town, which belonged to the third line of the Roman colonies, remained
faithful, and held out. Hannibal, like many great generals, Frederic
the Great, for instance, had an aversion to sieges, and he never
undertook any in person. He first tried to intimidate Spoleto; and when
he did not succeed in it he withdrew. The gates were everywhere shut
against him, wherever the earthquake had not opened them. He strove
therefore to spread terror far and wide. Why did he not march close up
to Rome? why did he not entrench himself before its walls? and why, if
he could not take it by storm, did he not at least try and blockade it?
But for a siege like this, very great machines were indeed requisite,
and as he had none whatever with him, he could only have burned down
the suburbs. When one knows the extent of ancient Rome, one understands
the difficulties of a siege. The Capitoline hill was a scarped rock;
the side of the Quirinal to the _Porta Collina_ was very much like it;
then came the wall of Servius Tullius: it would have needed an immense
army to invest Rome. Hannibal’s men were suffering from sickness,
especially from diseases of the skin; the horses also had suffered
much; he had therefore to put them into quarters. The unhealthy air of
the neighbourhood of Rome in summer is another reason. The battle at
the Trasimene lake may have taken place in May, or in the beginning of
June, and already before the festival of St. Peter and St. Paul, the
malaria at Rome begins; so that the army would have been swept away
by disease. He therefore stationed himself in Picenum and the March
of Ancona, a fruitful country, with a very temperate climate, and
exceedingly healthy. There he had his summer-quarters, which in Italy
are just as necessary as winter-quarters are elsewhere. The earthquakes
had been his battering rams, and the walls of not an inconsiderable
number of Italian towns had been thrown down: he was thus able to
enter into them without hindrance, and to appropriate to himself their
resources.
Whilst he was allowing his soldiers this necessary relaxation, the
Romans made every exertion in their power, and appointed Q. Fabius
Cunctator dictator. The flower of the Roman troops were destroyed, and
Fabius had to bring together a new army: this was now a medley of all
sorts of people; even the prisoners were already taken as volunteers.
With such troops he was to make head against Hannibal, whose power
could not but increase with his success; whilst, on the other hand,
the Romans had the consciousness of having been beaten, and dared
not risk an engagement, although Hannibal, like all great generals,
was not willing to give battle when there was no necessity for it.
Fabius perceived that he had to train his troops, and that it was very
fortunate for him that the allies remained faithful: this he was to
turn to advantage. He also hoped that the consequences which might be
expected from such a motley composition of Hannibal’s army would show
themselves; and yet this was not the case. That army was indeed swept
together from all nations,--Gauls especially there were in it, though
these were so exasperated against the Romans, that he might safely
rely upon them,--but his choice troops consisted of Africans, and in a
lesser proportion, of Spaniards, which last were most likely the best
of all. Moreover, he had many slingers; his infantry did not yet on the
whole amount to more than forty thousand men; and with this army, he
was in a country in which not one town had hitherto opened to him its
gates of its own free will. The country especially which he had last
marched through, was firmly attached to the Romans; in Apulia, perhaps,
the feeling was already different.
Hannibal, however, started in autumn, and marched along the Adriatic
through the Abruzzi, the country of the Marrucinians and Pelignians.
Here Fabius withstood him, and tried to cut off his supplies, in which
he also partly succeeded. But Hannibal, when hard pressed, eluded his
vigilance, and quietly breaking up his camp, appeared all at once in
Campania. It was his design to make himself master of Casinum and
the Latin road, and by confining the communication between Rome and
Campania to the Appian road alone, to try and see whether the Italians
would declare for him. Here we may see an example of the disadvantage
of the want of maps, although on the whole it is wonderful how
well they managed in ancient times without them. Hannibal meant to
give the order to lead the army to Casinum; but the guide, either
misunderstanding him, or from downright dishonesty, led him through
Upper Samnium, along the banks of the Vulturnus, down to Casilinum; and
here Hannibal perceived that he was in quite a different neighbourhood
from where he had wished to be. In the meanwhile, Fabius had been
beforehand with him, and had left the Latin road, and strongly posted
himself in Samnium. Hannibal, after having visited the country of the
Falernians and Campania with devastation, and made an immense booty,
owing to which the men of rank at Rome were already sufferers, now
wanted to begin his retreat through Samnium to Apulia, a very mild,
sunny district, where he meant to take up his winter-quarters, and to
establish a communication with Tarentum and other towns of lower Italy,
and also with the king of Macedon. Here Fabius cut off his retreat near
Mount Callicula, blocking up with his troops the Caudine road, while
another body of Romans beset the passes of Casinum, which led to Rome.
Then Hannibal availed himself of his famous stratagem: he had encamped
near the mountains which Fabius occupied. Livy’s account of this
stratagem makes out rather a silly story for the Romans. He says that
Hannibal tied faggots to the horns of oxen, and setting these on fire,
had them driven up into the mountains between the Roman posts; and
that on this, the Romans, believing them to be spectres, had betaken
themselves to flight. But the real truth is what Polybius tells.
