chosen the beautiful city of Ephesus for his capital: thither Hannibal
came, and was received with the greatest distinction. The latter, who
had passed the first years after the conclusion of the second Punic
war in his native city, had by no means given himself up to despair:
he soon showed himself, after the peace, to be as great as during the
war. He had been made Suffete, a term which we also find in the Book
of Judges, meaning the head of the state in peace; and though this was
a dignity which had not any longer much weight, as the ruling power in
Carthage was already seriously paralysed by the democratical element,
while in office, he by his ability had given it its former influence.
He reformed abuses of every kind,[33] and turned his attention
particularly to the finances, in which he had found out an immense
deficit, as the great men had helped themselves to all the good things:
in short, he brought with him new life and new hopes into his native
city. But the more he laid abuses bare, the faster grew the party of
the traitors, who at that time were to be met with in Carthage as well
as in all the states,--a set of men who sought their own individual
power, whilst sacrificing their country to the Romans. The latter,
who, to use Livy’s fine expression, had made peace with Carthage, but
not with Hannibal, looked upon him with great mistrust; which was
very natural, as his only thought was to raise his country. Rome had
long ceased to be a conscientious state; her unsullied moral purity,
which in her earlier days was far from being a mere dream, was quite
gone, and just when she had the power, and therefore the opportunity
of acting uprightly, she broke all the laws of honour and virtue. The
Romans had already more than once complained of Hannibal; and now they
regularly charged him with the design of preparing war, and demanded
that he should be given up to them. This embassy, however, was not set
on foot without the strongest opposition from the great Scipio, who
denounced such conduct as unworthy, as shameful indeed. But before the
Carthaginians had come to a resolution which would perhaps have been
wrung from them, Hannibal fled to Antiochus, the king of Syria.
Hannibal was startled, when he saw the state of the Syrian troops. He
found a host, of which the great mass were barbarians, which though
apparently trained in some measure to the Macedonian way of fighting,
was unsound to the core, and quite as cowardly as under the Persian
rule: it was only from single divisions of such an army that he could
expect anything. But his plan was worthy of him. He advised Antiochus
to bestow his greatest exertions on the fleet, and by means of it to
carry the war into Italy; the picked troops and those which he himself
still hoped to train, might then be embarked on it and landed in
southern Italy, which was so exasperated against Rome on account of
the revenge which she had taken. Greece he should not touch; for that
would irritate Philip, to whom he should rather leave it, and seek
to aggrandize himself in Egypt. But it was natural that men of small
minds should reject this plan; and it was resolved to transfer the
war to Greece, where the Ætolians were their allies, and to try and
gain over Philip. The latter plan was the more hazardous, and in fact
quite impracticable, owing to the folly which the advisers of Antiochus
displayed in all that they did: they wished to work upon Philip, not
by fair means only, but also by fear. Thus at the very moment, when
everything turned upon Philip’s goodwill being won, a pretender, who
gave himself out to be a descendant of Alexander the Great, and who
had been with the Acarnanians in Epirus, was received at Ephesus as
the rightful sovereign of Macedon: they even fostered the fond hope
of bringing about a revolution there. This was childish folly. As
matters now stood, Hannibal gave his advice against war; and this was
accounted to him as treachery, and the wretched king with his wretched
councillors so thoroughly misunderstood this great man as to think him
capable of playing into the hands of Rome. In this belief they were
confirmed by a stratagem of the Romans by which bad men only could have
been taken in. Scipio was sent over to Asia for a last negotiation with
Antiochus. He and Hannibal were personally acquainted, and two such
great men passed lightly over the circumstance of their having faced
each other as enemies. They were not mere tools of the state; but they
were as two great moral powers arrayed against each other, which after
a mighty struggle had made peace, and not as ordinary men. In such
cases, there is kindled in truly great souls a mutual love. They met
familiarly, and Hannibal was thus led to offer hospitality to Scipio,
which the latter said that he would have accepted, had not Hannibal
been dependent on an enemy of Rome. Scipio was perhaps less frank in
this conversation than Hannibal, and he may have taken advantage of
him: this may have contributed to make Hannibal suspected.
When it became known, that the Romans began to arm, the Ætolians
demanded that Antiochus should come over with his forces to Greece.
Hannibal saw that Antiochus was running to his destruction, if he
undertook the war with his present means; and he told him, that he must
gain over Philip, and if possible, the Egyptians. Yet there were great
difficulties in the way of these alliances. If Philip united with the
Ætolians, the Achæans were thrown into the arms of the Romans. Philip
also was angry, because Antiochus had not supported him in his war; and
moreover, should everything turn out most favourably, the object of
Antiochus was no other than to conquer Greece: if it therefore became
possible to weaken Rome, the Macedonians thereby merely got another
dangerous neighbour. Thus the negotiations did not advance matters;
and if Antiochus had been wise, he would not have listened to the
blind rage of the Ætolians, and he would have been aware of their
insignificance: but he thought them to be a great nation.
