limited to Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia, an insurrection was
planned among the Spaniards. Few of the Spanish states were republics;
most of them were governed by princes, two of whom, Mandonius and
Indibilis, after a long alliance with the Romans, had imbibed a furious
hatred against them. Here also that nationality of the Spaniards which
one meets with in all ages, displays itself in the wrath which all at
once breaks out against the foreigners, whom they had wished from the
beginning only to use as tools. These events are also remarkable for
another reason, being the first traces of a state of things which long
afterwards showed itself in a more decided shape, the tendency of the
Italian allies towards equality with the Romans. Yet our accounts of
them are incomplete, and do not hit the main point. Scipio was very
ill; and a report got abroad of his death, at a time when there was
stationed near Sucro an army of eight thousand men, consisting of
Italian allies, and not, as Livy says, of Romans. These resolved to
make themselves masters of Spain, and to found an independent state.
The first pretext of this insurrection was the arrears of their pay,
which, although it was taken from their own treasuries, they received
much more irregularly than the Romans: on the whole, they felt that
they were neglected, and yet they well knew, that there was no doing
without them. They chose two from among themselves, an Umbrian, and
a Latin from Cales, to be their generals, and even invested them
with the consular insignia, which Zonaras mentions, though Livy says
nothing about it: these took the command, and were entering into an
understanding with the two Spanish princes. The crisis seemed most
highly dangerous; but when the tidings of Scipio’s recovery reached
the camp, they at once lost courage, and his personal character had
such influence, that they abandoned every idea of an insurrection,
and thought of nothing but making their peace. Scipio came down to
Carthagena; he behaved as if he deemed them to be in the right, and
intimated to them, that they might atone for their offence by serving
against the Spanish princes; and that they were to go to Carthagena
to receive their pay, either singly, or in a body. They determined
upon coming in a body, as this seemed to be the safer plan, and they
believed that everything had been forgiven them. And their minds were
set quite at ease, when on the day before their entry into Carthagena,
they met with a quartermaster, who told them that the Roman army was
to march to Catalonia: thus they arrived in the evening, and were
quartered in the suburbs, the officers in the town itself. The latter
were invited to the houses of the most respectable Romans, and arrested
during the night. The next morning, the Roman army, on which he could
implicitly rely, made a show of marching out of the gates, and the
mutineers were summoned to the _forum_ to get their pay: these had
their suspicions completely lulled, and they came unarmed. But at the
gates, the columns were ordered to halt; they occupied all the streets,
and hemmed in the mutineers. Scipio now addressed these last, and told
them what punishment they had deserved; yet he contented himself with
having only the ringleaders, thirty-five in number, seized and put to
death: the rest received their pay, and were let off. After this, the
war against the Spaniards was easy. The two princes were pardoned on
their oath to keep quiet.
Before Scipio had yet left Spain, he achieved a feat of romantic daring
in going over to Africa to visit Syphax, the king of the Massæsylians,
who lived in eastern and part of western Algeria, and whose capital was
Cirta: the geography of those countries at the time of the Carthaginian
rule, is one of the most obscure. Syphax was not tributary to the
Carthaginians, but in that sort of dependence in which the prince of a
barbarous people must be upon a very powerful and civilized state: he
served them for pay, and felt altogether subordinate; sometimes he was
quite at their disposition, at others, he fell away from them, after
which, he would make peace again. Just then, he was at peace with them;
but he had previously, when at war, made overtures to the Romans, and
on his demand for Roman officers to train his troops, Scipio had sent
over envoys with full powers. This, however, led to no results; for in
the meanwhile peace had been concluded, and Syphax kept neutral. Scipio
now ventured to cross over at his invitation, in the hope of forming
an alliance with him, as he had, from the very first, entertained the
just notion of attacking Carthage on her own ground. Here he actually
met with Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, at the same banquet. The object
of the conduct of Syphax towards the Romans, was not to allow the
Carthaginians to become too powerful, and to draw money out of them:
that he let Scipio escape, is really to be wondered at.
