THE "SUSSEX" INCIDENT
On the 24th March the unarmed passenger-ship _Sussex_ was torpedoed
without warning, and several Americans lost their lives. The first
information about this incident was so vague that the matter was
at first treated in a dilatory fashion in Washington. At the time
I sent the following report to Berlin:
REPORT IN CIPHER
"Washington, 4th April, 1916.
"During the fourteen months that have passed since the opening of
the submarine campaign there have been intermittent periods in which
the American Government have shown themselves aggressive towards
us, and others in which the now proverbial expression 'watchful
waiting" formed the _Leit-motif_ of their attitude. The past month
belonged to the second category until the sinking of the _Sussex_
and other similar incidents stirred American public opinion to
fresh excitement. Officially I have, during the last four weeks,
heard nothing further from the American side on the subject of
the submarine campaign. During this time Mr. Lansing even allowed
himself a fortnight's holiday for recuperation. On my side there
was no occasion to reopen the submarine question as a complete
understanding with the American Government cannot be attained,[*]
and in my opinion it is advisable to avoid as far as possible any
new crisis in our relations with the United States. I therefore
contented myself with keeping in touch with Colonel House so that
I should not be taken by surprise by any _volte-face_ on the part
of the American Government. As soon as a new crisis arises Mr.
Wilson will, as usual, be in a fearful hurry and bring us to the
brink of war. Whether such a crisis will be precipitated by the
_Sussex_ incident, and whether the President in that case will
shrink from war at the last moment, it is difficult to foretell,
as this question--like all others at the present moment--will be
viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the approaching presidential
election.
[Footnote: *i.e., Without instructions from Berlin.]
"Except for the surprises that are usual over here, things are
at present quite calm. This is due, in the first place, to the
desire for peace shown by the population, who are not anxious to
be disturbed in their congenial occupation of money-making, and
secondly, to the development of the Mexican question. This latter
question stands in the forefront of public interest, and it seems
to be increasingly probable that the punitive expedition against
Villa will lead to a full-dress intervention. A few days ago it
was reported that Villa was defeated, then wounded, and finally
even a prisoner. All this good news proved later to be false and now
Villa is said to have escaped south and won over fresh supporters.
So long as the Mexican question holds the stage here we are, I
believe, safe from an act of aggression on the part of the American
Government.
"On the other hand it looks as though Mr. Wilson were looking for
a fresh way out of the _impasse_ into which his attitude on the
question of the submarine campaign has led him. As I have already
had the honor to cable, Colonel House holds out the prospect of an
early move towards peace by the President. The view is entertained
here, and strengthened by the impressions gathered from Colonel
House, that gradually the stress of circumstances will force all
the neutral Powers into the war. If this happens there will be no
further prospect of the conclusion of peace, as there will be no
one available to set the ball rolling. It is therefore essential
that the foundations of peace should be laid before the world
conflagration spreads any further and finally destroys the prosperity
of every nation. This view may sound like pure theory, but it gains
substance from the fact that it can very well be made to harmonize
with Mr. Wilson's election campaign. In his capacity of founder of
peace in Europe, and peace-maker--i.e., indirectly conqueror--of
Mexico, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to vanquish Mr.
Wilson in the election. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt would then shout
himself hoarse to no purpose and Mr. Charles Hughes, the strongest
Republican candidate, would perhaps not even go so far as nomination
if his position seemed hopeless."
In that report I announced for the first time that Mr. Wilson had
so far changed his policy as now to put peace mediation in the
foreground and to give the question of the 'Freedom of the Seas'
second place. I shall return later to this political development.
When news reached Washington which left no doubt that the _Sussex_
had been torpedoed by a German submarine, I immediately cabled
to Berlin for instructions in order to be in a position to give
an official disavowal of the act. It required nothing further to
convince me that it was now a question of bend or break. I had no
means of knowing whether the supporters of the submarine campaign
or the partisans of an understanding with the United States would
win the day. In the former case war was inevitable. To provide for
the second alternative I recommended in my cablegram that there
should be no question of an official exchange of Notes, because
I was anxious that our withdrawal should not be accompanied by a
humiliation. If our Government were prepared to give way I regarded
as the most appropriate _modus procedenti_ the immediate issue of
instructions to me, empowering me to offer the American Government
satisfaction and compensation for this fresh incident. There was no
hope of purchasing immunity from a break with any less concession
than a pledge to carry on the submarine campaign for the future in
accordance with the principles laid down by international law for
cruiser warfare. I recommended, however, a provisional cessation
of the submarine war on the basis of an oral agreement with the
American Government. If this proposal had been acted on, the American
Government would have been obliged to follow suit and there would
have been no sharp exchange of Notes, which still further prejudiced
the position on both sides. If, after such a pause in the submarine
war and the establishment of a really clear diplomatic situation,
Mr. Wilson failed us and made no positive progress either with regard
to his programme for the 'Freedom of the Seas' or the conclusion of
peace, we should have held quite a different position from which--if
we really thought it desirable--to reopen unrestricted submarine
warfare. We had always made the mistake of dealing in half-hearted
concessions. In my opinion it was essential for us to strive for
a complete understanding with America if we were not prepared to
carry on the submarine campaign without regard to consequences.
