contained in a part.
For we either contemplate the form of every thing in its cause, and
affirm that the whole which subsists in its cause is prior to parts;
or we contemplate the form of a thing in the parts which participate
of that form. And this in a two-fold respect. For the form is either
collectively in all the parts; and this is a whole composed from parts,
any one of which when absent diminishes the whole itself. Or it is
in each of the parts; so that every part according to participation
becomes a whole, i.e. a partial whole. But the whole composed from
parts subsists on account of essence. But that which is prior to parts
according to cause: and that which subsists in a part, according to
participation. For this is a whole according to ultimate subjection, so
far as it imitates the whole consisting from parts; since it is not any
part indifferently, but that which is capable of being assimilated to a
whole, whose parts also are wholes.
PROPOSITION LXVIII.
Every whole contained in a part, is a part of that whole which is
composed from parts.
For if it is a part, it is a part of some whole: and is either a part
of that whole which abides in itself, according to which it is called
a whole in a part. But on this hypothesis the whole would be a part of
itself, and a part would be equal to the whole, and each would be the
same. Or it will be a part of some other whole; and if of some other,
it is either only a part of that other, in such a manner as again to
differ in no respect from the whole. Or it will be a part together with
some other whole. For the parts of every whole, are more than one;
and this will be a whole composed from many parts. And thus the whole
contained in a part, is a part of that whole which is composed from
parts.
PROPOSITION LXIX.
Every whole composed from parts, participates of that totality which is
prior to parts.
For if it is composed from parts, it becomes passive to a whole. For
the parts since, they are made one, suffer a whole, on account of their
union: and this is a whole subsisting in parts which are not wholes.
But that which is imparticipable has an existence prior to every thing
participated. An imparticipable totality, therefore, exists prior
to a participated totality. And hence there is a certain species of
totality, prior to that whole, which is composed from parts. And this
is not a passive whole, but is an essential totality; from which the
totality resulting from parts proceeds. Since likewise that whole which
is composed from parts, subsists in many places, and in various ways,
in many other things composed from parts. But it is requisite that
there should be an essential monad or unity of all totalities. For each
of these wholes is not sincere, because indigent of the parts from
which it is composed, and which are themselves different from wholes.
Nor if this whole was generated in any thing particular, could it be
the cause that all others are wholes. The cause, therefore, by which
all things are wholes, is prior to parts. For if this also was composed
from parts, it would be a _certain whole_, and not that which is
_simply whole_. And this again would subsist from another whole:
and this must either be the case in infinitum, or there must be a first
whole; a whole not composed from parts, but that which is a perfect
totality.
PROPOSITION LXX.
That which is more universal subsists in principal causes, and
prior to particulars illuminates participants; and leaves that
which participates as second in order from principal causes.
For a more universal cause begins its energy in secondary natures,
prior to that which is posterior to a more universal cause: and it is
present not only when that which is posterior is present, but even when
the energy of that which is posterior is no more; and it energises in a
more causal manner, and this not only in different subjects, but also
in each of the things which sometimes participate. Thus for example
it is requisite, that being should be first, afterwards animal, and
then man. And the species man no longer exists, when deserted by the
rational power: but animal, breathing and sentient, will still subsist.
And again, though life is taken away, being remains: for when man
ceases to live, being is present. And the same reasoning may be adopted
in all things. But a cause which is more efficacious, and which is on
this account more causal, energises first in a more causal nature: for
it suffers the same from a cause more powerful, and prior to itself;
and it co-energises with that which is secondary when in energy. For
every thing which generates that which is secondary, congenerates also
that which is more causal: and when that which is secondary deserts
the more causal nature, that which generates the secondary nature is
present. For the communication of a more powerful cause, when it is
more efficacious, leaves that which participates it, the last of all.
For through the communication of that which is second, it strengthens
its own illumination.
PROPOSITION LXXI.
All things which abide in principal causes, and which possess
a more universal and superior order in effects, according to
the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain
respect the subjects of the communications of particulars.
And the illustrations emanating from superior, receive the
progressions of secondary natures. And thus some participations
antecede others, and representations, or resemblances (ἐμφάσεις)
supernally coalesce one after another in the same subject:
things more universal energizing first, but particulars
posterior to the energy of universals, bestowing their
communications on their participants.
For if things which partake more of cause, energize prior to things
secondary, on account of their exuberance of power, and are present
with, and illuminate things endued with a more imperfect aptitude: but
if things more subordinate, and which are second in order, receive
their communications from these; it is evident that the illustrations
of superior natures pre-occupy that which participates of both,
and establish the communications of subordinate natures. But these
illustrations use the resemblances emanating from superior natures,
as supports and foundations, and operate in a participant prepared by
superior natures.
PROPOSITION LXXII.
All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject,
proceed from more perfect and universal causes.
For the causes of many effects are more powerful and universal, and
nearer to _the one_, than the causes of a few effects. But things
producing the subjects of others, are the causes of many effects,
because they likewise produce aptitudes, before forms are present. And
hence these are more universal and perfect in the order of causes.
COROLLARY.
From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence
from _the one_, is essentially destitute of form. And why body is
effectually destitute of soul, although it participates of being. For
matter which is the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of
all[115]: but body which is the subject of animation, subsists from
that which is more universal than soul, because it participates of
being in a certain respect.
PROPOSITION LXXIII.
Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of
being: but every being is not a whole.
For either _being_ and _whole_ is the same; or the one is prior, and
the other posterior. But a part also, so far as a part, is a certain
being (for that which is a whole consists from partial beings), yet
is not an essential whole. And hence _being_ and _whole_ is not the
same: for on this hypothesis, a part would be a _non-entity_. But if
the part is a _non-entity_, neither can the whole be _being_. For
every whole is a whole of parts, either considered as existing prior
to the parts[116], or as inherent in the parts. But the part being
a non-entity, it is impossible that the whole can exist. But if the
whole is prior to being, every being will be immediately a whole; and
so a part, will not be a part, which is impossible. For if a whole is
a whole, and is a whole of parts; the part also existing as a part,
will be a part of the whole. It remains therefore that every _whole_ is
_being_, but not every _being a whole_.
COROLLARY.
For hence it is evident that the first being is above totality, since
being is present to a multitude of things: for it affords essence to
parts, so far as parts. But totality is present to fewer natures. For
the cause of a multitude of effects is more excellent: but that of a
few is subordinate, as is demonstrated.
PROPOSITION LXXIV.
Every form is a certain whole.
For it is composed from a multitude of things, each of which
replenishes the form. But every whole is not a form. For that which is
particular, and an indivisible, is indeed a whole, so far as it is an
indivisible; but is not a form: For every whole consists from parts.
But form or species, is that which may be divided into many particular
forms. Hence _whole_, and _form_ differ from each other: and the former
is inherent in more natures than the latter. That which is _whole_,
therefore, is above the _forms_ of beings.
COROLLARY.
From hence it is evident that _whole_ possesses a middle order
between being, and forms: and hence it follows that being is prior to
forms, and that forms, are beings; and yet every being is not a form.
From hence likewise in effects, privations are after a certain manner
beings, yet they are not forms[117]. But on account of the unifying
power of being, they likewise receive a certain debile representation
of being.
PROPOSITION LXXV.
Every thing which is called a cause properly, is exempt from its
effect.
For if it subsisted in its effect, it must either replenish its effect,
or be indigent of it in a certain respect, in order to its being; and
thus be more imperfect than its effect. But that which abides in its
effect, is more an assistant-cause than cause itself: because it is
either a part of that which is made, or an instrument of that which
makes. For the part subsisting in that which is made, is more imperfect
than the whole: and the instrument which supplies the measures of
fabrication to the efficient, is not able to separate itself. Every
thing, therefore, which is properly a cause, if it is more perfect,
than that which proceeds from it, affords likewise a measure to
generation, and is exempt from instruments, and elements, and from
every thing which is simply called an assisting cause.
PROPOSITION LXXVI.
Every thing which is produced from an immoveable cause,
possesses an immutable hyparxis: but every thing which emanates
from a moveable cause, possesses a mutable hyparxis.
For if every thing which fabricates is entirely immovable, it produces
that which is second from itself, not by motion, but by being. But
if this be the case, that which emanates from it, concurs with its
essence. And if this be the case, as long as it exists, it will
produce. But it always is, and therefore will always produce that
which is posterior to itself. Hence too that which is posterior always
emanates from thence, and always is; conjoining its own _progressive
ever_, with the _ever_ according to energy, of an immoveable cause.
If, therefore, the cause is moved, that also which is produced by
it will be essentially mutable. For that which derives its essence
through motion, when the motion is changed, changes its being. For
if that which is produced from motion abides immutable, it will be
more excellent than its producing cause: but this is impossible. It
will not, therefore, be immutable; and will consequently be changed,
and moved according to essence, imitating the motion by which it is
produced.
PROPOSITION LXXVII.
Every being in _capacity_, emanates from that which is
_energy_; and that which is in capacity proceeds into
energy. But that which is in a certain respect in capacity,
so far as it is in capacity, emanates from that which is in
a certain respect in energy. And that which is all things in
capacity proceeds from that which is all things in energy.
For that which is in capacity is not adapted to produce itself into
energy because it is imperfect. For if that which is imperfect should
become the cause of perfection to itself, and this in energy, the
cause will be more imperfect than that which it produces. Hence that
which is in capacity, so far as in capacity, will not be to itself,
the cause of subsisting in energy. For on this hypothesis, so far as
it is imperfect, it will be to itself the cause of the perfect: since
every thing in capacity, so far as in capacity, is imperfect. But every
thing which is in energy, so far as in energy, is perfect. If then that
which is in capacity becomes in energy, it will inherit perfection from
something else. And this again, will be either in capacity; (but then
again, the imperfect will be generative of the perfect), or it will be
in energy. And either something else, or this which is in capacity,
will rise into energy. But if something else in energy operates, acting
according to its propriety, it will produce into energy, that which
is in capacity, in another. Nor will this again be in energy; unless
it rises into energy from capacity. It remains, therefore, that from
that which is in energy, that which is in capacity must be changed into
energy.
PROPOSITION LXXVIII.
All power or capacity is either perfect, or imperfect.
