AMERICAN MEDIATION
At midsummer, 1916, the political lull desired by Colonel House
actually set in. The Colonel betook himself to one of the beautiful
lakes of New Hampshire, in the far north of the United States, where
in the ordinary way I could only reach him by letter or telegram. How
secret we kept our communications is shown by the fact that, according
to agreement, I wrote and telegraphed to Colonel House under the
pseudonym "Martin." This caution proved to be fully justified, as
the inquiry by the Senate Committee has shown that the letters
from the Embassy were frequently opened by agents of the Entente
propaganda, whether with or without the connivance of the American
secret police I will not definitely say. I have already had occasion
to mention this question in connection with the robbing of Mr.
Albert. There are in the secret police of all countries men of
doubtful honor. It might be taken as certain that there were such
men in the pay of the Entente agents.
Soon after the settlement of the _Sussex_ incident--on 27th May--Mr.
Wilson made public, for the first time, his plan for the League
of Nations. This idea was to constitute the foundation-stone of
his mediation and fulfil all the hopes of the American pacifists
for a compulsory court of arbitration in international disputes
and general disarmament. Before the war many shrewd men in the
United States thought that the arbitration system initiated by the
American Government would exclude the possibility of great wars.
The outbreak of the World War showed that this was an illusion,
and the question arose what precautions could be taken to prevent
a recurrence of the world catastrophe. Mr. Wilson was one of the
first in whom the idea matured that the scheme, hitherto regarded
as utopian, of a league binding all civilized nations to a peaceful
settlement of their disputes was capable of being made a practical
proposition if backed, as a means of compulsion, by a commercial
boycott, similar to that which the Entente, in contravention of
international law, employed with such terrible results against
Germany.
The most important sentences of the speech which the President addressed
to the American peace league ran as follows:
"When the invitation for me to be here to-night came to me, I was
glad to accept,--not because it offered me an opportunity to discuss
the programme of the League,--that you will, I am sure, not expect
of me,--but because the desire of the whole world now turns eagerly
towards the hope of peace, and there is just reason why we should
take our part in counsel upon this great theme....
"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure
fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are
not interested to search for or explore....
"And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a
matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made
poignantly clear is, that the peace of the world must henceforth
depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great
nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to
what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and
as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation
or group of nations seek to disturb those fundamental things, can
we feel that civilization is at least in a way of justifying its
existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that
nations must in future be governed by the same high code of honor
that we demand of individuals....
"Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great
nations now engaged in the war have made it plain that their thought
has come to this, that the principle of the public right must henceforth
take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations,
and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves
together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish
aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against
alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must
be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart
of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples
and mankind....
"This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves
will say when there comes a proper occasion to say it....
"We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has
a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like
other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended
that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion,
as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but
it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second,
that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same
respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity
that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third,
that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of
its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the
rights of peoples and nations.
"So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I
speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that
the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible
association of nations formed in order to realize these objects
and make them secure against violation....
"But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a programme. I
came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I
feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation,
when some common force will be brought into existence which shall
safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interests of all
peoples and all governments, where coercion shall be summoned,
not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but
to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common
peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and
of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!"
This speech displayed all the characteristics of Mr. Wilson's oratory:
brilliant command of the English language, dazzling wealth of vocabulary
and nebulous sentence construction which made the purpose clear only
to the initiated. Nevertheless, the vital points of the speech
could not be misunderstood. It prepared the world for American
mediation by strong emphasis of the League of Nations idea.
The political lull of midsummer brought an important improvement in
public feeling towards us. This change for the better was reflected
with special clearness in the reception given to the merchant submarine
_Deutschland_, as I have already described.
At the time of this speech of Mr. Wilson's, I sent the following
report:
REPORT IN CIPHER
"Washington, 28th May, 1916.
"The placation of American public opinion is progressing. Hardly
any mention is now made in the Press of German-American relations.
Only two persons are still wavering. The American Government are
delaying the publication of my letter on the subject of the _Lusitania_
settlement, because they think that it will not satisfy public
opinion here. It may be assumed that its publication will take
place at the beginning of June, during the Republican National
Convention, so that it may pass as far as possible unnoticed in the
general excitement about domestic politics. The American Government's
delay in this matter shows clearly how great the opposition has
been. While we thought to have made important concessions, the
American Government here consider that they have not attained the
objective prescribed for them by public opinion.
"Further, the Igel incident is not yet settled. On this question
there is a difference of opinion between the State and Law Departments.
The former confirming our standpoint that the seizure of the papers
was illegitimate and that they must be returned. The Law Department,
on the other hand, holds that Herr von Igel has been guilty of
a legal offence and so has forfeited his diplomatic privileges.
Consequently I get no further, and the case is continually deferred.
It is to be hoped that the State Department will soon bestir itself
to make a decision which will, however, in any case, necessitate
the recall of Herr Igel.
"Mr. Wilson's peace plans are becoming more and more tangible.
The only question is whether he possesses sufficient authority
to force our enemies to agree to negotiations. Colonel House is
convinced that Mr. Wilson will succeed. The President is considering
the plan of calling together a conference at the Hague, in which
the neutrals will only participate so far as the 'Freedom of the
Seas' is concerned. If the project materializes, Colonel House
is sure to take part in the conference, even though he may not
be the official American representative. His influence, however,
would be sure to be great, for no one else is so completely in
touch with Mr. Wilson's views. The latter is still of the opinion
that the United States should under no circumstances take part in
the actual settlement of the peace conditions. He and his _alter
ego_ are meanwhile very much afraid that our enemies might remain
obdurate, since they are under the impression, or are trying to
spread the impression, that the President, in opening the peace
negotiations, is acting for Germany. Certainly England continually
drags this idea into the discussion. At one time it is said that
Prince Buelow is coming here to submit the German peace conditions to
Mr. Wilson; at another, that Germany is on the brink of starvation
and must therefore sue for peace. We ought as far as possible to
counteract this propaganda of our enemies. It is to be hoped that it
will not do serious harm, because the peace vote in America continues
to grow and Mr. Wilson can count with certainty on re-election
if he establishes a peace conference. We shall therefore daily
gain ground here so long as we appear to be ready to encourage the
American peace movement, while our enemies adopt an unfavorable
attitude. The American people is now pacifically minded. It becomes
clearer every day how difficult it is to arouse enthusiasm for war
preparedness, etc. No one who has lived here for any length of
time can help coming to the conclusion that peaceful money-making
is the Americans' chief interest in life. Only when they think that
their rights have been seriously infringed do they lash themselves
into an hysterical war-fever. Why should war passion smoulder in the
hearts of a people whose boundaries are so secure that no enemy
has ever been seen inside them, nor in all human probability ever
will be?"
