For if it understands itself, and intellect is the same with that

which is intelligible; intellection also is the same with intellect,

and intelligible. For since intelligence is a medium between that which

knows, and that which is known; and since these two are the same,

intelligence also will be one and the same with each of these. But

since the essence of intellect is eternal (for the whole subsists at

once) intelligence also will be eternal: for it is the same with the

essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal, it will by no means

be measured by time, neither according to essence, nor according to

energy. And since these subsist in the same manner, the power also of

intellect is eternal.

PROPOSITION CLXX.

Every intellect, at once understands all things. But an

imparticipable intellect understands all things simply. And

each of the intellects posterior to this understands all things

according to one.

For if every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and

together with its essence, its energy, it will understand all things

at once. And all things indeed exist according to parts, and a

successive energy, which do not subsist in eternity. For every thing

successive subsists in time; since it possesses prior and posterior,

which are successive, and do not subsist all at once. If, therefore,

all intellects understand similarly, they will not differ from each

other: for if they understand all things similarly, they are all

things similarly; since they are no other than the things which they

understand. But if they are all things similarly, one intellect will

not be imparticipable, and another not: for their essences are the

same with the objects of their intellections; since the intellection

of each is the same with its essence, and every intellect is both

intelligence and essence. It remains, therefore, either that every

intellect does not equally know all things but one or more, and

not all things together; or that it knows all things according to

one[147]. But to assert that intellect does not understand all

things, is to make it ignorant of some particular being. For if it

is affected with transition, and does not understand _at once_,

but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an

immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, understanding all

things according to motion, or a mutable energy; because intellect

on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent

energy. It will, therefore, understand all things according to one.

For it either understands all things; or one thing; or all things

according to one. And the intelligence indeed of all things perpetually

subsists in all intellects: but they terminate all things, according

to one intelligence of all. Hence there is something pre-dominant

in intellection, and the objects of intelligence; since all things

are at once understood as one, through the dominion of one, which

characterizes all things with itself.

PROPOSITION CLXXI.

Every intellect is an impartible, or indivisible essence.

For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, and immoveable, it

is impartible. For every thing in any respect partible, is either

partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or on account of

energies subsisting in time. But intellect is eternal according to all

things, and is beyond a corporeal nature; and the multitude which it

contains is united. It is, therefore, impartible. But that intellect is

incorporeal, is manifest, from its conversion to itself: for no body

possesses a self-convertive power. But that intellect is also eternal,

the identity of its energy with its essence evinces: for this we have

already demonstrated. And that its multitude is united, is evident

from the coherence of intellectual multitude, with the divine unities:

for these are the first multitude, and after these intellects subsist.

Hence though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united

multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected,

and is nearer to the one, subsists.

PROPOSITION CLXXII.

Every intellect is the proximate sustaining cause of natures eternal,

and immutable according to essence.

For every thing produced from an immoveable cause, is immutable

according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things

eternally, and abiding in eternity, essentially produces that which it

produces. But if it is perpetual, and subsists after the same manner,

it will always produce, and according to one uniform energy. Hence it

is not the cause of things which are sometimes beings, and sometimes

not, but it is the cause of eternal beings.

PROPOSITION CLXXIII.

Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and

posterior to itself.

For it is the same with things posterior to itself according to cause,

and with things prior to itself by participation; but still it is

intellect, and is allotted an intellectual essence. Hence it defines

all things according to its essence; both such as subsist according

to cause in another, and such as subsist according to participation.

For every thing according to its natural constitution, participates

of more excellent natures; but not according to the subsistence of

its superiors. For these indeed are participated by all things,

though in a different respect, according to the various natures of

the participants. And hence participations subsist according to the

characteristic and power of the participants: and consequently in

intellect things prior to its nature, subsist in an intellectual

manner. But intellect is likewise intellectually things posterior to

itself: for it does not consist from its effects, nor does it contain

these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is the cause

of all things by its essence, and its essence is intellectual; and

consequently it contains the causes of all things intellectually.

Hence every intellect possesses all things intellectually: both such

as are prior and such as are posterior to itself. As, therefore,

every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it

contains sensibles according to an intellectual subsistence.

PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every intellect constitutes through intelligence natures

posterior to itself: and its fabrication is contained in

intellection, and its intelligence in fabrication.

For if intelligible and intellect is the same; hence the being of every

intellect consists in self-intellection. Bur it fabricates that which

it fabricates by its essence, and produces that which is, according

to being; and consequently its productions arise from intelligence.

For in intellect being and intelligence are one; because intellect is

the same with every being which is contains. If, therefore, intellect

fabricates by its essences, and its essence is intellection, it will

operate through intelligence, and intelligence will subsist in energy

in intellection. But this is the same with its essence: and its essence

consists in operating. For that which operates immoveably, always

possesses its essence in operating: and consequently intellection

consists in fabrication.

PROPOSITION CLXXV.

Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures, which are

intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.

For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these,

or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence,

but are not always intelligent. But it is impossible that it should

be participated by these latter. For the energy of intellect is

immoveable. And hence the natures by which intellect is participated,

always participate of an intellectual energy, which always causes

the participants to be intellectual. For that which possesses its

energy in any part of time, cannot be conjoined with an eternity of

energy. But as in essences themselves, so also in the variations of

energies, between every eternal energy, and that energy which receives

its perfection in some period of time, that energy intervenes which

possesses its perfection through the whole of time. For progressions

subsist no where immediately, but are produced through kindred and

similar natures, both according to hypostases, and the perfections of

energies. Every intellect, therefore, is primarily participated by

those natures which are able to understand through the whole of time,

and which possess a perpetual intelligence; though their intellection

may subsist according to time, and not according to the stability of

eternity.

COROLLARY.

From hence it is evident that the soul which sometimes understands, and

at ether times is void of intellection, cannot proximately participate

of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXVI.

All intellectual forms subsist in one another, and each is at the same

time separate and distinct from the rest.

For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which it

contains is united through an intellectual impartibility: hence all

that intellect contains will entirely subsist in one, and impartibles

will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will penetrate

through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist immaterially, and

incorporeally, they are without confusion with respect to each other,

and each separately preserves its own purity, and abides that which it

is. But the characteristic participation of each distinct participant,

declares the unconfused subsistence of intellectual forms. For if

participated natures were not distinguished, and separate from each

other, neither would their participants participate them distinctly,

but there would be a much greater indistinct confusion in subordinate

natures, from their subsisting in a more degraded order. For from

whence could distinction arise, if the natures which constitute and

perfect these, should be indistinct and confused? Again, the hypostasis

of that which contains impartibly, and an uniform essence, attest the

union of forms. For things possessing their hyparxis, in that which is

impartible and uniform, subsist impartibly in the same. For how can

that be divided, which is impartible and one? For natures of this kind

subsist together, and penetrate totally through each other, without

distance: since that which contains, is not distant; and one thing

is not in this place, and another in that, as in things separated by

interval from each other. But every thing at once subsists in that

which is impartible and one: and consequently they all subsist in each

other. All intellectual forms, therefore, subsist unitedly in each

other, and each is at the same time distinctly separate from the rest.

COROLLARY.

But if any one besides the above demonstrations requires examples,

let him contemplate the theorems resident in one particular soul;

all which subsist truly in the same soul, in an essence destitute of

magnitude, and are united to each other. For the soul does not contain

the things resident in its nature, according to magnitude, and locally,

but impartibly, and without distance, unitedly, and distinct. For the

soul produces all things distinctly, and each at the same time separate

and apart, without attracting any thing to itself from the rest, which

unless they were always distinguished according to habit, would not be

distinguished by the energy of the soul.

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Every intellect since it is a plenitude of forms, comprehends

either more universal or more particular forms. And superior

intellects contain in a more universal manner, whatever

posterior intellects contain in a more particular manner. But

inferior intellects, contain according to a more partial mode,

whatever prior intellects contain more universally.

For superior intellects employ greater powers, because they are more

uniform than secondary intellects. But inferior intellects, from their

being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they possess. For

such as are more allied to the one, being contracted in quantity, are

superior in power to such as are posterior; while such as are more

distant from the one possess a contrary property. Superior intellects,

therefore, establishing a greater power, but a less multitude, produce

more effects through forms, less according to quantity. [But[148]

intellects posterior to these, produce fewer effects, through a greater

multitude of forms, on account of their deficiency in power. If,

therefore, superior intellects produce more effects, through a less

number of forms, the forms which they contain are more universal.]

And if inferior intellects, produce fewer effects through a greater

multitude of forms, the forms which they contain, are more particular.

COROLLARY.

From hence it happens that the natures which are generated from the

superior orders according to one form, are produced in a divided manner

from secondary orders, according to a greater multitude of ideas.

And on the contrary those natures which are produced from things

subordinate, through many, and distinct forms, are produced by superior

natures, through fewer, and more universal forms. And that which is

universal and common, supernally accedes to all participants. But

that which is divided, and peculiar proceeds from secondary natures.

Hence secondary intellects by the more particular separation of

characteristics, articulately distinguish, and attenuate the formations

of primary intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.

Every intellectual form, is the framer of eternal natures.

For if every intellectual form is eternal, and immoveable, it is

essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases; but not

of such as subsist in generation, and are corruptible. And hence

every thing fabricated according to an intellectual form, is an

_intellectual eternal_. For if it produces all forms posterior to

such as are intellectual, through _being_; and if the being of

intellectual forms is eternally the same, their productions also will

subsist after the same manner, and will be eternal. Hence neither the

genera which according to some particular time, are fabricated by a

formal cause, nor things corruptible, so far as corruptible, possess a

pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be void of corruption

and generation, if they possessed their hypostasis, according to a

pre-existent intellectual form.

PROPOSITION CLXXIX.

Every intellectual number is bounded.

For if there is another multitude posterior to this diminished

according to essence, and so more remote from the one, while

intellectual number is nearer to the one: and if that which is nearer

to the one, is less according to quantity, and that which is far

distant is more according to quantity; intellectual number also will

be less than every multitude posterior to its nature. It is not,

therefore, infinite: and so the multitude of intellects is bounded. For

that which is less than another, is not infinite: because infinite, so

far as infinite, is not less than any thing.

PROPOSITION CLXXX.

Every intellect is a whole, as composed from parts, and is

united with others, and at the same time distinguished from

them. But imparticipable intellect is simply universal; and

contains in itself, as it were all parts universally. But each

particular intellect possesses the whole as in a part; and thus

contains all things particularly.

For if it is all things according to one thing; and if that which is

all things according to one, is something particular alone: hence, the

whole subsists in each of these particularly, on account of something

particular, determinately predominating in them all.

PROPOSITION CLXXXI.

Every intellect which is participated is ether divine, as depending on

the gods, or is intellectual only.

For if there is a divine and imparticipable intellect, that which

is primarily allied to this, does not differ from it in both these

respects; that it is not divine, and that it is not imparticipable.

For things dissimilar in both these respects, cannot be conjoined with

each ether. It is evident, therefore, that the medium between these, is

partly similar to the first intellect, and partly dissimilar. Either,

therefore, it is imparticipable, and not divine; or it is participated,

and divine. But every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted

an order in multitude, analogous to the one. And hence there will be

some one intellect, divine, and at the same time participated. But

it is requisite that there should be an intellect, not participating

the divine unities, but intelligent only. For in every series, first

natures, and which are conjoined with their unity, are able to

participate their proximate superiors. But such as are far distant from

their primary unity, cannot depend on the natures placed in an order

proximately superior to their own. There is, therefore, both a divine

intellect, and an intellect intellectual alone. And the latter subsists

according to an intellectual characteristic which it possesses from its

own unity, and from imparticipable intellect: but the former according

to a union, which it receives from participated unity.

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

Every divine intellect, which is participated, is participated by

divine souls.

