Wilson has ultimately
come to the conclusion that our enemies are no longer able to defeat
us. One is constantly hearing the opinion expressed, both by members
of the Cabinet and other friends of the President, who enjoy his
confidence, that neither of the belligerent parties will now be
able to achieve a decisive victory, and that further bloodshed
is therefore useless.
"As already stated above, the anti-German party is doing its utmost
to put every possible obstacle in Mr. Wilson's way, while the Press
does not cease from repeating that the Peace Note is to be regarded
as a menace against Germany. It is thus hoped to stiffen our enemies'
backs, by dazzling them with the expectation of America's entry
into the war; much, too, is made of the argument--and this was
particularly so in the Senate--that Mr. Wilson's intervention was
imperilling the traditional policy of the United States, which
rests primarily upon the Monroe Doctrine, and upon the principle
of non-interference with European affairs. Finally, a scurrilous
attempt has been made by the Republican party to attack Wilson
in the flank, by getting a notorious Stock Exchange speculator
publicly to proclaim that members of the Administration, who knew
beforehand of Wilson's action, had taken advantage to speculate
heavily upon it. As this man could, however, produce no proofs,
he simply made himself ridiculous.
"I have already frequently called attention in my report to the fact
that the prolonged war hysteria over here has created an atmosphere
of gossip and tittle-tattle, which at other times would have been
regarded as impossible. For instance, even quite responsible people
believe that I have obtained for cash certain compromising letters
of Wilson's in order to be able to get a hold over him by this
means. Senator Lodge, in his own house, privately expressed the
view that this was a credible rumor, and then turned it to account
in the Senate. The President is so terribly put out by this and
other similar machinations on the part of the Republicans, who
refuse to grant him the fame of the peace-maker, that he recently
kept away from a public festival, because Mr. Lodge was to be the
principal speaker there.
"Owing to the incredible rumors which are bandied from mouth to
mouth here, I regarded it as necessary to bring an action against
one notorious swindler and blackmailer. I wanted to convince public
opinion that the Embassy had nothing to fear. I intend doing the
same thing in the case of all future attempts at blackmail, once
we have got a clean slate in regard to all compromising questions.
Our enemies will, however, persist in leaving no stone unturned in
order to cast a slur upon the Embassy, for their principal object is
to succeed in bringing about my recall, or the rupture of diplomatic
relations with Germany. Once they have accomplished this, they
are convinced that it will be an easy matter to draw the United
States into the war.
"As is well known, President Wilson received a reply from the Entente,
in response to his peace move, which contained conditions utterly
unacceptable to us. Messrs. Wilson and House regarded these conditions
as 'bluff,' and were as convinced, as they had previously been,
that the Entente would accede to a peace by arrangement. People
frequently alluded in those days to the fact that in the last
Anglo-American War of 1812-1814, the English, very shortly before
the peace settlement, had proposed unacceptable peace terms which they
suddenly allowed to drop later. I also believed, and believe still,
that the Entente were perfectly well acquainted with the political
situation in Germany, and wished by proposing such conditions to
strike panic amongst us and compel us to declare an unrestricted
U-boat war. The Entente never diverged from its one object, which
was to draw the United States into the war, and thus to bring about
a decision. Moreover, the negative reply sent to our Government
by the Entente had sufficed to achieve this object; for the final
resolution to declare an unrestricted U-boat war was formed before
the peace conditions framed by the Entente became known in Berlin."
On the 19th of January I received official notice that the unrestricted
U-boat campaign would begin on February 1st, and I was to give
the American Government notice accordingly on the evening of the
31st January. After all that had happened, I could but regard this
intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and
one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end
to the peace overtures made by Mr. Wilson, which had been started
with our approval. I did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution
cancelled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on
which it was to come into force, and with this end in view I sent
the following telegram to Berlin:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 19th January, 1917.
"War inevitable in view of the proposed action. Danger of rupture
could be mitigated by the fixing of a definite interval of time,
say one month, so that neutral vessels and passengers may be spared,
as any preliminary and timely warning seems impossible if present
programme is carried out. I shall have to give the password for
unnavigable German steamers on February 1st, as effect of carrying
out of my instructions here will be like declaration of war, and
strict guard will be kept. In any case an incident like that of
the _Lusitania_ may be expected soon.
"If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in view of my
Telegram 212, postponement most urgently desirable. Wilson believes
he can obtain peace on the basis of our proposed equal rights of
all nations. House told me again yesterday, that Wilson proposed to
take action very shortly, for in view of our declaration regarding
future Peace League, etc., he regards prospects of a Peace Conference
as favorable."
In my efforts to avoid a breach with the United States, the President
helped me to the extent of making a communication to the Senate on
January 22nd, which he personally read to them in solemn session. In
this communication, Mr. Wilson exhaustively developed his programme of
a "Peace without Conquest." As the President officially communicated
this proposal to all the belligerent Powers on the same day, it
was to be regarded as a fresh and most solemn step towards peace.
As, on the other hand, it is also a document which expresses most
plainly Mr. Wilson's desires and mentions before his entry into the
war, I quote it verbatim below. Those who read it to-day cannot help
feeling that certainly no more scathing criticism of the Versailles
Peace has ever been written,--a peace which contained all the signs
of having been imposed upon the vanquished, and against which the
President's communication was a warning.