After the settlement of the _Sussex_ incident the Imperial Government
naturally hoped that Mr. Wilson would take steps to justify our
concessions with regard to the submarine question. Accordingly
I received the following general instructions:
"Berlin, 7th June, 1916.
"Order A. 56.
"_Confidential._
"More than a month has passed since our last Note to the United
States without President Wilson making up his mind to approach
the English Government on the question of the blockade. True I
do not expect that England would allow herself to be influenced
by the United States to abandon her infringement of international
law; nor do I imagine that a rejection of the American demands
by England would lead to a serious disturbance of the relations
between these two countries. The existing arbitration treaty, which
makes it possible in extreme cases to delay the settlement of the
points of contention indefinitely, rules this out. But the complete
passivity of Mr. Wilson, which could be understood so long as he
wished to avoid giving the impression that he was acting under
German coercion, but which cannot continue to be justified on these
grounds, is bound to re-act very unfavorably on public opinion
here and puts the Imperial Government in an extremely difficult
position.
"From the information which has reached you, Your Excellency will
already realize that our surrender to America on the submarine
question has met with approval in wide and influential circles
in Germany. If President Wilson persists in his passive attitude
towards England, it is to be feared that the section of German
public opinion whose attitude has so far been favorable to the
Government will ally themselves with the opponents of the Government
policy, and that the whole of public opinion in Germany will clamor
for the resumption of the submarine campaign on the old lines.
In that case, the Imperial Government would be all the less in
a position to resist this demand for any length of time, as all
the military authorities have always been unanimous in regarding
and urging unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective
means to bring about the defeat of England. Moreover, as we have
received secret information that the Entente have decided on a
drastic tightening of the blockade, and at the same time have agreed
in future to meet the protests of the neutrals, and particularly
America, with the argument that only in this way can the end of the
war, which is also in the interests of the neutral countries, be
brought about. Your Excellency will therefore bring to the notice
of President Wilson and Mr. House the serious dangers which his
passivity towards England involves.
"With regard to Mr. Wilson's plans for mediation, they are meanwhile
meeting with vigorous opposition in England. If they are rejected
by England, the result cannot but be favorable to us, for we are
naturally sceptical of mediation on the part of a statesman so
partial to England, and at the same time so naive as President
Wilson. This necessarily follows on the consideration that the
President would primarily be concerned to construct peace on the
basis of the _status quo ante_, and particularly in respect of
Belgium. Although there is to-day little on which to form an estimate
as to how far we shall be in a position to bring about a solution
in conformity with our own interests to the Belgian question, which
is the direct result of the war, so much is certain, that if the
war continues in our favor, a peace on the basis of the absolute
status quo ante would not be acceptable to us. So, as the President
interprets his role as the chosen champion of all that, in his
opinion, is right and just, it is to be feared that a refusal on
our part to make peace on this basis might induce him to go over
openly to the enemy's camp. It is not, however, out of the question
that public opinion in England may in time again turn to Mr. Wilson
and his desire for mediation. As soon, therefore, as Mr. Wilson's
mediation plans threaten to assume a more concrete form and there
is evidence of an inclination on the part of England to fall in
with them, it will be Your Excellency's duty to prevent President
Wilson from approaching us with a positive proposal of mediation.
The choice of means for attaining this object without endangering
our relations with the United States I think I may leave to Your
Excellency's diplomatic skill, as from here I am not in a position
to get a clear insight into the position of affairs in America.
"VON JAGOW."
I have already mentioned that Mr. Wilson had for some time past
subordinated the question of the "Freedom of the Seas," i.e., in
this concrete instance the English blockade, to his desire for
mediation. Regarded from his point of view, this new ordering of his
plans was based on an entirely correct political train of thought.
The President gave first place to the attainable, with a view to
taking up later what was for the time being unattainable. In view
of the fact that we could bring no pressure to bear to change Mr.
Wilson's point of view, it only remained for us to exploit his
plans as far as possible in the interests of German policy.
As my instructions on the most important point--the question of
mediation--did not appear to me sufficiently clear, I asked in the
following report, dated from the summer quarters of the Embassy,
for a more detailed explanation:
REPORT IN CIPHER
"In reply to Order A. 56,
"Rye, 13th July, 1916.
"The inactivity of Mr. Wilson, who has only one thought, re-election,
is due in the first place to the fact that no pressure is being put
upon him by American public opinion to take action with regard to
England. It is obvious that conditions here are not favorable to
such action. Those American circles which are suffering financial
losses as a result of the English blockade, have no weight in face
of the tremendous stream of gold which our enemies have poured
lavishly over this country, not haggling over details, and conniving
at 'graft.' For the rest, Mr. Wilson's train of thought with regard
to action in respect of England practically coincides with that
expressed by Your Excellency. He does not think at present that it
is likely to meet with any success, as he has no means of bringing
pressure to bear. No one would take him seriously if he threatened
England with war.
"The position is quite different with the President's well-known
anxiety to bring about peace in Europe. In this matter he now has
the whole of American public opinion behind him. He also believes
that, after the expected failure of their present offensives, our
enemies will be ready to open peace negotiations. If this assumption
proves unfounded, and our enemies reject an American invitation
on these lines, the main question dealt with in Your Excellency's
instructions to me will be settled. Meanwhile, he is sure to make
an attempt to negotiate peace, if only for election purposes. I
therefore venture to request Your Excellency to cable me further
brief instructions as to how I am to interpret the words 'more concrete
form of mediation plans,' and 'positive proposal of mediation.' I
am assuming that the main part of my respectful reports will only
reach Your Excellency at the same time as this. Therefore, Mr.
