DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS (_Continued_)
A few days after the events narrated in Chapter XII, von Jagow
called to see me at the Embassy and invited me to visit the Emperor
at the Great General Headquarters; but he did not state why I
was asked, and I do not know to this day whether the Chancellor
and those surrounding the Emperor had determined on a temporary
settlement of the submarine question with the United States and
wished to put that settlement out, as it were, under the protection
of the Emperor, or whether the Emperor was undecided and those
in favour of peace wished me to present to him the American side
of the question. I incline to the latter view. Von Jagow informed
me that an officer from the Foreign Office would accompany me and
that I should be allowed to take a secretary and the huntsman
(_Leibjaeger_), without whom no Ambassador ever travels in
Germany.
Mr. Grew, our counsellor, was very anxious to go and I felt on
account of his excellent work, as well as his seniority, that
he was entitled to be chosen. Lieutenant von Prittwitz, who was
attached to the Foreign Office as a sort of special aide to von
Jagow, was detailed to accompany us. We were given a special
salon car and left on the evening of Friday, April twenty-eighth.
As we neared the front by way of the line running through Saar
Brucken, our train was often halted because of long trains of
hospital cars on their way from the front to the base hospitals
in the rear; and as we entered France there were many evidences of
the obstinate fights which had raged in this part of the country
in August, 1914. Parts of the towns and villages which we passed
were in ruins, and rough trench lines were to be discerned on
some of the hillsides. At the stations, weeping French women
dressed in black were not uncommon sights, having just heard
perhaps of the death, months before, of a husband, sweetheart
or son who had been mobilised with the French army.
The fortress city of Metz through which we passed seemed to be as
animated as a beehive. Trains were continuously passing. Artillery
was to be seen on the roads and automobiles were hurrying to and
fro.
The Great General Headquarters of the Kaiser for the Western
Front is in the town of Charleville-Mézières, situated on the
Meuse in the Department of the Ardennes, which Department at that
time was the only French Department wholly in the possession of
the Germans. We were received at the railway station by several
officers and escorted in one of the Kaiser's automobiles, which had
been set apart for my use, to a villa in the town of Charleville,
owned by a French manufacturer named Perin. This pretty little red
brick villa had been christened by the Germans, "Sachsen Villa,"
because it had been occupied by the King of Saxony when he had
visited the Kaiser. A French family servant and an old gardener
had been left in the villa, but for the few meals which we took
there two of the Emperor's body huntsmen had been assigned, and
they brought with them some of the Emperor's silver and china.
The Emperor had been occupying a large villa in the town of
Charleville until a few days before our arrival. After the engineer
of his private train had been killed in the railway station by
a bomb dropped from a French aeroplane, and after another bomb
had dropped within a hundred yards of the villa occupied by the
Kaiser, he moved to a red brick château situated on a hill outside
of Charleville, known as either the Château Bellevue or Bellaire.
Nearly every day during our stay, we lunched and dined with von
Bethmann-Hollweg in the villa of a French banker, which he occupied.
About ten people were present at these dinners, the Chancellor's
son-in-law, Zech, Prittwitz, two experts in international law,
both attached to the Foreign Office, and, at two dinners, von
Treutler, the Prussian Minister to Bavaria, who had been assigned
to represent the Foreign Office near the person of the Kaiser and
Helfferich who, towards the end of our stay, had been summoned
from Berlin.
I had been working hard at German and as von Bethmann-Hollweg
does not like to talk English and as some of these persons did not
speak that language we tried to carry on the table conversation
in German, but I know that when I tried to explain, in German,
to Helfferich the various tax systems of America, I swam out
far beyond my linguistic depth.
During our stay here I received cables from the Department of
State which were transmitted from Berlin in cipher, and which
Grew was able to decipher as he had brought a code book with
him. In one of these it was expressly intimated that in any
settlement of the submarine controversy America would make no
distinction between armed and unarmed merchant ships.
We formed for a while quite a happy family. The French owners
of the villa seemed to have had a fondness for mechanical toys.
After dinner every night these toys were set going, much to the
amusement of von Bethmann-Hollweg. One of these toys, about two
feet high, was a Hoochi-Koochi dancer and another successful one
was a clown and a trained pig, both climbing a step ladder and
performing marvellous feats thereon. Grew, who is an excellent
musician, played the piano for the Chancellor and at his special
request played pieces by Bach, the favourite composer of von
Bethmann-Hollweg's deceased wife. One day we had tea in the garden
of the villa formerly occupied by the Emperor, with the Prince
of Pless (who is always with the Kaiser, and who seemed to be a
prime favourite with him), von Treutler and others, and motored
with Prince Pless to see some marvellous Himalayan pheasants
reared by an old Frenchman, an ex-jailer, who seemed to have a
strong instinct to keep something in captivity.
The Kaiser's automobile, which he had placed at my disposal,
had two loaded rifles standing upright in racks at the right
and left sides of the car, ready for instant use. On one day we
motored, always, of course, in charge of the officers detailed
to take care of us, to the ancient walled city of Rocroy and
through the beautiful part of the Ardennes forest lying to the
east of it, returning to Charleville along the heights above
the valley of the Meuse.
[Illustration: AMBASSADOR GERARD AND HIS PARTY IN SEDAN.]
[Illustration: WITH GERMAN OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH
FOOD COMMISSION BEFORE THE COTTAGE AT BAZEILLES, WHERE NAPOLEON
III AND BISMARCK MET AFTER THE BATTLE OF SEDAN.]
The feeding of the French population, which is carried on by
the American Relief Commission, was a very interesting thing
to see and, in company with one of the members of the French
committee, we saw the workings of this system of American Relief.
We first visited a storehouse in Charleville, the headquarters
for the relief district of which Charleville may be called the
capital.
For relief purposes Northern France is divided into six districts.
From the central distribution point in each district, food is
sent to the commune within the district, the commune being the
ultimate unit of distribution and each commune containing on
the average about five hundred souls. We then motored to one
of the communes where the distribution of food for the week was
to take place that afternoon. Here in a factory, closed since the
war, the people of the commune were lined up with their baskets
waiting for their share of the rations. On entering a large room
of the factory, each stopped first at a desk and there either paid
in cash for the week's allowance of rations or signed an agreement
to pay at some future date. The individuals who had no prospect
of being able to pay received the rations for nothing. About
one-third were in each class. The money used was not always French,
or real money, but was, as a rule, the paper money issued in
that part of Northern France by each town and redeemable after
the war.
Signs were hung up showing the quantity that each person was
entitled to receive for the next fifteen days and the sale price
per kilo to each inhabitant. For instance, in this particular
period for the first fifteen days of the month of May, 1916,
each inhabitant could, in this district, receive the following
allowances at the following rates:
ARTICLE AMOUNT PER HEAD PRICE
Flour 4 K. 500 The Kilogram 0 fr. 48
Rice K. 500 0 fr. 55
Beans K. 500 0 fr. 90
Bacon K. 500 2 fr. 80
Lard K. 250 2 fr. 30
Green Coffee K. 250 1 fr. 70
Crystallized Sugar K. 150 0 fr. 90
Salt K. 200 0 fr. 10
Soap (hard) K. 250 1 fr. 00
In addition to these articles each inhabitant of the commune
which we visited, also received on the day of our visit a small
quantity of carrot seed to plant in the small plot of ground
which each was permitted to retain out of his own land by the
German authorities.
The unfortunate people who received this allowance looked very
poor and very hungry and very miserable. Many of them spoke to
me, not only here but also in Charleville, and expressed their
great gratitude to the American people for what was being done
for them. Those in Charleville said that they had heard that I
was in their town because of trouble pending between America
and Germany. They said they hoped that there would be no war
between the two countries because if war came they did not know
what would become of them and that, in the confusion of war,
they would surely be left to starve.
In Charleville notices were posted directing the inhabitants
not to go out on the streets after, I think, eight o'clock in
the evening, and also notices informing the population that they
would be allowed a small quantity of their own land for the purpose
of growing potatoes.
