the same principle, “That, if, even after a mature consideration of the
prophecies, and of the events, in which they are taken to be fulfilled,
there should, after all, be some cloud remaining on this subject, which
with all our wit or pains we cannot wholly remove, this state of things
would afford no objection to prophecy, because it is indeed no other
than we might reasonably expect.”
For, 1. If Jesus be the end of prophecy, the same reasons that made
it fit to deliver some predictions darkly, will further account to
us for some degree of obscurity in the application of them to their
corresponding events.
I say—will _account_ to us for such obscurity—for, whatever
those _reasons_ were, they could not have taken effect, but by the
intervention of such _means_, as must darken in some degree, the
application of a prophecy, even after the accomplishment of it; unless
we say, that an object can be seen as distinctly through a _veil_, as
without one. For instance: _figurative language_ is the chief of those
means, by which it pleased the inspirer to throw a shade on prophecies,
unfulfilled; but figurative language, from the nature of it, is not
so precise and clear, as _literal expression_, even when the event
prefigured has lent its aid to illustrate and explain that language.
If then it was _fit_ that some prophecies concerning Jesus should be
_delivered_ obscurely, it cannot be supposed that such prophecies,
when they come to be _applied_, will acquire a full and absolute
perspicuity[37].
2. If the dispensation of Jesus be the main subject of the prophecies,
then may some of them be still impenetrable to us, because the various
fortunes of that dispensation are not yet perfectly disclosed, and so
some of them may not hitherto have been fulfilled. But the completion
of a prophecy is that which gives the utmost degree of clearness, of
which it is capable.
3. But lastly and chiefly, if the end and use of prophecy be to attest
the truth of Christianity, then may we be sure that such attestation
will not carry with it the utmost degree of evidence. For Christianity
is plainly a state of discipline and probation: calculated to improve
our moral nature, by giving scope and exercise to our moral faculties.
So that, though the evidence for it be _real_ evidence, and on the
whole _sufficient_ evidence, yet neither can we expect it to be of that
sort which should compel our assent. Something must be left to quicken
our attention, to excite our industry, and to try the natural ingenuity
of the human mind.
Had the purpose of prophecy been to shew, merely, that a predicted
event was foreseen, then the end had been best answered by throwing all
possible evidence into the completion. But its concern being to shew
this to such only as should be disposed to admit a reasonable degree of
evidence, it was not necessary, or rather it was plainly not fit, that
the completion should be seen in that strong and irresistible light[38].
For all the reasons, now given, (and doubtless, for many more) it was
to be expected, that prophecy would not be one cloudless emanation of
light and glory. If it be clear enough to serve the ends, for which it
was designed; if through all its obscurities, we be able to trace the
hand and intention of its divine author; what more would we have? How
improvidently, indeed, do we ask more of that great Being, who, for the
sake of the _natural_ world, _clothes the heavens with blackness_ [Is.
1. 3.]; and in equal mercy to the _moral_ world, veils his nature and
providence _in thick clouds, and makes darkness his pavilion_ [Ps.
xviii. 11]?
TO THESE deductions from the text, more might be added. For I believe
it will be found that if the _end_ of prophecy, as here delivered, be
steddily kept in view and diligently pursued, it will go a great way
towards leading us to a prosperous issue in most of those inquiries,
which are thought to perplex this subject. But I mean to reason from
it no farther than just to shew, in the way of specimen, the method
in which it becomes us to speculate on the prophetic system. We are
not to imagine principles, at pleasure, and then apply them to that
system. But we are, first, to find out what the principles are, on
which prophecy is founded, and by which it claims to be tried; and then
to see whether they will _hold_, that is, whether they will aptly and
properly apply to the particulars, of which it is compounded. If they
will, the system itself is thus far clearly justified. All that remains
is to compare the prophecies with their corresponding events, in order
to assure ourselves that there is real evidence of their completion.
The _use_ of this method has been shewn in FOUR capital instances.
