CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGY AND CAUSES WHICH PREPARED THE NATION FOR WAR

To the outsider, the Germans seem a fierce and martial nation.

But, in reality, the mass of the Germans, in consenting to the

great sacrifice entailed by their enormous preparations for war,

have been actuated by fear.

This fear dates from the Thirty Years' War, the war which commenced

in 1618 and was terminated in 1648. In 1648, when the Treaty

of Westphalia was concluded, Germany was almost a desert. Its

population had fallen from twenty millions to four millions.

The few remaining people were so starved that cannibalism was

openly practised. In the German States polygamy was legalised,

and was a recognised institution for many years thereafter.

Of thirty-five thousand Bohemian villages, only six thousand

were left standing. In the lower Palatinate only one-tenth of the

population survived; in Württemberg, only one-sixth. Hundreds of

square miles of once fertile country were overgrown with forests

inhabited only by wolves.

A picture of this horrible period is found in the curious novel,

"The Adventurous Simplicissimus," written by Grimmelshausen, and

published in 1669, which describes the adventures of a wise peasant

who finally leaves his native Germany and betakes himself to a desert

island which he refuses to leave when offered an opportunity to

go back to the Fatherland. He answers those who wish to persuade

him to go back with words which seem quite appropriate to-day:

"My God, where do you want to carry me? Here is peace. There is

war. Here I know nothing of the arts of the court, ambitions,

anger, envy, deceit, nor have I cares concerning my clothing and

nourishment.... While I still lived in Europe everything was

(O, woe that I must appear witness to such acts of Christians!)

filled with war, burning, murder, robbery, plundering and the

shame of women and virgins." The Munich weekly, "Simplicissimus,"

whose powerful political cartoons have often startled Europe,

takes its name from this character.

After the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was again

and again ravaged by smaller wars, culminating in the Seven Years'

War of Frederick the Great and the humbling of Germany under

the heel of Napoleon. In the wars Of Frederick the Great, one

tenth of the population was killed. Even the great Battle of

the Nations at Leipsic in 1813 did not free Germany from wars,

and in 1866 Prussia and the smaller North German States, with

Italy, defeated Austria, assisted by Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel,

Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Saxony, Baden, Württemberg and Hanover.

I am convinced that the fear of war induced by a hereditary instinct,

caused the mass of the Germans to become the tools and dupes of

those who played upon this very fear in order to create a military

autocracy. On the other hand, and, especially, in the noble class,

we have in Germany a great number of people who believe in war for

its own sake. In part, these nobles are the descendants of the

Teutonic Knights who conquered the Slav population of Prussia,

and have ever since bound that population to their will.

The Prussian army was created by the father of Frederick the

Great, who went to the most ridiculous extremes in obtaining tall

men at all costs for his force.

The father of Frederick the Great gave the following written

instructions to the two tutors of his son. "Above all let both

tutors exert themselves to the utmost to inspire him with a love

of soldiery and carefully impress upon his mind that, as nothing

can confer honour and fame upon a prince except the sword, the

monarch who seeks not his sole satisfaction in it must ever appear

a contemptible character in the eyes of the world."

Frederick the Great left, by the death of that father who had

once threatened to execute him, at the head of a marvellous army

with a full treasury, finally decided upon war, as he admits in

his own letters, "in order to be talked about," and his desire

to be talked about led to the Seven Years' War.

The short war against Denmark in 1864, against Austria, Bavaria,

etc., in 1866 and against France in 1870, enormously increased

both the pride and prestige of the Prussian army. It must not

be forgotten that at all periods of history it seems as if some

blind instinct had driven the inhabitants of the inhospitable

plains of North Germany to war and to conquest. The Cimbri and

Teutones--the tribes defeated by Marius; Ariovistus, who was

defeated by Julius Caesar; the Goths and the Visi-Goths; the

Franks and the Saxons; all have poured forth from this infertile

country, for the conquest of other lands. The Germans of to-day

express this longing of the North Germans for pleasanter climes

in the phrase in which they demand "a place in the sun."

The nobles of Prussia are always for war. The business men and

manufacturers and shipowners desire an increasing field for their

activities. The German colonies were uninhabitable by Europeans.