After visiting the factory building where the distribution of
rations was taking place, we motored to Sedan, stopping on the
way at the hamlet of Bazeilles, and visiting the cottage where
Bismarck and Emperor Napoleon the Third had their historic interview
after the battle of Sedan.
The old lady who owns this house received us and showed us bullet
marks made on her house in the war of 1870, as well as in the
present war. She apologised because she had had the window-pane,
broken by a rifle shot in this war, replaced on account of the
cold. As a girl, she had received Bismarck and Napoleon and had
shown them to the room upstairs where they had held their
consultation. I asked her which chair in this room Bismarck had
sat in, and sat in it myself, for luck. I also contributed to the
collection of gold pieces given to her by those who had visited
her cottage.
In Sedan we visited an old mill where stores of the relief commission
were kept, and in the mayor's office were present at a sort of
consultation between the Prussian officers and members of the
French Committee of Sedan in which certain details relative to
the feeding of the population were discussed.
The relief work is not, of course, carried on right up to the
battle line but we visited a small village not many kilometres in
the rear of the German line. In this village we were, as before,
shown the stores kept for distribution by the relief commission.
As there were many soldiers in this village I said I thought that
these soldiers must have stores of their own but, in order to
be sure that they were not living on the supplies of the relief
commission, I thought it only fair that I should see where the
soldiers' stores were kept. I was taken across the railroad track
to where their stores were kept and, judging from the labels on
the barrels and boxes, I should say that a great many of these
stores had come from Holland.
During this trip about the country, I saw a number of women and
girls working, or attempting to work, in the fields. Their appearance
was so different from that of the usual peasant that I spoke to
the accompanying officers about it. I was told, however, that
these were the peasants of the locality who dressed unusually
well in that part of France. Later on in Charleville, at the
lodging of an officer and with Count Wengersky, who was detailed
to act as sort of interpreter and guide to the American Relief
Commission workers, I met the members of the American Relief
Commission who were working in Northern France and who had been
brought on a special train for the purpose of seeing me to
Charleville. This Count Wengersky spoke English well. Having
been for a number of years agent of the Hamburg American Line in
London, he was used to dealing with Americans and was possessed
of more tact than usually falls to the lot of the average Prussian
officer. We had tea and cakes in these lodgings, and then some
of the Americans drew me aside and told me the secret of the
peculiar looking peasants whom I had seen at work in the fields
surrounding Charleville.
It seems that the Germans had endeavoured to get volunteers from
the great industrial town of Lille, Roubeix and Tourcoing to
work these fields; that after the posting of the notices calling
for volunteers only fourteen had appeared. The Germans then gave
orders to seize a certain number of inhabitants and send them
out to farms in the outlying districts to engage in agricultural
work. The Americans told me that this order was carried out with
the greatest barbarity; that a man would come home at night and
find that his wife or children had disappeared and no one could
tell him where they had gone except that the neighbours would
relate that the German non-commissioned officers and a file of
soldiers had carried them off. For instance, in a house of a
well-to-do merchant who had perhaps two daughters of fifteen and
seventeen, and a man servant, the two daughters and the servant
would be seized and sent off together to work for the Germans
in some little farm house whose location was not disclosed to
the parents. The Americans told me that this sort of thing was
causing such indignation among the population of these towns
that they feared a great uprising and a consequent slaughter and
burning by the Germans.
That night at dinner I spoke to von Bethmann-Hollweg about this
and told him that it seemed to me absolutely outrageous; and that,
without consulting with my government, I was prepared to protest
in the name of humanity against a continuance of this treatment
of the civil population of occupied France. The Chancellor told
me that he had not known of it, that it was the result of orders
given by the military, that he would speak to the Emperor about
it and that he hoped to be able to stop further deportations.
I believe that they were stopped, but twenty thousand or more who
had been taken from their homes were not returned until months
afterwards. I said in a speech which I made in May on my return to
America that it required the joint efforts of the Pope, the King
of Spain and our President to cause the return of these people to
their homes; and I then saw that some German press agency had
come out with an article that I had made false statements about
this matter because these people were not returned to their homes
as a result of the representations of the Pope, the King of Spain
and our President, but were sent back because the Germans had
no further use for them. It seems to me that this denial makes
the case rather worse than before.
At the Chancellor's house in the evenings we had discussions
on the submarine situation and I had several long talks with
von Bethmann-Hollweg alone in a corner of the room while the
others listened to music or set the mechanical toys in motion.
These discussions, without doubt, were reported to the Emperor
either by the Chancellor or by von Treutler who at that time
was high in favor with his Majesty.
I remember on one evening I was asked the question as to what
America could do, supposing the almost impossible, that America
should resent the recommencement of ruthless submarine warfare
by the Germans and declare war. I said that nearly all of the
great inventions used in this war had been made by Americans;
that the very submarine which formed the basis of our discussion
was an American invention, and so were the barbed wire and the
aeroplane, the ironclad, the telephone and the telegraph, so
necessary to trench warfare; that even that method of warfare
had been first developed on something of the present scale in our
Civil War; and that I believed that, if forced to it, American
genius could produce some invention which might have a decisive
effect in this war. My German auditors seemed inclined to believe
that there was something in my contentions. But they said, "While
possibly you might invent something in America, while possibly
you will furnish money and supplies to the Allies, you have no
men; and the public sentiment of your country is such that you
will not be able to raise an army large enough to make any
impression." I said that possibly if hostilities once broke out
with the Germans, the Germans might force us by the commission
of such acts as had aroused England, to pass a law for universal
military service. This proposition of mine was branded by the
Germans as absolutely impossible; and, therefore, I am sure that
the adoption by the United States of universal service in the
first round of the war struck a very severe blow at the morale
of Germany.
The Chancellor always desired to make any settlement of the submarine
question contingent upon our doing something against England;
but I again and again insisted that we could not agree to do
anything against some other power as a condition of obtaining
a recognition of our rights from the German Empire.
During my stay at the General Headquarters, General Falkenhayn,
although he was there at the time, carefully avoided me, which
I took to be a sign that he was in favour of war with America.
In fact, I heard afterwards that he had insisted on giving his
views on the subject, but that a very high authority had told
him to confine himself to military operations.
After we had been a day or so at Charleville, the Vice-Chancellor,
Helfferich, arrived. I have always believed that he was sent for
to add his weight to the arguments in favour of peace and to
point out that it was necessary for Germany to hate the friendship
of America after the war, so as to have markets where she could
place her goods. And I am convinced that at this time, at any rate,
the influence of Helfferich was cast in the scale in favour of
peace.
Finally, I was told that on the next day, which was Monday, May
first, I was to lunch with the Emperor. Grew was invited to accompany
me, and the Chancellor said that he would call for me about an
hour before the time set for lunch as the Emperor desired to
have a talk with me before lunch. In the afternoon an extract
from the log of a German submarine commander was sent to me in
which the submarine commander had stated that he had sighted a
vessel which he could easily have torpedoed, but as the vessel
was one hundred and twenty miles from land, he had not done so
because the crew might not be able from that distance to reach a
harbour. When the Chancellor called for me the following morning,
he asked me if I had read this extract from the submarine officer's
log, and noted how he had refrained from torpedoing a boat one
hundred and twenty miles from land. I told the Chancellor that I
had read the extract, but that I had also read in the newspaper
that very morning that a ship had been torpedoed in stormy weather
at exactly the same distance from land and the crew compelled
to seek safety in the ship's boats; that, anyway, "one swallow
did not make a summer," and that reports were continually being
received of boats being torpedoed at great distances from land.
We then got in the motor and motored to the château about a mile
off, where the Kaiser resided. We got out of the motor before
going into the courtyard of the château, and immediately I was
taken by the Chancellor into a garden on the gently sloping hillside
below the château. Here the Emperor, dressed in uniform, was
walking.
As I drew near the Emperor, he said immediately, "Do you come
like the great pro-consul bearing peace or war in either hand?"
By this he referred, of course, to the episode in which Quintus
Fabius Maximus, chief of the Roman envoys sent to Hannibal in
the Second Punic War, doubled his toga in his hand, held it up
and said: "In this fold I carry peace and war: choose which you
will have." "Give us which you prefer," was the reply. "Then
take war," answered the Roman, letting the toga fall. "We accept
the gift," cried the Carthaginian Senator, "and welcome."