For if participation renders the participant similar, and causes it to

be allied to that which is participated; it is evident that that which

participates a divine intellect, must be a divine soul[149]. It is

likewise evident that it must depend on a divine intellect, and that it

must participate the deity which it contains, through intellect as a

medium. For[150] intellect connects with deity (θεότης) its participant

soul, and conjoins one divine nature with another.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.

Every intellect, which is participated indeed, but is

intellectual alone, is participated by souls neither divine, nor

subsisting in a mutation from intellect, into a privation of

intellect.

For neither are divine souls of this kind; nor such as participate

of intellect. For souls participate of the gods through a divine

intellect, as we have already demonstrated. Nor are such as participate

of an intellectual intellect susceptive of mutation. For every

intellect is participated by natures, which are always intellectual,

both according to essence, and according to energy; as is evident from

the preceding propositions.

CONCERNING SOUL.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.

Every soul is either divine, or capable of being changed from

intellect into a privation of intellect; or it always remains

as a medium between these, and is at the same time inferior to

divine souls.

For if a divine intellect is participated by divine souls, but an

intellectual intellect, by those souls alone, which are neither

divine, nor susceptive of a mutation from intellect into a privation

of intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes

understand, and are sometimes destitute of intelligence), it is

evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first indeed are

divine. But the second are not divine, yet they always participate of

intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes changed into an

intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXXV.

All divine souls are gods animastically, (ψυχικῶς, or according

to the nature of soul). But all souls participating an

intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the

gods. And all souls susceptive of mutation, are some time or

other attendants of the gods.

For if some souls possess a divine light, supernally illustrating

their nature, but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and

others again, are sometimes only allotted this perfection: hence the

first of these will among the multitude of souls, be analogous to the

gods; but the second, will perpetually attend the gods, on account

of their perpetually energizing intellect, and will depend on divine

souls, to which they will have the same proportion, as that which is

intellectual to that which is divine. And those which are sometimes

endued with intelligence, will also sometimes attend the gods; but they

will neither always participate intellect after the same manner, nor

will they always be conversant with divine souls. For that which is

only sometimes allotted intellect, cannot by any means always attend

the gods.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.

Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, and separable from body.

For if it knows itself, and if every thing self-gnostic, is converted

to itself, and every thing converted to itself is not a body (for every

body is incapable of self-conversion), nor inseparable from body; for

every thing inseparable from body, is not naturally adapted to be

converted to itself, since through this, it would be separated from

body; hence every soul, is neither a corporeal essence, nor inseparable

from body. But that the soul, knows itself, is manifest. For if it

knows things superior to itself, and is naturally adapted to know

itself, it will much more know itself, through causes prior to its own

nature[151].

PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.

Every soul is immortal and incorruptible.

For every thing which is capable in any respect of dissolution and

dispersion, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted an

hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed which is dissolved, is

corrupted, as subsisting from many things. But that which is naturally

adapted to subsist in another, when separated from its subject,

vanishes into non-entity. But soul is both incorporeal, and external to

every subject, residing in itself, and being converted to itself. It

is, therefore, immortal, and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.

Every soul, is both life, and vital.

For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives; and that which is

deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. For it either

lives through soul, or through something else, and not through soul.

But it is impossible, that it should live through something else alone.

For every thing which is participated, either communicates itself, or

something of itself to its participant. But if it should do neither

of these, neither will it be participated. But soul is participated

by that to which it is present: and that is called animated, which

participates of soul. If, therefore, that which is participated confers

life on animated natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or at

the same time both life and vital. But if it is vital alone, and not

also life, it will be composed from life, and non-life[152]: and

thus it will neither know, nor be converted to itself. For _life

is knowledge_[153]; and that which is gnostic, or endued with

knowledge, so far as it is gnostic, lives. If, therefore, there is any

thing in soul destitute of life, this something will not essentially

possess a self-gnostic power. But if soul, is life alone, it will no

longer participate an intellectual life. For that which participates of

life, is vital, and not life alone; since that which is life alone, is

first and imparticipable life. But life posterior to this, is vital,

and at the same time life. And soul is not imparticipable life. It is,

therefore, both life, and vital.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.

Every soul is self-vital.

For if it is converted to itself, and every thing self-convertive, is

self-subsistent, soul also is self-subsistent, and sustains itself.

But it is also both life, and vital, and its hyparxis is according

to vitality. For to whatever natures it is present, it communicates

life, through its essence. And if the participant is adapted to

participation, it immediately becomes animated and vital; soul neither

reasoning nor chusing, nor vivifying by reasoning and judgement, but

by its essence alone communicating life to the participant. Hence

the being of soul, is the same with its life. If, therefore, it

possesses being from itself, and this is the same with its life, it

will essentially possess life, and will afford life to itself, and

will possess life from itself. But if this be the case, soul will be

self-vital.

PROPOSITION CXC.

Every soul is a medium between natures impartible, and such as are

divisible about bodies.

For if it is self-vital, and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis

separate from bodies, it is separated from, and is more excellent

than all partible natures, subsisting about bodies. For these are

entirely inseparable from their subjects; because they are divided

together with divisible weights, depart from themselves, and their

own impartibility, and are co-extended with bodies. And though they

subsist in vital natures, yet these are not the lives of partible

essences, but of their participants: and though they abide in essence

and forms, yet these are not their own forms, for they are forms of

formed natures. Soul, therefore, is a self-subsisting, and self-vital

essence; it is likewise a knowledge, gnostic of itself, and according

to all these separable from bodies. But it likewise participates of

life: and if this be admitted, it likewise participates of essence.

But it participates also of knowledge from other causes. And hence it

is evident, that it is worse than impartibles, because it is filled

with life externally: and if with life, it is evident that it is also

externally replenished with essence. For prior to every particular

life, imparticipable life, and imparticipable essence subsists. But it

is likewise manifest that soul, is not the first gnostic nature. For

every soul so far as soul, possesses life indeed, but not knowledge

also from its existing as soul. For certain souls, while they remain as

souls, are at the same time ignorant of beings. Soul, therefore, is not

the first gnostic nature, nor does it possess knowledge on account of

its essence. And hence it possesses an essence the second from those,

which are primarily, and essentially gnostic. Since, therefore, the

essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, it does not rank among

natures purely impartible. But it has been demonstrated, that neither

does it subsist in the order of things divisible about bodies. It is,

therefore, situated between both.

PROPOSITION CXCI.

Every participable soul possesses an eternal essence, but its energy

subsists in time.

For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or one

eternally, but the other temporally. But it cannot possess both

eternally: for on this hypothesis, it would be an impartible essence;

and the nature of soul would differ nothing from an intellectual

hypostasis; viz. a self-motive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it

possess both its energy and essence in time: for thus it would be

generated alone; and would neither be self-vital, nor self-subsistent.

For nothing measured by time is essentially self-subsistent. But soul

is self-subsistent. For that which is converted to itself according

to energy, is also essentially converted to itself, and proceeds from

itself. It remains, therefore, that every soul is partly eternal,

and partly a participant of time. It is either, therefore, eternal

according to essence, but participating of time, according to energy;

or the contrary. But this latter hypothesis is impossible. Every

participable soul, therefore, is allotted an eternal essence, but

possesses an energy according to time.

PROPOSITION CXCII.

Every participable soul, ranks in the number of eternal beings, and

among the first of generated natures.

For if it is eternal according to essence, it is true being according

to its hyparxis, and is a perpetual being. For that which participates

of eternity, participates likewise of perpetual being. But if it

subsists in time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing

participating of time, is always in generation (or in becoming to be)

according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once, that

which it is, but the whole of it is generated. But if every soul, is in

a certain respect generated according to energy, it will be the first

of generated natures. For that which is entirely generated, is more

remote from eternal natures.

PROPOSITION CXCIII.

Every soul subsists proximate to intellect.

For if it possesses an eternal, and immutable essence, it proceeds

from an immoveable essence: since that which proceeds from a moveable

essence, is entirely changed according to essence. The cause,

therefore, of every soul is immoveable. But if it is proximately

perfected by intellect, it is also converted to intellect, and

participates the knowledge, which intellect confers on the natures able

to participate cognition. For all knowledge proceeding from intellect,

is inherent in all the natures, in which intellect resides. But that

to which all things are naturally converted, is the source of their

progression according to essence. Every soul, therefore, proceeds from

intellect.

PROPOSITION CXCIV.

Every soul possesses in a secondary manner, all the forms, which

intellect primarily contains.

For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect is the fabricator of

soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things; it

will also impart to soul, which it constitutes, the essential reasons

of all things which it contains. For every thing which operates through

essence, imparts secondarily to its production, that which it is

itself primarily. Soul, therefore, contains in a secondary manner the

representations of intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CXCV.

Every soul is all things, containing sensible natures, after the

manner of an exemplar; (παραδείγματικῶς) but intelligibles after

the manner of images (είκονικῶς).

For subsisting as a medium between natures impartible, and such as are

divided about bodies; it produces and constitutes the latter of these;

but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it proceeds.

Hence it previously receives after the manner of an exemplar the

natures to which it is prior as their cause: but it possesses through

participation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its

subsistence. It previously receives in its essence, therefore, through

cause all sensible natures, and contains immaterial reasons of things

material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and indistant of such

as are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after

the manner of an image, and receives partibly, their impartible forms,

such as are uniform variously, and such as are immoveable according to

a self motive condition. Soul, therefore, is all beings; containing

such as are first through participation, but such as are posterior to

its nature, after the manner of an exemplar.

PROPOSITION CXCVI.

Every participable soul primarily uses an eternal body, which possesses

an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

For if every soul is eternal according to essence, and through its

essence first animates some particular body, it will always animate

this body: for the essence of every soul is immutable. But if this be

admitted, that which is animated must be always animated, and must

always participate life. But that which always lives, is perpetual

by far the first of all things[154]. And that which is perpetual is

eternal. Hence that body which is first animated, and which first

depends on soul, is eternal. But every participable soul is primarily

participated by some particular body; since it is not imparticipable,

and essentially animates its participant. Every participable, or

participated soul, therefore, uses a body primarily eternal, without

generation, and incorruptible according to essence.

PROPOSITION CXCVII.

Every soul is _an essence_ vital and gnostic, and a _life_

essential, and gnostic, and is both knowledge, essence, and

life. It likewise contains all things together, the essential,

the vital, and the gnostic; and all in all, and each separate

and apart from the rest.

For if it has a middle subsistence between forms impartible, and

such as are divisible about bodies; it is neither so impartible as

all intellectual natures, nor so partible, as corporeal forms. Since,

therefore, both essences, lives, and cognitions, are distributed in

corporeal natures; all these subsist impartibly in souls, unitedly,

and incorporeally, and are at the same time all things, on account of

their immateriality, and impartibility. And since all things subsist

in intellects according to union, they are distinguished and divided

in souls. All things, therefore, subsist together, and apart in soul.

But if all impartibles subsist together and in one, they mutually

penetrate through each other: and if separate they are again divided

without confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all in all.

For in essence there is both life and knowledge: since if essence was

essentially deprived of life and knowledge, every soul would not know

itself. And in life there is both essence and knowledge. For life

without essence and knowledge belongs to material lives, which are

neither able to know themselves, nor are sincere and pure essences. And

knowledge which is both destitute of essence and life, is incapable of

self subsistence. For all cognition belongs to that which is vital, and

which is allotted essence essentially.

PROPOSITION CXCVIII.

Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is

measured by periods.

For since it is measured by time it both participates a measure and

bound of motion, and proceeds according to number. But because it

is always moved, and this _always_, is not eternal[155], but

temporal, it is necessary that it should use periods. For motion

is a certain mutation from some things into others. But beings are

terminated by multitudes and magnitudes. And these being terminated,

there can neither be an infinite mutation, according to a right line,

nor can that which is always moved proceed according to a finished

progression. Hence that which is always moved will proceed from the

same to the same; and will thus form a period in its progression.