All his life the glittering Emperor and his generals had planned

and thought of war; and the Crown Prince, surrounded by his

remarkable collection of relics and reminders of Napoleon, dreamed

only of taking the lead in a successful war of conquest. Early in

the winter of 1913-14, the Crown Prince showed his collection of

Napoleana to a beautiful American woman of my acquaintance, and

said that he hoped war would occur while his father was alive,

but, if not, he would start a war the moment he came to the throne.

Since writing the above, the American woman who had this conversation

with the Crown Prince wrote out for me the exact conversation

in her own words, as follows: "I had given him Norman Angell's

book, 'The Great Illusion,' which seeks to prove that war is

unprofitable. He (the Crown Prince) said that whether war was

profitable or not, when he came to the throne there would be war,

if not before, just for the fun of it. On a previous occasion

he had said that the plan was to attack and conquer France, then

England, and after that my country (the United States of America);

Russia was also to be conquered, and Germany would be master of

the world."

The extraordinary collection of relics, statues, busts, souvenirs,

etc., of the first Napoleon, collected by the Crown Prince, which

he was showing at the time of the first of these conversations

to this American lady, shows the trend of his mind and that all

his admiration is centred upon Napoleon, the man who sought the

mastery of the world, and who is thought by admirers like the

Crown Prince to have failed only because of slight mistakes which

they feel, in his place, they would not have made.

If the Germans' long preparations for war were to bear any fruit,

countless facts pointed to the summer of 1914 as the time when the

army should strike that great and sudden blow at the liberties

of the world.

It was in June, 1914, that the improved Kiel Canal was reopened,

enabling the greatest warships to pass from the Baltic to the

North Sea.

In the Zeppelins the Germans had arms not possessed by any other

country and with which they undoubtedly believed that they could

do much more damage to England than was the case after the actual

outbreak of hostilities. They had paid great attention to the

development of the submarine. Their aeroplanes were superior to

those of other nations. They believed that in the use of poison

gas, which was prepared before the outbreak of the war, they had

a prize that would absolutely demoralise their enemy. They had

their flame throwers and the heavy artillery and howitzers which

reduced the redoubtable forts of Liege and Namur to fragments

within a few hours, and which made the holding of any fortresses

impossible.

On their side, by the imposition of a heavy tax called the

_Wehrbeitrag_ or supplementary defence tax, they had, in

1913, increased their army by a number of army corps. On the

other hand, the law for three years' military service voted in

France had not yet gone into effect, nor had the law for universal

military service voted by the Belgian Chambers. Undoubtedly the

Germans based great hopes upon the Bagdad railway which was to

carry their influence to the East, and even threatened the rule

of England in Egypt and India. Undoubtedly there was talk, too,

of a Slav railroad to run from the Danube to the Adriatic which

would cut off Germany from access to the Southern Sea. Francis

Deloisi, the Frenchman, in his book published before the great

war, called "De la Guerre des Balkans à la Guerre Européenne,"

says, "In a word, the present war (Balkan) is the work of Russia,

and the Danube Asiatic railway is a Russian project. If it succeeds,

a continuous barrier of Slav peoples will bar the way to the

Mediterranean of the path of Austro-German expansion from the

Black Sea to the Adriatic. But here again the Romanoffs confront

the Hapsburgs, the Austro-Serb conflict becomes the Austro-Russian

conflict, two great groups are formed, and the Balkan conflict

becomes the European conflict."

Another reason for an immediate war was the loan by France to

Russia made on condition that additional strategic railways were

to be constructed by the Russians in Poland. Although this money

had been received, the railways had not been constructed at the

time of the opening of the Great War. Speaking of this situation,

the Russian General Kuropatkin, in his report for the year 1900,

said, "We must cherish no illusions as to the possibility of an

easy victory over the Austrian army," and he then went on to say,

"Austria had eight railways to transport troops to the Russian

frontier while Russia had only four; and, while Germany had seventeen

such railways running to the German-Russian frontier, the Russians

had only five." Kuropatkin further said, "The differences are too

enormous and leave our neighbours a superiority which cannot be

overcome by the numbers of our troops, or their courage."