"On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identical note
to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to
state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either
group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it
possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the
rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most
vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central
Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready
to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.
The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated,
in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply
details the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which
they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory
settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the
peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer
the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter
hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that
must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must
be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it
virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm
us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man
must take that for granted.
"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought
that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the
final determination of our international obligations, to disclose
to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking
form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the
days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a
new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.
"It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play
no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will
be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves
by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved
practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a
new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that
it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor
withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged.
They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and
to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under
which they will feel free to render it.
"That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority
and their power to the authority and force of other nations to
guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement
cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes
this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which
it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal
and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt
to state those conditions.
"The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and
to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as
our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it
makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it
is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must
embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing
and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not
merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate
aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining
what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice
in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the
guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is
fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency
should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.
"No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples
of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war;
and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America
could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be
elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of
the American governments, elements consistent with their political
faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America
have once for all embraced and undertake to defend.
"I do not mean to say that any American government would throw
any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now
at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever
they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace
between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents
themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will
be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of
the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of
any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected
that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or
withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it
must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind!
"The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether
it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question
upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends
is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace,
or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for
a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee,
the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil
Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of
power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an
organized common peace.
"Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point.
The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against
one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted,
that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their
antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be
equally clear to all,--may not be the same on both sides of the
water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth
what we understand them to be.
"They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory.
It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to
put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood
that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to
face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory
would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed
upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under
duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a
resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest,
not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between
equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality
and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state
of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for
a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of
territory or of racial and national allegiance.
"The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it
is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged
must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations
and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak.
Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual
strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.
Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be;
nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful
and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one
asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind
is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.
"And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right
among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which
does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive
all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that
no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to
sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for
instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen
everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent,
and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of
life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should
be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power
of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their
own.
"I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract
political principle which has always been held very dear by those
who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same
reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which
seem to me clearly indispensable,--because I wish frankly to uncover
realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle
will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections
or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole
populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all
the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its
life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in
rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense
of justice, of freedom, and of right.
"So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling
towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should
be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where
this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt
be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the
general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right
comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from a free access
to the open paths of the world's commerce.
"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free.
The freedom of the seas is the _sine qua non_ of peace, equality,
and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of
many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be
established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free
and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind,
but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There
can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without
them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is
an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It
need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom
of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to
come to an agreement concerning it.
"It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval
armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping
the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval
armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the
limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation.
Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced
with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation
if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay.
Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can
be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great
preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there
to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan
for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy
to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless
contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land
or sea is the most immediately and intensely practical question
connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.
"I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with
the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary
if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free
voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority
amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak
and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I
am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great
government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people
of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add, that I
hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and
friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty?
I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of
mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity
to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they
see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold
most dear.
"And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government
of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the
world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I
have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because
it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise
no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but
a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven
for.
"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord
adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world:
that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other
nation or people, but that every people should be left free to
determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered,
unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.
"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances
which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net
of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with
influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance
in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and
with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free
to live their own lives under a common protection.
"I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that
freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference
representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of
those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation
of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order
merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.
"These are American principles, American policies. We could stand
for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of
forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation,
of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind
and must prevail."
In Helfferich's account of these matters, the author charges this
appeal of Mr. Wilson's with having favored the Entente side, because
in it the conditions laid down are regarded as an acceptable basis
for peace. When I returned to Germany the Imperial Chancellor advanced
the same argument in my presence; I have heard it repeated again
and again at home, and among other places, before the Examination
Committee of the National Assembly. It seems to me that this view is
rather a Berlin _fable convenue_. There is no word in the document
which would justify one in drawing such a conclusion. The President
stated simply that he had invited both belligerent parties to define
the conditions under which they would make peace, and that the
Entente had replied fully to the invitation, whereas the Central
Powers had not submitted their terms. He then proceeded to say
that in so far as the conditions insisted upon by one side had
become known, we had advanced a step nearer to the discussion of
peace. If we read the wording of the document without prejudice,
and in connection with the views expressed by American statesmen,
it becomes abundantly clear that the President regarded the terms
laid down by our enemies as maximum conditions, and further, that
he believed that we also would submit our maximum terms, and finally
come to an agreement by adopting a middle course.
Herr Helfferich makes a similar charge against Wilson's Note of
the 18th December, owing to the threats that it contained. But
this charge strikes me as being just as gratuitous as the first.
The threats were uttered in London quite as plainly as they were
in Berlin. The charge of partiality would have been justified only
if the threats had been contained simply in the version of the
Note which was sent to Berlin.
Besides, in all Entente countries, it was maintained that both
the Note of the 18th December and the appeal of the 22nd January
revealed partiality for the Central Powers. The diplomats of the
Entente in Washington were quite beside themselves with anger,
and plainly revealed their displeasure to Mr. Wilson. I am not
concerned now with criticizing the President's efforts for peace
in retrospect. The fact that Mr. Wilson became our personal enemy
after the 31st January, 1917, and that he consented to the Peace
of Versailles, is no proof of the contention that, before the 31st
January, 1917, he would have proved a similar failure as a peacemaker.