PROPOSITION CXCIX.

Every mundane soul uses periods and restitutions of its proper life.

For if it is measured by time it operates transitively, and possesses a

proper motion. But every thing which is moved and participates of time,

when it is eternal, uses periods, revolves periodically, and proceeds

from the same to the same. And hence every mundane soul, possessing

motion and energizing according to time, will both possess periods of

motion, and restitutions into its pristine state. For every period of

eternal natures, returns to its pristine state.

PROPOSITION CC.

Every period of soul is measured by time. But the period of

particular souls, is measured by some particular time: and the

period of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is

measured by universal time.

For if all motions contain prior and posterior, they participate of a

period, and on this account of time. And that which measures all the

periods of souls is time. But if the periods of all souls were the

same, and about the same; the time of all would be the same. But if

the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time

of their restitutions also, is different. That the soul, therefore,

which is first measured by time, is measured by universal time,

is evident. For if time is the measure of every motion; the first

motion, will entirely participate of time, and will be measured by

the whole of time. For if universal time, did not measure its first

participant, neither would it measure any thing else, according to the

whole of itself. But that all other souls are measured by the more

particular measures of universal time, is evident from what we have

now demonstrated. For if they are more particular than the soul which

first participates of time, they cannot accommodate their periods to

universal time. But the multitude of their restitutions, will be parts

of that one period and restitution, by which the first participant of

time, returns to its pristine state. For the participation of a lesser

power is more particular, but of a greater, more universal. Other

souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to receive a universal

temporal measure, through one life; since they are allotted an order

more remiss than that which is first measured by time, because they are

allotted an inferior order.

PROPOSITION CCI.

All divine souls possess triple energies; one kind as souls;

another as receiving a divine intellect; and a third kind, as

depending on the gods. And they provide indeed for the universe,

as gods; but they know all things through an intellectual life;

and move bodies through a self-motive essence.

For since they naturally participate super-mundane natures, and

are not simply souls, but divine souls, bearing before themselves

an order analogous to the gods, in an animastic latitude; they will

energize not only animastically, but also divinely; because they are

allotted a deified summit in their essence, and possess an intellectual

hypostasis, through which they are spread under intellectual essences.

They energize, therefore, not only divinely, but also intellectually;

possessing one energy according to _the one_, which they contain in the

recesses of their natures, but another according to an intellectual

operation. There is likewise present to these divine souls, an energy

according to their proper hyparxis; which is motive of natures moved

by others, but vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. For

this is the proper employment of every soul; but such energies as

intelligence and providence, they receive through participation.

PROPOSITION CCII.

All souls attending upon, and always following the gods, are inferior

to divine, but more eminent than particular souls.

For divine souls participate of intellect and deity. They are,

therefore, at the same time intellectual and divine, and preside

over other souls, in the same manner as the gods preside over the

universality of things. But particular souls are deprived of a

suspension from intellect, because they are not able to participate

proximately of a divine essence. For they would not fall from an

intellectual energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as

we have previously demonstrated[156]. Hence the souls, which always

follow the gods, are of a middle condition; participating indeed a

perfect intellect, and through this surpassing particular souls, yet

not depending on the divine unities. For the intellect which they

participate is not a divine intellect.

PROPOSITION CCIII.

Of every animastic multitude, (i.e. a multitude belonging to

souls) divine souls since they are greater than others in power,

are contracted according to number. But such as always follow

the gods, retain a middle order among all souls, both in power,

and quantity. And particular souls, are inferior to others in

power, but proceed according to a greater number.

For divine souls are more allied to the one, on account of a divine

essence; but those of a middle order, through the participation of

intellect. And those of the last order, are essentially dissimilar to

those of the middle and first kind. But among eternal natures such

as are nearer to the one, are more united in number, and are more

contracted in multitude, than such as are more distant. But such as are

more remote, are more multiplied. Hence the powers of superior souls,

are greater, and have the same proportion to secondary souls, as that

which is divine to that which is intellectual, and as the intellectual

to the animastic nature. And the quantities of inferior souls, are more

in number. For that which is more distant from the one, is a greater,

and that which is nearer a less multitude.

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Every divine soul presides over many souls, the perpetual

attendants on the gods; and over a still greater number of such

as sometimes receive this order.

For if it is divine, it is requisite that it should be allotted an

order, generative of all things, and first-operative among souls.

For that which is divine, throughout all beings, presides over the

universality of things. And it is requisite that it should neither

alone preside over such souls, as perpetually follow the gods; nor

alone over such as are sometimes their attendants. For if any divine

soul alone presides over such souls as sometimes attend the gods,

how can these be united with a divine soul; since they are entirely

different from this, and neither proximately participate intellect,

nor (by a much stronger reason,) the gods? But if it alone presides

over such as perpetually follow the gods, how can the series proceed

to souls, the partial attendants on the gods? For thus intellectual

natures will be the last, and will be unable through their barrenness,

both to perfect other natures, and reduce them to their original.

It is necessary, therefore, that such souls as follow the gods, and

energize through intellect, and are reduced to intellects more partial

than divine intellects, should first depend from every divine soul.

But the second to these are partial or particular souls, which are

able through the former, as mediums, to participate intellect, and a

divine life. For through those which always participate, those which

sometimes participate a more excellent condition, are perfected. And

again, it is necessary, that about every divine soul, there should be

a greater number of souls which sometimes follow, than of those which

always attend on the gods. For the power of unity, always proceeds into

multitude, according to remission, and subjection; failing indeed in

power, but excelling in number. Since in a similar manner every soul

perpetually following the gods, presides over a greater multitude of

particular souls, imitating a divine soul; and elevates many souls

to the first-operative unity of the whole series. Every divine soul,

therefore, presides over a multitude of souls, the perpetual attendants

on the gods: but presides over a still greater multitude of such as are

sometimes allotted this order.

PROPOSITION CCV.

Every particular soul has the same proportion to the soul to

which it is subjected according to essence, as the vehicle of

the one to the vehicle of the other.

For if there is a natural distribution of vehicles in all souls, it is

necessary that the vehicle of every particular soul, should have the

same proportion to the vehicle of a universal soul, as the essence of

the one, to the essence of the other. But the distribution of vehicles

is according to nature: for first participants are naturally conjoined

with the things participated[157]. If, therefore, as a divine soul is

to a divine body, so is a particular soul to a particular body, each

being participated essentially; hence that is true, which was asserted

in the beginning, that vehicles also have the same proportion, as their

correspondent souls.

PROPOSITION CCVI.

Every particular soul, possesses a power of descending infinitely into

generation, and of ascending from generation to _being_.

For if it sometimes follows the gods, but sometimes falls from its

pursuit of a divine nature, and alternately participates of intellect,

and a privation of intellect; it is evident that it is conversant by

parts in generation, and with the gods. But since it does not reside

with the gods, through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant

with bodies, through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no

temporal beginning, cannot have any end: and that which has no end, is

necessarily without a beginning[158]. It remains, therefore, that every

soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from generation, and of

descensions into generation; and that this will never fail, through

an infinite time. Every particular soul, therefore, is capable of

descending and ascending in infinitum: and this passion never ceases to

take place about every particular soul.

PROPOSITION CCVII.

The vehicle of every particular soul is fabricated by an immoveable

cause.

For if it eternally depends on the soul, by which it is used, and is

by a natural sympathy immutable according to essence, it is allotted a

subsistence from an immoveable cause. For that which is produced from

moveable causes, is wholly changed according to essence. But every

soul possesses an eternal body, which is the first participant of its

nature. Hence the cause of every particular soul[159], and consequently

of its vehicle, is immoveable, and on this account super-mundane.

PROPOSITION CCVIII.

The vehicle of every particular soul, is immaterial, indivisible

according to essence, and impassive.

For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is eternal, it

possesses an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things as

are naturally passive according to essence, are all of them changed,

and material: and from their subsisting differently at different times

depend on mutable causes. And on this account they receive an all

various mutation, because they are moved with their primary causes. But

that this vehicle is indivisible is manifest. For every thing which is

divided, is corrupted so far as it is divided, because it relinquishes

the whole, and departs from continuity and conjunction. If, therefore,

the vehicle is essentially immutable, it will also be impassive, and

indivisible.

PROPOSITION CCIX.

The vehicle of every particular soul descends indeed with the

addition of material vestments[160]; but is conciliated with the

soul, by an ablation of every thing material, and by returning

to a form proper to its nature, and analogous to the soul by

which it is employed.

For the vehicle indeed descends, assuming irrational lives, but in its

ascent, casts aside all the powers of generation, with which it was

invested in its descent, and becoming [_pure returns to its proper

form, and the pristine condition of its nature. It likewise_[161]]

imitates the lives of the souls which employ it as an instrument,

and is every where moved in conformity, with their motions. And by

its circulations, it represents the intellections of some souls, but

the falling of others, through their inclination to the realms of

generation; and the purgations of others through the revolutions which

lead to an immaterial nature. But because it is essentially vivified

by, and is connate with souls, it is all-variously changed along with

their mutations; follows them every where; becomes passive, when they

are exposed to passivity; returns with them when they are purified; and

is elevated when they are elevated, and pursues its proper perfection.

For every thing is perfected, when it pursues the perfection of its

nature.

PROPOSITION CCX.

Every connate vehicle of the soul, possesses both a form and

magnitude perpetually the same. But it appears to be both

greater and less, and endued with a dissimilar figure, through

the additions and ablations of other bodies.

For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident

that both its figure and magnitude is derived from this cause: and each

is immutable and invariable. But it appears differently at different

times, as likewise greater, and less. Hence through the intervention of

other bodies added from the material elements and again taken way, it

exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.

PROPOSITION CCXI.

Every particular soul, descending into generation descends totally. Nor

does any part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

For if any thing belonging the soul remains in the intelligible

world, it either perpetually understands without transition, or

transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and

not a part of the soul; and this particular soul will be that which

proximately participates of intellect. But this is impossible. And

if transitively, that which is perpetually, and that which is only

sometimes intelligent, will form one essence. But this likewise is

impossible: for all these differ, as we have previously shewn. Add too,

the absurdity which results from supposing that the summit of the soul

is perpetually perfect, and yet does not rule over the other powers,

and give them perfection. Every particular soul, therefore, totally

descends.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

When I first determined to give my labours to the public, in hopes of

contributing to the restoration of the Platonic philosophy, I embraced

the resolution of Dr. Johnson and Goldsmith, _to set the Reviewers at

defiance_. For I was fully convinced that neither able criticism, nor

candid attention could be expected, where composition is dictated by

the spirit of malevolence, and influenced by the views of pecuniary

reward. However, though contempt is the most philosophical mode of

revenge, yet as a certain author well observes severe retaliation

is sometimes requisite, in order to convince the subjects of our

revenge, that we do not stoop to the meanness of abject submission.