In Spain, all was now ended, and Scipio returned to Italy, where,
however, he was not granted a triumph, because while conducting this
war, he had not held any curule office: every other mark of honour was
shown him. He was still proconsul; before that, he had been ædile; he
had not yet been prætor; nevertheless he now stood for the consulship,
though he had not yet reached the age prescribed by law: the _leges
annales_, by a very wise enactment, had been set aside for so long as
the war should last. He was unanimously chosen by all the centuries;
the nation longed to see the end of the war, and every one expected it
from him. As far as we can see, this was nothing but one of those silly
notions, by which the public are so easily taken in; the great men, it
was said, were right glad that the war with Hannibal should drag on,
as thus they could so much the oftener get for themselves the highest
dignities. Scipio, who was the idol of the people, was withstood
by the party of the grandees, of which Fabius is to be deemed the
mainspring,--a party just like the one which Livy describes as having
existed in Carthage against Hannibal. Yet one ought to be fair, even
to that party. Old Fabius Maximus, perhaps already in his eightieth
year, was at its head for more reasons than one; perhaps, even because,
like every old man who sees his own brightness fading away, he was
inclined to look upon the rising young men with unfavourable eyes.
Scipio also, from the very circumstance of his being no common man, may
have seemed to the Romans a very incomprehensible character; many may
have been afraid that his good luck would make him reckless, as it did
Regulus; others, that it might tempt him to overthrow the constitution.
That this suspicion was utterly groundless, as far as it was founded
upon Scipio’s personal disposition, may safely be asserted; yet we
find it mentioned here and there,[29] that it was intended to make
him consul or censor for life: had this been done, he would have been
king, although, as things then were, this could not possibly have been
brought about without bloodshed: yet it shows, that the mistrust, after
all, was not without reason. Hence it was that a determined opposition
manifested itself in the senate, to whose department belonged grants
of men and money. Scipio tried to get Africa for his province; but
they gave him Sicily, without allowing him any other troops but those
which were there already: he, however, got leave to try his chance in
an expedition with those who might voluntarily offer themselves. This
conduct of the senate towards Scipio is an acknowledged fact, and by it
Rome was very nearly on the point of losing again all the advantages of
the war. This behaviour of the senate ought to be borne in mind, when
its stedfastness in the war with Hannibal is spoken of.
The influence of Scipio’s personal qualities was now seen. In Italy
there was famine and disease, and yet part of the Etruscan and Umbrian
states, which were not obliged to bear any burthens whatever, and
therefore, owing to the regard which the Romans then had for every
sort of privilege, had remained in full vigour, whilst Rome had worn
herself out, exerted themselves for Scipio, as much as if they had
themselves to undertake a war. They built a fleet for him, and equipped
it; Arretium gave him arms for thirty thousand men, and likewise money
and provisions; from the Sabines, Picentines, Marsians, and other
neighbouring peoples, a great number of veterans and young discharged
soldiers volunteered to serve under him. Thus he got a considerable
fleet and a large army, quite against the wishes of the senate. He
crossed over to Sicily, made from thence an attempt upon Locri, and
took that town from Hannibal; yet, on the whole, the year of his
consulship passed off without any thing remarkable. Why he waited so
long in Sicily, has not been fully accounted for; it seems that he
took matters easy, and willingly lingered in these Sicilian regions,
being particularly delighted with Syracuse. Men’s expectations were
most signally disappointed: it had been believed, that as soon as his
preparations were at all complete, he would pass over to Africa; and
now it was understood that he was living quite in the Greek style at
Syracuse. Commissioners thereupon were sent to inquire into the matter,
and if the charge were true, to depose him; but he so overawed them,
that they reported that he was by no means wasting his time, but was
finishing his preparations.
Hannibal, after the battle of Sena, had already foreseen the issue of
the war; but he did not yet lose courage. On the contrary, he deemed
it his duty to struggle to the last moment, that the Romans might
not be sure of their own country; yet, as he could not defend such
extensive provinces, he evacuated Apulia, Messapia, the country of the
Hirpinians, and the greater part of Lucania, so that he only kept the
south-eastern part of it, and Bruttium. Here he remained for three
campaigns, with a perseverance which Livy himself admires; like a lion,
he made whoever dared to touch him, pay heavily for it. Within this
narrow tract of country, he had to recruit and provision his army, and
to detain the Romans, so as to keep them away from Africa, living the
whole time in the midst of peoples whom he drove to despair by the most
exorbitant demands. And he succeeded in all this, without a thought
either of rebellion or of violence being awakened against him; yet he
was neither able to pay nor to feed his army, and he suffered from
plague and hunger. His headquarters and arsenal was Croton. Thus the
war went on, until the Carthaginians called him to Africa, the Romans
narrowing his district more and more by wresting from him one place
after the other.
It was not till the year after his consulship, 548, when his
proconsular _imperium_ was prolonged, that Scipio with four hundred
transports, protected by forty quinqueremes, crossed over to Africa.
If the Carthaginians had had their ships of war assembled, they must
have baffled Scipio’s undertaking; but this could hardly have been the
case, or else their inactivity would have been quite unaccountable.