For that which produces energy is a perfect power: for it makes other
things perfect through its energies. But that which is perfective of
others, is greater, because it is more self-perfect. But the power
which is indigent of something pre-existing in energy, according to
which it is something in capacity, is imperfect: for it is indigent of
the perfect abiding in another, that it may become prefect through its
participation. And hence such a power is essentially imperfect. Hence
too the power which subsists in energy is perfect, because prolific of
energy. But the power which subsists in capacity is imperfect; deriving
its perfection from power in energy.
PROPOSITION LXXIX.
Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.
For it is requisite that it should be adapted to generation, and that
it should possess an imperfect power. It is likewise requisite that the
agent being in energy, such as that which is generated is in capacity,
should previously assume a perfect power. For every energy proceeds
from inherent power. For if the agent does not possess power, how can
it energise, and operate in another? But if that which is generated,
does not possess power according to aptitude, how can it be fabricated?
For that which produces, produces every thing, in that which possesses
a passive power; but not in every thing; nor in that which is not
naturally passive to the energies of the producing cause.
PROPOSITION LXXX.
Every body is naturally adapted to passivity: but every thing
incorporeal is naturally adapted to fabricate. And the former
is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. Yet
that which is incorporeal becomes passive through its communion
with body: just in the same manner, as bodies are enabled to
fabricate, through the participation of incorporeals.
For body, as body is divisible alone, and through this becomes
passive; being every way partible, and this every way in infinitum.
But that which is incorporeal, because it is simple, is impassive. For
neither can that which is impartible be divided, nor can that which
is incomposite be altered. Hence nothing will be fabricative, or this
must be affirmed of an incorporeal: since body so far as body, does not
operate, because it is alone exposed to division and passivity; while
on the contrary every agent possesses an active power. Hence it will
not fabricate so far as body, but according to a power of operating,
which it contains. But body is essentially inefficacious, and impotent:
and hence when it fabricates, it fabricates by a participation of
power. But incorporeals likewise participate of passions, when they
abide in bodies; because in this case they are divided in conjunction
with bodies, and enjoy their partible nature, though at the same time,
they are impartible according to their proper essence.
PROPOSITION LXXXI.
Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is
present by a certain inseparable power, which it inserts in its
participant.
For if it is separable from its participant, and does not abide in it,
as that which possesses a subsistence in itself, a certain medium is
requisite, which may connect the one with the other, and which is more
similar to that which is participated, and to that which participates.
For if this medium is separable, how can it be participated by the
participant? Since neither the participant contains the medium nor any
thing proceeding from this medium. A power, therefore, and illumination
emanating from this medium, into its participant, conjoins both. One
thing, therefore, is that through which participation subsists, but the
second is that which is participated, and the third is the participant.
PROPOSITION LXXXII.
Every thing incorporeal, because converted to itself, when it is
participated by others, is participated in a separable manner.
For if in an inseparable manner, its energy will not be separable from
its participant, any more than its essence. But if this be the case,
it will not be converted to itself. For if it is converted it will be
separable and different from its participant. If, therefore, it is
capable of being converted to itself, it is participated in a separable
manner, when it is participated by others.
PROPOSITION LXXXIII.
Every thing endued with a self-gnostic power, is entirely converted to
itself.
For that which is converted to itself, in energy, manifestly knows
itself: for that which knows is one and the same with that which is
known; and the knowledge of itself reverts to itself, as that which
is known. And as this knowledge belongs to that which knows, it is a
certain energy: but it is an energy of itself to itself, because it
possesses a power of knowing itself. But that this also subsists in
essence if in energy has been demonstrated. For every thing which is
converted to itself in energy, contains also an essence verging to
itself.
PROPOSITION LXXXIV.
Every thing which always _is_, possesses an infinite power.
For if its essence is never-failing, its power also, according to which
it is what it is, and is able ta be, must he infinite. For if the power
according to which it subsists was finite, it would some time or other
fail. But if it should fail, the being also of that which possesses
this power must fail; nor would it be any longer an eternal being. It
is requisite, therefore, that the power belonging to, and containing
that which always is, should be essentially infinite.
PROPOSITION LXXXV.
Every thing which is always _in generation_ (ἀεὶ γινόμενον),
possesses an infinite power of _being generated_ (του yίνεσθαι).
For if it is always in the act of becoming to be, it contains a
never-failing power of generation. For, if its power was finite, it
would cease in a infinite time. But if its power of being generated
ceases, that also which is in generation will cease; viz. that which
is in generation according to this power will cease; nor will it any
longer be always in generation[118]. But it is always in generation,
according to the hypothesis: and consequently it possesses an infinite
power of being generated.
PROPOSITION LXXXVI.
Every _true being_ is infinite, not according to multitude, nor
according to magnitude, but according to power alone.
For every infinite is either in multitude, or in magnitude, or
in power. But true being is indeed infinite, as possessing an
inextinguishable life, a never-failing essence, and an undiminished
energy. Nor is it infinite on account of magnitude; since that which
is true being, is without magnitude, and self-subsistent. For every
self-subsistent being, is impartible, and simple. Nor is it infinite,
on account of multitude, for it is most uniform, on account of its
vicinity, and alliance to the one. But the one is infinite according
to power: and hence through this, true being will be impartible and
infinite. And indeed by how much the more it is one and impartible, by
so much the more will it be infinite. For power when distributed into
parts, becomes debile, and finite. And powers entirely partible, are
entirely finite. Far such as are last, and most distant from the one,
are after a certain manner finite: but first powers are on account of
their impartibility infinite. For partition dissipates and dissolves
the power of every thing. But impartibility, from its binding and
collective nature, contains in itself, that which is never-failing and
undiminished. But infinite according to magnitude and multitude, is
entirely a privation, and desertion of impartibility. For that which
is finite proximately approaches to that which is impartible; while
that which is infinite is most distant from an impartible nature,
because it on all sides departs from the one. Hence that which is
infinite according to power, does not belong to the infinite, either
of multitude, or magnitude: since infinite power is co-existent with
impartibility. But infinite, either in multitude or magnitude is most
distant from an impartible nature. If, therefore, true being was
infinite, either in magnitude, or multitude, it would not be endued
with infinite power. But it is endued with infinite power, and is,
therefore, not infinite, either according to magnitude, or multitude.
PROPOSITION LXXXVII.
Every thing eternal, is _being_; but not every being is
_eternal_.
For in generated natures the participation of being, is after a
certain manner inherent, so far as they are not that, which is in no
respect being. But if that which is in generation, is not that which
_is in no respect being_ (οὐδαμῶς ὀν,) it is being, _in a certain
respect_ (ἔστι πῶς ὀν.) But that which is eternal, or eternity itself,
is _in no respect_ inherent in generated natures; and is particularly
separated from things which do not participate of eternity, according
to the whole of time. But every thing eternal always is; for it
participates of eternity itself, which confers perpetual being, on
the natures by which it is participated. _Being_, therefore, is
participated by more natures than _eternity_: and hence _being_ is
above _eternity_. For things which participate eternity, participate
also of being; but not all that participate of being, participate also
of eternity.
PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.
Every true being, is either prior to eternity, or abides in eternity,
or participates of eternity.
But that it is above, or prior to eternity, is demonstrated in the
preceding proposition. And it likewise abides in eternity: for eternity
possesses perpetuity together with being. And this is also true of that
which participates of eternity: for every thing eternal, is called
eternal from its participation of perpetuity and being. For this
according to participation possesses both perpetuity and being. But
_eternity_ possesses perpetuity the first of all; but _being_, through
participation[119]. And being itself, is the first being.
PROPOSITION LXXXIX.
Every _primary being_ (πρώτως ὅν) consists of _bound_, and
_infinite_.
For if it is endued with infinite power, it is evident that it is
infinite, and through this subsists from _infinite_. But if it is
impartible and uniform, through this it participates of _bound_. For
that which participates of the one, is bounded. But that which is
impartible, is at the same time endued with infinite power. Every true
being, therefore, consists from _bound_ and _infinite_.
PROPOSITION XC.
_First bound_, and _first infinity_, have a self-subsistence prior
to all things which consist from _bound_ and _infinite_.
For if beings which subsist from themselves, subsist prior to certain
beings, because common to all, and primary causes, and this not to some
in particular, but simply to all; it is requisite that there should be
a first bound, and a first infinity prior to that which consists from
both. For in that which is mixed, _bound_ participates of _infinity_,
and _infinity_ of _bound_. But the first of each, is no other than that
which it is. It is requisite, therefore, that that which is _primarily
infinite_ should not possess the form of _bound_, and that that which
is _primarily bound_, should not possess the form _of infinite_. And
hence these subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.
PROPOSITION XCI.
Every power is either bounded, or infinite. But every terminated
power subsists from infinite power: and infinite power from
_first infinity_.
For powers which have a partial existence; or subsist sometimes, are
bounded; because they have fallen from the infinity of perpetual being.
But the powers of eternal beings, are infinite, because they never
desert their own hyparxis.
PROPOSITION XCII.
Every multitude of infinite powers, depends on one first
infinity, which is not as a participated power, and which does
not subsist in things endued with power, but is essential; not
existing as the power of any participant, but as the cause of
all beings.
For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power
itself: for it likewise possesses bound. But the first power is
infinity: for infinite powers, are infinite, through the participation
of infinity. Infinity itself, therefore, will be before all powers;
through which being also possesses infinite power, and all things
participate of infinity. For _that which is first_, is not infinity:
for that is the measure of all things, because it is the good; and the
one. Nor is _being_ infinity: for this is infinite, but not infinity
(or infinite itself.) Hence between that which is first, and being
itself, infinity subsists, as the cause of all things endued with
infinite power, and of all the infinity in beings.
PROPOSITION XCIII.
Every infinite subsisting in beings, is neither infinite with respect
to superior natures; nor is it infinite to itself.
For that by which every thing is infinite, by this also it is without
circumscription. But every thing in natures superior to beings, is
bounded in itself, and in all things prior to itself. It remains,
therefore, that the infinite belonging to inferior natures, belongs to
them alone, above which it is expanded in such a manner, that it is
incomprehensible by them all. For however they may extend themselves
towards this infinite, yet it possesses something entirely exempt from
their nature. And though all things enter into this infinite, yet it
possesses something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures.