No attention was paid to my suggestion in Berlin at the time. Admiral
von Tirpitz had just resigned and the decision had been taken against
the continuance of unrestricted submarine warfare. I do not know
why the dispatch of an official Note was preferred to the oral
negotiations I had suggested, but I think that the deciding factor
was consideration for public opinion in Germany.
A few days later I cabled the following to Berlin:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 8th April, 1916.
"House gave me a very gloomy view of the position with regard to the
_Sussex_. At the White House the situation is regarded as hopeless
because the view is held that, in spite of Tirpitz's resignation,
the German Government, with the best will in the world, cannot
curb the submarine campaign. It has hitherto been merely due to
good luck that no American has lost his life and any moment might
precipitate a crisis which would be bound to lead to a break. The
American Government are convinced that the Sussex was torpedoed by
a German submarine. A repetition of such mistakes would be bound
to drive the United States of America into war with us, which Wilson
would greatly regret, as he is anxious--as I have already reported--to
lay the foundations of peace in a few months. If the United States
were drawn into the war all hope of an early peace would be at
an end.
"I request to be furnished with instructions on the basis of which
I can pacify the Government here, which now has doubts of our _bona
fides_."
After Mr. Gerard, apart from other questions concerning doubtful
cases of torpedoing, had also submitted a similar inquiry to the
Foreign Office on the subject of the _Sussex_ incident, an official
reply was handed to him on the 10th April which read in the following
terms:
"A decision as to whether the Channel steamer _Sussex_ was damaged
by a German submarine or not is made extraordinarily difficult
owing to the fact that no exact information is known as to the
place, time and accompanying circumstances of the sinking, and
moreover a picture of this ship could not be obtained until the
6th April. Consequently the inquiry has had to be extended to all
submarine enterprises which took place on the day in question, 24th
March, in the Channel anywhere on the course between Folkestone
and Dieppe.
"In this area on the 24th March, in the middle of the English Channel,
a long, black vessel, flying no flags, with a gray funnel, small gray
superstructure and two high masts was hit by a German submarine.
The German captain was definitely convinced that she was a ship of
war, and indeed a mine-layer of the newly-built English _Arabic_
class. He was led to this conviction:
"1. By the flush deck of the ship.
"2. By the shape of the stern, which sloped outwards.
"3. By the paintwork, which was that of a ship of war.
"4. By the high speed of about eighteen knots which the ship developed,
"5. By the fact that the ship was not steering the course north
of the light buoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head within which
frequent observation had led the German submarines to keep a look
out for merchant shipping, but was in mid-Channel, heading almost
for Le Havre.
"Consequently, the submarine fired a torpedo at 3.55 p.m. Central
European time, 1-1/2 knots southeast of the Bull Rock. The torpedo
struck, and so heavy an explosion occurred that the whole of the
ship forward of the bridge broke away. The unusually heavy explosion
leaves no doubt that there were large stores of ammunition on board.
"The German captain has prepared a sketch of the ship he attacked,
of which two copies are sent herewith. The two copies of pictures
of the _Sussex_, also enclosed, were photographed from the English
newspaper _The Daily Graphic_, of the 27th inst. A comparison of
the sketches and the photograph shows that the vessel attacked
is not identical with the _Sussex_; particularly striking is the
difference in the position of the funnel and the shape of the stern.
No other attack was made by a German submarine on the course between
Folkestone and Dieppe at the time of the _Sussex_ incident.
"From this the German Government are obliged to assume that the
sinking of the _Sussex_ is to be set down to other causes than attack
by a German submarine. Some light may be thrown on the incident by
the fact that on the 1st and 2nd April alone no less than twenty-six
English mines were destroyed in the Channel by German naval forces.
In general the whole of that area is rendered dangerous by drifting
mines and not torpedoes. Off the English coast the Channel is also
made increasingly dangerous by German mines which have been laid
for the enemy naval forces.