How many troops he carried over, was unknown, even to the ancients
themselves; as an average number, we may assume sixteen thousand men
foot, several thousand horse, and a considerable fleet: when these
departed, there were great tremblings of heart in the timid party among
the Romans, who thought of nothing but the fate of Regulus. Scipio’s
arrangements were admirable. In three days he made the passage, and
landed north of Carthage, not far from Utica, near a headland at the
mouth of the river Bagradas, which, like almost all the rivers which
fall into the Mediterranean, has formed another mouth farther on, its
old one having been choked up with sand; Shaw, however, in his travels,
fixes the point with admirable precision. Its memory was kept up as
long as the Roman empire lasted, by the name of _Castra Cornelia_; it
was a headland with an offing, a gradually sloping beach of gravel, on
which the ships had to be drawn up. Here Scipio entrenched himself,
and from thence made excursions. In the meanwhile, Syphax had been
entirely gained over to the Carthaginians, having married Sophonis (in
Hebrew Zephaniah), or, as Livy has it, Sophonisbe, the daughter of
Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo. When Scipio had landed, a Carthaginian
army under Hasdrubal, a great Numidian one under Syphax, and a smaller
Numidian one under Masinissa, went out to meet him. Masinissa was
hereditary prince of the Massylians, a people on the frontier of what
is now Tunis, which dwelt at the foot of the mountains. He was a vassal
of the Carthaginians, had served under their standards in Spain, and
in that country already had entered into some correspondence with
the Romans. He is known to have been the guest-friend of Scipio;
in the _Somnium Scipionis_, he makes his appearance as a venerable
old man; he was brought up in Carthage, and, at least in his later
years, understood Greek or Latin. These African princes were all of
them thoroughly faithless. That his truth to the Romans ever became
so renowned, was merely owing to the fact that it was his object to
enrich himself at the expense of Carthage, in which he was aided by
the Romans; but his son, who already stood in a different relation
to them, in the third Punic war certainly did them a great deal of
mischief. A romance has been got up, in which Masinissa is in love with
Sophonisbe, and therefore jealous of Syphax; with the latter, he is
said to have been involved in a war, and afterwards reconciled. He now
came, it would seem, as an ally of the Carthaginians against Scipio,
who enticed him to go over. He had lost his hereditary right, owing to
the Carthaginians having favoured a rival of his; for some time, he had
roved in the desert: he now wished to try his luck with the Romans,
and he showed himself useful to them as a centre, round which a host
of Africans gathered. He imparted to Scipio his plan by which he had
beguiled the Carthaginians, and Scipio fell upon them from an ambush:
the loss was considerable for Carthage, as it comprised a number of
her citizens. The Carthaginian general Hanno was taken prisoner, and
afterwards exchanged for Masinissa’s mother. In the meanwhile, Syphax
had had the presumption to act as mediator between the Romans and
Carthaginians; which, of course, came to nothing, as everything was
then to remain as before, and Hannibal and Scipio were each of them to
withdraw from Italy and Africa. But the attempt was of use to Scipio;
for while this was going on, he was able to establish himself in Africa.
Scipio besieged Utica with ill success; Hasdrubal and Syphax kept him
in check, very likely in open camps. On this, Scipio undertook a sudden
night-attack, which shows what wretched discipline there was in their
armies. He managed to get in, and to set fire to both the camps, which
were of straw-built huts; the enemy, taken by surprise, tried to make
their escape, but were pent in like sheep, and slaughtered by the
Romans. The two armies were scattered; Syphax left the Carthaginians,
and returned to his own country. Masinissa now set himself up as a
competitor for his throne, and marched against him: the subjects
of Syphax joined him in great masses, and Lælius accomplished the
undertaking. Syphax was taken prisoner. Masinissa followed up his
advantage, and made himself master of Cirta, the chief town, afterwards
called Constantineh, a name which it still bears. There the wife of
Syphax was found, and Masinissa immediately married her, without asking
the consent of the Romans. But Scipio was positive in his demand, that
Sophonis, as a Carthaginian woman and an enemy of the Romans, should be
given up; Masinissa, not wishing to let her suffer such a fate, sent
her poison, and she killed herself. Part of the kingdom of Syphax was
given to his son; he himself was sent as a prisoner to Italy, and led
in the triumph of Scipio: he died an old man at Alba in the country
of the Marsians. His statues must have been common: there are still
several pedestals which have his name and a summary of his history.
