1. Without insisting on the opinion of Plato and Tully, I would

rather appeal to your own feelings; as I cannot doubt your familiar

acquaintance with the writings of the Attic Bee. Compare the Anabasis

with the Cyropædia; and _feel_ the difference between truth and

fiction; between the lively and copious variety of the one, and the

elegant poverty of the other. A few general incidents, thinly scattered

through a diffuse work, and destitute of any notes of geography or

chronology, compose the life of Cyrus; which seems lost in a multitude

of speeches, councils, reflections, and familiar episodes. Xenophon

was a philosopher and a soldier; and if we unravel with any care the

fine texture of the Cyropædia, we shall discover in every thread the

Spartan discipline and the philosophy of Socrates. The only part

which has the air of real history, is the judicious digression, where

Xenophon compares the degeneracy of the modern Persians with the wise

institutions of their founder. He possessed the best opportunities of

examining both the one and the other, whilst he served in the camp

of the younger Cyrus, and traversed, with the immortal ten thousand,

the greatest part of the provinces of Artaxerxes. The first Cyrus was

confessedly a great man. The conquest of Asia is a sufficient testimony

of his abilities; and the name of Father given him by the Persians

after his death, must stand as the surest evidence of his virtues. But

the hero of the Cyropædia is drawn as a _perfect character_; a monster

as fabulous, and less interesting than those of Ariosto. His wise

councils are never, in a single instance, seduced by passion, misled by

error, or disappointed by accident. Xenophon labours to establish the

empire of prudence; his countryman Herodotus had entertained himself

with displaying the tyranny of fortune; and both writers, whilst they

inculcate the moral precept, seem alike, though by opposite paths, to

deviate from historic truth.

2. But if the Cyropædia be admitted as a genuine history, Darius the

Mede is still excluded from the throne of Babylon, since Cyaxares

himself never ascended it. When the Cyrus of Xenophon besieged that

great city, he had gradually shaken off all dependance on his uncle,

and assumed to himself the supreme command, and exclusive advantages of

the war. The strength of his army consisted of seventy thousand natural

Persians, solely attached to their hereditary prince, from every motive

of duty, gratitude, and interest. He was followed by a various train of

nations, allies and subjects, all subdued by his arms and policy. About

forty thousand Medes, who served under his banners, had long since been

taught to despise the weakness, and to disobey the commands of their

sovereign. After the conquest, Cyrus was solemnly inaugurated king of

Babylon, with every circumstance of pomp and greatness, which could

dazzle the eyes of the multitude. Some time afterwards he visited his

uncle at Ecbatana, presented him with rich gifts, the spoils of Asia,

accepted his only daughter in marriage, and very politely told the King

of the Medes, that he had set apart for him, one of the finest palaces

of Babylon; that whenever he should chuse to come to that city, he

might find himself, _as if he were still in his own dominions_.

If these observations are founded in truth and nature; it will

follow, that the author of the Book of Daniel has entertained us with

incredible stories, which happened under an imaginary monarch. So much

error and so much fiction are incompatible with an inspired, or even

with a contemporary, writer. But if the prophecies were framed three

or four centuries after the Prophet’s death, it was much easier for

the counterfeit Daniel to _foretel_ great and recent events, than to

compose an accurate history or probable romance of a dark and remote

period.

The question is curious in itself, important in its consequences,

and in every light worthy the attention of a critical divine. This

consideration justifies the freedom of my address, and the hopes I

still entertain, that you may be able and willing to dispell the mist,

that hangs, either over my eyes, or over the subject itself. On my

side, I can only promise, that whatever you shall think proper to

communicate, shall be received with the candor which I owe to myself,

and with the deference, so justly due to your name and abilities,

I am, Sir,

with great esteem,

your obedient humble servant,

——

P.S. You will be pleased, Sir, to address your answer _To Daniel

Freeman, Esq. at the Cocoa Tree, Pall Mall_: but if you have any

scruple of engaging with a mask, I am ready, by the same channel, to

disclose my real name and place of abode; and to pledge myself for the

same _discretion_, which, in my turn, I shall have a right to expect.