I said, "No, your Majesty, only hoping that the differences between
two friendly nations may be adjusted." The Emperor then spoke of
what he termed the uncourteous tone of our notes, saying that
we charged the Germans with barbarism in warfare and that, as
Emperor and head of the Church, he had wished to carry on the
war in a knightly manner. He referred to his own speech to the
members of the Reichstag at the commencement of the war and said
that the nations opposed to Germany had used unfair methods and
means, that the French especially were not like the French of
'70, but that their officers, instead of being nobles, came from
no one knew where. He then referred to the efforts to starve out
Germany and keep out milk and said that before he would allow
his family and grand-children to starve he would blow up Windsor
Castle and the whole Royal family of England. We then had a long
discussion in detail of the whole submarine question, in the
course of which the Emperor said that the submarine had come
to stay, that it was a weapon recognised by all countries, and
that he had seen a picture of a proposed giant submarine in an
American paper, the _Scientific American_. He stated that,
anyway, there was no longer any international law. To this last
statement the Chancellor agreed. He further said that a person
on an enemy merchant ship was like a man travelling on a cart
behind the battle lines--he had no just cause of complaint if
injured. He asked me why we had done nothing to England because
of her alleged violations of international law,--why we had not
broken the British blockade.
In addition to the technical arguments based on international
law, I answered that no note of the United States had made any
general charge of barbarism against Germany; that we complained
of the manner of the use of submarines and nothing more; that we
could never promise to do anything to England or to any other
country in return for a promise from Germany or any third country
to keep the rules of international law and respect the rights and
lives of our citizens; that we were only demanding our rights
under the recognised rules of international law and it was for
us to decide which rights we would enforce first; that, as I
had already told the Chancellor, if two men entered my grounds
and one stepped on my flower beds and the other killed my sister,
I should probably first pursue the murderer of my sister; that
those travelling on the seas in enemy merchant ships were in a
different position from those travelling in a cart behind the
enemy's battle lines on land because the land travellers were
on enemy's territory, while those on the sea were on territory
which, beyond the three-mile limit, was free and in no sense
enemy's territory. We also discussed the position taken by the
German Government in one of the _Frye_ Notes, in which the
German expert had taken the position that a cargo of food destined
for an armed enemy port was presumed to be for the armies of
the enemy, and therefore contraband. The Emperor spoke of the
case of the _Dacia_ with some bitterness, but when I went
into an explanation the Chancellor joined in the conversation
and said that our position was undoubtedly correct. I said that
it was not our business to break the blockade--that there were
plenty of German agents in the United States who could send food
ships and test the question; that one ship I knew of, the
_Wilhelmina_, laden with food, had been seized by the British,
who then compromised with the owners, paying them, I believed, a
large sum for the disputed cargo. And in taking up the doctrine
of ultimate destination of goods, i.e., goods sent to a neutral
country but really destined for a belligerent, I said I thought
that during our Civil War we had taken against England exactly
the same stand which England now took; and I said I thought that
one of the decisions of our Supreme Court was based on a shipment
to Matamoras, Mexico, but which the Supreme Court had decided
was really for the Confederacy.
Discussing the submarine question, the Emperor and Chancellor
spoke of the warning given in the _Lusitania_ case; and
I said: "If the Chancellor warns me not to go out on the
Wilhelmplatz, where I have a perfect right to go, the fact that
he gave the warning does not justify him in killing me if I
disregarded his warning and go where I have a right to go." The
conversation then became more general and we finally left the
garden and went into the château, where the Emperor's aides and
guests were impatiently waiting for lunch.
This conversation lasted far beyond lunch time. Anxious heads
were seen appearing from the windows and terraces of the château
to which we finally adjourned. I sat between the Emperor and
Prince Pless. Conversation was general for the most of the time,
and subjects such as the suffragettes and the peace expedition
of Henry Ford were amusingly discussed.
After lunch, I again had a long talk with the Emperor but of a
more general nature than the conversation in the garden.
That night about eleven o'clock, after again dining with the
Chancellor, we left Charleville in the same special salon car,
arriving at Berlin about four P. M. the next day, where at the
station were a crowd of German and American newspaper correspondents,
all anxious to know what had happened.
At this last dinner at the Chancellor's he took me off in a corner
and said, "As I understand it, what America wants is cruiser
warfare on the part of the submarines." And I said, "Yes, that
is it exactly. They may exercise the right of visit and search,
must not torpedo or sink vessels without warning, and must not
sink any vessel unless the passengers and crew are put in a place
of safety."
On the morning of the third of May, I heard that the German note
had been drafted, but that it would contain a clause to the
effect that while the German submarines would not go beyond cruiser
warfare, this rule, nevertheless, would not apply to armed
merchantmen.
As such a proposition as this would, of course, only bring up
the subject again, I immediately ordered my automobile and called
on the Spanish Ambassador, stating to him what I had heard about
the contents of the note; that this would mean, without doubt, a
break with America; and that, as I had been instructed to hand
the Embassy over to him, I had come to tell him of that fact. I
gave the same information to other colleagues, of course hoping
that what I said would directly or indirectly reach the ears
of the German Foreign Office. Whether it did or not, I do not
know, but the _Sussex_ Note when received did not contain
any exception with reference to armed merchantmen.
With the receipt of the _Sussex_ Note and the President's
answer thereto, which declined assent to the claim of Germany
to define its attitude toward our rights in accordance with what
we might do in regard to the enforcement of our rights against
England, the submarine question seemed, at least for the moment,
settled. I, however, immediately warned the Department that I
believed that the rulers of Germany would at some future date,
forced by public opinion, and by the von Tirpitz and Conservative
parties, take up ruthless submarine war again, possibly in the
autumn but at any rate about February or March, 1917.
In my last conversation with the Chancellor before leaving the
Great General Headquarters, when he referred to the cruiser warfare
of the submarines, he also said, "I hope now that if we settle this
matter your President will be great enough to take up the question
of peace." It was as a result of intimations from government
circles that, after my return to Berlin, I gave an interview to
a representative of a Munich newspaper, expressing my faith in
the coming of peace, although I was careful to say that it might
be a matter of months or even years.
Thereafter, on many occasions the Chancellor impressed upon me
the fact that America must do something towards arranging a peace
and that if nothing was done to this end, public opinion in Germany
would undoubtedly force a resumption of a ruthless submarine war.
In September of 1916, I having mentioned that Mrs. Gerard was
going to the United States on a short visit, von Jagow insistently
urged me to go also in order to make every effort to induce the
President to do something towards peace; and, as a result of his
urging and as a result of my own desire to make the situation
clear in America, I sailed from Copenhagen on the twenty-eighth
of September with Mrs. Gerard, on the Danish ship, _Frederick VIII_,
bound for New York. I had spent almost three years in Berlin,
having been absent during that time from the city only five or
six days at Kiel and two week-ends in Silesia in 1914, with two
weeks at Munich in the autumn, two days at Munich and two days at
Parten-Kirchen in 1916, and two week-ends at Heringsdorf, in the
summer of the same year, with visits to British prison camps
scattered through the two and a half years of war.
On the _Frederick VIII_ were Messrs. Herbert Swope of the
_New York World_ and William C. Bullitt of the _Philadelphia Ledger_,
who had been spending some time in Germany. I impressed upon each
of these gentlemen my fixed belief that Germany intended shortly,
unless some definite move was made toward peace, to commence
ruthless submarine war; and they made this view clear in the
articles which they wrote for their respective newspapers.
Mr. Swope's articles which appeared in the _New York World_
were immediately republished by him in a book called "Inside the
German Empire." In Mr. Swope's book on page ninety-four, he says,
"The campaign for the ruthless U-boat warfare is regarded by one
man in this country who speaks with the highest German authority,
as being in the nature of a threat intended to accelerate and
force upon us a movement toward peace. Ambassador Gerard had
his attention drawn to this just before he left Berlin but he
declined to accept the interpretation."