And again, though it expands its powers, yet it contains something
on account of its union, invincible, convolved, and surpassing their
involutions. Likewise containing and bounding itself, it will not be
infinite to itself; and much less will it be infinite with respect
to superior natures, because it possesses a portion of the infinity
which they contain. For the powers of more universal natures are more
infinite[120], because they are more universal, and are placed nearer
to the first infinity.
PROPOSITION XCLV.
Every eternity is a certain infinity, but every infinity is not an
eternity.
For many infinites possess _the infinite_, not on account of their
perpetuity; as is evident in the infinity according to multitude, and
according to magnitude, and in the infinity of matter; and whatever
else may be infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or on
account of the indefinite nature of its essence. But that eternity
is an infinity, is evident: for that which never fails is infinite:
and this because it possesses a never-failing subsistence. Infinity,
therefore, is prior to eternity. For that which constitutes a greater
multitude, and is more universal, is a more causal nature. _First
infinity_, therefore, is above eternity, and _infinity itself_, is
prior to eternity.
PROPOSITION XCV.
Every power which possesses more of the nature of the one
than of multitude, is more infinite than the power which is
multiplied.
For if the first infinity is the nearest to the one, hence of the
powers which are more allied to the one, that which is less distant
from the one, is more infinite. For when multiplied it loses its
uniform nature; in which when it abides, it will possess a superiority
among other natures, being contained by impartibility. For among
partible natures, collected powers are multiplied, but such as are
divided, are debilitated.
PROPOSITION XCVI.
The power of every finite body, when infinite is incorporeal.
For if this power is corporeal, since in this case it would be an
infinite body, infinite would reside in that which is finite. But if
this power is a finite body, it will not be an infinite power, on
account of body, but on account of something else. For if through body
it is finite, but through power infinite; it will not be power, on
account of body. Hence the infinite power, which resides in a finite
body is incorporeal.
PROPOSITION XCVII.
Every principal cause in every series, communicates its property
to all that series: and the series is that by remission, or
subjection, which this cause is after a primary manner.
For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all kindred natures,
are co-ordinated to this cause, it is manifest, that it confers on
all one idea, through which they are allotted an order under the same
series. For either all things participate of similitude with this
principal cause, without a cause; or the sameness which is in all,
proceeds from this principal cause. But that this should be the case,
without a cause, is impossible: for that which is without a cause is
fortuitous. But among things in which there is order, and a connection
with each other, and which always abide in the same state, chance can
never take place. From this principal cause, therefore, the whole
series receives the property of its subsistence. And if from this
cause, it is evident that it receives this property with remission,
and a descent accommodated to secondary natures. For either this
property subsists in a similar manner, in that which is principal,
and in things secondary, and the former presides, but the latter are
allotted a subsistence posterior to the principal; or it subsists in
a dissimilar manner. And if this is the case, it is manifest that
identity in multitude proceeds from one, and not the contrary; and
that the property which primarily pre-exists in one, is secondarily in
multitude, and is exempt from the series.
PROPOSITION XCVIII.
Every separate cause, is at once, every where, and no where.
For by the communication of its power, it is every where. For this
is a cause, which replenishes things naturally adapted to participate
of its nature, and is the leader of all secondary natures, and is
present to all the prolific progressions of illustrations. But, on
account of an essence unmingled with things in place, and through its
excellent purity, it is no where. For if it is separate from effects,
it is placed above all things. In like manner it resides in none of
the natures subordinate to itself. For if it was alone every where,
it would not indeed be hindered from being a cause, and it would be
in all participants: but it would not be in a separate manner prior
to all. But if it was no where, without being every where, it would
not indeed be restrained from being prior to all things, and it
would not be any one of subordinate natures, but it would not be in
all things; as causes are naturally in things caused, through their
abundant communications. On account of its being a cause, therefore,
it is in all things which are able to participate its nature: and from
its being separate in itself, it is prior to all the natures which it
replenishes; and is at once every where and no where. And indeed it is
not according to a part every where, and according to a part no where:
for thus it would suffer a divulsion and separation from itself: since
one part of itself would be every where in all things, and another part
would be no where, and prior to all things. But it is total, every
where and no where, after the same manner. For things which are able
to participate of this cause, abide in the _whole_, and find the
_whole_ present with their nature; while this whole is exempt from
its participants. For its participant does not establish this whole in
itself, but participates of it as much as it is able to receive. Nor
in communicating does it contract itself, through the participations
of a multitude of things: for it is separate. Nor do the participants
participate in a defective manner: for that which communicates is every
where.
PROPOSITION XCIX.
Every imparticipable, so far as it is an imparticipable, does
not subsist from another cause, but is the principle and cause
of all participated natures. And in consequence of this every
principle in every series is without generation.
For if it is imparticipable, it is allotted a principality in its own
proper series, and does not proceed from others: for it would not be
the first, if it received that property on account of which it is
imparticipable, from any other. But if it is worse than others and
proceeds from them, it is not allotted a progression, so far as it is
imparticipable, but so far as it is a participant. For in this case
it participates of the natures from which it proceeds, and the things
which it participates, have not a primary subsistence. But that which
is imparticipable has a primary subsistence. And hence so far as it is
imparticipable it does not flow from a cause[121]. For if it proceeded
from a cause, it would be a participant, and not an imparticipable. But
so far as it is an imparticipable, it is the cause of participants, and
not that which participates of others.
PROPOSITION C.
Every series of wholes is extended to an imparticipable cause
and principle. But all imparticipables depend on one first
principle of all.
For if every series suffers a certain sameness, there is something in
every ruling nature, which is the cause of identity. For as all beings
proceed from _the one_, so likewise every series emanates from _one_.
But all imparticipable unities are reduced to the one itself because
all of them analogous to the one. So far, therefore, as they suffer a
certain sameness, through their analogy to the one, so far they are
reduced to the one itself. And so far as they all proceed from _the
one_, none of them is a principle, but they flow from _the one_, as
from a principle. But so far as each of them is imparticipable, so far
each of them is a principle. Because, therefore, they are principles
of certain things, they depend on the principle of all: for that is
the principle of all, of which all participate. But the first is alone
participated by all things; while some things only participate of the
rest. And hence _the one_ is that which is simply the first. But others
are firsts with relation to a certain order, but are not simply firsts.
PROPOSITION CI.
The leader of all things participating of intellect, is an
imparticipable intellect: of all things participating life, an
imparticipable life: and of all things participating being, an
imparticipable being. But of these, being is prior to life, and
life is prior to intellect.
For since in every order of beings, imparticipables are prior to
participants, it is requisite that there should be an intellect prior
to intellectuals, life prior to things vital, and being prior to
beings. But since that which is the cause of more effects precedes that
which is the cause of a fewer; hence among these being will be the
first: for it is present to all things, to which life and intellect is
present. For every thing vital and intellectual participates of being;
but the contrary is not a necessary consequence: since all beings are
not endued with life, and intellect. But the second in order is life:
for all things to which intellect is present, participate also of life;
but the contrary is not true. For many things are endued with life,
but are destitute of cognition. But the third is intellect. For every
thing which is endued in any respect with cognition, both lives, and
possesses being. If, therefore, being is the cause of more effects; but
life of fewer; and intellect of still fewer: hence _being_ is the first
in order, _life_ the second, and _intellect_ the third.
PROPOSITION CII.
All beings, in whatever manner they may possess being, consist
from _bound_ and _infinite_, through the first being. But all
vital natures, are self-motive, through the first life. And all
gnostic natures, participate of cognition, through the first
intellect.
For if that which is in every series imparticipable, communicates its
peculiar property, to all things under the same series; it is evident
that being first communicates to all things _bound_ together
with _infinite_; since it is primarily mixed from these. And
life imparts the motion resident in its nature: for life is the first
progression and motion, from the stable subsistence of being. And
lastly, intellect imparts cognition: for the summit of all cognition,
is in intellect; and intellect is the first gnostic nature.
PROPOSITION CIII.
All things are in all, but subsist peculiarly in each.
For in being there is both life and intellect; and in life, being and
intellection; and in intellect, being and life. But in intellect all
things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being, according
to true beings. For since every thing subsists, either, according to
cause, or according to essence, or according to participation: and
since in the first the rest subsist according to cause; and in the
second, the first subsists through participation, and the third through
cause: and in the third, natures prior to its own, subsist through
participation; hence in _being_, _life_ and _intellect_ preside. But
since every thing receives its characteristic, according to hyparxis,
and not according to cause (for cause pertains to other things, or
to effects); nor yet according to participation (for it receives
externally that which it participates): hence in being there is
_true_[122] life and _true_ intelligence, essential life and essential
intellect. And in life, there is being according to participation;
but intelligence according to cause. But both of these, are vitally
inherent in life: for its hyparxis is according to life. And in
intellect there is both life and essence, through participation: but
both these subsist intellectually. For the being and life of intellect
is knowledge.
PROPOSITION CIV.
Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence, and
energy eternal.
For if it is primarily allotted the perpetuity of eternity, it does
not partly participate of this, and partly not; but it entirely
participates of perpetuity. For either participating according to
energy, it does not participate according to essence: but this is
impossible, since in this case, energy would be more excellent than
essence. Or participating according to essence, it does not participate
according to energy. And thus that which is primarily eternal, will be
the same with that, which primarily participates of time[123]. And time
will primarily measure the essence of some things, but eternity which
is more excellent than all time, will be the measure of nothing; since
that which is primarily eternal, will not be contained by eternity
according to energy[124]. Every thing, therefore, primarily eternal,
has both its essence and energy eternal.
PROPOSITION CV.
Every thing immortal is eternal, but every thing eternal is not
immortal.
For if that is immortal which always participates of life, and that
which always participates of life, participates also of being, and
that which is always vital is perpetual; hence every thing immortal
is eternal. For that is _immortal_ which does not receive death,
and perpetually _lives_: but that is _eternal_ which cannot receive
non-being, and which always _is_. But if there are many beings more
excellent and worse than life, but which are not susceptive of
immortality, though they are perpetual beings; it follows that every
thing eternal is not immortal. But that many perpetual beings; are not
immortal is evident. For there are certain beings, destitute indeed
of life; yet perpetual and incorruptible[125]: since as being is to
life, so is that which is eternal to that which is immortal. For that
life which cannot be taken away, is _immortality itself_. And being
which cannot be destroyed, is _eternity itself_. But being is more
comprehensive than life: and hence that which is eternal is more
comprehensive than that which is immortal[126].