The President's spiteful censure and treatment of us, both during
the war and at Versailles, may be explained psychologically, by
the fact that we rejected his efforts as a mediator, and declared
the U-boat war.
Mr. Wilson's personal sensitiveness and egocentric nature played
an essential part in all the negotiations. When the French and
English Press derided the President, in November, 1916, after the
first cables had announced the election of Mr. Hughes, Mr. Wilson
was deeply mortified. A further improvement in his attitude towards
us followed, when we showed that we were favorably disposed to his
mediation for peace. The fact that Germany relied on him, stimulated
his self-esteem to such an extent that he became, to a certain degree,
interested in bringing about a peace that would be satisfactory
to Germany. Nor should the interest he showed in this matter be
underrated. I openly confess that it was also my ambition to assist
in restoring peace, in order to save our country from the catastrophe
that threatened to overtake it, and to spare the world any further
suffering. To this day I am still convinced that, had the Germans
skilfully conducted their share in these peace negotiations, we
should have achieved all we wanted to achieve. The happy personal
relations which, in that case, would have prevailed between Mr.
Wilson and the German representatives at the Peace Conference,
would, in view of the element of chance, which is so conspicuous at
such congresses, have turned the scales in our favor to a surprising
extent. On the other hand, I was, and am still, of the opinion
that the peace which would have been settled at that time, would
not have satisfied the public opinion of the moment in Germany.
But I attached no importance whatever to this consideration. He
who practises politics in the interests of his native country,
must be ready at any moment to plunge like Curtius into the abyss,
in order to save his nation. This, however, is what made Curtius
immortal. Besides, in a few years, if not sooner, the German people
would surely have realized that "Peace without Victory" constituted
a victory for Germany.
After the 31st January, 1917, Mr. Wilson was incapable of an impartial
attitude towards Germany. He saw red whenever he thought of the
Imperial Government, and his repugnance against it knew no bounds.
Even to-day the bitter feeling still rankles within him, that the
German Government deprived him of the glory of being the premier
political personage on the world's stage. It goes without saying,
that at Versailles the Entente exploited with a vengeance both
this attitude on the part of the President, and his peculiar
idiosyncrasies. Intercepted wireless messages from Paris had made
us aware of the fact that the original American interpretation
of the fourteen points entirely agreed with our own; and thus we
in Berlin were filled, not without reason, with certain hopes of
America's help. But Mr. Wilson, who would have acted more wisely
had he never gone to Versailles, sat there alone, facing three
European statesmen, for whom he was no match. They played upon
his weakest point, by suggesting to him the view that, in addition
to the German Government, the German people, who were guilty, too,
should also be punished, and that the obligation to punish the
guilty took precedence of the fourteen points. Had Mr. Wilson,
after January, 1917, really come to the definite conclusion that
he held the proofs of Germany's war guilt and lust of world empire?
Whereas, theretofore he had considered the question of war guilt
impartially, he now agreed that the Germans would have been able to
obtain a reasonable peace through his mediation, but had rejected
it and chosen to declare the U-boat war instead, in order to achieve
a complete victory. Consequently, the Germans had not been concerned
all this time with bringing about a reasonable peace, but with
gaining the empire of the world, a conclusion from which their
war guilt was also to be inferred. It was as the result of these
ideas that Mr. Wilson preached the crusade against militaristic and
autocratic Germany, who wanted to achieve the mastery of the world.
Only by means of the belief in a crusade could the peace-loving
American people be prevailed upon to wage war.
Regarding the effect upon the Senate of the President's appeal,
I sent the following telegram to the Foreign Office:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, January 23rd, 1917.
"Wilson's appeal has met with general approval in Senate, and is
regarded as a further energetic step in peace movement. Only our
wildest opponents have again attacked President as a pro-German.
Almost throughout views expressed about appeal contain the wish
that Central Powers will also state their peace terms now. House
also begged me urgently that this might be done, either publicly or
secretly. Then Wilson would immediately propose Peace Conference;
President also seems inclined to conclude the Bryan Treaty with
us. Time is now, alas, too short, otherwise treaty might perhaps
have helped us to avert war.
"As result of proposed unrestricted U-boat war, peace movement
will presumably come to an end. Nevertheless, it is possible on the
other hand that Wilson will make redoubled efforts for peace, if a
time-limit be allowed. I should like to leave no stone unturned in
order to avert war with United States. As I understand the situation,
our refusal to submit our peace terms arises out of the fear that
they may appear too moderate to public opinion in Germany. Would
it perhaps be possible, before opening the unrestricted U-boat
war, to state the peace terms, which we should have submitted at
the Peace Conference we proposed, and to add, that, in view of
our enemies' insolent rejection of our scheme, we could no longer
abide by these moderate terms? And then we might hint that, as
victors, we should demand an independent Ireland. A declaration
of this sort would win over public opinion on this side, as far
as this is possible, and might perhaps also satisfy public opinion
in Germany."
The day after the President had read his appeal to the Senate, I
received a telegram inviting me to visit Mr. House in New York.
During the interview the Colonel read me a memorandum of Mr. Wilson's,
in which the President formally offered us to act as mediator, in
order to bring about a peace by arrangement. The memorandum left
me in no doubt whatever that Mr. Wilson was certain of being able
to achieve this end. With the utmost possible speed I sent the
following telegrams about my interview with Mr. House, by three
different routes to Berlin, on the assumption that it was impossible
for us to abide by our former resolve:
(1) CIPHER WIRELESS TELEGRAM
(Most urgent)
"Washington, 27th January, 1917.