This mode of retaliation the defamation of the _Monthly Reviewers_ in

their _bundle of criticism_ for August last obliges me to adopt: and

they have afforded me in this review the most favourable opportunity

I could desire, of exposing their _malevolence_, _ignorance_, and

_pride_. I shall begin, therefore, with instancing their _malevolence_,

as it is the first in our list of their bad qualities, and is the

general characteristic of these assuming critics. In my preface to

the translation of Orpheus, after representing the difficulty of well

translating the compound epithets of the Greek, into English, and the

necessity of possessing the philosophic genius for this purpose. I add:

“_If some sparks of this celestial fire, shall appear to have animated

the bosom of the translator, he will consider himself as well rewarded

for his laborious undertaking_.” Upon which these _candid_ reviewers

observe, (p. 138.) “Mr. Taylor was aware of this difficulty, though

he seems to claim the merit of subduing it.” In the second place they

assert, (p. 138.) that after lamenting, that the Commentary of Proclus

on Plato’s Cratylus is not likely to be published, “I comfort myself

with the hope that my own labours will in some measure supply its

place, by opening the pure sources of genuine wisdom. And that to this

end I promise copious and truly philosophic notes.” Now the passage

which furnished this malevolent assertion is the following: “What

farther light we have been able to throw on these mysterious remains

of antiquity, will appear in our following notes. If the valuable

Commentary of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato, was once published, I

am persuaded we should find them full of the most recondite theology:

but as this is not to be expected in the present age, the lovers of

wisdom will I doubt not gratefully accept the preceding and subsequent

elucidations. _For on a subject so full of obscurity as the present,

a glimmering light, is as conspicuous, and as agreeable to the eye of

the mind, as a small spark in profound darkness, is to the corporeal

sight._” Dissertation, p. 106. The infamy of such misrepresentation

is too glaring to require any illustration, too shameful to admit of

any excuse, and in any other cause than that of verbal criticism, too

contemptible either to rouse resentment, or deserve the most trifling

attention. Let us now examine the specimens of _ignorance_ which these

Reviewers afford in great abundance; and which as I presume will appear

much to the credit of my translation. In the first place I am charged

with “universally translating the epithets φιλένθεος, φίλοιϛτρος, and

μανικός, by the word _fanatic_, which I have employed in the sense

of the Latin word, from which it is derived.” To which I reply, that

the former part of this charge is false. For in the hymn to Minerva

φιλοιϛρος is translated _rage_; in the hymn to Diana, _fierce_; and in

the hymn to Dionysius Bassareus, μανικὸς is translated _furious_. [The

latter part of this assertion is true. For as the word _fanatic_ is

immediately derived from the Latin word _fanaticus_, which according

to their own confession means _numine afflatus_, or _one inspired by

a divine power_; and as the great Scaliger, whose authority is always

decisive, constantly translates φιλένθεος, _fanaticus_, I made no

scruple of adopting it in my translation. That, _fanatic_ is never

used in a good sense by any author of repute may perhaps be true: but

I see no reason why it should not be employed according to the meaning

of its original, especially as there is no other word in our language

so expressive of the words to which it corresponds in the Greek. The

example of Aristotle, and the greatest men of antiquity sufficiently

justifies both the invention of new terms when the poverty of a

language requires a supply, and the adoption of old ones in a different

sense, when the difficulty of the subject demands verbal innovation.

After this I am accused of _totally mistaking_ the meaning of various

passages, the greater part of which I shall expose to the view of the

reader with a literal translation, and comment; that the ignorance of

the _Reviewers_ may appear without that veil which at present screens

it from the eyes of the unlearned in Greek. In the hymn to Pluto then,

I have translated the following line:

Μοῦνος ἔφυς ἀφανῶν ἔργων φανερῶν τε βραβευτής·

Of unapparent works thou art alone

The dispensator visible and known.

That is, literally, “Thou art alone the dispensator of apparent and

unapparent works.” Now there is nothing in my version can be objected

to, but the omission of the word _apparent_, which the measure of

the verse obliged me to neglect; and which the addition of _visible_

and _known_ in the second line renders superfluous, as the following

observations will evince. According to the Orphic theology, _Pluto_

belongs to the same order as the _sun_, and from his subsisting in

occult union with this deity, he is celebrated as one and the same: a

custom frequent with the Orphic theologists, as is well known to those

who are skilled in their writings. Hence considered as the _sun_,

he is the dispensator of _apparent_, and as _Pluto_, of _unapparent

works_: and thus I presume, I have not _totally mistaken_ the meaning

of this line, in celebrating Pluto as a deity _visible and known_. But

that the reader may be fully convinced of the truth of this assertion,

concerning the occult union between Pluto and the sun, let him attend

to the following Orphic verse, preserved by Justin Martyr, (in

Cohortat. ad Gentes).

Εἷς ζεὺς, εἷς ᾄδης, εἷς ἥλιος, εἷς διόνυσος·----

i.e. “Jupiter, Pluto, the Sun, and Bacchus are one.”

Again, in the epithet ἀγλαότιμε, it seems I have _totally mistaken_

the meaning of my author, by translating it _honor’d light_. This word

means literally _exceedingly honoured_: and the preceding exposition

sufficiently proves the propriety of calling _Pluto_, _lucid_. Every

reader knows the necessity there is in poetical translations of adding

something to the original: and this is always allowed, when the

addition is not contrary to the sense of the text, but either expands

it, if condensed, or enlightens it, if obscure. I am likewise charged

with mistaking the meaning of λόγου θνητοῖσι, προφῆτα, or, _prophet of

discourse to mortals_, which I have rendered,

----‘Prophet of discourse.’

Now as this is literal, the mistake must consist in not substituting

another word for _prophet_, which might express what the author

meant; the _Reviewers_ never dreaming that this word, when properly

understood, is perfectly sufficient for the purpose. As they appear,

therefore, to be _totally_ ignorant of the original signification of

a prophet, I shall subjoin its definition from Festus. “_Prophetas_

dicebant veteres antistites fanorum, oraculorumque interpretes:”

i.e. “the ancients called prophets the priests of fanes, and the

_interpreters_ of oracles.” _Prophet of discourse_, therefore, means

_interpreter of discourse_: and as this epithet is applied to Mercury,

it is doubtless highly proper; if we consider that he first reduced the

infinity of voice into bound, by dividing letters into species; and

thus truly became the interpreter of speech to mankind. In the hymn to

Venus, I have translated,

Εἴτ’ ἐν Κύπρῳ, ἄνασσα τροφῷ σέο----

“Or if in Cyprus with thy mother fair.”

And it is literally “_Or if in Cyprus O queen, with thy nurse_”.

Fortunately for me, the metaphrase of Scaliger agrees with my version,

“_Sive in Cupro, matre tua_”. Perhaps the Reviewers forgot, or perhaps

they are ignorant, that a mother and a nurse are frequently synonymous

terms! I shall not trouble the reader with any more instances of my

_mistakes_, as I can faithfully assure him, that the remaining passages

adduced by the _Reviewers_, betray _if possible_, more malevolence and

ignorance than the present. I shall, therefore, proceed to a defence

of some epithets, and expressions which I have employed; and in which

these _exquisite critics_, can neither discover _beauty_, nor even

_propriety_.

In the first place then, they confess that they have too little

_taste_, or too little _knowledge_ to discover either _beauty_, or

propriety, in my translation of the following line:

Νύμφαι θυγατέρες μεγαλήτορς Ὠκεανοῖο----

‘Nymphs, who from _ocean’s stream_ derive your birth.’

i.e. literally, ‘Nymphs, daughters of the mighty ocean.’ Now as the

exceptionable part of this line, is _ocean’s stream_, as appears by its

being printed in _italics_; I can only assure the reader that I can

plead no less authority than that of both _Homer_, _Hesiod_, _Plato_,

and _Milton_ for its _propriety_ and _beauty_. Thus Homer, (Iliad

xviii. l. 606.) speaking of the fabrication of Achilles’ shield by

Vulcan, says:

Ἐν δ’ ἐτίθει ποταμοῖο μέγα σθένος ὠκεανοῖο.

i.e. ‘But he placed in it the mighty strength of the _ocean’s

stream_.’

So likewise: (Iliad xx. l. 7.)

Οὔτε τις οὗν ποταμῶν ἀπέην νόσφ’ ὠκεανοῖο.

i.e. ‘No _stream_ was absent, except the _stream of the ocean_.’

Thus again, in the Odyssey: (lib. xi. l. 637.)

Τὴν δὲ κατ’ Ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν φέρε κῦμα ῥόοιο.

i.e. ‘But the waves of the current bore it (the vessel) through the

_ocean stream_.’ And Milton had doubtless an eye to this last

passage, when, speaking of the Leviathan, (Paradise Lost, book I.) he

says:

----or that sea beast

Leviathan, whom god of all his works

Created hugest, that swim th’ _ocean stream_.

For here, as the reader must observe, he uses the very same expression

with Homer. But Milton was not only a great poet, but a man of great

learning; and was doubtless much better acquainted with Homer than the

Reviewers.

Thus too Hesiod: (in Theog. l. 241. &c.):

----καὶ Δωρίδος ἠϋκόμοιο,

Κούρης Ὠκεανοῖο τελήεντος ποταμοῖο.

i.e. ‘and from the fair haired Doris, the daughter of the perfect

_stream_ of the _ocean_.’ And the same epithet is used in l. 959. of

the same work. And lastly, Plato in the Phædo, thus speaks of the

_ocean_, as one of the four great _rivers_, of which Tartarus is the

source: τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά

ἐϛι. τυγχάνει δ’ ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἄττα ῥεύματα,

ὦν τὸ μὲν μέγιϛον και ἐξωτάτω ῥέον περί κύκλῳ, ὁ καλούμενος Ὠκεανός

ἐϛι. i.e. ‘There are many other both great and all-various _rivers_,

but principally four; the greatest and last of which, flowing round the

earth in a circle, is called the _ocean_.’

I only add that this expression is perfectly philosophical, as will be

evident from considering the ever-_flowing_ condition of the ocean,

by means of which it admirably corresponds with the nature of a

_stream_. Homer indeed was so sensible of this truth, that he generally

(if not always) speaks of the ocean in this manner; and there is no

doubt, but he derived his conviction from the first and most profound

philosophy in the world. After this the expression, a _blameless tide_

of abundance is objected to. But if the epithet _blameless_ may be

applied to _abundance_, which it is in the original; (ἠδ’ ὄλβον ἀμεμφῆ)

and if a _tide_ of wealth, is an usual expression, I see no reason

why abundance, when conferred with moderation, may not be said to be

poured in a _blameless tide_. The objections to the translations of

(θνητῶν ϛήριγμα) ‘basis of mankind,’ and the first part of the hymn to

Protogonus, are too contemptible to deserve any reply. This too would

be the case with the epithet ‘_Bacchic King_,’ which is literally

translated from the Greek; (Βακχεῖον ἄνακτα) but very fortunately

these _sagacious critics_ have employed a correspondent expression,

in their Review of Wharton’s Milton: for in page 1. they speak of the

_Miltonic muse_, which I presume must fall under the same imputation of

_impropriety_, and want of _beauty_ with _Bacchic king_. I shall only

adduce one instance more, and then proceed to take notice of the pride

of these uncandid and _ignorant_ censors. In the hymn to Boreas, that

deity is requested to dissolve the all-_misty station_ of the air:

Λῦέ τε παννέφελον ϛάσιν ἠέρος----

Which I have accordingly translated,

‘The _misty station_ of the air dissolve.’

And I must confess, that as I cannot find the least impropriety in

speaking of the air as being in a _misty station_, I must conclude that

this was exactly the _station_ of the Reviewers, at the time when they

composed the present criticism; the whole of which appears to have been

the result of _misty_ visions, _clouded_ conceptions, and _uncertain_

conjectures.

Let us now proceed to a _review_ of their _pride_. In the first

place then, they very pompously inform us of their natural gravity as

follows: ‘Grave though we be, _our own_ risibility has been provoked,’

&c. As if it was of any consequence to the public, whether they are

_grave_ or _facetious_, solemn or _ludicrous_, sanguine or _bilious_:

whether they possess the qualities of the _owl_, or the ape; and

whether they laugh like the tickled Hyæna, or like Milton’s _death_

‘grin horribly a ghastly smile.’ In the next place, after having

praised my paraphrase of Plotinus on the Beautiful, they add: ‘this

praise ought to convince Mr. Taylor, that we are neither insensible to

the real value of his author’s work, nor blind to the merits of the

translation’. As if the praise of a Reviewer could be of any importance

to a man, whose writings, are not calculated for the multitude: or as

if the censure of ignorant judges, was not preferable to their most

unbounded approbation! I only add that from men who are critics by

profession on the writings of others, the most perfect composition may

be justly expected: and yet the _Monthly Reviewers_ have grosly failed

in this respect, as the following instances will evince: Polybius makes

use of the expression, νεύειν πρὸς ἔνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν σκοπόν, i.e.