It is objected to the scriptural prophecies, _that they are
obscure_—_that they abound in double senses_—_that they were
delivered to one people_—_that, after all, there is sometimes
difficulty in making out the completion_—all of them, it is said, very
suspicious circumstances; and which rather indicate a scheme of human
contrivance, than of divine inspiration.
To these objections it is replied, that, from the very idea which the
scriptures themselves give of prophecy, these circumstances must needs
be found in it; and further still, that these circumstances, when
fairly considered, do honour to that idea: for that the obscurity,
complained of, results, _from the immensity of the scheme_—the double
senses, _from the intimate connection of its parts_—the partial
and confined delivery, _from the wisdom and necessity of selecting
a peculiar people to be the vehicle and repository of the sacred_
oracles—And lastly, the incomplete evidence, _from the nature of the
subject, and from the moral genius of that dispensation, to which the
scheme of prophecy itself belongs_.
In conclusion, it is now seen to what purpose these preliminary
discourses serve, and in what method they have been conducted.
The FIRST, shewed the vanity and folly of reasoning on the subject
of scriptural prophecy from our preconceived fancies and arbitrary
assumptions. The SECOND, shewed the only true way of reasoning upon it
to be from scriptural principles, and then opened and explained _one_
such principle. In this LAST, I have shewn that, by prosecuting this
way of reasoning from the principle assigned, some of the more specious
objections to the scriptural prophecies are easily obviated.
Taken together, these three discourses serve to illustrate the
_general_ idea of prophecy, considered as one great scheme of
_testimony_ to the religion of Jesus; and consequently open a way for
the fair and equitable consideration of _particular_ prophecies, the
more immediate subject of this Lecture.
SERMON IV.
THE GENERAL ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY.
JOHN xiii. 19.
_Now I tell you before it come, that when it is come to pass, ye may
believe, that I am He._
It hath been concluded (not on the slight grounds of hypothesis, but on
the express authority of scripture,) that prophecy was given TO ATTEST
THE MISSION OF JESUS: to afford a reasonable evidence, that the scheme
of redemption, of which he was the great instrument and minister, was,
in truth, of divine appointment; and was carried on under the immediate
cognizance and direction of the Supreme Being, whose prerogative it is
to see through all time, and to _call those things, which be not, as
though they were_[39].
Our next inquiry will be, how the prophetic scriptures _serve_ to
that end, and what that _evidence_ is (I mean, taking for granted,
not the truth of the prophetic scheme itself, but the truth of the
_representation_, given of it in scripture) which is thus administered
to us by the light of prophecy.
I. The text refers to a particular prophecy of our Lord, concerning the
treachery of Judas; of which, says he to his disciples, _I now tell
you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that
I am He_: that is, “I add this, to the other predictions concerning
myself; that, when ye see it fulfilled, as it soon will be, ye may be
the more convinced of my being the person, I assume to be, the _Messias
foretold_.”
The information, here given, was perhaps intended by our Lord to
serve a particular purpose, To prevent, we will say, the offence,
which the disciples might have taken at the circumstance of his being
betrayed by one of them, if they had not, previously, been admonished
of it. But the reason of the thing shews, that the _use_, which the
disciples are directed to make of this prophecy, was the _general_ use
of the prophecies concerning Jesus. The completion was to verify the
prediction, in all cases; and to convince the world, That HE was the
Messiah, in whom such things should be seen to be accomplished, as had
been expressly foretold[40].
Indeed prophecies, unaccomplished, may have their use; that is, they
may serve to raise a general expectation of a predicted _event_ in
the minds of those, who, for other reasons, regard the _person_
predicting it, in the light of a true prophet. And such might be one,
a _subordinate_, use of the prophecies concerning Jesus: but they
could not be applied to the _proof_ of his pretensions, till they were
seen to be fulfilled. Nor can they be so applied even then, unless the
things predicted be, confessedly, beyond the reach of human foresight.