PROPOSITION CVI.
The medium of every thing entirely eternal, both according to
essence, and according to energy, and of that which has its
essence in time; is that which is in a certain respect eternal,
but which in a certain respect is measured by time.
For that which has its essence comprehended by time is entirely
temporal: for this in a most primary manner, is allotted a temporal
energy. But that which according to all things is temporal, is
perfectly dissimilar to that which is according to all things eternal.
But all progressions subsist through similars. There is, therefore,
some medium between these. Hence either that is the medium which is
eternal in essence, but temporal in energy; or the contrary. But
this is impossible: for energy on this latter hypothesis would be
more excellent than essence. It remains, therefore, that the former
hypothesis must be the medium.
PROPOSITION CVII.
Every thing which is in a certain respect eternal, but in a
certain respect temporal, is at the same time _being_ and
_generation_.
For every thing eternal, is being, and that which is measured by time
is generation. And hence, if the same thing participates both of time
and eternity, yet not according to the same, or after the same manner;
this same thing will be, both being and generation, yet will not be
both according to one of these alone[127].
COROLLARY.
From hence it is evident that generation, since it has a temporal
energy, depends on that which partly participates of being, and partly
of generation; and which at once participates of eternity and time. But
this is related to that which is eternal according to all things. But
that which is eternal according to all things is related to eternity
itself: and eternity itself is related to _being_, which is prior
to eternity.
PROPOSITION CVIII.
Every thing which is particular in each order, is capable of
participating in a two-fold manner, that unity which is placed
in a proximate superior disposition; either by its own proper
totality, or through that which it contains, of a partial
nature, and which is allied to something particular, according
to an analogy to the whole series.
For if all things are converted through similitude, the particular
nature which subsists in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that
which in a superior order is monadic, and total; and is as that which
is particular to that which is universal, and as different orders are
to each other. But this particular nature is similar to a _whole_ of
the same series, on account of a communion of peculiarity; and to
that superior proximately co-ordinated property, through an analogous
subsistence. It is, therefore, evident that through these mediums a
conversion from one to the other is effected, as through similars, to
that which is similar[128]. For _particular_, is similar to that which
is _particular_, but that which is of the same series is peculiar. And
the universal, or whole which is placed above the series, is dissimilar
according to each of these.
PROPOSITION CIX.
Every particular intellect participates of that unity, which is
above intellect, and is the first; both through that which is
_universal_, and through a _particular_ unity, co-ordinated to
its nature. And every particular soul, participates of universal
intellect; both through _universal_ soul, and a _particular_
intellect. And every particular nature of body, participates
of universal soul, both through _universal_ nature, and a
_particular_ soul.
For every thing particular (by the preceding proposition) participates
of that unity placed in an order above it; either by its own proper
universality; or by that particular nature which it contains, and which
is co-ordinated to something particular.
PROPOSITION CX.
Of all things placed in order, according to every series,
such as are first, and are conjoined with their unity, may
participate of those which are proximately established in a
superior order, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect,
and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally
adapted to participate of their superiors.
For because some things are allied to their superiors being allotted in
their proper order, a more excellent and divine nature; but others are
more distant, because they are allotted a secondary and ministerial,
but not a primary and principal progression in every series: hence
some things are naturally conjoined with those of a superior order;
but others are not conjoined with a superior order. For all things are
not of equal dignity, though they belong to the same distribution. For
there is not one reason, of all things: but all things proceed from
one, and return to one, from their own proper unity. And hence they are
not allotted the same power. But some are able to receive continually
the participations of their superiors. But others of a dissimilar
nature, are deprived of such a power, through their far distant
progressions from their principles.
PROPOSITION CXI.
Of every intellectual series, some are divine intellects
receiving the participations of the gods; but others are
intellects alone. And of every animastic series (i.e. a series
composed of souls) some are intellectual souls, depending on
their proper intellects; but others are souls alone. And of
every corporeal nature, some have supernally-presiding souls,
but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.
For in every series the whole genus is not naturally adapted to depend
on that which is prior to itself; but this belongs to that more perfect
nature which the genus contains, and which is sufficient to coalesce
with superior natures. Hence every intellect is not connected with a
god; but this belongs to the highest and most uniform intellects, (i.e.
to intellects which participate most of unity). For these are allied
to the divine unities. Nor do all souls participate of participable
intellect; but this belongs to such as are most intellectual. Nor do
all corporeal natures enjoy the presence of soul, and of that soul
which is participated; but such only as are more perfect and rational.
And the mode of demonstration is the same in all.
PROPOSITION CXII.
First natures in every order, possess the form of things prior to
themselves.
For the highest genera in every order, are conjoined with their
superiors by similitude, and through a continuation of the progression
of universals. Hence such as superior natures are primarily, such is
the form which things first in every order are allotted, and which is
allied to the nature of superiors. And through the peculiarity of their
subsistence, they appear such as natures prior to themselves.
PROPOSITION CXIII.
Every divine number is _unical_ (ἑνιαῖος), i.e. possesses the form
of unity.
For if a divine number has the one itself, as its preceding cause,
in the same manner as an intellectual number has intellect, and an
animastic number (ψυχικὸς, or number possessing the form of soul) soul
as its preceding cause, and if multitude is every where analogous to
its cause; it is evident that a divine number also, is uniform. Since
_the one itself_, is _the deity_: and this because _the good itself_
is the same with _the one_. For the _good itself_, and _the deity_
are the same: since that above which there is nothing, and which all
things desire, is _the deity_. And that from which all things proceed,
and to which all things tend, is _the good_. If, therefore, there is
a multitude of gods, it is an uniform multitude. But that there is a
multitude is evident: since every principal cause is the leader of a
proper multitude[129]; and to this multitude it is similar and allied.
PROPOSITION CXIV.
Every god is a self-perfect unity: and every self-perfect unity
is a god.
For if there is a two-fold number of unities, as we have previously
demonstrated, and some of these are self-perfect, but others
illuminations emanating from the self-perfect unities; and if a divine
number is allied, and of a similar nature to the good; hence the gods
are self-perfect unities. And on the contrary every self-perfect unity
is a god. For as unity is most excellently allied to the one itself,
and that which is self-perfect to the good, and through both the one,
and the good, participates of a divine property; so likewise that which
is self-perfect is a god.
COROLLARY.
But if a god was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity; or a
self-perfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be placed in another
order, on account of a mutation of his property.
PROPOSITION CXV.
Every god is super-essential, supervital, and super-intellectual.
For if every god is a self-perfect unity, but each of these (viz.
essence, life, and intellect) is not a unity, but united; it is evident
that every god, is above essence, life, and intellect. For if these
differ from each other, but all are in all, every one of these being
_all things_ will not be _one_ alone. Besides, if the first deity
is super-essential, but every god, so far as a god is of the first
series[130]; hence every god will be super-essential. But that the
first deity is super-essential is evident: for _essence_ is not the
same with _unity_; nor is _to be_, and _to be united_ one and the same.
But if _essence_, is not the same with _unity_, that which is first
will either be both of these, and so will not be _one_ alone, but
something besides _one_, and will participate of _the one_, without
being _the one itself_; or it will be either of these. But if indeed it
is essence, it will be indigent of the one. But it is impossible that
_the good_, and _the first_ should be indigent. It will, therefore,
be _the one_ alone; and will consequently be super-essential. But if
every thing subsisting in a primary manner, confers the property of its
primary subsistence on the whole series; hence every divine number is
super-essential. For every principal cause produces similars prior to
dissimilars. If, therefore, the first god is super-essential, all the
gods, will be super-essential: for by this means they will be perfectly
similar. But if they were essences they would be produced from the
first essence, as the unities of essences.
PROPOSITION CXVI.
Every deity, except _the one_, is participable.
For that _the one_ is imparticipable, is evident; since if he
participated any thing, and thus became dependant on some other nature,
he would no longer be the cause of all things; both of such as are
prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that other unities are
participants we shall now demonstrate as follows: For if there is
another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ
from _the one_? For it either subsists in the same manner as that: but
how in this case, is the one second, and the other first? Or it does
not subsist in the same manner. And so _that_ will be the one itself,
but _this_ will be both _one_, and _non-one_. But this non-one, if it
is no hypostasis (or subsistence) will be one alone. But if it is some
other hypostasis besides the one, _the one_ will be participated by
non-one: and that will be a self-perfect one, by which it is conjoined.
Hence this again, will be the deity. But that which subsists as
non-one, will subsist in the participation of the one. Every unity,
therefore, which subsists after _the one_ is participable, and every
god is participable.
PROPOSITION CXVII.
Every god is the measure of beings.
For if every god possesses the form of one (ἑνιαῖος), he defines and
measures all the multitudes of beings. For since all multitudes, are
naturally indefinite, they are bounded by _the one_. But that which is
one, measuring and bounding whatever it supervenes, is willing to lead
into bound, by its terminating power, whatever is indefinite. For that
which is one becomes uniform through participation: but that which is
indefinite recedes from the one, through its interminable and infinite
nature. And by how much the less it is uniform, by so much the more
is it indefinite and immense. And hence every multitude of beings, is
measured by the divine unities.
PROPOSITION CXVIII.
Every thing which is in the gods, according to their idioms (or
properties), pre-exists in their natures. And the property of
the gods, is uniform and super-essential. And hence all things
are contained in the gods, uniformly, and super-essentially.
For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, either through
cause, or through hyparxis, or through participation, but the first of
all numbers is the divine number; hence nothing will be inherent in the
gods according to participation. But all things will reside in them,
either through hyparxis, or through cause. But likewise, whatever the
gods, as the authors of all things previously receive, they previously
receive in a manner convenient, and apposite to their union. For
every thing which presides over secondary natures according to cause,
naturally contains the cause of inferiors. All things, therefore, are
in the gods uniformly, and super-essentially.