‘to verge to one and the same end:’ and this our admirable critics

_translate_ (p. 122.) ‘to verge to one _point_, and conspire to one

_end_:’ which is obviously a most ridiculous tautology. For it is

impossible that any thing can verge to one _point_, and at the same

time conspire to an _end_, different from that _point_. Again, in their

review of Bell’s Shakespeare, (p. 156.) they make use of the following

simile: ‘Shakespeare, now stands (among the French) as a _Colossus_,

while the most that can be done by Voltaire, and indeed the very best

of our modern writers at home, is to _creep_ under his _feet_.’ But

here we may very justly enquire, what similitude there is between

_modern wits_ endeavouring to imitate Shakespeare, considered as a

_dramatic writer_, and _men_ crawling under his feet, considered as a

_Colossus_? If Shakespeare indeed had been a quadruped, men by creeping

under his feet might be considered as his _groveling_ imitators:

but I cannot conceive any similitude between a _creeping_, and an

_upright_ figure. I only add, that the Analytical Reviewers, are not

more fortunate in their review of my translation of Proclus. For after

asserting that the original is not remarkable for its elegance (though

the contrary is the opinion of the best ancient and modern writers)

and that I have too faithfully copied my author in this respect, they

inform us, among other _interesting_ particulars, ‘that the employment

of an ancient philosopher did not consist in relieving the _distresses_

of the _wretched_, and the _wants_ of the _miserable_!’ After such a

specimen of tautology, we cannot wonder that Proclus is considered as

an inelegant writer: for though his language is always overflowing and

majestic, it never degenerates into weak and needless repetition. While

on the other hand, there is such a _perfect_ sameness, in the above

sentence, that, ‘to relieve the _distresses_ of the _wretched_, and the

_wants_ of the _miserable_,’ is indeed no other, than ‘to verge to one

_point_, and conspire to one _end_!’

And thus much for the Reviewers, whom in any other cause than that of

verbal criticism, I should consider as too mean for censure, and even

too insignificant for _contempt_. For what attention can those writers

deserve, who decide dogmatically on subjects they have never studied;

who endeavour by malevolent aspersions to ruin the reputation of men

they have never seen; and who abuse the credulity of the ignorant, by

a monthly compilation of criticisms, which originate from vanity, and

ultimately tend to illiberal gain?

THE END.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In the two preceding books of this work our author has displayed

an uncommon degree of philosophic elegance and depth; and in the

present two, he no less manifests the greatest geometrical accuracy

and skill. In the former he elevates us from participated truth to

truth itself; and from the glimmering light of universals reflected

in the catoptric bosom of the phantasy, to the bright refulgence of

ideas. In the latter he combines geometry and philosophy, occasionally

cloathes the rigid accuracy of demonstration with the enchanting

imagery of divine imaginations, and unites the graces of diction with

the precision and sanctity of truth. Yet his genius, though rapid as a

torrent, never passes beyond the bounds of propriety; and though his

thoughts are vehement and vast, they are at the same time orderly and

majestic. For my own part I confess myself enamoured with the grandeur

of his diction, astonished with the magnificence of his conceptions,

and enlightened by the irradiations of his powerful genius. And I

desire nothing so much as that others may experience similar effects

from this admirable work. I only add, that the study of this second

part is absolutely necessary to a perfect comprehension of Euclid’s

method and meaning; and to the understanding geometry completely and

philosophically. It is easy indeed to learn a science in a manner

sufficient for mechanical purposes; for this is accomplished by the

_many_: but it is arduous to learn it with a view to the perception

of truth; for this is alone the province of a _few_. It is easy to

be knowing in effects, for these are obvious and common; but it is

difficult to investigate causes, for these are occult and rare. In

short, a general and confused apprehension of a science may be readily

obtained, without much labour and toil; but a particular and accurate

knowledge requires liberal application, and patient endurance. For the

one is like the distant prospect of a country, in which the larger

parts are alone conspicuous to the observer’s eye; but the other

resembles a near and distinct view, in which every thing is recognized

essential to the perfection of the whole.

[2] See the second section of the Dissertation, Vol. I.

[3] The nature of place has been a subject of much curious and deep

speculation to the Peripatetic and Platonic philosophers, as may be

seen in the very valuable Commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle’s

Physics; so that Proclus does not affirm without reason, that place

is more obscure than the natures it contains. But as the opinion of

our philosopher, concerning place, is so admirably profound, subtle,

and remarkable, I persuade myself the following translation from the

fourth book of Simplicius on the Physics, containing his sentiments at

large on this subject, will not be unacceptable to the liberal English

reader. “Proclus (says Simplicius) having proved from the arguments

of Aristotle, that place is neither matter nor form, concludes, that

it is a certain interval:” after which, he reasons as follows. “This

interval then, is either, nothing or something; and if nothing, local

motion will consist in a transition from nothing to nothing; but all

motion subsists according to something. But if it ought to be called

something, it is either corporeal or incorporeal; and if incorporeal,

an absurdity will ensue; for it is necessary that place should be equal

to the thing placed. But how can body, and that which is incorporeal be

equal? For equal is found in quantities, and especially in those of a

similar kind, as lines are equal to lines, superficies to superficies,

and bodies to bodies: place, therefore, is body, if it be a certain

interval; but if body, it is either moveable or immoveable; and if

moveable, in whatever manner it may be moved, it must necessarily be

moved according to place, so that place again will require another

place, which is impossible, as was also evident to Aristotle and

Theophrastus; for Aristotle says, that a vessel is a moveable place,

but place an immoveable vessel, because place is naturally immoveable.

But if it be immoveable, it is either indivisible, which cannot be

divided by the bodies entering its receptacle, since one body cannot

penetrate another; or it is divisible, as air and water are divided

by the bodies entering into their yielding natures; but if it be

divisible, the whole being dissected or divided, the divided parts

will be moved on each side, and place will be the first mutable, since

its parts are moved; but we have demonstrated that it is immoveable.

Again, the parts being separated, we ask where that which is divided

betakes itself; for there must be again given or investigated another

interval, intervening between the divided parts, which may receive

and be placed together with that which is divided; and this will be

the case, in infinitum. Place, therefore, is an indivisible body;

and if an indivisible body, either material, or destitute of matter:

but if material it will not be indivisible, for it is requisite

that all material bodies, when permeated by other material bodies,

should be divided by them, as is the case with our bodies when they

fall into water. But immaterials alone resist all division and this

from a necessity of nature; for every body destitute of matter is

void of passion; but every thing which is divided likewise suffers.

Since division is a certain affection of bodies, which extirpates and

destroys their unity and connection; for that which is continuous,

so far as continuous suffers no other affection or molestation than

section, which destroys and takes away its continuity. That we may

therefore collect together what we have separately demonstrated, place

is an immoveable indivisible body, destitute of matter. And if this

be admitted, it is evident that it is a body by far less material

than the rest, and indeed less than the matter contained in things

which are moved. Hence, if light is the most simple of these (for

fire is more incorporeal than the other elements, and fire is lucid)

it will be manifest, that since light is the purest among the rest,

light will be place. Conceive, therefore, two spheres, of which one is

composed from many bodies, and the other of light alone, and let both

be of equal bulk; then, by establishing the sphere of light, together

with the centre, and giving the composite sphere a revolution in the

circumscribing sphere of light, you will perceive the world moved in

immoveable light, and according to its whole extension, immoveable,

similar to place, but moved according to its parts, because these are

less than place.” Now, from this demonstration of Proclus, it follows

by a necessary consequence, since contraries are contained under the

same genus that darkness, if it be any thing positive, is the most

material of all bodies; and hence, the most material natures will

participate the most of darkness, as indeed, is evident in the elements

of earth and water. It likewise follows that whatever exists in perfect

darkness, exists out of corporeal place, which, however paradoxical, is

perhaps, no less true than wonderful to conceive.

[4] See Section second, of the Dissertation, in Vol. I. of this work.

[5] See the third figure of this problem.

[6] This is easily proved from the mensuration of a triangular space,

which it is well known is obtained by multiplying the base into half

the altitude; and this in the first triangle will be equal to 3

multiplied by 2; and in the second, to 2 multiplied by 2½ = 5.

[7] The quantity of this perpendicular in each triangle may be easily

obtained from the 47th proposition of this book; for in the first

triangle it will be three units; and in the second four. Hence, the

area of each will be 12 units; but the ambit of the one will be 18, and

of the other 16 units, as is evident in the following figures.

[Illustration]

[8] That is angles formed from the circumferences of circles cutting or

touching each other, when they are on both sides concave.

[9] Most probably Zeno, the Epicurean.

[10] Mr. Simpson, in his note on the 7th proposition of this book,

positively asserts, that it contains two cases, though there is but

one in the Greek text; and ridicules Proclus for asserting that the

second part of the present proposition was added, in order to solve

objections which might be urged against the seventh. But that Euclid

never added any more than one case, is, I think, evident, not only

from no such case being found in the Greek copies so early as the age

of Proclus; but from his not converting it in the 6th proposition.

Besides, it is employed with advantage in the solution of objections

against the 9th proposition, as the reader will perceive in its

commentary; and the objection there started merits the appellation

of a case, as much as the 7th. But Mr. Simpson seems to have been

ignorant of Euclid’s design in these elements;--the tradition of that

only which is accommodated to an elementary institution. Hence, Euclid

every where avoids a multiplicity of cases; and anticipates objections

where he foresees they may be urged. Mr. Simpson adds in support of

his dogmatical assertion, “that the translation from the Arabic has

this case explicitly demonstrated.” As if an Arabic translation was

of greater authority than the Greek text which Proclus consulted! And

lastly, he concludes, with observing, that “whoever is curious, may

read what Proclus says of this in his commentary on the 5th and 7th

propositions; for it is not worth while to relate his trifles at full

length.” If an accurate knowledge of the nature, beauty, and tendency

of a science, or a collection of scientific propositions, is trifling,

Proclus, indeed, deserves this accusation; as I doubt not the liberal

reader, is, by this time, fully convinced. But Mr. Simpson was no

philosopher; and therefore the greatest part of these Commentaries must

be considered by him as trifles, from the want of a philosophic genius

to comprehend their meaning, and a taste superior to that of a _mere

mathematician_, to discover their beauty and elegance. It is common,

indeed, to hear geometricians of the present day exclaiming, _What

need of a comment on Euclid! Is he not perspicuous to every one?_ I

will readily admit that such gentlemen know enough of geometry for all

mechanical and sensible purposes: but I fear they are totally ignorant

of its end; and have never dreamt that when properly studied it is the

handmaid of true philosophy, the purifier of the rational soul, and

the bridge by which we may pass from the obscurity and delusion of a

material nature, to the splendor and reality of intellectual vision.

I add farther, that I am greatly inclined to doubt, whether such

geometricians ever considered what kind of subsistence geometrical

forms possess Whether they have any certainty, or are only imaginary?

Where these forms, if real, reside? And a multitude of other questions

which are discussed in these Commentaries. And lastly, what is most

material of all, if geometry be a science, what science itself is? This

last question, indeed, they would doubtless consider so _trifling_

and easy of solution, that they would readily and confidently answer

with young Theætetus in Plato, “that sciences are such things as may

be learned from Mathematicians, geometry, and the like; shoe-making,

and other mechanical arts; and that all, and each of them are no other

than sciences!” To which admirable definition we may justly reply in

the words of Socrates, “Generously and magnificently O my friends,

when interrogated concerning _one thing_, have you given instead of

something simple, things _many_ and _various_.”