Under these conditions, the argument is clear and easy, and will lie
thus.—“A great variety of distant, or, at least, future events,
inscrutable to human sagacity, and respecting one person (whom we will
call, Messiah) have been by different men, and at different times,
predicted. These events have accordingly come to pass, in the history
and fortunes of one person; in such sort, that each is seen to be, in
a proper sense, fulfilled in him, and all together in no other person
whatsoever: Therefore the prediction of these events was divinely
inspired: or (which comes to the same thing) therefore the person,
claiming under these predictions to be the Messiah, or person foretold,
hath his claims confirmed and justified by the highest authority, that
of God himself.”
Such is the argument from prophecy[41]: and on this foundation, Jesus
assumes to be the MESSIAH; and his religion, to be DIVINE.
II. Let us now see, what the amount of that _evidence_ is, which
results from this kind of proof.
Careless talkers may say, and sometimes think, “that prophecy is but
an art of conjecturing shrewdly; that the sagacity of one man is seen
to be vastly superior to that of another; that, in some men, the
natural faculty may be so improved by experience, as to look like
_divination_; and that no precise bounds can be set to its powers.”
Light or sceptical minds may, I say, amuse themselves with such
fancies: but serious men will readily acknowledge, That many future
events, especially, if _remote_, or _extraordinary_[42], or described
with some degree of _particularity_, are not within the ability of the
human mind to predict. And, to cut off all occasion of cavil, let it be
owned, that the argument under consideration is, or ought to be, drawn
from the completion of prophecies, so qualified.
To evade the force, which this argument apparently carries with it,
it must then be said, That the completion of any particular prophecy,
alleged, was fortuitous, or, what we call, a _lucky hit_.
“Coincidencies of this sort, we may be told, are very frequent. In
the ceaseless revolution of human affairs, some event or other will
be turning up, which may give a countenance to the wildest and
most hazardous conjecture. Hence it is, that every groundless fear,
every dream, almost, has the appearance of being realized by some
corresponding accident; which will not be long in occurring to those,
who are upon the watch to make such discoveries. Upon these grounds,
the superstition of _omens_ hath, at all times, been able to sustain
itself; and to acquire a degree of credit, even with wise men. We
see, then, that _chance_, in a good degree, supplies the place of
inspiration: and that He, who sets up for a Prophet, is likely to
drive a safe, as well as gainful trade; especially, if he have but the
discretion not to deal too freely in precise descriptions of _times_,
and _persons_[43]: a consideration, of great moment to the men of this
craft[44]; and which hath not been overlooked by those, whom we account
_true_ prophets.”
Such libertine reflections, as these, thrown out with an air of
negligent ridicule, have too often the effect intended by them. At
the same time, they disgust sober men, and are thought too light
and trivial to deserve a confutation. But, because I take these
suggestions, with whatever levity, or disingenuity, they may be made,
to contain the whole, or at least, the chief strength of the infidel
cause, on this subject, I shall not decline to give them a very serious
answer.
IT IS TRUE, no doubt, what is here alledged, That the conjectures
of fanciful or designing men, whether grounded on casual signs, or
delivered in the direct way of prophecy, have been frequently verified
in the events: that is, such events have actually come to pass, in the
sense put upon the _sign_, when it was observed, and in the literal
sense of the _prophecy_, as delivered. History and common life, it is
agreed, abound in such instances[45]: and I shall even make no scruple
to produce _one_ of each sort; as much, at least, to the purpose
of these objectors, as any of those, which they have produced for
themselves.
Nothing is more famous in the annals of ancient Rome, than the story
of Romulus, and his TWELVE VULTURES; an _omen_ this, on which the
auspicious name of the rising city, and the fortune of its founder,
were, at once, established[46]. What further construction was
then put on this prodigy, doth not appear: but, as the science of
augury advanced in succeeding times, a very momentous and striking
prophecy was grounded upon it. For we have it affirmed[47], on the
high authority of M. T. VARRO, that Vettius Valens, an augur of
distinguished name in those days, took occasion from this circumstance
(and in the hearing of Varro himself) to fix the duration of the Roman
empire. The TWELVE VULTURES, he said, which appeared to Romulus,
_portended_, that the sovereignty of that state and city, whose
foundations he was then laying, should continue for the space of TWELVE
HUNDRED YEARS. It is of no moment to inquire, on what principles of his
art the learned augur proceeded, in this calculation. The TRUTH is,
that the event corresponded, in a surprising manner, to the conjecture;
and that the _majesty_ of the Western empire (of which Rome was the
capital) _did_, indeed, expire under the merciless hands of the Goths,
about the time limited by this augural prophet.