"After having had very important conference request most urgently
postponement till my next two messages received. Suggest reply
by wireless."
(2) CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 26th January, 1917.
"Wilson offered officially, but in first place privately, to mediate
for peace, on basis of his appeal to Senate, that means without
interference with territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous
request for communication of our peace terms not to be regarded
as private.
"I am wiring with full particulars through State Department. To
begin U-boat war without previous negotiations regarding above
proposals would among _other things_ put us seriously in the wrong,
and owing to Wilson's personal sensitiveness, would make prevention
of rupture quite impossible."
(3) CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 27th January, 1917.
"House suddenly invited me to visit him on behalf of Wilson, and
told me the following as an official message from President:
"First of all, Wilson offers privately to mediate for peace on
basis of his appeal to Senate, i.e., therefore without interference
in territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous request to us
to submit our terms of peace is not to be regarded as private. House
revealed to me following thoughts of the President. Our enemies had
openly expressed their impossible peace terms. Thereupon President
had, as a direct contrast to these, developed his programme. Now
we are also morally bound to make our peace terms known, because
our desire for peace would otherwise appear insincere. After Your
Excellency had informed Mr. Wilson that our peace terms were moderate,
and that we agreed to second Peace Conference, President thought he
had given expression to our wishes in his appeal to the Senate.
"Wilson hopes that we shall communicate our peace terms to him,
which might be published both in Germany and over here, so that
they could become known immediately all over the world. If only
we had confidence in him, President was convinced that he would be
able to bring about both Peace Conferences. He would be particularly
pleased if Your Excellency were at the same time to declare that we
are prepared to enter the second Peace Conference on the basis of
his appeal. Our declaration might be shown to have been actuated
by Wilson's having sent us a direct request for our peace terms.
President is of opinion that Note sent to him by the Entente was a
piece of bluff which need not be taken seriously. He hopes definitely
to bring about Peace Conferences, and quickly too, so that the
unnecessary bloodshed of the Spring Offensive may be averted.
"To what extent Your Excellency will and can meet Wilson, it is
impossible to tell from this side. Meanwhile I urgently beg leave,
to submit the following remarks for your consideration. If the U-boat
campaign is opened now without any further ado, the President will
regard this as a smack in the face, and war with the United States
will be inevitable. The war party here will gain the upper hand, and
the end of the war will be quite out of sight, as, whatever people
may say to the contrary, the resources of the United States are
enormous. On the other hand, if we acquiesce in Wilson's proposal,
but the scheme nevertheless comes to grief owing to the stubbornness
of our enemies, it would be very hard for the President to come into
the war against us, even if by that time we began our unrestricted
U-boat war. At present, therefore it is only a matter of postponing the
declaration for a little while so that we may improve our diplomatic
position. For my own part, I confess that I am of opinion that we
shall obtain a better peace now by means of conferences, than we
should if the United States joined the ranks of our enemies.
"As cables always take several days, please send instructions by
wireless, in case telegraphic privileges 157 cannot be used on
February 1st."
I had hoped that the communication of the President's appeal through
Mr. Gerard, would have led to a postponement of the unrestricted
U-boat war. This, however, was not the case. I can pass over all
that happened in Berlin at that time, and all the deliberations
which led to the ultimate decision, for not only did I not take
part in them, but they have also become general knowledge since
the taking of the evidence before the Examination Committee of
the National Assembly. I need only mention here that I received
the following reply to my proposals, from the Imperial Chancellor:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Berlin, 29th January, 1917.
"Please thank President on behalf of Imperial Government for his
communication. We trust him completely, and beg him to trust us
likewise. Germany is ready to accept his secret offer of mediation
for the purpose of bringing about a direct Conference of the
belligerents, and will recommend similar course to her Allies.
We wish our acceptance of offer, as well as offer itself, to be
treated as quite secret.
"A public announcement of our peace terms is at present impossible,
now that Entente has published their peace terms which aim at the
degradation and annihilation of Germany and her Allies, and have
been characterized by President himself as impossible. We cannot
regard them as bluff, as they entirely agree with professed opinions
of enemy Powers expressed not only before, but afterwards. They also
correspond exactly with the objects for which Italy and Rumania
entered the war, and as regards Turkey, with the assurances made on
behalf of Russia by both England and France. So long as these war
aims of our enemies are publicly maintained, it would be impossible
to interpret public announcement of our own peace terms, as anything
else than a sign of weakness which at present does not exist, and
would only lead to a prolongation of the war. In order to give
President Wilson a proof of our confidence, however, tell him just
for his own private information the terms on which we should have
been prepared to take part in peace negotiations, if the Entente
had accepted our offer of peace on the 12th December, 1916.
"The restitution to France of that part of Upper Alsace occupied by
her. The acquisition of a strategical and economic safety-frontier-zone,
separating Germany and Poland from Russia.
"Colonial restitution in the form of an understanding which would
secure Germany colonial possessions compatible with the size of
her population and the importance of her economic interests.
"Restoration of those parts of France occupied by Germany, on condition
that certain strategic and economic modifications of the frontier
be allowed, as also financial compensation.