PROPOSITION CXIX.
Every god subsists according to a super-essential goodness, and is good
neither through habit, nor through essence.
For both habit and essence are allotted an order secondary and remote
from the gods: but these have a super-essential subsistence. For if the
first one, is also the good, and so far as the one is the good itself,
and so far as the good the one itself; hence every series of gods, is
both uniform, and beneficent (ἀγαθοειδὴς), on account of one property
alone, and not through more than one. But every god, so far as a unity
is also a goodness, and so far as a goodness is also a unity; and on
account of progression from the first is also beneficent and uniform.
For the first cause of all, is both the one itself, and the good; and
consequently all the gods are unities and goodnesses. As therefore _the
one_ of the gods is super-essential, so likewise _the good_, which they
contain, is super-essential, and is nothing else than _one_. For every
god is not first of all something different from good, and afterwards
_good_; but is good alone. Nor is first of all something besides _one_,
and afterwards _one_; but is _one_ alone.
CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.
PROPOSITION CXX.
Every god contains in his hyparxis a providence of the universe; and
primary providence resides in the gods.
For all things posterior to the gods, provide through the communion
of the gods: but providence is connate with the gods. For if to
communicate good to things provided for, is the peculiar employment
of a providential property, but all the gods are goodnesses; hence
they will either communicate themselves to nothing, and so there will
be no good in secondary natures (for whence can that which subsists
by participation emanate, but from natures which are primarily endued
with properties); or if they communicate, they will communicate good,
and through this communication provide for the universe. Providence,
therefore, primarily subsists in the gods. For where can an energy
prior to intellect abide, but in super-essential natures? And hence
providence as the name indicates, is an energy prior to intellect.
The gods, therefore, on account of their being, and because they are
goodnesses, provide for all things[131]; and fill all things with that
goodness which is prior to intellect.
PROPOSITION CXXI.
Every thing divine has for its hyparxis goodness itself,
and possesses an uniform power, and a knowledge occult, and
incomprehensible by all secondary natures.
For if it provides for the universe, it contains a power comprehensive
of the things for which it provides; and by this invincible and
indiscribable power, it fills all things with itself; and subjects
every thing to its own nature. For every principal and ruling cause,
rules through its abundance of power, and contains according to nature.
There is, therefore, a primary power in the gods, which does not
govern some things, and not others, but it equally assumes in itself
in a primary manner, the powers of all beings: and this is neither
an essential power, nor much more unessential, but it is connate to
the hyparxis of the gods, and is super-essential. But likewise the
boundaries of all cognitions, pre-exist uniformly in the gods. For
all other cognitions subsist, on account of divine cognition, which
is abstracted from the universality of things. And this cognition is
neither intellectual, nor much less does it belong to the cognitions
posterior to intellect; but according to its divine property, it is
constituted above intellect. If then this knowledge is divine, it is
an occult and uniform cognition. But if the power is divine, it is
uncircumscribed by all things, and, in a similar manner, comprehensive
of all things. But if the goodness is divine, it gives bound to the
hyparxis of the gods. For if all things are contained in the gods,
and among these knowledge, power, and goodness; and if their hyparxis
is characterized with that which is best, the subsistence also of the
gods will take place according to the best: and this is no other than
goodness.
PROPOSITION CXXII.
Every thing divine both provides for secondary natures, and is
separated from the things for which it provides; providence
neither remitting its unmixed and uniform excellence, nor a
separate union obscuring providence.
For the gods abiding in their uniform nature, and hyparxis, fill all
things with their power. And every thing which is able to participate,
enjoys the goods, which it is capable of receiving according to the
measure of its proper subsistence; the gods in the mean time, through
being itself, or rather through a nature prior to being, pouring their
illuminations on every thing which exists. For since they are no other
than goodnesses, they abundantly confer good upon all things, through
being itself; not making a distribution according to a reasoning
energy, but because these receive according to their dignity, and
those confer according to their hyparxis. Hence, in their providential
operations, they receive no impediment from the natures for which they
provide: for they benefit all things through their very being itself.
But every thing which operates essentially, operates without habitude
or respect: for respect, is an addition to being itself: and is on
this account contrary to nature. Nor again, because they are separate,
do they take away their providential care; for thus they would remove
(which it is unlawful to say) their peculiar hyparxis whose property
is goodness. For the communication of good extends to every thing
capable of its participation: and that which is greatest, is not that
which is endued with a form of good, but that which is beneficent. This
beneficent nature, therefore, either no being will possess, or the
gods will possess it prior to beings. For to goods subsisting through
communication, it is impossible that a greater good should be present,
but a less good only, to such goods as are first.
PROPOSITION CXXIII.
Every thing divine, on account of its super-essential union,
is ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is
comprehensible, and knowable by its participants. And hence
_that which is first_, is alone entirely unknown, because
it is imparticipable.
For all knowledge subsisting through reason, belongs to _beings_,
and in _beings_ possesses the apprehension of its truth: for it is
conversant with _conceptions_, and subsists in intellections. But the
gods are above all beings. Hence that which is divine, is neither
to be apprehended by opinion, nor by a rational energy, nor by
intellection. For every being, is either sensible, and on that account
the object of opinion, or true being, and on that account intelligible.
Or it subsists between these, and is at the same time _being_, and
_generable_, and is on this account the subject of a rational energy.
If, therefore, the gods are super-essential[132], and prior to beings,
there can neither be any opinion of their natures, nor science, nor
cogitation, nor intellection. But they are known by dependant natures
in a manner correspondent to their properties: and this by a necessary
consequence. For the diversities of participants are divided together
with the properties of the things participated. Nor does every thing
participate every thing: for neither is there a composition of things
perfectly dissimilar, nor does any thing participate fortuitously of
another: but a kindred nature is conjoined with every thing kindred,
and derives its progression from that to which it is allied.
PROPOSITION CXXIV.
Every god knows partible natures, in an impartible manner,
things subsisting in time without time, things not necessary,
necessarily, things mutable, immutably; and universally, all
things, in a manner more excellent than the order of the things
known.
For if every thing which is present with the gods is present,
according to their _characteristic_; it is evident that the
knowledge of the gods will not subsist according to the nature of
things inferior, but according to the singular excellence which the
gods contain. Their knowledge, therefore, of multiplied, and passive
natures, will be uniform and without passion. Likewise if that which
is the object of cognition, is partible, divine knowledge will be
impartible. If the subjects are mutable, the gnostic energy of the gods
will be immutable: if contingent, divine knowledge will be necessary;
and if indefinite, definite. For that which is divine does not receive
knowledge into itself from subordinate natures, that so cognition may
correspond to the object of knowledge; but inferiors receive their
indefinite subsistence, about the terminated nature of the gods, are
changed about their immutability, receive with passivity that which is
impassive, and temporally, that which subsists without time. For it is
possible that subordinate, may be surpassed by more excellent natures:
but it is not lawful for the gods to receive in themselves any thing
from natures inferior to their own.
PROPOSITION CXXV.
Every god proceeds through all secondary natures, in the
order from which he begins to indicate himself. Always indeed
multiplying and dividing his communications, yet preserving the
characteristic of his own proper subsistence.
For since progressions are produced through remission, things first,
every where multiply into the decrements of secondary natures. But
proceeding according to a similitude to their producing causes, they
receive the same ordination; so that the whole, is in a certain
respect the same and different, and that which proceeds, with that
which abides. For on account of its remission, it appears different,
but on account of its coherence with the whole, it does not depart
from identity. But such as _that_ is among first natures, such
is the subsistence of _this_ among things secondary, and such is
its preservation of the indissoluble communion of the series. Every
god, therefore, appears in a manner adapted to the orders in which he
exhibits his presence: but he proceeds from thence even to the last of
things, through the generative power of primary natures. But he always
multiplies the progression from one into multitude: but preserves
identity, in the progression, on account of the similitude of the
progressions to the governing and first operative cause of every series.
PROPOSITION CXXVI.
Of every deity, he is the more universal, who is nearer to the one: but
he is more particular, who is more distant.
For he who is the cause of more effects, is nearer to the cause of all,
but he who produces fewer effects, is more distant. And he who is the
author of many is more universal, but he who produces fewer effects, is
more particular. And each of these is a unity. But the one is greater,
and the other less according to power. And the more particular goods
are generated from such as are more universal, without the latter
receiving any division, (for they are unities) of alteration (for they
are immoveable) or being multiplied according to habitude (for they
are unmixt). But they generate from themselves through an abundance of
power, secondary progressions, diminished from such as are first.
PROPOSITION CXXVII.
Every thing divine is primarily, and especially simple, and through
this is most sufficient.
For that it is simple, is evident from its unity: for the whole is
eminently uniform. But a nature of this kind, is most eminently simple.
But that it is likewise most sufficient, may be learnt by any one who
considers, that a composite, is indigent; though not of things external
to its nature, yet of those from which it is composed. But that which
is most simple, and uniform, and one, is the same with _the good_,
in which good establishing itself, it becomes most sufficient. But
every thing divine, is of this kind. And hence it is neither indigent
of externals, because it is goodness itself, nor of things requisite to
composition, because it is uniform.
PROPOSITION CXXVIII.
Every god, who is participated by natures nearer to his own, is
_immediately_ participated: but when he is participated by
far distant natures, this is effected through _mediums_
more or less numerous.
For the former, since they are by their alliance uniform, are on this
account enabled to participate the divine unities. But such as through
their diminution, and extension into multitude become far distant, are
indigent of other things more united, that they may participate such as
are no longer united, but are essential unities. For multitude united,
subsists between essential unity, and divided multitude. And thus
united multitude is able to coalesce with unity, through _union_; but
is at the same time allied to divided multitude, through _the manifest
appearance of multitude_.
PROPOSITION CXXIX.
Every divine body is divine, through a divine soul. But every
soul, is divine, through a divine intellect. And every intellect
is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And
_unity_ indeed, is a god from itself (αὐτόθεν θεὸς) but
intellect, is most divine: and soul is divine, but body deiform,
or endued with a divine form.