It should further, be observed that this prediction was of such
credit and notoriety, as to take the attention of the later Romans
themselves[48], who looked with anxiety for the accomplishment of it:
and that it was delivered by Valens, at least _five hundred years_
before the event; when there was not the least appearance, that this
catastrophe would befall, what was called, the ETERNAL CITY, within
that period.
THIS is an instance of divination from _augury_. The OTHER, I am
about to give, is a _prophecy_, in full form; respecting a still more
important subject, and equally accomplished in the event. A poet, in
the ideas of paganism, was a prophet, too. And Seneca[49] hath left us,
in proof of the inspiration to which, in his double capacity, he might
pretend, the following oracle:
——venient annis
Secula seris, quibus Oceanus
Vincula rerum laxet, et ingens
Pateat tellus, Tiphysque novos
Detegat orbes; nec sit terris
Ultima Thule.
This prediction was made in the reign of Nero; and, for more than
_fourteen hundred_ years, might only pass for one of those sallies of
imagination, in which poetry so much delights. But, when, at length,
in the close of the _fifteenth_ century, the discoveries of Columbus
had realized this vision: when that enterprizing navigator had forced
the barriers of the vast Atlantic ocean; had _loosened_, what the poet
calls, _the chain of things_; and in these _later ages_[50], as was
expressly signified, had set at liberty an immense continent, shut up
before in surrounding seas from the commerce and acquaintance of our
world; when this event, I say, so important and so unexpected, came to
pass, it might almost surprize one into the belief, that the prediction
was something more than a poetical fancy; and that Heaven had, indeed,
revealed to _one_ favoured Spaniard, what it had decreed, in due time,
to accomplish under the auspices of _another_[51].
THESE two instances of casual conjecture, converted by time and
accident into prophecies, I shall take for granted, are as remarkable,
as any other that can be alledged. Cicero, in his first book of
_Divination_, where he laboured to assert the reality of such a power
in the pagan world, was able to produce nothing equal, or comparable
to them. We have the fullest evidence, that these two predictions
were delivered by the persons, to whom they are ascribed; and in the
time, in which they are said to have been delivered, that is, many
hundred years before the event. They, both of them, respect events
of the greatest dignity and importance: one of them, the downfal of
the _mightiest empire_, that hath hitherto subsisted on the face
of the earth; and the other, the discovery of a _new world_. Both,
express the _time_, when these extraordinary events were to happen:
the _latter_, by a general description, indeed, yet not more general,
than is frequent in the scriptural prophets; but the _former_, in the
most precise and limited terms. In a word, both these predictions are
authentic, important, circumstantial: they foretell events, which no
human sagacity could have foreseen; and they have been strictly and
properly fulfilled.
Now, if such coincidencies, as these, do not infer divine inspiration;
if, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, it must still be
allowed (as it will, on all sides) that they were simply _fortuitous_,
or what we call the effects of hazard and pure chance, by what
characters shall we distinguish genuine, from pretended, prophecies; or
in what way shall it be discovered, that the scriptural prophets spake
by the spirit of _God_, when these pagan diviners could thus prophecy,
by their _own_ spirit?
To this objection, put with all the force which I am able to give to
it, I reply directly, That the distinction, so importunately demanded,
may very easily and clearly be assigned.
If _one or two_ such prophecies, _only_, had occurred in our
scriptures; if even _several_ such had occurred in the whole extent
of those writings, and in the large compass of time they take up,
without descending to a greater detail than is expressed in these pagan
oracles; nay, if _a greater number still_ of supposed predictions, thus
generally delivered in the sacred writings, had been applicable only to
single independent events, dispersed indifferently through the several
ages of the world: In all these cases, I should freely admit, that the
argument from prophecy was very precarious and unsatisfactory: I could
even suppose, with the deriders of this argument, that so many, and
such prophecies, so directed, might not improbably be accounted for,
from some odd conjuncture of circumstances; and that the accomplishment
of them did by no means infer a certainty of inspiration.