"Restitution of Belgium under definite guarantees for the safety of
Germany, which would have to be determined by means of negotiations
with the Belgian Government.
"Economic and financial settlement, on the basis of exchange, of
the territory invaded by both sides, and to be restituted by the
conclusion of peace.
"Compensation for German undertakings and private persons who have
suffered damage through the war.
"Renunciation of all economic arrangements and measures, which
after the peace would constitute an obstacle in the way of normal
commerce and trade, with the conclusion of corresponding commercial
treaties.
"The Freedom of the Seas to be placed on a secure basis.
"The peace terms of our Allies coincide with our own views, and
observe the same limits.
"We are, moreover, prepared to enter the International Conference
which he wishes to invoke after the war on the basis of his
communication to the Senate.
"Your Excellency will give President these details at the same
time as you hand him Note relating unrestricted U-boat war, and
will inform him as follows:
"If his offer had only reached us a few days earlier, we should have
been able to postpone opening of the new U-boat war. Now, however, in
spite of best will in the world, it is, owing to technical reasons,
unfortunately too late, as far-reaching military preparations have
already been made which cannot be undone, and U-boats have already
sailed with new instructions. Form and content of enemy's reply to
our offer of peace, and the Note of the President, were so abrupt
and harsh, that, in view of the life and death struggle which has
once again been proclaimed against us, we cannot any longer delay
the use of those means which appear to us best calculated to end the
war quickly, and for the relinquishment of which we could not have
taken the responsibility in the face of our whole nation.
"As the order regarding the unrestricted U-boat war shows, we are
prepared, at any moment, to make every possible allowances for
America's needs. We would beg the President to prosecute--that is
to say, pursue, his plan notwithstanding, and declare ourselves
ready to discontinue the unrestricted U-boat war the moment we
are completely assured that the President's efforts will lead to
a peace that would be acceptable to us.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
I immediately communicated the peace terms contained in this telegram
to Mr. House, and I still cherished a small hope that he would,
after all, perhaps, be able to exercise a favorable influence over
the President. Truth to tell, he actually went to Washington in
order to take part in the deliberations which were to decide the
attitude which America was henceforth to adopt towards us. Apart
from the fact that the secrecy covering the communication of our
peace terms deprived them of all diplomatic value, the simultaneous
declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war gave the death-blow to
all hope of maintaining peace. As Herr von Betmann-Hollweg declared
before the Examination Committee of the National Assembly: "It was
perfectly clear to the authorities in Germany, that the decision
to prosecute the unrestricted U-boat war would destroy all chance of
further efforts on the part of the President to bring about peace.
The U-boat war meant rupture, and ultimately war with America.
The discussions between General Head Quarters and the Political
Leaders had turned upon this question for years. That which led
to the decisive step being taken was, that General Headquarters
was firmly resolved to face even the risk of America's entry into
the war, and that it wished to use the circumstances as a trial
of strength with the political leaders."
On January 31st, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I handed Mr. Lansing
the official communication about the U-boat war. This was my last
political interview in America. We both knew that the end had come,
but we did not admit the fact to each other. The Secretary of State
contented himself with replying that he would submit my communication
to the President. I cherished no illusions regarding the expected
outcome of this interview, for the Ultimatum of April 18th, 1916, no
longer allowed of any chance of preventing the rupture of diplomatic
relations. Consequently on the morning of the 31st January, I had
already given the order that the engines of all ships lying in
American harbors were to be destroyed. I had already been given
instructions to this effect at the time of the _Sussex_ crisis,
and these instructions had now been repeated from Berlin. As a
matter of fact it was, dangerous to allow of any delay, for on
the evening of January 31st our ships were already seized by the
American police. As far as I know, however, all of them without
exception were made unfit for use before this occurred.
On the 3rd February, at twelve midday, Mr. Wilson announced to
a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress, the rupture of all
diplomatic relations with Germany, and at the same time my pass
was brought to me by a higher official of the Department of State.
Thus war was decided upon, even if it was not immediately declared.
Everything that followed amounted only to preparation for war or war
propaganda. Nothing except the abandonment of the U-boat campaign
could have prevented war.
It has frequently been asserted that the notorious Mexico telegram
led to the war with the United States. I do not believe this is
correct. The telegram was used with great success as propaganda
against us; but the rupture of diplomatic relations--as I have
already pointed out--was, in view of the situation, equivalent
in all circumstances to war. I had nothing to do with the Mexico
telegram, which took me completely by surprise. It was addressed, in
the usual way, direct to the legation in Mexico, and passed through
the Embassy at Washington on the same day on which I received the
notification that the unrestricted U-boat war was to be declared.
I had neither the right, nor was it my duty, to hold up the telegram,
although I disapproved of its contents. But even if I had held
it up, I should have served no useful purpose. As I afterwards
heard from a certain Englishman, there was an office in England
which deciphered all the telegrams which we sent over the English
cable and this office placed all their intercepts at the disposal of
the American Government after the rupture of diplomatic relations.
There is nothing surprising in this, for we also deciphered all
enemy telegrams which we were able to intercept. Nowadays there
is no cipher which is absolutely safe, if it has been in use for
some time. At that time, however, I did not know that all our cipher
telegrams were being read by the English. If, therefore, I had held
up the Mexico telegram in Washington, its contents would have been
revealed to the American Government by the English, notwithstanding,
and no one would have believed that the message had not been forwarded
in some way to Mexico. Moreover the telegram, as is well-known,
was only conditional; the instructions it contained were only to
hold good if the United States came into the war. I strained every
nerve, at that moment, to prevent this from taking place. If I had
been successful, the Mexico telegram would have served no purpose.