* * * * *

I had neither leisure nor inclination to enter into controversy with

this stranger (for which there was the less occasion, as he had

disputed no principle or opinion advanced by me in the Sermons); but,

as I knew, whoever he was, that he would complain, or rather _boast_,

of being wholly unnoticed by me, I sent him this answer.

ANSWER TO THE FOREGOING LETTER.

_Thurcaston, August 29, 1772._

SIR,

Your very elegant letter on the antiquity and authenticity of the Book

of Daniel (just now received) finds me here, if not without leisure,

yet without books, and therefore in no condition to enter far into

the depths of this controversy; which indeed is the less necessary,

as every thing, that relates to the subject, will come, of course,

to be considered by my learned successors in the new Lecture. For,

as the prophecies of Daniel make an important link in _that chain,

which_, as you say, _has been let down from heaven to earth_ (but not

by the Author of the late Sermons, who brought into view only what he

had found, not invented) the grounds, on which their authority rests,

will, without doubt, be carefully examined, and, as I suppose, firmly

established.

But, in the mean time, and to make at least some small return for the

civility of your address to me, I beg leave to trouble you with two

or three short remarks, such as occur to me, on the sudden, in reading

your letter.

Your main difficulties are these two: 1. That the author of the Book

of Daniel is too clear for a prophet; as appears from his prediction

of the Persian and Macedonian affairs: And 2. too fabulous for a

contemporary historian; as is evident, you suppose, from his mistakes,

chiefly, I think, in the vith chapter.

1. The first of these difficulties is an extraordinary one. For why

may not prophecy, if the Inspirer think fit, be as clear as history?

Scriptural prophecy, whence your idea of its obscurity is taken,

is _occasionally_ thus clear, I mean after the event: And Daniel’s

prophecy of the revolutions in the Grecian empire would have been

obscure enough to Porphyry himself, before it.

But your opinion, after all, when you come to explain yourself, really

is, as one should expect, that, as a prophet, Daniel is not clear

enough: for you enforce the old objection of Porphyry by observing,

That, where a pretended prophecy is clear to a certain point of time,

and afterwards obscure and shadowy, there common sense leads one to

conclude that the author of it is an impostor.

This reasoning is plausible, but not conclusive, unless it be taken for

granted that a prophecy must, in all its parts, be equally clear and

precise: whereas, on the supposition of real inspiration, it may be

fit, I mean it may suit with the views of the Inspirer, to predict some

things with more perspicuity, and in terms more obviously and directly

applicable to the events in which they are fulfilled, than others. But,

further, this reasoning, whatever force it may have, has no place here;

at least, you evidently beg the question when you urge it; because the

persons, you dispute against, maintain, That the subsequent prophecies

of Daniel are equally distinct with the preceding ones concerning the

Persian and Macedonian empires, at least so much of them as they take

to have been fulfilled, and that, to judge of the rest, we must wait

for the completion of them.

However, you admit that the suspicion arising from the _clearest_

prophecy may be removed by direct positive evidence that it was

composed before the event. But then you carry your notions of that

evidence very far, when you require “that the existence of such a

prophecy prior to the accomplishment should be proved by the knowledge

of it being generally diffused amongst an enlightened nation, previous

to that period, and its public existence attested by an unbroken chain

of authentic writers.”

What you here claim as a matter of _right_, is, without question, very

desirable, but should, I think, be accepted, if it be given at all, as

a matter of courtesy. For what you describe is the utmost evidence that

the case admits: but what right have we, in this or any other subject

whether of natural or revealed religion, to the utmost evidence? Is

it not enough that the evidence be sufficient to induce a reasonable

assent? And is not that assent reasonable, which is paid to real

evidence, though of an inferior kind, when uncontrouled by any greater?

And such evidence we clearly have for the authenticity of the book of

Daniel, in the reception of it, by the Jewish nation, down to the time

of Jesus, whose appeal to it supposes and implies that reception to

have been constant and general: Not to observe that the testimony of

Jesus is further supported by all the considerations that are alledged

for his own divine character. To this evidence, which is positive so

far as it goes, you have nothing to oppose, but surmise and conjecture,

that is, nothing that deserves to be called evidence. But I doubt, Sir,

you take for granted, that the claim of inspiration is never to be

allowed, so long as there is a possibility of supposing that it was not

given.