"If the American Government should have at their disposal any further
data that may help to elucidate the _Sussex_ incident, the German
Government beg that it may be communicated to them so that they may
subject it to examination. In the event of differences of opinion
arising between the two Governments the German Government now declare
themselves ready to submit the whole incident to an International
Commission in accordance with the third clause of the 'Hague Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of the 18th
October, 1907.'"
I have reproduced this Note in full because its influence was quite
particularly fateful and because it was probably the most unfortunate
document that ever passed from Berlin to Washington. Mr. Wilson
thought he detected a direct untruth, and the mixture of an uneasy
conscience and clumsiness which the German Note appeared to betray
prompted the sharp tone of the President's reply. For the sake of
his prestige Mr. Wilson was now compelled by the recent course of
events to take action, although the excitement of public opinion was
this time undoubtedly less than was the case after the torpedoing of
the _Lusitania_ and the _Arabic_. The American Government, therefore,
couched the Note which they dispatched on the 18th April in the
terms of an ultimatum. In the meantime, the discovery in the hull
of the _Sussex_ of a piece of a German torpedo placed the matter
beyond all doubt. Additional importance was given to the ultimatum
by the fact that before dispatching it Mr. Wilson laid it personally
before Congress at a special sitting.
It is my firm conviction that had it not been for this ultimatum
diplomatic relations would not have been broken off immediately,
even in 1917. In the increased tension of the situation resulting
from the exchange of Notes on the subject of the _Sussex_ I see,
therefore, one of the immediate germs of the war with America.
After this exchange of Notes a challenge in the form of our formal
declaration of the 31st January, 1917, could no longer be tolerated.
The clumsiness of such formal declarations was, as I have said,
only surpassed by the regrettable impression of a juristic argument
produced by our first _Lusitania_ Note.
As the American ultimatum later formed the basis on which the American
Government, immediately after the declaration of unrestricted submarine
warfare, broke off diplomatic relations, I here give the vital
contents of the American Note of the 18th April verbatim:
"Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances
to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships
would not be dealt thus with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted
its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire
impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would
regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the
armed naval forces of its adversaries, and deal with them as with
men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give
warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security
of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation
their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.
"The Government of the United States has been very patient. At
every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy
it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration
of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war, and to
be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people
and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations
and assurances of the Imperial Government as of course given in
entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope,
that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so
to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square
its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in
the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented
conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became
unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.
"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute
an indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of
submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States
must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law
and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government
of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there
is but one course to pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should
now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present
methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying
vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but
to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.
This action the Government of the United States contemplates with
the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf
of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."
After this Note it is obvious that there was no longer any doubt
in Berlin, that persistence in the point of view they had hitherto
adopted would bring about a break with the United States, for I
received instructions to make all preparations for German merchant
ships lying in American ports to be rendered useless by the destruction
of their engines.
I also received orders to arrange that Mr. Gerard, who had not
been informed of the minimum demands of the American Government,
should be instructed accordingly.
My reply was as follows:
CABLEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 1st May, 1916.
"House has informed me that at his request Gerard has already been
informed of the minimum demands of the American Government. Wilson
is strongly influenced by peace votes. Even the anti-German ring
desires the end of the war, as otherwise they fear financial loss. My
suggestions are based on the view that submarine warfare, according
to international law, is valueless, and in any case, the opening
of peace negotiations is more important. It would be advisable
in the Note of reply to touch only on the principal points, to
talk much of international law and humanity, and to leave details
to be settled at a later date. I fear that the continuance of the
submarine campaign, on the lines of cruiser warfare, only means
the postponement of the rupture as fresh incidents are bound to
occur."
On the 4th May followed the German reply, which averted the fourth
serious crisis, by declaring that the submarine campaign would
return to the recognized laws of cruiser-warfare. The Note began
by opposing, in strong terms, the American view, and concluded
with the following sentences:
"The German Government feel themselves justified in declaring that
it would be impossible to answer to humanity and history, if, after
twenty-one months of war the contention over the submarine war
were allowed to develop into a serious menace to peace between
the German and American peoples. Such a development the German
Government will do everything in their power to prevent. They desire,
at the same time, to make a final contribution towards confining--so
long as the war lasts--the war to the present combatant Powers,
an aim which includes the freedom of the seas, and in which the
German Government believe themselves still to be in agreement with
the Government of the United States.
"On this assumption the German Government beg to inform the Government
of the United States that instructions have been issued to the German
naval forces to observe the general principles of international
law, with regard to the holding up, searching and destruction of
merchant vessels, and not to sink any merchant vessel, even within
the war zone, without warning and rescue of the passengers and
crew, unless they attempt to escape or offer resistance.