On page eighty-eight he writes, "Our Embassy in Berlin expected
just such a demonstration as was given by the U-53 in October
when she sank six vessels off Nantucket, as a lesson of what
Germany could do in our waters if war came."
On page seventy-four he says further, "Throughout Germany the
objection for the resumption of ruthless U-boat warfare of the
_Lusitania_ type grows stronger day by day. The Chancellor
is holding out against it, but how long he can restrain it no one
can say. I left Germany convinced that only peace could prevent
its resumption. And the same opinion is held by every German
with whom I spoke, and it is held also by Ambassador Gerard.
The possibility was so menacing that the principal cause of the
Ambassador's return in October was that he might report to
Washington. The point was set out in press despatches at that
time."
I wrote a preface to Mr. Swope's book for the express purpose
of informing the American public in this way that I believed
that Germany intended at an early date to resume the ruthless
V-boat warfare.
Our trip home on the _Frederick VIII_ was without incident
except for the fact that on the ninth day of October, Swope came to
the door of my stateroom about twelve o'clock at night and informed
me that the captain had told him to tell me that the wireless had
brought the news that German submarines were operating directly
ahead of us and had just sunk six ships in the neighbourhood
of Nantucket. I imagine that the captain slightly changed the
course of our ship, but next day the odour of burning oil was
quite noticeable for hours.
These Danish ships in making the trip from Copenhagen to New
York were compelled to put in at the port of Kirkwall in the
Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, where the ship was searched by
the British authorities. On the occasion of our visit to Kirkwall,
on this trip, a Swede, who had been so foolish as to make a sketch
of the harbour and defences of Kirkwall from the top deck of the
_Frederick VIII_, was taken off the boat by the British. The
British had very cleverly spotted him doing this from the shore
or a neighbouring boat, through a telescope.
Ships can enter Kirkwall only by daylight and at six o'clock
every evening trawlers draw a net across the entrance to the
harbour as a protection against submarines. A passage through
this net is not opened until daylight the following morning.
Captain Thomson of the _Frederick VIII_, the ship which
carried us to America and back to Copenhagen, by his evident
mastery of his profession gave to all of his passengers a feeling
of confidence on the somewhat perilous voyage in those dangerous
waters.
When I reached America, on October eleventh, I was given a most
flattering reception and the freedom of the City of New York.
Within a few days after my arrival, the President sent for me
to visit him at Shadow Lawn, at Long Branch, and I was with him
for over four hours and a quarter in our first conference. I saw
him, of course, after the election, before returning to Germany,
and in fact sailed on the fourth of December at his special request.
Before I left I was impressed with the idea that he desired above
all things both to keep and to make peace. Of course, this question
of making peace is a very delicate one. A direct offer on our part
might have subjected us to the same treatment which we gave Great
Britain during our Civil War when Great Britain made overtures
looking towards the establishment of peace, and the North answered,
practically telling the British Government that it could attend
to its own business, that it would brook no interference and would
regard further overtures as unfriendly acts.
The Germans started this war without any consultation with the
United States, and then seemed to think that they had a right
to demand that the United States make peace for them on such
terms and at such time as they chose; and that the failure to
do so gave them a vested right to break all the laws of warfare
against their enemies and to murder the citizens of the United
States on the high seas, in violation of the declared principles
of international law.
Nevertheless, I think that the inclination of the President was
to go very far towards the forcing of peace.
Our trip from New York to Copenhagen was uneventful, cold and
dark. We were captured by a British cruiser west of the Orkneys
and taken in for the usual search to the port of Kirkwall where
we remained two days.
The President impressed upon me his great interest in the Belgians
deported to Germany. The action of Germany in thus carrying a
great part of the male population of Belgium into virtual slavery
had roused great indignation in America. As the revered Cardinal
Farley said to me a few days before my departure, "You have to
go back to the times of the Medes and the Persians to find a
like example of a whole people carried into bondage."
Mr. Grew had made representations about this to the Chancellor
and, on my return, I immediately took up the question.
I was informed that it was a military measure, that Ludendorf had
feared that the British would break through and overrun Belgium
and that the military did not propose to have a hostile population
at their backs who might cut the rail lines of communication,
telephones and telegraphs; and that for this reason the deportation
had been decided on. I was, however, told that I would be given
permission to visit these Belgians. The passes, nevertheless,
which alone made such visiting possible were not delivered until
a few days before I left Germany.
Several of these Belgians who were put at work in Berlin managed
to get away and come to see me. They gave me a harrowing account
of how they had been seized in Belgium and made to work in Germany
at making munitions to be used probably against their own friends.
I said to the Chancellor, "There are Belgians employed in making
shells contrary to all rules of war and the Hague conventions."
He said, "I do not believe it." I said, "My automobile is at the
door. I can take you, in four minutes, to where thirty Belgians
are working on the manufacture of shells." But he did not find
time to go.
Americans must understand that the Germans will stop at nothing
to win this war, and that the only thing they respect is force.
While I was in America von Jagow, as had been predicted by his
enemies in Berlin, had fallen and Zimmermann had been given his
place.
I remained a day in Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the
transportation to Germany of the three tons of food which I had
brought from New York, and, also, in order to lunch with Count
Rantzau, the German Minister, a most able diplomat.
Therefore, the President's peace note arrived in Berlin just
ahead of me and was delivered by Mr. Grew a few hours before my
arrival. Joseph C. Grew, of Boston, was next in command during
all my stay in Berlin. He most ably carried on the work of the
Embassy during my absence on the trip to America, in the autumn
of 1916; and at all times was of the greatest assistance to me. I
hope to see him go far in his career. This note was dated December
eighteenth, 1916, and was addressed by the Secretary of State
to the American Ambassadors at the capitals of the belligerent
powers. It commenced as follows: "The President directs me to
send you the following communication to be presented immediately
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government to which
you are accredited.
"The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest
to the (here is inserted a designation of the government addressed)
a course of action in regard to the present war which he hopes
that the government will take under consideration as suggested
in the most friendly spirit, etc."
In the note which was sent to the Central Powers it was stated:
"The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President
has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed
to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to
have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with
the recent overtures of the Central Powers."
Of course, the President thus referred to the address made by
Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag in December, in which, after
reviewing generally the military situation, the Chancellor said:
"In a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards this nation
and beyond it towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the
moment has come for official action towards peace. His Majesty,
therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our Allies decided
to propose to the hostile powers to enter peace negotiations."
And the Chancellor continued, saying that a note to this effect
had been transmitted that morning to all hostile powers, through
the representatives of these powers to whom the interests and
rights of Germany in the enemy States had been entrusted; and
that, therefore, the representatives of Spain, the United States
and Switzerland had been asked to forward the note.
Coincidently with this speech of the Chancellor's, which was
December twelfth, 1916, the Emperor sent a message to the commanding
generals reading as follows: "Soldiers! In agreement with the
sovereigns of my Allies and with the consciousness of victory,
I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be
accepted is still uncertain. Until that moment arrives you will
fight on."
I return to the President's note.
The President suggested that early occasion be sought to callout
from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective
views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded,
and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a
guarantee against its renewal.
He called the attention of the world to the fact that according
to the statements of the statesmen of the belligerent powers,
the objects which all sides had in mind seemed to be the same.
And the President finally said that he was not proposing peace,
not even offering mediation; but merely proposing that soundings
be taken in order that all nations might know how near might
be the haven of peace for which all mankind longed.
Shortly after the publication of this note Secretary Lansing
gave an interview to the representatives of the American press
in which he stated that America was very near war. This interview
he later explained.
As soon as possible after my return to Berlin I had interviews
with Zimmermann and the Chancellor. Zimmermann said that we were
such personal friends that he was sure we could continue to work,
as we had in the past, in a frank and open manner, putting all
the cards upon the table and working together in the interests of
peace. I, of course, agreed to this and it seemed, on the surface,
as if everything would go smoothly.