I am therefore able to say, with a clean conscience, that I did
everything that stood in my power, to remedy the error committed
in the dispatch of the telegram.
In Helfferich's account of these events, the author says:
"If Count Bernstorff was, and apparently is still, of the opinion,
that Wilson was actually engaged in trying to bring about a peace
which would have been acceptable and tolerable to us, and with
a promise of success, this can only be explained as the result
of the enduring effect of suggestion, which, acting upon him for
two years, had had no really adequate knowledge of home opinion to
counteract it. As the communication between Berlin and the German
Embassy in Washington was completely cut off, it is not surprising
that our representatives on the other side of the vast ocean should
have lost touch with their fellow-countrymen struggling for their
lives, and should have failed to retain the proper standpoint in
regard to what was either necessary or tolerable."
To this I should like to reply, in the first place, that the
unrestricted U-boat war did not in the least bring the German people
either what was necessary or tolerable. Furthermore, not only I
myself, but almost all those gentlemen who returned with me to
Germany, had the feeling, on reaching home, that we in America
had formed a much clearer notion of the true state of Germany,
than those of our fellow-countrymen who had been living at home;
for they had been completely cut off from the world by the Blockade.
After we had seen the conditions prevailing in Germany, we could
understand even less than we had before, why the Imperial Government
had not snatched with joy at the chance of making peace.
As to the question whether we should have obtained an acceptable
and tolerable peace through Mr. Wilson's efforts, I am still firmly
convinced to-day, that this would have been the case. The President
would not have offered to mediate if he had not been able to reckon
with certainty upon success, and he was better situated than any
German, to know the attitude of the Entente. In his farewell letter
to me, Mr. House wrote:
"It is too sad that your Government should have declared the
unrestricted U-boat war at a moment when we were so near to peace.
The day will come when people in Germany will see how much you
have done for your country in America."
Moreover, later on, Mr. Bonar Law publicly admitted in the English
Parliament that Great Britain would have collapsed financially, if
American help had not saved her. The war-spirit in France, during
the year 1917 was simply upheld by the hope of American help, and
finally, in March, the Russian Revolution broke out. If we had
accepted Wilson's mediation, the whole of American influence in
Russia would have been exercised in favor of peace, and not, as
events ultimately proved, against ourselves. Out of Wilson's and
Kerensky's Peace programme, we might, by means of diplomatic
negotiations, easily have achieved all that we regarded as necessary.
My conviction that we could in the year 1917 have obtained a peace
which would have been acceptable to ourselves, is based not so much
on Wilson's good will, as upon the fact that, without American
help, the Entente could not possibly have achieved a victory.
Against this view, the argument is advanced that the United States
would in any case have entered the war, in order to avoid a German
victory. I have already pointed out, that according to my view,
no "German Peace" was any longer possible after the first battle
of the Marne. Besides, it was precisely the object of the policy
which was directed at American mediation, to prevent the United
States from entering the war.
At the present time, even Mr. Wilson himself is produced as
crown-witness in support of the view that America would have entered
the war against us whatever might have happened. In the discussions
about the Peace Treaty, which the President held in the White House
on the 19th August, 1919, much stress is laid upon a certain passage
in particular, which gives the impression that Mr. Wilson would have
wished America to enter the war, even if Germany had not declared
the unrestricted U-boat campaign. Almost without exception, all
the German national newspapers interpreted the short dialogue in
question between the President and Senator McCumber in this way,
and the _Deutsche Tageszeitung_ even went so far as to regard it as
a striking proof of what they called Wilson's "_a priori_ resolve
to have war with Germany."
I must most emphatically reject this interpretation of the passage
under discussion, which was turned to account by some papers in
America in the political fight.
In the first place I should like to point out that it is obviously
inadmissible to take the above-mentioned passage out of the context,
and to regard it in itself as an interchange of views between Mr.
Wilson and Mr. McCumber. It ought, on the contrary, to be judged
in conjunction with the passage that precedes it.
The proposition for discussion was the President's motion that the
League of Nations made it obligatory upon all States united, under
it, to take common action against any country guilty of a breach of
international law. Senator Harding, one of the keenest opponents
of the League of Nations, suggested the idea in the debate that
it was impossible for a sovereign State like the United States of
America to have her moral obligation in any international conflict
dictated to her by an external body consisting of the Council of
the League of Nations. Driven into a corner, Mr. Wilson had to
acknowledge this fact; but he emphasized the point that in spite
of this the value of the League of Nations was in no way impaired.
He said:
"The American Republic is not in need of any advice from any quarter,
in order to fulfil her moral duty; but she stabilizes the whole
world by promising in advance that she will stand by other nations
who regard matters in the same light as herself, in order to uphold
Justice in the world."
Following upon this, Senator McCumber then tried to confute the
President's theory, by applying it practically to the most recent
events in the world's history. He referred to the last war, at the
outbreak of which there was no League of Nations in existence,
and the following discussion took place:
_McCumber:_ Would our moral conviction of the injustice of the
German war have drawn us into this war, if Germany had been guilty
of no aggressive acts, and, what is more, without the League of
Nations, for of course we had no League of Nations then?