Gerard, when Your Excellency spoke with him at the beginning of
May, on the question of mediation, would not have received detailed
instructions as to the President's intentions. In any case, he
was mistaken as to the attitude Your Excellency should adopt with
regard to an American peace-movement. On the strength of a telegram
received at that time from Mr. Gerard, Mr. Wilson believed that
the Imperial Government was ready to accept his mediation, and
I accordingly contradicted this assumption as instructed. As far
as I know, Mr. Wilson refuses definitely to take any part in the
discussion of territorial questions, but confines his interest to
'disarmament' and 'Freedom of the Seas.' His idea is that there
should be a conference at the Hague, in which the United States
and other neutral Powers would only take part in so far as these
two questions are concerned. 'Disarmament' may certainly be very
undesirable for us, but, on the other hand, the 'Freedom of the
Seas,' ought, without a doubt, to bring us on the side of the United
States. If it once comes to peace negotiations between the combatants,
I regard it as out of the question--even were they to fail--that
the United States would enter the war against us. American public
feeling in favor of peace is too strong for that. It required the
hysterical excitement roused by the _Lusitania_ question, and the
incidents connected with it, to produce a state of mind among Americans
which at times made war seem inevitable. In the absence of similar
incidents, such a state of public feeling could not be aroused. The
admiration with which the cruise of the submarine _Deutschland_
was regarded showed plainly which way the wind blows now.
"I made the above mentioned request because I consider it out of
the question to prevent Mr. Wilson from taking action with regard
to peace. I am in doubt, however, whether by a 'positive proposal
of mediation' your Excellency means such a proposal as that made
by Mr. Roosevelt after the Russo-Japanese War. On that occasion it
is well known that the negotiations were carried on under direct
American influence. This, as I have already said, is not what Mr.
Wilson wants. He only wants to play the part of peace-instigator; he
would like to deserve the credit for having brought the combatants
to negotiate one with the other. Such a success would, in view of
the state of feeling here, probably assure his re-election.
"I am therefore convinced that within the next few weeks the President
will institute proceedings with regard to peace, provided that the
enemy offensive continues to prove abortive. Mr. Wilson will then
tell England that he has been obliged on the grounds of domestic
politics to make a sharp protest against the blockade, provided that
peace negotiations have not been opened. For me the question now
arises whether I am to try to stand in the way of these proceedings.
Of course I could exert strong influence on Colonel House. Wilson,
however, would immediately suspect that we were attempting to deal
with his successor, and to give Mr. Hughes the honor of instigating
peace proceedings.
"As far as I can judge from here, there seem to be three possibilities:
"1. That the Wilson peace movement should fail in consequence of
the obduracy of our enemies. In that case, if we were to reopen
the submarine campaign to bring England to her knees, the situation
would at least be more favorable to us than before.
"2. That the peace movement should fail through us, and that we
should resume the submarine war.
"3. That the peace movement should be accepted by both sides.
"In the first case, I consider war with the United States probable;
in the second, certain. This is the reason for my request for more
definite instructions as to whether I am to impede a peace movement, or
only a positive proposal that would bind us in respect of territorial
conditions."
To this report I received the following reply, containing quite
clear instructions, emphatically to encourage Mr. Wilson in whatever
course he might take:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 18th August, 1916.
"In reply to report A. 350 of the 13th inst.
"Mediation by the President intended lead to the opening of peace
negotiations between the combatants we are gladly ready to accept.
Please encourage emphatically the President's efforts in this direction.
Naturally it must not be imagined that in accepting such mediation
we bind ourselves to any concrete peace conditions. A general peace
conference with participation of neutrals only tolerable on the
lines of previous successful peace-negotiations between combatants
with regard to general and international questions of Freedom of
the Seas and Disarmament.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
In close connection with the above exchange of letters with Berlin,
stood an interchange of telegrams dealing with the eventual reopening
of the unrestricted submarine campaign. I received the following
telegrams:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"(Strictly confidential.)
"Berlin, 12th June, 1916.
"The Army and Navy are again urging submarine warfare as the only
weapon against England, and particularly against her blockade, to
which President Wilson has never, nor can very well, take exception.
"It now remains to be decided:
"1. Whether after his nomination Wilson would still be prepared
to press matters as far as a rupture and war, even if we spare
human life in the new submarine war?
"2. What attitude the Republican candidate would adopt on this matter?
"Public opinion in England is opposed to mediation by Wilson, which
is also not wanted on principle here, because too unpopular.
"VON JAGOW."
I dispatched as quickly as possible to Berlin the following telegram:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 19th June, 1916.
"Assuming that it is intended that the resumption of the submarine
campaign be accompanied by the official or clandestine withdrawal of
the concessions granted in our Note of the 4th May, such a withdrawal
or modification of our concessions would in my opinion lead to a
rupture and America's entry into the war. By condoning such a move
Wilson would forfeit all hope of being re-elected and Hughes, who is
already suspected of being the German candidate, could not afford
to recommend a surrender. With regard to mediation and blockade I am
in constant communication with House. The former to be expected
in course of summer, for election reasons; probably Wilson will
inform our enemies that he will have to resort to sharp measures
if peace is not attained."
From the orders and telegrams here reproduced I gathered that the
political situation was, as far as I was concerned, to be regarded
as a kind of race between the unrestricted submarine campaign on
the one hand and the American peace mediation on the other. There
was apparently no third possibility.
On the 1st September I saw Colonel House again. In order that this
visit should not attract notice I went to stay with other friends
in New Hampshire for the customary American September holidays
(Labor Day). From there I motored to New London, where Colonel House
had been spending the summer. The conversation brought out that the
President considered a postponement of mediation unavoidable, because
the Entente were now filled with hopes of victory in consequence of
Rumania's entry into the war. In all my conversations with Colonel
House we both proceeded from the assumption that an attempt to
bring about American mediation could only succeed provided that
the Entente had given up hope of victory without the entry into the
war of the United States. For this reason Colonel House repeated
his advice that there should be less public talk in Berlin of an
early peace than had hitherto been the case, since in this way we
were betraying weakness and making America's task more difficult.
Colonel House also said that the President now intended to await
the further development of the war, and, if he should be re-elected,
immediately to take steps towards mediation. Before the presidential
election the time was too short for any action, for the Entente
would pay no heed to the mediation of a problematical candidate.