Although the torpedoing without warning of the _Marina_,
while I was in the United States, had resulted in the death of a
number of Americans on board, nevertheless there seemed to be an
inclination on the part of the government and people of the United
States to forget this incident provided Germany would continue to
keep her pledges given in the _Sussex_ Note. During all
the period of the war in Germany I had been on good terms with
the members of the government, namely, the Chancellor, von Jagow,
Zimmermann and the other officials of the Foreign Office, as well
as with Helfferich, Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, Kaempf, the
President of the Reichstag and a number of the influential men
of Germany such as von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Gutmann of
the Dresdener Bank, Dr. Walter Rathenau, who for a long time was
at the head of the department for the supply and conservation of
raw materials, General von Kessel, Over-Commander of the Mark of
Brandenburg, in spite of many tiffs with him over the treatment
of prisoners, Theodor Wolff, editor of the _Tageblatt_, Professor
Stein, Maximilian Harden and many others.
For a long time the fight waged by the Chancellor was America's
fight and a fight for peace, so much so that the newspapers which
attacked the Chancellor were the same ones which had attacked
President Wilson, America and Americans in general, and which had
very often included me in their attacks. During every crisis between
America and Germany I had acted with von Jagow and Zimmermann in
a most confidential way, looking forward always to one object,
namely, the preservation of peace between our respective countries.
Many suggestions were made which, I think, materially aided up
to that time in the preservation of peace.
The Chancellor and the Foreign Office, however, through sheer
weakness did nothing to prevent the insults to our flag and President
perpetrated by the "League of Truth"; although both under the law
and the regulations of the "State of Siege" this gang could not
operate without the consent of the authorities. So far as I was
concerned personally, a few extra attacks from tooth carpenters
and snake dancers meant nothing, but certainly aroused my interest
in the workings of the Teutonic official brain.
On my return everyone in official life,--the Chancellor, Zimmermann,
von Stumm who succeeded Zimmermann, von der Busche, formerly
German Minister in the Argentine, who had equal rank with Stumm
in the Foreign Office--all without exception and in the most
convincing language assured me that cases like that of the
_Marina_, for example, were only accidents and that there
was every desire on the part of Germany to maintain the pledges
given in the _Sussex_ Note.
And the great question to be solved is whether the Germans in
making their offers of peace, in begging me to go to America to
talk peace to the President, were sincerely anxious for peace,
or were only making these general offers of peace in order to
excuse in the eyes of the world a resumption of ruthless submarine
warfare and to win to their side public opinion in the United
States, in case such warfare should be resumed.
Had the decision rested with the Chancellor and with the Foreign
Office, instead of with the military, I am sure that the decision
would have been against the resumption of this ruthless war.
But Germany is not ruled in war time by the civilian power.
Hindenburg at the time I left for America was at the head of
the General Staff and Ludendorf, who had been Chief of Staff,
had been made the Quartermaster General in order that he might
follow Hindenburg to General Headquarters.
Hindenburg, shortly before his battle of the Masurian Lakes,
was a General living in retirement at Hanover. Because he had
for years specialised in the study of this region he was suddenly
called to the command of the German army which was opposing the
Russian invasions. Ludendorf, who had been Colonel of a regiment
at the attack on Liège, was sent with him as his Chief of Staff.
The success of Hindenburg in his campaigns is too well known
to require recapitulation here. He became the popular idol of
Germany, the one general-in fact the one man--whom the people felt
that they could idolise. But shortly before my trip to America an
idea was creeping through the mind of the German people leading
them to believe that Hindenburg was but the front, and that the
brains of the combination had been furnished by Ludendorf. Many
Germans in a position to know told me that the real dictator
of Germany was Ludendorf.
My trip to America was made principally at the instance of von
Jagow and the Chancellor, and, in my farewell talk with the
Chancellor a few days before leaving, I asked if it could not
be arranged, since he was always saying that the civilian power
was inferior to that of the military, that I should see Hindenburg
and Ludendorf before I left. This proposed meeting he either
could not or would not arrange, and shortly after my return I
again asked the Chancellor if I could not see, if not the Emperor,
at least Hindenburg and Ludendorf, who the Chancellor himself
had said were the leaders of the military, and, therefore, the
leaders of Germany. Again I was put off.
In the meantime and in spite of the official assurance given
to me certain men in Germany, in a position to know, warned me
that the government intended to resume ruthless submarine war.
Ludendorf, they said, had declared in favour of this war and,
according to them, that meant its adoption.
At first I thought that Germany would approach the resumption of
ruthless submarine war _via_ the armed merchantman issue.
The case of the _Yarrowdale_ prisoners seemed to bear out
this theory. A German raider captured and sunk a number of enemy
vessels and sent one of the captured boats, the _Yarrowdale_,
with a prize crew to Swinemunde. On board, held as prisoners,
were a number of the crews of the captured vessels; and among
those men I learned "under the rose," were some Americans. The
arrival of the _Yarrowdale_ was kept secret for some time,
but as soon as I received information of its arrival, I sent
note after note to the Foreign Office demanding to know if there
were any Americans among the prisoner crews.
For a long time I received no answer, but finally Germany admitted
what I knew already, that Americans taken with the crews of captured
ships were being held as prisoners of war, the theory of the
Germans being that all employed on armed enemy merchant ships
were enemy combatants. I supposed that possibly Germany might
therefore approach the submarine controversy by this route and
claim that armed merchantmen were liable to be sunk without notice.
Instructed by the State Department, I demanded the immediate
release of the _Yarrowdale_ prisoners. This was accorded
by Germany, but, after the breaking of relations, the prisoners
were held back; and it was not until after we left Germany that
they were finally released.
I asked permission to visit these prisoners and sent Mr. Ayrault
and Mr. Osborne to the place where I knew they were interned.
The permission to visit them arrived, but on the same day orders
were given to remove the prisoners to other camps. Mr. Osborne
and Mr. Ayrault, however, being on the ground, saw the prisoners
before their removal and reported on their conditions.
On January sixth the American Association of Commerce and Trade
gave me a dinner at the Hotel Adlon. This was made the occasion
of a sort of German-American love-feast. Zimmermann, although
he had to go early in the evening to meet the Foreign Minister
of Austria-Hungary, was present; Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor
and Secretary of the Interior; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister;
Sydow, Minister of Commerce; Dernburg; von Gwinner of the Deutsche
Bank; Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank; Under Secretary von der
Busche of the Foreign Office; the Mayor and the Police President
of Berlin; the President of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce; Under
Secretary von Stumm of the Foreign Office; and many others of
that office. There were present also Under Secretary Richter
of the Interior Department; Lieutenant Colonel Doeutelmoser of
the General Staff; the editors and proprietors of the principal
newspapers in Berlin; Count Montgelas, who had charge of American
affairs in the Foreign Office; naval officers like Captain Lans;
the American correspondents in Germany; and Prince Isenburg;
rubbing shoulders with the brewers, George Ehret and Krueger,
of New York and Newark. There were literary lights like Ludwig
Fulda, Captain Persius, Professor Hans Delbrück, Dr. Paasche,
Vice-President of the Reichstag, and many others equally celebrated
as the ones that I have named. Speeches were made by Mr. Wolf,
President of the American Association of Commerce and Trade,
Helfferich, Zimmermann, von Gwinner and me. A tone of the greatest
friendliness prevailed. Zimmermann referred to our personal
friendship and said that he was sure that we should be able to
manage everything together. Helfferich in his speech said that
I, by learning German and studying the life of the German people,
was one of the few diplomats that had come to Germany who had
learned something of the real life and psychology of the Germans.
Von Gwinner made a speech in English that would have done credit
to any American after-dinner speaker; and I, in my short address,
said that the relations between the two countries had never been
better and that so long as my personal friends like Zimmermann
and other members of the government, who I named, were in office,
I was sure that the good relations between the two countries
would be maintained. I spoke also of the sums of money that I had
brought back with me for the benefit of the widows and orphans
of Germany.
The majority of the German newspapers spoke in a very kindly
way about this dinner and about what was said at it. Of course,
they all took what I said as an expression of friendliness, and
only Reventlow claimed that, by referring to the members of the
government, I was interfering in the internal affairs of Germany.