"The German Government hope and expect that these new instructions
to the naval forces will also remove in the eyes of the United
States Government every obstacle that might stand in the way of the
realization of the offer of co-operation contained in the Note of
the 23rd July, 1915, towards restoring the freedom of the seas during
the war, and they do not doubt that the United States Government will
now insist with all possible emphasis on the immediate observation
by the British Government of those international rules which were
universally accepted before the war, and which are specifically stated
in the Notes of the American Government to the British Government
of the 28th December, 1914, and the 5th November, 1915. Should
it happen that the steps taken by the Government of the United
States do not meet with the desired result of insuring recognition
of the laws of humanity by all the combatant nations, the German
Government would consider themselves faced by a new situation, for
which they must reserve for themselves full freedom of decision."
The German Note reached the German Embassy piecemeal, and while
the first part was being deciphered, its harsh tone produced in
an increasing degree the impression: "Then it is war," which was
not relieved until we came to the conclusion of the text.
The attempt made by the Imperial Government to reserve to themselves
the right to resume the submarine campaign at a later date was not
accepted by Mr. Wilson, and so the difference of opinion remained,
which was bound to become a _casus belli_ if we reverted to unrestricted
submarine warfare. This reservation led to a further Note from
Washington, which I give here:
"The Note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4th,
1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the
United States. It is especially noted, as indicating the purpose of
the Imperial Government as to the future, and that it 'is prepared
to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest
of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents,' and
that it is determined to impose on all its commanders at sea the
limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which
the Government of the United States has insisted. Throughout the
months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced
on February 4th, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned,
the Government of the United States has been constantly guided
and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts
to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising
from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration
of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced
the good relations between the two countries, the Government of
the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth
of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will
remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations
existing between the United States and Germany.
"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state
that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government
does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly-announced
policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic
negotiations between the Government of the United States and any
other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain
passages in the Imperial Government's Note of the 4th instant might
appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to
avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United
States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment
entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German
naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States
upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be
made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting
the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such
matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."
This American Note, however, in no way affected the peaceful conclusion
of the negotiations.
As a direct result of the _Sussex_ incident, a step forward was
taken in the question of American peace mediation. When I called
on Colonel House, during the last days of the crisis, we had a
long conversation on this question. As always, Colonel House had
used his influence on the side of peace with regard to the _Sussex_
incident. He took this opportunity to convey to me the pleasing
news contained in a cablegram from Mr. Gerard, that the German
Government were now ready to agree to American mediation.
This cablegram was the outcome of the following facts: Mr. Gerard,
on account of his anti-German tendency, was not popular in Berlin. He
regarded it as a personal slight that the most important negotiations
should have been carried on partly in Washington, and partly by
Colonel House in Berlin. The Ambassador wanted therefore, to use
the opportunity of the _Sussex_ incident to assert himself, and
expressed a desire to visit G.H.Q. and explain the American point
of view in person to the Emperor. On the 1st May, Mr. Gerard was
received by the Emperor, in the presence of the Imperial Chancellor,
on which occasion he received the assurance contained in his telegram.
Karl Helfferich's account in _Weltkrieg_ gives the impression that
the question of American mediation was mentioned for the first
time on the 1st May. The two journeys of Colonel House, which were
of far greater importance than Mr. Gerard's visit to G.H.Q., are
not mentioned in the Helfferich account. For the rest I have to
rely for my information about events in Germany on this and other
publications, in addition to the evidence given before the Commission
of the National Assembly. In any case, Colonel House regarded the
telegram from Berlin as the sequel of his own negotiations there,
which point was placed beyond all doubt by the text of the information
he communicated to me. In order to inform myself on my side also as
to the attitude of our Government, I sent the following telegram
to Berlin, to ascertain whether the information from the American
Ambassador was in accordance with the facts:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, No. 26, 4th May.
"House informs me that Gerard has cabled that we would agree to the
President's mediation, and that a visit from House to Berlin, with
this object, would be welcomed. Nothing known here about solution of
_Lusitania_ question. Mediation naturally depends on this running
smoothly, which would be most easily assured by cessation of submarine
campaign during negotiations."
I received the following reply from the Imperial Chancellor:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 6th May, 1916.
"Reply to telegram No. 26.
"For Your Excellency's information.