The Carthaginians became convinced that their force was not sufficient;
they had indeed succeeded in an attempt against the Roman ships, but
this was also the only time during the three years of the war in
Africa. They sent word to Hannibal and Mago that both of them were to
come, which was good news for Italy; yet as it was uncertain, whether
the transport of the armies was possible, the Carthaginians also made
Scipio proposals of peace, to which he listened the more readily, as
he had now for three years been proconsul in Africa, and had always to
expect his dismissal, in which case the consul of the following year,
Ti. Claudius Nero, would have carried away the glory of having ended
the war. Moreover, the issue of the contest with Hannibal was still
very doubtful; and therefore the conditions of Scipio, hard as they
were, were yet tolerable in comparison with what happened afterwards.
The independence of the Carthaginians was acknowledged; they were to
be masters of the whole tract of country within the Punic canal, (what
its extent was, is uncertain;) to give up Italy, Spain, Sicily, and
Sardinia, and likewise all their ships but thirty, probably triremes,
and to deliver up the prisoners of war: how much was asked by way of
payment for the expenses of the war, is uncertain. Livy says that the
annalists stated the numbers very differently: the exact numbers which
we meet with in the later Greek writers (fifteen hundred talents in
Appian), are taken from these statements, between which Livy does not
venture to decide. The latter mentions also a great quantity of corn.
On these conditions, the rulers of Carthage were resolved to make
peace; but quite different was the feeling of the restless, unruly
populace, who fiercely raved against the peace, without, however, being
willing to shed a drop of their own blood. These were in despair.
After having gloriously fought for so long, were they, it was said, to
declare themselves vanquished, while Hannibal was still alive? for the
great mass of the people certainly looked upon him as an idol. In the
meanwhile, the government carried its point, and a truce was concluded,
and ambassadors sent to Rome. There the peace was accepted on condition
that Hannibal should leave Italy. But the Carthaginians now heard that
Hannibal was really going to evacuate Italy, and they thought that
they might try a different tack. The peace was all but sworn to, when
a large Roman fleet, which had arrived with provisions, but had not
yet landed them, was driven from its moorings by a storm. Carthage had
for a long time been in want of food, and the people murmured at this
supply being allowed to go to the enemy, when the gods themselves were
against them, and they could take it if they liked; so they embarked
in a riotous manner, and cut out the Roman ships, which, relying
on the truce, had cast anchor there. Scipio on this sent envoys to
remonstrate, and to demand satisfaction. This, however, was not to
be had, such was the general fermentation, and the Roman emissaries
got away with great difficulty; it was only under the protection of a
guard, that they managed to return to their ship, which--contrary, it
is true, to the wish of the government--was chased by a Carthaginian
vessel, and had to save itself, by running ashore. This story reminds
one of the murder of the French ambassadors at Rastadt. All hope of
peace was now utterly gone, and the Carthaginian ambassadors were
commanded to withdraw from Rome.
Mago had landed from Spain at Genua, had taken it, and was trying to
change Liguria into a Carthaginian province; just as the Romans had
spread in Spain from one single place. Yet he made but little progress
in the Apennines and in the Alps, as he had to deal with a host of
unmanageable petty tribes. Although indeed he got reinforcements and
money, his means at first were inconsiderable; yet he always obliged
the Romans to employ some forces against him. Once he defeated them
in the country of the Insubrians: so that, if he had not now been
recalled, he would certainly have given them a great deal of trouble.
He embarked, but died of the wounds which he had received in that
engagement.
Hannibal had likewise had positive orders to embark, and one cannot
understand why the Romans did not do their utmost to destroy his fleet:
he reached Africa without an accident. Against Carthage itself, the
Romans were not able to undertake anything: it was too strong a town.