Nothing was more common among the ancients than to march by torch
light. Now, when the Romans saw lights between their stations in the
space which was left unoccupied, they thought that the Carthaginians
were breaking through; and they quickly made for what they supposed to
be the endangered spot, that they might stop their further progress.
In the meanwhile, the rest of the Carthaginians had advanced close
to the defiles, and had stormed the abandoned posts; and thus the
whole of the army got off without any loss: the Roman camp was burnt.
Hannibal encamped on the borders between Apulia and the country of the
Frentanians. Fabius followed him; and here the Master of the Horse,
Minucius, in Fabius’ absence, and contrary to his orders, engaged in a
successful battle with Hannibal. This raised the pride of the Romans so
much, that they took it into their heads, that all their former mishaps
had only befallen them by chance, and that now they were able to make
up for it all; and Minucius got an equal command with Fabius. Hannibal
enticed him out, and gave him such a defeat, that he would have been
annihilated, had not Fabius and a faithful band of Samnites come up at
the very nick of time. Fabius brought the campaign to an honourable
conclusion, as he did not lose anything against Hannibal, and not to
lose anything, was a great deal indeed. Minucius resigned his power.
Hannibal passed the winter in a state of actual distress: he was badly
off for provisions, and as yet, not a single people had declared for
him.
In the year 536, L. Æmilius Paullus and C. Terentius Varro were
consuls. For the first, and perhaps, the only time in Roman history,
symptoms now manifest themselves, like those to which we are so well
accustomed in the times of Cleon and Hyperbolus, namely, that we meet
with tradesmen holding the first offices of the state. C. Terentius
Varro is said to have been the son of a butcher, which is so much at
variance with everything before and after, that we can hardly believe
it. Yet if this were so, the notion of plebeity must already have been
quite changed, and such trades were carried on, not only by foreigners,
Metics, and freedmen, but also by born citizens. Terentius Varro is
made out to have been a demagogue who had a decided influence with
the people, and used it in a spirit the very fellow to that of Cleon
at Athens. But if we look to facts, we might entertain some doubts
with regard to the sentence of condemnation, which our historians
pronounce against him. If the overthrow at Cannæ had really been owing
to his fault, and his fault alone, how would the senate--although,
_ominis causa_, he was no more chosen consul--have over and over again,
during a long series of years, entrusted him with an army, and after
the battle have gone out to meet him, and to thank him for not having
despaired? This shows that the judgment formed of Varro, as handed down
to us, cannot be relied on; and that the pride of the great men was
arrayed against him, as it was in former times against Cn. Flavius.
That the learned M. Terentius Varro was his descendant, seems to be
beyond a doubt: the latter, who lived not a hundred and fifty years
later, belonged to the aristocratical party,--so much, and so quickly
will the state of things change. L. Æmilius Paullus was μισόδημος, very
likely from just causes; he had, after his Illyrian campaign, been
wrongfully accused, and had a narrow escape from being condemned.
It was the rule that each consul had to command a consular army of
two legions, each of four thousand two hundred foot and two hundred
horse, with a corresponding number of allies: the latter furnished
five thousand men and six hundred horse. If this force was to be
strengthened, four legions and a proportionate number of allies took
the field, in all, 16,800 Romans, 20,000 allies, and 3,200 horse; if
one wanted to increase it still more, then, instead of four thousand
two hundred Romans, there were five thousand levied for each legion,
and three hundred horse instead of two hundred. The Romans now raised
such an army of eight legions; and besides the consuls of the year,
those of the year before were also placed at its head as proconsuls.
This army collected in Apulia. Q. Fabius most earnestly recommended
that his plan should be faithfully kept to, and such was likewise the
conviction of the consul L. Æmilius Paullus; but the feeling at Rome
was quite different.
The description of the battle of Cannæ in Appian, is taken from Fabius
Pictor; the very same is likewise to be found in Zonaras. According to
this version, Terentius Varro was far from being so blameable as Livy,
and also Polybius make out. In fact, it is said that at the departure
of the consuls from Rome, the whole people had raised an outcry against
the sluggishness of Fabius, and had demanded a battle, because the long
war pressed heavily upon them. This story is likely in itself, and it
accounts for Paullus having yielded against his own conviction. The
two consuls joined each other in Apulia, and embarrassed Hannibal by
their superior numbers: he took up his position near Cannæ. This town
had been destroyed by the earthquake; but the _arx_ was yet standing,
and he took it by treachery. The statement in Gellius[26] that the
battle was fought on the second of August, is hard to understand: if it
be correct, the two armies must have faced each other for months. But
it would seem from Polybius’ account, that the season was not yet so
far advanced; though this is by no means clear: the harvest there is
at the end of May, and it must at all events have been already over.