Looking back, I am still convinced even to-day that Colonel House's
estimate of the situation with regard to the President was entirely
correct from the American point of view. Mr. Wilson could only afford
to offer his mediation provided that he was sure of success. For us
the position was in my opinion different. For Germany American
mediation would have been welcome at any time. It would either
succeed and bring about an acceptable peace, or the Entente would
reject Wilson's proposal after we had accepted it. In the latter
case we should score a diplomatic success in Washington which would
make it very difficult for the American Government to enter the
war. The third possibility, that the German Government, after all
that had passed, might refuse Mr. Wilson's mediation, I did not
even consider.
Immediately after my return from New Hampshire I telegraphed the
following to the Foreign Office:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER NO. 100
"Rye, 6th September, 1916.
"Wilson's mediation postponed until further notice because for
the moment out of question, owing to Rumania's entry into war and
consequent renewed prospect of victory for our enemies. Wilson
thinks he cannot now mediate before the election, because England
might pay little attention to him until after the election, and
if he were not elected would have nothing further to do with him.
If, however, Wilson wins at the polls, for which the prospect is at
present favorable, and if the war meanwhile remains at a standstill,
the President will at once take steps towards mediation. He thinks
in that case to be strong enough to compel a peace conference.
"Wilson regards it as in the interest of America that neither of
the combatants should gain a decisive victory."
This telegraphic report of my conversation with Colonel House reached
Berlin when they were beginning to grow impatient of the delay in
the peace movement. According to Karl Helfferich's account the
question was discussed at the time between himself, the Imperial
Chancellor and Herr von Jagow. Thereupon, according to General
Ludendorff's "War Memories," "the Chancellor proposed to His Majesty
that instructions should be given to Ambassador Count Bernstorff
to induce the President at the earliest possible moment, and in
any case before the presidential election, to make a peace offer
to the Powers." Herr Helfferich then goes on to report that the
Chancellor cabled to me to question me quite personally as to my
opinion of Wilson as a peace mediator. The accounts of both these
gentlemen are doubtless accurate, but they do not mention that
the inquiry addressed to me did not, nor was intended to, create
a new situation, but had as its sole object to obtain my opinion
as to the prospects of a movement which had long been set on foot.
In the inquiry, as Herr Helfferich also reports, I was informed
that we would evacuate Belgium. This was of course a necessary
preliminary to Mr. Wilson's mediation, which otherwise, in view
of the feeling prevailing in America, would have been entirely
out of the question.
The Chancellor's inquiry read as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER NO. 74
"Berlin,2nd September, 1916.
"_Confidential._
"Our West Front stands firm. East Front naturally threatened somewhat
by Rumania's declaration of war. Rolling up of front or collapse
of Austria, however, not to be feared. Turkey and Bulgaria to be
relied on. Greece uncertain. Hopes of peace before winter, as result
of Russian or French war-weariness, diminished by this development.
Apparently, if no great catastrophe occurs in East, Wilson's mediation
possible and successful if we guarantee required restoration of
Belgium. Otherwise, unrestricted submarine warfare would have to
be seriously considered. Request you give purely personal opinion
without inquiry in any quarter.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
To this inquiry I replied as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER NO. 101
"Rye, 8th September, 1916.
"In reply to Telegram No. 74.
"Your question answered in substance by my telegram No. 100. I take
it then that your Excellency intends yourself to invite Wilson's
mediation. In so far as the United States of America concerns itself
with territorial questions--which hitherto I have always categorically
opposed--restoration of Belgium should constitute America's principal
interest, since public opinion is almost exclusively favorable to
this.
"If Wilson is re-elected, I think there is good prospect of his
mediation before the end of the year.
"From this point of view the attainment of peace through unrestricted
submarine war seems hopeless, since the United States would inevitably
be drawn into the war--no matter what may be the result of the
election--and consequently the war would be prolonged."
I should like particularly to draw the reader's attention to this
telegram, because it expresses definitely my opinion that the submarine
campaign could not bring us peace.
Soon afterwards I was again instructed by the Chancellor to hasten
Mr. Wilson's peace movement. His telegram is here reproduced:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 26th September, 1916.
"For Your Excellency's personal information.
"The enemy's intention of breaking through our fronts has not, so
far, succeeded, and will not succeed, any more than his Salonika
and Dobrudja offensives. On the other hand, the operations of the
Central Powers against Rumania are making encouraging progress.
Whether we shall succeed this year in gaining a victory there that
will bring the war to an end is still doubtful; therefore, for the
present we must be prepared for a further prolonging of the war.
Meanwhile, the Imperial navy is confident that by the unrestricted
employment of large numbers of submarines they could in view of
England's economic position, meet with a success which would in
a few months make our principal enemy, England, more disposed to
entertain thoughts of peace. It is therefore essential that G.H.Q.
should include a submarine campaign among their other measures to
relieve the situation on the Somme Front, by impeding the transport
of munitions, and so making clear to the Entente the futility of
their efforts in this area.
"The whole situation would change if President Wilson, following
out the plans he has already indicated, were to make an offer of
mediation to the Powers. This would, of course, not have to include
any definite proposals of a territorial nature, as these questions
should form part of the agenda of the peace negotiations. Such a
move, however, would have to be made soon, as otherwise we could
not continue to stand calmly aside and watch England, realizing
as she does the many difficulties to be reckoned with, exert with
impunity increasingly strong pressure on the neutrals, with a view
to improving her military and economic position at our expense, and
we should have to claim the renewed liberty of action for which
we stipulated in the Note of the 4th of May of this year. Should
Mr. Wilson insist on waiting until immediately before or after
the election, he would lose the opportunity for such a step. Also
the negotiations should not at first aim at the conclusion of an
armistice, but should be carried on solely by the combatant parties,
and within a short period directly bring about the preliminary
peace. A further prolongation would be unfavorable to Germany's
military situation, and would result in further preparations being
made by the Powers for the continuance of the war into next year, so
that there would be no further prospect of peace within a reasonable
time.
"Your Excellency should discuss the position cautiously with Colonel
House, and find out the intentions of Mr. Wilson. A peace movement
on the part of the President which bore the outward appearance of
spontaneity would be seriously considered by us, and this would
also mean success for Mr. Wilson's election campaign.