For if every number of gods is above intellect, but participations are
effected through kindred and similar natures, an impartible essence
will first of all participate the super-essential unities. But in the
second place things conjoined with generation. And in the third place,
generation itself. And each particular will participate through its
proximate superior; the peculiarity of the gods proceeding even to the
extremities of things in participants, through mediums allied to their
natures. For unity confers on the first intellect, its own illustrious
power among divine concerns, and causes this intellect to be like
itself, according to an uniform multitude. But through intellect it
is present also to soul, adapting and inflaming its conjunction with
intellect, when this intellect is participable. And by the resounding
echo[133] as it were of soul, it imparts its idiom or peculiarity to
body, if it is a body participating in any respect of soul. And thus
body becomes not only animated, and intellectual, but also divine. For
it receives life and motion from soul, but indissoluble permanency from
intellect, and divine union from participated unity. For each of these
communicates its subsistence to subsequent natures.
PROPOSITION CXXX.
In every divine order, things first, are more exempt from the
natures proximately placed under them, than these last are from
thing subsequent: and secondary natures are more dependant on
their proximate superiors, than following natures are dependant
on these.
For by how much the more uniform, and universal any thing is, by so
much the more it is allotted an excellence greater than subsequent
natures: and by how much the more it is diminished according to power,
by so much the more is its alliance encreased with things posterior to
its nature. And sublimer natures are indeed more united with their more
principal causes: but inferiors are less united. For it is the property
of a greater power to be more exempt from its inferiors, and to be more
united with more excellent natures. And on the contrary to recede more,
and to be passive together with these, implies a diminution of power.
And this indeed happens to secondary natures in every order, but not to
such as are first.
PROPOSITION CXXXI.
Every god begins his own proper energy from himself.
For he first exhibits in himself the peculiarity of his presence in
secondary natures, because he likewise communicates himself to others,
according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is defect, nor
plenitude alone, peculiar to the gods: since every thing deficient is
imperfect; and it is impossible that the imperfect, can cause any thing
to be perfect. But that which is full, is alone sufficient, and is not
yet prepared for communication. It is requisite, therefore, that the
nature which fills, and extends its beneficence to others, should be
above measure full. Hence, if that which is divine, fills all things
through itself, with the goods which it contains in itself, every
thing divine is beyond measure full. And if this be the case, it will
primarily possess in itself, the property which it confers on others.
For thus it will extend to others the communications of overflowing
goodness.
PROPOSITION CXXXII.
All the orders of the gods, are bound in union, by a medium.
For all the progressions of beings, are effected through similars; and
much more is it necessary that the orders of the gods, should possess
an indissoluble continuity, because they subsist uniformly, and are
terminated according to one principal cause of their subsistence. Their
remissions, therefore, take place in an united manner, and through
that similitude alone which is found among beings, of things secondary
to such as are first: and this because the subsistence of the gods,
much more consists in union, than the subsistence of beings. All the
divine genera, therefore, are bound together by proper mediums; so that
first natures do not immediately proceed into progressions entirely
different, but through genera common to each, and of which they are the
immediate causes. For these genera combine the extremes into one union,
being subjected to some, through an alliance of nature, but proximately
separated from others: and they preserve the well-ordered progeny of
divine causes.
PROPOSITION CXXXIII.
Every god is a beneficent unity, or a goodness unific
(ἑνοποιὸς); and each possesses this hyparxis, so far as a god.
But the first god is simply _good_, and simply _one_. And every
god posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain
unity.
For a divine property or idiom distinguishes the unities and
goodnesses of the gods: so that every god confers goodness on all
things, according to a certain characteristic of goodness; such as
that of _perfecting_, or _containing_, or _defending_. For each of
these is a certain good, but not every good. But that which is first
primarily establishes a uniform cause. And this is no other than the
good, constitutive as it were of all goodness. For all the hyparxes
of the gods are not together equal to _the one_; so great is the
super-eminence of _the first_, with respect to the multitude of the
gods.
PROPOSITION CXXXIV.
Every divine intellect, _understands_ as _intellect_, but
_provides_ as _a god_.
For to possess a knowledge of beings, and a perfection in intellectual
conceptions, is the property of intellect. But it is the province of
a god to exercise a providential care, and to fill all things with
good. But this communication, and replenishing, subsists through a
union of the things replenished, with natures prior to their own. And
intellect imitating this, becomes in its intellections the same with
intelligibles. So far, therefore, as a divine intellect provides, it
is a god; because providence is an energy prior to intellect. Hence,
as a god, it communicates itself to all things; but as intellect, it
is not present to all things. For a divine unity, extends beyond the
progressions of an intellectual property. And this will be evident by
considering, that natures void of intelligence, desire to provide, and
to participate something of good: and this because all things do not
desire intellect, even among such as are capable of its participation;
but all things desire good, and hasten to acquire its possession.
PROPOSITION CXXXV.
Every divine unity is immediately participated by some being;
and every thing which is deified, is extended to one divine
unity; and the number of the participating genera of beings is
the same as that of the participated unities.
For neither two, or more unities, are participated by one being[134].
For how is it possible, that when the properties, which the unities
contain, are changed, that which is connate to each, can remain without
alteration; since conjunction subsists through similitude? Nor is one
unity participated in a divisible manner by many beings: for many
beings are unconjoined with unity; both considered as beings, with
respect to that which is prior to beings, and as multitude to unity.
But it is requisite that the participant, should be partly similar
to that which it participates, and partly different and dissimilar.
Since, therefore, that which participates, is something belonging to
beings, but unity is super-essential, and the two are on this account
dissimilars; it _is_ requisite that _that_ which participates should
be one, that by this means it may become similar to the participated
one; though the latter is one, because it is a unity, but the former is
one, because it is passive to the communications of one, and is united
through its participation.
PROPOSITION CXXXVI.
Every god having a more universal subsistence, and being placed
nearer to _the first_, is participated by a more universal
genus of beings. But every god who is more particular and
remote, is participated by a more particular genus of beings.
And as being is to being, so is unity to divine unity.
For if the number of unities, is the same with that of beings, and on
the other hand one unity is participated by one being; it is evident
that the order of beings proceeds according to the order of unities,
assimilated to an order prior to that of beings. And more universal
beings coalesce with more universal unities, but more particular
beings, with more particular unities. For if this be not the case,
dissimilars will again be joined with dissimilars, and distribution
will not subsist according to dignity of nature: but both these cases
are impossible; since the one itself, and a proper measure, through
the divine unities illuminates and supervenes all other natures. Much
more, therefore, will there be an order of participation in the divine
unities; similars depending on similars according to the power which
they contain.
PROPOSITION CXXXVII.
Every unity, together with _the one_ constitutes being
participating of its nature.
For _the one_, as it is hypostatic, (ὑποϛατικὸς) or constitutive of
all things, so likewise it is the cause of participated unities, and of
beings depending on unities. But the unity belonging to every being,
produces the property, which shines forth to view in that particular
being. And _the one_, indeed, is the cause of _simple being_; but
_unity_ is the cause of alliance, because it is connate to _the one_.
Hence unity, is that which of itself defines the being, which is its
participant, and _essentially_ exhibits in it a _super-essential_
characteristic. For universally, from that which is primary, that
which is secondary obtains its subsistence. If, therefore, there is
any super-essential property of deity, it must belong to being, which
participates it essentially.
PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.
Of all things which participate of a divine property, and which are
deified, the first and highest is _being itself_.
For if being is above intellect and life, as we have demonstrated,
and is the most abundant cause after the one; hence _being_ will be
the highest after _the one_. For it is more uniform than intellect
and life, and is on this account more venerable. But there is no
other prior to this, except _the one_: for what besides _the one_,
can be prior to uniform multitude? But _being itself_ is uniform
multitude; because it consists from _bound_ and _infinite_. And
universally, super-essential being[135] is prior to essence. For in
the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, _the one_
alone extends beyond _being_. But _being_ subsists immediately after
_the one_. For that which is _being_ in capacity, and is not as yet
_being_ in energy, is nevertheless according to its nature one. And the
being, which subsists after _the one_, is being in energy. Among the
principles of being, therefore, _non-being_[136] subsists immediately
above being, as something more excellent, and no other than the _one
itself_.
PROPOSITION CXXXIX.
All the participants of the divine unities originate from _being_,
and end in a _corporeal nature_.
For being is the first of participants, but body the last: for we
say that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all genera are
attributed to the gods, whether they are bodies, souls, or intellects;
as in every order, things analogous to the gods, contain and preserve
secondary natures, and every number is a whole, containing all things
in itself according to that whole which is contained in a part, and
possessing before all things a divine characteristic. The divine
genus, therefore, subsists both _corporeally_, and _animastically_ (or
according to the nature of soul ψυχικῶς) and _intellectually_: and it
is evident that all these are divine through participation. For that
which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. The participants,
therefore, of the divine unities, originate from being, but end in a
corporeal nature.
PROPOSITION CXL.
All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and
proceeding through proper mediums, extend to the extremity of
things, and to places situated about the earth.
For nothing intercepts these powers, and restrains their universal
presence; because they are in no respect indigent of places and
intervals, on account of their invincible excellence in all things, and
a presence every where pure and unmixed. Nor is that which is adapted
to the participation of these powers, prohibited from participation:
but as soon as any thing is prepared for their communications, they are
immediately present, neither then approaching, nor being prior to this
absent, but always possessing themselves in the same uniform manner.
If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the participation
of these divine powers, they are present to this; and fill all
things with themselves. And indeed they are more present to superior
natures, but they are present to such as are middle according to the
order of these, and to last natures, in an ultimate respect. They
supernally, therefore, extend themselves to the extremities of things:
and on this account last natures contain the images of such as are
first; and _all things sympathise with all_[137]. For secondary
pre-exist in first natures; and first natures manifestly appear in
such as are second. For every thing subsists in a three-fold manner;
either through _cause_, or through _hyparxis_, or through
_participation_.
PROPOSITION CXLI.
Every providence of the gods, is partly exempt from the natures for
which it provides, and is partly co-ordinated with them.
For one kind of providence is entirely extended above the things which
are illuminated, according to its subsistence, and the characteristic
of its order. But another kind provides for subjects of the same
co-ordination with itself; these subjects themselves imitating the
providential energy of the gods, who are separated from the concerns
for which they provide; and desiring to fill secondary natures with the
goods, they are capable of receiving.