Both armies were encamped on the banks of the Aufidus, in the midst
of the plains of Apulia, where the soil throughout is calcareous, as
in Champagne, and there are therefore but few springs in it; so that
they were obliged to keep near the river. Hannibal is said to have been
so hard put to it for provisions, that, if the battle had been at all
delayed, he must needs have decamped. Yet he enticed the Romans into
fighting; for in a petty skirmish, whilst foraging, they got the best
of it, as he did not come to the support of his men, but feigned to be
afraid. The Romans still had a camp on either side of the river; their
base was Canusium, their magazines at Cannæ: Hannibal took these before
their eyes, they being not yet strong enough to hinder it. Even later
than this, Paullus was very loth to give battle, and it would also have
perhaps been best to wait quietly: the longer Hannibal kept himself
inactive, the more favourable matters became for the Romans; if once
the day was lost, all would be lost. Yet, on the other hand, much might
be said in behalf of the expediency of a battle. If the Romans could
not gain the victory with such superior numbers, they gave the allies,
who, as it was, were already troublesome, the opportunity of falling
off; and if, in their rear, the Samnites, or Capua proved faithless,
their situation would have been desperate. The Romans therefore passed
the river.
The first who has given a satisfactory and clear description of the
ground of the battle of Cannæ, was the traveller Swinburne. From his
account, the battle may easily be made out. The Aufidus near Cannæ
makes a bend within which the two armies took their position: the
Romans stood on the chord of the arc which is formed by the river;
Hannibal likewise passed over, and rested his two flanks on the curve
of the river, so that the numerical superiority of the Romans was of no
avail.
[Illustration:
_a._ Place where the Romans crossed.
_b._ Place where the Carthaginians crossed.
_c._ Line of battle of the Carthaginians.
_d._ Line of battle of the Romans.
]
The Romans therefore had the land behind them. Hannibal placed himself
in such a dangerous position, because anyhow he was lost, if he did
not win this battle. The Romans had 80,000 foot, and from 6 to 8,000
horse; among the latter, about 2,500 were Romans. The Carthaginians
had 40,000 foot, and also about 8,000 horse, most of which, however,
were Numidians; these were excellent for foraging, reconnoitering, and
harassing the enemy, but by no means fitted to stand the shock of a
battle, and of no use at all against heavy cavalry: if they were worth
anything, it was against light infantry. The Romans left ten thousand
men behind in the camp, and thus advanced against the enemy with only
70,000, from whom we are besides to deduct a large number for those who
at all times, and especially in a summer campaign, are either sick,
or remain behind from other causes. On their right wing, they had the
Roman cavalry; on the left, was that of the allies. Hannibal had no
elephants in this battle: he placed his best cavalry on his left wing,
over-against the right one of the Romans; on his own right, he had the
Numidians. Besides these, there were on the left wing the Libyans, and
on the right, the Celts and Spaniards, but part of the Libyans and
Celts were also in the centre. The Romans had not room enough for the
whole of their army; so that they were drawn up unusually deep, many
maniples being one behind the other, which in their system of warfare
was of no advantage. The battle was opened by the cavalry on the left
wing of the Carthaginians making an attack upon the Roman horse, who,
although they fought with great bravery, were soon routed, as the whole
battle lasted only a short time: it began two hours after sunrise, and
was ended two hours before sunset. In the meanwhile, the Numidians on
the right wing were engaged with the cavalry of the allies. Hannibal
now divided his line in the middle, and ordered one half to advance
with the right, and the other with the left shoulders forward; so that
they advanced in the form of a wedge against the Roman centre. This
was an employment of what is called the oblique line of battle, which
in the seven years’ war was so fatal at Collin, wherein one of the two
extreme points stands still, while the rest of the line moves forward:
he did this here with two lines. The Romans advanced to meet them, and
the fight was very bloody. The Carthaginian troops could not break
through, so they retreated by the wings; and these, when the Romans
were pressing on, wheeled half round and attacked them in the flanks.
At the same time, the cavalry of the Carthaginian left wing had gone
round that of the Romans, and having been joined by the Numidians, it
had routed the cavalry on the Roman left: it could now freely fall upon
the Roman infantry from the rear. Æmilius Paullus was mortally wounded,
and in the dreadful confusion there was no longer any command; so that
two hours before sunset the whole army was annihilated. The loss is
not stated with precision. Polybius, contrary to his custom, gives
the largest numbers: according to him, out of 80,000 men, 50,000 were
killed, and 30,000 taken prisoners: but in this instance, we must deem
Livy’s statement to be the more correct one. Not to speak of those who
were saved by having remained behind in the fortified camp, there also
escaped at least ten thousand men from the field of battle; the Romans
consequently lost about forty thousand men. In Zonaras and Appian, we
meet with the following story, borrowed in all likelihood from Fabius,
which is characteristic, as it shows how the Romans tried to throw a
vail over their disasters. It is said that in Apulia a breeze rises
every afternoon from the east, that is to say, from the sea, which
lifts up clouds of dust from the chalky soil; and that Hannibal on
this had not only placed himself in such a position that the Romans
had the dust blown into their faces, but also on the day before had
caused the ground to be ploughed, so as to increase these clouds.