"Gerard has applied for leave, as the result of a private letter
from Colonel House, but he has received no reply from the State
Department.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The explanation of the final sentence of the above telegram is as
follows. I have already mentioned that Mr. Gerard was not popular in
Berlin, owing to his very highly-strung temperament, his impetuosity
and his want of tact. His recall was eagerly desired. Consequently, I
had received instructions to arrange, if possible, for the replacement
of Mr. Gerard, and in any case that the Ambassador should be recalled
for a time to Washington, so that his nerves might have a chance
to rest. As always, in strictly confidential matters, I referred
this to Colonel House, who told me that in view of the existing
political situation there could be no question of a recall of Gerard.
He would, however, arrange for the Ambassador to be summoned at once
to Washington for fresh instructions. If once Mr. Gerard learned
that the President now had the definite intention of mediating
with a view of peace, Colonel House thought he would be received
in a more friendly manner in Berlin.
I answered the Chancellor's last telegram as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 5th October, 1916.
"No. 121.
"Telegram No. 89 discussed according to instructions.
"No change here in the situation reported in telegrams Nos. 100
and 101.
"In view of possibility of surprises in war and election, Wilson,
for reasons already stated, refuses to attempt mediation until
re-elected. Result of election, which is being fought exclusively on
foreign politics, uncertain. President showing surprising firmness.
If unrestricted submarine campaign unavoidable, advise emphatically,
postpone at least until after election. Now, immediate rupture with
United States would be certain; after election Wilson's mediation
probable on the one hand; on the other hand at least slight possibility
of finding _modus vivendi_ by negotiation with United States."
The instructions from Berlin gave me occasion for repeated conversations
with Colonel House. The Imperial Government were now ready to accept
Mr. Wilson's League of Nations programme, which provided for general
disarmament, freedom of the seas, and compulsory arbitration. My
reports to Berlin on this question had the result that on 9th November
the Chancellor in a speech publicly espoused this programme, and
that I, at my own suggestion, received permission to communicate
officially the Chancellor's speech to the American Peace League,
which published my communication.
On the other hand, the Imperial Government desired that the territorial
questions should be regulated by direct negotiations between the
combatant Powers. Mr. Wilson, as Colonel House told me, was in
agreement with this. Mr. Wilson had already expressed himself to
this effect in the above mentioned speech of the 27th May, and
in general adopted the point of view that the United States had
no interest in the details of territorial adjustment; but that it
was of equally fundamental importance for America as for Europe
that in future wars should be avoided. The President was only willing
to intervene in so far as he was certain of having American public
opinion behind him. In my conversations with Colonel House we never
spoke of the evacuation of any German territory. We always confined
ourselves exclusively to a real peace by negotiation on the basis
of the _status quo ante_. With such a peace Germany's position
in the world would have remained unimpaired. The freedom of the
seas, a principal point in the Wilson programme, could not but
be welcome to us. The President and Colonel House have been the
sponsors of this idea in America. Both were indefatigable in their
efforts to materialize this idea in such a way that war on commerce
should be abolished and that all commerce, even in war-time, should
be declared free. As a necessary result of this development of
the laws of naval warfare Mr. Wilson hoped to bring about general
naval disarmament, since navies would lose their _raison d'etre_
if they could only be used against each other and no longer against
commerce and for purposes of blockade. It is a regrettable fact
that at the Hague Conference we accepted the English standpoint
on the question of war on commerce, and not the American.
In October I was again instructed from Berlin to speed up Mr. Wilson's
peace movement. With regard to this new urgency Herr von Jagow,
on the 14th April, 1919, granted an interview to the Berlin
representative of the _New York Sun_, the substance of which was
as follows:
"In the autumn of 1916 the Emperor, Count Bernstorff and I opposed
the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, which was urged
with increasing vigor by our military and naval departments, as
being the only means of bringing the war to an early conclusion.
Week after week we watched for the hoped-for peace move of President
Wilson, which, however, did not come. At last, in October, the
Emperor, upon whom increasing pressure was being brought to bear
to give his consent to the unrestricted submarine campaign, sent
a memorandum to the American Government, reminding them or certain
mediation promises which had been made at the time of the _Sussex_
crisis.
"When this memorandum, addressed to Mr. Gerard, reached Berlin
Mr. Gerard had already left for America. I, therefore, cabled the
text to Washington and instructed Count Bernstorff to hand the
memorandum to Mr. Gerard on his arrival in New York. Count Bernstorff,
who had been made fully aware that the Emperor wished to avert
the submarine campaign and a rupture with the United States, was
also informed by me that the memorandum had been written by the
Emperor in person. For reasons which there is no need for me to
mention here, Count Bernstorff handed the memorandum, not to Mr.
Gerard, but to Colonel House, who certainly communicated it to
the President."
The telegram in which the Emperor's memorandum was communicated
to me read as follows:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 9th October, 1916.
"His Majesty the Emperor desires that the following memorandum should
be handed to Ambassador Gerard on the latter's arrival.
"Your Excellency should do this in strict confidence and say that
the memoir is not intended to convey a threat of submarine warfare.
I should only like you to remind the Ambassador before his interview
with the President of the expectations we based in the spring on
Wilson and to call his attention to the increasing ruthlessness
with which the enemy is carrying on the war. I take it for granted
that Gerard will treat my memoir as strictly confidential and will
not publish it.
"Should Your Excellency, however, regard the delivery of the memorandum
as indiscreet, I request that it may be deferred.
"For Your Excellency's information (strictly confidential):
"1. The memorandum is written personally by His Majesty.
"2. Unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present deferred.
"MEMORANDUM
"Your Excellency hinted to His Majesty in your last conversation at
Charleville in April that President Wilson possibly would try towards
the end of summer to offer his good services to the belligerents for
the promotion of peace. The German Government has no information
as to whether the President adheres to this idea, and as to the
eventual date at which his step would take place. Meanwhile the
constellation of war has taken such a form, that the German Government
foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom
of action that it has reserved to itself in the Note of May 4th
last, and thus the President's steps may be jeopardized."
Mr. Gerard arrived in New York a few days after I had received the
Emperor's memorandum. He was accompanied by the American journalist,
Herbert Swope, a correspondent of _The World_, who had spent a
considerable time in Berlin. This gentleman professed to be Mr.
Gerard's confidant, and even from the ship sent wireless messages
to his paper in which he reported that the unrestricted submarine
campaign was imminent. The Ambassador also, after landing in New
York, expressed himself, as I at once learned, to the same effect,
and Mr. Swope continued his open Press-campaign in this direction.