[11] Triangular numbers, are 1, 3, 6, 10, &c.; and sexangular numbers,

1, 6, 15, 28, &c. But concerning their formation, see note to page 95,

Vol. I. of this work; by means of which, the truth of this assertion

will be evident.

[12] Concerning the meaning of total predication, see page 45 of the

Dissertation, Vol. I. of this work.

[13] Mr. Simson in his note to this proposition observes, that he

thought proper to change its enunciation, so as to preserve the same

meaning; “because (says he) the literal translation from the Greek,

is extremely harsh, and difficult to be understood by beginners.”

Whatever difficulty learners may find in conceiving this proposition

abstractedly, is easily removed by its exposition in the figure; and

therefore, I conceive, that Mr. Simson acted very injudiciously in

altering its enunciation. Besides, the following comment of Proclus

shews, that there is great beauty in Euclid’s statement of this

proposition; the greatest part of which is lost in Mr. Simson’s

indiscreet alteration. It would appear strange that such liberties

should be taken by one, who professes in his preface, _to remove

blemishes, and restore the principal books of the Elements to their

original accuracy_, if Mr. Simson had not informed us in his note, that

the present Commentary of Proclus unfolding the beauty and _accuracy_

of this proposition, is too _trifling_ to merit a relation! See more

concerning this proposition in the note to Prop. 5.

[14] See the Comment of Clavius on this proposition.

[15] And from hence, also appears the emptiness and arrogance of Mr.

Simson’s note to this proposition, which we have already exploded.

[16]

[Illustration]

This too may be easily effected by means of the first problem, and the

present. Thus let _a b c_ be a right angle, which it is required to

trisect; then, upon the side _a b_, describe an equilateral triangle _c

d b_, and bisect the angle _d b c_, and the angles _a b d_, _d b e_, _e

b c_, shall be equal. For the angle _d b c_, is one third of two right

angles, or two thirds of one right, and consequently the angle _d b a_,

is one third of a right angle; and this is equal to _d b e_, the half

of _d b c_. Therefore they are all equal.

[17]

[Illustration]

The method of dividing an angle in any given ratio, by means of a

right line and circle only, seems to have been entirely unknown to

the ancients, as well as to the moderns. However, the author of this

translation presumes he has discovered the means of solving this

arduous problem; and that such as admit the truth of his demonstration

respecting the quadrature of the circle in page 56 of his Dissertation,

vol. I. of this work, must necessarily subscribe to the following

method of dividing an angle in any required proportion. Let there be an

acute angle given _g a k_, which it is required to divide in the ratio

of the right line _a c_ to _c g_. Bisect _a c_ in _b_, and from the

centre _a_, with the radius _a b_, describe the arch _b e_, and with a

radius equal to _a c_, describe an arch touching _b e_, in the point

_b_. Likewise with a radius double to _a c_, describe another tangent

arch at the point _b_, and with a radius equal to _a g_, a tangent arch

at the same point, according to the figure; and lastly, let the arches

_c d_, _g k_, from the centre _a_ be drawn. Then ½ of the arch _b e_,

shall be equal to ¼ of _c d_, and to ⅛ of the arch similarly placed,

described with a radius the double of _a c_, as is well known. Bisect

then _b e_ in _f_, and make each of its two next tangent arches at

_b_, equal to _b f_, which is easily done, from what has been already

observed; and through the points of equality describe a circle, this

(by the theorem in page 56, of our Dissertation), shall cut off some

part of the tangent arch described with the radius _a g_, equal to _b

f_, or the fourth part of _c d_. Hence, a part in the arch _g k_, may

be easily taken equal to _c d_, which let be _g l_, and drawing the

right line _a l_, the angle _g a l_, shall be to _l a k_, as _a c_ to

_e g_, which was required to be done.

The same construction will serve for the division of a right angle in

any given ratio, as is evident; and if the given angle be obtuse, the

problem may be solved by a two-fold operation, that is, by bisecting

the obtuse angle, and dividing either of the equal sections in the

given ratio; for when this is effected, the whole angle may be easily

divided in the same proportion. Hence, too, a right line may be

speedily obtained equal to a given arch of a circle.

[18] In the 30th Prop.

[19] See Chap. 8. Book 2d.

[20] Mr. Simson having a great objection to the word infinite,

though it is adopted by Euclid, substitutes in its place the word

_unlimited_; but not in my opinion with any success. For if by

_unlimited_, he means infinite, the alteration is ridiculous: but

if he means only _indefinite_, or a line which has boundaries,

though they are not ascertained, the problem will not succeed, as

the ensuing commentary most beautifully evinces. I only add, that

the reader, if he be a man of taste, and possesses any spark of the

philosophic genius, must be greatly delighted with the digression of

Proclus in this comment, concerning the nature of infinite, as it is

perfectly philosophical and truly sublime.

[21] That no other figure besides these can fill place, will be

evident, if its angle, when found, is multiplied by any number: for, as

Tacquet well observes, it will always either exceed, or be deficient

from four right angles. For a more particular demonstration of this

admirable theorem, see Tacquet Elementa Geometriæ, p. 88.

[22] Pappus in Mathem. Collect. shews that any two sides, whose ratio

to the external sides is less than two to one, may be inscribed after

this manner in a triangle.

[23] See likewise concerning these triangles, ol. I. p. 173 of these

Commentaries.

[24] In the second comment of this book.

[25] This will be manifest from the following figure. Let the circles

_a c_, _b d_, be drawn passing through their respective centres _a_,

_b_; and from the centre _c_, with the radius _c b_, equal to _a b_,

describe the arch _a b d_, and draw the lines _c b_, _c d_, _c a_. Then

because _a c b_ is an equilateral triangle, as also _c b d_, each of

the angles _a c b_, _b c d_, shall be equal to ⅔ of one right angle;

and because the biline _c d_, is equal to the biline _c b_, hence, the

angle formed by the arch _c b_, and the arch _c d_, viz. the angle _a c

f_, shall be equal to the angle formed by the right line _c b_, and the

right line _c d_, i.e. to ⅔ of one right angle. Q. E. D.

[Illustration]

[26] See more concerning these universal genera in the third section of

the Dissertation, Vol I. of this work.

[27] In Book II. Comment 2. of this work.

[28] In the Comment on the 32d proposition.

[29] In book III. chap. I. and in Com. 3.

[30] In lib. i. de Cælo, tex. 35.

[31] Clavius and Simson have employed a multitude of propositions in

the demonstration of this petition, but their demonstrations fall far

short in my opinion of the elegance of the present.

[32] In Lib. III. Com. 2.

[33] i.e. In his last analytics. See the second section of the

Dissertation, Vol. I, of this work.

[34] In the definitions which are with great propriety called by the

Platonists hypotheses, because their evidence is admitted without

proof, which at the same time they are capable of receiving from the

first philosophy.

[35] In his last Analytics. See page 49, of the Dissertation, Vol. I.

of this work.

[36] See the last preceding figure.

[37] This is a well known property of the hyperbola, and its

asymptotes; and is thus expressed by Mr. Simson, in his Conic Sections,

Lib. 3. Prop. 16. “If from a point in the hyperbola, any two lines are

drawn to the asymptotes, and if from any point, in the same or opposite

hyperbolas, there are drawn to the asymptotes other right lines

parallel to the former; then the rectangle contained by the lines first

drawn, shall be equal to the rectangle contained by the other drawn

lines.”

[38] Thus let there be a square, whose side is equal to three, and a

parallelogram whose longest side is equal to four, and its shortest to

two; the ambit of each figure will indeed be equal to twelve, but the

area of the square will be equal to nine, and of the parallelogram to

eight.

[39] This will be evident by conceiving a rectangular parallelogram

equal to that which is non-rectangular, described on the same base:

for the ambit of the former will be less than that of the latter, and

consequently less than the parallelogram, with an ambit equal to the

non-rectangular parallelogram.

[40] From hence it is evident that it was the intention of Proclus to

comment on the whole of Euclid: but it does not appear that he ever

carried this design into execution.

[41] The present Commentary is imperfect, both in the Greek, and the

translation of Barocius; who observes that the conclusion is wanting

in all the copies which he had an opportunity of perusing. Those who

are curious may consult his scholium, in which he has endeavoured to

complete it.

[42] See Comment 8, of the third book, with its note.

[43] Barocius is of opinion, that this Commentary was originally

mutilated; and that the part which follows the word _drawn_, was

added by some skilful geometrician, as necessary to the perfection of

the demonstration. See his Scholium to this Commentary.

[44] The Commentary of Proclus, on this proposition is wanting in the

Greek, and, as we are informed by Barocius in all the MS. copies which

he had an opportunity of consulting. Barocius has endeavoured to supply

this deficiency, after the manner of Proclus; but he appears to have

fallen into prolixity, by a too minute division of the problem.

[45] See Sims. Sect. Con. Lib. I. Prop. 13. and Lib. II. Prop. 23, and

Lib. III. Prop. 48.

[46] In the sixth Commentary of this book.

[47] In the 31st proposition.

[48] Ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ’ Ἕλλησι θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐϛὶ μυϛαγωγίας

ἔκγονος·: πρώτου μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφήμου τὰ περὶ Θεῶν ὄργια

διδαχθέντος. Procl. in Plat. Theol. p. 13.

[49] In Lib. ii. Florid.

[50] Euseb. Prepar. Evang. lib. xiv.

[51] This pestilence was in the time of the emperor Gallienus, and

raged so vehemently, according to Trebellius Pollio, that five thousand

men perished with an equal disease in one day. This happened in the

year of Christ 262, and of Gallienus, 9, 10; and not long after

Porphyry applied himself to Plotinus. Fabricius.

[52] This is the Firmus Castricius to whom Porphyry inscribes his books

on Abstinence.

[53] This was probably nothing more than a small serpent resembling the

form of a dragon.

[54] It is strange that Fabricius should think it ought to be entitled

περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας τῶν σωμάτων: for he who reads this book must see that

such a title would be ridiculous. Vide Bibl. Grec. tom. iv. p. 143.

[55] This Rogatianus is the person Porphyry alludes to in his Treatise

on Abstinence, lib. i. p. 106, when he speaks as follows. “There

was once an instance, where a negligence of terrene concerns and

a contemplation and intuition of such as are divine, expelled an

articular disease, which had infested a certain person for the space of

eight years. So that at the very same time, that his soul was divested

of a solicitous concern for riches, and material affairs, his body was

freed from a troublesome disease.”

[56] I have, however, the happiness of being intimate with a lady, who

is a noble exception to this remark; and is both an excellent Greek

scholar, and skilled in the Platonic philosophy.

[57] For this is alone the virtue of traffic; and is the chief support

of its professors.

[58] Concerning the Ἱεροὶ Γάμοι, or holy marriages, which were first

celebrated by the Orphic Theologers, see the note to the hymn to

Proserpine, in my translation of the Orphic Initiations.

[59] A line somewhat altered from Homer. The original is βάλλ’ οὕτως αἴ

κέν τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένηαι. Iliad. 8. l. 282.

[60] In the original.

Οἶδα δ’ ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ’ ἀριθμόν, καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης,

Καὶ κωφοῦ ξυνίημι, καὶ οὐ λαλέοντος ἀκούω.

[61] Lib. 6.

[62] Vide Procl. in Plat. Theol. p. 89, et 90.

[63] This passage is cited by Ficinus, in the second volume of his

works, p. 1186. and is, I doubt not, taken from the manuscript

Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides.

[64] οὗτος γὰρ (i.e. Moderatus) κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν

ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται. Simp. in Ar. Phys. fol. 50.