That he took advantage of the wind, we may believe; the rest sounds
somewhat unlikely. There is another idle tale of his having allowed
Spaniards, with daggers hidden about them, to go over as deserters to
the enemy, and that these, being stationed by the Romans in the rear of
their army, had afterwards suddenly fallen upon them. This is quite a
childish and pitiful fable. The day after the battle, the Romans in the
camp surrendered, on condition that if the Roman people would ransom
them, they should regain their liberty. Varro escaped with seventy men
to Canusium, whither all those now collected, who had got away safe;
and with these he betook himself to Venusia. Here Hannibal again shows
how much he disliked sieges; for he let Canusium alone with its Roman
garrison, and hastened to Capua, with which he had already before
entered into negotiations.
Cato has told us that Maharbal, the commander of the Carthaginian
cavalry, called upon Hannibal to follow him, saying that on the fifth
day he would hold a feast as conqueror on the Capitol. Hannibal smiled,
and said that it was a fine idea, but that it could not be carried out.
Then Maharbal had answered, “Thou art able then to gain a victory, but
not to make use of it!”--There is no saying indeed what impression it
would have made in Rome, if, instead of any tidings from the field of
battle, the Carthaginian cavalry had been seen on the Latin road. But
even cavalry could hardly have done it: the distance in a straight
line is from fifty to sixty German miles; so that they must have had
relays of horses: for infantry, the thing was quite impossible. Against
cavalry, the gates might have been shut. Nor would the Romans have felt
so utterly defenceless as they did after the battle at the Alia. There
were recruits in Rome, who were drilled, and in training for the naval
service; nothing would have been achieved, and the Carthaginians would
in the most pestilential time of the year have been lying before the
walls of Rome. To burn the country round the city, would not have been
of any use to Hannibal; whilst, on the other hand, it could not but
have made the worst impression upon the Italians, had he returned with
the cavalry without having done anything.
How soon Hannibal arrived at Capua, is more than we can tell, as,
generally speaking, in such matters we have no precise dates given us
by the ancients; yet in the same year he was master of Capua, much
earlier than it would seem from Livy’s account. This town enjoyed
isopolity with the Romans, and was under its own government; its
nobility held itself equal to that of Rome, and was connected by
marriage with the very highest Roman families, even with the Claudii.
During its long alliance with the Romans, it had gotten great wealth
and many demesnes, and it was therefore in a very prosperous condition.
But owing to their riches and their luxury, its citizens had become
utterly effeminate; so that they formed the strongest contrast to the
moral and political energy of Rome. If such a town had dreamed of
acquiring the leading rule over Italy after the downfall of that city,
it was an inconceivable delusion. Were the nations indeed to shake
off the yoke of Rome, only that they might put themselves under that
of Capua! But the Campanians flattered themselves with the hope of
getting this hegemony with the help of Hannibal, who fostered their
day-dreams, but without promising them anything for certain. They
therefore separated from Rome, formed a league with Hannibal, and
received him into their city, which he forthwith made his arsenal. The
terms of their alliance, taken literally, were very favourable. They
were granted perfect independence; and it was stipulated that no single
Campanian should be charged with any burden whatever; that they should
not have to furnish any soldiers; and that, in short, they should be
free from everything which had been irksome to the Tarentines in their
alliance with Pyrrhus. The Romans had no garrison at Capua; but three
hundred horsemen from that town served in Sicily, and as hostages for
these, Hannibal gave them as many Roman prisoners. They seem to have
been exchanged: Rome, at that time, was by no means so haughty. The
description in Livy of the way in which Hannibal established himself
in the town, of the banquet and the attempt to murder Hannibal, is
wonderfully beautiful, but certainly a romance. The story of Decius
Magus, the only man in Capua who raised his voice for remaining true
to the Romans, may alone have some foundation, however much it be
embellished: there is no reason for us to doubt, that Hannibal banished
him as a friend of the Romans. On the part of Capua, it was indeed a
foul ingratitude to fall off from Rome, and therefore the frightful
vengeance of the Romans is very much to be excused. The Campanians had
derived from their alliance with Rome nothing but benefit; and now they
did not only show themselves ungrateful, but they also committed an act
of useless barbarity. They put the Romans who were staying with them,
to death in overheated bath rooms. Nothing is more sickening than the
arrogance of the unworthy, when they array themselves against worth.