Under these circumstances I considered it inopportune to give Mr.
Gerard the Emperor's memorandum, as I assumed that he would read
into it merely a confirmation of his view, and would discuss it
in that light. If, however, the idea spread abroad that we were
about to begin the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect
of success for peace mediation was lost. It was indeed clear that
the Entente would not accept American mediation if they could hope
for the submarine campaign and consequent declaration of war by
the United States. It must continually be repeated that mediation
could only succeed if the Entente had already abandoned all hope of
American assistance. On these considerations I handed the memorandum
to Colonel House, of whose discretion I had two years' experience.
In this way it came into the hands of the equally unusually discreet
President, without anyone else learning anything about it. The
memorandum at once produced a great effect, as now the American
authorities had no further doubt that the Imperial Government would
accept the intended mediation. This could, however, not be speeded
up because Mr. Wilson did not want to undertake a great political
movement so shortly before the election.
At this time I sent the following report to the Chancellor:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 17th October, 1916.
"For a week there has again been some excitement here about foreign
policy. This is due to a variety of causes. At first the rumor
was that Ambassador Gerard was bringing with him a peace proposal
from the German Government. In spite of all denials this rumor was
believed for a time, because it was started by one of the first
bankers of New York. Unfortunately Mr. Gerard heard of this canard
while he was still on the ship, and as he was travelling with Herbert
Swope a denial, sent by wireless, appeared in _The World_, which
was worse than the rumor itself. In this Swope reported that Mr.
Gerard was coming over to announce the approaching beginning of
ruthless submarine war. Just at this moment the U53 appeared at
Newport, and two days later I had an audience of the President,
which had been arranged a long time before, that I might hand to
Mr. Wilson the reply of His Majesty the Emperor and King on the
question of Polish relief.
"Colonel House, with whom, as is known, I am in constant communication,
expected that on his landing Mr. Gerard would let fall some intentional
or unintentional diplomatic _lapsus linguoe_, and therefore went in
the early morning to the quarantine station in order to protect Gerard
from the reporters. Mr. Gerard received a very hearty reception,
which, however, had certainly been engineered for election purposes,
because it is to the interest of the Democratic Administration to
extol their ambassador and their foreign policy. Immediately after
the reception Gerard breakfasted with House, and there everything
was denied that had been actually said or implied.
"As I have known Mr. and Mrs. Gerard for many years I had a longish
conversation with them on the day after their arrival. The quintessence
of the ambassador's remarks was that he was completely neutral,
but that Berlin expected more than that.
"Now everything has calmed down again here, and nothing is talked
about except the election, which will be decided in three weeks'
time. As I have several times had the honor to report, the result
is most uncertain. While four months ago a Republican victory seemed
certain, to-day Wilson's success is very possible. This is explained
by the fact that Mr. Hughes has made no permanent impression as a
speaker, whereas Roosevelt blew the war trumpet in his usual bombastic
fashion. If Hughes should be defeated he can thank Roosevelt. The
average American is, and remains a pacifist '_Er segnet Friede
und Friedenszeiten_,' and can only be drawn into war by passionate
popular excitement."
With the facts contained in the above report the following telegram
is also concerned, which I despatched after the visit to the President
mentioned above:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 11th October 1916.
"Wilson gave particular force to his remarks by pointing out that
the leaders of the opposition Roosevelt, Lodge and Co., desired
war with Germany, which he was quite unable to understand. His
only desire was to remain neutral, and to help to bring the war
to an end as a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the
question. He thought that neither of the belligerent parties would
be able to gain a decisive victory. Therefore it was better to
make peace to-day than to-morrow. But all prospect of ending the
war would vanish if the United States were also drawn in.
"As Wilson always spoke as though he was holding himself in readiness,
in case his services as mediator were required, I told him that
in my opinion there was no prospect of any advances being made
by the belligerent Powers.
"It was obvious that Wilson would have preferred to be directly
encouraged to make peace before the election because in that case
he would have been sure of being re-elected. If, however, he were
re-elected without this, he would have to make up his mind to take
the initiative himself. Result of the poll still very doubtful.
Wilson surprisingly strong, as Hughes has little success as a speaker
and Roosevelt does more harm than good."
To this I received the following reply from the Chancellor:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Berlin, 14th October, 1916.
"Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing here with
prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow,
without, however, shaking the Government's attitude.
"Direct request for Wilson's mediation still impossible, in view
of favor hitherto shown to Entente, and after last speeches of
Asquith and Lloyd George. Spontaneous appeal for peace, towards
which I again ask you to encourage him, would be gladly accepted
by us. You should point out Wilson's power, and consequently his
duty, to put a stop to slaughter. If he cannot make up his mind
to act alone he should get into communication with Pope, King of
Spain and European neutrals. Such joint action, since it cannot be
rejected by Entente, would insure him re-election and historical
fame.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The incident of the Emperor's memorandum closed with the following
telegram sent by me:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 20th October, 1916.
"I thought it better to give memorandum to Gerard for House, as
in this way greater discretion is assured. Latter was incautious
in his utterances to Press here. House will speak with Gerard.
Both gentlemen see Wilson shortly, and are accordingly in constant
touch.
"It is still not to be expected that Wilson will make peace advances
before the election. Nor that he will get into communication with
Pope or King of Spain as hitherto every suggestion of joint action
has met with immovable opposition, chiefly based on tradition.
Meanwhile prospect of Wilson's re-election becomes obviously greater
every day. Should this occur I believe that Wilson will very soon
attempt mediation and with success, chiefly because the feeling
against England has greatly increased, which England is seeking to
hide. If peace is not concluded serious Anglo-American differences of
opinion are to be expected. Until now every fresh dispute with Germany
with regard to the submarine question has always been exploited by
our enemies here to bridge the differences with England. Already
the agitation in the German Press for unrestricted submarine warfare
is persistently used for this purpose."
After a hard struggle Mr. Wilson was re-elected President. The
pacifist tendency in the United States had won, for the battle
was fought under the watchword that Mr. Wilson had preserved peace
for the United States. "He kept us out of the war" had been the
battle-cry of the Democrats. The few electioneering speeches made
by the President breathed the spirit of neutrality and love of
peace. It is particularly to be noticed that at that time, Mr.
Wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly objective way with
the question of guilt for the origin of the war, which was later to
be the determining factor in his attitude towards us. The way was
now cleared for the opening of the peace movement. Public feeling
had also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the American war
industry no longer attached so much importance to the prolongation
of the war after the victorious Democratic party had drawn up an
extensive armament programme and so indicated to the industry the
prospect of great State contracts.
On the subject of my own attitude with regard to the election,
innumerable legends have been spread through Germany. The few
German-Americans who shared the views of the so-called "German-American
Chamber of Commerce" have reproached me with having brought about
Mr. Wilson's election by influencing the German-Americans.
Anti-German-American newspapers maintained, on the other hand,
that I had used every lever to bring about the election of the
Republican candidate, Mr. Hughes, so as to punish Mr. Wilson for
his attitude towards the submarine campaign. My position was an
extraordinarily difficult one, as I could neither take part in
the election nor give up the relations which naturally and in the
course of my duty bound me to the German-Americans and pacifists.
In general I may say that the vast majority of German-Americans
had absolute confidence in me throughout. A splendid testimony of
this was given at the great German bazaar which was held in New
York in aid of the Red Cross. This undertaking made the astounding
net profit of 800,000 dollars. At the opening nearly 30,000 people
were present, who gave me an indescribably enthusiastic ovation
simply because they believed that I had prevented war between Germany
and the United States.
I never for a moment denied that I personally should be glad to
see Mr. Wilson re-elected, as I was convinced that he had the
determination and the power to bring about peace. It was at that
time impossible for me to foresee that our Government would change
its attitude to this question. All American pacifists belonged to
the Democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the Republican
party.
A change in our favor was, therefore, not to be expected from the
election of Mr. Hughes. Apart from the usual relations with the
pacifists and German-Americans already mentioned, which were in no
way altered during the election, I held myself aloof as my position
demanded. If it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides,
the agents of the Entente would not have missed the opportunity
of bringing me to book, as this they regarded as their object in
life. I continually received letters from _agents provocateurs_,
asking for my opinion on the elections. Of course I never replied to
these. Neither were the false statements of anti-German newspapers
any more successful which announced that on the day of the election
I had openly shown my support of Mr. Hughes.
New York at night after the polling is one of the sights of America. All
streets, squares, theatres and restaurants are filled to overflowing.
The election results are displayed everywhere by electric light and
cinematograph. Particularly when the result is very uncertain, as
in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. At 11 p.m. the election
of Mr. Hughes seemed certain, as the Eastern States had voted for
him almost to a man, and it was said that a Democratic candidate
can only gain the victory if he wins over New York State. Next day
the picture changed, after the results had come gradually from
the West, where the Democratic party was everywhere triumphant.
The majority, however, was so slight that it was several days before
Mr. Wilson's election was secure.
The malcontents among the German-Americans already mentioned maintain
that if Mr. Hughes had been elected, Congress would have used the
four months between the election and the 4th March, during which
Mr. Wilson was powerless and Mr. Hughes had not yet got the reins
into his hands, to rush through the warning of American citizens
against travelling on British passenger-ships. In that case, Mr.
Hughes, on assuming office, would have found himself faced with
a situation which would have prevented him from entering the war,
in view of the national inclination towards peace. Therefore, the
German-Americans ought to have supported Hughes. This had been
clear to the Germans in the East. They maintained that Wilson's
re-election was due to the German votes in the Western States which
had obeyed a more or less clear order from the German Embassy.
This line of argument is yet another proof that the Germans in
question had no idea of the situation in America. They kept exclusively
to themselves in the _Deutscher Verein_, and scarcely ever saw a
real, true-bred American. To begin with, it is difficult to see
why the Germans in the West should obey the alleged order from me
if the Germans in the East did not do so. But the important thing
is that Wilson had firmly made up his mind, in case Mr. Hughes
was elected, to appoint him Secretary of State immediately and,
after Hughes had informed himself on the political position in
this office, to hand over the presidency and himself retire. Mr.
Wilson considered it impossible to leave the country without firm
leadership at such a dangerous moment.
Immediately after the official announcement of his reelection,
Mr. Wilson wrote a Peace-Note, but unfortunately kept it in his
desk, because, unhappily, just at that time a new anti-German wave
swept over the country on account of the Belgian deportations. Mr.
Wilson was at that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his
Notes and speeches himself, and only submitting them to his advisers
on points of law or other technicalities. Whether he still works
in this way I do not know. If the unhappy measure of the Belgian
deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had
informed the President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the
history of the world would probably have taken a different course.
The American mediation would have anticipated our peace offer and,
therefore, would probably have succeeded, because we could not
then have reopened the unrestricted submarine campaign without
letting the mediation run its course.
In November several submarine incidents occurred in which there
was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser warfare had been
followed. The ships _Marina_ and _Arabia_ came under particular
consideration. I will not go into these cases as they had no political
importance. President Wilson caused the investigations to be carried
on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to see his peace
move disturbed by controversies.
Of greater importance was the wish that was again cropping up in
Berlin to open the so-called "intensified submarine campaign." I
learned this in the following from Secretary of State von Jagow:
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 112.
"Berlin, 8th November, 1916.
"Navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo-vessels without
warning. Does Your Excellency consider this dangerous, apart from
probable mistakes, particularly in view of fact that now many Americans
are lured to travel on such steamers!
"VON JAGOW."
As the "intensified submarine campaign" would have destroyed all
prospect of American intervention, I advised strongly against it
in the two following telegrams:
(1) CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 152
"Washington, 17th November, 1916.
"It is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about armed
merchantmen, especially in view of Wilson's peace plan."
(2) CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 20th November, 1916.
"In reply to telegram No. 112 which was delayed.
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 152.
"Urge no change in submarine war, until decided whether Wilson will
open mediation. I consider this imminent."
At the same time I received the first news of the intended peace
offer of the German Government. To begin with, the following telegram
arrived from Secretary of State von Jagow:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Berlin, 16th November, 1916.
"Desirable to know whether President willing to take steps towards
mediation, and if so, which and when? Question important for decision
of possible steps in same direction elsewhere.
"How does Mexican question stand?
"VON JAGOW."
Then followed a further telegram which read as follows:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Berlin, 22nd November, 1916.
"Strictly confidential.
"For Your Excellency's strictly personal information. So far as
favorable military position permits we intend, in conjunction with
our Allies, immediately to announce our readiness to enter into
peace negotiations.