PROPOSITION CXLII.
The gods are present to all things after the same manner,
but all things are not after the same manner present to the
gods. For every thing participates of their presence according
to its order and capacity. And this is accomplished by some
things uniformly, and by others variously; by some things
eternally, and by others according to time; and by some things
incorporeally, and by others in a corporeal manner.
For it is necessary that the different participation of these, should
either proceed from the participant, or from the thing participated.
But every thing divine always possesses the same order: and with
respect to all things, is without restraint, and without mixture. It
remains, therefore, that mutation must subsist through the participant;
and that in these that which is not perpetually the same must abide;
and that these are differently present to the gods. Hence the gods
are present to all things, in the same uniform manner, though all
things are not equally present to them, But particulars are present
according to their ability; and they enjoy the divinities, agreeable to
the manner in which they are present to their illuminations. For the
participation of these is according to the measure of their presence.
PROPOSITION CXLIII.
All inferior natures fail before the presence of the
gods, though a participant among these may be adapted to
participation. Indeed every thing foreign departs from divine
light, but all things are at once illuminated by the gods.
For divine natures always possess a more comprehensive capacity, and
are more powerful than their progressions. But the inaptitude of the
participants, is the cause of the privation of divine light: for it
obscures divine light by its debility[138]. But this obscured light,
appears to receive another domination, not according to its own power,
but according to the impotency of the participant, which seems to fail
and die away, before the illumination of a divine form.
PROPOSITION CXLIV.
All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their
progressions as the orders of the gods.
For the gods produce beings together with themselves, nor is any thing
able to subsist, and to receive measure, and order beyond the influence
of the gods. For all things are perfected, disposed, and measured
through the power of the gods. Hence the gods have a subsistence prior
to the last genera of beings; who also dispose these, and impart to
them life, formation, and perfection; who convert them to _the
good_, and who are in like manner prior to middle, and primary
natures. And all things are bound, and stably rooted in the gods, and
through this derive the continuance, and preservation of their being.
But when any thing apostatizes, or recedes from the gods, and becomes
on this account solitary and destitute, it entirely departs into
non-entity, and perishes: because perfectly deprived of those natures,
by which it was contained.
PROPOSITION CXLV.
The characteristic of every divine order, pervades through all
secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate
genera of beings.
For if the distributions of beings, extend as far as the orders of the
gods, there must be in every genus of beings, a supernally-illuminated
property of the divine powers. For every thing receives from its
proximate cause, that characteristic, or property, by which it is
allotted its peculiar subsistence. I say, for example, if any deity
possesses a cathartic, or purgative power, there will also be a
purgation in souls and in animals, in plants and in stones. And in the
same manner with respect to a defensive, converting, perfective, and
vivifying power. And a stone indeed participates of a purgative virtue,
but in a corporeal manner only. But a plant participates it more
clearly according to life. An animal possesses this form, according to
the motion of appetite: but a rational soul, in a rational manner; and
intellect, intellectually. But the gods possess this super-essentially,
and uniformly. And the whole series is endued with this power, from one
divine cause: and there is the same mode of reasoning in the rest. For
all things depend on the gods. And different natures are illuminated by
different gods; the divine series, descending even to the extremity of
things. And some things are connected with the gods immediately, but
others through more or fewer mediums; _while all things in the mean
time are full of gods_. And whatever any being naturally possesses
it possesses from the gods.
PROPOSITION CXLVI.
The extremities of all the divine progressions, are assimilated
to their principles; preserving a circle without beginning and
end, through a conversion to their principles.
For if every progression returns to the principle from which it
proceeds, much more must total orders, proceeding from their summit,
be converted to it again. But the conversion of the extreme to its
principle, forms one whole, finite, and verging to itself; and
exhibiting through its inclination uniformity in multitude.
PROPOSITION CXLVII.
The summits of all the divine orders, are assimilated to the extremes
of their superiors.
For if it is requisite that there should be a coherence, and continuity
in a divine progression, and that every order should be connected by
proper mediums; it is necessary that the summits of secondary orders,
should be conjoined with the extremes of such as are first. But
conjunction subsists through similitude: and hence there will be a
similitude of the principles of an inferior order, to the extremes of
one superior.
PROPOSITION CXLVIII.
Every divine order is united to itself in a triple respect; by the
summit which it contains; and by its middle, and end.
For its _summit_ possessing a most united power, transmits this
power into a total union, and unites every thing supernally flowing
into itself. But its _middle_ extending to each extreme, connects
every thing about itself: transfusing the gifts of primary natures,
but extending the powers of such as are last; and inserting in all
things a communion and connection with each other. For by this means
one co-ordination is produced from replenishing and replenished
natures, mutually verging to the middle, as to a certain centre. But
the _end_ returning again to the beginning, and reducing to this
the progressive powers, affords similitude and a mutual inclination to
the whole order. And thus the whole order is one, through the unifying
power of its primary parts; through the coherence subsisting in its
middle; and through the conversion of the extreme, to the principle of
the progressions.
PROPOSITION CXLIX.
Every multitude of divine unities, is bounded according to number.
For if it is proximate to the one, it is not infinite; since that
which is infinite is not connate to the one, but foreign from its
nature. For if multitude essentially recedes from _the one_, it is
evident that infinite multitude is perfectly destitute of the one:
and hence it is likewise impotent and inefficacious. The multitude of
the gods, therefore, is not infinite: and consequently, it is uniform
and bounded, and more bounded than any other multitude, because it is
more allied to the one. If, therefore, multitude was the principle of
things, it would be requisite that every thing nearer to, should be a
greater multitude than that which is more distant from the principle:
for that which is nearer is more similar. But since that which is first
is _the one itself_, the multitude conjoined with it must be less
multitude than that which is more remote from _the one_. But infinite
is not a less multitude, but multitude in the, most eminent degree.
PROPOSITION CL.
Every thing progressive in the divine orders, is not naturally
adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor
do secondary natures entirely receive all the powers of natures
prior to themselves: but these possess some powers abstracted
from inferiors; and incomprehensible by things posterior to
themselves.
For if there is a difference in the characteristics of the gods,
those of the inferior must pre-exist in the superior gods: but the
characteristics of the superior, as being more universal, do not reside
in the inferior divinities. But the more excellent characteristics
impart some powers to their productions, but eminently pre-occupy
others in themselves. For it has been demonstrated that those are more
universal, which are nearer to the one, but more particular, which are
more distant. But if the more universal possess powers comprehensive
of the more particular characteristics; hence those which possess a
secondary, and more particular order, will not contain the power of
such as are more universal. Hence in the superior, there is something
incomprehensible, and uncircumscribed by the inferior properties. For
every thing divine is truly infinite; nor does it exhibit itself to
itself; nor to things of a much prior superiority to itself: but to
all such as are posterior to its nature. But infinity resides in these
last, according to capacity. And infinite is incomprehensible by those
to whom it is infinite. Hence inferiors do no not participate of all
the powers, which more excellent natures pre-occupy in themselves. For
the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things secondary,
from their more particular subsistence, will neither possess the whole
of superior natures, nor will they contain the properties which they
possess, in the same manner, as their superiors; on account of that
infinity through which superior excel subordinate natures.
PROPOSITION CLI.
Every thing paternal[139] in the gods has a primary subsistence,
and pre-exists in the order of _the good_, according to all
the divine distributions.
For that which is paternal, produces the hyparxes of secondary natures,
and universal powers, and essences, according to one ineffable
excellence. And on this account it is denominated _paternal_,
indicating the uniform and beneficent power of _the one_, and the
hypostatical, or procreative cause of secondary natures. And in every
order of the gods, that which is paternal, obtains the principality,
producing and adorning all things from itself; because it is
established analogous to _the good_. And with respect to these divine
fathers, some are more universal, but others more particular; just as
the orders of the gods differ in the proportion of cause, according
to more universal, and more particular. As many therefore as are the
universal progressions of the gods, so many also, are the differences
of fathers. For if in every order there is something analogous to the
good, it is requisite that _the paternal_ should reside in all, and
that each order should proceed from a paternal union.
PROPOSITION CLII.
Every thing generative in the gods proceeds according to the
infinity of a divine power, multiplying itself, penetrating
through all things; and eminently demonstrating a never failing
energy, in the progressions of secondary natures.
For what else but the infinite power of the gods, through which
all divine natures are filled with prolific good, can multiply
progressions, and produce them into offspring from their occult
comprehension in causes? For that which is universally full, produces
other things from itself, through its overflowing power. Hence a
dominion of power, is the characteristic of generative deity: and this
absolute dominion multiplies the powers of generated natures, causes
them to be prolific, and excites them to the generation and production
of others. For if every thing imparts its primary characteristic to
others, every thing prolific must insert in natures posterior to
itself, a prolific progression, and form a figurative representation of
that infinity, which is the first progeny of the universe; from which
every generative power proceeds, and which eminently scatters as from a
fountain, the perennial progressions of divine natures.
PROPOSITION CLIII.
Every thing perfect in the gods, is the cause of divine perfection.
For as with respect to hypostases, or subsistences, some belong to
beings, and others are super-essential; so likewise of perfections,
some belong to the gods themselves according to hyparxis, but others
to secondary beings posterior to the gods. And the former indeed are
self-perfect, and first-artificers, because in these good is contained
in a primary manner: but the latter possess perfection through
participation. On this account, therefore, the perfection of the gods
is different from the perfection of things deified. But that which is
primarily perfect in the gods, is not only the cause of perfection to
things deified, but to the gods themselves. For if every thing perfect
is converted to its domestic principle, the cause of every divine
conversion, is the perfective genus of the gods.
PROPOSITION CLIV.
Every thing in the gods endued with a protecting power,
preserves every thing in its proper order; uniformly separating
secondary natures, and establishing them in such as are first.
For if the preservation of every order, preserves measure in an
immutable manner, and contains all the protected natures, in their
proper perfection, divine protection will insert in all things an
eminence above their inferiors, and will permanently establish in
itself every thing, without mixture. It will likewise be the cause
of immaculate purity, to protected natures, and will establish them
in their superiors. For every thing adhering to primary natures is
perfect; but at the same time it abides in itself, and is extended
above inferior natures.