The speeches and, in fact, this dinner constituted a last desperate
attempt to preserve friendly relations. Both the reasonable men
present and I knew, almost to a certainty, that return to ruthless
submarine war had been decided on and that only some lucky chance
could prevent the military, backed by the made public opinion, from
insisting on a defiance of international law and the laws of humanity.
The day after the dinner the Chancellor sent for me and expressed
approval of what I said and thanked me for it and on the surface
it seemed as if everything was "as merry as a marriage bell."
Unfortunately, I am afraid that all this was only on the surface,
and that perhaps the orders to the submarine commanders to recommence
ruthless war had been given the day preceding this love-feast.
The Germans believed that President Wilson had been elected with
a mandate to keep out of war at any cost, and that America could
be insulted, flouted and humiliated with impunity. Even before
this dinner we had begun to get rumours of the resumption of
ruthless submarine war and within a few days I was cabling to
the Department information based not upon absolute facts but upon
reports which seemed reliable and which had been collected through
the able efforts of our very capable naval attaché, Commander
Gherardi.
And this information was confirmed by the hints given to me by
various influential Germans. Again and again after the sixth of
January, I was assured by Zimmermann and others in the Foreign
Office that nothing of the kind was contemplated.
Now were the German moves in the direction of peace sincere or not?
From the time when the Chancellor first spoke of peace, I asked
him and others what the peace terms of Germany were. I could
never get any one to state any definite terms of peace and on
several occasions when I asked the Chancellor whether Germany
was willing to withdraw from Belgium, he always said, "Yes, but
with guarantees." Finally in January, 1917, when he was again
talking of peace, I said, "What are these peace terms to which
you refer continually? Will you allow me to ask a few questions
as to the specific terms of peace? First are the Germans willing
to withdraw from Belgium?" The Chancellor answered, "Yes, but
with guarantees." I said, "What are these guarantees?" He said,
"We must possibly have the forts of Liege and Namur; we must
have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have
possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the
ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not
be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain
a large army in Belgium. We must have the commercial control of
Belgium." I said, "I do not see that you have left much for the
Belgians except that King Albert will have the right to reside in
Brussels with an honor guard." And the Chancellor said, "We cannot
allow Belgium to be an outpost (_Vorwerk_) of England"; and
I said, "I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish
it to become an outpost of Germany, especially as von Tirpitz
has said that the coast of Flanders should be retained in order
to make war on England and America." I continued, "How about
Northern France?" He said, "We are willing to leave Northern
France, but there must be a rectification of the frontier." I
said, "How about the Eastern frontier?" He said, "We must have
a very substantial rectification of our frontier." I said, "How
about Roumania?" He said, "We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with
Roumania." I said, "How about Serbia?" He said, "A very small
Serbia may be allowed to exist, but that is a question for Austria.
Austria must be left to do what she wishes to Italy, and we must
have indemnities from all countries and all our ships and colonies
back."
Of course, "rectification of the frontier" is a polite term for
"annexation."
On the twenty-second of January, 1917, our President addressed
the Senate; and in his address he referred to his Note of the
eighteenth of December, sent to all belligerent governments. In
this address he stated, referring to the reply of the Entente
Powers to his Peace Note of the eighteenth of December, "We are
that much nearer to the definite discussion of the peace which
shall end the present war."
He referred to the willingness of both contestants to discuss
terms of peace, as follows: "The Central Powers united in reply
which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists
in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have
replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms,
indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the
arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem
to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.
We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which
shall end the present war." The President further referred to a
world concert to guarantee peace in the future and said, "The
present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and
to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far
as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned,
it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what
terms it is ended." He said that the statesmen of both of the
groups of nations at war had stated that it was not part of the
purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists, and he said
that it must be implied from these assurances that the peace
to come must be "a peace without victory."
In the course of his address he said: "Statesmen everywhere are
agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous
Poland." In another place he said: "So far as practicable, moreover,
every great people now struggling toward a full development of
its resources and its powers should be assured a direct outlet
to the highways of the sea." Where this cannot be done by cession
of territory it can no doubt be arranged by the neutralisation
of direct rights of way; and he closed by proposing in effect
that the nations of the world should adopt the Monroe Doctrine
and that no nation should seek to explain its policy for any
other nation or people.
After the receipt of the Ultimatum of January thirty-first from
Germany, the Chancellor, in a conversation I had with him, referred
to this Peace Note of December eighteenth and to the speech of
January twenty-second.
[Illustration: A POSTER FROM THE CHARLEVILLE DISTRICT, SHOWING
THE ALLOTMENT OF FOOD TO EACH PERSON FOR THE FIRST FIFTEEN DAYS
OF MAY, 1916.]
I must say here that on my return to Germany I went very far
in assuring the Chancellor and other members of the Government
of the President's desire to see peace established in the world;
and I told them that I believed that the President was ready
to go very far in the way of coercing any nation which refused
a reasonable peace; but I also impressed on all the members of
the Government with whom I came in contact my belief that the
election had not in any way altered the policy of the President,
and I warned them of the danger to our good relations if ruthless
submarine warfare should be resumed.
Von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, at this interview after the
thirty-first of January, said that he had been compelled to take
up ruthless submarine war because it was evident that President
Wilson could do nothing towards peace. He spoke particularly of
the President's speech of January twenty-second and said that
in that speech the President had made it plain that he considered
that the answer of the Entente Powers to his Peace Note formed a
basis for peace, which was a thing impossible for Germany even
to consider; and said further (and this was a criticism I heard
not only from him, but also from many Germans), that when the
President spoke of a united and independent Poland he evidently
meant to take away from Germany that part of Poland which had been
incorporated in the Kingdom of Prussia and give it to this new
and independent Kingdom, thereby bringing the Eastern frontier of
Germany within two hours by motor from Berlin; and that, further,
when the President spoke of giving each nation a highway to the
sea, he meant that the German port of Dantzig should be turned over
to this new State of Poland, thereby not only taking a Prussian
port but cutting the extreme Eastern part of Prussia from the
remainder of the country. I said that these objections appeared
to me very frivolous; that the President, of course, like a clever
lawyer endeavouring to gain his end, which was peace, had said
that all parties were apparently agreed that there should be a
peace; that if Germany were fighting a merely defensive war,
as she had always claimed, she should be greatly delighted when
the President declared that all the weight of America was in
favor of a peace without victory, which meant, of course, that
Germany should be secured from that crushing and dismemberment
which Germany's statesmen had stated so often that they feared.
I said, further, that I was sure that when the President spoke
of the united and independent State of Poland he had not, of
course, had reference to Poland at any particular period of its
history, but undoubtedly to Poland as constituted by Germany
and Austria themselves; and that, in referring to the right of
a nation to have access to the sea, he had in mind Russia and
the Dardanelles rather than to any attempt to take a Prussian
port for the benefit of Poland.
Von Bethmann-Hollweg said that one of the principal reasons why
Germany had determined upon a resumption of ruthless submarine
warfare was because of this speech of the President to the American
Senate. Of course, the trouble with this feeling and the criticism
of the President's speech made by the Chancellor is that the
orders for the resumption of ruthless submarine warfare had been
given long before the news of the speech came to Germany.
I had cabled the information collected by Commander Gherardi
as to the orders given to submarines long before the date of
the President's speech, and it happened that on the night after
I had received the German note announcing this resumption I was
taking a walk after dinner about the snow-covered streets of
Berlin. In the course of this walk I met a young German woman of
my acquaintance who was on intimate terms with the Crown Princess.
She was on her way on foot from the opera house, where she had
been with the Crown Princess, to the underground station, for
by this time, of course, taxis had become an unknown luxury in
Berlin, and I joined her. I told her of the Ultimatum which, I
had received at six o'clock that evening from Zimmermann and I
told her that I was sure that it meant the breaking of diplomatic
relations and our departure from Germany. She expressed great
surprise that the submarine warfare was set to commence on the
thirty-first of January and said that weeks before they had been
talking over the matter at the Crown Princess's and that she
had heard then that the orders had been given to commence it on
the fifteenth. In any event it is certain that the orders to the
submarine commanders had been given long prior to the thirty-first
and probably as early as the fifteenth.