[65] In the note to page 14, of this volume, we have shewn from Proclus

that light is place, and is an immaterial body. Indeed that light is

something superior to sensible matter may, I think, be evinced by the

following consideration. As the supreme principle of the universe, (who

can be compared to nothing so properly as light,) is the light of the

intelligible world, and is at the same time more exalted than every

thing which it contains; so in this sensible, which is the image of

the intelligible world, it is necessary that corporeal light, should

be more excellent than any material nature. But as Proclus prosecutes

this speculation on light, in the above mentioned passage, in a most

admirable and uncommon manner; let us attend him in the abstruse

investigation. In the first place speaking of that light which emanates

from the fontane soul of the world, and which, according to the

Zoroastrian oracle,

Ἄρδην ἐμψυχοῦσα φάος, πῦρ, αἰθέρα, κόσμους,

abundantly animates, light, fire, ether, and the world; he says that

this light is one fire, above the three others, viz. the empyrean,

etherial, and material fire; and that it first unfolds the eternal

quiet of the gods, and illustrates essential spectacles to such as

are worthy of their inspection. For by the assistance of this light,

things destitute of figure and impression, are impressed according to

reason and intelligence. And perhaps (says Simplicius) he calls light

place, because it is a certain description and type of the universe,

and gives distance to things, which without the presence of light

would not appear to be distant. But here Proclus very philosophically

doubts against his own position. In the first place, how body can be

received and penetrated by body. In the second place, whether place,

i.e. light, is inanimate, or participates of soul. But (says he) it

cannot be inanimate, because it is better than the animated natures

which it contains, and because rational beings are said to be animated.

Hence this body, will be animated the first of all others. But if it is

animated, how can it be immoveable? And he dissolves the first doubt,

because there are some immaterial bodies void of affection and passion.

For (says he) a body void of matter neither resists nor is resisted;

since that which is impelled and repelled, is eminently passive in such

operations. But neither can such a body be divided, since it is void

of passivity. Hence neither can the absurdity be adduced, that the

universe is received by a minimum, or penetrates a minimum. For if it

cannot be divided, neither can it be equally divided with the smallest;

and if this is impossible, neither can it be permeated by the universe.

But he removes the second objection, by asserting, that this body, i.e.

light, is animated by that soul, which is the fountain of others; and

that it possesses a divine life, and an essence self-motive, but not

in energy. For if we assert that soul is self-motive, in a two-fold

manner, in one respect according to essence, but in the other according

to energy; we must likewise affirm that place, or light is partly

moveable, and partly immoveable. For what should hinder our asserting,

that place participates of such a life, and that it lives according

to an immutable essence, and not according to a self-motive energy?

But if you are desirous (says he) of considering the motion of place,

according to energy, you will plainly perceive, that it is, as it were,

the mover of the bodies which are moved, and which turn their parts

according to a certain distance; since these cannot be every where, and

are incapable of being present to all the parts of place, according to

each of their parts. And this is that intervention and affinity, which

it possesses with soul moving without dimension. For, life so far as

life, appears to produce motion: and since place is that which first

participates of life, motion to place, will confer a true motion on

every part; and will produce a desire in every part of the moved body

of arriving at its whole, and since it is not able to accomplish this,

on account of the natural property of interval, of subsisting divisibly

in the universe. For whatever desires any nature, which it is not able

to reach, through its peculiar defect, is then more enflamed in the

pursuit of that, which it cannot possess through the imbecility of its

nature. For it is requisite (says he) that between an incorporeal and

immutable life, such as that of soul, the fountain of the rest; and

one corporeal and mutable, that one immutable and corporeal should

intervene as a proper medium. And thus much from Proclus concerning

place or light, whose reasonings appear to me equally elegant and

philosophical, subtle and profound.

But the opinion of the Phœnicians respecting light, as preserved by the

emperor Julian in his elegant oration to the sun, is no less admirable

than that of Proclus; and at the same time asserts its immaterial

nature. “According to the Phœnicians (says Julian) who are skilled

in divine science and wisdom, the universally-diffused splendor of

light, is the sincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure: i.e. of

the solar intellect, which as Julian expresses it, scattering its

light from the middle region of the heavens, fills all the celestial

orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine

and incorruptible light.” With great reason, therefore, does Plotinus

assert, that light is nothing else than that which is visible: for

this must be the necessary property of a nature, possessing a triple

dimension without sensible matter.

[66] En. 2. l. 9. c. i.

[67] Intellectual System, p. 562.

[68] In Timæum. p. 93. 94.

[69] In Plat. Theol. p. 158

[70] In Plat. Theol. p. 27.

[71] Ennead, 5. p. 492.

[72] Intellectual System, p. 568.

[73] Præpar. Evan. lib. iv. c. 6.

[74] Lib. x. cap. 29.

[75] It is necessary to inform the genuine Platonic reader, that

Synesius was not a bishop, and had not embraced Christianity, when he

composed the present excellent book. This is not only evident from the

recondite wisdom of antiquity, which it every where displays, but from

his expressly using in one place, p. 151, the epithet, _the mundane

god_ (θεὸς ἐγκόσμιος) in the same manner as it is always employed by

heathen Platonists. There are three Latin versions of this admirable

work: the first and best by Ficinus, the next both in the order of

time and excellence, by Cornarius, and the last and worst by Petavius.

This industrious Jesuit, indeed, though sufficiently learned on other

subjects, appears by his version to be very ignorant of the Greek

philosophy. This will be evident by comparing his translation with the

Greek, and, I hope, I may add, with the above version, which contains

the greatest, and most important part of this inestimable work. With

respect to Synesius, he was a native of Cyrene, in Africa; travelled

into Egypt for improvement; and perfected his studies under the

celebrated Hypatia: a woman no less eminent for her uncommon abilities,

than remarkable for her tragical death, effected by the infernal

revenge of the Alexandrian church, and the _orthodox_, _patriarchal_,

_Christian_ malice of St. Cyril. Though Synesius was reluctantly

consecrated bishop of Ptolemais about the year 410, yet we may collect

from his tenets, that he was not a perfect convert to Christianity;

and from his epistles, that he lamented his episcopal station. For

with respect to the former, he denied the immediate creation of the

world, its final destruction, and the resurrection of the dead: and

with regard to the latter, he frequently and earnestly begs to be

discharged from his office; and declares that as he was by education a

heathen, and by profession a philosopher, he had met with no success

since he presumed to serve at the altar. Particularly in a letter to

his friend Olympius (Epist. 95.) he declares that if his duty as a

bishop should be any hinderance to his philosophy, he would relinquish

his diocese, abjure his orders, and remove into Greece. For farther

conviction in this particular consult Epist. 11, 13, 57, 67, 80, 105:

and the Clidophorus, and Hypatia of Toland, who largely and curiously

descants on the life and writings of Synesius. I shall only add, that

even Petavius, the editor of his works, affirms, that in some of the

books composed after his profession of Christianity, Synesius appears

as great a heathen as before: and this conduct may be reconciled, by

what Synesius himself asserts in one of his letters: (Epist. 105.)

“that it may be sometimes expedient to lye, in order to do good; since

philosophical truth is not necessary for the vulgar, who may receive

hurt from their knowledge. _Wherefore_ (says he) _if this method_,

(that is of concealing the truth), _be consistent with the rights of

episcopal dignity, I may be consecrated. I shall freely philosophize

at home, and tell fables abroad; neither teaching, nor unteaching, but

suffering people to live in the prejudices they have imbibed._” This

must be allowed to be sound philosophy, excellent policy, and true

_orthodoxy_!

[76] This is excellently amplified by Porphyry in Senten. 32. p. 232,

“As the soul’s residence on the earth, (says he) does not consist in

being conversant in the earth, as bodies, but in presiding over bodies

situated on the earth: so likewise the soul is said to be in Hades,

when she presides over her image, which has a nature accommodated to

place, but then obtains a subsistence in darkness. Hence if Hades is

a subterranean dark place, the soul though not separated from being,

dwells in this case in Hades, attracting to herself her image. For

the spirit which she had collected from the spheres, attends her in

her departure from a solid body. But from her affection towards body,

reason having a partial object, according to which, she obtained a

habitude towards a body of this kind, while she lived; from this

propense affection, a form of the phantasy is impressed on the spirit,

and so she attracts the image. But she is said to be in Hades, because

she obtains a spirit of a formless and dark nature: and since a heavy

and humid spirit, extends to subterranean places, on this account also

the soul is said to dwell under the earth; not because her essence

passes from place to place, and subsists in place, but because it

receives the habits of bodies endued with a natural inclination to

local transitions, and the possession of place. And bodies of this

kind indeed, receive the soul, according to aptitudes, from a certain

disposition towards her nature. For according to her particular

disposition, she finds a body defined, correspondent to her order and

properties. Hence when the soul is in a more pure condition of being,

a body is natural to her, approximating very nearly to that which

is immaterial; such as an etherial body. But when she proceeds from

reason to the object of imagination, she naturally obtains a solar-form

body; and when effeminated and captivated with the love of forms, she

is united with a lunar-form body. Lastly, when she falls into bodies

composed from humid vapours, a perfect ignorance of being succeeds,

and darkness and infancy. And indeed in her egress from body, when

she retains a spirit disturbed by a humid evaporation, she attracts

a shade, and is weighed down; a spirit of this kind, endeavouring to

dwell naturally in the bottom of the earth, unless some other cause

draws it into a contrary place. As therefore when surrounded with

this terrene shell, it is necessary she should reside on the earth;

so likewise when she attracts a humid spirit, it is necessary she

should be surrounded with the image. But she attracts moisture, when

she continually studies to be present with a nature, whose operation

consists in moisture, and is mostly subterranean. But when she

endeavours to depart from nature, she becomes a dry splendor, without

a shadow, and without a cloud: for humidity constitutes a cloud in the

air; but dryness produces from vapour, a dry splendor.”

[77] This _sacred discourse_ composed by Pythagoras was two-fold;

one in verse, mentioned by Heraclides, and the other ΠΕΡΙ ΘΕΩΝ, in

Doric prose, both which are unfortunately lost. It appears, however,

from the present passage, that a part of one of them consisted

in explaining the labours of Hercules, who, like Ulysses, is an

allegorical character, representing the progress of a man from the

impurity of a sensible life, till he acquires the perfection and purity

of a life intellectual and divine. Hence Proclus on Plato’s Republic,

p. 382. “Hercules being purified by sacred initiations, and having

acquired undefiled advantages, deserved a perfect establishment among

the gods.” We may conceive, therefore, that by the club of Hercules

is meant philosophy, and by his lion’s skin, prudence; through whose

assistance he tamed the passions, those monsters of the soul, and

destroyed vain cogitations: both which are occultly signified by

the twelve labours he endured. I only add that Petavius appears to

have been entirely ignorant, that any such writings as the _sacred

discourses_, ever existed: for he translates them in one place

_sacræ historiæ_, and in another, where they are mentioned in the

singular number, (λόγος) _nostra hæc oratio_. Such ignorance may

be excusable in the modern priest; but as a man of learning Petavius

cannot be defended by any apology in such vile translations.

[78] The Scholium of Nicephorus upon this passage is as follows:

“Synesius (says he) calls the dross of matter, that which the phantasy,

descending from the supernal spheres, derives from the natural elements

of fire and air. And this he observes it is not lawful to leave in

the precipice of matter, viz. in the world every way obscure and

dark, but it is requisite to draw it upwards, by the assistance of

temperance, continence, and the other virtues, and re-elevate it to the

etherial world; since there is a place allotted for nature, and the

image, in the region every where lucid. But he calls the _image_, the

phantastic spirit, as being connate to the rational soul, though of a

subordinate nature. For as _intellect_ is the resemblance and image of

the divinity, but the _rational soul_ of intellect: so _the phantastic

spirit_, or irrational soul, is the image of the rational soul. Hence,

as _nature_ or the natural soul, is the image of the phantastic spirit,

and of this again _the body_, and of body, _matter_: on this account

he observes that the phantasy obtains a certain familiar proportion

to the natures which communicate with it on each side, by a certain

union and affinity, and by a tendency to the same common end. Hence in

its descent it not only acquires fire and air, from the rational soul,

which has a supernal situation, but likewise from the natural elements,

which are placed beneath.” Nicephori Scholia, p. 390.