II. In the second division of your Letter, which is longer and more

laboured than the first, you endeavour to shew that the _historical_

part of the book of Daniel, chiefly that of the sixth chapter, is false

and fabulous, and, as such, confutes and overturns the _prophetical_.

What you say on this head is contained under _five_ articles.

1. You think it strange that Daniel, or any other man, should be

advanced to a great office of state, _for his skill in divination_.

But here, first, you forget that Joseph was thus advanced, and for the

same reason: Or, if you object to this instance, what should hinder the

advancement either of Joseph or Daniel (when their skill in divination

had once brought them into the notice and favour of their sovereign)

for what you call _mere human accomplishments_? For such assuredly

both these great men possessed, if we may believe the plain part of

their story, which asserts of Joseph, and indeed proves, that he was,

in no common degree, _discreet and wise_; and of Daniel, that _an

excellent spirit was found in him_, nay that he had _knowledge and

skill in all learning and wisdom_, over and above his _understanding

in all visions and dreams_. In short, Sir, though princes of old might

not make it a rule to chuse their ministers out of their soothsayers,

yet neither would their being soothsayers, if they were otherwise

well accomplished, prevent them from being ministers: Just as in

modern times, though churchmen have not often, I will suppose, been

made officers of state, even by bigotted princes, because they were

churchmen, yet neither have they been always set aside from serving in

those stations, when they have been found eminently qualified for them.

2. Your next exception is, That a combination could scarce have been

formed in the court of Babylon against the favourite minister (though

such factions are common in other courts) because the courtiers of

Darius _must have apprehended that the piety of Daniel would be

asserted by a miraculous interposition_; of which they had seen a

striking instance. And here, Sir, you expatiate with a little too much

complacency on the strange indifference which the ancient world shewed

to the gift of miracles. You do not, I dare say, expect a serious

answer to this charge; Or, if you do, it may be enough to observe,

what I am sure your own reading and experience must have rendered very

familiar to you, that the strongest belief or conviction of the mind

perpetually gives way to the inflamed selfish passions; and that, when

men have any scheme of interest or revenge much at heart, they are not

restrained from pursuing it, though the scaffold and the axe stand

before them in full view, and have perhaps been streaming but the day

before with the blood of other state-criminals. I ask not, whether

miracles have ever _actually_ existed, but whether you do not think

that multitudes have been firmly _persuaded_ of their existence: And

their indifference about them is a fact which I readily concede to you.

3. Your third criticism is directed against what is said of _the

law of the Medes and Persians, that it altereth not_; where I find

nothing to admire, but the extreme rigour of Asiatic despotism. For I

consider this irrevocability of the law, when once promulgated by the

Sovereign, not as contrived to be a check on his will, but rather

to shew the irresistible and fatal course of it. And this idea was

so much cherished by the despots of Persia, that, rather than revoke

the iniquitous law, obtained by surprize, for exterminating the Jews,

Ahasuerus took the part, as we read in the book of Esther, (and as

Baron Montesquieu, I remember, observes) to permit the Jews to defend

themselves against the execution of it. Whence we see how consistent

this law is with the determination of the Judges, quoted by you

from Herodotus—“That it was lawful for the King to do whatever he

_pleased_”—for we understand, that he did not please, that his law,

when once declared by him, should be altered.

You add, under this head, “May I not assert, that the Greek writers,

who have so copiously treated of the affairs of Persia, have not left

us the smallest vestige of a restraint, equally injurious to the

monarch, and prejudicial to the people?” I have not the Greek writers

by me to consult; but a common book I chance to have at hand, refers

me to one such vestige in a very eminent Greek Historian, Diodorus

Siculus. Lowth’s Comm. in loc.

4. A fourth objection to the historic truth of the book of Daniel is

taken, with more plausibility, from the matter of this law, which,

as you truly observe, was very strange for the King’s councillors to

advise, and for any despot whatsoever to enact.