"We hope that our Note and great concession finally removes cause
of mistrust, and opens era of greater mutual confidence. Animosity
of public opinion here against Wilson, as result of tone and contents
of his Note and impression of _parti pris_ against us, however, so
great that he must take open and unmistakable action with regard to
England before he would be accepted as unbiassed mediator by German
people. To this extent Gerard's telegram is premature. If Wilson
neglects to take such action, there is danger that the animosity
may become irremediable and possibility of mediation driven into
distant future. Smoothing the way for peace, of course, always
desired. Action against England, however, seems necessary to encourage
conciliatory attitude there, if a peace exclusively favorable to
England is to be avoided.
"If it is found impossible to induce England to discuss peace with
us, even though unofficially perhaps at first, we shall, as England
refuses to return to the provisions of the Declaration of London,
be placed in an absolutely free position with regard to our great
concession amounting to abandonment of submarine campaign. A visit
from House very welcome here at any time.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
Karl Helfferich's account confirms the view I held at that time,
that our concessions in respect of the submarine campaign were
essentially prompted by the hope of mediation by Mr. Wilson. The
following words of the Emperor make this plain:
"In politics it is necessary, before all things, to know the other
party's point of view; for politics are a question of give and take.
Gerard's utterances had made it clear that Wilson was seeking a
ladder for re-election. It was better, then, that we should offer
him the ladder of peace than the ladder of war, which will eventually
fall on our own heads."
Moreover, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has declared before the Commission
of the National Assembly that he had expressed to Mr. Gerard the
hope that the President would now take steps to bring about the
restoration of peace.
When, at that time, Colonel House was discussing with me the German
reservation in the Note of the 4th May, in connection with the
questions of the "Freedom of the Seas" and peace, he said that the
circumstances were then such that the President no longer possessed
the power to compel England to observe international law. England
would only give way before the menace of war. In view, however,
of the state of natural feeling in the United States, and the
development of trade relations between America and the Entente,
war with England was out of the question. On the other hand, Mr.
Wilson possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this
question he could rely on the support of the majority of the American
nation. When the time was ripe, the President would take the desired
steps, but a neutral act of this nature would be cried down by
the very active Entente party in the United States as pro-German,
and could only be carried through if the national feeling towards
Germany took a more friendly turn. It was, therefore, necessary
that there should be a period of lull, during which Germany should
possibly not be discussed at all. The approaching hot season and the
usual exodus of political personages from Washington to the country
would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotiations rest,
especially as, after the settlement of the _Sussex_ question, no
new incidents were to be expected. Colonel House's remarks accurately
reflected the actual position in the United States at the time. I could
not but express my agreement, and felt no doubt that the American
mediation would begin in the late summer. After our giving way on
the submarine question in order to avoid a break with the United
States, I regarded it as certain that we would not directly bring
about the rupture which had just been averted with such difficulty
by reopening the unrestricted submarine campaign, for in view of
the American ultimatum of the 18th April, 1916, there was no
alternative.
I should like to take this opportunity of making clear that I always
regarded American mediation as the only possible way out of the
war. I had no faith in the submarine campaign as likely to save
the situation, because the entry of the United States into the war
would more than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines could
bring us. On the other hand I was convinced that If the American
Government established a peace conference, this would be sure to
lead to peace itself. It could not be imagined that, in view of the
nations' need of peace, such a conference could break up without
having reached any result. Moreover, after the meeting of a conference,
the United States would no longer be in a position to enter the
war, because American public opinion would not have allowed it.
But without the help of the United States, the Entente could not
win. It resolved itself, therefore, into a question of the skill of
our negotiators to ensure a tolerable peace for us, as the result
of the conference. Diplomatic negotiations have a way of ending
owing to general weariness, in which case the party which holds
the best cards secures the greatest advantages. If this happened,
we should have the advantage of the position as our military gains
would give us a strong lever in the negotiations.
Here I may touch on another question which was engaging my attention
at that time. Since the _Lusitania_ catastrophe I had adopted the
principle, and put it into practice as far as possible, of leaving
the propaganda to our American friends, who were in a position to
get an earlier hearing than we, and in any case understood the
psychology of the Americans better than the Imperial German agents.
Indeed, the words "German propagandist" had already become a term of
abuse in America. We were reproached there with being too indulgent,
while in Germany the opposite criticism was levelled at us. In spite
of the difficulty of the situation, however, there were Americans
of German and other origin, who had the courage openly to champion
our cause and to swim against the stream. Among others, a "Citizens'
Committee for Food Shipments" was formed, whose activities spread
through the whole country, and were avowedly pro-German. A special
function of the committee with Dr. von Mach as executive chief, was
a month of propaganda throughout the country, with the object of
obtaining the means to supply the children of Germany with milk. The
English control of the post even led to the bold plan of building a
submarine to run the milk through the English blockade. The propaganda
was very vigorously attacked by the greater part of the American
Press, but pursued its course unafraid, collected money, submitted
protests to the State Department against the attitude of the Entente,
and so on.