I sincerely believe that the only object of the Germans in making
these peace offers was first to get the Allies, if possible, in
a conference and there detach some or one of them by the offer
of separate terms; or, if this scheme failed, then it was believed
that the general offer and talk about peace would create a sentiment
so favourable to the Germans that they might, without fear of
action by the United States, resume ruthless submarine warfare
against England.
A week or two before the thirty-first of January, Dr. Solf asked
me if I did not think that it would be possible for the United
States to permit the resumption of ruthless submarine warfare
against Great Britain. He said that three months time was all
that would be required to bring Great Britain to her knees and end
the war. And in fact so cleverly did von Tirpitz, Grand Admiral
von Meuster, the Conservatives and the enemies of the Chancellor
and other advocates of submarine war carry on their propaganda
that the belief was ingrained in the whole of the German nation
that a resumption of this ruthless war would lead within three
months to what all Germans so ardently desired--peace. It was
impossible for any government to resist the popular demand for
the use of this illegal means of warfare, because army and navy
and people were convinced that ruthless submarine war spelled
success and a glorious peace.
But this peace, of course, meant only a German peace, a peace
as outlined to me by the Chancellor; a peace impossible for the
Allies and even for the world to accept; a peace which would
leave Germany immensely powerful and ready immediately after
the war to take up a campaign against the nations of the Western
hemisphere; a peace which would compel every nation, so long
as German autocracy remained in the saddle, to devote its best
energies, the most fruitful period of each man's life, to
preparations for war.
On January thirtieth, I received a definite intimation of the
coming Ultimatum the next day and, judging that the hint meant
the resumption of ruthless submarine war, I telegraphed a warning
to the American Ambassadors and Ministers as well as to the State
Department. On January thirty-first at about four o'clock in the
afternoon I received from Zimmermann a short letter of which
the following is a copy:
"The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, Zimmermann,
requests the honor of the visit of his Excellency, the
Ambassador of the United States of America, this afternoon
at six o'clock in the Foreign Office, Wilhelmstrasse 75/76.
"Berlin, the 31st January, 1917."
Pursuant to this letter, I went to the Foreign Office at six
o'clock. Zimmermann then read to me in German a note from the
Imperial Government, announcing the creation of the war zones
about Great Britain and France and the commencement of ruthless
submarine warfare at twelve P. M. that night. I made no comment,
put the note in my pocket and went back to the Embassy. It was
then about seven P. M. and, of course, the note was immediately
translated and despatched with all speed to America.
After the despatch of the note I had an interview with the Chancellor
in which he, as I have stated above, criticised both the Peace
Note of December eighteenth as not being definite enough and
the speech to the Senate of January twenty-second; and further
said that he believed that the situation had changed, that, in
spite of what the President had said in the note before the
_Sussex_ settlement, he was now for peace, that he had been
elected on a peace platform, and that nothing would happen.
Zimmermann at the time he delivered the note told me that this
submarine warfare was a necessity for Germany, and that Germany
could not hold out a year on the question of food. He further
said, "Give us only two months of this kind of warfare and we
shall end the war and make peace within three months."
Saturday, February third, the President announced to Congress
the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany. The news of
this, of course, did not reach Berlin until the next day; and on
this Saturday afternoon Mrs. Gerard and I had an engagement to go
to the theatre with Zimmermann and Mrs. Friedlaender-Fuld-Mitford,
a young lady whose father is considered the richest man in Berlin,
and who had been married to a young Englishman, named Mitford, a
son of Lord Redesdale. Through no fault on the lady's part, there
had been an annulment of this marriage; and she was occupying a
floor of her own in the handsome house of her father and mother
on the Pariser-Platz in Berlin. We stopped for Mrs. Mitford and
took her to the theatre where we saw a very clever play, I think
by Thoma, called "Die Verlorene Tochter" (The Prodigal Daughter).
Zimmermann did not come to the play but joined us later at the
Friedlaender-Fuld House where we had a supper of four in Mrs.
Mitford's apartments. After supper, while I was talking to
Zimmermann, he spoke of the note to America and said: "During
the past month, this is what I have been doing so often at the
General Headquarters with the Emperor. I often thought of telling
you what was going on as I used to tell you in the old days,
but I thought that you would only say that such a course would
mean a break of diplomatic relations, and so I thought there was
no use in telling you. But as you will see, everything will be
all right. America will do nothing, for President Wilson is for
peace and nothing else. Everything will go on as before. I have
arranged for you to go to the Great General Headquarters and see
the Kaiser next week and everything will be all right."
The next day, Sunday, we had a German who is connected with the
Foreign Office and his American wife to lunch, and another German
who had been in America, also connected with the Foreign Office.
Just as we were going in to lunch some one produced a copy of the
"_B. Z._", the noon paper published in Berlin, which contained what
seemed to be an authentic account of the breaking of diplomatic
relations by America. The lunch was far from cheerful. The Germans
looked very sad and said practically nothing, while I tried to
make polite conversation at my end of the table.
The next day I went over to see Zimmermann, having that morning
received the official despatch from Washington, and told him
that I had come to demand my passports.
Of course, Zimmermann by that time had received the news and
had had time to compose himself. The American correspondents
told me that when he saw them on the day before, he had at first
refused to say anything and then had been rather violent in his
language and had finally shown great emotion. I am sure, from
everything I observed, that the break of diplomatic relations
came as an intense surprise to him and to the other members of
the government, and yet I cannot imagine why intelligent men
should think that the United States of America had fallen so low
as to bear without murmur this sudden kick in the face.
The police who had always been about our Embassy since the
commencement of the war, were now greatly increased in numbers;
and guarded not only the front of the house, but also the rear and
the surrounding streets; but there was no demonstration whatever
on the part of the people of Berlin. On Tuesday afternoon I went
out for a walk, walking through most of the principal streets
of Berlin, absolutely alone, and on my return to the Embassy
I found Count Montgelas, who, with the rank of Minister, was
at the head of the department which included American affairs
in the Foreign Office. I asked Montgelas why I had not received
my passports, and he said that I was being kept back because
the Imperial Government did not know what had happened to Count
Bernstorff and that there had been rumours that the German ships
in America had been confiscated by our government. I said that
I was quite sure that Bernstorff was being treated with every
courtesy and that the German ships had not been confiscated. I
said, moreover, "I do not see why I have to disprove your idea that
Bernstorff is being maltreated and the German ships confiscated. It
seems to me it is for you to prove this; and, at any event, why
don't you have the Swiss Government, which now represents you,
cable to its Minister in Washington and get the exact facts?" He
said, "Well, you know, the Swiss are not used to cabling."
He then produced a paper which was a re-affirmation of the treaty
between Prussia and the United States of 1799, with some very
extraordinary clauses added to it. He asked me to read this over
and either to sign it or to get authority to sign it, and said
that if it was not signed it would be very difficult for Americans
to leave the country, particularly the American correspondents.
I read this treaty over and then said, "Of course I cannot sign
this on my own responsibility and I will not cable to my government
unless I can cable in cipher and give them my opinion of this
document." He said, "That is impossible." This treaty was as
follows:
Agreement between Germany and the United States of America
concerning the treatment of each other's citizens and their
private property after the severance of diplomatic relations.
_Article 1._
After the severance of diplomatic relations between Germany and
the United States of America and in the event of the outbreak of
war between the two Powers the citizens of either party and their
private property in the territory of the other party shall be
treated according to Article 23 of the treaty of amity and
commerce between Prussia and the United States of 11 July, 1799,
with the following explanatory and supplementary clauses.
_Article 2._
German merchants in the United States and American merchants
in Germany shall so far as the treatment of their persons and
their property is concerned be held in every respect on a par
with the other persons mentioned in Article 23. Accordingly
they shall even after the period provided for in Article 23 has
elapsed be entitled to remain and continue their profession in
the country of their residence.
Merchants as well as the other persons mentioned in Article 23
may be excluded from fortified places or other places of military
importance.
_Article 3._
Germans in the United States and Americans in Germany shall
be free to leave the country of their residence within the
times and by the routes that shall be assigned to them by the
proper authorities.