But 1. I a little question whether prayer was so constant and

considerable a part of Pagan worship, as is supposed; and, if it was

not, the prejudices of the people would not be so much shocked by

this interdict, as we are ready to think. Daniel indeed prayed three

times a day: but the idolaters might content themselves with praying

now and then at a stated solemnity. It is clear that when you speak

of _depriving men of the comforts, and the priests of the profits of

religion_, you have Christian and even modern principles and manners

in your eye: perhaps, in the _comforts_, you represented to yourself

a company of poor inflamed Huguenots under persecution; and, in the

_profits_, the lucrative trade of Popish masses. But, be this as it

may, it should be considered, 2. that this law could not, in the

nature of the thing, suppress all prayer, if the people had any great

propensity to it. It could not suppress _mental_ prayer: it could not

even suppress _bodily worship_, if performed, as it easily might be, in

the night, or in secret. Daniel, it was well known, was used to pray

in open day-light, and in a place exposed to inspection from his usual

manner of praying; which manner, it was easily concluded, so zealous

a votary, as he was, would not change or discontinue, on account of

the edict. Lastly, though the edict passed for thirty days, to make

sure work, yet there was no doubt but the end proposed would be soon

accomplished, and then it was not likely that much care would be taken

about the observance of it.

All this put together, I can very well conceive that extreme envy and

malice in the courtiers might suggest the idea of such a law, and that

an impotent despot might be flattered by it. Certainly, if what we read

in the third chapter be admitted, That _one_ of these despots required

all people, nations, and languages to worship his image on pain of

death, there is no great wonder that _another_ of them should demand

the exclusive worship of himself, for a month[255]; nay perhaps he

might think himself civil, and even bounteous to his gods, when he left

them a share of the other eleven. For, as to the presumption—

——Nihil est quod credere de se

Non possit, cui laudatur Diis æqua potestas.

5. A fifth, and what you seem to think the strongest objection to the

credit of the book of Daniel, is, “That no such person, as Darius the

Mede, is to be found in the succession of the Babylonish princes [You

mean, as given in Ptolemy’s Canon and the Greek writers] between the

time of Nebuchadnezzar and that of Cyrus.”

In saying this, you do not forget, nor disown, what our ablest

chronologers have said on the subject: But then you object, that

Xenophon’s Cyaxares has been made, (to serve a turn) to personate

Darius the Mede, and yet that Xenophon’s book, whether it be a romance,

or a true history, overturns the use which they have made of this

hypothesis.

1. I permit myself, perhaps, to be too much flattered by your civility

in referring me to my own taste, rather than to the authority of

Cicero: But the truth is, I am much disposed to agree with you, “that,

if we unravel with any care the fine texture of the Cyropædia, we shall

discover in every thread the Spartan discipline and the philosophy of

Socrates.” But then, as the judicious author chose to make so recent

a story as that of Cyrus, and so well known, the vehicle of his

political and moral instructions, he would be sure to keep up to the

_truth_ of the story, as far as might be; especially in the leading

facts, and in the principal persons, as we may say, of the drama. This

obvious rule of decorum such a writer, as Xenophon, could not fail to

observe: And therefore, on the supposition that his Cyropædia is a

romance, I should conclude certainly that the outline of it was genuine

history.

But, 2. if it be so, you conclude that there is no ground for thinking

that Darius the Mede ever reigned at Babylon, because Cyaxares himself

never reigned there.

Now, on the idea of Xenophon’s book being a romance, there might be

good reason for the author’s taking no notice of the short reign of

Cyaxares; which would break the unity of his work, and divert the

reader’s attention too much from the hero of it: while yet the omission

could hardly seem to violate historic truth, since the lustre of his

hero’s fame, and the real power which, out of question, he reserved

to himself, would make us easily forget or overlook Cyaxares. But, as

to the _fact_, it seems no way incredible, that Cyrus should concede

to his royal ally, his uncle, and his father-in-law (for he was all

these) the _nominal_ possession of the sovereignty—or that he should

_share_ the sovereignty with him—or, at least, that he should leave

the _administration_, as we say, in his hands at Babylon, while he

himself was prosecuting his other conquests at a distance. Any of these

things is supposable enough; and I would rather admit any of them, than

reject the express, the repeated, the circumstantial testimony of a not

confessedly fabulous historian.