Dr. von Mach succeeded in bringing the matter to the notice of
the President who actively interested himself in it, and promised
to see that the milk should pass the English blockade and reach
Germany in safety. Accordingly, the State Department instructed
the American Embassy in Berlin to issue a statement. Meanwhile, the
well-known American journalist, McClure, returned from a tour of
investigation in Germany, where he had been supported in every way
by the German Government departments. He gave a very favorable account
of the milk question, as of the feeding of infants in general, and
this gave rise to the first disagreeable controversy. Mr. McClure
took up an unyielding attitude. Unfortunately, however, the State
Department then published an equally favorable report, which, coming
from the American Embassy and published with the approval of the
Foreign Office in Berlin, caused the complete collapse of Dr. von
Mach. This incident made a very painful impression in America, and
led to a series of bitter attacks on Dr. von Mach and the whole
movement, which was thus exposed in a most unfortunate light. The
favorable report on the milk question was drawn up by a Dr. E. A.
Taylor, and definitely confirmed, and, indeed, inspired, by the
German authorities.
I mention this incident to show that our propaganda was not by any
means made easier by Germany, although our Press Bureau repeatedly
brought up this very question in Berlin. This movement was particularly
dear to us, because the Americans are most easily won over when an
appeal is made to their humanity. Moreover, the favorable reports
on the question of supplies in Germany did not coincide in any way
with our defence of the submarine campaign as an act of reprisal.
This method of propaganda from home lost us our best argument.
Even to-day the majority of Americans certainly have no idea how
many children have been murdered by the blockade.
At the time of which I am speaking occurred also the much discussed
Bolo affair. It is quite astonishing how many lies were told before
the commission of inquiry of the American Senate with regard to
this affair. Among others, hotel servants, chauffeurs, etc., were
sworn, and gave evidence that I had met Bolo in the apartments
of Mr. Hearst. True, I have often visited Mr. Hearst, which goes
without saying, as he was the only important newspaper proprietor
who maintained a neutral attitude throughout the war. I did not,
however, meet Bolo, either there or anywhere else; I have never
made his acquaintance, or even seen him in the distance. I heard
his name for the first time when he was brought up for trial in
Paris.
If the statements made before the commission of inquiry are to
be relied on in any point at all, it is to be assumed that Bolo
first came to America to arrange a combine between the _Journal_
and the Hearst Press. This combine was to support the cause of
Pacifism after the war. Who Bolo's principal was I do not know,
but so much seems to be established, that he was connected with
the _Journal_. Apparently, Bolo wanted to sell shares in this paper
to Mr. Hearst, in order to acquire funds for the Pacifist agitation.
This theory seems justified since Bolo, on the voyage to America,
got into touch with Mr. Bartelli, Hearst's representative in Paris.
The latter did fall in with Bolo's ideas.
Later--whether intentionally or not I do not know--Bolo met the
co-proprietor of the firm Amsinck and Co., Herr Pavenstedt, who was
one of the most respected, if not _the_ most respected, Imperial
German in New York, and intimately acquainted with all the members
of the Embassy. Herr Pavenstedt, who as a private citizen was not in
a position to accept Bolo's suggestions, then travelled to Washington
to lay the matter before me. He gave me to understand that a French
acquaintance of long standing, for whose good faith he could vouch,
had come to America to raise funds for a Pacifist agitation in
France. He said that national feeling in that country had reached
a point which promised success for such a movement, if the prospect
could be held out of a peace by negotiation. Herr Pavenstedt said
that he could not, under any circumstances, disclose the gentleman's
name. As the plans of the Frenchman recommended by Herr Pavenstedt
coincided with my policy for bringing about a peace by negotiation,
and I had absolute confidence in Herr Pavenstedt, I communicated
the matter to Berlin, where the necessary money was granted. Later,
the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the United States
interrupted the policy I had initiated, and also put an end to
any prospect of effecting a change of feeling in France, where
the hope of American assistance revived enthusiasm for the war.
I do not know how Bolo's enterprise came to the knowledge of the
French Government. In any case this cannot have been due to the
deciphering of my telegrams to Berlin, as I did not know Bolo's
name. Owing to this ignorance on my part it was arranged between
Herr Pavenstedt and myself, at a second interview, that the anonymous
Frenchman should at a given time address further communications
on the progress of the movement to our Embassy at Bern under the
pseudonym "St. Regis."