The preparations were made with so little method, that Antiochus had no
more than ten thousand men ready to embark. The Ætolians, who expected
an innumerable army, had likewise described their own power as much
larger than it really was; so that he was highly astonished to find
that they had scarcely four thousand men. He landed at Demetrias,
which, as we shall see, was already evacuated by the Romans, and now
occupied by the Ætolians. He now reduced Phthiotis, and passed over to
Eubœa, and made himself master of the strong town of Chalcis. It was
fated that the Romans should be justified in their unwillingness to
intrust their fortresses to the Greeks, who did not know how to behave.
From thence he went on to Bœotia, where he was joyfully welcomed, to
Phocis, and into Thessaly. This last country had been converted by the
Romans into a republic; yet it had never known how to govern itself,
and owing to its having been so long dependent on Macedon, it had
become quite unable to take care of its own affairs: the Magnesians
and Phthiotes had been detached, and formed into an independent state.
He met with a good reception on both sides of mount Œta, and here he
made fresh acquisitions. This was the critical moment: had Philip
energetically declared himself, the Romans would have been driven back
as far as Illyricum. But Philip was diverted from it by the Romans.
He saw that the war had been begun with so little judgment that there
was not much to be expected from it: moreover, he had not himself
acquired strength enough, and he knew well, that if the issue were
unfavourable, he should fare the worst; and if he were to wait awhile,
he might hope that the Romans would crush his enemies the Ætolians,
whilst his position would be none the worse, and then he might quietly
abide his time when the Greeks would begin to be hostile to the
Romans. He therefore only took possession of the town of Demetrias, one
of the three chief strongholds of Greece, which gave him the command
of Thessaly. There must have been a secret treaty about it with the
Romans; for it henceforth remained Macedonian until the fall of that
empire, without its evacuation having been called for. The district of
Magnesia was also incorporated with Macedon.
In the war of Nabis already, a bitterness of feeling between the Romans
and Achæans had begun to show itself: the latter were mistrustful,
because the Romans had not yet withdrawn their garrisons from the
Acrocorinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias. But as Antiochus was approaching,
of whose power quite an exaggerated opinion was entertained, the Romans
were wise enough now to remove those garrisons. The other Greek states
likewise fell off one by one from Rome, and there was everywhere a
Roman and a Macedonian party. Flamininus now sullied his fair fame by
allowing the faction devoted to himself and to the Romans in Bœotia
to murder the leader of the Macedonian faction, and by screening the
guilty from justice. The Achæans were still his friends, but very
negative ones: they did not wish to join themselves with the Ætolians.
Antiochus and the Ætolians had now on both sides their eyes opened with
regard to the expectations which they had entertained of each other.
Hannibal, who from the very first had been a prophet of evil, was now
called in. This is the usual fate of great men. So long as one is doing
well, and one can still follow their advice, they are not listened to;
but if one has got into trouble by acting against it, then are they
charged with obstinacy, if they declare that nothing any more is to be
done. Hannibal could only propose that they should renew the attempts
to gain over Philip. But the latter had already concluded his alliance
with Rome, hoping thereby to regain Thessaly; at the same time, to him
the thought was delightful of revenging himself on the Ætolians by
means of a union with the Romans. Antiochus now ventured no more on any
greater undertaking; but by the advice of his courtiers, he sought to
employ the winter in making preparations in Asia. This, however, was
only done to a small extent, and in the meanwhile he wasted his time
in feasts at Chalcis. By the beginning of spring, a new consular army
under M’. Acilius Glabrio, which was reinforced by the Macedonians,
appeared in Thessaly, where it was opposed by no more than ten thousand
Asiatics and a few Ætolians; and it encamped near Heraclea, whilst
Antiochus occupied Thermopylæ, just the reverse of what happened in the
days of the Persians: for this time it was the Asiatics, though indeed
these were half-Macedonians, who in their turn defended the pass. The
Achæans had now again decidedly joined the Romans, and they did them
good service. That the pass at Thermopylæ could be turned, unless Œta,
over which there lay a path, were occupied as well, was then generally
known already, as experience had twice shown it. The order to take two
mountains which covered the defile, was given to old Cato, and to his
friend L. Valerius Flaccus. The latter was unsuccessful; but the former
got possession of the heights, and dashed into the enemy’s camp along
with the flying Ætolians, whilst M’. Acilius beat the Syrians in front.
The army of Antiochus broke, and was scattered; he himself escaped to
Chalcis, where a short time before he had been revelling in Asiatic
luxury and childish festivities. That town he abandoned, leaving behind
a weak garrison which made no stand against the Romans, who, however,
did not pursue him; and he went to Asia. His fleet also, at the sight
of a Roman one which had now arrived, sheered off to Asia Minor.
Antiochus looked upon the war as ended; yet he gathered together a new
army, and again gave himself up to his pleasures. There is no doubt but
that he would have agreed to any peace, however indifferent it might
have been.