PROPOSITION CLV.
Every thing vivific in the divine genera, is a generative cause; but
every prolific order is not also vivific.
For a generative power is more universal than that which is vivific,
and is nearer to the principle of all. For generation manifests a cause
producing beings into multitude: but vivifying (ζωογονία) represents
deity the supplier of universal life. If, therefore, the former
multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter the progressions of
life; it will be as _being_ is to _life_, so is the _generative_ order
to the _vivific_ series. And hence the generative order will be more
universal, and the cause of more effects, and on this account nearer to
the principle of all.
PROPOSITION CLVI.
Every cause of purity, is contained in the protecting order. But the
protecting is not the same with the purifying genus.
For purity inserts an unmixed nature in every thing inferior to the
gods, and an unpolluted power, in the providence of secondary natures.
But protection likewise produces this, comprehending all things in
itself, and firmly establishing them in their superiors. Hence the
protecting is more universal than the purgative genus. For it is simply
the property of protection, to preserve the order of every thing,
both with respect to itself, and to things prior and posterior to
its nature. But it is the property of purity to separate things more
excellent from such as are more base[140]: and the former of these are
primarily contained in the gods. For it is requisite that there should
be one antecedent cause of that which is contained in all things.
And universally the uniform measures of every thing good, are first
received from the gods; and there is no good in secondary natures,
which does not pre-exist in the gods according to cause. For what other
origin, or cause, can this possess? In the gods, therefore, purity is
likewise a primary good, together with protection, and every thing of
this kind.
PROPOSITION CLVII.
Every paternal cause supplies every thing with being, and
constitutes the hyparxes of beings. But every demiurgic, or
fabricative cause of forms, precedes composite natures, together
with their order, and division according to number: and is of
the same order with a paternal cause, in the more particular
genera of things.
For each of these belongs to the order of bound, because both
_hyparxis_, and _number_, and _form_, are all of them endued with the
form of bound: and hence through this they are co-ordinate to one
another. But that which is _a demiurgic cause_, deduces fabrication
into multitude. And that which is _uniform_, supplies the progressions
of beings. And the former indeed is the artificer of forms, but the
latter produces essence. In whatever respect, therefore, _form_ and
_being_[141] differ from each other, in the same respect that which
is _demiurgic_ differs from that which is _paternal_[142]. But form
itself, is a certain one. A paternal cause, therefore, is both more
universal and causal, and is superior to the demiurgic genus; in the
same manner as being itself is more universal than form.
PROPOSITION CLVIII.
Every reductorial cause (τὸ ἀναγωγὸν) in the gods differs both from a
cathartic or purifying cause, and from convertive genera.
For that a reductorial cause, ought to be primarily resident in
the gods, is evident; as in these all the causes of universal good
pre-exist. But it subsists prior to a cathartic cause; because that
liberates from baser, but a reductorial cause connects with more
excellent natures. It has, however, an order more particular than the
convertive genus; because every thing convertive, is either converted
to itself, or to a more excellent nature. But the operation of that
which is reductorial, is characterized according to a conversion to
that which is more excellent; because it leads that which is converted
to something superior, and more divine.
PROPOSITION CLIX.
Every order of the gods consists from the first principles,
_bound_ and _infinity_. But one order consists more from the
cause of _bound_, and another from that of _infinity_.
For every order indeed proceeds from both, because the communications
of primacy, penetrate through all secondary causes. But in some orders
_bound_ predominates in the mixture, and in others _infinity_. And
hence that in which _bound_ prevails, becomes a genus possessing the
form of bound; but that in which _infinity_ has the dominion, becomes a
genus endued with the form of infinity.
CONCERNING INTELLECT.
PROPOSITION CLX.
Every divine intellect is uniform, and perfect; and is a primary
intellect subsisting from itself, and producing other intellects.
For if it be a god, it is full of divine unities, and is uniform. But
if this be the case it is also perfect, being full of divine goodness.
And again, if this be the case, it is a primary intellect, as being
united to the gods: for deified intellect is more excellent than
every intellect. But since it is a primary intellect, it also confers
subsistence on other intellects: for from first entities, all secondary
beings obtain their hyparxis.
PROPOSITION CLXI.
Every true being depending on the gods, is a divine intelligible, and
is imparticipable.
For since true being as we have demonstrated is that which first
participates a divine unity, it also fills intellect, from itself.
For intellect is being, as that which is replenished with being: and
consequently true being is a divine intelligible. It is divine indeed,
as that which is deified; but as that which is filled with intellect,
which it also participates, it is intelligible. And intellect indeed is
being, through the first being. But the first being is separated from
intellect, because intellect is posterior to being. And imparticipables
are prior to things participated. Hence being united with intellect,
pre-exists by itself, and is imparticipable. For it is intelligible,
not as co-ordinated with intellect, but as eminently perfecting
intellect; because it communicates being to intellect, and fills it
with essence substantial and real.
PROPOSITION CLXII.
Every multitude of unities illustrating true being, is occult
and intelligible. _Occult_ indeed, as conjoined with the one;
but _intelligible_, as participated by being.
For all the gods are denominated from their dependants, because the
different hypostases of the gods may be known from these. For every
thing divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, because connate to
_the ineffable one_. But by the permutation of participants, it
happens that the properties of the gods become known to subordinate
natures. Indeed the unities which illustrate true being are
intelligible; because true being is a divine intelligible, and is
likewise imparticipable, as subsisting prior to intellect. For this
would not depend on the first gods, unless they possessed a primary
hypostasis, and a power perfective of other gods: since as participants
are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of participated natures.
PROPOSITION CLXIII.
Every multitude of unities participated by imparticipable intellect, is
intellectual.
For as intellect is to true being, so are these unities, to
intelligible unities. So far, therefore, as they illuminate divine and
imparticipable intellect, they are intellectual: but they are not so
intellectual, as subsisting in intellect, but as subsisting through
cause prior to, and generating intellect.
PROPOSITION CLXIV.
Every multitude of unities participated by imparticipable soul, is
super-mundane.
For since imparticipable soul, is primarily super-mundane, the gods
also participated by this soul, are super-mundane; possessing the same
proportion to the intellectual, and intelligible gods, which soul has
to intellect, and intellect to true being. As therefore every soul is
extended to intellect, and intellect is converted to that which is
intelligible; so likewise the super-mundane depend on the intellectual
gods, in the same manner as these last, on such as are intelligible.
PROPOSITION CLXV.
Every multitude of unities participated by any sensible body, is
mundane.
For it supernally illuminates the parts of the world, through the
mediums of intellect and soul. For neither is intellect present
without soul to any mundane body; nor are deity, and soul immediately
conjoined: for participations subsist through similars. And intellect
according to the intelligible which it contains, and the summit of its
nature, participates of unity. Unities, therefore, are mundane, so
far as they fill the whole world, and deify apparent bodies. For each
of these is divine, not through soul; (for soul is not the first god)
nor through intellect; (for this is not the same with _the one_),
but is animated and self-motive, through soul. But it always contains
itself in the same manner, and is carried in the best order through
intellect; being at the same time divine through a divine unity. And
if it possesses a providential power, it is such through unity as the
cause.
PROPOSITION CLXVI.
Every intellect is either imparticipable, or participable. And
if participable, it is either participated by super-mundane, or
mundane souls.
For an imparticipable intellect possessing a primary hyparxis presides
over every multitude of intellects. But of participated intellects,
some are super-mundane, and illustrate imparticipable soul; but others
are mundane. For multitude emanating from an imparticipable, is not
immediately mundane; since progressions subsist through similars.
But that which is separated from the world, is more similar to an
imparticipable, than that which is divided about it. And there is not
only a super-mundane, but likewise a mundane multitude. Since there
is likewise a mundane multitude of gods, and the world is at the
same time animated and endued with intellect. And the participation
of super-mundane gods by mundane souls, subsists through mundane
intellects as the connecting mediums.
PROPOSITION CLXVII.
Every intellect understands itself. But the first intellect
understands itself alone[143]. And in this, intellect and that
which is intelligible is one in number. But all succeeding
intellects, understand both themselves and prior intellects.
[144]And the intelligible to this first intellect, is partly
that which it is itself, and partly that from which it proceeds.
For every intellect either understands itself, or that which is above,
or that which is posterior to itself. But if it understands that which
is posterior to itself; since it is intellect it will be converted to
a worse nature, and will not even know that to which it is converted,
because the object of its intellection will not reside in its nature,
but will be external. And thus it will only possess in itself a
type, or figure, of this external object. For it knows that which it
possesses, and that to which it is passive, but not that which it does
not possess, and by which it is not affected. But if it understands
that which is above itself, since this is accomplished by the knowledge
of itself, it will both understand itself, and the nature superior to
its own. But if it knows that alone, it will at the same time that
it is intellect, be ignorant of itself. But by knowing that which is
superior to itself, it knows also that it is a cause, and of what it
is the cause: for if it is ignorant of these, it will also be ignorant
of that superior nature. And hence by knowing that which is prior
to itself, it will also know itself. If therefore any intellect is
intelligible, this by knowing itself will understand an intelligible,
and will be itself its own intelligible. But each of the intellects
posterior to this, will at the same time understand that which is
intelligible in itself, and that which is prior to itself. There is,
therefore, in intellect, that which is intelligible, and in that which
is intelligible intellect. But the one, is the same with that which is
intelligible[145]; and the other is the same with the intelligible in
itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself. For
the one is simply intelligible, and the other is an intelligible in an
intelligent nature.
PROPOSITION CLXVIII.
Every intellect knows in energy that which it understands. And
it is not the property of one part of its nature to know, and of
another to understand that which it knows.
For if it is intellect in energy, and knows itself as not different
from the object of its intellection[146]; it will both know and
perceive itself. But beholding that which is intelligent, and knowing
that which beholds, it will know that it is intellect in energy. And
knowing this, it will know that it understands, and will not alone know
the object of its intellection. It will, therefore, at the same time
both know that which is intelligible, and that it understands this: and
by intellection it will be understood by itself.
PROPOSITION CLXIX.
Every intellect possesses in eternity, its essence, power, and energy.