_Wilson: As things turned out,_ I hope that it would finally have
done so, Mr. Senator.
_McCumber:_ Do you believe that, if Germany had been guilty of
no act of injustice against our own citizens, we should have come
into this war?
_Wilson:_ I believe it.
_McCumber:_ You believe that we should have come in whatever happened?
_Wilson:_ Yes.
It is abundantly clear that with his first answer, "as things turned
out, I hope that it"--that is to say, America's moral conviction
of the injustice of the German war--"would finally have drawn us
into the war"--the President lays the emphasis on the words "as
things turned out." There can be no doubt that he meant to say:
"As things turned out in regard to his efforts for peace," the
first ready concurrence of the Imperial Government, notwithstanding,
was thwarted at the decisive moment. With such a Government, Mr.
Wilson seems to imply, it was impossible in the long run for America
to remain on terms of peace. From that time henceforward--there can
be no question of any earlier period, because up to that moment he
had been in constant negotiation with us--he regarded the Imperial
Government as morally condemned. Then, however, he calls to mind very
clearly the feeble war-spirit of the American people in the spring
of 1917, which, as is well known, had to be whipped into the war by
propaganda on a prodigious scale. That is why the President says he
"hopes," that the moral conviction of the American people regarding
the injustice of Germany's cause would finally have triumphed over
his readiness for peace expressed so brilliantly as late as November,
1916. His words are, therefore, to be regarded as a reflection in
retrospect, not as a proof of an _a priori_ intention to urge the
United States into the war in any circumstances.
Truth to tell, if Mr. Wilson had really been striving to declare
war against us, he would, of course, only have needed to nod in
order to induce his whole country to fight after the _Lusitania_
incident, so great was the war feeling at that critical time. Later
on, the President concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of
being the Peacemaker of the world, and even made such prominent
use of the motto, "He kept us out of the war," in the campaign for
his re-election, that it is quite unthinkable that all this time
he should have secretly cherished the intention, ultimately, to
enter the war against Germany. In this matter, the fact that after
the rupture of diplomatic relations between America and Germany,
Mr. Wilson really did urge on the war by every means in his power,
proves nothing. For, after January 31st, 1917, Wilson himself was
a different man. Our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our
announcement of the unrestricted U-boat war, which was to him utterly
incomprehensible, turned him into an embittered enemy of the Imperial
Government. But this is by no means a proof of the contention that,
before the date named, he was secretly watching for an opportunity
to make war upon Germany. Neither does it excuse the President
for having allowed himself at Versailles to be convinced of the
alleged complicity of the German people in the general war-guilt.
Theretofore he had certainly always differentiated between the
autocracy, as also Militarism, on the one hand, and the German
people on the other. At Versailles he suddenly advanced the theory
that the Germans must be punished for their crimes, and not only
those among them who were responsible, but also the innocent German
people, who neither desired the breach of Belgium's neutrality,
nor understood the moral consequences of the U-boat war, nor were
aware of Mr. Wilson's mediation for peace.
The above dialogue is also interesting from the standpoint that
the President is most clearly convinced that the Entente could
not have conquered without American help. If to-day he concludes
therefrom that America would have been obliged ultimately to join
in the war, in order to punish Germany, in former days he concluded
that his duty was to bring about a Peace without victory. If he had
succeeded in doing this, all of us, friend and foe alike, would
now be living in a better world than the present one. It would be
the world as we had been shown it in a vision of the future on the
22nd January, 1917, and not the world of the Peace of Versailles,
blooming with starvation, Bolshevism and nationalistic hatred.
In his Memoirs, Herr von Tirpitz says that of all the practical
advantages which I declared would follow from a compliant attitude
on our part, not one had fallen to our lot. But I must confess, I
was not aware that the U-boat war had brought us any advantages
either. Its results have been a heavy moral debt and a huge bill
of costs that the German people must pay. And how could the policy
which I recommended have yielded practical results, seeing that I
was never able, or even allowed, to carry it through? Never at any
time was the U-boat war really given up. Every time a diplomatic
success was in view, an incident occurred which made it necessary
to start one's labors all over again.
Other people have said that as I was not in agreement with the
policy of the Imperial Government, I ought to have resigned my
office. This view does not take into account all the facts of the
case. As long as Herr von Jagow was Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, I worked in complete harmony with him. We both worked
together in trying to avert war with the United States. I knew as
little as Herr von Jagow himself did, whether we should succeed
in scoring every point in the policy we pursued, for the Secretary
of State was in perpetual conflict with the Military and Naval
Authorities. If I had heard in time that Herr von Jagow's resignation
had occurred in connection with the question of the U-boat war, and
was the result of it, I should have resigned at the same time as he
did; because my name was identified with the idea of American mediation
for peace. Moreover, up to the 9th, or rather the 19th, January,
1917, I was completely in accord with the Imperial Chancellor; for
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg declared before the Examination Committee
of the National Assembly:
"The whole of my work in connection with Wilson's efforts for peace
was, indeed, directed towards rendering the threat of a U-boat
war unnecessary, by bringing about a peace movement which would,
of course, have some promise of proving successful."