At the time of the _Sussex_ crisis a further awkward incident occurred
which took us back to the days of conspiracies. In consequence
of the Welland Canal case the American secret police came down
upon Herr von Igel, the representative of the Military Attache,
in his New York office, for alleged complicity, arrested him by
force and seized papers which were found on his table. I immediately
laid a protest before the State Department, whereupon Herr von
Igel was set at liberty and a long international controversy arose
which had not come to an end when Herr von Igel returned with me
to Germany. The American Law Department maintained that Herr von
Igel was suspected of complicity in a legal offence, that he could
not therefore plead extra-territoriality, and must stand his trial
before an American Court. The State Department, it is true, had
doubts as to whether an office in New York could be recognized as
extraterritorial, but for the rest maintained a correct attitude
and refused to agree to the opening of proceedings against Herr
von Igel.
The seized documents were handed over to the State Department,
where they probably still lie. The State Department declared to
me their readiness to hand back the papers if I wished to declare
them Embassy documents. I, however, thought that an attempt might
be made later to use such a declaration against me as a trap and
I rejected the offer to return the papers on these conditions,
as they were of no further importance to us. If there was among
them material which could be used against the former Attaches it
might be assumed that the Law Department would long ago have had
the documents copied.
The Igel affair had no definite political result, as the American
Government dropped all controversies when they began to take up
the question of mediation.
To return to the settlement of the _Sussex_ incident it should be
mentioned that our surrender on the submarine question was widely
resented in Germany. Further, it caused a check in submarine
construction. At least, Secretary of State von Capelle has declared
before the Commission of the National Assembly that an extensive
submarine construction programme had to be abandoned because it
would have been too sharp a contrast with Germany's attitude after
the settlement of the _Sussex_ affair. As a matter of fact, submarine
construction was never carried on with full vigor after 1916 as
has been pointed out by Messrs. Struve, Gothein and Co. In the
light of this the gravity of the decision in 1917 to resort to
unrestricted submarine warfare is doubled. It will be seen clearly
here how our divided policy on the one hand permanently crippled
the submarine policy and on the other that of mediation.
To conclude the _Sussex_ question, I will add one more telegram
which I sent to the Foreign Office after Secretary of State Lansing
had publicly mentioned an Anglo-American agreement--a remark which
in Berlin was taken to mean that America had formed an alliance
with England. It is well known that during the war such a statement
has frequently been made.
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 21st May, 1916.
"I am working confidentially in co-operation with House for the
settlement of such still unsettled questions as the _Lusitania_
and the Igel cases, so as to clear the air completely. Feeling here
now more favorable owing to the influence of the Irish executions.
Wilson regards conflict with us as a thing of the past and desires to
let things rest and soon to lay the foundations of peace. Lansing's
speech as to Anglo-American agreement refers to the Bryan agreement.
He desired to make clear that war with England because of the blockade
is out of the question, and therefore there is no means of bringing
pressure to bear. The speech coincides with the American view I
have already reported that it would be easier to bring the war
to an end than to force England to raise the blockade."
Hitherto I have not mentioned the different German vessels which
visited United States ports during the war. Besides their history
is well known. I will therefore only describe their psychological
influence and my own experiences.
The auxiliary cruisers _Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm_ and _Eitel
Friedrich_ were the first German ships to enter Hampton Roads,
there to be interned.
Much more interest was aroused by the arrival on the 15th February,
1916, of the _Appam_, because it was then a long time since the
German flag had been seen on the American side of the Atlantic.
The facts are familiar to German readers from Count Dohna's _Moeve_
book. Lieutenant Berg's exploit met with general appreciation in
the United States, especially as his conduct was completely in
accord with the American conception of international law. Even
to-day I can hear the tone of absolute conviction in which Secretary
of State Lansing told me at the Metropolitan Club that the voyage
of the _Appam_ was a "marvellous achievement."
In the far-off future, students of international law will quote
the _Appam_ case as a classic. At the German Embassy in Washington
volumes were filled with the opinions of eminent lawyers, for the
incident was not treated politically by the American Government,
but submitted to the courts. Meanwhile the _Appam_ remained interned
in Hampton Roads as a prize. The case was not settled until after
the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, when it was no longer
of any importance to us.
The interest roused by the _Appam_ shrank into nothing before the
excitement caused by the arrival of the submarine _Deutschland_ on
the 8th July, 1916. Apart from those that followed the agreement
on the _Arabic_ incident, the few days after the arrival of the
_Deutschland_ were the pleasantest I experienced in America during
the war. Feeling on all sides was openly friendly, and Captain Koenig
was the most popular man in the United States. If we had sent ten
such merchant submarines to America and for the rest had carried
on the submarine campaign according to the principles laid down for
cruiser warfare, we should have attained far greater political
results than has been the case.