The persons departing shall be entitled to take along their
personal property including money, valuables and bank accounts
excepting such property the exportation of which is prohibited
according to general provisions.
_Article 4._
The protection of Germans in the United States and of Americans
in Germany and of their property shall be guaranteed in accordance
with the laws existing in the countries of either party. They
shall be under no other restrictions concerning the enjoyment of
their private rights and the judicial enforcement of their rights
than neutral residents; they may accordingly not be transferred
to concentration camps nor shall their private property be subject
to sequestration or liquidation or other compulsory alienation
except in cases that under the existing laws apply also to neutrals.
As a general rule, German property in the United States and
American property in Germany shall not be subject to sequestration
or liquidation or other compulsory alienation under other
conditions than neutral property.
_Article 5._
Patent rights or other protected rights held by Germans in the
United States or Americans in Germany shall not be declared
void; nor shall the exercise of such rights be impeded nor shall
such rights be transferred to others without the consent of the
person entitled thereto; provided that regulations made exclusively
in the interest of the State shall apply.
_Article 6._
Contracts made between Germans and Americans either before or
after the severance of diplomatic relations, also obligations
of all kinds between Germans and Americans shall not be declared
cancelled, void or in suspension except under provisions applicable
to neutrals.
Likewise the citizens of either party shall not be impeded in
fulfilling their liabilities arising from such obligations either
by injunctions or by other provisions unless these apply also to
neutrals.
_Article 7._
The provisions of the sixth Hague Convention relative to the
treatment of enemy merchant ships at outbreak of hostilities
shall apply to the merchant vessels of either party and their
cargo.
The aforesaid ships may not be forced to leave port unless at
the same time they be given a pass recognised as binding by all
the enemy sea powers to a home port or a port of an allied country
or to another port of the country in which the ship happens to be.
_Article 8._
The regulations of chapter 3 of the eleventh Hague Convention
relative to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right
of capture in maritime war shall apply to the captains, officers
and members of the crews of merchant ships specified in Article
7 and of such merchant ships that may be captured in the course
of a possible war.
_Article 9._
This agreement shall apply also to the colonies and other
foreign possessions of either party.
Berlin, February, 1917.
I then said, "I shall not cable at all. Why do you come to me with
a proposed treaty after we have broken diplomatic relations and
ask an Ambassador who is held as a prisoner to sign it? Prisoners
do not sign treaties and treaties signed by them would not be
worth anything." And I also said, "After your threat to keep
Americans here and after reading this document, even if I had
authority to sign it I would stay here until hell freezes over
before I would put my name to such a paper."
Montgelas seemed rather rattled, and in his confusion left the
paper with me--something, I am sure, he did not intend to do
in case of a refusal. Montgelas was an extremely agreeable man
and I think at all times had correctly predicted the attitude
of America and had been against acts of frightfulness, such as
the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ and the resumption of
ruthless submarine war. I am sure that a gentleman like Montgelas
undertook with great reluctance to carry out his orders in the
matter of getting me to sign this treaty.
I must cheerfully certify that even the most pro-German American
correspondents in Berlin, when I told them of Montgelas' threat,
showed the same fine spirit as their colleagues. All begged me
not to consider them or their liberty where the interests of
America were involved.
As soon as diplomatic relations were broken, and I broke them
formally not only in my conversation with Zimmermann of Monday
morning but also by sending over a formal written request for my
passports on the evening of that day, our telegraph privileges were
cut off. I was not even allowed to send telegrams to the American
consuls throughout Germany giving them their instructions. Mail
also was cut off, and the telephone. My servants were not even
permitted to go to the nearby hotel to telephone. In the meantime
we completed our preparations for departure. We arranged to turn
over American interests, and the interests of Roumania and Serbia
and Japan, to the Spanish Embassy; and the interests of Great
Britain to the Dutch. I have said already that I believe that
Ambassador Polo de Bernabe will faithfully protect the interests
of America, and I believe that Baron Gevers will fearlessly fight
the cause of the British prisoners.
We sold our automobiles; and two beautiful prize winning saddle
horses, one from Kentucky and one from Virginia, which I had
brought with me from America, went on the stage, that is, I sold
them to the proprietor of the circus in Berlin!
The three tons of food which we had brought with us from America
we gave to our colleagues in the diplomatic corps,--the Spaniards,
Greeks, Dutch and the Central and South Americans. I had many
friends among the diplomats of the two Americas who were all
men of great ability and position in their own country. I think
that most of them know only too well the designs against Central
and South America cherished by the Pan-Germans.
Finally, I think on the morning of Friday, Mr. Oscar King Davis,
correspondent of the _New York Times_, received a wireless
from Mr. Van Anda, editor of the _New York Times_, telling
him that Bernstorff and his staff were being treated with every
courtesy and that the German ships had not been confiscated. In
the evening our telephone was reconnected, and we were allowed to
receive some telegrams and to send open telegrams to the consuls,
etc. throughout Germany; and we were notified that we would probably
be allowed to leave the next day in the evening.
Always followed by spies, I paid as many farewell visits to my
diplomatic colleagues as I was able to see; and on Saturday I
thought that, in spite of the ridiculous treatment accorded us in
cutting off the mail and telephone and in holding me for nearly
a week, I would leave in a sporting spirit: I therefore, had
my servant telephone and ask whether Zimmermann and von
Bethmann-Hollweg would receive me. I had a pleasant farewell
talk of about half an hour with each of them and I expressly told
the Chancellor that I had come to bid him a personal farewell,
not to make a record for any White Book, and that anything he
said would remain confidential. I also stopped in to thank Dr.
Zahn, of the Foreign Office, who had arranged the details of our
departure and gave him a gold cigarette case as a souvenir of
the occasion. At the last moment, the Germans allowed a number
of the consuls and clerks who had been working in the Embassy,
and the American residents in Berlin, to leave on the train with
us; so that we were about one hundred and twenty persons in all
on this train, which left the Potsdamer station at eight-ten in
the evening. The time of our departure had not been publicly
announced, but although the automobiles, etc. in front of the
Embassy might have attracted a crowd, there was no demonstration
whatever; and, in fact, during this week that I was detained in
Berlin I walked allover the city every afternoon and evening,
went into shops, and so on, without encountering any hostile
demonstration.
There was a large crowd in the station to see us off. All the
Spanish Embassy, Dutch, Greeks and many of our colleagues from
Central and South America were there. There were, from the Foreign
Office, Montgelas, Dr. Roediger, Prittwitz and Horstmann. As the
train pulled out, a number of the Americans left in Berlin who
were on the station platform raised quite a vigorous cheer.
Two officers had been sent by the Imperial Government to accompany
us on this train; one, a Major von der Hagen, sent by the General
Staff and the other, a representative of the Foreign Office, Baron
Wernher von Ow-Wachendorf. It was quite thoughtful of the Foreign
Office to send this last officer, as it was by our efforts that
he had secured his exchange when he was a prisoner in England;
and he, therefore, would be supposed to entertain kindly feelings
for our Embassy.
I had ordered plenty of champagne and cigars to be put on the
train and we were first invited to drink champagne with the officers
in the dining car; then they joined us in the private salon car
which we occupied in the end of the train. The journey was
uneventful. Outside some of the stations a number of people were
drawn up who stared at the train in a bovine way, but who made
no demonstration of any kind.
We went through Württemburg and entered Switzerland by way of
Schaffhausen. The two officers left us at the last stop on the
German side. I had taken the precaution before we left Berlin to
find out their names, and, as they left us, I gave each of them
a gold cigarette case inscribed with his name and the date.
At the first station on the Swiss side a body of Swiss troops
were drawn up, presenting arms, and the Colonel commanding the
Swiss army (there are no generals in Switzerland), attended by
several staff officers, came on the train and travelled with
us nearly to Zurich.
I started to speak French to one of these staff officers, but
he interrupted me by saying in perfect English, "You do not have
to speak French to me. My name is Iselin, many of my relations
live in New York and I lived there myself some years."
At Zurich we left the German special train, and were met on the
platform by some grateful Japanese, the American Consul and a
number of French and Swiss newspaper reporters, thus ending our
exodus from Germany.