But, if now, on the other hand, it be indisputable, That a vast variety
of predictions are to be found in the scriptures of the Old and New
Testament; That a great part of these predictions are delivered with
the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity; and, lastly, That
_all_ of them, whether general or particular, respect one common
subject, and profess to have, or to expect, their completion in one
connected scheme of things, and, upon the matter, in one single person:
On this latter supposition, I must still think, that there is great
reason to admit the divine inspiration of such prophecies, when seen to
be fulfilled.
To convert this supposition into a _proof_, is not within the scope
and purpose of this Lecture. The work hath been undertaken and
discharged by many others: or, it may be sufficient, in so clear a
point, to refer you directly to the Scriptures themselves; which no
man can read without seeing, that the prophecies, contained in them,
are extremely numerous—that many of these prophecies are minutely
circumstantial—and that one person, whoever he be, is the principal
object of them all. My concern, at present, is only to shew, that,
if the supposition itself be well founded, the _inference_, just now
mentioned, is rightly made.
1. First, then, if the prophecies in the Old and New Testament be very
numerous, and if those prophecies, so many of them, I mean, as are
alledged in this controversy with unbelievers, have had a reasonable
completion (and I have a right to make this last supposition, when
the question is concerning the _account_ to be given of such a fact):
If, I say, we argue from these two assumptions, it must appear highly
credible and probable, that so numerous prophecies, so fulfilled,
had not their origin from human conjecture, nor their accomplishment
from what we call, _Chance_. For mere conjecture is not usually so
happy; nor chance, so constant[52]. Further still; if the scriptural
prophecies have been completed in numerous instances, and if in _no_
instance whatsoever can it be clearly shewn that they have failed in
the event, the presumption is still stronger, that such coincidence
could not be fortuitous; and a material difference between scriptural
prophecy, and pagan divination is, at the same time, pointed out. For,
that, in the multitude of pretended oracles in the days of paganism,
some few only should come to pass, while the generality of them fell to
the ground, may well be the sport of _fortune_[53]. But, that very many
prophecies, recorded in our scriptures, have had an evident completion,
when not _one_ of all those, there recorded, can be convicted of
imposture, must surely be the work of _design_.
The argument cannot be denied to have real weight, though the
expression of _all_ the prophecies were allowed to be _general_. But
this is, by no means, the case. It is further assumed, and is evident
to all that have read the Scriptures, that a great number of them are
delivered with the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity. And,
from this assumption, I infer,
2. Secondly, that the accomplishment of prophecies, so circumstantially
defined, can still less be imputed to mere chance.
Without doubt, if all the prophecies concerning the Messiah had been
penned in the style of the first—_that the seed of the woman should
bruise the serpent’s head_—though even then there might be reason
for applying them, exclusively, to the person of Christ, yet, the
evidence, that they were intended to be so applied, would have been
much obscured by the mode of expression; the wide cover of which might
seem to afford room for other applications. But when, to this general
prophecy, the theme of all succeeding ones, it is further added, That
this seed of the woman, should be the seed of Abraham; of the tribe of
Juda; of the family of David; that he should be born at Bethlehem; that
he should appear in the world at a time, limited by certain events,
and even precisely determined to a certain period:—when, after a
particular description of his life and office, it is said of him, that
he should be betrayed by an intimate friend; and sold for a price,
exactly specified; that he should suffer a particular kind of death;
should have his hands and feet pierced; should have vinegar given him
to drink; and should be buried in the sepulchre of a rich man—with
innumerable other particularities of the like nature[54]—When all
this, I say, is considered; the improbability, that these _specific_
characters should meet in the same person by _chance_, is so great,
that a reasonable man will scarce venture on so hazardous a position.