Nor had Scipio as yet taken any other city that was fortified, though
he was master of many open places. Hannibal landed near Adrumetum;
he had taken with him all those whom he could find in Bruttium able
to bear arms, and he had embodied among his troops all the Roman
and Italian deserters, whose only chance of life depended on the
war with Rome. His army consisted of about forty thousand men. Yet
when he beheld the state of things at Carthage, he made an attempt
to negotiate; for he saw how unlikely it was that the war would be
successfully carried on, and he knew well that, if a battle were lost,
the city would obtain a peace from which it might never recover. Scipio
likewise was very anxious for peace; for he was always afraid that
they would not prolong his _imperium_. The conditions which Hannibal
offered, were too low, as he demanded for the Carthaginians the
sovereignty over Africa, leaving indeed to the Romans the countries
which they had conquered, but refusing everything else; Scipio still
wished to keep to the former conditions, with a trifling compensation
for the wrong which had been done. All was spoilt at last by the folly
of the Carthaginian people, who, now that Hannibal was come, thought
that Scipio’s army would be destroyed like that of Regulus; and thus
the famous battle of Zama was brought on (550). Hannibal, according
to the testimony of Polybius, here also displayed the qualities of a
great general. He drew up his army in three lines. The foremost was
formed of a medley of foreign troops enlisted from among the most
opposite races; behind these were placed the Carthaginian citizens,
who only took up arms in times of the utmost need, but were forced
by these very circumstances to be brave; behind these again, as a
reserve, were the Italians whom he had brought over, and they were a
considerable body: in front of the whole were eighty elephants, and on
the wings were the cavalry. This is the only battle in which Hannibal
made use of elephants. The Romans were set in their usual array of
_hastati_, _principes_, and _triarii_, save only that Scipio left
large spaces between each of these three divisions, whereas otherwise
they were so placed behind each other, that the maniples of the one
always covered the intervals between two maniples of the others. In
these wide spaces, as well as in front of the lines, he put the light
troops, that when the elephants approached, they might hurl their
missiles at them, and then, should they enter these open lanes, assail
them with javelins. On the wings, he set the Numidian and Roman horse.
The result of the battle shows that this cavalry was now superior, in
quality at least, to that of the Carthaginians; for the latter was
soon put to flight. The object with regard to the elephants was partly
attained, as most of them ran right through these lanes, although
there were some, who turned themselves sideways upon the men who were
armed with javelins. Now began the shock between the _hastati_ and the
Carthaginian mercenaries, who, after a gallant fight, were forced to
throw themselves upon the Carthaginian phalanx behind them, but were
driven back again by these upon the Romans; so that they were trampled
down between the two. The _hastati_, however, had to give way before
the Carthaginians; Scipio then made them fall back, and the _principes_
and the _triarii_ move sideways towards the wings, so as to attack the
Carthaginians in the flank: this had the fullest success. The Italians
alone fought with desperate courage; but the Carthaginian cavalry had
been all destroyed, and the Romans burst upon the Carthaginian rear,
on which the rout became such, that nearly the whole of the army was
cut to pieces. Hannibal himself escaped with a small handful of men to
Adrumetum.
Nothing else was now thought of in Carthage, but peace. It was the
great Hannibal who principally negociated it, and accepted the
conditions, which of course were much harder than the former ones; the
eagerness, however, of Scipio to hurry on the peace, was the saving of
Carthage. Her independence was acknowledged; the towns and provinces
which had belonged to the Carthaginians in Africa before the war, they
were indeed still to keep as subjects; but in this there was trickery,
as they were to prove, what they had possessed. Instead of thirty
triremes being left to them, as at first, only ten were now allowed
them; they had to deliver over their elephants, and were no more to
tame any; they were to pay ten thousand Euboïc talents (15,000,000
dollars) within fifty years; to give a hundred and fifty hostages to
be chosen by the Romans themselves, (which was very hard, as hostages
were so badly treated among the ancients;) and to yield up all the
Roman prisoners and deserters, and likewise the unfortunate Italians
who had come over with Hannibal. Whether these were all put to death as
rebels, or sold for slaves, is not told us by Livy, who indeed says not
a word about the whole of this article: Appian has given the account
of it, and therefore so did Polybius likewise. They were moreover to
acknowledge Masinissa as king of the Numidians within the boundaries
prescribed by the Romans; to conclude a passive alliance offensive and
defensive, with the Romans, on whom, however, it was not to be binding;
and to feed and keep the Roman soldiers for six months longer. In
Africa, they might wage war only with the consent of the Romans; out of
Africa, not at all; and they were not to enlist mercenaries anywhere in
Europe.
Some fools in Carthage wanted to speak against these conditions; but
Hannibal seized hold of one Gisgo, and dragged him down from the
platform on which he was haranguing. An outcry was raised about the
violation of the liberty of the citizen; Hannibal, however, justified
himself, saying that ever since his ninth year, he had been for six and
thirty years away from his country, and therefore was not so accurately
acquainted with the law; that, moreover, he deemed the peace to be
necessary. All men of sense had become aware that the peace was now
unavoidable, and that matters would have taken a different turn, if
Hannibal had been supported at the right time.
Scipio now evacuated Africa; all the Carthaginian ships of war were
brought to sea, and there set fire to. Thus ended, after sixteen years,
the second Punic war and the rivalry of Carthage. Rome had made an
immense booty.[30]
THE MACEDONIAN WAR.[31]