After all, Sir, I doubt, I should forfeit your good opinion, if I did

not acknowledge that some, at least, of the circumstances, which you

have pointed out, are such as one should hardly expect at first sight.

But then such is the condition of things in this world; and what is

_true_ in human life is not always, I had almost said, not often, that

which was to be previously expected: whence, an indifferent romance

is, they say, more _probable_ than the best history. But should any

or all of these circumstances convince you perfectly that some degree

of error or fiction is to be found in the book of Daniel, it would be

too precipitate to conclude that therefore the whole book was of no

authority. For, at most, you could but infer, that the historical part,

in which those circumstances are observed, namely the sixth chapter,

is not genuine: Just as hath been adjudged, you know, of some other

pieces, which formerly made a part of the book of Daniel. For it is

not with these collections, which go under the name of the prophets,

as with some regularly connected system, where a charge of falsehood,

if made good against one part of it, shakes the credit of the whole.

Fictitious histories may have been joined with true prophecies, when

all that bore the name of the same person, or any way related to him,

came to be put together in the same volume: But the detection of such

misalliance could not affect the prophecies, certainly not those of

Daniel, which respect _the latter times_; for these have an intrinsic

evidence in themselves, and assert their own authenticity in proportion

as we see, or have reason to admit, the accomplishment of them.

And now, Sir, I have only to commit these hasty reflections to your

candour; a virtue, which cannot be separated from the love of truth,

and of which I observe many traces in your agreeable letter. And

if you would indulge this quality still further, so as to conceive

the possibility of that being _true and reasonable_, in matters of

religion, which may seem strange, or, to so lively a fancy as your’s,

even ridiculous, you would not hurt the credit of your excellent

understanding, and would thus remove one, perhaps a principal, occasion

of _those mists which_, as you complain, _hang over these nice and

difficult subjects_.

I am, with true respect,

Sir, &c.

R. H.

* * * * *

I should not perhaps have thought it worth while to print either of

these Letters, if a noble person had not made it necessary for me to

give the _former_ to the publick, by doing this honour (though without

my leave or knowledge) to the _latter_. By which means, however, we

are now at length informed (after the secret had been kept for twice

twelve years) that the anonymous Letter-writer was Edward Gibbon, Esq.

afterwards the well-known author of “The History of the _Decline and

Fall of the Roman Empire_[256].”

Of Mr. Gibbon’s Letter to me, I have no more to say: And of his

_History_, only what may be expressed in few words.

It shews him, without doubt, to have possessed parts, industry,

and learning; each in a degree that might have entitled him to a

respectable place among the compilers of ancient history. But these

talents were disgraced, and the fruit of them blasted, by a FALSE TASTE

OF COMPOSITION: that is, by _a raised, laboured, ostentatious style_;

effort in writing being mistaken, as it commonly is, for energy—by _a

perpetual affectation of wit, irony, and satire_; generally misapplied;

and always out of place, being wholly unsuited to the historic

character—and, what is worse, by a _free-thinking libertine spirit_;

which spares neither morals nor religion; and must make every honest

man regard him as a bad citizen, as well as writer.

These miscarriages may, all of them, be traced up to one common cause,

an EXCESSIVE VANITY.

Mr. Gibbon survived, but a short time, his favourite work. Yet he lived

long enough to know that the most and best of his readers were much

unsatisfied with him. And a few years more may, not improbably, leave

him without one admirer.—Such is the fate of those, who will write

themselves into fame, in defiance of all the principles of true taste,

and of true wisdom!

R. W.

_Hartlebury Castle, Nov. 18, 1796._

THE END OF THE FIFTH VOLUME.

Printed by J. Nichols and Son,

Red Lion Passage, Fleet-Street, London.

Errata:

P. 365, l. 9. for _two_ read _too_.

FOOTNOTES:

The works of Richard Hurd, volume 5 (of 8) · 第 16 / 19 段