Comparing the two armies, he said, "The invasion of Russia by

German troops is more probable than the invasion of Germany by

Russian troops"; and, "Our Western frontier, in the event of

a European war, would be in such danger as it never has known

in all the history of Russia."

Agitation by workmen in Russia was believed in Germany to be

the beginning of a revolution. Illuminating figures may be seen

in the gold purchase of the German Imperial Bank: in 1911,

174,000,000 marks; in 1912, 173,000,000 marks; but in 1913,

317,000,000 marks.

There was a belief in Germany that the French nation was degenerate

and corrupt and unprepared for war. This belief became conviction

when, in the debates of the French Senate, Senator Humbert, early

in 1914, publicly exposed what he claimed to be the weakness

and unpreparedness of France.

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, certainly

reported to his government that England did not wish to enter

the war. He claims now that he did not mean that England would

not fight at all events, but undoubtedly the German Foreign Office

believed that England would remain out of the war. The raising of

the Ulster army by Sir Edward Carson, one of the most gigantic

political bluffs in all history, which had no more revolutionary

or military significance than a torchlight parade during one of

our presidential campaigns, was reported by the German spies

as a real and serious revolutionary movement; and, of course, it

was believed by the Germans that Ireland would rise in general

rebellion the moment that war was declared. In the summer of

1914 Russia was believed to be on the edge of revolution.

As I have said in a previous chapter, the movement against

militarism, culminating in the extraordinary vote in the Reichstag

against the government at the time of the Zabern Affair, warned

the government and military people that the mass of Germans were

coming to their senses and were preparing to shake off the bogy of

militarism and fear, which had roosted so long on their shoulders

like a Prussian old-man-of-the-sea. The Pan-Germans and the

Annexationists were hot for war. The people alive could recall

only three wars, the war against Denmark in 1864, which was settled

in a few days and added the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to

the Prussian crown, and the war of 1866 in which Bavaria, Baden,

Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxony were defeated, when the

Austrian kingdom of Hanover disappeared and the territories of

Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, and the free city of Frankfort were

added to Prussia. This war, from its declaration to the battle

of Königgratz in which the Austrians were completely defeated,

lasted only two weeks. In 1870 France was defeated within a month

and a half after the opening of hostilities; so that the Kaiser

was implicitly believed when, on the first day of the war, he

appeared on the balcony of the palace and told the crowds who

were keen for war, that "before the leaves have fallen from the

trees you will be back in your homes." The army and all Germany

believed him and believed, too, that a few short weeks would

see the destruction of France and the consequent seizure of her

rich colonies; that Russia could then be struck a good quick

blow before she could concentrate her army and resources; that

England would remain neutral; and that Germany would consequently

become, if not the actual owner, at least the dictator of the

world. Some one has since said that the Emperor must have meant

pine trees.

Working ever in the dark, either owning or influencing newspapers,

the great munition and arms factory of the Krupp's insidiously

poisoned the minds of the people with the microbe of war.

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to London, called upon

me often after the outbreak of the war, and insisted that he

had correctly reported the sentiments of England in saying that

England did not want war. After his return to Germany the Germans

quite unfairly treated him as a man who had failed and seemed

to blame him because England had taken the only possible course

open to her and ranged herself on the side of France and Russia.

The dedication at Leipzig, in the year 1913, of the great monument

to celebrate what is called the "War of Liberation," and the

victory of Leipzig in the War of the Nations, 1813, had undoubtedly

kindled a martial spirit in Germany. To my mind, the course which

really determined the Emperor and the ruling class for war was

the attitude of the whole people in the Zabern Affair and their

evident and growing dislike of militarism. The fact that the

Socialists, at the close of the session of the Reichstag, boldly

remained in the Chamber and refused to rise or to cheer the name

of the Emperor indicated a new spirit of resistance to autocracy;

and autocracy saw that if it was to keep its hold upon Germany

it must lead the nation into a short and successful war.

This is no new trick of a ruling and aristocratic class. From

the days when the patricians of Rome forced the people into war

whenever the people showed a disposition to demand their rights,

autocracies have always turned to war as the best antidote against

the spirit of democracy.

My Four Years in Germany · 第 5 / 20 章