"VON JAGOW."
To the first of these two telegrams I sent the following reply:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 21st November, 1916.
"Wilson spontaneously commissioned House to tell me in strict confidence
that he is anxious to take steps towards mediation as soon as possible,
probably between now and the New Year. He makes it a condition,
however, that until then, mediation should be spoken and written
of as little as possible, and further, that we should conduct the
submarine war strictly according to our promises and not allow
any fresh controversies to arise.
"Wilson's reasons for the above conditions are as follows: He believes
that he can only resort to mediation provided that public opinion
over here remains as favorable to us as it has been during the
last few months. On this account he deplores the so-called Belgian
deportations. Any new submarine controversy would again affect
public feeling adversely for us, whereas if this question can be
eliminated the tension with regard to England will increase. The
British reply on the subject of the black lists and the English
Press utterances on Wilson's election have created a bad impression
in Government circles over here. The submarine question, however,
will always divert this resentment against us again.
"Wilson still hesitates to intervene because the State Department
expects a refusal on the part of our enemies, while House urges it
strongly and is very hopeful. I have, according to instructions,
encouraged him as much as possible, by telling him, that in my
opinion, our enemies would be quite unable to refuse to enter into
negotiations, and that is all that Wilson has in view. House seemed
very much impressed when I reminded him how, throughout the whole
war, the English Government had tried by lying and diplomatic trickery
to bring public opinion on to their side. This house of cards,
built on lies and deception, would immediately collapse if our
enemies were now to refuse negotiations and thus would have to
admit openly their desire for conquest. I am rather afraid that
England may make a pretense of entering into negotiations and then
try to put us in the wrong.
"I chose this line of argument because Wilson fears above all things
the humiliation of a refusal. If it does come to negotiations, even
unsuccessful, Wilson will have scored a great success. Whether
the negotiations will lead to a definite result I cannot judge
from here. In any case, if it should come to negotiations, strong
pressure will be exerted by the Government over here in the direction
of peace.
"The Mexican question is still in a state of stagnation as a result
of diplomatic negotiations. This affair interests practically no
one any more and proved to have no influence on the election.
"If Your Excellency still desires Wilson to intervene it is necessary,
in view of the above, to get rid as soon as possible of the _Marina_
and _Arabia_ incidents without further controversy and not to allow
any fresh controversies to arise. I think that, with the help of House,
I can bury these two incidents without attracting much attention, as
this is the wish of Wilson himself. As House said, the President
takes a tragic view of these incidents, because, after the _Sussex_
Note, he could not possibly write another Note, and therefore,
there is nothing left but to break off diplomatic negotiations,
should it be impossible to dispose of the matter privately and
confidentially with me.
"Next week Gerard will be in Washington for a day or two: he will
lunch with me and dine with Lansing. House keeps him in strict
control. In case Gerard's return to Berlin is not desired, please
send me instructions. Otherwise he should be there again at the
end of the year."
To this telegram, which announced very definitely the American
mediation, I received from the Foreign Office the following reply:
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 121
"Berlin, 26th November, 1916.
"Replacement, or at least further retention, of Gerard in America
desired in Berlin, provided that it is possible without wounding
his vanity and sensitiveness to our disadvantage, that it is certain
that this hint from our side will not become known in America and
that a suitable successor is available.
"We should prefer Wilson's peace move to the step on our part mentioned
in our telegram No. 116 of the 22nd November. For this reason it
is eminently desirable that Wilson should make up his mind for
immediate action if possible at the opening of congress or immediately
afterwards. If it is put off until the New Year or later, the lull
in military operations during the winter campaign would moderate
the desire of public opinion for peace, and on the other hand would
make preparations for the spring offensive necessary which would
probably strengthen the military opposition of a peace movement.
Please place this point of view cautiously and without _empressement_
before House as your personal opinion and keep me closely instructed
by telegram as to the position.
"ZIMMERMANN."
To this telegram I sent the following replies:
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 164
REPLY TO TELEGRAM NO. 121
"Washington, 1st December, 1916.
"To-morrow I shall see House in New York and will try to arrange
that Gerard, who is to sail on 5th December, is kept back.
"Lansing expressed himself very strongly to me on the subject of
the American protest with regard to the Belgian deportations. These
have endangered the whole Belgian relief movement; in addition,
feeling here has been poisoned against us, and that just at a moment
when it looked as though peace negotiations might be begun. Lansing
expressed the view that, if the Imperial Government could find a
way of yielding to the protests of the neutrals, this would make a
strong impression in our favor and that it would probably be possible
immediately afterwards to propose the opening of peace negotiations.
Hitherto, unfortunately, something has always intervened.
"The Federal Reserve Board's warning to the banks against unsecured
promissory notes of foreign States is the first sign that the Government
here wishes to put pressure on our enemies."
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 4th December, 1916.
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 164 of the 1st inst.
"House told me in strict confidence question of Mr. Gerard's return
has been thoroughly discussed by him with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing.
Mr. Gerard's unpopularity in Berlin and his unfriendly manner were
well known here. However, no satisfactory successor was available,
and Mr. Gerard is at least straightforward and does exactly what he
is told. He has received very detailed instructions here, and is
even quite enthusiastic over the idea of assisting in bringing about
peace. In addition, Mr. Gerard was so pleased at the appointment of
the Secretary of State that he is sure to adopt a more friendly
attitude in future.
"As a matter of fact, Mr. Gerard has everywhere described the changes
in the personnel at the Foreign Office as extraordinarily favorable
for German-American relations, and laid particular stress on his
personal friendship with the Secretary of State.
"Everything is prepared for a peace move, but with Mr. Wilson still
hesitating, it is still doubtful when he will take action. All
the authorities here have now been won over to favor such a step.
This may then come at any time, especially if it is possible for
us to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the Belgian question. Mr.
Wilson believes that he is so hated in England that he won't be
listened to. This train of thought largely explains his eagerness
in the Belgian question. In any case, so much is certain, that
House is continually urging Mr. Wilson to take action; moreover,
peace propaganda here is steadily increasing, notwithstanding that
it is for the moment very seriously hampered by the Belgian question.
If Mr. Wilson--as is to be expected--finds a strong feeling for
peace in Congress, he should at last make up his mind."