The arrival of the submarine _Deutschland_ at Baltimore and Captain
Koenig's first visit to the town resembled a triumphal procession.
I had intended to go there at once to welcome the hero of the day
and his bold seamen, but thought it better to wait and see what
would be the American attitude towards the protests of the English
and French Ambassadors, who had both claimed that the _Deutschland_,
as a submarine, should be regarded without hesitation as a ship of
war. On the 13th July a most minute inspection of the _Deutschland_
was made by an American Government Commission consisting of three
naval officers, and she was recognized as a genuine merchant vessel.
In consequence the _Deutschland_ had a right to lie at Baltimore
as long as was necessary to take a cargo on board for the return
journey. It was now possible for me to pay an official visit to
Baltimore and to view the _Deutschland_. The Mayor of the town
accompanied me and went down with me, in spite of the terrific heat
of about 40 deg. centigrade, into the lowest parts of the submarine,
which cost the stoutly-built gentleman considerable effort and a
good deal of perspiration. In the evening the Mayor gave a banquet
which passed off as in the good days before the war. The rooms
were decorated with German and American flags, the band played the
"Wacht am Rhein," and many speeches were made on the good relations
between the two countries.
Again on her second visit, which took place in October in New London
(Connecticut), the _Deutschland_ met with a very friendly reception,
even though the atmosphere was appreciably cooler. Feeling in the
New England state has always been particularly unfavorable to us.
But there, to, I passed a very pleasant day with Captain Koenig.
In contrast to the moral gain of the visit of the _Deutschland_
was the generally unfavorable impression created by the visit at
the same time of the U53. Quite unexpectedly I received the news
that a German submarine had arrived at Newport, the captain of
which had reported himself to the American commandant and had handed
him a letter addressed to me. The letter attracted a good deal of
attention in the Press, but it actually contained nothing further
than the introduction of the captain. The episode of the U53 was,
from a political point of view, most undesirable and of no military
value. When, moreover, a few days later the news arrived that the
U53 had sunk several ships off the American coast--always, it is
true, according to international law--the incident assumed a fairly
serious aspect. Meanwhile I travelled direct to Shadow Lawn, the
President's beautiful summer residence on the New Jersey coast,
to hand to Mr. Wilson a letter from the Emperor. The President
had appealed to the Heads of all the combatant States to urge them
to permit relief to starving Poland, as had been done for Belgium.
As was to be expected, the Entente rejected the proposal while the
Central Powers agreed to it. The Emperor's approval was contained
in the letter which I brought to Mr. Wilson.
The President took this opportunity to speak to me very seriously on
the cruise of the U53, and urged me to see to it that this incident
was not repeated. Otherwise he could not be responsible for public
feeling in the United States, which might again become very bitter.
The affair was very disagreeable to me personally, because I was
building hopes on Mr. Wilson's mediation and because I feared that
the cruise of the U53 would be interpreted as an attempt on our
part to put difficulties in the way of the President's re-election.
It might be assumed that his Republican opponents would say that
Germany could now do what she liked, as Mr. Wilson had never adopted
energetic measures.
On the subject of this conversation with Mr. Wilson I sent the following
telegram to the foreign office:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 11th October, 1916.
"I had a conversation with Mr. Wilson on the occasion of handing
over the Emperor's autograph letter with regard to Polish relief.
The President is anxious to carry the matter further and asked
me how this could best be done. I replied that the difficulties
lay exclusively on the English side.
"The cruiser warfare undertaken by our submarines off the American
coast is naturally regarded by Mr. Wilson with anxiety, because
all his hopes of re-election are based exclusively on the fact
that according to the opinion held over here he has kept the United
States out of the war and in spite of that has put an end to our
so-called illegal attacks on American lives. His whole position
falls to pieces if American lives are lost now, or if indignation is
aroused by a submarine campaign off the American coast. So far this
has not occurred. The exploit of U53 is even hailed as a sporting
achievement. This view will, however, be changed if the incident is
repeated. For this reason Wilson spoke plainly about a continuance
of the submarine campaign off the American coast. He regarded as
particularly serious the fact that two neutral ships were sunk, as
well as a Canadian passenger vessel making for the United States.
He said that such incidents could not be understood by the American
public."
To this telegram I received from the Imperial Chancellor the following
reply:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 4th October, 1916.
"England entirely responsible for difficulties with regard to Polish
relief. For Your Excellency's exclusive information it is not intended
to continue submarine campaign off American coast. Final decision as
to activity of U53 not possible until she returns. Our concessions
to America are being strictly observed and will be until explicitly
revoked.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."