These words amount to a complete approval of the policy which I
pursued in Washington. When, therefore, on the 19th January, I
received the Note informing me of the intended opening of the
unrestricted U-boat campaign, I could not tender my resignation,
for I regarded it as my duty to the German people, to resist until
the last the unrestricted U-boat war, and, if possible, to avert
a breach with the United States. When, on the 31st January, 1917,
the U-boat policy had definitely triumphed, I had no further chance
of resigning my office, seeing that owing to the immediate rupture
of diplomatic relations it was lost to me.
The various reasons, for and against Mr. Wilson's mediation, were all
thrashed out in great detail in this country, before the Examination
Committee of the National Assembly, in the winter of 1916-17. And,
according to the evidence given, the decisive cause of the failure
of the scheme was the distrust which the most influential statesmen
felt towards the President. If any confidence had been felt in Mr.
Wilson, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would have opposed the adoption
of the U-boat war, and would have allowed the President's efforts for
mediation to pursue their course. As a witness before the Committee,
he himself said:
"There can be no doubt, now that we can look back upon events,
that we should have done better had we placed our fate in President
Wilson's hands, and had accepted his offers of mediation."
As I have already pointed out, the factor which in my opinion was
largely responsible for determining the course we ultimately adopted
was the under-estimation and ignorance of America which was so
widespread in Germany. From the very first moment the problem was
not properly understood by the German nation. The fact was overlooked
that the most important battle of the war was taking place in
Washington, and when the tragedy reached its climax, no one believed
that, with all her political, military and economic power, the
United States of America would ever enter into the War.
Finally, it has been pointed out as an objection to my view, that,
after all, the Entente would have rejected Wilson's efforts at
mediation. I am no longer in a position to prove the contrary to-day,
and it is, of course, just possible, that the President and Mr.
House were mistaken in assuming as much as they did. If at that
time, however, we expected the Entente to reject Mr. Wilson's offer
of mediation, we should at all events have postponed the U-boat
war, and accepted American intervention, in order to improve our
diplomatic position in Washington, before having recourse to the
_ultima ratio_. It seems to have been our destiny that all our most
important decisions of the war were the outcome of military and
not of political considerations. On the Entente side, the converse
was always true, and that is why, though it suffered many military
reverses, the Entente won the war.
In pursuing the policy I advocated, I was influenced by considerations,
which now, in conclusion, I should like to sum up as follows:
(1) It was no longer possible to achieve a decisive German victory
after the first Battle of the Marne, that is why German policy
should have been directed towards obtaining "Peace without Victory";
and, as things turned out, such a victory was only to be obtained
by means of American mediation.
(2) The personality of Mr. Wilson played no decisive part in determining
my attitude. I never once reckoned upon his personal friendliness
towards ourselves; for I knew him too well to suppose him capable
of pro-German tendencies. I expected nothing more from him than
that he would play America's game--America's and no other
country's--supported by the public opinion of the United States.
American policy, however, pursued the object of a "Peace without
Victory," from the standpoint of practical politics, in order that,
neither Germany nor England should attain to a superlatively powerful
position. A "Peace without Victory" of this sort, under American
patronage, would have left the United States in the undisputed
position of the first political power in the world. To this, there
was added certain other reasons of an ideal political nature, owing to
the fact that both Mr. Wilson and the great majority of the American
people wished to put an end to all the bloodshed and misery.
(3) The beginning of the unrestricted U-boat war was bound, as things
had developed, to lead automatically to the rupture of diplomatic
relations with the United States.
(4) As matters stood in America, the rupture of diplomatic relations
was equally bound automatically to bring about war with the United
States.
(5) War with the United States had to be averted at all costs,
because America's help meant giving our enemy such an overwhelming
preponderance of power, that a German defeat became an absolute
certainty.
(6) The political situation was such that, the acceptance of the
American offer of mediation was the only means of preventing the
United States from entering the war.
(7) If America did not enter the war, the Entente were not in a
position to beat us.
(8) If Mr. Wilson had succeeded in bringing both belligerent parties
to the conference table, a sort of Hubertsburg Peace[*] would have
been concluded. In view of the situation, a peace unfavorable to
ourselves was unthinkable. Who, at that time, could have compelled
us to accept terms which we regarded as incompatible with Germany's
position in the world? Herr Helfferich before the Examination Committee
of the National Assembly, expressed the view that in the end Mr.
Wilson would have forced peace upon us with the butt-end of a rifle.
But whence would he have obtained this butt-end? He had not one, and
it took him a year to create an army. No one who is familiar with
the United States can believe that it would ever have been possible
to drive the Americans into the war, once a Peace Conference had
assembled. For then it would only have been a matter of deciding
the fate of one or two pieces of territory or colonies, in which the
Americans would not have felt the slightest interest. Naturally,
we should have had to restore Belgium and accept the disarmament
programme, etc. But we had already declared ourselves ready to take
these measures, and, as regards disarmament, etc., this reform was
inevitable, in view of the economic position of all the countries
concerned. If America had not entered the war, no one could have
forced us to accept less advantageous terms than the _status quo
ante_, with possibly some mutual compensation.
[Footnote *: This refers to the Treaty of Hubertsburg, which was
one of the treaties that put an end to the Seven Years War on the
15th February, 1763. It was concluded between the States of Prussia,
Austria and Saxony. Nobody seems to have derived any advantage
from the treaty, except perhaps Frederick II., on whose province
of Silesia Marie-Therese renounced all further claim.]