M’. Acilius Glabrio now turned the war against the Ætolians. Heraclea
and Lamia, on the Thessalian side of Thermopylæ, belonged to Ætolia
Epictetus: the former of these was besieged by the consul, Lamia by
Philip. The siege of Heraclea, where the main force of the Ætolians
lay, was carried on with the utmost spirit, according to all the
rules of military art. The town was taken by storm, and the garrison
surrendered at discretion. The Ætolians now lost courage. Yet they
were still saved by the eagerness of the Romans to pass over into the
rich country of Asia, and to have done with this toilsome mountain war
against a race which had nothing; and also by the anxiety of these
that Philip should not gain his ends. When Lamia was about to fall,
although without doubt possession of it had been promised to Philip,
the consul sent him word, that he had made a convention for Lamia, and
that therefore the king was to give up the siege. Hereupon Philip took
no further share in the war, beyond reducing the Athamanians and the
Dolopians.
The Ætolians would have been extirpated, had not the Romans themselves
wished to have them preserved. The latter besieged Naupactus. Had they
urged on this siege with true vigour and earnestness the town must have
yielded; but they went to work sluggishly and with much forbearance,
which enabled the Ætolians to save the place. The war ended with the
siege of Ambracia, which at that time was Ætolian, and in the defence
of which the little people of the Ætolians, though abandoned by all the
Greeks, and without any great man to head them, displayed the highest
gallantry. The siege is one of the most scientific in the whole of
ancient history: the description of it is delightful, owing to the
cleverness of invention, and the stedfastness of the besieged: it does
one good to see physical weakness holding its own by means of skill.
This defence does honour to the Ætolians, whose wars are otherwise not
very glorious: it is of a somewhat later date (564). At length, peace
was mediated by the Athenians. The Ætolians had to pay a few hundred
talents as a war-contribution; to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome,
and to bind themselves to follow the Romans in their wars; to evacuate
Ambracia, and to give it up to them, as well as Cephallenia, which
was taken and laid waste by the conquerors: a like fate had already
befallen the Acarnanians. The peace was a hard one, yet under the
circumstances fair enough. Thus the Romans gained possession of the
country along the coast, and of the landing places in Greece.
Antiochus now confined himself to holding out with his fleet against
the Rhodians and the ships of Eumenes, amongst which there were only
a very few Roman ones. An unimportant battle was fought, in which
these had the best of it; but after the fleets had separated, the
Rhodians were shamefully deceived, surprised, and defeated by the
Syrians. The Roman admiral, M. Æmilius Regillus, now came up with a
new fleet of not more than eighty ships: the Romans were so little
made for the sea-service, that they kept no fleet whatever, when they
did not actually want one. Hence likewise, at least one half of their
crews were then Rhodians; for these were the best seamen of the age,
being yet in their prime, as in the best days of Greece. The fleet of
Antiochus had been furnished almost entirely by the Phœnician towns,
which, however, important as they were during the Persian rule, must
now have very much gone down; and it was commanded by Hannibal. Yet
though led by Hannibal, it was not able to effect a junction with
another division, when a battle was fought near Myonnesus. The victory
was altogether on the side of the Romans and their allies: the fleet
of Antiochus was all but destroyed; the ships which were left, fled
away into two harbours in Caria. This success had been achieved by
the Rhodians; it was won, however, by means of fire, the Rhodians
having engines on board their ships which hurled fire upon the enemy,
most likely a kind of what was afterwards called Greek fire: it was
not thrown with rockets, and from the way in which historians speak
of it, this at least is certain, that the masses of it were quite
extraordinary, and that it could not be quenched. This naval victory
decided the war. Antiochus, by the advice of Hannibal, had meant to
occupy the Chersonesus, which is joined to Thrace only by a narrow
tongue of land about half a mile in length; on this lay Lysimachia,
a well fortified town, from whence strong walls stretched out to the
Melas Colpos and the Propontis, so that on the landside it could only
be taken by a siege: one could land indeed at several places, but the
Syrian fleet might have prevented it, and ought to have done so. He
would then have been unassailable in Asia, so long as he chose to keep
on the defensive. Yet such was the blindness of this king, that he sent
Hannibal, as a hateful reminder of rejected counsels to Pamphylia,
and banished him from his presence. It is possible that Antiochus by
occupying the Chersonesus might have protected Asia, although he could
not have kept it in the long run; but what was senseless, was his
giving it up without making even so much as an attempt to defend it:
the rich magazines there, which had been laid up for a long campaign,
were abandoned to the Romans, and the garrisons withdrawn from the
towns. He beguiled himself, or his subjects, with the thought that
he should be able to make a stand behind the Hellespont; yet this
coast also he forsook at the approach of the Romans, and fell back
into Lydia. In the same way, the troops of Philip, which, even before
Alexander’s days, had set foot on those shores, were not hindered by
the Persians from crossing.[34]