[79] “Synesius says that there are two extreme seats, the summits of

the universe, one beneath, every way dark, the other above, wholly

luminous; and that the former is miserable, but the latter blessed.

But because opposites cannot be immediately copulated together, he

asserts that in the middle of these two seats, there are many other

regions, differing from each other, which he denominates in one part

luminous, and in the other obscure, participating of the extremes, and

beneath the region totally resplendent with light. Just in the same

manner as _cogitation_ is the medium between intellect and soul:

but _opinion_ is seated between the phantasy and the soul; and

_sense_ between the phantasy and body. And these mediums mutually

penetrate, and extend through each other, from body to intellect, and

participate all their surrounding natures. As air possesses on each

side two extremities and seats, by means of which, it is hot in its

supreme situation, through its proximity to elementary fire, but humid

in its inferior extremity, through its vicinity to water.’ Nicephori

Schoia, p. 392.

[80] The Greek is very defective in this place, which I have

endeavoured to supply, as the learned reader may observe.

[81] Pope’s Odyssey, book xix.

[82] There are three editions of this excellent work. The first Greek

and Latin by Holstenius, Cantab. 1655; the second by Barnes, prefixed

to his Homer; and the third by some German editor, which I have not

seen.

[83] I. e. about ten Italian miles.

[84] Viz. a mile and a half.

[85] These verses are not to be found in any of the hymns now extant,

ascribed to Homer.

[86] Macrobius in the 12th chapter of his comment on Scipio’s dream,

has derived some of the ancient arcana which it contains, from the

present part of this admirable work. What he has farther added, I shall

translate on account of its excellence, and connection with the above

passage of Porphyry. “Pythagoras (says he) thought that the empire of

Pluto, began downwards from the milky way, because souls falling from

thence, appear already to have receded from the gods. Hence he asserts,

that the nutriment of milk is first offered to infants, because their

first motion commences from the galaxy, when they begin to fall into

terrene bodies. On this account, since those who are about to descend,

are yet in _Cancer_, and have not left the milky way, they rank in the

order of gods. But when by falling they arrive at the _Lion_; in this

constellation, they enter on the exordium of their future condition.

And, because in the _Lion_, the rudiments of birth, and certain primary

exercises of human nature commence; but _Aquarius_ is opposite to the

Lion, and presently sets, after the Lion rises: hence, when the sun is

in Aquarius, funeral rites are performed to departed souls; because he

is then carried in a sign, which is contrary, or adverse to human life.

From the confine, therefore, in which the zodiac, and galaxy touch

each other, the soul descending from a round figure, which is the only

divine form, is produced into a cone by its defluxion. And as a line is

generated from a point, and proceeds into length, from an indivisible;

so the soul from its own point, which is a monad, passes into the duad,

which is the first protraction. And this is the essence which Plato in

the Timæus, calls indivisible, and at the same time divisible, when

he speaks of the fabric of the mundane soul. For as the soul of the

world, so likewise that of man will be found in one respect ignorant of

division, if the simplicity of a divine nature is considered; and in

another respect capacious of division, if we regard the diffusion of

the former through the world, and of the latter through the members of

the body.

As soon, therefore, as the soul gravitates towards body, in this first

production of herself, she begins to experience a material tumult,

that is, matter flowing into her essence. And this is what Plato

remarks in the Phædo, that the soul is drawn into body, staggering

with recent intoxication; signifying by this the new drink of matter’s

impetuous flood, through which the soul becoming defiled and heavy, is

drawn into a terrene situation. But the starry _cup_, placed between

Cancer and the Lion, is a symbol of this mystic truth, signifying that

descending souls first experience intoxication in that part of the

heavens, through the influx of matter. Hence, oblivion the companion

of intoxication, there begins silently to creep into the recesses of

the soul. For if souls retained in their descent to bodies, the memory

of divine concerns of which they were conscious in the heavens, there

would be no dissension among men, concerning divinity. But all, indeed,

in descending drink of oblivion; though some more, and others less. On

this account, though truth is not apparent to all men on the earth, yet

all exercise their opinions about it: because _a defect of memory, is

the origin of opinion_. But those discover most, who have drank least

of oblivion: because they easily remember what they had known before

in the heavens. Hence, that which is called _lectio_ by the Latins,

is called by the Greeks ἀνάγνωσις, or _repeated knowledge_; because

when we learn any truths, we recognize what we naturally knew, before

material influxion, rushing into the body, had intoxicated the soul.

But it is this _hyle_ or matter which composes all that body of the

world, which we every where perceive adorned with the impressions of

forms. Its highest and purest part, however, by which divine natures,

are either sustained, or composed, is called nectar, and is believed

to be the drink of the gods: but its more inferior and turbid part, is

the drink of souls. And this is what the ancients have denominated the

river of Lethe. But according to the Orphic writers the νοῦς ὑλικὸς, or

_material intellect_, is Bacchus, who proceeding from that indivisible

part, is divided into particulars. Hence, in the Orphic mysteries,

he is reported to have been torn in pieces, by Titanic fury, and the

fragments being buried, are said to have risen entire, and collected

into one; because intellect by passing into a divisible from an

indivisible nature, and again returning from divisible to indivisible,

both accomplishes the duties of the world, and does not desert the

arcana of its own nature.

The soul, therefore, falling with this first weight, from the zodiac,

and milky-way into each of the subject spheres, is not only clothed

with the accession of a luminous body, but produces the particular

motions, which is to exercise in the respective orbs. Thus in Saturn,

it energises according to a ratiocinative and intellective power, which

they call λογιϛικὸν and θεωρητικὸν: in the sphere of Jove, according

to the power of acting, which is called πρακτικὸν: in that of Mars,

according to the ardour of courage, which is denominated θυμικὸν: in

the orb of the sun, according to a sensitive and phantastic nature,

which they call αἰσθητικὸν and φανταϛικὸν: but according to the motion

of desire, which is denominated ἐπιθυμητικὸν, in the planet Venus:

of pronouncing and interpreting what it perceives, which is called

ἑρμηνευτικὸν, in the orb of Mercury; and according to a plantal nature,

and a power of acting on body, which is denominated φυτικὸν, when

it enters the lunar globe. And this sphere, as it is the last among

the divine orders, so it is the first in our terrene situation. For

this body, as it is the dregs of divine concerns; so it is the first

substance of an animal. And this is the difference between terrene and

supernal bodies (under which last, I comprehend the heavens, the stars,

and the other elements) that the latter are called upwards to be the

seat of the soul, and merit immortality from the very nature of the

region, and an imitation of sublimity; but the soul is drawn down to

these terrene bodies, and is on this account reported to die, when it

is inclosed in this fallen region, and the seat of mortality. Nor ought

it to cause any disturbance, that we have so often named the death of

the soul, which we have pronounced to be immortal. For the soul is

not extinguished by its own proper death, but is only overwhelmed for

a time. Nor does it lose the benefit of perpetuity, by its temporal

demersion: since when it deserves to be purified from the contagion of

vice, through its entire refinement from body; it will be restored to

the light of perennial life, and will return to its pristine integrity

and perfection.”

[87] Iliad. lib. xx. l. 223, &c.

[88] In the original ἱϛᾶσιν οὖν καὶ σύμβολον τῆς μεσημβρίας καὶ τοῦ

νότου, ἐπὶ ῇ θύρᾳ μεσημβριάζοντος τοῦ θεοῦ. Which Holstenius translates

most erroneously, as follows: “Austrum igitur meridei symbolum

statuunt: cum Deus meridiano tempore ostio immineat.”

[89] Iliad. lib. ix. l. 579.

[90] Iliad. lib. viii. l. 395.

[91] Iliad. lib. viii. l. 393.

[92] This assertion of Pythagoras that _the people of dreams_, δῆμος

ὀνείρων, are souls situated in the milky way, admirably contributes

to elucidate the following passage in the 24th book of the Odyssey,

respecting the descent of the suitors’ souls to the region of spirits:

Πὰρ δ’ ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,

Η’δὲ παρ’ ἠελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων

Ἤισαν, αἶψα δ’ ἴκοντο κατ’ ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,

Ἔνθά τε ναίουσι ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων.

i.e. “But they passed beyond the flowing waters of the ocean, and the

rock Leucas, and the gates of the sun, and _the people of dreams_:

and they immediately came into meadows of asphodel, where souls the

images of the dead reside.” For it is evident from hence that the souls

of the suitors passed through the galaxy, or the seats of the blessed,

according to the most ancient theology: and I doubt not but Homer

describes in these lines the complicated progression of an impure soul

till it regains its original habitation in the stars, and again begins

to gravitate to this terrene abode. This, I presume, will be manifest

from the following elucidation of these admirable lines.

In the first place these souls are said to pass over _the flowing

waters of the ocean_, and _the Leucadian_, or _white rock_. Now by

this nothing more is meant than the flight of the suitors’ souls to

the extremity of the earth, in order to a subterranean descent: for,

according to the most ancient opinion, the earth is bounded by the

ocean; and the Leucadian rock may, as Eustathius observes, be some

rock on the earth’s extremity, which receives the last rays of the

sun. Afterwards they are said to pass through _the gates of the sun_,

by which, as Porphyry informs us above, we must understand the tropics

of Cancer and Capricorn: and as Capricorn is subterranean, and affords

a passage to ascending immortals, we must conceive that they enter

through this prior to the tropic of Cancer. But in order to comprehend

the perfect propriety of this transition, we must observe that the

souls of the suitors on account of their impurity, are punished in the

recesses of the earth, before they enter the celestial tropics, and

pass into the meadows of Pluto. This the poet evidently evinces by the

_screaking noise_, which they utter, and the squalid paths, through

which they descend: a noise of this kind as Proclus well observes,

(in Plat. Repub.) “representing a species of life solely given to

appetite and imagination.” After they have been purified therefore

by subterranean punishment, they are fit to ascend to _the people

of dreams_, or the souls of the blessed situated in the milky way.

However as the soul, on account of her middle nature, is incapable

of a perpetual sameness of situation, but is formed for infinite

circulations (as will be demonstrated in the following elements); hence

Homer, without mentioning her duration among the gods, though it is

doubtless very extended, agreeable to the mystic brevity of his Muse,

makes her immediately pass into _the meadows of Asphodel, where souls

the images of the dead reside_. Now these _meadows of Asphodel_, form

the supreme part of Plato’s dominions: for, according to Pythagoras, as

we are informed by Macrobius, in the preceding note to page 287, the

empire of Pluto commences downwards from the milky way; so that these

meadows are most probably situated in _the Lion_, the constellation

into which souls first fall, after they leave the tropic of Cancer.

But the description of the Asphodel, perfectly corresponds with, and

confirms the preceding exposition. For the Asphodel is a plant, bearing

a naked _starry flower_, which comprehends an ovarium, or _orbicular

figure_, after the manner of a cup. And what can more aptly symbolize

with the stars, than such a flower? It was usual too with the ancients

to scatter this plant in the tombs of the deceased; occultly intimating

most probably, the similitude of this flower to the pristine and proper

habitations of the soul. And hence it derived its appellation from

σποδός, _ashes_, διὰ τὴν τῶν καιομένων νεκρῶν σποδόν, i.e. _from the

ashes of burnt dead bodies_.